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Grutter v.

Bollinger Case Summary

The United State Supreme Court case of Grutter v. Bollinger (539 U.S. 306, (2003) is a case which upheld the affirmative action admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School. The United States Supreme Court was announced the extremely tight decision of 5-4 on June 23, 2003. The case came to the United State Supreme Court when the University of Michigan Law School denied admission to Ms. Grutter, a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT score. The petitioner, Ms. Grutter, filed a law suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against respondents, the Michigan Law School and its officials In addition to the law school, which was ranked among the nations top schools, respondents included: regents of the University of Michigan, The Regents of the University of Michigan, Lee Bollinger who was the dean of the law school from 1987 to 1994 and president of the University of Michigan from 1996 to 2002, Jeffrey Lehman the current dean of the law school at the time and Dennis Shields who was a director of admissions at the law school from 1991 until 1998, during which time Ms. Grutter had applied to the law school. In 1996, Ms. Grutter, applied to the University of Michigan Law School. Ms. Grutter alleged she was rejected because the Law School uses race as a predominant factor, giving applicants belonging to certain minority groups a significantly greater chance of admission than students with similar credentials from disfavored racial groups; and that respondents had no compelling interest to justify that use of race. Ms. Grutter alleged the school had discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. This case ended up going to the District Court, where they found the Law Schools use of race as an admissions factor unlawful. The district court granted the applicants motion for class certification. In the end, the district court concluded that the law school's use of race as a factor in admissions decisions was unlawful, it granted the applicants request for declaratory relief, and it enjoined the law school from using race as a factor in its admissions decisions. However, the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Courts. The Sixth Circuit Court based their decision on a Supreme Court case that took place almost 25 years ago ground when it considered the topic of race classifications benefiting minorities in university admission in the controversial case the Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978). The Court made a critical decision regarding affirmative action when it decided Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. Although it struck down the particular admissions policies implemented at the University of California, Davis School of Medicine, the Court held that race and ethnicity could be considered as a factor in higher education admissions policies. When the case went to the Supreme Court, they affirmed that the Sixth Circuit's reversal of the District Court decision, thereby upholding the University's admissions policy. The Equal Protection Clause provides that No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws. The United States Supreme Court, in the Grutter decision, found that a Michigan law school's admissions program, designed to reach the goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority students by using race as a plus factor in admissions decisions to promote student body diversity, met the requirements of the Equal Protection clause. The Grutter majority held that the Law School had a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body and that the Law Schools plan was narrowly tailored to that end but that the Law Schools program had to have a logical endpoint, probably in about 25 years. However, following the Grutter decision, in November 2006, a majority of voting Michiganders (58%), apparently disagreeing with the Court majority, passed a referendum banning state-education affirmative action, essentially negating the effect of Grutter in Michigan (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003).

Referenc Brief Fact Summary. A white law school applicant challenges a law schools use of race as a factor in the admissions process.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Schools may consider race as a part of the admissions process as long as it is only one factor in an individualized process.

Facts. Petitioner, Barbara Grutter, applied for admission to University of Michigan Law School in 1997 with an undergraduate GPA of 3.8 and an LSAT of 161. She was denied. Petitioner, who is white, is challenging the law schools use of race as a factor in the admissions process.

Issue. Did the University of Michigans use of racial preferences in the admissions process violate the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Facts of the Case In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a

compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical mass" was the functional equivalent of a quota. Question Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Legal provision: Equal Protection No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body. The Court reasoned that, because the Law School conducts highly individualized review of each applicant, no acceptance or rejection is based automatically on a variable such as race and that this process ensures that all factors that may contribute to diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race. Justice O'Connor wrote, "in the context of its individualized inquiry into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School's race- conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants."

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