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ECON 278 Experimental and Behavioral Economics MW 1:15-3:05 PM, Room: Econ 218

Instructors: B. Douglas Bernheim, Economics 242, Phone: 725-8732, bernheim@stanford.edu. OH: Wednesday 1:30 - 3:00 PM, or by appointment. Charles Sprenger, Economics 332, Phone: 724-4903, cspreng@stanford.edu. OH: Monday 11:00 -12:00 PM, or by appointment.

General Readings: There is no textbook, but a useful book to have is: The Handbook of Experimental Economics, John Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, editors, Princeton University Press, 1995. Course Requirements: 1. Attend all classes and participate in open discussions of assigned papers 2. Complete and present a paper on an approved topic, including the design of an original experiment (which you must discuss in advance with an instructor) 3. Complete miscellaneous assignments (e.g., referee reports) 278 Course Outline: Lecture 1 (D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Introduction Lecture 2-3 (D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Time Inconsistency: Theory and Applications Lecture 4-5 (D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reference Dependent Preferences Lectures 6 (D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Social Image Lecture 7 ( D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Behavioral Welfare Economics Lecture 8 (D) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neurobiology of Choice Lectures 9-10 (C) . . . . . . . . . Experiments in Discounting and Dynamic Inconsistency Lectures 11-12 (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Decision Making Under Uncertainty Lecture 13-14 (C) . . . . . . . . . . Experiments and Innovations in Reference Dependence Lectures 15-16 (C) . . . . . . . Social Preferences: Public Goods and Models of Altruism Lectures 17-18 (Both) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Guest Presentations Lectures 19-20 (Both) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Student Presentations

This course is taught under the assumption that students have completed the core PhD microeconomics sequence.

278 Readings and Selected Papers (in bold) Lecture 1: The Scope of Behavioral Economics Some examples of behavioral phenomena in the laboratory Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec (2003), Coherent Arbitrariness: Stable Demand Curves without Stable Preferences, Quarterly Journal of Economics, No.118 (1), (February), 73-105. Grether, David M., and Charles R. Plott, Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon, American Economic Review 69, September 1979, 623538. Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch and R. Thaler, Anamolies: The Endowment Eect, Loss Aversion, and the Status Quo Bias. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991, 5(1), pp. 193-206. Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch and R. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Eect and the Coase Theorem, Journal of Political Economy 98, December 1990, 1325-1348. Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, American Psychologist 39(4), April 1984, 341-350. Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Science 185(4157), September 27, 1974, 1124-1131. Solnick, Jay V., Catherine H. Kannenberg, David A. Ackerman, and Marcus B. Waller, An Experimental Analysis of Impulsivity and Impulse Control in Humans, Learning and Motivation 11, February 1980, 61-77. Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, Science 211, January 30, 1981, 453-458. Tversky, Amos, and Eldar Shar, Choice Under Conict: The Dynamic of Deferred Decision, Psychological Science 3, November 1992, 358-361. Some example of behavioral phenomena in the eld Arks, Hal R., and Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 35, February 1985, 124-140. Bertrand, Marianne, Dean Karlan, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shar, and Jonathan Zinman, Whats Psychology Worth? A Field Experiment in the Consumer Credit Market, NBER Working Paper No. 11892, December 2005. Camerer, Colin, Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, and Richard Thaler, Labor Supply of new York City Cab Drivers: One Day at a Time, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, May 1997, 407-441. DellaVigna, Stefano, and Ulrike Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym, American Economic Review 96, June 2006, 694-719. Gilovich, Thomas, Robert Valolone, and Amos Tversky, The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences, Cognitive Psychology 17, July 1985, 295-314. Madrian, B., and D. Shea The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Saving Behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 2001, 1149-1187.

Saez, Emmanuel, Details matter: the impact of presentation and information on the take-up of nancial incentives for retirement, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1(1), 2009, 204-228. Lectures 2-3: Time Inconsistency Theory and Applications Amador, Manuel, Ivn Werning, and George-Marios Angeletos, Commitment vs. Flexibility, Econometrica 74(2), March 2006, 365-396 Angeletos, George-Marios, David Laibson, Jeremy Tobacman, and Stephen Weinberg, The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(3), 2001. Banerjee, Abhijit, and Sendhil Mullainathan, The Shape of Temptation: Implications for the Economic Lives of the Poor, mimeo, May 2010. Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Antonio Rangel, Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes, American Economic Review 94(5), December 2004, pp. 1558-90. Bernheim, B. Douglas, Debraj Ray, and Seving Yeltekin, Poverty and SelfControl, NBER Working Paper 18742, 2013 Dekel, Eddie, and Bart Lipman, Self-Control and Random Strotz Representations, mimeo, July 2007. Della Vigna, Stefano and Ulrike Malmendier, Contract Design and SelfControl: Theory and Evidence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 2004, 353-402. Fang, Hanming, and Daniel Silverman, Time-Inconsistency and Welfare Program Participation: Evidence from the NLSY, 50(4), November 2009, 10431077. Fudenberg, Drew, and David Levine, A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control, American Economic Review 96(5), December 2006, 1449-76. Gruber, Jonathan, and Botond Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational? Theory and Evidence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(4), 2001, 1261-1305. Gruber, Jonathan, and Botond Koszegi, Tax incidence when individuals are time-inconsistent: the case of cigarette excise taxes, Journal of Public Economics 88(9-10), August 2004, Pages 1959-1987. Gul, Faruk and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Temptation and Self-Control, Econometrica 69(6), November 2001, 1403-35. Gul, Faruk and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption, Econometrica 72(1), January 2004, 119-158. Gul, Faruk and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Harmful Addiction, Review of Economic Studies 74(1), January 2007, 147-72. Harris, Christopher, and David Laibson, Dynamic Choices of Hyperbolic Consumers, Econometrica 64(4), July 2001, 935-957. Krussel, Per, and Anthony Smith, Consumption-Saving Decisions with Quasi-Geometric Discounting, Econometrica 71(1), January 2003, 365-375.

Krussel, Per, Burhanettin Kuruscu, and Anthony Smith, Temptation and Taxation, mimeo, March 2005. Laibson, D., Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 1997, 443-78. Laibson, David, A Cue-Theory of Consumption, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 2001, 81-120. Loewenstein, G., Out of Control: Visceral Inuences on Behavior, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 65, 1996, 272-92. Manzini, Paulo, and Marco Mariotti, Choice over time, in P. Anand, P. Pattanaik, C. Puppe, (Eds.), Handbook of Rational and Social Choice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, forthcoming. ODonahue, T. and M. Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 2001, 121-60 ODonahue, T. and M. Rabin, Doing it Now or Later, American Economic Review, 89(1), 1999, 103-24 Shefrin, Hersh M. and Richard H. Thaler, The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis, Economic Inquiry 26(4), October 1988, 609-644. Thaler, Richard H. and Hersh M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, Journal of Political Economy 89(2), April 1981. Lecture 4-5: Reference-Dependent Preferences: Theory and Applications Barberis and Huang, Stocks as Lotteries: The Implications of Probability Weighting for Security Prices, American Economic Review 98(5), 2008, 20662100. Barberis, Nicholas, Ming Huang, Preferences with Frames: A New Utility Specication that Allows for the Framing of Risks, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33(8), August 2009, 1555-1576. Barberis, Nicholas, Ming Huang, and Tano Santos, Prospect Theory and Asset Prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(1), February 2001, 1-53. Barberis, Nicholas, Ming Huang and Richard H. Thaler, Individual Preferences, Monetary Gambles, and Stock Market Participation: A Case for Narrow Framing, American Economic Review 96(4), September 2006, 1069-1090. Barberis, Nicholas, and Wei Xiong, What Drives the Disposition Eect? An Analysis of a Long-Standing Preference-Based Explanation, Journal of Finance 64(2), April 2009, 751-784.

Barberis, Nicholas, and Wei Xiong, Realization Utility, Journal of Financial Economics 104(2), May 2012, 251-271. Benartzi, Shlomo, and Richard Thaler, Myopic loss aversion and the equity premium puzzle, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 1995, 7592. Camerer, Colin, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in Advances in Behavioral Economics, Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin, eds., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, Econometrica 47(2), March 1979, 263-292. Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A ReferenceDependent Model, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4), November 1991, 1039-1061. Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5(4), 1993, 297-323. Heidhues, Paul, and Botond Koszegi, Competition and Price Variation when Consumers Are Loss Averse, American Economic Review 98(4), September 2008, 1245-1268. Koszegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin, A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences, Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(4), November 2006, 11331165. Koszegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin, Reference-Dependent Risk Attitudes, American Economic Review 97(4), 2007, 104773. Koszegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin, Reference-Dependent Consumption Plans, American Economic Review 99(3), 2009, 909936. Odean, Terrance, Are investors reluctant to realize their losses? Journal of Finance 53, 1998, 17751798. Rabin, Matthew, Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem, Econometrica, September 2000, 1281-1292. Lecture 6: Social Image and Status Andreoni, James, and Bernheim, B. Douglas, Social Image and the 5050 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Eects, Econometrica, 77(5), September 2009, 1607-1636.

Andreoni, J., and R. Petrie, Public Goods Experiments Without Condentiality: A Glimpse Into Fund-Raising, Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2004, 16051623. Bagwell, Laurie Simon, and B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen Eects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, American Economic Review, 86(3), June 1996, 349-373. Ball, S., C. Eckel, P. Grossman and W. Zame, Status in Markets, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 2001, 161-188. Becker, G. S., K. M. Murphy and I. Werning, The equilibrium distribution of income and the market for status, Journal of Political Economy 113, 2005, 282-310. Benabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, American Economic Review, 96(5), December 2006, 1652-1678. Bernheim, B. Douglas, A Theory of Conformity, Journal of Political Economy 102(5), October 1994, 841-877. Cole, Harold L., Mailath, George J., and Postlewaite, Andrew, Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth Journal of Political Economy 100, December 1992, 1092-1125. Corneo, G. and O. Jeanne, Conspicuous consumption, snobbism and conformism, Journal of Public Economics 66, 1997, 55-71.

Dana, J., D. M. Cain, and R. M. Dawes, What You Dont Know Wont Hurt Me: Costly (But Quiet) Exit in Dictator Games, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 100, 2006, 193201. Dana, J., R. A. Weber, and X. Kuang, Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: Experiments Demonstrating an Illusory Preference for Fairness, Economic Theory, 33, 2007, 6780. Ellingsen, T., and M. Johannesson, Sunk Costs and Fairness in Incomplete Information Bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior, 50, 2005, 155177. Frank, Robert H. Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status. Oxford University Press, New York, 1985. Fershtman, H., K. Murphy and Y. Weiss, Social status, education and growth, Journal of Political Economy 104, 1996, 108-132. Glazer, A., and K. A. Konrad, A Signaling Explanation for Charity, American Economic Review, 86, 1996, 10191028. Harbaugh, William T., The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable Transfers, American Economic Review, 88, 1998, 277282. Harbaugh, William T., What Do Donations Buy? A Model of Philanthropy Based on Prestige and Warm Glow, Journal of Public Economics, 67(2), 1998, 26984. Hopkins, E. and T. Kornienko, Running to keep in the same place: Consumer choice as a game of status, American Economic Review 94, 2004, 1085-1107. Ireland, Norman, On Limiting the Market for Status Signals, Journal of Public Economics, 53, 1994, 91110. Ross, Lee, Gunter Bierbrauer, and Susan Homan, The Role of Attribution Processes in Conformity and Dissent: Revisiting the Asch Situation, American Psychologist 31, February 1976, 148-57. Soetevent, A. R., Anonymity in Giving in a Natural ContextA Field Experiment in 30 Churches, Journal of Public Economics, 89, 2005, 23012323. Tadelis, S., The Power of Shame and the Rationality of Trust, Mimeo, Haas School of Business, U.C. Berkeley, 2007. Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles, American Economic Review, 85(4): 77192, 1995. Potters, Jan, Martin Sefton, and Lise Vesterlund. Forthcoming. Leading-by-Example and Signaling in Voluntary Contribution Games: An Experimental Study, Economic Theory, 2007, 33, 169-82. Lectures 7: Behavioral Welfare Economics Bernheim, B. Douglas, Andrey Fradkin, and Igor Popov, The Welfare Economics of Default Options in 401(k) Plans, NBER Working Paper 17587, revised July 2013. Bernheim, B. Douglas, Behavioral Welfare Economics, Journal of the European Economics Association, 7(2-3), April 2009, 267319. Choice Based Welfare Analysis

Beshears, John, James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, How are Preferences Revealed? Journal of Public Economics 92, 2008, 1787-1794. Bernheim, B. Douglas and Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(1), February 2009, 51-104. Chetty, Raj, Adam Looney, and Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, American Economic Review 99(4), September 2009, 1145-1177. Green, Jerry, and Daniel Hojman, Choice, Rationality, and Welfare Measurement, mimeo, Harvard University, 2007 (newer version 2008). Koszegi, Botond and Matthew Rabin, Mistakes in Choice-Based Welfare Analysis, American Economic Review 94(2), May 2007, pp. 477-81 Koszegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin, Choices, Situations, and Happiness, Journal of Public Economics 92, 2008, pp. 1821-1832. Koszegi and Rabin, Revealed Mistakes and Revealed Preferences, in Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter (eds.), The Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 193-209. Manzini, Paola, and Marco Mariotti, Categorize Then Choose: Boundedly Rational Choice and Welfare, mimeo, University of London, 2008. Thaler, Richard, and Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 93(2), 2003, 175-179. The measurement of experienced utility

Benjamin, Daniel J., Ori Heetz, Miles Kimball, and Alex Rees-Jones, Do People Seek to Maximize Happiness? Evidence from New Surveys, mimeo, 2010. Easterlin, Richard A., Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?: Some Empirical Evidence, in P. A. David and W. R. Levin eds., Nations and Household in Economic Growth, Stanford University Press, 1974, pp. 98-125. Frey, Bruno S., and Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research? Journal of Economic Literature 40, June 2002, pp. 402-435. Gruber, Jonathan, and Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers Happier? Advances in Economics Analysis and Policy, 2005, Berkeley Electronic Press, HYPERLINK http://www.bepress.com/bejeaphttp:// Kahneman, Daniel, Objective Happiness, Chapter 1 in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener and Norbert Schwarz, eds., Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1999. Kahneman, Daniel, Alan B. Krueger, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz, and Arthur A. Stone, Toward National Well-Being Accounts, American Economic Review 94, 2004, pp. 429-434. Kahneman, Daniel, Alan B. Krueger, David A. Schkade, Nobert Schwarz, and Arthur A. Stone, A survey method for characterizing daily life experience: The Day Reconstruction Method, Science 306, 2004, 1776-1780. Kahneman, D., P. Wakker, and R. Sarin, Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1997, 375-406.

Kahneman, Daniel and Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy Analysis, Environmental and Resource Economics 32(1), September 2005, pp. 16181. Kimball, Miles and Robert Willis, Utility and Happiness, mimeo, University of Michigan, October 2006. Kimball, Miles, Helen Levy, Fumio Ohtake and Yoshiro Tsutsui, Unhappiness after Hurricane Katrina, NBER Working Paper 12062, March 2006. Layard, Richard, Happiness, London, UK: Penguin Press, 2005. Stevenson, Betsey, and Justin Wolfers, Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2008, 1-87. Lecture 8: Neuroeconomics Some Critical Surveys Bernheim, B. Douglas, On the Potential of Neuroeconomics: A Critical (but Hopeful) Appraisal, AEJ: Microeconomics 1(2), 2009, 1-41. Camerer, Colin, George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec, Neuroeconomics: Why Economics Needs Brains, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 106(3), November 2004, 555579. Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec, Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics, Journal of Economic Literature 43(1), March 2005, 9-64. Fehr, Ernst, and Antonio Rangel, Neuroeconomics for Foundations of Choice Recent Advances, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 2011, 3-30. Glimcher, Paul W., and Aldo Rustichini, Neuroeconomics: The Consilience of Brain and Decision, Science 306, October 2004, 447-452. Kable, Joseph W., and Paul W. Glimcher, The Neurobiology of Decision: Consensus and Controversy, Neuron 63, 2009, 733-745. Rustichini, Aldo, Neuroeconomics: Present and Future, Games and Economic Behavior 52, 2005, 201-212. Neurobiological mechanisms Baumgartner, Thomas, Markus Heinrichs, Alin Voniathan, Urs Fischbacher, and Ernst Fehr, Oxytocin Shapes the Neural Circuitry of Trust and Trust Adaptation in Humans, Neuron 58, May 2008, 639-650. Hare, Todd, Colin Camerer, and Antonio Rangel, Self-Control in Decision Making Involves Modulation of the vmPFC Valuation System, Science 324, May 2009, 646648. Kable, Joseph W., and Paul W. Glimcher, The Neural Correlates of Subjective Value During Intertemporal Choice, Nature Neuroscience 10(12), December 2007, 1625-1633. Krajbich, Ian, Carrie Armel, and Antonio Rangel, Visual Fixations and the Computation and Comparison of Value in Simple Choice, Nature Neuroscience 13(10), October 2010, 1292-1298.

Plassman, Hilke, John P. ODoherty, and Antonio Rangel, Appetitive and Aversive Goal Values Are Encoded in the Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex at the Time of Decision Making, Journal of Neuroscience 30, August 2010, 10799-10808. Plassman, Hilke, John P. ODoherty, Baba Shiv, and Antonio Rangel, Marketing Actions Can Modulate Neural Representations of Experienced Pleasantness, PNAS 105(3), January 2008, 1050-1054. Rangel, Antonio, Colin Camerer, and Read Montague, A Framework for Studying the Nuerobiology of Value-Based Decision Making, Nature Reviews: Neuroscience 9, July 2008, 545-556. Rangel, Antonio, and Todd Hare, Neural Computations Associated with Goal-Directed Choice, Current Opinion in Neurobiology 20, 2010, 262-270. Economic Applications Bernheim, B. Douglas, and Antonio Rangel, Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes, American Economic Review 94(5), December 2004, pp. 1558-90. Bushong, B., M. Rabin, C. Camerer, A. Rangel Orbitofrontal cortex encodes hedonic signals at the time of consumption consistent with the good-news-is-pleasurehypothesis, mimeo 2010. Brocas, Isabelle, and Juan D. Carrillo, The Brian as a Hierarchical Organization, American Economic Review 98(4), September 2008 , 1312-1346. Caplin, Andrew, and Mark Dean, Dopamine, Reward Prediction Error, and Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(2), May 2008, 663-701. Caplin, Andrew, Mark Dean, Paul W. Glimcher, and Robb B. Rutledge, Measuring Beliefs and Rewards: A Neuroeconomic Approach, Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(3), August 2010, 923-960. Clithero, John A., and Antonio Rangel, Combining Response Times and Choice Data Using a Neureconomic Model of Decision Process Improves Out-of-Sample Predictions, Cal Tech mimeo, August 2013. Fehr, Ernst, Urs Fischbacher, Michael Kosfeld, Neuroeconomic Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences: Initial Evidence, American Economic Review 95(2), May 2005, 346-351. Frydman, C., N. Barberis, P. Bossaerts, C. Camerer, A. Rangel Realization utilities in the brain are associated with suboptimal trading in an experimental stock market, mimeo, 2010. Glimcher, Paul W., Michael C. Dorris, and Hannah M. Bayer, Physiological utility theory and the neuroeconomics of choice, Games and Economic Behavior 52, 2005, 213256. Harbaugh, William T., Ulrich Mayr, and Daniel R. Burghart, Neural Responses to Taxation and Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations, Science 316, June 15, 2007, 1622-1625. Krajbich, Ian, Colin Camerer, John Ledyard, and Antonio Rangel, Using Neural Measures of Economic Value to Solve the Public Goods Problem, Science 326, October 2009, 596-599. McClure, S. M., D. I. Laibson, G. Loewenstein, and J. D. Cohen, Separate neural systems value immediate and delayed monetary rewards, Science 306, October 15, 2004, 503-507.

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S.Andersen, G.W. Harrison, M.I. Lau, and E.E. Rutstrom. Eliciting risk and time preferences. Econometrica, 76(3):583618, 2008. S.Meier and C.Sprenger. Stability of time preferences. Working Paper, 2009. T.Tanaka, C.Camerer, and Q.Nguyen. Risk and time preferences: Experimental and household data from vietnam. American Economic Review, 100(1):557571, 2010. J.Benhabib, A.Bisin, and A.Schotter. Present-bias, quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and xed costs. Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming. J.Andreoni and C.Sprenger. Estimating time preferences with convex budgets. AER, 2012. Commitment Demand N.Ashraf, D.Karlan, and W.Yin. Tying odysseus to the mast: Evidence from a commitment savings product in the philippines. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1):635672, 2006. D.Ariely and K.Wertenbroch. Procrastination, deadlines, and performance: Selfcontrol by precommitment. Psychological Science, 13(3):219224, 2002. S.Kaur, M.Kremer, and S.Mullainathan. Self-control and the development of work arrangements. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 100(2):624628, 2010. Thaler, Richard, and Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, Journal of Political Economy 2004 112(1), S164-S196. N. Augenblick, M. Niederle and C. Sprenger Working Over Time: Dynamic Inconsistency in Real Eort Tasks, Working Paper, 2013 Bernheim, B. Douglas, Jonathan Meer, and Neva K. Novarro, Do Consumers Exploit Precommitment Opportunities? Evidence from Natural Experiments Involving Liquor Consumption, NBER Working Paper 17762, revised July 2013. Risk and Time G.Keren and P.Roelofsma. Immediacy and certainty in intertemporal choice. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Making, 63(3):287297, 1995. V.Anderhub, W.Guth, U.Gneezy, and D.Sonsino. On the interaction of risk and time preferences: An experimental study. German Economic Review, 2(3):239253, 2001. B.J. Weber and G.B. Chapman. The combined eects of risk and time on choice: Does uncertainty eliminate the immediacy eect? does delay eliminate the certainty eect? Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 96(2):104118, 2005. Y.Halevy. Strotz meets allais: Diminishing impatience and the certainty eect. American Economic Review, 98(3):11451162, 2008. J.Andreoni and C.Sprenger. Risk preferences are not time preferences. AER, 2012. Lectures 11-12: Decision Making Under Uncertainty Risk Preference Elicitation and Certainty Eects

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