LAW OF DEMOCRACY PildesSpring 2000

I. INDIVIDUAL RI !" "O VO"E

#. In$r%d&'$i%n (. C%ns$i$&$i%n)!is$%r*+ a. Citizenship & right to vote NOT defined in C b. State determination of voter eligibility c. Amendments: 1 th Amendment !1"#$%: blac& s'ffrage 1(th Amendment !1()$%: *omen+s s'ffrage ),rd Amendment !1(-1%: ..C. s'ffrage for presidential elections )-th Amendment !1(#1%: 1"/year/olds d. 0&1 Cla'se !Sla'ghterho'se Cases%: narro*ly defined2 not font of rights ). V%$ing , F&nd-.en$-l Rig/$: -. !ARPER 0(1223 in$r%d&'es s$ri'$ s'r&$in* 4%$ing -s 56&nd-.en$-l rig/$7 8. 9RAMER 4. UNION FREE SC! DIS" NO. (: 0(1213+ '%n6ir.s 6&nd-.en$-l rig/$s -ppr%-'/ 0n%$ s&spe'$ 'l-ss3 c. Ins$i$&$i%n-l C%.pe$en'e: no deference to leg b3c rt to vote 4 fo'nd of all other rights C. ener-l Disen6r-n'/ise.en$ Iss&es ;. W%.en a. 5'stifications for .enial: Te6t'al: 17A 'ses refers to male voting pop2 1 A mentions race !incl'sio 'ni's% Str'ct'ral: if 17A granted right to vote8 1 A s'perfl'o's 9istorical3Originalist: no : s'ffrage at fo'nding or ratification of 17A2 17A conferred civil8 not political rights: ins'fficient political *ill at time of ratification 0olicy: : 4 economic dependents2 virt'al representation via h'sbands3other men2 protection against domestic conflict b. Challenges: ;1NO< v. 9A00=<S=T !1"# %>: NO national : s'ffrage conferred by 17A State enfranchisement 1(th Amendment !1()$% national right <. Fel%ns a. 5'stifications: Te6t: 17A?) e6empts @participation in rebellion or other crime 9istory: 0olicy: e6pressive !brea&ing of social A8 lac& of moral competence%2 instr'mental !avoid giving la*ma&ing p*r to la*brea&ers%2 p'nitive b. Challenges:

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F&nd-.en$-l Rig/$s: <1C9A<.SON v. <A;1<=B !1(#7%: C3. in CA constit'tion &p/eld Dis'ri.in-$i%n 4. S&spe'$ Cl-ss: 9DNT=< v. DN.=<EOO. !1(" %: AF C3. la* on basis of crimes of @moral t'rpit'deG s$r&'=8 *here racially discriminatory motive >2 %6 V%$ing Rig/$s A'$)Disp-r-$e I.p-'$: c'rrent approachH Correct interpretation of I<AJ Constit'tionally permissible 'nder KO=<N=J

:. Li$er-'* "es$s+ a. FASS1T=< v. NO<T9A;0TON CTL K. OC =F=CT1ONS !1( (%: 'pheld tests on rational relationship basis2 most li&ely *o'ld+ve been str'c& if NAAC0 @as appliedG challenges given more time to acc'm'late3mat're b. Kanned by Stat'te in 1(#$: 2. P%ll "-?es a. National elections: banned by )7th Amendment !1(-7% b. State elections: banned by 9A<0=< v. IA K. OC =F=CT1ONS !1(--% as violation of =0C @. "erri$%ri-l Disen6r-n'/ise.en$ a. 0'erto <ico: no right to vote in pres elections !1MA<TDA .= FA <OSA v. D.S.8 )$$$% Te6t: Art. 118 ?1 refers to states 0< has voted not to become state b. .istrict of Col'mbia: no right to elect legislators !A.A;S v. CF1NTON8 ..C )$$$% Te6t: Art. 118 ?1 =0C & @resid'al citizenshipG in ;. arg'ments not s'ccessf'l c. 1nstit'tional Competence: both of above 4 highly political iss'es8 b't also clear cases of political loc&'p ". Other =ligibility 1ss'es a. Citizenship: can be prereN8 b't not necessarily b. Age: see )-A c. <esidency: .'rational <eNs: @s'bstantialG period str'c& !.DNN v. KFD;ST=1N% Kona Cide: physical presence & intent to remain ;ilitary: right to vote in loc elec+ns !CA<<1NMTON v. <AS98 1(- % =6tension of vote to non/residents: rational relationship !K<OEN v. C9ATTANOOMA K. OC CO;;N+<S8 1("(% =6traterritorial 5'risdiction: doesn+t confer voting rights !9OFT C1I1C CFDK v. C1TL OC TDSCAFOOSA8 1(#"% 9omelessness: fi6ed add NOT reN+d !e.g. 01TTS v. KFACA8 S.NL8 1("7% d. Overseas Ioters: O- >

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D. #l-'= 0Dis3En6r-n'/ise.en$ 1. In$r%d&'$i%n)!is$%r* a. 1 A !1"-$% high level of blac& participation in post/CE phase b. 0ost 1"(" decline: violence8 fra'd8 redistrictingH c. .isenfranchising constit'tions: discriminatory criminal disenfranchisement2 poll ta6es2 literacy tests2 'nderstand & e6plain tests2 *hite primaries d. =ffect 4 dramatic & precipito's decline in blac& participation (0. Disen6r-n'/ising C%ns$i$&$i%ns a. M1F=S v. 9A<<1S !1($,%: S3C can+t intervene to prevent arbitrary disenfranchisement of blac&s in AF Cormalism: catch/)) of endorsing 'nconstit'tional state C 0ragmatism: co'rt has no p*r to enforce P'dgment 1nstit'tional Competence: co'rts don+t right political *rongs b. MD1NN v. D.S. !1(1 %: grandfather cla'se e6cl'ding blac&s from franchise held 'nconstit'tional DS Q plaintiff <emedy 4 'phold convictions of elections officers administering =ffect 4 disenfranchise poor *hites protected by grandfather cla'se Cacial8 not as/applied challenge c. =6isting !0olitical% =nforcement ;echanisms: 17A?): red'ce 9< representation by R red'ction in blac& s'ffrage Cong P'dgment of N'alifications of members !S,$ challenges in this period% ((. W/i$e Pri.-ries a. N1TON v. 9=<N.ON !1()#%: stri&es state e6cl'sion of blac&s from primaries on basis of 17A b. N1TON v. CON.ON !1(,)%: stri&es parties+ e6cl'sion of blac&s from primaries2 e6ec comms+ p*r to reg'late participation 4 state action 'nder stat'tory a'thorization c. M<OI=L v. TOENS=N. !1(, %: 'pheld party restriction of membership to *hites d. D.S. v. CFASS1C !1(71%: 'pheld integral nat're of primary in voting rights 'nder Art. 18 ?7 prepared gro'nd for follo*ingH e. S;1T9 v. AFFE<1M9T !1(77%: *hite primary str'c& 'nder 1 A2 given 'nitary nat're of electoral process !CFASS1C%8 affirmative delegation to party e6 comm. U party determination of eligibility to vote in primaries 4 state f'nction3action Theories: p'blic f'nction v. affirmative state facilitation OJJ> f. T=<<L v. A.A;S !1( ,%: 5aybird Ass+n e6cl'sion of blac&s from 'nofficial primaries 4 'nconstit'tional 'nder 1 A2 state permission 4 sanction8 eN'ivalent to *hite primaries g. C'nctional Approach !0ildes%: blac&s Q s*ing voters2 e6cl'ded in order to maintain conservatives+ dominance2 if free access to ballot8 then reason to believe that blac&s *o'ld be integrated into competing faction2 ergo sho'ldn+t *orry abo't membership r'les of parties if free access to ballot and environment for fair competition 1). R-'i-ll* E?'l&si4e err*.-ndering:

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a. MO;1FF1ON v. F1M9TCOOT8 1(-$%: stri&es racial gerrymander to e6cl'de blac&s from T's&egee8 AF 'nder 1 A2 enPoins enforcement of ne* )"/sided fig're defa'lt to prior b. NK: choice of 1 A8 not 17A limits these cases to race8 rather than =0 in general

I.

RE A"ION)REAPPOR"IONMEN"

E. OneAPers%nAOneAV%$e+ #A9ER REYNOLDS 9ARC!ER 1,. COLE ROVE v. M<==N !1(7-%: &-r-n$ee Cl-&se challenge to (:1 pop disparity among 1F districts2 NO S)C in$er4en$i%n a. ;: p%li$i'-l B&es$i%nC p&8D n%$ pri4-$e Er%ngC n% 'le-r re.ed*. b. .: K't clear case of political loc&/'p2 =0 problem 17. #A9ER v. CA<< !1(-)%: re-pp%r$i%n.en$ reBFd &nder EPC. a. ;aP: not a political N'estion2 =0 has stds b. C: loc&/'p8 no alternative c. .: 0V.2 M'arantee Cla'se action in disg'ise2 ct choosing pol philosophy 1 . REYNOLDS v. S1;;S !1(-7%: S$ri'$ (P(V reB&ire.en$ 6%r both /%&ses %6 s$-$e legisl-$&re. a. ;: DS Senate inapposite !prior sovereignty%!see also M<AL v. SAN.=<S8 1(-,% b. . !9arlan%: loo& at factors at root of differences among states c. E=SK=<<L v SAN.=<S8 1(-7: e6tends <=LNOF.S3101I to Congress 1-. 9ARC!ER v. .AMM=TT !1(",%: .ini.-l dep-r$&re 6r%. -8s%l&$e .-$/e.-$i'-l eB&-li$* d%es NO" ins&l-$e -pp%r$i%n.en$ 6r%. '/-llenge2 KO0 on defenders of scheme a. @As nearly as possibleG2 @;a&e a good/faith effort to achieve precise mathematical eN'alityG 4 std !A1<A0AT<1CA% b. Tolerable std of deviation appears greater in state than in nat+l leg (@. #-seline 6%r De$er.in-$i%n %6 (P(V a. <egistered Ioters: 'pheld in 9a*aii districting plan !KD<NS v. <1C9A<.SON8 1(--% b. <esidents: reN+d by (th Cir2 'sing registered voters discriminates against 9ispanics !MA<BA v. CTL OC FOS ANM=F=S8 1(($%. c. 0rinciples: history: framers accepted residents as basis fairness: congressional appointments on basis of residents policy: ta6ation3svc cons'mption based on residents (G. N%nAResiden$ V%$ingH a. <ational <elationship Scr'tiny of provisions e6tending franchise to non/residents on basis of in/P'risdiction property8 etc. !K<OEN v. C9ATTANOOMA K. OC CO;;+N=<S8 1("(%!stri&ing% b. =6traterritorial 5'risdiction: does not confer right to vote !9OFT% (1. S&..-r* %6 P%si$i%ns+ a. Cran&f'rter: 0V.2 stay o't b. Ste*art3Clar&: intervene *here political process fail're !diffic'lt to administer%
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c. Krennan: 101I e6cl'des cts from s'spicion2 obPective2 simple2 enforceable

F. L%'-l

%4ern.en$sD )$.

ener-l I Spe'i-l P&rp%se

ener-l Prin'iple+ (P(V reBFd E/ere 5&ni$ %6 L Ei$/ gener-l resp%nsi8ili$* -nd pEr 6%r l%'-l -66-irs7 !AI=<L v. ;1.FAN.8 1(-"%!T6 cty comm+ners co'rt 4 admin3e6ec3leg% a. NK: not necessary to have elections8 b't if yo' do8 m'st comply *3 101I2 see e.g. SAILORS v. K. OC =.. OC A=NT CTL8 1(-#8 'pholding appointive syst for sch bds

)1. S'/%%l %4ern-n'e: a. 9RAMER !1(-(%: limitation of vote to parents of c'rrent p'pils U property ta6payers 4 4i%l-$i%n %6 EPC2 f'ndamental gov+t activity in *hich all residents have interest b. FUMAROLO v. C91CAMO K. OC =.DCATO<S8 1F8 1(($: school governance system allocating votes !-08 )<8 )T8 principal% 4i%l-$es EPC 0roperty ta6es & val'es 0arents of f't're & private schoolchildren c. J&ni%r C%llege Dis$ri'$: tr'stees of comm'nity college 4 general p'rpose2 (P(V reBFd !9A.F=L v. 5DN. COFF .1ST8 1(#$% d. N#: no loc&/'p in any of these casesH )). Ci$* %4ern.en$: general p'rpose8(P(V reBFd2 1 member3boro'gh U city/*ide members 4 violation of =0C !K. OC =ST1;AT= v. ;O<<1S8 1("(% a. A'th: form'late b'dget2 land/'se8 franchise & contracting p*rs ),. Spe'i-l P&rp%se Dis$ri'$s 0S-l*erA#-ll D%'$rine3 : *ater district bd governing half state of AB & vote limited to maPor cons'mers2 NO 4i%l-$i%n %6 EPCD spe'i-l p&rp%se dis$ri'$ KAFF v. 5A;=S8 1("12 SAFL=<8 1(#,%2 0o*ell conc no loc&/'p a. Other e6amples: #IDs: property o*ners pay maP+y of ta6es to s'pport K1. & given maP+y vote on K1.2 NO 4i%l-$i%n %6 EPCD spe'i-l p&rp%se dis$ri'$ !A=SSF=< v. M<AN. C=NT .1ST ;M;T8 )d 1(("% Comm'nity .evelopment .ist !see p. 1#1% .rainage & 1rrigation .istricts b. V'estions re S0.s O1#)> Create S0. from limited grp in first place !e.g. freeholders%J Les Can limit to specially affected grp8 b't no affirmative right to limitation Can limit franchise on basis of geography c. Special 0'rpose Kodies8 e.g. bar ass+ns same r'le O1#,> )7. S$-$e J&dges: NO 101I reN'irement !E=FFS v. =.EA<.S8 ;...Fa. 1(#)%2 @5'dges do not represent people8 they serve people.G

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I.

VRA)FAIR REPRESEN"A"ION)REDIS"RIC"IN

. C%ns$i$&$i%n-l Pre'eden$s ) . E91TCO;K v. .AI1S8 1(#(: .&l$i.e.8er dis$ri'$s &p/eldC do not 'nconstit'tionally dil'te blac& vote2 blac&s losing b3c 4 dems in sea of reps8 not b3c of disc. )-. E91T= v. <=M=ST=<8 1(#,: .&l$i.e.8er dis$ri'$s s$r&'= -s &n'%ns$i$&$i%n-l 2 challenge by blac& & hispanic voters Oho* to dist from E91TCO;KJJJ> )#. C1TL OC ;OK1F= v. KOF.=N8 1("$: -$Al-rge ele'$i%n %6 'i$* '%..Fn E) r-'i-ll* p%l-riKed 4%$ing &p/eld2 I<A?) 4 1 A & =0: reB&ires dis'ri.in-$%r* p&rp%se a. . !;arshall%: voting 4 C3<8 not =308 ergo doesn+t reN'ire intent !. (1G2 A.end.en$s $% >2 %6 $/e VRA )". 1(") Amendments: a. =ffects Test !overr'ling KOF.=N%: no voting N'alification8 prereN'isite8 std8 practice or proced're shall be applied in a manner that res'lts in denial or abridgement of right to vote on basis of color or race b. Totality of circ'mstances approach: violation if @political processes leading to nomination or electionHare not eN'ally open to participation by members of Oprotected class>G or @members have less opp than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and elect representative of their choice.GH Provided above shall not be interpreted to reN'ire representation proportional to R of pop'lation 1. Application '. "!ORN#UR 4. IN LESD (1G2+ .&l$i.e.8er dis$ri'$ s$r&'= &nder VRA>2D ; 6-'$%rs+ Min%ri$* gr%&p s&66i'ien$l* l-rge I ge%gr-p/i'-ll* '%.p-'$ Min%ri$* gr%&p p%li$i'-ll* '%/esi4e R-'i-l 8l%' 4%$ing 8* E/i$es+ demonstrate by bivariate scattergram OOOther Bimmer factors s'pportive of8 b't not essential to voters+ claim>> 9istory of official discrimination <acial polarization of voting Dse of large dists8 maPority vote reNs8 anti/single shot provisions8 etc. ;inority access to candidate slating process <acial disc in social svc provision <acial appeals in campaigns =6tent of electoral s'ccess of minorities

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d. 5O9NSON v. .eM<AN.L8 1((7: VRA>2 d%es n%$ i.p%se reB $% .-?i.iKe p%ssi8le L %6 .in%ri$* dis$ri'$sC totality of circ'mstances approach8 foc'sing on proportionality !not necessarily an absol'te defense8 b't corresp bet R of pop & R of dists helpf'l% e. FDFAC v. CF=;=NTS8 th 1((7: -$Al-rge s*s$e. %6 ele'$ing s$-$e M&dges &p/eldC i6 4%$ing p-$$ern e?pl-in-8le %n 8-sis %6 p-r$* -66ili-$i%nD #OP s/i6$s 8-'= $% '/-llenger Fimited to P'dicial electionsJ .: reintrod'ction of intent std2 high correlation of race *3 party f. 9OF.=< v. 9AFF8 1((7: &p/eld single '%..Fner s*s$e. 6%r A '$* g%4ern-n'eC baseline is e6isting system8 in place since 1(1) Thomas conc'rrence: Klac& infl'ence more important than control2 s*ing gro'p Segregation into @safeG race/based dists dangero's2 political apartheid

I.

err*.-nders 21. P-r$is-n err*.-nders+ a. #ip-r$is-n err*.-nder N O9 !MACCN=L v. CD;;1NMS8 1(#,% Stevens: introd'ces alternate @traditionalG criteria !see belo*% b. J&s$i'i-8ili$* !.AI1S v. KAN.=;=<8 1("-%: partisan gerrymander claims P'sticiable O+Connor dissenting on this point: parties can protect themselves political gerrymandering 4 self/limiting partisan gerrymandering good for electoral comp !strong party model% Co'rt involvement proportional representation c. S$-nd-rd N C%nsis$en$ Degr-d-$i%n %6 V%$ersF In6l&en'e %n P%li$i'-l Pr%'ess -s W/%le 0DAVIS 4. #ANDEMER3+ 0o*ell3Stevens approach !applies to any gerrymander8 not P'st partisan%: loo& to: Shape of district .istrict+s adherence to established political s'bdivisions & bo'ndaries 0rocess !fairness of districting proced're% KA.9A; v. =D8 1("(: applied KAN.=;=<2 no proof that <eps s'ffered degradation of infl'ence in political process as a *hole 1ss'es: Near imposs to ma&e o't case2 only 1 e6. !<=0 0TL OC N.C.%2 KDT ;ight be different in case of minor party (. R-'i-l err*.-nders d. Types of 9arm3Claims Access to ballot bo6 !9A<0=< etc.% Dnconstit'tional vote dil'tion !E91TCO;K8 E91T=8 <=M=ST=<% Meneralized e6pressive harm in 'sing race as basis for districtingH e. D5O v. CA<=L8 1(##: 'l-i. %6 $/ird $*pe %6 /-r. n%$ '%gniK-8leD *here 9asidic 5e*s 'sed as @filler peopleG in racially motivated redistricting bro'ght claim2 n% in4idi%&s dis'ri.in-$i%n %r r-'i-l sl&r. f. S9AE v. <=NO8 1((,: re'%gniKes $/ird $*pe %6 'l-i. -s '%gniK-8leC C 4i%l-$ed E/en r-'e &sed -s pred%.in-n$ 6-'$%r in dis$ri'$ing

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.!Stev3M3K3So't%: no const inP'ry2 this @benignG 'se of race is not the &ind *3 *hich 17A concerned O+Connor: race/conscio's redistricting 'nconst *here @e6cessive and 'nP'stifiableG2 if meets traditional factors !Stevens30o*ell%8 or reN'ired by I<A8 then OA A3<3Scal3T: motive matters2 if race 4 predominant motive8 then violation g. 9DNT v. C<O;A<T1=8 )$$1: S3C held dist ct+s finding that race predominated in redistricting clearly erroneo's2 high correlation of race *3 party affiliation2 KO0 4 sho* that district is 'ne6plainable on gro'nds other than race h. 1ss'es: .escriptive v. S'bstantive <epresentation Administrability of Standard =vidence of relative predominance of different factors very diffic'lt to interpret i. Alternatives: pree6isting 'niversal constraints regardless of reason for derogation independent commissions

II.
J. ener-l Iss&es

REMEDIES

,$. Cederalism: a. Cognizable Claims: 1n order not to federalize every election iss'e8 limit to: Stat'tory voter eligibility .istricts Kallot access for parties3candidates Ioting <ights Act: race b. Ced Ct =6amination of State Fa* NeE L-E 0M-nip&l-$i%n %6 S$-$e L-E3: e.g. <O= v. STAT= OC AF !11th 1(( %8 postelection change to reN notarization of absentee ballots by t*o *itnesses2 str'c& on remand for fact'al inN'iry De$ri.en$-l Reli-n'e: e.g. M<1CC1N v. KD<NS !1st 1(#"%8 absentee voters *ld have voted in state if &no*n that *ld be e6cl'ded S$-$e 4. Fed Ele'$i%ns OHP: fed P'dges less biased in state elections8 b't perhaps eN'ally so in fed elections ,1. Concept'alizing 9arm a. <ights of individ'al voters b. <ights of candidates c. .iff'se p'blic right to @electoral integrityG 9. Presiden$i-l Ele'$i%n O2000P ,). Fegal Kac&gro'nd a. CF stat'tes: protest & contest phasesH b. )$th Amendment: pres term begins 13)$2 'p from ,37 !1)A% c. Ele'$%r-l C%&n$ A'$ %6 (GG@: enacted in *a&e of 9ayes/Tilden electionH

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? !Safe 9arbor%: if any state sets 'p mechanism in advance of election for resolving disp'tes8 and reaches determination - days prior to 1)31"8 Congress *ill not inN'ire as to validity of the co'nt ?1 !Competing Slates%: if state sends ) slates of electors8 and if ) ho'ses can agree *hich to accept then o&2 if ) ho'ses disagree8 then *hichever slate is validated by highest e6ec'tive official of state *ins d. Ar$ IID >(D 'l. 2: each state appoints electors @in s'ch ;anner as the Fegislat're thereof may directG ,,. Case 1 !KDS9 v. 0AF; K=AC9 CTL2 protest phase% a. CF SC: conflict bet*een man'al reco'nt provision & filing deadlines2 resolved by CFSC 'sing CF constit'tion b. SC: vacate & remand for determination of role played by CFSC in r'ling <ehnN'ist3Scalia: CF const can+t be 'sed to interpret stat'tes given Art. 11 deference to @Fegislat'reG ,7. Case ) !KDS9 v. MO<=2 contest phase% a. CFSC reN'ires reco'nt in OWJ> co'nties8 giving cty bds discretion to fashion stds b. SC reverses: =0C violated by discretionary std2 can+t complete permissible reco'nt before safe harbor deadline EPC: radical e6pansion of =0 in election conte6t2 b't 'nli&e CA<<8 no political process fail're8 no stdsJ S-6e !-r8%r: SC determining state la* N'estion2 'nli&e <O=8 no evidence of manip'lation8 detrimental reliance8 or difference in bias bet*een state & fed cts Ar$ II 0WR)AS3: completely novel8 *ld apply to Senate39< elections as *ell2 no historical s'pport for this interpretation2 L. P-r$i'&l-r Re.edies ;:. NeE Ele'$i%n a. 0recedent: K=FF v. SODT9E=FF !1( #%: ordered ne* election *here segregated voting booths8 immediately after I<A2 loo&s li&e electoral integrity case b3c losing candidate cldn+t have *on even if every blac& voter had been able to vote AB1AAA1 v. CONM !9a*.8 1(-(%: ne* election *here invalid absentee ballots mingled *ith valid ballots b. 0rinciples !Starr%: 1nvalidation Q retrib'tion =ns'ring electoral p'rity O'tcome determinative OKell & Azi&a&i contradict on *h intent vel non indicative of ne* election> ;2. InM&n'$i%n %6 Up'%.ing Ele'$i%n a. C91SO; v. <O=;=< ! th 1(""%: no preliminary inP'nction *here I<A violation alleged in FA SC election b. 0rinciples: high cost of inP'nction b3c inc'mbents remain in office 'ntil determination2 can ta&e years ;@. InM&n'$i%n %6 P-r$i'&l-r Ele'$i%n Pr-'$i'e
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a. <OK=<TS v. EA;S=< !=... ;o. 1("#%: voter ed'cation and mandatory reco'nts reN+d by I<A in challenge to differential impact of p'nch/card tech in St. Fo'is2 KDT <=I+. on standing grds in Ct of Appeals !I<A doesn+t give candidates rights8 only voters% ;G. AdM&s$.en$ %6 V%$e "%$-ls OHHP ;1. D-.-ges OHHP

I.
M. #-ll%$ A''ess

PAR"IES

7$. Wri$eAIn V%$ing !KD<.1CA v. TAADS918 1(()%: n% '%ns$i$&$i%n-l rig/$ to *rite/in vote2 no strict scr'tiny a. ;: leg state interest in red'cing admin costs2 avoiding factionalism v. individ'alistic3atomistic right of self/e6pression b. .: loc&/'p iss'e c. C'nctional basis for *rite/in: e6p dissent re 1aries2 last min'te safety valve 71. Filing Fees !KDFFOCA v. CA<T=<8 1(#)%: &n'%ns$i$&$i%n-l 'nder strict scr'tiny analysis2 a. State interests: limit field to @serio'sG cands2 alleviate b'rden on treas'ry b. ;: means not s'ff3reasonably related to ends <2. "/ird P-r$* A''ess $% #-ll%$+ -. Dis'ri.in-$%r* De-dlines+ O9 deadline effectively e6cl'ding ,d !Ohio Amer. 1nd./Eallace% party from ballot 4 4i%l-$i%n %6 EPCC n% '%.pelling s$-$e in$eres$ !E1FF1A;S v. <9O.=S8 1(-"% O9 early filing deadline for independent pres candidates s$r&'= &nder s$ri'$ s'r&$in* !AN.=<SON v. C=F=K<=BB=8 1(",% b. Sign-$&re ReB&ire.en$s: MA reg reN'iring signat'res of R of registered voters &p/eld !5=NN=SS v. CO<TSON8 1(#1% c. S%re L%ser S$-$&$es: stat'tes preventing independents from placement on ballot if voted in immediately preceding primary or registered *3 party in prior year &p/eld !STO<=< v. K<OEN8 1(#7% d. Dire'$ E?'l&si%n %6 ;d P-r$ies 6r%. #-ll%$: EA e6cl'sion of ,d party candidate *ho *on in 1ary from Senate ballot &p/eld &nder B&-siAr-$i%n-l rel-$i%ns/ip !;DN<O v. SOC1AF1ST EO<A=<S 0A<TL8 1("-% e. F&si%n #-ll%$ing: state prohibition on f'sion balloting &p/eld !T1;;ONS v. TE1N C1T1=S A<=A N=E 0A<TL8 1((#%2 Ct strongly endorses )/party system 4 @political stabilityG

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(. C-ndid-$e Pl-'e.en$ %n Pri.-r* #-ll%$ %r C%n4en$i%n -. .DA= v. ;ASS=L8 11th 1((-%: &p/eld state party prevention of candidate from r'nning in its state primary No sho*ing reN+d as to motivation for e6cl'sion Can be seen as conflict bet*een party in electorate and party Q organization f. ;OF1NA< v. 0OE=<S8 =...N.L. )$$$ !;cCain Case%: s$r&'= onero's state la* reNs for placement on primary ballot g. Fa<ODC9= v. COEF=<8 ..C. Cir. 1((": &p/eld vie*point discrimination in e6cl'ding candidate from candidacy Q party convention !rational relationship%

N. P-r$* Represen$-$i%n)P-r$i'ip-$i%n 1. 0articipation in 0arty Convention !<=0 0TL OC T=T v. .1=TB8 Te6. 1((#%: convention 4 private internal party affair8 so not state actor8 can e6cl'de gays8 etc.

h. Ced dist ct r'led opposite in prior preliminary inP'nction proceeding

7,. ;edia Access !A< =.DC. TI CO;;+N v. CO<K=S8 1(("%:e6cl'sion of ,d party candidate from debates OA b3c vie*point ne'tral8 Po'rnalistic P'dgment a. Ct foc'sed on prevention of @cacophonyG b. .: needed to artic'late ne'tral stds in advance 77. 0arty =ndorsement of 0rimary Candidates !=D v. S.C. .=; C=NT<AF C;T=8 1("(% : state cannot ban party endorsement of primary candidates 7 . 0arty Movernance Str'ct'res !=D% : state cannot reN'ire parties to adopt partic'lar governance str'ct'res 7-. Closed 0rimaries: Fimitation of primary to party members 4 valid !NA.=< v. SC9ACC=<8 ..Conn. 1(#-% 7#. Open 0rimaries: a. State cannot prevent parties from opening primaries !TAS951AN% b. State cannot reN'ire delegates from open primary to vote according to primary vote at national convention !.=; 0TL OC D.S. v. E1SC.8 1("1% Conflict bet*een state and national parties K3c national office8 national entity controls OJ> 7". Klan&et 0rimaries: state cannot impose blan&et primary on parties !5ON=S% a. 5ones 4 strong endorsement of party a'tonomy2 right of non/association2 <aiding & hedging 4 serio's threats to party 'nder blan&et primary b. Ct disregards democratic pedigree of 0rop. 1("

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II.
O.

CAMPAI N FINANCE

ener-l 7(. <ationales for <eg'lation a. Corr'ption: 4 only rationale legitimated by S3C b. =N'ality of infl'ence: very diffic'lt to define or attain c. Arms <ace: Channeling of candidate3officeholder efforts to C< d. 1nformation: V'ality & N'antity of information for voters e. !;is%Dse of @other people+s XXG !corps8 'nions% $. Fegislative Kac&gro'nd a. Tillman Act !1($#%: banned corps from giving XX direct to candidates b. Cederal =lection Campaign Act !1(#7%: Caps on contrib'tions & e6pendit'res

P. C%n$ri8&$i%n)E?pendi$&re Li.i$s 1. KDCAF=L v. IAF=O !1(#-%: a. C-ps %n e?pendi$&res s$r&'=: XX4speech8 ergo 1stA prevents limitation b. C-ps %n '%n$ri8&$i%ns O9: marginal 1stA val'e of contrib'tions over cap is minimal2 danger of corr'ption is on contrib'tion side 0ACs incl'ded !'pheld in CA ;=.1AF ASSOC. v. C=C8 1("1% c. =ffect 4 limit s'pply *3 'nlimited demand @blac& mar&etG :2. #-ll%$ Ini$i-$i4es a. C%rp%r-$e Spending !C1<ST NAT+F KANA OC KOSTON v. K=FFOTT18 1(#"%: s$-$es '-nn%$ 8-n '%rp%r-$e e?pendi$&res %n 8-ll%$ ini$i-$i4esD e4en i6 $/e* d% n%$ .-$eri-ll* -66e'$ $/e '%rp2 no danger of corr'ption here !b3c no candidate% ;: over/ and 'nderincl'sive for state interests in corr'ption & protection of shareholders . !Ehite%: corp speech less protected2 not individ'al self/e6pression & corps have state/conferred advantages2 ergo deference to leg b. O$/er Org-niK-$i%ns !C1T1B=NS AMA1NST <=NT CONT<OF v. C1TL OC K=<A=F=L8 1("1%: s$r&'= limitation on conts to cmtes for ballot meas're advocacy

1) of ))

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(. S$-$e C%n$ri8&$i%n Li.i$s !N1TON v. S9<1NA ;O.8 )$$$%: s$-$es '-n pl-'e li.i$s %n '%n$ri8&$i%ns $% '-ndid-$es in the interest of preventing corr'ption or the appearance thereof c. Std of revie*: ;inimal evidentiary reNs to ma&e sho*ing of @perceptionG of corr'ption d. 5'stices+ 0ositions: Aennedy: K'c&ley has created pathological @covert speechG2 shld be overr'led & defer to congressional e6perimentation T3Scal: cont3e6p distinction *rong2 both shld be s'bPect to strict scr'tiny2 no evidence of corr'ption here2 if so8 'se bribery3f'll disclos're la*s K3M: 1stA interests of both state & party8 ergo deference2 if K'c&ley is going to be applied in lopsided fashion8 shld be overr'led ,. Independen$ E?pendi$&res 8* P-r$ies !COFO. <=0. C=.. CA;0A1MN C;T= v. C=C8 1((-%: s$-$e '-nn%$ li.i$ independen$ 0n%n'%%rdin-$ed3 e?ps 8* p-r$* a. NK: these e6ps *ere made before candidate even nominated b. 5'stices+ 0ositions: Kreyer8 O+Connor8 So'ter: can+t reg'late independent e6ps T: no constit'tional significance to distinction bet*een contrib'tions & e6ps T8 <8 Scalia: no ris& of corr'ption *hen e6p is by party8 *h indep or coord Stevens8 Minsb'rg: leg state interests 4 not only direct corr'ption8 b't also circ'mvention of cont caps via parties8 & eN'ality 7. C%%rdin-$ed E?pendi$&res 8* P-r$ies+ N'alify as contrib'tions 'nder C=CA2 s$r&'= by 1$th Circ'it in COFO. <=0. 0TL 11 a. 0arty contrib'tions can+t @corr'ptG candidates8 ergo no legitimate gov+t interest in reg'lating2 evidence proffered by C=C !articles8 intervie*s% inadeN'ate b. .: N1TON reNs only minimal evidence of perception of corr'ption2 maP+y stri&ing congressional reg on basis of its o*n vision of parties . Independen$ E?pendi$&res 8* C%rps !ADST1N v. ;1C9. C9A;K=< OC CO;;.8 1(($%: s$-$e l-E '-n 8-n independen$ e?ps 8* '%rps $% ge$ '-ndid-$es ele'$ed . a. ;: corr. rationale8 b't loo&s li&e @corr'ptionG has been e6panded to incl'de eN'ality b. Narro* reading 4 corp/specific c. 0ossible to disting'ish among types of independent entitiesJ !corps8 'nions8 ideological entities% Q. Iss&e Ad4%'-'* -. 0recedent a. C=CA: limits on spending @in connection *ithG or @for the p'rposes of infl'encingG federal election8 or @relative toG a federal candidate b. KDCAF=L: only @e6press advocacyG comes 'nder limits2 magic *ords !vote for8 elect8 vote against8 etc.% c. C=C v. ;ASS. C1T1B=NS CO< F1C=8 1("-: e6press advocacy *3o magic *ords d. Circ'its: C=C v. CD<MATC98 (th 1("#: foc's on @comm'nication as a *holeG in conte6t2 e6press if s'sceptible to only one pla'sible interpretation C=C v. C9<1ST1AN ACT1ON8 7th 1(( : e6press only if 'ses lang'age directly e6horting p'blic to vote e. C=C <egs: reasonable person co'ld only interpret as advocacy of election or defeat of candH

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f.

Kriffa'lt 0roposal: !1% reference to candidate2 !)% made *3in defined time period2 !,% s'fficiently large e6p

#. M'C-in Feing%ld 0>20(A20;3: places 'nder C=CA limits @election comm'nicationG 4 any comm'nication referring to candidate made -$ days prior to election8 ,$ days prior to primary8 to a'dience incl'ding members of the electorate R. S%6$ M%ne* ". Kac&gro'nd a. Shared activities: federal3state elections ta&e place at same time2 both benefit from party e6pendit'res other than campaigning8 e.g. MOTI8 voter reg8 literat're8 overhead8 party ads8 etc. 1(#"/#( !C=C% national parties can create separate state accts for state campaigns and shared activities8 & this XX doesn+t need to comply *3 C=CA s/-red -'$i4i$ies N pres&.ed $% 8e s$-$e rel-$ed b. Soft XX: 4 XX o'tside of C=CA8 ergo not s'bPect to XX or so'rce limits b3c technically not being 'sed for @federalG elections Soft XX 4 Y13, of party system :1. M'C-inAFeing%ld a. N-$Fl P-r$* 0>(0(0-30(33+ -ll n-$Fl p-r$* -'$i4i$* N &nder -'$ !cannot solicit8 receive8 or direct XX to another person o'tside of act+s regs% b. S$-$eD Dis$D L%'-l P-r$* 0>(0(0833+ 56eder-l ele'$i%n -'$i4i$*7D in'l&ding -ll s/-red -'$i4i$iesD &nder -'$ !flips prior pres'mption% incl'ding @p'blic comm'nicationsG 4 any comm'nications that promote or s'pport a candidate !goes beyond e6press advocacyG c. C3< costs 4 s'bPect to limits d. Ta6/=6empt Orgs: parties & entities established by parties can+t raise XX for T=Os e. Officeholders: can+t raise soft XX e6cept if r'nning for state office S. P&8li' Fin-n'ing -$. =6isting !C=CA%: partial financing of presidential race !for party conventions% no* p'blic X X 'sed as seed XX for conventions -1. Alternatives: a. ;aine 0roposal: raise minim'm amt of XX8 t'rn it in8 get p'blic financing8 and agree to spending cap Ooverr'led b3c state reg of fed camp in COOA v. M<=LF=I> -). 1ss'es: a. =N'ality: increase W of candidates able to p't 'p @table sta&esG b. Iiability: have to spend a lot to get to level at *hich demand for nonp'blic XX decreases2 ability to p'blicly finance at level of diminishing marginal ret'rns m'ch lo*er in big states & national level

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DEMOCRACY "!EMES)QUES"IONS
1NST1TDT1ONAF CO;=T=NC= !1% Foc&/'pJ: 0resent in Ka&er8 <eynolds NOT present in FDCAS8 A<A;=<8 CD;A<OFO !)% Competitiveness of Kac&gro'nd =nvironment: KD<.1CA T1;;ONS E91T= 0<1;A<1=S Campaign Cinance !,% AdministrabilityJ: 101I 4 administrable2 AA<C9=<H 0redominance of race in redistricting NOT2 intent not appropriateH !7% =ffects on Fegitimacy of Co'rt: *here inherently political controversy8 thin& abo't availability of political bodies to ma&e decision CA;0A1MN C1NANC= !1% Contrib'tions v. =6pendit'res NK: K'c&ley restraint of contrib'tions is predicated on freedom in e6pendit'res 0ro allo*ing reg'lation of e6pendit'res !Stevens in Colo <ep2 Ehite in K'c&ley% ;'st attac& XX4speech ;'st introd'ce competing 1stA val'es !mar&etplace of ideas2 competition2 etc.% 0ro strict scr'tiny of both contrib'tions and e6pendit'res !Thomas% XX4speech =N'ality never rationale for constraining speech2 m'st level/'p8 not level do*n

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!)% 1ndependent v. Coordinated =6pendit'res 1ndependent not reg'lable if by parties !COFO <=0 0TL%8 b't reg'lable if by corps !ADST1N% Coordinated e6pendit'res by parties 'nder attac& !COFO <=0 0TL 11%: no corr'ption rationale Stevens co'nter: !,% =6press v. 1ss'e Advocacy KDCAF=L: magic *ords approach ;cCain/Ceingold: tries to define @electioneering comm'nicationG !reference to cands8 temporal restriction%2 b't doesn+t prohibit speech8 only places it 'nder limits !7% Sta&eholder: party2 corp2 independent org Corps special8 can be reg'lated: K=FFOTT1: in ballot meas're conte6t ADST1N: independent e6pendit'res in candidate race 0arty: Colo <ep N'estions *hether party can @corr'ptG ! % =videntiary thresholds m'ch different in @contrib'tionG conte6t !Shrin& ;o.%8 than @e6pendit'reG !Colo <ep 0ty%

<=MDFAT1ON OC 0A<T1=S30<1;A<1=S 0rimary Typology: Closed: open only to members affiliated at some time before election Semi/closed: ne* registrants or independents may vote2 b't not members of other party NK: limits on state+s p*r to forbid s*itching OADS0=< v. 0ONT1A=S8 1(#, !stri&ing ),/mo *aiting period after vote in other pty+s 1ary%> b't not on some *aiting period O<OSA<1O v. <OCA=C=FF=<8 1(#) !'pholding 11 month *aiting period8 to prevent raiding%> Open: can vote in *hichever primaryH open to independents & ne* registrants open to all voters semi/open: p'blic instead of secret selection of 1ary ballot Klan&et: Ca8 Ea8 A&2 str'c& 'nder 5ON=S Non/partisan: Fa only2 OA 'nder 5ON=S 1ss'es: Cormalist: 5ON=S dicta seems to s'pport formalist line bet*een open & blan&et primaries on grd that some level of @affiliationG is reN+d C'nctional: not s'stainable on f'nction grds no p'blic affiliation reN+d in secret open primaries2 even in closed8 *here membership available same day8 affiliative act is limited

.1ST<1CT1NM !1% 101I: Aarcher

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!)% Non/racial factors: traditional8 political !,% I<A3<ace: Mingles8 .eMrandy !7% 17A Fimitations: Sha*8 Cromartie

M=N=<AF v. S0=C1AF/0D<0OS= MOIT !1% !)% !,% !7% Type: M04city govt2 schools2 sometimes 'tilities2 S0.4*ater8 irrigation8 etc.2 S0K4bar assns8 etc. 0o*ers: ta6ation8 b'dgeting8 1nterests Affected: thin& sch bd effects on property val'es8 etc. OOConsider also iss'e of non/resident rep !K<OEN v. C9ATANOOMA%2 categorical rep !CD;A<OFO>>

DEMOCRACY CASE INDER

Amendments: Co'rteenth !1"-"%Z=N'al 0rotection Cifteenth !1"#$%Z=nfranchisement & <ace Seventeenth !1(1,%Z.irect =lection of Senators Nineteenth !1()$%Z=nfranchisement & Se6 T*enty Co'rth !1(-7%Z=limination of Cederal 0oll Ta6 T*enty Si6th !1(#1%Z=nfranchisement & 1" year/olds Ar&ansas =d. TI Comm. v. Corbes !1(("%ZC$. &p/%lds P#S e?'l&si%n %6 F%r8es 6r%. de8-$e Ct. !1% classified 0'blic TI as non/p'blic for'm8 !)% p'blic TI not forced to choose bet*een @cacophanyG and @Cirst Amendment Fiability8G!,% Standard: e6cl'sion m'st !a% not be based on spea&er+s vie*point8 and !b% be other*ise reasonable. Dissent says that *here a state government *ields the po*er to e6cl'de a candidate from consideration8 it m'st8 at the very least8 act according to pre/established8 obPective criteria A'stin v. ;ichigan Chamber of Commerce !1(($%ZC$. &p/%lds S$-$e 8-n %n Indep. E?pendi$&res Ct. 'pholds ;ichigan ban on corp. e6pendit'res made from general f'nds ;arshall employs rhetoric of @corr'ption8G b't seems to be motivated by the equality rationaleH i.e. that corporations represent biggest agglomerations of *ealth8 hence co'ld distort campaigns Ka&er v. Carr !1(-)%ZApp%r$i%n.en$ 'l-i.s J&di'i-ll* C%gniK-8le Citing Momillion8 !a 1 A gerrymander case% the Ct.8 per Krennan8 holds that the @debasement of votesG s'ffered in malapportioned states is *ithin the 17A Clar&8 conc'rring8 e6presses the =ly 3 Caroline 0rod'cts 3 political loc&/'p concern re: *hy this cannot be left to the political branches Cran&f'rter8 in dissent: !1% rePects Krennan+s attempt to say this isn+t a @political N'estionG by resting the res'lt on the 17A instead of the M'arantee Cla'se2 !)% *arns that the Ct.s po*er comes from its moral a'thority8 *hich is sapped *hen it vent'res onto political t'rf cf. <eynolds v. Sims
1# of )) .emocracy O'tline

Kall v. 5ames !1("1%ZSingle P&rp%se %4ern.en$-l #%dies I..&ne 6r%. (Apers%n ) (A4%$e Ct. declines to e6tend <eynolds to a *ater district 0o*ell8 conc'rring notes !1% *ater district does not e6ercise general governmental f'nctions8 b't it does deal *ith matters of great importance8 b't !)% it sits at the pleas're of the Arizona Fegislat're8 hence !,% there isn+t the threat of political loc&/'p8 and hence !7% this can remain a political N'estion Kd. of =stimate v. ;orris !1("(%Z(Apers%n ) (A4%$e -pplied $% NYC =lections for NLC Kd. of =stimate fo'nd to violate 17A beca'se they rely on boro'gh bo'ndaries for the election of some membersZand the boro'ghs have *idely varying pop'lations Ct. rePects more sophisticated methods of *aiting votes for a 1/person 3 1/vote methodology K'c&ley v. Ialeo !1(#J%ZC%n$ri8&$i%ns #-dS ) E?pendi$&res %%dS

K'rdic& v. Ta&'shi !1(()%ZUp/%lding !-E-iiFs 8-n %n Wri$eAIn C-ndid-$es Ehen a state election la* imposes only a reasonable8 nondiscriminatory restriction on ballot access8 inN'iry is *hether there are 1mportant State <eg'latory 1nterests 9a*aii asserts interests against: !1% factionalism & !)% party raidingH these s'ffice to overcome incidental impact on 1A e6pressive right in *riting in8 say8 Donald Duck Dissent arg'es for strict scr'tiny8 saying *rite/ins !1% deter loc&/'p8 !)% provide safety valve for last/min'te revelations K'lloc& v. Carter !1(#)%Z@Cl%se7 S'r&$in* -pplied $% 6iling 6ees Keca'se TT+s !patently e6cl'sionary% filing fee system !1% has @real and appreciableG impact on e6ercise of the franchise8 and !)% beca'se that impact is related to the reso'rces of s'pporters8 !,% la*s m'st be fo'nd @reasonably necessaryG to accomplish @legitimate state obPectives.G cf. F'bin v. 0anishZCalifornia+s filing fee system str'c& do*n8 b't Ct. recognizes importance to !a% voters and !b% candidates to be on ballot *3o regard to ability to raise filing fee California .emocratic 0arty v. 5ones !)$$$%ZCA 8l-n=e$ pri.-r* /eld &n'%ns$i$&$i%n-l 0arties as private8 protected by 1A8 and having right to e6cl'de Th's 0rop. 1(" strictly scr'tinizedH !a% state not allo*ed to enforce la* *ith p'rpose of ma&ing candidates @better represent the electorate8G !b% Ct. do*nplays fairness8 participation8 etc. concerns !c% Ct. leaves open poss+y of open primary follo*ed by non/partisan gen+l electionHnoJ DissentZ*o'ld disting'ish8 for 1A p'rposes8 bet*een private parties and those *hich perform state f'nctions. .issent sees primaries as state f'nction Colegrove v. Mreen !1(7-%ZApp%r$i%n.en$ 'l-i.s n%$ J&di'i-ll* C%gniK-8le Apportionment as a @political thic&etG Citing Miles8 the Ct. holds !1% no private *rong8 !)% beyond Ct.s po*er to act8 !,% this is a matter reserved for the legislat're8 !7% a political N'estion .emocratic 0arty v. Eisconsin !1("1%ZS$-$e .-* n%$ 8ind p-r$* E)Open Pri.-r* Strong Party Autonomy case8 *ith party+s 1A rights !re: determining candidate% tr'mp state+s interest in open primary Note: 1n this case8 state party sided *ith state against national party. Sho'ld Ct. intervene hereJ .'nn v. Kl'mstein !1(#)%ZD&r-$i%n-l Residen'* ReB&ire.en$s Tenn.+s t*o P'stifications *ere: !1% preventing fra'd8 !)% ens'ring identity *ith the comm'nity. Ct s said re: !1% people co'ld lie abo't length of residency as *ell as *hatever else2 and re: !)% Ct. rePects idea of *aiting for people to assimilate local vie*points as P'stif. for denying s'ffrage
1" of )) .emocracy O'tline

=' v. San Crancisco Co'nty .emocrats !1("(%ZS$-$es -8ili$* $% reg&l-$e P-r$* %rg-niK-$i%n 1f party can sho* state reg+n affects interests protects by 1A2 state m'st then sho* that the reg+n is narro*ly tailored to meet a compelling state interest Ct rePects ban on party endorsements of candidatesZ!1% implicates 1A2 !)% gag r'le is not necessary for stability8 avoiding voter conf'sionHit is inappropriate for a state to @save a party from itself.G Ct rePects r'les re: internal party governanceH not nec+y to re. party participation in elections Cirst National Kan& of Koston v. Kellotti !1(#"%ZS$-$e Reg.s %n C%rp. Re6erend- E?pendi$&res Ct. thro*s o't ;ass. reg. prohibiting corp.s from ma&ing contrib.s 3 e6pendit'res to campaigns not related to corp. Ct. says !1% stat'te infringes on 1A rights of corp.8 !)% state interests are in avoiding appearance of corr'ption & protecting shareholders8 b't !,% no corr'ption poss. *3referenda8 and !7% shareholders overprotected !can+t vote to s'pport% and 'nderprotected !no provisions for e6pend.s re: legislation% C'marolo v. Chicago Kd. of =d. !1(($%ZC/i'-g% S'/%%l #d. ele'$i%ns s&8Me'$ $% S$ri'$ S'r&$in* Ct. holds that local school co'ncils perform a general governmental f'nction. Therefore their str'ct're !*3 different n'mbers of representatives for parents8 teachers8 comm'nity members8 etc.% is s'bPect o strict scr'tiny @The administration of schoolsG is a f'ndamental government interest in *hich @all members of societyG have an interest I. iles 4. !-rris 0(10;3The Plessy v. Ferguson of =lection Fa* challenges Alabama reg. scheme8 Ct. says: Equity cannot undertake to enforce political rights. Ct. ma&es a Catch/)) style arg'ment re: entangling itself in voter fra'd8 b't basically says that it is po*erless8 on its o*n8 to enfranchise African Americans Cf. the Ct. in 1($, *3the Ct. in 1( 7 .emonstrates that dicta in Lic& Eo did not s'ffice to ma&e voting a @C'ndamental <ightG

Momillion v. Fightfoot !1(-$%Z"/e "&s=egee gerr*.-nder reMe'$ed %n (:A gr%&nds @Dnco'th t*enty/eight/sided fig'reG e6cl'des blac&s from m'nic. elections in Alabama @Ehen a legislat're th's singles o't a readily isolates segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment8 it violates the Cifteenth Amendment.G M'inn v. Dnited States !1(1 %Z"/e An$iAGiles The Ct. rePects an O&lahoma registration reN+t clearly aimed !by its re. to 1"--% to evading the 1 A 9arper v. Iirginia Kd. of =lections !1(--%ZP%ll $-?es 0%n s$-$e ele'$i%ns3 4i%l-$e EB&-l Pr%$e'$i%n A Fundamental !ights case" citing <eynolds @OO>nce the franchise is granted to the electorate8 lines may not be dra*n *hich are inconsistent *ith the =N'al 0rotection Cla'se.G Ct. analogizes to <eynolds v. Sims8 arg'es that poll ta6 dil'tes votes on the basis of class DissentZarg'es that there is rational basis for poll ta68 !hence rePects @f'ndamental rightsG arg'ment% Aarcher v. .aggett !1(",%Z =stablishes K'rden Shifting in apportionment cases: !1% m'st sho* plan is not the res'lt of good/faith effort to achieve pop'lation eN'ality2 !)% state m'st then sho* that deviations in plan *ere necessary to achieve legitimate state interests !i.e. compactness8 respecting political bo'ndaries8 protecting old districts%. The standard for !)% depends on the size of the deviations and the strength of the state interests presented Aramer v. Dnion Cree School .istrict No. 1 !1(-(%ZPr%per$* ) P-ren$/%%d ReB.s reMe'$ed in N.Y. A fundamental rights case8 citing <eynolds
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Ct. overt'rns property 3 parenthood restrictions on school district elections DissentZIoting reN'irements at iss'e prom'lgated by N.L. State legislat're8 in *hich can vote2 Cf. Eater .istrict Cases

Fassiter v. Northampton Co'nty Kd. of =lections !1( (%ZLi$er-'* "es$s Up/eld A !ational #asis case Ct.s logic in 'pholding literacy tests: !1% literacy is related to intellect'al ability to vote2 !)% literacy is non/ discriminatory Collo*ed by 9arper v. Iirginia Kd. of =lections8 Aramer v. Dnion Cree School .istrict No. 1 Overt'rned by 1(#$ amendments to Ioting <ights Act F'cas v. Colorado !1(-7%ZOne Pers%n ) One V%$e Dpper ho'se of Colorado legislat're based on geographic 'nits8 leading to disparities in n'mber of citizens per senator Ct. holds !1% Ct.s sit to adP'dicate denials of const+l rights2 !)% The fact that this *as the res'lt of a referend'm is beside the point2 !,% =N'al 0rotection Cla'se reN'ires that seats be apportioned on a pop'lation basis Some iss'es: =ffect is to mandate restr'ct'ring of nearly every state legislat're nation*ide. K't *hat+s the point of bi/ cameralism after F'casJ Koth ho'ses represent same people in same *ay. Ehat to ma&e of: !1% The fact that this apportionment *as chosen by referend'm2 !)% Earren+s assertion that people cannot vote a*ay their rightsJ One/0erson3One/Iote does have the advantage of being a bright/line r'le .issenters favor lighter =N'al 0rotection analysis: apportionment has to be rational2 sho'ldn+t systematically fr'strate *ill of maPority ;inor v. 9appersett !1"# %Z(<A d%esnF$ gi4e E%.en rig/$ $% 4%$e S'preme Co'rt holds that the Constit'tion doesn+t confer the right to vote on any one Constit'tion leaves the franchise 'p to the states Overt'rned by 1(A Ct. arg'es !1% *omen have al*ays been citizens8 !)% they haven+t al*ays been citizens8 !,% hence voting cannot be one of the rights of citizenship protected by the 17A. !7a% Ct. also relies on arg'ment that ?) of 17A refers to ability of state legislat're to disenfranchise certain men. !7b% Also8 ?) of 17A refers to men8 not *omen2 ! % 1f 17A g'aranteed right to vote8 *hy *as a 1 A necessaryJ !-% M'arantee cla'se never 'sed to bar admission of states *hich didn+t let *omen vote ;obile v. Kolden !1("$%ZC$. /%lds $/-$ (:A reB&ires 5Dis'ri.in-$%r* P&rp%se7 <es'lt is 1(") Amendments to I<A ;'nro v. Socialist Eor&ers 0arty !1("-%ZS$-$eFs A8ili$* $% Reg&l-$e A''ess $% #-ll%$ State need not sho* voter conf'sion8 ballot overcro*ding or presence of frivolo's candidacies to impose reasonable restrictions on ballot access Nader v. Schaffer !1(#-%Z Nader obPects to closed primary8 *hich allo*s only party members to vote. Complaint dismissed. Ct. arg'es !1% party has associational right to organize itself to as to maintain its effectiveness2 !)% state has an interest in preserving parties as @viable and identifiable interest gro'psG cf. .'&e v. ;assey !'pholding stat'te permitting central party committees to delete candidate names as narro*ly tailored to f'rther states compelling interest in protecting political parties from those *3adverse vie*s%2 <ep'blican 0arty v. .ietz !TT <ep'blicans allo*ed to e6cl'de Fog Cabin <eps.% <eynolds v. Sims !1(-7%ZV%$ing -s F&nd-.en$-l Rig/$ ) OneAPers%n OneAV%$e ;andates @s'bstantial eN'ality of pop'lation among the vario's districtsG in state legislat'res
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Citing Momillion for the proposition that sophisticated discrimination is barred P'st as 'nsophisticated discrimination is8 says predictable res'lt of malapportionment is 'nderrepresentation of some voters Eesberry v. Sanders e6tends this to Congressional districts Permissa$le deviations% Cor Congression disticts8 close to $R !see Aarcher v. .aggett%2 for state legislat'res some*hat higher !1$R8 1 R%

<ichardson v. <amirez !1(# %Z(<A d%es n%$ 8-r 6el%n disen6r-n'/ise.en$ Arg'ment is that 17A8 ?) seems to contemplate felon disenfranchisement K't8 in 9'nter v. Dnder*ood !1(" %8 the Ct. str'c& do*n a section of the 1($1 Alabama constit'tion *hich disenfranchised individ'als convicted of any crime of moral t'rpit'deHfinding it racially motivated 5'stifications: !1% E&pressiveZonly the morally competent sho'ld be able to vote2 !)% PunishmentZit is a *ay to disco'rage crime2 !,% 'nstrumentalZdon+t let those *ho brea& the la* ma&e the la* <oe v. AlabamaZS$-$e C$. In$erpFn %6 S$-$e Ele'$i%n L-E !1% 1n !oe '8 the s allege that by changing the standards for absentee ballots after the election !a% Alabama is dil'ting their votes8 !b% Alabama disenfranchised those *ho *o'ld have voted had they &no*n. !)% 11 th Cir. certifies state la* N'estion to Alabama high ct.8 *hich replies that yes8 indeed8 the ballots in N'estion co'nted. !,% Ced. district ct. finds that Alabama had changed the r'le. !7% 11th Cir. certifies this8 th's rePecting state interp. of state la* re: state offices TashPian v. <ep'blican 0arty of CT !1("-%ZS$-$e C-nn%$ Pre4en$ Open Pri.-r* i6 P-r$* W-n$s i$ A 0arty+s determination of its o*n bo'ndaries tr'mp the co'ntervailing determination of a state Ct. rePects states arg'ment re: preventing party raiding *3closed primaries8 noting ho( thin a notion party identity is" () citi*ens a$le to register up until the day $efore the election Thornb'rg . Mingles !1("-%Z#renn-n In$erpre$s $/e (1G2 A.end.en$s s challenging ;;. m'st prove: !1% minority pop'lation large & compact eno'gh to form a maPority in a single member district8 !)% that the minority pop'lation is politically cohesive8 !,% maPority bloc voting Krennan advocates bivariate analysis re: racially polarized voting !i.e. a correlation bet*een race of voters and candidate s'pported%. O+Connor *ants a m'ltivariate analysis !i.e. proof that race is the motivating factor in *ho people vote for%. Krennan says that inN'iring into the reasons voters vte as they do defeats the p'rpose of the 1(") amendments8 i.e. to eliminate @p'rposeG from the inN'iry Timmons v. Ne* 0arty !1((#%ZUp/%lds #-n %n F&si%n "i'=e$s Constit'tion permits states to determine that political stability is best served by a )/party system !P'st as it allo*s states to avoid p'blic financing of campaigns & proportional representation% Ehitcomb v. Chavis !1(#1%ZReMe'$s C/-llenge $% MMD Ialidity of ;;. P'sticiable8 b't Ct. says !1% intent to discriminate to be the standard8 and !)% electoral fail're is not evidence of s'ch intent The Ehite 0rimary CasesP-r$* Pri.-riesD -nd S$-$e A'$i%n per (<A -nd (:A Ni6on v. 9erndon !1()#%ZCt. tosses o't a TT stat'te barring blac&s from .emocratic primary Ni6on v. Condon !1(,)%ZCt. tosses o't TT responseZa stat'te empo*ering the @State =6ec'tive CommitteesG of the parties to determine the reN+ts for voting in the primaries. Avoids @state actorG problem by describing =6ec'tive Committees as organs of state !Mrovey v. To*nsend !1(, %ZCt. 'pholds TT .em.+s e6cl'sion of blac& voters from primary8 saying it is not @state actionG per 17A% !Dnited States v. Classic !1(71%ZCt. holds primary to be @integral part of electionG%

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Smith v. All*right !1(77%ZOverr'les Mrovey8 rePects TT .em+s e6cl'sion of blac&s8 saying that it is @state actionG per 1 A8 citing Classic Terry v. Adams !1( ,%Z1n a divided opinion8 the Ct. rePects the right of the 5aybirds to hold a *hites/only pre/ primary primary: Klac& holds 5aybird primary is an @integralG part of co'nty elections8 and therefore is @state actionG for 1 A p'rposes2 Cran&f'rter finds @state actionG in participation of co'nty officials2 Clar& *o'ld find the 5aybirds to be a political party. Dissent *orries: ho* do *e dra*the line bet*een 5aybirds and private press're gro'psJ

Critical for the Ct.s @state actionG reasoning Ehy the move to the 1 AJ See Momillion v. Fightfoot cf. Anderson v. ;artin8 *here a Iirginia la* reN'iring that ballots list the race of candidates is thro*n o't as facilitating private discrimination cf. 9olme+s positions in Ni6on v. 9erndon & Miles v. 9arris

Ehite v. <egester !1(#,%ZUp/%lds '/-llenge $% MMDs Ct. rePects TT ;;.8 relying on trial ct. finding of @invidio's discriminationG against ;e6ican Americans

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