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RestitutoYnotvs Intermediate Appellate Court Police Power Not Validly Exercised There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos. ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Assoc., Incvs Mayor of Manila Police Power Due Process Clause On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and motels. It classified them into 1 st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at 4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate. ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague.

White Light Corp., vs City of Manila Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement of Private Rights On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City. ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio Police Power On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid. HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

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(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. JMM Promotion and Management vs Court of Appeals Police Power Due to the death of one MaricrisSioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artists Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC. ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to high risk destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies. Lao Ichongvs Jaime Hernandez Constitutional Law Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pactasundservanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it me rely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market. United States vs Luis Toribio Police Power Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid. HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community. VELASCO v. VILLEGAS Facts:The petitioners filed a declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No.4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their meansof livelihood without due process of law.The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shopto conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of saidbarber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as longas the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person."The lower court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the assailed ordinance. Hence, the appeal. Issue:Whether or not Ordinance No. 4964 is unconstitutional Held:NO Ratio:It is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to imposepayment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 asamended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers."The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clausebecause it "delegates in statutory form the

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police power to a municipality; this clause has been given wideapplication by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case beenliberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence."The judgment of the lower court is affirmed Agustin vsEdu Generally Accepted Principles of International Law Police Power Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning devices. Agustin is argui ng that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires. ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid. HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking -lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built -in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision. On Police Power The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the gener al welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc wit h the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time. The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety. Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation Police Power Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads: SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phasedout, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. ISSUES: A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to procedural due process?

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B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners constitutional rights to. (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard? HELD: As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Mary Concepcion Bautista et al vs Alfredo Juinio et al Equal Protection Distinction Between Heavy and Extra Heavy Cars and Others Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned these vehicles during weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am Monday. Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption. Further, the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by them fall within such category. ISSUE: Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection. HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. The ideal situation is for the laws benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest. Gancayco vs. Quezon City & MMDA, G.R. No. 177807, Oct. 11, 2011 Facts: The MMDA then sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. He did not comply with the notice. Thelma then proceeded to demolish the party wall of the ground floor structure. The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone. Justice Gancayco filed a Petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs decision and ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to its police powers. Issue: Did MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, validly empower the MMDA to demolish Justice Gancaycos property? Ruling: No. the Supreme Court held that the power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways, not in MMDA. Since there was no evidence that the MMDA had been delegated by the DPWH to implement the Building Code, it necessarily had no authority to carry out the demolition. Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment of a fine or by imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court. The ordinance itself clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance. Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform Equal Protection These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act. Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenantfarmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also

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violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties. The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause. HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. quality education in his petition for mandamus before the court. Respondent judge rendered decision citing the admission rule of the petitioner as an arbitrary exercise of police power, depriving respondent of his right to pursue medical education thus this petition for review before the higher court. Issue: Whether or not the admission rule implemented by petitioner an arbitrary exercise of police power. Held: The court held that police power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. The State needs to implement decisive steps to regulate system of education by directing students to the course where he is best suited through initial tests and evaluation. The decision of the respondent judge was reversed.

Decs V San Diego 180 Scra 533 Facts: The respondent failed to pass the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) 3 times and he was denied admission to take the test for another time by the petitioner under its rule that a student is allowed only to take the NMAT 3 times and after 3 consecutive failures a student shall not be allowed to take NMAT the 4th time. Respondent invoke his constitutional rights on academic freedom and

Villanueva vsCastaeda There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as a talipapa. This is the subject of the herein petition. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property. At the petitioners behest, we have issued a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo between the parties pending our decision. This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the above-mentioned place. The action was protested on November 10, 1961, in Civil Case No. 2040, where the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants from constructing the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. On January 18, 1964, while this case was pending, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 29, which declared the subject area as the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961. Four years later, on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent. HELD: Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained

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away through the medium of a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power. We hold that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for prohibition. On the contrary, he acted correctly in sustaining the right and responsibility of the mayor to evict the petitioners from the disputed area and clear it of all the structures illegally constructed therein. PRC vs. De Guzman, G . R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004 Constitutional Law: Police Power Facts:The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, MetroManila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names assuccessful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees fromFatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. ElevenFatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% inBio-Chem, and twentyone scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those whopassed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The Boardobserved that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. Itwas a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination.For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima exa minees in the [1993] Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to thetest questions. The Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents with "immorality,dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. Itrecommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. Trial courts judgment isrendered ordering the respondents to allow the petitioners and interveners to take the physicians oathand to register them as physicians without prejudice to any administrative disciplinary action whichmay be taken against any of the petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided by law andconsistent with the requirements of the Constitution as any other professionals. Issue:Whether or not the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 known as The Medical Act of 1959 a validexercise of police power. Held: Yes. It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession orcourse of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. Butlike all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant tothe police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and generalwelfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiringscientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engagingin their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who wouldpractice medicine.It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressivemanner. A political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to bothforbid and grant such privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not,however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license. Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association et al vs DENR Sec EliseaGozun et al Police Power Eminent Domain In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies when it comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including BrgyDidipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust taking of private property for private purpose in contradiction wit h Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just compensation. Traversing petitioners assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded that to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid. HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are; (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period. (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To wit, Section 76.xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.

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Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated. Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands. City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta&Himlayang Pilipino Police Power Not Validly Exercised Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid. HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. Dela Cruz v Paras G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983 Fernando, CJ: Facts: 1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.' The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. 3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. 4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. 1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs. 2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. 3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. 4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. El BancoEspaol-Filipino vs Vicente Palanca Judicial Due Process Requisites EngracioPalanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracionever received the summons. ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed. HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The requisites are;

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1. 2. 3. 4. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Delgado. An accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process. Pedro Consultavs People of the Philippines Due Process Consulta is charged for stealing a gold necklace worth 3.5k owned by a certain Silvestre. He was convicted by the lower court. Consulta raised before the CA the issue that he was not properly arraigned and that he was represented by a non lawyer. ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta was denied of due process. HELD: The SC ruled that Consultas claim of being misrepresented cannot be given due course. He was assisted by two lawyers during the proceeding. In the earlier part, he was assisted by one Atty. Jocelyn Reyes who seemed not to be a lawyer. Granting that she indeed is not a lawyer, her withdrawal from the case in the earlier part of the case has cured the defect as he was subsequently assisted by a lawyer coming from the PAO. People vsOpida This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, imposing the death penalty upon Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo for the crime of murder. Unlike the victim in this case, who died from only one stab wound, the decision under review suffers from several fatal flaws, all equally deadly. It suffices to discuss only one of them. Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. 1 Bolstering this requirement, we have added that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 2 The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process. This guaranty was not observed in this case. On July 31, 1976, in Quezon City, several persons ganged up on Fabian Galvan, stoned and hit him with beer bottles until finally one of them stabbed him to death. The actual knife-wielder was identified as Mario delMundo. Nonetheless, Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo were charged with murder as conspirators and, after trial, sentenced to death. The basis of their conviction by the trial court was the testimony of two prosecution witnesses, neither of whom positively said that the accused were at the scene of the crime, their extrajudicial confessions, which were secured without the assistance of counsel, and corroboration of the alleged conspiracy under the theory of interlocking confession. What is striking about this case is the way the trial judge conducted his interrogation of the two accused and their lone witness, LilianLayug. It was hardly judicious and certainly far from judicial, at times irrelevant, at Worst malicious. Reading the transcript, one gathers the impression that the judge

Imelda Marcos vsSandiganbayan Due Process Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienzas dissent in favor of Imeldas innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores request, Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores manifestation granted that a majority has already decided on Imeldas favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda. ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed. HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong showing of Imeldas guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived o f due process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores manifestation. Such procedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its decision convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division. Emma Delgado vs Court of Appeals Due Process Delgado together with 3 others were charged for estafa causing the frustration of one medical student. Delgado was assisted by one Atty. Yco. The said lawyer has filed for multiple postponement of trial and one time he failed to appear in court by reason of him being allegedly sick. No medical certificate was furnished. The court was not impressed with such actuation and had considered the same as Delgados waiver of her right to trial. The lower court convicted her and the others. She appealed before the CA and the CA sustained the lower courts rule. Delgado later found out that Yco is not a member of the IBP. ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed.

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had allied himself with the prosecution to discredit at the outset the credibility of the witnesses for the defense. Opida is a police character, admittedly a member of the Commando gang and with a string of convictions for robbery, theft and vagrancy. It is worth noting that the judge took special interest in his tattoos, required him to remove his shirt so they could be examined, and even described them in detail for the record. Besides belaboring Opida's criminal activities and his tattoos, the judge asked him if he had "ever been convicted at the National Mental Hospital with what else but malice and suggested to him that his claim of manhandling by the police was a lie because investigators leave no mark when they torture a suspect. This was a point that could have been validly raised by the prosecution but certainly not by the court. The judge also made it of record that the witness was gnashing his teeth, was showing signs of hostility, that he was uneasy and that he was restless. "Now, whom do you want to fool the judge asked, "the prosecutor, your lawyer, or the court? 9 In the hearing of September 22, 1976, the interrogation of Virgilio Marcelo, the other accused, was conducted almost wholly by the judge who started cross-examining the witness even before the defense counsel could ask his first question, and took over from the prosecution the task of impeaching Marcelo's credibility. The judge asked him about his drug addiction, his membership in the Commando gang, his tattoos, his parentage, his activities, his criminal record all when he was supposed to be under direct examination by his own lawyer. Defense counsel could hardly put in a word edgewise because the judge kept interrupting to ask his own questions. The questions were not clarificatory but adversary; and when they were not adversary, they were irrelevant, and sometimes also cruel. At one point, the judge drew from the witness the statement that his mother was living with another man; forthwith he suggested that the mother was unfaithful to his father. We deplore this sadistic treatment of the witness, especially as, for all his supposed "toughness," he could not answer back. We fail to see what possible connection the mother's infidelity could have had, by any stretch of the imagination, with the instant prosecution. But the judge was to save the best or worst of his spite for the third witness, LilianLayug, a waitress in the restaurant where the appellant Opida was working as a cook. Noting at the outset that she spoke English, he wanted to know where she had learned it and asked in ill-concealed insinuation if she had worked in Angeles City or Olongapo or Sangley. Because she was gesturing nervously, he asked, "Are you a conductor? Of the two accused, he asked her, "They are very proud of belonging to the Commando gang to which the witness answered, putting him in his place, "That I do not know, Your Honor." On direct examination, Opida challenged his extrajudicial confession, claiming it had been obtained without observance of the rights available under Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, particularly the right to counsel.17 Parenthetically, the extrajudicial confession of Marcelo was also made without assistance of counsel. 18 Opida also testified, under questioning from his counsel, that he had been repeatedly hit with a "dos por dos" by a police officer while he was being investigated. 19 We have consistently held that the rights guaranteed during a custodial investigation are not supposed to be merely communicated to the suspect, especially if he is unlettered, but must be painstakingly explained to him so he can understand their nature and significance. Moreover, manhandling of any sort will vitiate any extrajudicial confession that may be extracted from him and renders it inadmissible in evidence against him. 20 Those principles were given mere lip service by the judge, who did not bother to look deeper into the validity of the challenged confessions. Given the obvious hostility of the judge toward the defense, it was inevitable that all the protestations of the accused in this respect would be, as they in fact were, dismissed. And once the confessions were admitted, it was easy enough to employ them as corroborating evidence of the claimed conspiracy among the accused. The accused are admittedly notorious criminals who were probably even proud of their membership in the Commando gang even as they flaunted their tattoos as a badge of notoriety. 21 Nevertheless, they were entitled to be presumed innocent until the contrary was proved and had a right not to be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. 22 The judge disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too eager to convict the accused, who had manifestly earned his enmity. When he said at the conclusion of the trial, "You want me to dictate the decision now?" 23, he was betraying a pre-judgment long before made and obviously waiting only to be formalized. The scales of justice must hang equal and, in fact, should even be tipped in favor of the accused because of the constitutional presumption of innocence. Needless to stress, this right is available to every accused, whatever his present circumstance and no matter how dark and repellent his past. Despite their sinister connotations in our society, tattoos are at best dubious adornments only and surely not under our laws indicia of criminality. Of bad taste perhaps, but not of crime. In any event, convictions are based not on the mere appearance of the accused but on his actual commission of crime, to be ascertained with the pure objectivity of the true judge who must uphold the law for all without favor or malice and always with justice. Accused-appellants Opida and Marcelo, who have been imprisoned since 1976, have sent us separate letters pleading for the resolution of their death sentences one way or the other once and for all. Considering the way they were tried, we now declare that they should not be detained in jail a minute longer. While this is not to say that the accused are not guilty, it does mean that, because their constitutional rights have been violated, their guilt, if it exists, has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and so cannot be pronounced. Due process has stayed the uneven hand of the quick condemnor and must set the defendants free.

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WHEREFORE, the conviction of Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo is reversed and they are hereby ordered released immediately. No costs. People vsMortera FACTS: This is an appeal from the January 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in criminal case which found accused BenancioMortera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the killing of one Robelyn Rojas. Prosecution witness Ramil Gregorio testified that one afternoon, he together with other men were drinking tuba. They have just started drinking when BenancioMortera, Jr. arrived. He wanted to hit Alberto Rojas with a Nescafe glass. Alberto Rojas ran away. Mortera said, "Sayang." He listened while the group of Ramil Gregorio were singing accompanied by a guitar. Jomer Diaz, brother-in-law of Alberto Diaz, arrived. Mortera said, "Here comes another Rojas." Gregorio and his companions told Jomer Diaz to run away. Mortera hurled a stone at Diaz but the latter was not hit. Mortera left but he said that he will return. After a few minutes, Mortera came back. When Jomer Diaz ran, Robelyn Rojas, brother of Alberto Rojas went to Jomer. Mortera met Robelyn at a distance of about seven meters from the place where the group were drinking. Mortera and Robelyn discussed with each other and later shook hands. Robelyn turned his face and Mortera suddenly stabbed Robelyn Rojas at the back. After stabbing Robelyn, Mortera ran away. Robelyn Rojas tried to chase Mortera but he was not able to catch up but he fell down mortally wounded. He was brought to the hospital by his brother but he was pronounced DOA at the hospital. JovelVeales who was drinking together with Ramil Gregorio and others, corroborated Ramil Gregorio's testimony. Although the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned, during the trial, he admitted having stabbed the victim whom he referred to as Tonying, but claimed self-defense. By his account he passed by a corner and saw a group of people drinking. They were Ramil Gregorio, JonelVeales and Tonying. Upon seeing him, Tonying ran away and called his brother, Alberto Rojas. When the accused was about to reach the main road, Alberto Rojas, Tonying and a certain "Duk" (brother-in-law of Tonying) accosted him and asked him for liquor money. When he refused, the three men got angry. After telling them that he had to go, Tonying hit him with a spray gun (for painting), causing him to fall down. While he was in a supine position, Tonying attempted to hit him again. It was at that point that he was able to get hold of his knife and thrust it forward and hit someone. He did not know who got stabbed. He then immediately fled. On January 23, 2007, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of murder. In rejecting the claim of self-defense, the trial court stated that it was not worthy of belief as it was belied by the credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The accused appealed to the CA raising the issues of denial of due process of law and his right to an impartial trial. He claimed that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostile towards him and prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from his "prosecutor-like" conduct. The accused likewise reiterated his claim of self-defense. In its decision, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the civil liabilities. The CA ruled that the trial judge did not transgress the standard of "cold neutrality" required of a magistrate and added that the questions he propounded were "substantially clarificatory." Still not satisfied, the accused now comes before the SC. ISSUE: WON the accused were denied of his right to have an impartial trial. HELD: As correctly pointed out by the CA, although the trial judge might have made improper remarks and comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial trial. Upon perusal of the transcript as a whole, it cannot be said that the remarks were reflective of his partiality. Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a negative defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the dark as to his intended defense. The invocation of Opida did not persuade the SC. In Opida, SC did not fail to notice the "malicious," "sadistic" and "adversarial" manner of questioning by the trial judge of the accused therein, including their defense witness. In Opida, the accused never admitted the commission of the crime, and so the burden of proof remained with the prosecution. Therefore, SC affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. Rodriguez vs. Blancaflor The Facts Previously pending before Judge Blancaflor was Criminal Case No. 22240 for arson (arson case), entitled People of the Philippines v. Teksan Ami, in which Tulali was the trial prosecutor. During the pendency of the case, Tulali was implicated in a controversy involving an alleged bribery initiated by Randy Awayan (Awayan), the driver assigned to Judge Blancaflor under the payroll of the Office of the Governor of Palawan, and one Ernesto Fernandez (Fernandez), to assure the acquittal of the accused, Rolly Ami (Ami), and the dismissal of the arson case. On June 29, 2009, a day before the scheduled promulgation of the decision in the arson case, Tulali filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation withdrawing his appearance in the said case to prevent any suspicion of misdemeanor and collusion. He attached to the said manifestation a copy of the administrative complaint against Awayan filed (but eventually withdrawn) by his superior, Rodriguez, before the Office of the Governor of Palawan. On June 30, 2009, Judge Blancaflor rendered his decision acquitting Ami of the crime of arson. Purportedly on the basis of the administrative complaint filed against Awayan and Rodriguez, Judge Blancaflor summoned several witnesses including Tulali and heard their testimonies. On July 30, 2009, he issued an order summoning Rodriguez to appear before him for the purpose of holding an inquiry on matters pertaining to his possible involvement in Tulalis filing of the ex-parte manifestation and the administrative complaint against Awayan, among others. On August 7, 2009, Rodriguez filed his Motion for Clarification as to the purpose of Judge Blancaflors continued inquiries considering that the decision in the arson case had already been promulgated. In an order dated August 13, 2009, Judge Blancaflor informed the petitioners that he was proceeding against them for direct contempt and violation of their oath of office on the basis of Tulalis ExParte Manifestation. As earlier recited, after the submission of petitioners respective position papers, Judge Blancaflor issued the assailed October 13, 2009 Decision finding petitioners guilty of direct contempt. The

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penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and a fine of P100,000.00 each were imposed upon them. Petitioners argue that the contempt proceedings are null and void for contravening their rights to due process of law. They claim that they were denied their rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, to confront the witnesses and present their own evidence. According to petitioners, Judge Blancaflors disregard of due process constituted grave abuse of discretion which was further aggravated by the unlawful manner of simultaneously conducting suspension and contempt proceedings against them. Petitioners further argue that the penalty imposed upon them in the "direct contempt" proceeding is clearly oppressive and without basis. In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment,5 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding petitioners guilty of direct contempt as the judgment was not based on law and evidence. The petition is impressed with merit. The power to punish a person in contempt of court is inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of punishment.6 Such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.7 In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge Blancaflors order penalizing petitioners for direct contempt on the basis of Tulalis Ex-Parte Manifestation. Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.8 Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be construed as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt. It must be recalled that the subject manifestation bore Tulalis voluntary withdrawal from the a rson case to dispel any suspicion of collusion between him and the accused. Its filing on the day before the promulgation of the decision in the pending criminal case, did not in any way disrupt the proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should not be held accountable for his act which was done in good faith and without malice. Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or participation in, the preparation and filing of the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed by Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case. The attached complaint against Awayan was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC. Apparently, Judge Blancaflors conclusion, that the subject manifestation containing derogatory matters was purposely filed to discredit the administration of justice in court, is unfounded and without basis. There being no factual or legal basis for the charge of direct contempt, it is clear that Judge Blancaflor gravely abused his discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged. Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from the penalty imposed on the petitioners. Under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court, direct contempt before the RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine not exceeding P2,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both. The penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 each with the additional order to issue a public apology to the Court under pain of arrest, is evidently unreasonable, excessive and outside the bounds of the law. Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor for non-observance of due process in conducting the contempt proceedings. It must be emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely unnecessary. What is your participation in the media coverage Re: VILIFICATION CAMPAIGN of the Judge of Branch 52 RTC-Palawan from July 1 to 10, 2009. Do you recognize that as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the Court, pursuant to the rules of judicial ethics and your oath of office as a lawyer, your loyalty and fidelity is primarily to the Court? Do you still recognize this duty and obligation? 9 Indeed, Judge Blancaflor failed to conform to the standard of honesty and impartiality required of judges as mandated under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. As a public servant, a judge should perform his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.10 Contempt and suspension proceedings are supposed to be separate and distinct. They have different objects and purposes for which different procedures have been established. Judge Blancaflor should have conducted separate proceedings. As held in the case of People v. Godoy,11 thus: A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer to

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continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice. x xx. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof. Thus, it was grossly improper for Judge Blancaflor to consider his July 30, 2009 Order on the contempt charge as the notice required in the disciplinary proceedings suspending petitioners from the practice of law.1avvphi1 Granting that the simultaneous conduct of contempt and suspension proceedings is permitted, the suspension of petitioners must still fail. This Court is not unmindful of a judges power to suspend an attorney from practice for just cause pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Judge Blancaflor, however, must be reminded that the requirements of due process must be complied with, as mandated under Section 30, Rule 138 of the same Rules which specifically provides, viz: Sec. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. His guilt, however, cannot be presumed. It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done, as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel. 12 In the case at bench, there was no prior and separate notice issued to petitioners setting forth the facts constituting the misconduct and requiring them, within a specified period from receipt thereof, to show cause why they should not be suspended from the practice of their profession. Neither were they given full opportunity to defend themselves, to produce evidence on their behalf and to be heard by themselves and counsel. Undoubtedly, the suspension proceedings against petitioners are null and void, having violated their right to due process. Likewise, Judge Blancaflors suspension order is also void as the basis for suspension is not one of the causes that will warrant disciplinary action. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules enumerates the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar from his office as attorney, to wit: (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer's oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Judge Blancaflor failed to show that the suspension was for any of the foregoing grounds. In fine, having established that Judge Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, petitioners are entitled to the remedy of prohibition under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules on Contempt which provides: SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. - The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The contemnor must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt. Where the person adjudged in direct contempt by any court avails of the remedy of certiorari or prohibition, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him. 13 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 13, 2009 Decision and November 6, 2009 Order are hereby annulled and set aside. Judge BienvenidoBlancaflor is hereby permanently enjoined from implementing the said decision and order. This injunctive order is immediately executory. Catacutanvs People Factual Antecedents The antecedent facts are clear and undisputed. Private complainant GeorgitoPosesano was an Instructor II with Salary Grade 13 while private complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was an Education Program Specialist II with Salary Grade 16, both at the Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT). [3] On June 2, 1997, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Caraga Administrative Region, appointed and promoted private complainants as Vocational Instruction Supervisor III with Salary Grade 18 at SNSAT.[4] These promotional appointments were duly approved and attested as permanent by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on June 3, 1997.[5] Being then the Officer-InCharge of SNSAT, the approved appointments were formally transmitted to the petitioner on June 6, 1997,[6] copy furnished the concerned appointees. Despite receipt of the appointment letter, the private

13
complainants were not able to assume their new position since petitioner made known that he strongly opposed their appointments and that he would not implement them despite written orders from CHED[7] and the CSC, Caraga Regional Office.[8] Thus, on August 2, 1997, private complainants lodged a formal complaint against petitioner for grave abuse of authority and disrespect of lawful orders before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. [9] In an Information dated February 27, 1998, petitioner was charged before the RTC of Surigao City with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as amended, committed in the following manner, to wit: That in June 1997 or sometime thereafter, in Surigao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN, OIC Principal of Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT), Surigao City, with salary grade below 27, while in the performance of his official duties, thus committing the act in relation to his office, willfully, feloniously and unlawfully did then and there, with grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith, refuse to implement the promotion/appointments of GeorgitoPosesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Supervisors III notwithstanding the issuance of the valid appointments by the appointing authority and despite the directive of the Regional Director of the Commission on Higher Education and the Civil Service Commission in the region, thereby causing undue injury to complainants who were supposed to receive a higher compensation for their promotion, as well as [to] the school and the students who were deprived of the better services which could have been rendered by GeorgitoPosesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Instruction Supervisors [III]. CONTRARY TO LAW.[10] During arraignment on September 22, 1998, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." For his defense, petitioner admitted that he did not implement the promotional appointments of the private complainants because of some procedural lapses or infirmities attending the preparation of the appointment papers. According to him, the appointment papers were prepared by SNSAT Administrative Officer, Crispin Noguera, using blank forms bearing the letterhead of SNSAT and not of the CHED Regional Office who made the appointments. He also averred that the appointment papers cited the entire plantilla[11] (1996 Plantilla-OSEC-DECSB-VOCIS3-19, Pages 1-16) instead of only the particular page on which the vacant item occurs. He likewise claimed that he received only the duplicate copies of the appointments contrary to the usual procedure where the original appointment papers and other supporting documents are returned to his office. Finally, he asserted that the transmittal letter from the CHED did not specify the date of effectivity of the appointments. These alleged infirmities, he contended, were formally brought to the attention of the CHED Regional Director on June 20, 1997[12] who, however, informed him that the subject appointments were regular and valid and directed him to implement the same. Still not satisfied, petitioner sought the intercession of CHED Chairman Angel C. Alcala in the settlement of this administrative problem[13] but the latter did not respond. Petitioner alleged that his refusal to implement the appointments of the private complainants was not motivated by bad faith but he just wanted to protect the interest of the government by following strict compliance in the preparation of appointment papers. Issue The sole issue for consideration in this present petition is: Whether the [petitioner's] constitutional right[s] to due process x xx and x xx equal protection of [the] law x xx were violated x xx [when he was denied] the opportunity to present [in] evidence [the Court of Appeals'] Decision dated April 18, 2001 x xx in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 entitled "Jose R. Catacutan, petitioner, versus Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, et al., respondents." [22] Invoking the constitutional provision on due process, [23] petitioner argues that the Decision rendered by the trial court is flawed and is grossly violative of his right to be heard and to present evidence. He contends that he was not able to controvert the findings of the trial court since he was not able to present the Court of Appeals' (CA's) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 which denied the administrative case filed against him and declared that his intention in refusing to implement the promotions of the private complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent. Our Ruling The petition lacks of merit. Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process. "Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard." [24] "Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy."[25] "Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process." [26] Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim denial of his fundamental right to due process. Records show that petitioner was able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, argue his case vigorously, and explain the merits of his defense. To reiterate, as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law for the opportunity to be heard is the better accepted norm of procedural due process. Under said provision of law, three essential elements must thus be satisfied, viz: 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; 3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. [31] All the above enumerated elements of the offense charged have been successfully proven by the prosecution. First, petitioner could not have committed the acts imputed against him during the time material to this case were it not for his being a public officer, that is, as the Officer-In-Charge (Principal) of SNSAT. As such public officer, he exercised official duties and functions, which include the exercise of administrative supervision over the school such as taking charge of personnel management and finances, as well as implementing instruction as far as appointment of teachers. Second, petitioner acted with evident bad faith in refusing to implement the appointments of private complainants. While petitioner may have laudable objectives in refusing the implementation of private complainants' valid appointments, the Court fails to see how he can still claim good faith when no less than the higher authorities have already sustained the validity of the subject appointments and have ordered him to proceed with the implementation. "It is well to remember that good intentions do not win cases, evidence does."[34]

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Third, undue injury to the private complainants was duly proven to the point of moral certainty. Here, the private complainants suffered undue injury when they were not able to assume their official duties as Vocational Supervisors III despite the issuance of their valid appointments. As borne out by the records, they were able to assume their new positions only on November 19, 1997. So in the interregnum from June to November 1997, private complainants failed to enjoy the benefits of an increased salary corresponding to their newly appointed positions. Likewise established is that as a result of petitioner's unjustified and inordinate refusal to implement their valid appointments notwithstanding clear and mandatory directives from his superiors, the private complainants suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights, serious anxiety warranting the award of moral damages under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code. At this point, the Court just needs to stress that the foregoing are factual matters that were threshed out and decided upon by the trial court which were subsequently affirmed by the Sandiganbayan. Where the factual findings of both the trial court and the appellate court coincide, the same are binding on this Court. In any event, apart from these factual findings of the lower courts, this Court in its own assessment and review of the records considers the findings in order. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on December 7, 2006 is AFFIRMED. Chan-Tan vs. ChanG.R.no. 167139 (February 25, 2010) Facts:June 1989: Petitioner and respondent got married at the Manila Cathedral. They had sons Justin (born inCanada in 1990) and Russel (born in the Philippines in 1993). Susie Chan-Tan, petitioner, then filed a case of annulment under FC 36 (psychological incapacity) againstJesse Tan. The parties, thereafter, submitted a compromise agreement. July 31, 2003: trial court issued a partial judgment of approval of the said compromise agreement. March 30, 2004: trial court declared the marriage null and void, under FC 36, on the ground of psychologicalincapacity of the parties. TC incorporated the compromise agreement it previously approved in said decision.Petitioner then cancelled the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No. 12, Block 2 property, andauthorizedMegaworld Corp. to offer it to other interested buyers. It also appeared that the petitioner left the countrywith the children. Respondent then filed an omnibus motion, seeking the main custody of the children claiming thatpetitioner brought the kids out of the country w/o his knowledge; that said petitioner failed to settle the balance for theMegaworld property, w/c, if forfeited, would prejudice the interest of the children; and that petitioner failed to turn over to him documents and titles in his name. May 17, 2004: TC awarded respondent custody of the children, ordered petitioner to turn over to respondentdocuments and titles in his name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, QC. June 28, 2004: Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that she was denied due process, was notable to properly present evidence due to negligence from her counsel, and said that she was forced out of thecountry due to beating she received from the respondent. Petitioner also prayed for an increase in the respondent'smonthly support obligation. October 12, 2004: TC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, because it was filed beyond the 15-dayreglementary period. TC also declared petitioner in contempt of court for non-compliance with the July 31, 2003partial judgment and the May 17, 2004 resolution. TC also denied the prayer for an increase in monthly supportobligation, since petitioner was able to enroll the children to another school by herself without respondent'sknowledge. November 4, 2004: Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration of the October 12, 2004resolution, claiming that she was no longer interested in the suit, claiming that withdrawing from the case would be inthe best interest of her children. She prayed to be vacated her from all prior orders, and leave the parties at a statusquo ante the filing of the suit, or re-instating the parties to their conditions prior the filings. December 28, 2004: TC denied both November 4, 2004 motions, declaring that the March 30, 2004 and May17, 2004 decisions had become final and executory upon lapse of the 15-day reglementary period.. February 15, 2005: TC again denied another motion for reconsideration of the December 28, 2004 decision. TCthen issued a Certificate of Finality of the March 30 and May 17, 2004 decisions.Issue: W/N the March 30, 2004 and May 17, 2004 decisions had become final and executory despite allegations of denial of dueprocess.Held: Petition has no merit, on the basis of lapse of the15-day reglementary period. Alleged negligence of counsel to inform the petitioner resulting in loss of petitioner's right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment that is valid and regular. Petitioner cannot claim she was denied due process, since records showed that she was very active in court. She alsocannot claim negligence on the part of her counsel, since said counsel issued a manifest on May 3, 2004, saying that saidcounsel made attempts to call the petitioner, but failed. Tan vsTabin Noryn S. Tan (complainant) filed a Complaint dated April 2, 2007 against Judge Maria Clarita CasugaTabin (respondent) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Baguio City for denial of due process relative to Criminal Case No. 118628. Complainant avers: On November 9, 2006, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Quezon City Police District (QCPD) served her a warrant of arrest dated October 13, 2006, issued by the MTCC Baguio City, Branch 4, presided by respondent, relative to Criminal Case No. 118628 for alleged violation of Batas PambansaBlg. 22. It was only then that she learned for the first time that a criminal case was filed against her before the court. She was detained at the Quezon City Hall Complex Police Office and had to post bail of P1,000.00 before the Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for her temporary release. Upon verification, she learned that respondent issued on August 8, 2006 an Order directing her to appear before the court on October 10, 2006 for arraignment. It was sent by mail to PNP Quezon City for service to her. However, she did not receive any copy of the Order and up to the present has not seen the same; hence, she was not able to attend her arraignment. She also found out that there was no proof of service of the Order or any notice to her of the arraignment. This notwithstanding, respondent issued a warrant for her arrest. Complainant alleges that she was deeply aggrieved and embarrassed by the issuance of the warrant for her arrest despite the fact that she was never notified of her arraignment. Complainant prayed that the appropriate investigation be conducted as to the undue issuance of a warrant for her arrest. 1

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In her Comment2 dated July 5, 2007, respondent answered: She issued the warrant of arrest because when the case was called for appearance, the complainant, as accused therein, failed to appear. Prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest, her staff sent by registered mail the court's Order dated August 8, 2006 addressed to complainant "through the Chief of Police, PNP, 1104, Quezon City" directing complainant to appear on October 10, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. for the arraignment and preliminary conference in Criminal Case No. 118628, as proven by Registry Receipt No. 0310. It is true that the return on the court's Order dated August 8, 2006 had not yet been made by the QC Police on or before October 10, 2006. Nonetheless, she issued the warrant of arrest in good faith and upon the following grounds: (a) under Sec. 3 of Rule 1313 of the Rules of Court, the court was entitled to presume that on October 10, 2006, after the lapse of a little over two months, official duty had been regularly performed and a letter duly directed and mailed had been received in the regular course of mail; and (b) Sec. 12 of the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases provides that bail may be required where the accused does not reside in the place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed. The warrant of arrest she issued was meant to implement this provision, which was not repealed by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, since complainant is a resident of Quezon City and not of Baguio City. If her interpretation was erroneous, she (respondent) believes that an administrative sanction for such error would be harsh and unsympathetic. She has nothing personal against complainant and did not want to embarrass or humiliate her. She issued the warrant in the honest belief that her act was in compliance with the rules. She prays that the case against her be dismissed and that a ruling on the interpretation of Secs. 10 & 12, of the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, in relation to Sec. 16 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure be made for the guidance of the bench and bar.4 The OCA, in its agenda report dated September 28, 2007, recommended that the case be dismissed for lack of merit. It held: Prior to the filing of the information, a preliminary investigation was conducted by the provincial prosecutor resulting in the Resolution dated July 11, 2006 recommending the filing of the case; it was incredulous for complainant to claim that she came to learn for the first time of the filing of the criminal case when the warrant of arrest was served on her; furthermore, there was already a complete service of notice as contemplated in Sec. 10, Rule 13 5 of the Rules of Court; hence the requirement of notice was fully satisfied by the service of the Order dated August 8, 2006 and the completion of the service thereof.6 Adopting the recommendation of the OCA, the Court on November 12, 2007 issued a Resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit.7 Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 8, 2008 alleging: The issue in this case was not whether complainant was aware of the criminal complaint against her, but whether the issuance of a warrant of arrest against her despite the absence of notice should be administratively dealt with; complainant was never notified of the arraignment; thus, she was not able to attend the same; respondent admitted in her Comment that no return had yet been made on or before October 10, 2006, the date respondent ordered the warrant to be issued; her explanation of good faith was therefore unjustifiable; neither could respondent invoke the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty, since the complainant did not actually receive any notice; respondent in an Order dated March 14, 2007 admitted that since she did not usually wear eyeglasses during hearings, she thought that the acknowledgment receipt at the back of the Order referred to the copy sent to complainant; later scrutiny, however, showed that it pertained to the one sent to the prosecutor's office; Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court did not apply to the instant case; the Order was addressed and sent to PNP Quezon City; assuming that the Order was properly served on the PNP, it was not equivalent to a service on complainant; there was no actual delivery of the Order to the complainant; hence, there was no personal service; neither was it served by ordinary mail or by registered mail; thus, the rule on completeness of service had not been satisfied; complainant was not aware of and therefore did not attend the preliminary investigation of her case; no proof can be shown that she was ever notified of the said preliminary investigation, much less of the filing of the same. 8 In a Resolution dated April 16, 2008, the Court required respondent to Comment on complainant's Motion for Reconsideration.9 Complainant filed a Comment stating: Complainant's motion did not raise any new issue or ground that would merit the reconsideration of the Court's November 12, 2007 Resolution; complainant failed to rebut the presumption that she was notified of the scheduled arraignment; what complainant propounded was a mere self-serving denial that she never received the subpoena intended for her; there was no explanation why she would be able to receive a warrant of arrest; which was coursed in the same manner as the subpoena, in a little less than a month, but allegedly to receive the subpoena in almost two months; if complainant's assertion was to be believed, the effect would be to paralyze the operation of courts in the provinces that had to inevitably rely on the police resources of Metro Manila; arraignments could not proceed and trials could not go on; it was reasonable to follow as a rule that once a pleading or any other official document was received in the ordinary course of sending them, it must be presumed that others of the same nature were also delivered to the named addressees; to believe otherwise would be to delay justice for those residing outside Metro Manila. 10 The Court finds the Motion for Reconsideration to be impressed with merit. Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is that the court shall not order the arrest of the accused, unless the accused fails to appear whenever required.11 This is clearly provided in Section 16 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which states: Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. - The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be in bail or on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court. (Emphasis supplied) In this case, respondent claims that the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of complainant was justified, since complainant failed to appear during the arraignment in spite of an order requiring her to do so. Respondent admits, however, that a copy of the Order dated August 8, 2006, was sent to complainant "through the Chief of Police, PNP, 1104, Quezon City. " While it is true that the Rules of Court provides for presumptions, one of which is that official duty has been regularly performed, such presumption should not be the sole basis of a magistrate in concluding that a person called to court has failed to appear as required, which in turn justifies the issuance of a

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warrant for her arrest, when such notice was not actually addressed to her residence but to the police in her city. So basic and fundamental is a person's right to liberty that it should not be taken lightly or brushed aside with the presumption that the police through which the notice had been sent, actually served the same on complainant whose address was not even specified. Respondent further admitted in her Comment dated July 5, 2007 that when she proceeded with the arraignment on October 10, 2006 as scheduled, no return had yet been made by the Quezon City Police.12 Nevertheless, she issued the warrant of arrest, arguing that she did so on the presumption that regular duty had been performed, and that the Order had been received in the regular course of mail; and since Sec. 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure provides that bail may be required where the accused does not reside in the place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed, the warrant of arrest she issued was justified since complainant is a resident of Quezon City and not of Baguio City. The Court disagrees. Sections 10 and 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases (As Amended) state: Sec. 10. Duty of the Court. - On the basis of the complaint of information and the affidavits accompanying the same, the court shall make a preliminary determination whether to dismiss the case outright for being patently without basis or merit, or to require further proceedings to be taken. In the latter case, the court may set the case for immediate arraignment of an accused under custody, and if he pleads guilty, may render judgment forthwith. If he pleads not guilty, and in all other cases, the court shall issue an order, accompanied by copies of all the affidavits submitted by the complainant, directing the defendant(s) to appear and submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses at a specified date not later than ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Failure on the part of the defendant to appear whenever required, shall cause the issuance of a warrant for his arrest if the court shall find that a probable cause exists after an examination in writing and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses. (Emphasis supplied) x xxx Sec. 12. Bail not required; Exception. --- No bail shall be required except when a warrant of arrest is issued in accordance with Section 10 hereon or where the accused (a) is a recidivist; (b) is fugitive from justice; (c) is charged with physical injuries; (d) does not reside in the place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed, or (e) has no known residence. Section 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure was not reproduced in the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, while Section 10 was revised and portions thereof reproduced in Sections 1213 and 16 of the 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure. Granting, arguendo, that Sections 10 and 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases were not repealed by the 1991 Revised Rules, still it does not justify the warrant of arrest issued in this case. Section 12 talks of instances when bails are required, one of which is when the accused does not reside in the place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed. It does not state, however, that a warrant of arrest shall immediately issue even without actual notice to the accused. Respondent's interpretation ascribes to the rules those which were not expressly stated therein and unduly expands their meaning. The Court also notes that in an Order dated March 14, 2007, a copy of which was attached by complainant to her Motion for Reconsideration, respondent admitted that: As a point of clarification, during the hearing on October 10, 2006, when the case was called and the accused failed to appear, the Court verified from the staff if the Accused was notified to which said staff answered in the affirmative, showing to the Court a copy of the Order dated August 8, 2006, setting this case for Appearance of the Accused on October 10, 2006. At the back of the Order was an attached Acknowledgment Receipt. A quick glance of the said receipt, and without eyeglasses of the Presiding Judge, as she does not usually wear one during Court sessions, made this Court believed that indeed, that was the Acknowledgment Receipt proving that the Accused was served with a copy of the said Order. The attention of the Court was called upon receipt of the Accused's Motion for Clarification and a closer look on the Acknowledgment Receipt shows that the same was for the City Prosecutor's Office . x x x14 (Emphasis supplied) From this, it can be inferred that respondent issued the warrant of arrest on the mistaken belief that complainant was actually notified of the arraignment. A closer scrutiny of the records however showed that the Acknowledgment Receipt pertained to the copy of the City Prosecutor's Office and not that of complainant's. Whatever the real reasons behind respondent's issuance of complainant's warrant of arrest -- whether from the mistaken belief that complainant was actually notified, or the presumption that the police had served a copy of the order on complainant or that the rules allow immediate issuance of warrants of arrests whenever the accused does not reside in the locality where the crime was committed -- the fact is, respondent failed to uphold the rules, for which she should be held administratively liable. The Court has held that a judge commits grave abuse of authority when she hastily issues a warrant of arrest against the accused in violation of the summary procedure rule that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence.15 While judges may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision they render, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent, abusive and arbitrary in their prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law, there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.16 While there appears to be no malicious intent on the part of respondent, such lack of intent, however, cannot completely free her from liability. 17 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to her office to know and simply apply it.18 Considering that this is respondent's first administrative infraction in her more than 8 years of service in the judiciary,19 which serves to mitigate her liability, the Court holds the imposition of a fine in the amount ofP10,000.00 to be proper in this case.20 WHEREFORE, Judge Maria Clarita Casuga-Tabin, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Baguio City is hereby found guilty of abuse of authority for which she is fined in the sum of P10,000.00. Secretary of Justice vs Judge Ralph Lantion Due Process

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Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez. ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process. HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case against Jimenez refer to an impending threat of deprivation of ones property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.