1) Introduction

In general, the energy security definitions by developed countries refer to a resilient energy system and securing the amount of energy required for peoples life, economic and social activities, defense and other purposes for acceptable prices, while, for developing countries, it is enough energy supply (quantity and quality) to meet all requirements at all time of all citizens in affordable and stable price, and it also leads to sustain economic performance and poverty alleviation, better quality of life without harming the environment. According to the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), energy security is the ability of an economy to guarantee the availability of energy resource supply in a sustainable and timely manner with the energy price being at a level that will not adversely affect the economic performance of the economy. International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA), energy security is the uninterrupted provision of vital energy services, is critical for energy nation. Winzer defines energy security as the continuity of energy supplies relative to demand. Based on these definitions and above statements, it is clear that energy security encompasses not only the economic dimension, but also the social and environment aspects. Therefore, to address the countrys current and future energy security, it needs to consider these dimensions of energy, ranging from production to utilization, including conversion, transport, and supply and demand side efficiencies. [1] Energy security is a term for an association between national security and the availability of natural resources for energy consumption. Access to cheap energy has become essential to the functioning of modern economies. However, the uneven distribution of energy supplies among countries has led to significant vulnerabilities. Renewable energy resources and significant opportunities for energy efficiency exist over wide geographical areas, in contrast to other energy sources, which are concentrated in a limited number of countries. Rapid deployment of renewable energy and energy efficiency, and technological diversification of energy sources, would result in significant energy security and economic benefits. [2]

1.1)

Evolution of energy security Energy insecurity can be defined as the loss of welfare that may occur as a result of a

change in the price or availability of energy (Bohi and Toman, 1996). Whether energy insecurity stems from price or physical availability concerns, however, depends on the nature and effectiveness of price-volume linkages in the market. In regulated energy markets, prices are fixed or pegged to other energy commodities. This is notably the case of natural gas prices which in many regions of the world are indexed to oil prices. Such arrangements may bring greater price security, yet the lack of price-volume linkages raises important physical availability concerns. In the case of a supply shortfall, for example, prices are unable to adjust, leading to excessive demand compared to available volumes, which raises the risk of physical unavailability. [2] In markets where prices do reflect market fundamentals, a shortfall in supply leads to a number of responses to re-establish market equilibrium. These generally include more expensive suppliers entering the market as well as consumers unwilling to pay the higher price reducing their consumption or switching to alternative fuels. The price mechanism therefore lowers risks of physical unavailability. In the end, the main energy security concern is one of price being set at uncompetitive levels. So while energy security always consists of both a physical unavailability component and a price component, the relative importance of these depends on the market structure, and in particular the extent to which prices are set competitively or not. [2]

Addressing energy insecurity The welfare losses referred to in the above definition of energy security, whether due to prices set at uncompetitive levels or physical unavailability are in fact the external costs of energy insecurity. Due to the ubiquity of commercial energy use, however, determining these external costs in practice is difficult. This is particularly true in the case of energy sources traded on international markets as impacts are all the more diffused. Appropriately gauging the magnitude of the problem and an adequate policy response is therefore a difficult task. Nevertheless, governments have defined a variety of tools to mitigate the risk of physical unavailability occurring in extreme events. These include, when economically viable, establishing strategic reserves. Among major energy consuming countries, for example, the risk
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of physical unavailability led to establishing co-ordinate emergency oil stocks. Governments may also seek to establish contingency plans to curtail consumption in times of major supply disruptions. In the longer term, governments have tended to focus policy efforts on tackling the root causes of energy insecurity. These can be broken down into four broad categories: Energy system disruptions linked to extreme weather conditions or accidents: A recent example from this category is the impact on the energy system of Hurricane Katrina which hit the Gulf of Mexico in 2005. Several refineries and other energy infrastructures were affected and had to be completely or partially shutdown for repairs that took several weeks or months. The impacts were so severe that the physical shortage of oil became a serious threat, leading the IEA to release oil stocks for the first time since 1991. However, while such incidents may be potentially disastrous and have far reaching economic implications, government action to address such potential causes of energy insecurity is not necessarily mandated. In many cases, for example, industry itself establishes standards of construction, provides spare capacity or diversifies sources and supply routes to ensure a given level of resilience of the system and avoid costly disruption. In any case, the scope of action is precautionary in nature. It should be noted, however, that governments have a clear role in preparing contingency arrangements for the management of and recovery from such incidents after they happen. Short-term balancing of demand and supply in electricity markets: As electricity is a nonstorable commodity, it is both technically and economically impossible to deliver electricity of varying quality as a function of consumers willingness to pay brown outs or black outs affect everyone. Thus, quality is a characteristic of electricity that everybody can benefit from without reducing the benefit for other one of the defining characteristics of a public good. Without intervention from governments, markets alone are unlikely to manage the short-term operational phase of balancing demand and supply in order to provide an acceptable level of quality and ensure system security (IEA, 2005b). The policy response to this is in fact relatively straight forward. Governments have established independent Transmission System Operators (TSOs) responsible for the short-term balancing of demand and supply to ensure a given standard of quality. Regulatory failures: Governments play an essential role in ensuring market rules are clearly defined to create effective marketplaces. In addition, electricity and gas networks tend to be considered as natural monopolies and are therefore under considerable regulatory supervision.
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Regulatory failures that have energy security implications may therefore occur. The policy response to such regulatory failures is by definition complex as in most cases the failure is not known until a problem occurs. It consists principally of monitoring and adjusting regulatory frameworks when a failure is identified. Concentration of fossil fuel resources: This is the most long-lasting cause of energy insecurity. Due to the concentration of resources in certain regions of the world, exploration and production as well as the transport of fuels to the market are also characterized by a certain degree of concentration. In addition, in many cases, fossil fuel resources are concentrated in politically sensitive regions. In the case of the transport of fuels to market, this is often exacerbated by local geographic constraints. These include for example choke points along oil trade routes, such as the Strait of Hormuz or the Suez Canal. Resource concentration can affect almost the entire energy system as fossil fuels play a prevailing role in most energy applications. The policy response to this cause of energy insecurity aims to reduce the exposure of a country to the resource concentration risks. [2] Out of these four categories policy implications are most significant in the case of regulatory failures and resource concentration. These are presented in more detail below.

Regulatory failures as a source of energy insecurity Over recent years, the energy security implications of regulatory failures have attracted significant attention due in large part to renewed efforts to liberalise energy markets in many OECD countries. Among the latest of these efforts, are the European Community Electricity and Gas Directives adopted in 2003, which officially launched the process of market liberalisation in European gas and electricity sectors. he institutional shift involved in the transition to liberalised markets is complex and takes place over many years. While the basic regulatory foundation may be established over a relatively short period of time, the learning process for regulators, firms, and end-users is linked to long-lived capital investment cycles. The establishment of a sound regulatory structure in support of energy markets can therefore be a long process spanning over many years, if not decades. Throughout this process, governments must monitor the evolution of markets and adjust market rules accordingly. Many electricity market structures, for example, underwent significant changes as they found themselves facing new challenges. In England and Wales the entire market structure was fundamentally changed in 2001, eleven years after its
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initial launch. Similarly, following an extensive market review in 2002, significant modifications were made to the electricity market structure in Australia (IEA, 2005b). Regulatory failures can take a variety of forms depending on the specificities of markets. Nevertheless, based on experience accumulated to date, certain types of regulatory failures common to most market structures can be identified as potential sources of energy insecurity. One, for example, is the limited consumer response to price variations. In an efficient market, the price is formed through the interaction of supply and demand. If buyers do not participate actively in this price-setting process, prices cannot play their balancing role. Instability may result such as excessive price volatility. In most cases, the limited demand response is a legacy of old vertically integrated energy systems, where the focus was largely set on the supply side and energy prices were uniformly set. By enhancing demand participation, governments can improve the efficiency of markets and enhance energy security. Demand response (even when only by a few large consumers) can notably dampen price peaks, reducing costs and risks to all market participants. Another example of a market failure with potentially important energy security implications is the inability of markets to spur investments when those are necessary. As it is only through actual investments in new capacity that one can gauge the efficacy of the regulatory structure to spur new investments, it is difficult to assess whether there is in fact a regulatory failure before a complete investment cycle takes place. In the oil products markets, for example, fears of underinvestment in refining capacity in OECD countries are growing and policymakers are actively considering how to adjust regulations in order to spur new investments. Over the past decade, demand for motor gasoline in the US has grown 2.4 times faster than the rate of refinery production capacity and there have been no new refineries built since 1976. In response, the US government is actively trying to spur new investments in refineries notably by simplifying environmental regulations. The policy response consists of monitoring the effectiveness of market rules and adjusting regulations when a regulatory failure is detected. It is a learning-by doing process. In principle, therefore, such concerns should fade as experience accumulates and regulatory structures are fine tuned. In practice, however, this is complicated by the inherent difficulty of distinguishing energy security concerns linked to regulatory imperfections from the normal functioning of energy markets.
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Fossil fuel resource concentration as a source of energy insecurity The uneven distribution of fossil fuel resources around the world is the most long-lasting cause of energy insecurity. 62% of global proved16 oil reserves are found in the Middle East. Taken together, members of the Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries account for 75% of global reserves while OECD countries only account for 7% and consume close to 60% of world total. Similarly, over half of global proved gas reserves are found in three countries: the Russian Federation (27%), Iran (15%), and Qatar (14%) while the OECD accounts for only 8% of the total and consumes over 50% of world total (BP, 2005). As illustrated in Figure 3 in the case of oil, resources in the Middle East and North African countries are more easily and economically accessible than those found in the OECD. Many OECD countries have, therefore, relied significantly on imports from these regions. In 2004, OECD countries imported 59% of their oil consumption while in the case of gas, OECD Europe and OECD Pacific imported respectively 40% and 69% of their total consumption. The limited number of import sources and the sensitive political climate in many exporting countries has fuelled much political concern in OECD countries. As illustrated in Figure 4, most significant world oil supply shortfalls were politically charged. While historically there have never been equivalent supply shortfalls inthe gas sector (since gas has tended to be mostly locally produced and used), the growing importance of long distance gas imports in OECD gas supplies is of increasing concern to policy makers. The Russia-Ukraine dispute and the echo it had across Europe in January 2006 is an indication of the sensitivity of the gas sector to potential supply disruptions.[2] Looking at reserve-to-production (R/P) ratios17 provides some insights on future trends. For oil, 2005 estimates show an R/P of approximately 81 years for the Middle East and 11 years for the OECD, indicating a likely increasing reliance on imports from the Middle East in the future. Gas R/P estimates are also much higher in the main resource rich countries than for the OECD 81 years for the Russian Federation, over 100 years for both Iran and Qatar and only 14 years for the OECD also indicating a trend towards rising imports by the OECD (BP, 2005). This is confirmed by recent IEA projections which also indicate a progressive concentration of import sources (IEA, 2006c).

Policy response to the energy security implication of resource concentration aims to minimize the exposure to concentration risks. This has taken a variety of forms ranging from energy efficiency measures to the promotion of less sensitive fuel sources. For example, though probably due as much to cost considerations as to energy security measures, the share of oil in electricity generation notably fell at the OECD level from 24% in 1974 to 5% in 2004, while the share of nuclear power rose from 5% to 23% (IEA, 2005d). Governments have also endeavored to diversify the mix of supplier countries, trade means and routes. [2]

1.2)

Parameters for sustainable energy security The analytical framework in fig. was developed to be applicable to any type of energy

system and was chosen as basis for the analysis in this article. The structure is more inclusive than many other frameworks on energy security and encompasses a variety of security and safety issues and potential risk factors. Within the energy system as an object approach, the focus lies on securing the functionality of the energy system, enabling it to provide the energy services demanded in society without major interruptions or severe price effects. These aspects are usually included in the term security of supply. One could also choose to take the perspective of the energy supplier for which security of demand is essential for preserving stable income, etc. Integrating the perspectives of the consumer and supplier could be justified by their mutual, but differing, interests in an efficiently functioning energy system. In the security of supply side of the approach, the focus is on the energy consumer, be it an individual, a nation or the global community. In this approach, considerations regarding long-term resource issues and short and medium-term balance between supply and demand are both of relevance, as is the adequacy and functioning of transportation, transmission and distribution infrastructure. Factors often used to qualify security of supply include resource availability, import dependency, supplier reliability, diversity in energy resources, secure transit routes, infrastructure reliability, etc. The approach to the energy system as a subject generating or enhancing insecurity can in turn be divided into three different types of risk areas: Economic-political, technological and environmental. [3] Economic-political risk factors arise from the competition around scarce and valuable resources, tensions, conflicts and violence resulting from overly abundant resources (the socalled resource curse), and the risk of the owner of a strategic resource using it as tool for achieving political and economic advantage. A consequence of the latter is that import
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dependency may appear as a negative factor in the discourse. However, liberal international relations theory presents a contrasting perspective and views interdependency as an important security-building factor. According to this theory, the more dependent countries are on each other, the more secure the world will be, which will also bring security to individual countries. Technological risk factors are associated with the physical characteristics of energy technologies, potentially leading to severe negative consequences and threats to security in cases where the system is not functioning as intended. This could be due to accidents, hostile attacks (e.g. on hydro dams or gas or nuclear facilities) or the use of radioactive material for weapon production or extortion. Environmental risk factors category, includes those security threats to the environment that occur as an unintended but well-known by-product of an otherwise efficiently functioning energy system. These include environmental impacts from expected GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions, threats to biodiversity from the extraction of RE sources, and health threats from air and water pollution. Although the typology of energy and security presented in fig can be helpful when analyzing the security aspects of energy, it should be noted that it is not possible to create a firm delimitation from other policy arenas such as environmental policy and economic policy. For example, the impact of energy use on the climate is, with good reason, usually framed as an environmental or a development issue rather than a security issue. The aspects analyzed in this paper under a security umbrella could also be studied in terms of sustainability, who defines energy security as the ability of an economy to provide sufficient, affordable and environmentally sustainable energy services so a to maintain maximum welfare state.[3]

Fig. 1 analytical structure used to study relationship between energy and security [3] 8

2) Global energy scenario and future projections 2.1) Fossil fuel scenario and growth
Population and income growth are the key drivers behind growing demand for energy. By 2030 world population is projected to reach 8.3 billion, which means an additional 1.3 billion people will need energy; and world income in 2030 is expected to be roughly double the 2011 level in real terms. World primary energy consumption is projected to grow by 1.6% p.a. from 2011 to 2030, adding 36% to global consumption by 2030. The growth rate declines, from 2.5% p.a. for 2000-10, to 2.1% p.a. for 2010-20, and 1.3% p.a. from 2020 to 2030. [4]

Low and medium income economies outside the OECD account for over 90% of population growth to 2030. Due to their rapid industrialisation, urbanisation and motorisation, they also contribute 70% of the global GDP growth and over 90% of the global energy demand growth. Almost all (93%) of the energy consumption growth is in non-OECD countries. Non-OECD energy consumption in 2030 is 61% above the 2011 level, with growth averaging 2.5% p.a.(or 1.5% p.a. per capita), accounting for 65% of world consumption (compared to 53% in 2011).

Fig. 2 Industrialization and growing power demand [4] 9

OECD energy consumption in 2030 is just 6% higher than in 2011 (0.3% p.a.), and will decline in per capita terms (-0.2% p.a. 2011-30). Energy used for power generation grows by 49% (2.1% p.a.) 2011-30, and accounts for 57% of global primary energy growth. Primary energy used directly in industry grows by 31% (1.4% p.a.), accounting for 25% of the growth of primary energy consumption The fastest growing fuels are renewables (including biofuels) with growth averaging 7.6% p.a. 2011-30. Nuclear (2.6% p.a.) and hydro (2.0% p.a.) both grow faster than total energy. Among fossil fuels, gas grows the fastest (2.0% p.a.), followed by coal (1.2% p.a.), and oil (0.8% p.a.). The power sector diversifies its fuel mix, with more than half the growth coming from non-fossil fuels. Renewables contribute 27% of the growth, just ahead of coal (26%) and gas (21%). Industry leads the growth of final energy consumption, particularly in rapidly developing economies. The industrial sector accounts for 57% of the projected growth of final energy demand to 2030. The transport sector shows the weakest growth, with OECD transport demand projected to decline. The sector starts to show some diversification away from oil; gas accounts for 16% of transport energy demand growth, with another 13% coming from biofuels, and 2% from electricity. The growth of other sector energy consumption (primarily residential and commercial) is heavily weighted towards electricity, with gas making up virtually all the non-electricity energy use. World primary energy production growth matches

consumption, growing by 1.6% p.a. from2011 to 2030. As is the case for energy consumption, growth in production will be dominated by the non-OECD countries, which will account for 78% of the worlds increase. These countries will supply 71% of global energy production in 2030, up from 69% in 2011 and 58% in 1990. The Asia Pacific region, the largest regional energy producer, shows the most rapid growth rate (2.2% p.a.), due to large indigenous coal production, and accounts for 48% of global energy production growth. The region provides 35% of global energy production by 2030. The Middle East and North America contribute the next largest increments for supply growth; and North America remains the second largest regional energy producer.Energy production will grow in all regions but Europe Prices, technology and policy drive changes in the fuel mix. Fossil fuels are converging on a market share of 26-28% each and non-fossil fuels groups on a market share of 6-7% each. Gas and non-fossil fuels gain share at the expense of coal and oil. Oil follows a long run trend of decline in its market share, with oil increasingly concentrated in the sectors where it commands the highest value. Gas remains on a trend of modest but steady gains in share. Coals recent rapid gain in share will start to reverse
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soon, with a trend decline evident by 2020. The rate at which renewables are projected to gain market share resembles the experience of nuclear power in the 1970s and 1980s. Fossil fuel prices have risen to record levels in real terms over the past decade. Average annual real oil prices over the five years 2007-11 were 220% above the average for 1997-2001; for coal the increase was 141% and for gas 95%. These long run price movements inevitably lead to demand and supply responses. We have previously noted the long run trend of declining and converging energy intensity (the amount of energy consumed per unit of GDP). Current high prices for energy and global integration reinforce this trend. Global energy intensity in 2030 is 31% lower than in 2011, declining at 1.9% p.a. compared to a decline rate of 1.0% p.a. for 2000-10. The rate of decline accelerates post 2020, averaging 2.2% p.a. for 2020-30, in large part the result of China moving onto a less energy-intensive development path. Energy intensity declines in all regions. The impact of declining energy intensity can be seen clearly in the gap between GDP and energy consumption. Without the projected intensity decline, the world would need to almost double energy supply by 2030 to sustain economic growth, rather than the 36% increase required in our Outlook. High prices are also supporting the expansion of supply, and not just from conventional sources the development and deployment of new technologies across a range of energy sources is opening up new supply opportunities at scale. The shale revolution, first for gas and then for oil, is an example of this. From 2011 to 2030 shale gas more than trebles and tight oil grows more than six-fold. Together they will account for almost a fifth of the increase in global energy supply to 2030. High prices for fossil fuels also support the expansion of non-fossil energy. Renewable energy supply more than trebles from 2011 to 2030, accounting for 17% of the increase in global energy supply. Hydro and nuclear together account for another 17% of the growth. Despite all the growth from shale, renewables and other sources, conventional fossil fuel supplies are still required to expand, providing almost half the growth in energy supply. High prices and technological innovation have unlocked vast unconventional resources in the US, reversing the trend of falling output and altering global energy balances. Globally there are estimated technically recoverable resources of 240 billion barrels (Bbbls) for tight oil and 200 trillion cubic meters (Tcm) for shale gas. Asia has an estimated 57 Tcm of shale gas and 50 Bbbls of tight oil, versus 47 Tcm and 70 Bbbls respectively for North America. In 2012, 2.1 Mb/d (24%) of US oil production was from tight oil and 24 Bcf/d (37%) of natural gas from shale. These resources have boosted gas output by nearly 20% and oil by 30% in the past
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five years. Assessing both global resources and above ground factors, North America will continue to dominate production by 2030, even as other regions gradually adapt to develop their resources. Above ground factors have enabled US success: a robust service sector with the worlds largest rig fleet (over 1,800 rigs in operation, a majority of which can drill horizontally), a competitive industry that spurs continued technological innovation, land access facilitated by private ownership, deep financial markets, and favourable fiscal and regulatory terms. As an example, output in the Bakken has increased from 0.1 Mb/d just five years ago to over 1 Mb/d currently, roughly matching that of Colombia, as operators are drilling more oil wells than in all of Canada So far, only the US and Canada have combined these variables to support rapid production growth. The pace of development elsewhere is likely to be measured, given the lengthy checklist of factors required for development of shale gas and tight oil resources. [4]

Oil scenario and future projections

After the oil price shocks of the 1970s, oils share in primary energy consumption fell from a peak of 48% in 1973 to 39% in 1985. Rising oil prices have again

Fig. 3 oil share in sector [4]

increased the burden of oil on the economy in recent years and oil has lost market share again falling to 33% in 2011. We project this to fall further to 28% by 2030. High relative prices have led to the substitution of oil by other fuels outside the transport sector where cheaper alternatives are available. Oils share in power generation, for example, fell from 22% in 1973 to

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4% in 2011 and is forecast to decline to just 2% by 2030. Oils share in industry and other sectors (including residential and commercial) has also declined substantially, although the decline in industry has been (and will be) slower because of limits to substitution in petrochemicals and other non-energy uses. In transport, the market response to high prices has been primarily via efficiency gains. Oil will remain the dominant fuel in transport, although its share falls from 94% in 2011 to 89% in 2030. Energy consumption growth in transport slows to 1.2% p.a. (from 1.9% p.a. 1990-2010) primarily due to accelerating gains in fuel economy. Other factors include the impact of high oil prices on driving behavior, vehicle saturation in the OECD, and non-OECD subsidy reduction. Fuel economy improvements have accelerated in recent years, driven by consumer reaction to rising prices and tightening policy (e.g. CO2 emissions limits in Europe and CAFE standards in the US) and enabled by technology improvements. Enhancements to the internal combustion engine and gradual hybridization of the vehicle fleet are expected to further accelerate efficiency gains, with fuel economy in the US, EU and China improving by 2.9% p.a. in each region over the outlook period. Transport demand will remain dominated by oil, since alternatives are likely to remain uneconomic in most markets without policy support. Nevertheless, biofuels and natural gas both reach 5% share of transport by 2030 with electricity at 1%. Gas (including gas-to-liquids) is the fastest growing alternative and likely to overtake biofuels in transport by 2030. Global liquids consumption is projected to reach 104 Mb/d by 2030 but growth slows to 0.8% p.a. (from 1.4% p.a. in 1990-2010 and 1.9% p.a. in 1970-90). OECD consumption will fall to 40.5 Mb/d, 1 Mb/d below the 1990 level. Non-OECD consumption is likely to overtake the OECD by 2014, and reach 63 Mb/d by 2030 2 times the 1990 level. By sector, liquids demand growth to 2030 comes from non-OECD transport (nearly 14 Mb/d) due to a rapid increase in vehicle ownership, with non-OECD industry also rising (by 6.5 Mb/d, largely for petrochemicals). OECD demand declines across all sectors as vehicle efficiency improvements outweigh (slow) growth in the vehicle fleet, and oil is displaced by other fuels outside of transport. Demand in China grows by 7 Mb/d to 17 Mb/d in 2030, surpassing the US in 2029 (US demand falls by 2 Mb/d to 16.5 Mb/d over the outlook period). Other non-OECD Asia also shows strong growth of 6 Mb/d (of which almost two-thirds are in India). The Middle East is the next largest contributor to growth over the outlook period at 3.5 Mb/d. [4]

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Tight oil will likely expand by 7.5 Mb/d by 2030 and account for nearly half of the 16.1 Mb/d of global supply growth. Non-OPEC

Fig. 4 Transport demand by fuel [4]

supplies will expand by 8.5 Mb/d versus 7.6 Mb/d for OPEC as the group will likely see its market share drop until 2018 due to the surge in tight oil supplies before recovering to

42% by the forecasting period. By 2030, tight oil should reach 9% of global supplies. North America will continue to dominate output with limited growth elsewhere. Both Russia and China with robust service sectors and expected additional fiscal incentives are expected to develop their tight oil resources reaching 1.4 Mb/d and 0.5 Mb/d by 2030, respectively. South America will also increase output due to investment in countries like Colombia and Argentina. North Americas tight oil growth is expected to slow post-2020 due to todays view of the resource base and the costs and drilling activity required to sustain output. The Americas will account for 65% of incremental supply growth to 2030 as tight oil (5.7 Mb/d), oil sands (2.7 Mb/d), and biofuels (1.8 Mb/d) drive growth. The US (4.5 Mb/d) leads regional increases and will surpass its previous record output reached in 1970. OPEC crude oil output will not return to the expected 2013 level of about 30 Mb/d until 2020 as non-OPEC supplies dominate global growth. From 2020-30, however, supplies will likely expand by 5.1 Mb/d as non-OPEC output growth fades. The US will likely surpass Russia and Saudi Arabia in 2013 as the largest liquids producer in the world
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(crude and biofuels) due to tight oil and biofuels growth, but also due to expected OPEC production cuts. Russia will likely pass Saudi Arabia for the second slot in 2013 and hold that until 2023. Saudi Arabia regains the top oil producer slot by 2027. The US, Saudi Arabia, and Russia will supply over a third of global liquids in our outlook.Oil is expected to be the slowest growing fuel over the next 20 years. Global liquids demand (oil, biofuels, and other liquids) nonetheless is likely to rise by 16 Mb/d, to reach 104 Mb/d by 2030. Demand growth com es exclusively from rapidly growing non-OECD economies. China, India and the Middle East together account for nearly all of the net global increase. OECD demand has peaked and consumption is expected to decline by 5.6 Mb/d. Rising supply to meet expected demand growth will come primarily from non-OPEC unconventional sources and, later in the outlook, from OPEC. By 2030, non-OPEC supply is expected to increase by 8.5 Mb/d while OPEC production will expand by 7.6 Mb/d. The largest increments of non-OPEC supply will come from the US (4.5 Mb/d), Canada (2.9 Mb/d), and Brazil (2.7 Mb/d), which offset declines in mature provinces such as Mexico and the North Sea. The largest increments of new OPEC supply will come from NGLs (2.5 Mb/d) and crude oil in Iraq (2.8 Mb/d). [4]

Coal scenario and future projections

Coal consumption declines in the OECD (by 0.8% p.a. 2011-2030), but continues growing in the non-OECD (1.9% p.a.). China remains the largest coal consumer (52% of global consumption), while India (12%) overtakes the US to become the second largest in 2024. China and India account for 63% and 29% respectively of global coal growth to 2030. Chinas coal demand growth decelerates rapidly from 9% p.a. in 2000-10 to 3.5% p.a. this decade and 0.4% p.a. in 2020-2030, driven by a shift to less coal-intensive economic activities and by efficiency improvements. Indias coal demand growth slows down more gradually from 6.5% p.a. in 200010 to 3.6% p.a. in 2011-2030, as energy efficiency gains partially offset rising energy demand for industrial and infrastructure expansion. Global coal supply is set to grow 1.0% p.a. in 201 12030, with increases in non-OECD countries offsetting declines in the OECD. Production in China and India rises 0.9% p.a. and 3.9% p.a. respectively. Growing imports drive further expansion and integration of global coal markets. The growth of global coal consumption in power generation slows from 3.6% p.a. in 2000-10 to 2.4% p.a. in 2011-20 and 0.4% p.a. after 2020. In the OECD coal use in power is already in decline (-0.2% p.a. 2000-10); this decline
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accelerates to -1.2% p.a. in 2020-30. In the non-OECD, the growth of coal use in power slows, from 7.7% p.a. 2000-10 to 1.0% p.a. after 2020. As a result, coals share in fuels used for power generation declines from 44% in 2020 to 39% in 2030; gas, nuclear and renewables all gain share. Coal

Fig. 5 Coal demand by sector [4]

consumption in the industrial sector also levels off. While consumption continues to decline in the OECD (-1.1% p.a.), growth in the non-OECD decelerates from 7.8% p.a. in 2000-10, to 1.9% p.a. 2011-20 and 1.2% p.a. in 2020-30. As the focus of Chinas economic development shifts from rapid industrialisation and infrastructure building to growth based on services and light manufacturing, its industrial consumption of coal decelerates from 9.6% p.a. in 2000-10 to 0.9% after 2020. [4]

2.2) Non fossil fuel scenario and growth

Non-fossil fuels grow strongly in both the OECD (2.0% p.a.) and non-OECD (5.2% p.a.). OECD growth is concentrated in renewable power (6.7% p.a.), while nuclear output remains below preFukushima levels, and hydro continues to grow slowly. In the non-OECD, growth is more evenly split between renewables, nuclear and hydro. Nuclear contributes the most to growth, with output increasing rapidly (7.9% p.a.) as China, India and Russia pursue ambitious expansion programmes. Including biofuels, renewables reach a 6% share of global primary energy by 2030, up from 2% in 2011. Renewables growth is initially led by the EU, but from 2020 the US and China are the largest sources of growth. The non-OECD shows a higher growth rate than the OECD (10.9% p.a. vs 6.1% p.a.), but in terms of volume growth the OECD remains just ahead of the non-OECD. Renewables are projected to gain market share in power, at a slower but perhaps more sustainable rate than nuclear in the 1970/80s. Nuclear power then
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gained share rapidly, but peaked in the 1990s as safety concerns, rising costs, and continued public opposition led to a loss of policy support. Renewables face a different set of challenges, the most pressing of which and the key factor limiting growth is the affordability of subsidies. Continued rapid cost reductions are required to keep the subsidy burden at an acceptable level as renewables scale up. Renewable power growth in the EU slows, as the share of renewables is now at a level where the subsidy burden has become an issue. Nevertheless renewables continue to gain market share in the EU, because overall power growth is low (0.8% p.a.). Less mature markets for renewables, with lower current shares, can sustain higher growth rates. [4]

Fig.6 Non-fossil fuels scenario and projections for OECD and Non-OECD countries [4]

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2.3) Power sector scenario and projections

The power sector is a key driver of global energy growth, and the only sector where all the primary fuels compete. Total electricity consumption will be 61% higher in 2030 than in 2011, growing by 2.5% p.a. (versus 3.4% p.a. for 2000-10, and 2.7% for 1990-2000). Electricity continues to gain share in final energy use, meeting 33% of non-transport energy demand in 2030, up from 28% in 2011. Electricity is closely tied to economic growth and industrialisation. Global electricity demand growth accelerated as China started to industrialise at scale. Beyond 2020 global electricity growth slows as China shifts to less energy-intensive growth. Improving end-use efficiency everywhere adds to this China effect. The net result is a 1.1% p.a. decline in electricity per unit of GDP, compared to a 0.1% p.a. decline 1990-2010. Improving conversion
Fig. 7 power generation sources projections [4]

efficiency in power generation means that the total fuel inputs to generate power grow less rapidly than electricity demand,

averaging 2.1% p.a. Over time we see large shifts in the fuel mix for power generation, driven by relative prices, policy, and technology developments. In the 1970s and 1980s high priced oil was replaced by nuclear and to a lesser extent by coal. In the 1990s and 2000s gas gained share as CCGT technology was deployed, and coals share also rose, reflecting the growing weight of Asias coal-intensive power sector in global power generation. From 2011 to 2030 coal loses share and gas gains share only marginally, as renewables start to penetrate the market at scale. The impact on the growth of fuels for power, in volume terms, is particularly striking in the final decade of the outlook. After 2020 we see very little growth in coal used in power, in stark contrast to the previous two decades. This is the result of the slowdown in total power growth, and the increased role of both renewables and nuclear. Gas growth is also reduced, but to a much lesser extent than coal. [4]
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3) Energy Security a growing concern for India

Energy security has been an important global policy issue for over four decades now, since the first oil crisis in the 1970s. According to the International Energy Agencys (IEAs) World Energy Outlook (WEO-2012) published in November 2012, the global energy demand is likely to grow by more than one-third over the period to 2035, with China, India and the Middle East accounting for 60% of the increase. Thereby, Energy security becomes a pertinent issue for a country like India where the dependence on import is increasing steadily. Energy Security, as defined by the Integrated Energy Policy of India, encompasses three critical dimensions: (a) meeting Indias large energy demand to sustain an annual economic growth rate of 8 to 9 percent through 2031-32, (b) meeting lifeline energy needs of all citizens to address social development, health and safety of the energy poor, and (c) to ensuring sustainability in energy supply and use. In the current context energy security also encompasses an overlapping element of energy efficiency across all aspects related to energy security. Energy Security thus entails a complex set of coordinated initiatives and the need for energy strategies, policies and regulations to align in making specific choices for the
Fig. 8 Indias energy mix [5]

country in charting a low-carbon and energy-secure growth path for the country. [5]

Demand and Consumption in India

India is the fourth largest primary energy consumer, after China, USA and Russia and it accounts for more than 4.6 % of total global annual energy consumption. In the last five years, India has averaged a growth rate of 8% and the demand for energy

19

has been putting pressure on its supply sources. It is an established fact that if India continues to grow at 8% or so in the coming years a higher than average demand for energy will persist. [5] Coal is the mainstay of Indias energy sector and accounts for over 5 0% of primary commercial energy supply and of the total power generated in the country, 69% comes from coal based thermal power stations. Next big share of energy portfolio in India is dominated by hydrocarbons and less than 10 percent of energy is accounted by other sources like hydro, renewables and nuclear. Demand for conventional energy in the past five years has demonstrated an increased pace with natural gas growing at highest rate of over 10% CAGR. While it is certain that India will see an increased escalation of energy demand, the question that surrounds India is at what scale and speed Indias energy demand will expand and which fuels and technologies it will use. With the increased consumption of energy, demand side management through increased efficiency has also gained prominence in the country. Energy conservation potential in India is estimated at ~ 23% and various initiatives have been taken to explore this potential. Several initiatives such as Super Energy Efficient Program, Smart Grid initiatives, National mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency, PAT (Perform Achieve Trade) scheme, Standards & Labelling (S&L) Program, Energy conservation building codes, etc. have been undertaken to enhance energy efficiency of the nation and make energy sector economically as well as environmentally sustainable.

Challenges Related to Energy Security of the Country

Low hydrocarbon proven reserves and declining interest of foreign players in E&P: India has low proven hydrocarbon reserves with reserve to production ratio of ~18 years for oil and ~26.9 years for gas as per the current production levels. Approximately 34% of the total area of Indias sedimentary basins is poorly explored to completely unexplored and India has seen diminishing interest from investors in exploration & production sector in the recent NELP bidding rounds with limited number of IOCs participating in the bidding. There is a need for India to establish and attractive fiscal regime to enhance the E&P activity and thereby domestic production levels.

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Increasing import dependence both for oil and gas:

The volume of crude oil imports has been increasing steadily in India and more than 75 percent of its total crude requirement in 2011. Similarly, gas imports are increasing steadily with lower than expected production from KG-D6. During the 12th Plan, import dependence on crude oil is expected to increase from ~76% in FY11 to ~80% in FY17 and import dependence on natural gas is expected to increase from ~21% in FY11 to 35% in FY17. High import dependence for energy amounts to high vulnerability and compromised energy security of the nation. As a result of this, GDP growth rate becomes dependent on external factors like oil prices. Also, it adds to concerns regarding continuously increasing fiscal deficit and depleting forex reserves. In such a scenario, volatile prices and increased competition for resources outside India are making it all the more difficult for Indian companies to source energy at a competitive price [5]

Fig. 9 oil production and import [5]

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Stagnating supplies in Coal Sector:

The coal sector has been facing challenges both in terms of domestic as well as imported supplies. The domestic production is stagnating in the coal sector as Indias coal demand increased at CAGR of 8.5% while CILs domestic production increased at a CAGR 4.6% only in 11th five year plan. Any additional coal requirement for new power plants would be unlikely met through FSAs with CIL, hence finding alternative sources is unavoidable. Indias coal imports have more than doubled over the last five years. However, coal imports have concerns around limited supporting infrastructure, huge price difference between imported and domestic coal and changing regulations countries. in Also, the source different
Fig. 11 coal demand for power sector [5] Fig. 10 Historical coal consumption [5]

characteristics of coal typically permit existing power plants to blend imported coal with

domestic coal only up to 10% to 15%. Further, there are concerns that there are very limited

manufacturers of quality mining equipment and machinery. Coal as a sector is monopolistic and remains virtually closed to private sector participation except end use cases. With slower growth rate of production of CIL and SCCL, and issues around import of coal, Indian power sector is facing capacity utilization issues. [5]

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Renewable Energy and related challenges:

Fig. 12 Installed capacity in mw 2012 [5]

Renewable sector has immense potential which needs to be explored going forward and is becoming an increasingly important part of Indias energy mix. The installed capacity in the renewable sector is ~ 26 GW in 2012. Wind constitutes the highest share in the renewable because of existing potential in India and the feed in tariff approaching grid parity. Solar PV is another source which is gaining prominence in the energy mix. Besides National Solar Mission at the federal level there are various State level policies which are pushing for wider adoption of Solar PV as an active source in the energy mix. In addition, India has significant potential in the hydro sector but sector is currently faced by issues related to R&R, land acquisition, clearances and evacuation infrastructure. [5]
Fig. 14 Hydro production of India [6] Fig.13 Indias hydro potential [5]

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Un-conventional sources of energy: With the thrust over un-conventional sources of energy globally, India is also gearing up to explore and develop domestic sources in terms of shale, CBM, tight gas, etc. While shale gas policy is still under formulation, exploration activities have already commenced for CBM. There is a need to formulate an attractive fiscal regime to incentivize investment in the un-conventional sources and attract foreign players. Currently, India is facing challenges in terms of availability of technology and skills/competency in terms of manpower and service providers so as to provide quality service at a competitive cost. Also, this sector is expected to face challenges related to land acquisition, especially for shale gas as it requires large number of wells to be drilled and extensive use of land. Water availability, management for fraccing process and infrastructure related challenges in view of under-developed gas transmission grid are some other challenges which could be faced by the sector.

Fig. 15 shale gas potential in India [5]

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4) Environmental challenges for energy

4.1) The greenhouse effect and climate change

The greenhouse effect is the process by which the atmosphere traps some of the suns energy, warming the earth and moderating our climate. A human-driven increase in greenhouse gases is increasing this effect artificially, raising global temperatures and disrupting our climate. These greenhouse
Fig. 16 The green house effect [7]

gases include carbon dioxide, produced by burning fossil fuels and through deforestation, methane, released from agriculture, animals

and landfill sites, and nitrous oxide, resulting from production variety of agricultural plus a

industrial

chemicals. Every day we damage our climate by using fossil fuels (oil, coal and gas) for energy and transport. As a result, climate change is already impacting on our lives, and is expected to destroy the livelihoods of many people in the developing world, as well as ecosystems and species, in the coming decades. We therefore need to significantly reduce our greenhouse gas emissions. This makes both environmental and economic sense. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the United Nations forum for established scientific opinion, the worlds temperature is expected to increase over the next hundred years by up to 5.8 Celsius. This is much faster than
25

anything experienced so far in human history. The goal of climate policy should be to keep the global mean temperature rise to less than 2C above pre-industrial levels. At 2C and above, damage to ecosystems and disruption to the climate system increases dramatically. We have very little time within which we can change our energy system to meet these targets. This means that global emissions will have to peak and start to decline by the end of the next decade at the latest. Climate change is already harming people and ecosystems. Its reality can be seen in disintegrating polar ice, thawing permafrost, dying coral reefs, rising sea levels and fatal heat waves. It is not only scientists that are witnessing these changes. From the Inuit in the far north to islanders near the Equator, people are already struggling with the impacts of climate change.
Fig. 17 World atmospheric concentration of CO2 and average global temp change [8]

An average global warming of 2C threatens millions of people with an increased risk of hunger, malaria, flooding and water shortages. [7] Never before has humanity been forced to grapple with such an immense environmental crisis. If we do not take urgent and immediate action to stop global warming, the damage could become irreversible. This can only happen through a rapid reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. [7]

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This is a summary of some likely effects if we allow current trends to continue: likely effects of small to moderate warming
Sea level rise due to melting glaciers and the thermal expansion of the oceans as global temperature increases. Massive releases of greenhouse gases from melting permafrost and dying forests. A high risk of more extreme weather events such as heat waves, droughts and floods. Already, the global incidence of drought has doubled over the past 30 years. Severe regional impacts. In Europe, river flooding will increase, as well as coastal flooding, erosion and wetland loss. Flooding will also severely affect low-lying areas in developing countries such as Bangladesh and South China. Natural systems, including glaciers, coral reefs, mangroves, alpine ecosystems, boreal forests, tropical forests, prairie wetlands and native grasslands will be severely threatened. Increased risk of species extinction and biodiversity loss. The greatest impacts will be on poorer countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Andean South America, as well as small islands least able to protect themselves from increasing droughts, rising sea levels, the spread of disease and decline in agricultural production. longer term catastrophic effects Warming from emissions may trigger the irreversible meltdown of the Greenland ice sheet, adding up to seven meters of sea level rise over several centuries. New evidence also shows that the rate of ice discharge from parts of the Antarctic mean it i s also at risk of meltdown. [7]
Fig. 18 Temp rise of New Delhi due to global warming [8]

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Kyoto protocol
Recognizing these threats the signatories to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change - agreed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The Kyoto Protocol finally entered into force in early 2005 and its 165 member countries meet twice annually to negotiate further refinement and development of the agreement. Only two major industrialized nations, the United States and Australia, have not ratified Kyoto. The Kyoto Protocol commits its signatories to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2% from their 1990 level by the target period of 2008-2012.This has in turn resulted in the adoption of a series of regional and national reduction targets. In the European Union, for instance, the commitment is to an overall reduction of 8%. In order to reach this target, the EU has also agreed a target to increase its proportion of renewable energy from 6% to 12% by 2010. At present, the Kyoto countries are negotiating the second phase of the agreement, covering the period from 2013-2017. Greenpeace is calling for industrialized country emissions to be reduced by 18% from 1990 levels for this second commitment period, and by 30% by the third period covering 2018-2022. Only with these cuts do we stand a reasonable chance of meeting the 2C target. The Kyoto Protocols architecture relies fundamentally on legally binding emissions reduction obligations. To achieve these targets, carbon is turned into a commodity which can be traded. The aim is to encourage the most economically efficient emissions reductions, in turn leveraging the necessary investment in clean technology from the private sector to drive a revolution in energy supply. However, because it took so long for Kyoto to enter into force after the US pulled out in early 2001, negotiators are running out of time. This is a crucial year because countries must agree a firm negotiating mandate at the next meeting in Indonesia in December 2007, in order that the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol can be agreed in 2008 or 2009 at the absolute latest. This is necessary to give time for it to be ratified and for governments to implement the policies and measures necessary for the next stage of deeper emissions reductions.[7]

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The nuclear threat

Uranium used in power production involved various steps from its mining to its waste disposal all this stages involved higher degree of risk the various risks are involved and various threats are described below:

1. Uranium mining Uranium, used in nuclear power plants, is extracted from huge mines in Canada, Australia, Russia and Nigeria. Mine workers can breathe in radioactive gas from which they are in danger of contracting lung cancer. Uranium mining produces huge quantities of mining debris, including radioactive particles which can contaminate surface water and food.

2. Uranium enrichment Natural uranium and concentrated yellow cake contain just 0.7% of fissionable uranium 235.To use the material in a nuclear reactor, the share must go up to 3 or 5 %.This process can be carried out in 16 facilities around the world. 80% of the total volume ends up as tails, a waste product. Enrichment generates massive amounts of depleted uranium that ends up as long-lived radioactive waste or is used in weapons or as tank shielding. 3. Fuel rod production Enriched material is converted into uranium dioxide and compressed to pellets in fuel rod production facilities. These pellets fill 4m long tubes called fuel rods.There are 29 fuel rod production facilities globally. The worst accident in this type of facility happened in September 1999 in Tokaimura, Japan, when two workers died. Several hundred workers and villagers have suffered radioactive contamination.

4. Power plant operation Uranium nuclei are split in a nuclear reactor, releasing energy which heats up water. The compressed steam is converted in a turbine generator into electricity. This process creates a radioactive cocktail which involves more than 100 products. One of these is the highly toxic and long-lasting plutonium. Radioactive material can enter the environment through accidents at nuclear power plants. The worst accident to date happened at Chernobyl in the then Soviet Union
29

in 1986. A nuclear reactor generates enough plutonium every year for the production of as many as 39 nuclear weapons.

5. Reprocessing Reprocessing involves the chemical extraction of contaminated uranium and plutonium from used reactor fuel rods. There are now over 230,000 kilograms of plutonium stockpiled around the world from reprocessing five kilograms is sufficient for one nuclear bomb. Reprocessing is not the same as recycling: the volume of waste increases many tens of times and millions of liters of radioactive waste are discharged into the sea and air each day. The process also demands the transport of radioactive material and nuclear waste by ship, rail, air and road around the world. An accident or terrorist attack could release vast quantities of nuclear material into the environment. There is no way to guarantee the safety of nuclear transport.

6. Waste storage There is not a single final storage facility for nuclear waste available anywhere in the world. Safe secure storage of high level waste over thousands of years remains unproven, leaving a deadly legacy for future generations. Despite this the nuclear industry continues to generate more and more waste each day. [7]

Nuclear threats There are multiple threats to people and the environment from nuclear operations. The main risks are: Nuclear Proliferation Nuclear Waste Safety Risks Together these explain why it has been discounted as a future technology in the energy revolution scenario.

Nuclear proliferation Manufacturing a nuclear bomb requires fissile material either uranium-235 or plutonium-239. Most nuclear reactors use uranium as a fuel and produce plutonium during their operation. It is
30

impossible to adequately protect a large reprocessing plant to prevent the diversion of plutonium to nuclear weapons. A small-scale plutonium separation plant can be built in four to six months, so any country with an ordinary reactor can produce nuclear weapons relatively quickly. The result is that nuclear power and nuclear weapons have grown up like Siamese twins. Since international controls on nuclear proliferation began, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea have all obtained nuclear weapons, demonstrating the link between civil and military nuclear power. Both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) embodies an inherent contradiction - seeking to promote the development of peaceful nuclear power whilst at the same time trying to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Israel, India, and Pakistan used their civil nuclear operations to develop weapons capability, operating outside international safeguards. North Korea developed a nuclear weapon even as a signatory of the NPT. A major challenge to nuclear proliferation controls has been the spread of uranium enrichment technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea. The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, has said that should a state with a fully developed fuel cycle capability decide, for whatever reason, to break away from its non-proliferation commitments, most experts believe it could product a nuclear weapon within a matter of months.

Nuclear waste The nuclear industry claims it can dispose of its nuclear waste by burying it deep underground, but this will not isolate the radioactive material from the environment forever. A deep dump only slows down the release of radioactivity into the environment. The industry tries to predict how fast a dump will leak so that it can claim that radiation doses to the public living nearby in the future will be acceptably low. But scientific understanding is not sufficiently advanced to make such predictions with any certainty As part of its campaign to build new nuclear stations around the world, the industry claims that problems associated with burying nuclear waste are to do with public acceptability rather than technical issues. The industry often points to nuclear dumping proposals in Finland, Sweden or the United States to underline its point. The most hazardous waste is the highly radioactive waste (or spent) fuel removed from nuclear reactors, which stays radioactive for hundreds of thousands of years. In some countries the situation is exacerbated by reprocessing this spent fuel which involves dissolving it in nitric
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acid to separate out weapons-usable plutonium. This process leaves behind a highly radioactive liquid waste. There are about 270,000 tonnes of spent nuclear waste fuel in storage, much of it at reactor sites. Spent fuel is accumulating at around 12,000 tones per year, with around a quarter of that going for reprocessing3. No country in the world has a solution for high level waste. The least damaging option for waste already created at the current time is to store it above ground, in dry storage at the site of origin, although this option also presents major challenges and threats. The only real solution is to stop producing the waste.

Safety risks Windscale (1957),Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986) and Tokaimura (1999) are only a few of the hundreds of nuclear accidents which have occurred to date. A recent simple power failure at a Swedish nuclear plant highlighted our vulnerability to nuclear catastrophe. As a result, Sweden shut down four of its 10 nuclear plants after faults were discovered. Emergency power systems at the Forsmark plant failed for 20 minutes during a power cut. If power was not restored there could have been a major incident within hours. A former director of the plant later said that it was pure luck there wasnt a meltdown.The closure of the plants removed at a stroke roughly 20% of Swedens electricity supply. A nuclear chain reaction must be kept under control, and harmful radiation must, as far as possible, be contained within the reactor, with radioactive products isolated from humans and carefully managed. Nuclear reactions generate high temperatures, and fluids used for cooling are often kept under pressure. Together with the intense radioactivity, these high temperatures and pressures make operating a reactor a difficult and complex task. The risks from operating reactors are increasing and the likelihood of an accident is now higher than ever. Most of the worlds reactors are more than 20 years old and therefore more prone to age related failures. Many utilities are attempting to extend their life from the 40 years or so they were originally designed for to around 60 years, posing new risks. De-regulation has meanwhile pushed nuclear utilities to decrease safety related investments and limit staff whilst increasing reactor pressure and operational temperature and the burn-up of the fuel. This accelerates ageing and decreases safety margins. Nuclear regulators are not always able to fully cope with this new regime. New so-called passively safe reactors have many safety systems replaced by natural processes, such as gravity
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5) Technologies for shifting towards alternative sources of energy

Renewable energy covers a range of natural sources which are constantly renewed and therefore, unlike fossil fuels and uranium, will never be exhausted. Most of them derive from the effect of the sun and moon on the earths weather patterns.They also produce none of the harmful emissions and pollution associated with conventional fuels. Although hydroelectric power has been used on an industrial scale since the middle of the last century, the serious exploitation of other renewable sources has a more recent history.

Solar power (photovoltaics)

There is more than enough solar radiation available all over the world to satisfy a vastly increased demand for solar power systems. The sunlight which reaches the earths surface is enough to provide 2,850 times as much energy as we can currently use. On a global average, each square meter of land is exposed to enough sunlight to produce 1,700 kWh of power every year. The average irradiation in Europe is about 1,000 kWh per square meter, however, compared with 1,800 kWh in the Middle East. Photovoltaic (PV) technology involves the generation of electricity from light. The secret to this process is the use of a semiconductor material which can be adapted to release electrons, the negatively charged particles that form the basis of electricity. The most common semiconductor material used in photovoltaic cells is silicon, an element most commonly found in sand. All PV cells have at least two layers of such semiconductors, one positively charged and one negatively charged. When light shines on the semiconductor, the electric field across the junction between these two layers causes electricity to flow. The greater the intensity of the light, the greater the flow of electricity. A photovoltaic system does not therefore need bright sunlight in order to operate, and can generate electricity even on cloudy days. Solar PV is different from a solar thermal collecting system (see below) where the suns rays are used to generate heat, usually for hot water in a house, swimming pool etc. The most important parts of a PV system are the cells which form the basic building blocks, the modules which bring together large numbers of cells into a unit, and, in some situations, the inverters used to convert the electricity generated into a form suitable for everyday use. When a PV installation is described as having a capacity of 3 kWp (peak), this refers to the output of the system under standard testing conditions, allowing comparison between different modules. In

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central Europe a 3 kWp rated solar electricity system, with a surface area of approximately 27 square meters, would produce enough power to meet the electricity demand of an energy conscious household. [7]

Types of PV system Grid connected The most popular type of solar PV system for homes and businesses
in the developed world. Connection to the local electricity network allows any excess power produced to be sold to the utility. Electricity is then imported from the network outside daylight hours. An inverter is used to convert the DC power produced by the system to AC power for running normal electrical equipment.

Grid support A system can be connected to the local electricity network as well as a
back-up battery. Any excess solar electricity produced after the battery has been charged is then sold to the network. This system is ideal for use in areas of unreliable power supply.

Off-grid Completely independent of the grid, the system is connected to a battery via
a charge controller, which stores the electricity generated and acts as the main power supply. An inverter can be used to provide AC power, enabling the use of normal appliances.Typical offgrid applications are repeater stations for mobile phones or rural electrification. Rural electrification means either small solar home systems (SHS) covering basic electricity needs or solar mini grids, which are larger solar electricity systems providing electricity for several households.

Hybrid system A solar system can be combined with another source of power - a
biomass generator, a wind turbine or diesel generator - to ensure a consistent supply of electricity. A hybrid system can be grid connected, stand alone or grid support.[7]

Concentrating solar power plants (CSP)

Concentrating solar power (CSP) plants, also called solar thermal power plants, produce electricity in much the same way as conventional power stations. The difference is that they obtain their energy input by concentrating solar radiation and converting it to high temperature steam or gas to drive a turbine or motor engine. Large mirrors concentrate sunlight into a single line or point.The heat created there is used to generate steam. This hot, highly pressurised steam
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is used to power turbines which generate electricity. In sun-drenched regions, CSP plants can guarantee large shares of electricity production. Four main elements are required: a concentrator, a receiver, some form of transfer medium or storage, and power conversion. Many different types of system are possible, including combinations with other renewable and nonrenewable technologies, but the three most promising solar thermal technologies are:

parabolic trough Trough-shaped mirror reflectors are used to concentrate sunlight on to

thermally efficient receiver tubes placed in the troughs focal line. A thermal transfer fluid, such as synthetic thermal oil, is circulated in these tubes. Heated to approximately 400C by the concentrated suns rays, this oil is then pumped through a series of heat exchangers to produce superheated steam. The steam is converted to electrical energy in a conventional steam turbine generator, which can either be part of a conventional steam cycle or integrated into a combined steam and gas turbine cycle. This is the most mature technology, with 354 MWe of plants connected to the Southern California grid since the 1980s and more than 2 million square metres of parabolic trough collectors installed worldwide. [7]
Fig. 19 parabolic through collector [7]

central receiver or solar tower A

circular array of heliostats (large individually tracking mirrors) is used to concentrate sunlight on to a central receiver mounted at the top of a tower. A heat transfer medium absorbs the highly concentrated radiation reflected by the heliostats and converts it into thermal energy to be used for the subsequent

Fig. 20 solar tower plant [7]

generation of superheated steam for turbine operation. To date, the heat transfer media
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demonstrated include water/steam, molten salts, liquid sodium and air. If pressurized gas or air is used at very high temperatures of about 1,000C or more as the heat transfer medium, it can even be used to directly replace natural gas in a gas turbine, thus making use of the excellent efficiency (60%+) of modern gas and steam combined cycles. After an intermediate scaling up to 30 MW capacity, solar tower developers now feel confident that grid-connected tower power plants can be built up to a capacity of 200 MWe solar-only units. Use of heat storage will increase their flexibility. Although solar tower plants are considered to be further from commercialization than parabolic trough systems, they have good longer-term prospects for high conversion efficiencies. Projects are being developed in Spain, South Africa and Australia.

Parabolic dish A dish-shaped reflector is used to concentrate sunlight on to a receiver

located at its focal point. The concentrated beam radiation is absorbed into the receiver to heat a fluid or gas (air) to approximately 750C.This is then used to generate electricity in a small piston, Sterling engine or a micro turbine, attached to the receiver. The potential of parabolic dishes lies primarily in decentralized power supply and remote, stand-alone power systems. Projects are currently planned in the United States, Australia and Europe. [7]
Fig. 21 Parabolic dish collector [7]

Solar thermal collectors

Solar thermal collecting systems are based on a centuries-old principle: the sun heats up water contained in a dark vessel. Solar thermal technologies on the market now are efficient and highly reliable, providing energy for a wide range of applications - from domestic hot water and space heating in residential and commercial buildings to swimming pool heating, solar-assisted cooling, industrial process heat and the desalination of drinking water. [7]

Solar domestic hot water and space heating

Domestic hot water production is the most common application. Depending on the conditions and the systems configuration, most of a buildings hot water requirements can be
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provided by solar energy. Larger systems can additionally cover a substantial part of the energy needed for space heating. There are two main types of technology:

Vacuum tubes: The absorber inside the vacuum tube absorbs radiation from the sun and
heats up the fluid inside. Additional radiation is picked up from the reflector behind the tubes. Whatever the angle of the sun, the round shape of the vacuum tube allows it to reach the absorber. Even on a cloudy day, when the light is coming from many angles at once, the vacuum tube collector can still be effective.

Flat panel: This is basically a box with a glass cover which sits on the roof like a skylight.
Inside is a series of copper tubes with copper fins attached. The entire structure is coated in a black substance designed to capture the suns rays. These rays heat up a water and antifreeze mixture which circulates from the collector down to the buildings boiler.

Solar assisted cooling

Solar chillers use thermal energy to produce cooling and/or dehumidify the air in a similar way to a refrigerator or conventional air-conditioning. This application is well-suited to solar thermal energy, as the demand for cooling is often greatest when there is most sunshine. Solar cooling has been successfully demonstrated and large-scale use can be expected in the future.

Wind power
Over the last 20 years, wind energy has become the worlds fastest growing energy source. Todays wind turbines are produced by a sophisticated mass production industry employing a technology that is efficient, cost effective and quick to install. Turbine sizes range from a few kW to over 5,000 kW, with the largest turbines reaching more than 100m in height. One large wind turbine can produce enough electricity for about 5,000 households. State-of-theart wind farms today can be as small as a few turbines and as large as several hundred MW. The global wind resource is enormous, capable of generating more electricity than the worlds total power demand, and well distributed across the five continents. Wind turbines can be operated not just in the windiest coastal areas but in countries which have no coastlines, including regions such as central Eastern Europe, central North and South America, and central Asia.The wind
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resource out at sea is even more productive than on land, encouraging the installation of offshore wind parks with foundations embedded in the ocean floor. In Denmark, a wind park built in 2002 uses 80 turbines to produce enough electricity for a city with a population of 150,000. Smaller wind turbines can produce power efficiently in areas that otherwise have no access to electricity. This power can be used directly or stored in batteries. New technologies for using the winds power are also being developed for exposed buildings in densely populated cities. [7]

Wind turbine design

Significant consolidation of wind turbine design has taken place since the 1980s.The majority of commercial turbines now operate on a horizontal axis with three evenly spaced blades. These are attached to a rotor from which power is transferred through a gearbox to a generator. The gearbox and generator are contained within a housing called a nacelle. Some turbine designs avoid a gearbox by using direct drive. The electricity output is then channeled down the tower to a transformer and eventually into the local grid. Wind turbines can operate from a wind speed of 3-4 metres per second up to about 25 m/s. Limiting their power at high wind speeds is achieved either by stall regulation reducing the power output or pitch control changing the angle of the blades so that they no longer offer any resistance to the wind. Pitch control has become the most common method. The blades can also turn at a constant or variable speed, with the latter enabling the turbine to follow more closely the changing wind speed. Although the existing offshore market is only 0.4% of the worlds land based installed wind capacity, the latest developments in wind technology are primarily driven by this emerging potential. This means that the focus is on the most effective ways to make very large turbines. Modern wind technology is available for a range of sites - low and high wind speeds, desert and arctic climates. European wind farms operate with high availability, are generally well integrated with the environment and accepted by the public. In spite of repeated predictions of a leveling off at an optimum mid-range size, and the fact that wind turbines cannot get larger indefinitely, turbine size has increased year on year - from units of 20-60 kW in California in the 1980s up to the latest multi-MW machines with rotor diameters over 100 m. The average size of turbine installed around the world during 2005 was 1,282 kW, whilst the largest machine in operation is the Enercon E112, with a capacity of up to 6 MW. This is targeted at the developing offshore market.[7]
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This growth in turbine size has been matched by the expansion of both markets and manufacturers. More than 80,000 wind turbines now operate in over 50 countries around the world. The German market is the largest, but there has also been impressive growth in Spain, Denmark, India and the United States.

Biomass energy
Biomass is a broad term used to describe material of recent biological origin that can be used as a source of energy. This includes wood, crops, algae and other plants as well as agricultural and forest residues. Biomass can be used for a variety of end uses: heating, electricity generation or as fuel for transportation. The term bio energy is used for biomass energy systems that produce heat and/or electricity and bio fuels for liquid fuels for transport. Biodiesel manufactured from various crops has become increasingly used as vehicle fuel, especially as the cost of oil has risen. Biological power sources are renewable, easily stored, and, if sustainably harvested, CO2 neutral. This is because the gas emitted during their transfer into useful energy is balanced by the carbon dioxide absorbed when they were growing plants. Electricity generating biomass power plants work just like natural gas or coal power stations, except that the fuel must be processed before it can be burned. These power plants are generally not as large as coal power stations because their fuel supply needs to grow as near as possible to the power plant. Heat generation from biomass power plants can result either from utilizing the heat produced in a Combined Heat and Power plant (CHP), piping the heat to nearby homes or industry, or through dedicated heating systems. Small heating systems using specially produced pellets made from waste wood, for example, can be used to heat single family homes instead of natural gas or oil.

Biomass technology
A number of processes can be used to convert energy from biomass. These divide into thermal systems, which involve direct combustion of either solids, liquids or a gas via pyrolysis or gasification, and biological systems, which involve decomposition of solid biomass to liquid or gaseous fuels by processes such as anaerobic digestion and fermentation.

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Thermal systems Direct combustion Direct combustion is the most common way of converting biomass to
energy, for heat as well as electricity. Worldwide it accounts for over 90% of biomass generation. Technologies can be distinguished as either fixed bed, fluidized bed or entrained flow combustion. In fixed bed combustion, such as a grate furnace, primary air passes through a fixed bed, in which drying, gasification and charcoal combustion takes place. The combustible gases produced are burned after the addition of secondary air, usually in a zone separated from the fuel bed. In fluidised bed combustion, the primary combustion air is injected from the bottom of the furnace with such high velocity that the material inside the furnace becomes a seething mass of particles and bubbles. Entrained flow combustion is suitable for fuels available as small particles, such as sawdust or fine shavings, which are pneumatically injected into the furnace.

gasification Biomass fuels are increasingly being used with advanced conversion
technologies, such as gasification systems, which offer superior efficiencies compared with conventional power generation. Gasification is a thermo chemical process in which biomass is heated with little or no oxygen present to produce a low energy gas. The gas can then be used to fuel a gas turbine or a combustion engine to generate electricity. Gasification can also decrease emission levels compared to power production with direct combustion and a steam cycle.

pyrolysis Pyrolysis is a process whereby biomass is exposed to high temperatures in the

absence of air, causing the biomass to decompose. The products of pyrolysis always include gas (biogas), liquid (bio-oil) and solid (char), with the relative proportions of each depending on the fuel characteristics, the method of pyrolysis and the reaction parameters, such as temperature and pressure. Lower temperatures produce more solid and liquid products and higher temperatures more biogas.

Biological systems
These processes are suitable for very wet biomass materials such as food or agricultural wastes, including slurry.

anaerobic digestion Anaerobic digestion means the breakdown of organic waste by

bacteria in an oxygen-free environment. This produces a biogas typically made up of 65% methane and 35% carbon dioxide. Purified biogas can then be used both for heating or electricity generation.
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 fermentation Fermentation is the process by which plants of high sugar and starch content
are broken down with the help of microorganisms to produce ethanol and methanol. The end product is a combustible fuel that can be used in vehicles. Biomass power station capacities typically range up to 15 MW, but larger plants are possible of up to 400 MW capacity, with part of the fuel input potentially being fossil fuel, for example pulverized coal. The worlds largest biomass fuelled power plant is located at Pietarsaari in Finland. Built in 2001, this is an industrial CHP plant producing steam (100 MWth) and electricity (240 MWe) for the local forest industry and district heat for the nearby town. The boiler is a circulating fluidised bed boiler designed to generate steam from bark, sawdust, wood residues, commercial bio fuel and peat. A 2005 study commissioned by Greenpeace Netherlands concluded that it was technically possible to build and operate a 1,000 MWe biomass fired power plant using fluidised bed combustion technology and fed with wood residue pellets.

Geothermal energy
Geothermal energy is heat derived from deep underneath the earths crust. In most areas, this heat reaches the surface in a very diffuse state. However, due to a variety of geological processes, some areas, including the western part of the USA, west and central eastern Europe, Iceland, Asia and New Zealand are underlain by relatively shallow geothermal resources. These are classified as low temperature (less than 90C), moderate temperature (90 - 150C) and high temperature (greater than 150C).The uses to which these resources can be put depends on the temperature. The highest temperature is
41 Fig. 22 geothermal power plant [7]

generally used only for electric power generation. Current global geothermal generation capacity totals approximately 8,000 MW. Uses for low and moderate temperature resources can be divided into two categories: direct use and ground-source heat pumps. Geothermal power plants use the earths natural heat to vaporizes water or an organic medium. The steam created powers a turbine which produces electricity. In New Zealand and Iceland, this technique has been used extensively for decades. In Germany, where it is necessary to drill many kilometers down to reach the necessary temperatures, it is only in the trial stages. Geothermal heat plants require lower temperatures and the heated water is used directly.

Hydro power
Water has been used to produce electricity for about a century. Today around one fifth of the worlds electricity is produced from hydro power. Large unsustainable hydroelectric power plants with concrete dams and extensive collecting lakes often have very negative effects on the environment, however, requiring the flooding of habitable areas. Smaller run-of-the-river power stations, which are turbines powered by one section of running water in a river, can produce electricity in an environmentally friendly way. The main requirement for hydro power is to create an artificial head so that water, diverted through an intake channel or pipe into a turbine, discharges back into the river downstream. Small hydro power is mainly run-of-the-river and does not collect significant amounts of stored water, requiring the construction of large dams and reservoirs. There are two broad categories of turbines: impulse turbines (notably the Pelton) in which a jet of water impinges on the runner designed to reverse the direction of the jet and thereby extract momentum from the water.This turbine is suitable for high heads and small discharges.[7]
Fig. 23 Hydro power plant [7]

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Reaction turbines (notably Francis and Kaplan) run full of water and in effect generate hydrodynamic lift forces to propel the runner blades These turbines are suitable for medium to low heads, and medium to large discharges. [7]

Ocean energy Tidal power

Tidal power can be harnessed by constructing a dam or barrage across an estuary or bay with a tidal range of at least 5 meters. Gates in the barrage allow the incoming tide to build up in a basin behind it. The gates then close so that when the tide flows out the water can be channeled through turbines to generate electricity. Tidal barrages have been built across estuaries in France, Canada and China but a mixture of high cost projections coupled with environmental objections to the effect on estuarial habitats has limited the technologys further expansion.

Wave and tidal stream power

In wave power generation, a structure interacts with the incoming waves, converting this energy to electricity through a hydraulic, mechanical or pneumatic power take-off system. The structure is kept in position by a mooring system or placed directly on the seabed/seashore. Power is transmitted to the seabed by a flexible submerged electrical cable and to shore by a subsea cable. Wave power converters can be made up from connected groups of smaller generator units of 100 500 kW, or several mechanical or hydraulically interconnected modules can supply a single larger turbine generator unit of 2 20 MW. The large waves needed to make the technology more cost effective are mostly found at great distances from the shore, however, requiring costly sub-sea cables to transmit the power. The converters themselves also take up large amounts of space. Wave power has the advantage of providing a more predictable supply than wind energy and can be located in the ocean without much visual intrusion. There is no commercially leading technology on wave power conversion at present. Different systems are being developed at sea for prototype testing. These include a 50 kW Power Buoy floating buoy device installed in Hawaii, a 750 kW Pelamis device, with linked semi submerged cylindrical sections, operating in Scotland, a 300 kW underwater tidal current turbine operating in south-

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west England, a 150 kW seabed-mounted Stingray, also using tidal currents, and a 500 kW coastline wave energy generator operating on the island of Islay, Scotland. Most development work has been carried out in the UK.
Fig. 24 House powered through renewable power [9]

Fig. 25 concept of renewable powered city [9]

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Conclusion
The above report shows that the relationship between energy and security for India. The government of India is failing to supply the energy demand of the country with the large gap between consumption and production and this gap is fed by the import which is effecting the growth in the GDP and prices for oil, gas are hiking and setting the new records. This import dependency of India also a threat for the India energy security. To create the long term energy security provide the energy to growing population of India some steps must be taken by India for proper management of demand supply chain : Reduce dependency on any single fuel Move from hydrocarbon energy sources towards the renewable energy sources Provide the more emphasis on the hydro energy for electricity production. To explore the unconventional energy sources like shale gas and coal bed methane Making the nuclear energy as major energy supply by providing higher safety and exploring the new technologies to use this sources more safely and efficiently By making wind, solar and waste recovery as a large share for energy mix By increasing the efficiency of current system and providing efficient end equipment. Reducing dependency on the on imports Making the solar energy as large part of the energy mix by proper road map for clean energy India has large potential for solar energy

By making the proper road map to attain the various targets and become a self dependent for future energy supply the above region are playing the important role. And based on this India can attain the long term security for future energy demand

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References
[1] Jutamanee Martchamadol, S. Kumar, An aggregated energy security performance indicator, Applied Energy 103 (2013) 653-670 [2] IEA publications, Energy Security and Climate Policy Assessing Interactions, OECD/IEA, 2007 [3] Benget Johansson, security aspect of future energy system A short overview, Energy 61 [4] [5] (2013) 598-605 BP Publications, BP Energy Outlook 2030, London, United Kingdom, January 2013 Vedamoorthy Namasivayam, shubhranshu Patnaik, Debashish Mishra, securing tomorrows energy today: policy and regulations, long term energy security 2013 [6] [7] IEA Publications, key world energy statistic, IEA 2013 Sven Teske, Arthouros Zervos, Oliver Schfer,Energy revolution sus tainable world energy outlook, Greenpeace International, European Renewable Energy Council (EREC) 2007 [8] IEA Publications, Redrawing the energy-climate map, world energy outlook special report, 10 June 2013 [9] Mohamed El-Ashry, Renewales world future REN 21, Institute Of Sustainable Energy policies January 2013

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