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Art, Science, and Experience Author(s): Sidney Zink Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 14 (Jul. 6, 1944), pp. 365-375 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2019649 Accessed: 26/06/2010 09:08
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VOLUME

XLI, No. 14

JULY

6, 1944

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ART, SCIENCE, AND EXPERIENCE N essays in the Winter,1944, numberof the Kenyon Review Mr. Van Meter Ames and Mr. J. C. Ransom discuss the relation of art and science. Mr. Ames presentsart as closelyrelatedto science, and Mr. Ransom replies that "Art Needs a Little Separating." I agree with the contention in the title of Mr. Ransom's article,and with his belief that the consequenceof the distinctions Mr. Ames recognizesbetweenart and science is a separation greaterthan he seemsto acknowledge. I would here like to inquire morefullyinto the issue as Mr. Ames confronts it. I shall say at the outset that the question of whetherart and scienceare essentially identicalor different is not a matterof theory but of immediate experience. And it must be settled, not by argument,but by consulting our actual experience of what are classified as artworks and scientific theories in an effort to determine in theirdirectexperientialpresence, whether, theynaturallydivide into two kinds-whether,that is, thereis something essentialto the experience of all artworks and something essentialto the experience of all scientific theories,constituting two groups internallyhomogeneous and mutually distinct. Thus the followingargumentsI do not recommend as demonstrating the distinction;the distinction can not be demonstratedbut only disclosed, and only artworks and scientific theoriescan disclose it. My aim is ratherto remove certainextrinsicelementsof art and science whichtend to obscure the essential difference they reveal in immediateperception. Mr. Ames discoversmany similarities betweencertainphases of art and of science,and these are, in termsof such phases, genuine similarities. I believe, however,that they are extrinsicand unessential to art as an immediateexperience; further, that they are therefore unessentialto the natureof art. For art is originallyand ultimatelyan immediateexperience. This does not mean that art is unintelligent or homogenous, as a sense pleasure, but that the various art objects and activitiesacquire value and definition only in termsof the experiencethey establish. The experienceof art presumablyconsistsof an organic whole of related elements; esthetic immediacyis not equivalent to absence of differentiation.

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However,the principal significance of an artworkis not as an object related to otherobjects, but as an object productiveof an experience. Art is essentiallya final value, and such value resides in directexperience. Here alone can the nature of art be grasped. In theiranalysis Mr. Ames and Mr. Ransom refer,implicitly or explicitly, to art and science as objects, activities,and experiences; however, no such differentiation of phases is notedby eitherwriter, and presumably theytake it to make no difference to the relationof art and science in which of these phases they are considered. I thinkthe discussionwould gain in clarity if, when distinctions or analogieswere drawn,theywere statedin termsof the artworkand the scientific theory, the process of recurrentartisticappreciation and scientific verification, or estheticcontemplation and scientific speculation. I take these to correspondto the respectiveobjects, activities, and experiences of art and science: meaningby "object," the material contentof the experienceor activity; by "activity," the human treatment of this object over a period of time,i.e., the relationof the object in presentexperienceto the object in future experience;by "experience," the immediatepresenceof the object to attention. It is, of course, conceivable that the analogies and distinctions holdingin one phase will hold in another; even so this divisionof the problemwould facilitateits solutionby showingthe full complexityof any relation considered,and by indicating in each case the specificreferents betweenwhichthe relationholds. I believe art and science are basically and irrevocablydistinct, but that theyare so only in termsof their experiences. There is, as Mr. Ames observes,much in commonbetween the objects and activitiesof art and science. But when theseobjects and activities are consideredin terms of the experiencesthey serve, we return always to a recognition of that ultimatedifference of kind whichis assumed in normal language and behavior. First of all, experiencesof art and science might seem to be alike in having for their objects the same physical thing. Value and essence are located ultimatelyonly in conscious experience; they arise there, and may be retained, or reappear, there. But no inevitable correlationunites such experiencesto their physical objects. Experiencesof different value and qualitymay be induced by identicalobjects; and experiencesof identicalvalue and quality by objects physicallydistinct. This is, of course,because a physical object is extremelycomplex, containingthe objects of many possible experiences;there must be a necessarydetermination between the specificpart of any object attended to and the kind of experienceit evokes. The experienceis nothingbut this specific content whichfillsconsciousness and on whichattention dwells; and

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the object nothing but what that experience discovers. When different objects establishthe same experiencethis is because their difference is never complete; and when different experiencesare correlatedwith the same object, this is because the object contains several possible objects-of-experience. Nevertheless, the fact that the single physical thingis a potential of diverseexperiences is cloakedby its obviousphysicalidentity -by the conspicuousness of the spatial aspect in which the object is manifestly single,not plural. It is easy to be led thereby to confuse the various experiencesproduced by the "same" (by which we always mean, spatially the same) object. Further confusion may be caused, and art identified withscience,whenit is notedthat, in addition to having the same object or subject-matter, the experiences in which these occur may exercisemany of the same human faculties. For example,a natural landscape may be a subject of esthetic contemplation for the artist,of practical appraisal for the farmer, of scientificspeculation for the geologist. Likewise, a work of human art may provide wealth for the commercial dealer, prestige for the collector,information for the historian,and a delightful apprehensionfor the artist. Natural objects, and objects as they are manipulatedin various formsof human activity, participatein causal contextswhich carry them into a variety of minds and places; and the experiencethey establishfor one mind, or for one mind at one time, does not restrictthem to the same functionin other minds and at other times. Indeed it would be surprising if any physical object induced only the same result for all its experiencers;and conversely it would be not very surprisingto find that different objects induced similar experiences. In the same fashion, manyof the same modesof humanbehavior will be involvedin the different experiencesof the variouslyprejudiced and preoccupied human agents. The farmer,the geologist, and the artistwill all depend,in theirexperiencesof the landscape, upon the facultyof vision,the use of establishedhabits or symbols, and the capacityto relate various elements in a spatial and perhaps a temporalorder. Because the human organismhas a limitedset of facultieswith which to meet a varietyof demands,it would be perhaps strangeif the experiencesof art and science did not have many points of coincidence. But many such coincidences,as the use of vision and the relatingof an orderedwhole,would not identifyart and science as particular experiences, since they would be common also to othermodesof humanbehavior,just as attention to an object of the same physical dimensionsand temporal location would not implythat the experiencesof it were identical. Experi-

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ences of art and science will be of an identical kind not merelyby sharing many of the same elements,nor by being related to the same organismor object, but by being discoveredto be the same in immediateexperience. The fact is that we treat art and science as though they were distinct. The questionis whether this distinction is essential. On the one hand, it might be based upon somethingso adventitious as the frequent discretenessof their physical objects. On the otherhand, the identification Mr. Ames observesbetween art and science mightrest on such an accident as the frequentcoincidence of their physical objects and various correspondences in their respective modes of apprehension. We can approach the issue by asking what is implied in our natural assumption that we can identifyinstancesof art that are not instancesof science,and vice versa. we can identify, Ultimately compare,or distinguish objects only in termsof theirimmediateexperiences, or in termsof the relation of theirimmediateand presentto theirmediateand futureexperiences,that is, by theirfunctions in activity. For example,we may distinguishthe colors blue and green by the different immediate experienceswhichthey constitute;but othercolors betweenwhich we are unable to mark such an immediatedifference may be found to differ in termsof the different immediateexperiencestheyestablish whenplaced in identicalcontexts, such as under an instrument for measuring wave lengths. Likewise artworks and scientific theoriesmight differin their immediateexperiential quality; or theymightbe identicalin kind for immediate but differ experience, in the kind of futureexperienceto whichactivityrelates them. It is conceivable that the advocate of the close relation of art and science mightargue, for example, that in essential quality or immediate kind the experience of an integratedscientific theory is indistinguishable fromthe qualitativekind of musical composition, but thatthesedivergein theirresults,the scientific theorybegetting various goods all different in kind fromscientific theoryor a musical composition, whereas the music generatesonly furtherexperiences of itself. Actually,I believe that by both methodsart objects are distinguishable from scientific theories: by the immediatelyrecognized in the kinds of objects as they present themselvesin differences esthetic contemplation and scientific speculation; and by differences in theircorrelative activities-by theseobjects' different relationsof immediateto future experience. The interestingfact about the standard distinction is that it is not quite either,but partly both. The distinction is that artworksare predominantly objects of im-

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mediate experience,whereas scientific theories are predominantly objects of instrumental activity. Thus it is held that art and science differ not in theirnatureas immediate experiences, nor in their natureas activities, but in that one is primarily an experiencewhile the otheris primarilyan activity. If the proponentof this view is movedby a preference for broad yet clear-cutcategories, he may identify art with the immediateand science withthe instrumental; and this distinctionof artworksand scientific theorieswill then serve as an adequate definition of each. In this case, the theory will be consistentand self-contained, howeverinadequate. But the common-sense view is less radical. I thinkMr. Ames is faithfulto the apparent evidence in suggestingthat artworksare more final and immediatethan scientific theories,and that scientifictheoriesare more instrumental and forward-looking than artworks. Then, the distinction is not absolute and complete. Truly scientific theoriesdo have value as immediateexperiencefor the interestedscientist; and it is a virtue of the thing of beauty that its lovelinessincreases. Mr. Ames is so far right in arguing that science is in some sense final,and art in some degree instrumental. Scientific theorymay also be a kind of immediateexperience,art also a kind of activity; and if an effective contrastis to be maintained betweenthemit will have to refereitherto both as immediate experiencesor to both as activities. But this verystatement of the distinction as tentative, as one of degree only, seems to imply that art and science are separately identified independentof and prior to it. The view mightbe that an artworkis equivalent to that which is more immediateand less instrumental, and a scientific theoryequivalent to that which is more instrumentaland less immediate; then they would be perfectly distinguishedby being each fully defined. But I suspect that what is implicitlyassumed in the distinction is that there are experiencesseparately identified as art and science simply on the level of immediateexperience,and that there are activitiescalled art and sciencewhich are distinguishable merelyas activities. Mr. Ames seeks to break down the distinction of art and science by showingthe limitationsof this particular distinctionof art as final and science as instrumental. I think he would succeed if there were not above and behind this a differentiation of kind in immediateexperience. But the distinctionhe tries to abolish, or to minimize, itselfpresupposesthat artworks and scientific theories differ originally,in addition to the greater persistenceof one in immediateenjoyment,and the greater referenceof the other to future enjoyment. It is this primal distinctionwhich must be eliminatedif art and science are shownto be essentiallythe same.

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This mightbe possible. It mightbe that experiencesof art and experiencesof sciencehave in the past been differentiated by traits that are externalratherthan essentialto them. For example,their differentiation conceivablymight rest on nothingmore than that we are used to receivingextraneousrewardsfor scientific speculation, whereas no such reward normallyattends our experienceof art. Or they might differ in that the scientific enterpriseis carried on in one kind of environment whereas the enjoymentof art is had in another. Discovery of the essential identityof art and science would then ensue with the eliminationof these extrinsic circumstances and withthe experienceof a resultantsameness. "Extrinsic" here means extrinsicto the immediateexperiences of art and science; for these circumstances would validly differentiate art and scienceas activities, i.e., in termsof theirresults. We have observed,however,that a difference in activitiesmay persist togetherwith an identityof immediateexperiences. And, since immediateexperienceis the essential categoryof art, anythingto be effectively identified with it must be identified in termsof this category. He who would effectively assimilate science and art must show that their only differences are the "extrinsic" ones of futureconsequences. There are many anomalies in language, and the distinctionof art and science mightwell be another. What is importantis that the identification of art and sciencedependsupon the establishment of this identity in immediateexperience, and of these in theirmost particular,ratherthanwithrespectto theirmostgeneral,nature. Science and art may be alike as two colors are alike in being as two different colors,and different colors are different.There is a very broad categoryin which this analogy would quite validly apply to art and science. Indeed if one makes his categorybroad enough he will be able to include within it things quite different at firstsight. Thus, though blue and green are different colors, they are both alike in being colors and not sounds; similarly,we may say that art and science are alike in being kinds of "experience," or, if we wonderwhetherthis would contrastthem to anything at all-whether therewould be any two thingsthat were not identical in this sense-we may say that art and science are alike in being kinds of "satisfactory" or "harmonious" experience. But we should be clear about what this accomplishes. It does not, of course, demonstrate that blue is green, nor, should I suppose, art is science. If we in understanding that were interested the nature of the particular colors blue and green,and not color in general, our inquiry would proceed, not in the direction of their but away fromit; just so, if we were interestedin identification,

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knowingthe particular natures of art and of science, we should kinds of "satisfactory inquire in what sense they are different experience." Having established the genus, we should look for the differentiae.Mr. Ames seemsto do the reverse: differentiae are given,but he claims that what is essentialto themare not differentiatingtraits,but theiridentical genus. Mr. Ames's thesisis:
Art and science are alike in having for their province the whole of experience, their ultimate motive being to rearrange, integrate and interpret it to increase freedom,to open avenues to broader and more satisfactory living.'

The particulararts of architecture and music provideillustrations:

A building is a theoryas to how people may satisfactorilybehave at home, at church,at school, in a bank, a theater. [P. 104.] A hymn is a hypothesisof praise, tried out by the voices of the congregation. A waltz is borne to acceptance or rejection by the feet of dancers. A funeral march is found to be right by the mood of mourners. . . . Each piece of music, like any work of art, is a model for dealing with the problem of so organizing a part of the environment, or the responses of the socio-psychophysical organism,that harmoniousliving may result. [Pp. 105-106.]

One can see what Mr. Ames has in mind,and in a sense one can affirm his assertions. They place art in the large contextof human life and living, and here artworkshave this very general result whichMr. Ames ascribes; theyall "organize a part of the environment" (namely,that part which they constitute) and in this way "promote [thoughI should say, 'constitute'] satisfactory living." As a scientific theorymay be regarded as organizinga part of the in a way whichsubsequentexperiencewill eitherconenvironment firmor reject, so we may considerthe artworkas a particular oror the reversein fuganizationwhichwill prove itselfsatisfactory ture experience. The question is whether, in placing both art and scienceon this extremely generalplane, and gainingwithMr. Ames an insightinto the way these, as all formsof experience,take a similarrole in the total human economy-whether we have not thus obscured authentic differences. Have we said anythingessential about art and science,as particularformsof experience (and it is, after all, this we are concernedwith,not with ethics or psychology), otherthan that they are both good, both desirable elements in humanlife? First Mr. Ames slights the difference in artistic and scientific as we have noted, will be unessential activity. (This difference, from the view of art; but it might be essential for science if it turned out that the nature and value of science, unlike art, were
1 "Art and Science," Kenyon Review, Winter, 1944, p. 101. Unless otherwise indicated all following quotations are from this essay.

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constitutedand revealed in mediate activity rather than in immediate experience.) His position is that while "Art is characterizedby delightin whatit is as well as in what it promises,"there also occurs in science "delighted attentionto data and their implications . . . when a hypothesis is first being formed" (p. 106). As stated,however, the similarity consistsonly in that science,like art, is capable of providingimmediateand enjoyable experience. Other assertionsdisclose that art, like science,is capable of instituting future experiences (pp. 103 ff.). But the bare statement to a that both are immediateto a degreeand both are instrumental degree,ignoresthe specificnature of their immediacyand inistrumentality. between art As mediate activitiesthere is this clear difference and science: in the art object "what it is" and "what it promises" are essentiallythe same; whereas the delightfulexperience of formulating a scientific from the hypothesisis quite different of that hyexperienced good resulting from the demonstration pothesis. Exclusive of the educativevalue possessedby the object of art,as by any object deliberately examined, the onlyvalue which in its initial experiencethe artworkcan promiseis furtherexperiences of the same kind. Not that repeated experiencesof a work of art are identical in everydetail; but thereis a significant sense in whichit is true that these experiencesare the same with variations. Artistswould be even more desperate than they commonly are are if convincedthat the experiencestheyobjectifyin artworks not at least partiallycommunicated by them-if incipientand confor example, as the hysummatory experienceswere as different, pothesisabout the cause of a disease fromthe proofof that hypothesis in an effected cure. Thus, even though the activitiesof both art and science contained immediatevalue, and thoughthe objects (or the hypotheses art and science would reregardingthem) were both instrumental, in that the immediatelyvaluable exmain essentially different, perience of art is instrumentalto the same kind of experience, whereasthe pleasure in scientific studyis but one, and not the most conspicuous,of the results of science. The adequately embodied estheticexperienceis recreativeof this experience; but the true scientific is productiveof values other than that which hypothesis accompaniesits formulation. of a hypothesisexcludes Indeed the adequate demonstration in its originalurgencyand importance, of the experience, repetition the hypothesis. This demonstration of formulating may instigate still more excitingadventuresin speculation; but these,even when the initial hypothesisis proved true, may branch into directions

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and developments remotefromthe original theory; and when the original hypothesisis shown to be false, this is quite likely to happen. In art, too, the repeated experiencewill make new excursions,discovernew featuresin its object; but always these dewill startfromand returnto a central,identicalquality. velopments As Mr. Ames says, "The promisein a work of art is to renew the immediateintegrationand, with every encore,to banish the wish for anythingelse" (p. 112). It mightbe argued that, despite the freshcontentof each new the experiencesare all qualitativelythe same; scientific hypothesis, so that science, like art, is productiveof the same kind of experiences. This will not help the comparison,however. For though the scientific experiencemay remain the same in essential quality, while the contentchanges,the repeated experienceof an art object will contain much of the same content,and when the art object changesthe experiencedquality will changewith it. Actually it is hard to see any possible limit to the fruitfulness of one hypothesis in the generationof futurescientific hypotheses. The process of science is everlastingand the fieldsof science are multiplyrelated. Any theory,true or false, is fertilewith manifold,unpredictableinsightsfor a mind with the heroismto follow themout. This is the sense in which science may promisefuture delightslike to the present. But the actual meaning,which is the may have nothingpalpably substance,of the generativehypothesis which later arise as its alternain commonwith those hypotheses tives or developments. A work of art, on the other hand, is reexperiencedas virtuallyan identicalcontent. If the experienceof science is qualitatively the same whereverit appears, this would the scientific fromthe estheticexperience, where itselfdifferentiate an individuality of contentis always accompaniedby an individual quality. I believe Mr. Ames does not ask the question whetherthere is in science a correspondence betweenthe initial and subsequent (or hypotheticaland demonstrative)experiences,an answer to which would identifyor distinguishart and science as activities. Nor does he ask the more fundamental question whether in either instance the experiencesof art and of science are essentiallythe same. The general directionof his view, however,indicates the answer he would give, namely,the answer of Mr. Dewey in his instrumentalist for the view of Mr. Dewey esthetics (significantly, and Mr. Ames, entitledArt as Experience, and not "The Experience of Art"). The view is that,on the one hand, all experiences are essentially of art differ unique,so thatnot onlymustexperiences from experiencesof science, but within each of these categories

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fromeveryother. The second half of everyexperiencemustdiffer the theoryis that there is a single pattern for all "satisfactory" experience,and particular experienceswill approximate more or variety less closelyto this pattern. Experience is a sort of infinite in perfect identity.2 The orientationof Mr. Ames's thoughtto a single categoryof in"satisfactory" or "harmonious" living,and the corresponding strumentalist tendencyeithereasily to mix or readily to substitute different values, are apparent in the specificexamples he selects to illustratethe functionof hypothesisin art. He is prone to take for such illustrationinstances of artworksthat are also employed for ends not exclusively esthetic. He mentionsa building as a behave at home, at "theory as to how people may satisfactorily church,at school,in a bank, a theater"; and in music he refersto a hymn,a waltz, and a funeral march,all of which function,and are validated as "hypotheticalorganizationsof the environment," not merelyin estheticcontemplation, but in such independentactivitiesas worship, study,exercise,mourning. One may, of course, test a building or a piece of music in termsof its service to these otheractivities; but we normallysuppose that the art object must also be tested in a furtherway if it is to be recognizednot only as useful to one of these ends, but as an estheticobject besides. is Science, or true knowledgeabout the nature of the environment, in the satisfactionof every need; the artthe effective instrument of a special need. workis the satisfaction It may be that scienceis itselfanotherdistinctneed which (like the benevolentnature), in providingfor the satisfactionof other needs, secures at the same time an intrinsicsatisfaction. There of art would thenbe two ways of denyingthe essentialdistinction and science: first, to show that there are no essential distinctions of needs whatsoever-there is simply more or less "satisfactory" experience; or second, to show only that the specificneeds of art and science are not distinct. But neitheris the conspicuousobject or methodof Mr. Ames. He merelynotes certain similaritiesin the objects and activitiesof art and science,and this,I believe, to disclosed in an examination the neglectof that essential difference and comparison of theirrespectiveexperiences. If the distinction of art and science is drawn simplyupon this it is difficult to see how it primarylevel of immediateexperience, are impressedwiththe fundacan be denied. The instrumentalists mental unity of human nature; they criticizewhat they term the
2 Cf. Art as Experience; also my paper on "The Concept of Continuity in Dewey's Theory of Esthetics," The Philosophical Review, Vol. LII (1943), pp. 392-400.

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of man into instincts and faculties; they compartmentalization would substitutean analysis of experiencein whichdistinctions are phases or points of intensification of a single basic process. It is not necessaryto quarrel with this general methodto observe that it requires recognitionof primary qualitative distinctionsin experience,whateverthe place of thesein the common pattern. And it seemsto me that the distinction of,for example,blue fromgreen is but a more specificdistinctionof the same immediatekind by which we recognize,on a more general level, the difference of an experienceof art fromone of scientific speculation,or, on a level midway between these in generality, the difference of experiences of color from experiencesof sound. I do not know what other than such a direct distinctioncould produce or justify our customaryassumptionthat there are really the two things-art and science-and not merelyone-art-science. It is quite possibleto grantthat,as Mr. Ames has said in another essay, "If the artisthas a place in art, life cannotbe kept out, for no man is purelyan artist . . . and yet to insistthat "life " (by which I suppose Mr. Ames means what Mr. Dewey calls ordinary or common experience) includes kinds of experiencethat are essenis anxious to rememberthat tially distinct. The instrumentalist the man who behaves as artistdoes not therebycease to be a mana creaturein some degree also moral and scientific. But if this is not an innocuoustruism,the issue becomesat this level psychological, constituting such questions as: what human faculties engage in each of these activities?are the same facultiesengaged in all of them? to what extent do the faculties so engaged interpenetrate, in degree of emphasisor domination? Such quesseparate, differ tions would seem preeminently of study,but they could be worthy studied only on the assumptionthat there exist authentic (hence distinct) experiencesof art and science,and only with reference to specificinstancesof such experiences. Would Mr. Ames ban such inquiriesab initio,contending he is, thatwhatever a man experiences afterall, thesame humanbeing (itselfratherquestionable); thathe will therefore use in some way part of all of himself in any experience; and that consequently his experiencewill be fundamentally the same? Mr. Ames will have to prohibitsuch inquiriesif he denies thatart and scienceare essentially distinctkinds of experience, for withoutthe latterpresupposition any inquiry could investigate only the conditionseitherof some particular,unique experience, or of experiencegenerally.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
3

SIDNEY ZINK (1943), p. 491.

"On Empathy," The Philosophical Review, Vol. LII