Pascual vs.

pascual-Bautista
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUALBAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUALNER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents. G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992 PARAS, J.: FACTS: Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children.. Adela Soldevilla Pascual the surviving spouse of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC Branch 162, a special proceeding case no.7554 for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. Olivia and Hermes are illegitimate children of Eligio Pascual (although they contend that the term illegitimate children as described in art 992 should be construed as spurious children). ISSUE: Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD: Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995 BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL,petitioners, vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.

VITUG, J.: The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant. Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter". On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away. On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-20594, OCT P19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles (OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her corespondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of

Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments. The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a quo for summary judgment. The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision, dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit. Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and severally (solidarily) pay (a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for litigation expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and P500.00 for attorney's fees. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court. The petition before us raises the following contentions: That 1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, AS THE CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS, AND NOT ARTICLE 992 OF THE SAME CODE. 2. THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF, AND VOIDING ALL DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY, RESPONDENT MODESTA BALTAZAR, WHO ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT THE STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICY.
3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS NEVER A LEGAL WRONG. 1

Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly: Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate. If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half. (Emphasis supplied) Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads: Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (Emphasis supplied) Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does

not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions. This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. 2 His thesis: What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of"brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. (Emphasis supplied) The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain", firstly, in the early case of Grey v. Fabie 3 and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4 and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals.5 In Diaz, we have said: Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; 6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; 9 and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. 10Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative 11 by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole.12 In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:
Order of Preference (a) Legitimate Children and Descendants Order of Concurrence (a) Legitimate Children and Descendants, Illegitimate Children and Descendants, and Surviving Spouse (b) Legitimate Parents and Ascendants (b) Legitimate Parents and Ascendants Illegitimate

Children and Descendants, and Surviving Spouse (c) Illegitimate Children and Descendants (in the absence of ICDs and LPAs, the Illegitimate Parents) (d) Surviving Spouse (e) Brothers and Sisters/ Nephews and Nieces (f) Other Collateral Relatives (within the fifth civil degree) (g) State (g) Alone (d) Surviving Spouse and Illegitimate Parents (e) Brothers and Sisters/ Nephews and Nieces and Surviving Spouse (f) Alone (c) Illegitimate Children and Descendants and Surviving Spouse

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13 We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-ininterest" 14 in the case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint. The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor. 15 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special pronouncement on costs. SO ORDERED. Feliciano, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

ORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs . COURT OFAPPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents . [G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997] Facts: The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew of the deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father HermogenesDezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant ord escendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation. The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT was issued in the latters name.Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyanceclaimi ng that they are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes. During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness, with documentary evidences offered to prove petitioners filiation to their father and their aunt. Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of the exhibits. Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to Plaintiffs Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero. The trial court dismissed the complaint for reconveyance. Respondent Court of Appealsup held the dismissal, declaring that the documentary evidence presented by hereinpetitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal. Issues: 1.Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of the petitioners.2.Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. Ruling: 1. The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on soundermorality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlockare legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot beattacked col

laterally.Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is void. This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed by law. Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore, becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available. 2.The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:

Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitima te children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject property wasautomatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate histotal undivided threefourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein privaterespondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by the Transfer Certificate of Title in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof, respectively.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116775. January 22, 1998]

HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE, namely, ROSELYN URIARTE, MADRILYN and LOURDES URIARTE, and FELOMINA BUNIEL URIARTE, and HEIRS OF PRIMITIVA ARNALDO and HEIRS OF GREGORIO ARNALDO, represented herein by FELISA ARNALDO SULLANO and LUPECINO ARNALDO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BENEDICTO ESTRADA, respondents. DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, as well as the appellate courts resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. At issue is the right of the parties to a 2.7 hectare piece of land in Sungkit, Madrid, Surigao del Sur, which Justa Arnaldo-Sering left upon her death on March 31, 1989. The parties and their relationship to Justa Arnaldo-Sering are as follows: Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is the son of Agatonica Arreza, whose parents were Pedro Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa.[2] Private respondent Benedicto Estrada is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica. Petitioners, referred to in this case as the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow and daughters of Pascasio Uriarte. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva Arnaldo and Conrado Uriarte. His mother, Primitiva Uriarte, was the daughter of Domingo Arnaldo and Catalina Azarcon. Domingo Arnaldo and Justas father, Juan Arnaldo, were brothers.[3] Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte. The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother Gregorio.[4] The children of Primitiva by Conrado Uriarte, aside from Pascasio, are Josefina, Gaudencio, Simplicio, Domingo and Virgilio, all surnamed Uriarte. The children of Gregorio Arnaldo, Primitivas brother, by Julieta Ilogon, are Jorencio, Enecia, Nicolas, Lupecino and Felisa. These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio Arnaldo and Primitiva Arnaldo. Private respondent Benedicto Estrada brought this case in the Regional Trial Court for the partition of the land left by Justa Arnaldo-Sering. The land, consisting of 2.7 hectares, had been acquired by Justa as follows: 0.5 hectare by inheritance from

her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 hectares by purchase.[5] Private respondent claimed to be the sole surviving heir of Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio Uriarte who, he claimed, worked the land as Justas tenant, refused to give him (private respondent) his share of the harvest.[6] He contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only one-half of the 0.5 hectare land which Justa had inherited from her parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil.[7] Pascasio died during the pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs.[8] In their answer, the heirs denied they were mere tenants of Justa [9] but the latters heirs entitled to her entire land. They claimed that the entire land, subject of the case, was originally owned by Ambrocio Arnaldo,[10] their great granduncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, Ambrocios nephews, in a holographic will executed by Ambrocio in 1908.[11] Domingo was to receive two-thirds of the land and Juan, onethird.[12] The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the harvest from it.[13] They alleged that private respondent did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio Arnaldo, [14] the original owner of the property. The trial court sustained petitioners contention. In its decision rendered on November 8, 1991 it ruled:

As earlier stated, the land of Ambrosio Arnaldo which he left to his two nephews, Domingo and Juan Arnaldo, was only .5481 hectares, divided as follows: two-thirds or 3,654 square meters to Domingo, and one-third or 1,827 square meters to Juan. The area increased to 2.7588 hectares from .5481 hectares because the adjacent lot of about two hectares was acquired by Justa Arnaldo Sering, daughter of Juan Arnaldo, after the latters death. The entire 2.7588 hectares was covered by tax declaration in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. The latter however died intestate and without issue. Her nearest surviving relatives are the children of her uncle Domingo Arnaldo, to whom her entire estate passed on after her death by operation of law, to the exclusion of all other relatives. Thus, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 277, Civil Code).
[15]

Accordingly, the court ordered:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and the intervenors [herein petitioners] and against the plaintiff [private respondent], declaring the defendants and the intervenors, together with the other heirs of the late Domingo Arnaldo, as entitled to the entire parcel of land described in Tax Declaration No. 124 and subsequent revising tax declarations in the name of Justa Arnaldo Sering. No cost. SO ORDERED.
[16]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Contrary to the trial courts finding, the appellate court found that the 0.5 hectares had been acquired by Justas parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, during their marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica, private respondent was held to be entitled to share in the estate of Justa. In the dispositive portion of its decision the appellate court ordered:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another is hereby entered Ordering the partition of the property described in the second amended complaint in the following manner: (1) (2) .2500 hectare as the share of defendants-intervenors, and 2.58 hectare as the share of the plaintiff.

For this purpose, the court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the partition in accordance with the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. SO ORDERED.
[17]

Hence, this petition by the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, the heirs of Primitiva Uriarte, and the heirs of Gregorio Arnaldo. Petitioners allege:

I THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK AND/OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS THE SON OF AGATONA ARREZA, THE HALF SISTER OF JUSTA ARNALDO SERING; II THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PREFERRED TECHNICALITY OVER SUBSTANTIALITY WHEN IT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL LEFT BY THE DECEASED AMBROCIO ARNALDO CANNOT PASS REAL OR PERSONAL PROPERTY; III THE PRAYERS FOR RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES IS MERITORIOUS; IV AND THE INSTANT PETITION IS IMPRESSED WITH MERIT AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
[18]

After due consideration of the petition, we find it to be without merit. As already stated, Justa left a piece of land consisting 2.7 hectares. Half of this land (0.5 hectares), as the Court of Appeals found, formerly was conjugal property of her

parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil. The rest, consisting of 2.2 hectares, was acquired by Justa after the death of her parents. Accordingly, the division of Justas property should be as follows as private respondent contends:

A - The first 1/2 hectare should be divided into two parts, the share of Juan Arnaldo which will accrue to petitioners and the second half which pertains to Ursula Tubil, which will accrue to private respondent. B - As to the second portion of the area of the land in question which as already stated was consolidated with the 1/2 hectare originally belonging to the conjugal partnership of Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, the same shall accrue to private respondent, who is the son of Agatonica Arreza, and who is only three degrees from Justa Arnaldo, whereas petitioners who are the children of Primitiva Arnaldo and Gregorio Arnaldo, are five degrees removed from Justa Arnaldo.
[19]

The issue in this case is who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justas estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil Code. As a preliminary matter, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in holding that private respondent is the son of Agatonica Arreza, who was the half-sister of Justa Arnaldo. Petitioners are raising this issue only now. It is well-settled, however, that questions not taken up during the trial of a case cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. With more reason, therefore, should such a question be disallowed when raised for the first time on appeal to this Court.[20] It is noteworthy that, in their brief before the Court of Appeals,[21] petitioners admitted that private respondent is Justas nephew, his mother, Agatonica, being Justas half-sister. Apparently they are now questioning private respondents filiation because, as explained by the Court of Appeals, private respondent is the nearest relative of Justa and, therefore, the only one entitled to her estate. Indeed, given the fact that 0.5 hectares of the land in question belonged to the conjugal partnership of Justas parents, Justa was entitled to 0.125 hectares of the half hectare land as her fathers (Juan Arnaldos) share in the conjugal property, while petitioners are entitled to the other 0.125 hectares. In addition, Justa inherited her mothers (Ursula Tubils) share consisting of 0.25 hectares. Plus the 2.2 hectares which belonged to her in her own right, Justa owned a total of 2.575 or 2.58 hectares of the 2.7-hectare land. This 2.58-hectare land was inherited by private respondent Benedicto Estrada as Justas nearest surviving relative. As the Court of Appeals held:

According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of Article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood,

and of Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between paternal and maternal lines. The manner of determining the proximity of relationship are provided by Articles 963 - 966 of the Civil Code. They provide: ART. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each generation forms a degree. ART. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral. A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants. A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor. ART. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.

The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. ART. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons, excluding the progenitor. In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus the child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent. In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth. In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa. On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justas cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.

Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment.
[22]

Nevertheless, petitioners make much of the fact that private respondent is not an Arnaldo, his mother being Ursulas daughter not by Juan Arnaldo but by Pedro Arreza. They claim that this being the case, private respondent is not an heir of Justa and thus not qualified to share in her estate. Petitioners misappreciate the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son of Justas half -sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justas nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent.[23] That private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his aunts heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.[24] Because of the conclusion we have thus reached, the third and fourth grounds of the petition for review must fail. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is LIFTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED