Nicholas Harmon Philosophy 161- Aristotle Professor Hursthouse GSI Jessica Gelber Wednesday 11 !! 16 "arch #!!

$ Aristotle on Wisdom In %oo& 'I of his Nicomachean Ethics( Aristotle deals )ith the rational part of the soul( )hich is important to *irtue in that it is the part of the soul )hich deliberates+ He first distin,uishes t)o parts of the rational part of the soul( one bein, scientific( the other calculati*e+ -he function of both parts is to achie*e truth( ho)e*er the t)o parts deal )ith different thin,s+ -he calculati*e part deals )ith thin,s that can be other)ise and can chan,e. the scientific part deals )ith )hat cannot be other)ise and cannot chan,e+ Within these t)o parts of the rational part of the soul are placed fi*e different dispositions to)ards sorts of &no)led,e systematic &no)led,e( intelli,ence( intellectual accomplishment( technical e/pertise( and )isdom+ Systematic &no)led,e( intelli,ence( and intellectual accomplishment are all said to deal )ith thin,s that cannot be other)ise( and so are components of the scientific part+ -echnical e/pertise and )isdom deal )ith thin,s that can chan,e and so are components of the calculati*e part+ Systematic &no)led,e is )hat is &no)n necessarily( throu,h deduction from first principles+ Intelli,ence is that throu,h )hich )e inducti*ely ,rasp the first principles necessary for systematic &no)led,e+ Intellectual accomplishment is the combination of the pre*ious t)o types of &no)led,e( inducti*ely ,raspin, first principles and deducti*ely &no)in, )hat must necessarily follo) from those principles+ Intellectual accomplishment is said

to be the e/cellence of the scientific part( as it is a disposition issuin, most in truth( and thus best accomplishin, the function of the scientific part of the rational part of the soul+ -echnical 0/pertise is a disposition in*ol*in, comin, into bein,+ It is a disposition concerned )ith production of specific thin,s+ Wisdom is a disposition concerned )ith actions ,ood for human bein,s in ,eneral+ %ecause one can be e/cellent or not in terms of technical e/pertise( it is not an e/cellence( )hile )isdom is itself an e/cellent thin,( and so )isdom is ta&en to be the e/cellence of the calculati*e part of the rational part of the soul+ After discussin, common conceptions of )isdom( Aristotle arri*es at a rou,h definition of )isdom( sayin, )isdom is 1a true disposition accompanied by rational prescription( relatin, to action in the sphere of )hat is ,ood and bad for human bein,s2 3Nicomachean Ethics 11$!b4-11$!b561+ Wisdom is also said to in*ol*e deliberation( deliberation concernin, thin,s that can be other)ise( and these thin,s must ha*e to do )ith )hat is best for humans+ Good deliberation is ta&en to be a characteristic of a )ise person( deliberati*e e/cellence bein, defined first as 1correctness as to )hat one should achie*e( and the )ay in )hich( and )hen( all in accordance )ith )hat is beneficial2 311$#b#5-11$#b#76 and then as 1that sort of correctness that corresponds to )hat conduces the end( of )hich )isdom is the true ,rasp2 311$#b88-11$#b8$6+ Wisdom in*ol*es deliberation about ho) and )hat to achie*e in order to reach an end+ Wisdom is also said to be prescripti*e( tellin, 1)hat one should do or not do92 311$8a:-11$8a1!6+ -he deliberation of the )ise person leads to action+ ;eliberation issuin, in actions consists of a syllo,ism in*ol*in, a uni*ersal premise and a particular premise( leadin, to an action as a conclusion+ Aristotle )rites(
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All subse<uent citations )ill refer to Nicomachean Ethics

19mista&es occur in relation either to the uni*ersal in deliberation or to the particular92 311$#a#1-11$#a##6+ -he e/cellences of the rational part of the soul pro*ide these premises+ Intellectual accomplishment( )hich deals )ith that )hich cannot be other)ise( issues uni*ersal premises( )hile )isdom( )hich deals )ith )hat can be other)ise( issues particular premises+ Aristotle )rites( 19)isdom is antithetical to intelli,ence( for intelli,ence has as its ob=ects the definitions for )hich there is no account( )hereas )isdom has as its ob=ect )hat comes last >in the syllo,ism?( and this is not an ob=ect of systematic &no)led,e( but of perception92 311$#a#4-11$#a#56+ While the intellectually accomplished person may be able to deduce rules of action from first principles( they )ill be unable to act consistently )ell )ithout )isdom( as )isdom pro*ides a prescription for )hat to do or not do in a particular circumstance in order to obey the deduced rules+ Wisdom percei*es circumstances( and has to do )ith particulars+ -his leads Aristotle to point out that since e/perience is often associated )ith )isdom this position is defended( as particulars come to be &no)n and understood throu,h e/perience rather than teachin,+ Wisdom is )hat allo)s one to act to)ards a ,ood end in a particular circumstance( )hile intellectual accomplishment allo)s one only to understand )hat mi,ht be ,ood in an abstract sense+ Intellectual accomplishment becomes practical throu,h )isdom+ 0arly in %oo& 'I Aristotle )rites that 1In the soul( the thin,s determinin, action and truth are three perception( intelli,ence( and desire+ %ut of these perception is not an ori,inator of any sort of action92 3118:a17-118:a#!6+ Perception then must determine only thou,ht( lea*in, intelli,ence and desire as the determinants of action+ Aristotle ,oes on to say that 19since e/cellence of character is a disposition issuin, in decisions( and decision is a desire informed by deliberation( in conse<uence both )hat issues from

reason must be true and the desire must be correct for the decision to be a ,ood one( and reason must assert and desire pursue the same thin,s2 3118:a##-118:a#66+ ;esire is informed by deliberation in that desire pro*ides the end+ Practical reasonin,( )hich is deliberation culminatin, in action( be,ins )ith an end in mind+ It is from this end that one deliberates usin, uni*ersals in accordance )ith this end and particulars )hich lead to)ards this end+ As Aristotle says( 19e/cellence >of character? ma&es the ,oal correct( )hile )isdom ma&es )hat leads to it correct2 311$$a7-11$$a:6+ @urther( 19decision9is made correct by e/cellence( but the doin, of )hate*er by the nature of thin,s has to be done to realiAe that decision is not the business of e/cellence but of another ability2 311$$a#!-11$$a#86+ ;ecision is made correct by e/cellence in that e/cellence pro*ides the end to)ards )hich decision is aimed( and )isdom( bein, the mentioned 1other ability(2 allo)s for particular actions to be correctly aimed at that end+ Wisdom is compared by Aristotle to cle*erness( in that 1)hen it comes to the thin,s that conduce to a proposed ,oal( >both are? able to carry these out and do so successfully2 311$$a#4-11$$a#66+ -he distinction bet)een )isdom and cle*erness is that )isdom necessitates cle*erness+ Bnscrupulous people possess cle*erness as )ell. the aim is simply different+ Aristotle compares the demonstrated difference bet)een cle*erness and )isdom to the difference bet)een 1natural e/cellence2 and 1e/cellence in the primary sense+2 Natural e/cellence and e/cellence in the primary sense are said to be similar( natural e/cellence bein, somethin, humans can be born )ith( and e/cellence in the primary sense somethin, more refined and better than this+ -he difference is said to be that the naturally e/cellent person does not possess )isdom( )hile the person )ith e/cellence in

the primary sense does 311$$b16-11$$b176+ -his distinction can be accounted for by reco,niAin, that e/cellence in the primary sense )ill al)ays ma&e the possessor act correctly in a ,i*en situation( in order to achie*e the ,ood life+ Without )isdom( the possessor of natural e/cellence is unable to deliberate correctly concernin, a ,i*en situation and is unable to ,rasp the particular path on the lar,er road of e/cellence+ -he possessor of natural e/cellence( lac&in, in )isdom( )ill thus be unable to al)ays and unsha&in,ly act e/cellently+ -his distinction accounts for the first part of AristotleCs statement that 1it is not possible to possess e/cellence in the primary sense )ithout )isdom( nor to be )ise )ithout e/cellence of character2 311$$b8#-11$$b886+ -he second part of this statement can be defended by referrin, to AristotleCs description of the practical syllo,ism as bein, dependent upon an end+ -he practical syllo,ism is composed of a uni*ersal premise( deri*ed from the e/cellence of the scientific part of the rational part of the soul )hich deals )ith unchan,in, thin,s( intellectual accomplishment( and a particular premise( deri*ed from the e/cellence of the calculati*e part of the rational part of the soul )hich deals )ith thin,s capable of chan,e( )isdom+ -he particular premises can only be assessed usin, )isdom )ith some end in mind( as they are useful insofar as they 1ma&e )hat leads to >a ,oal determined by e/cellence? correct2 311$$a7-11$$a:6+ Without e/cellence of character( )hich throu,h correct desires creates correct ends for deliberation( )isdom )ould be useless and none/istent( as )isdom re<uires the e/istence of an end in order to assess the particular and fulfill its role in deliberation+ -hus( AristotleCs statement that 1it is not possible to possess e/cellence in the primary sense )ithout )isdom( nor to be )ise )ithout e/cellence of character2 appears to be *alid+ His

*ie) seems lar,ely plausible as )ell+ Ho)e*er( thou,h it does seem true that one cannot be )ise )ithout e/cellence of character( it seems that the use of )isdom to achie*e e/cellence in the primary sense( )hich implies fla)less e/cellence( may be problematic+ -hou,h e/perience mi,ht lar,ely create a base of &no)led,e of particulars from )hich to dra) on in ne) circumstances( this base could ne*er positi*ely assure the impossibility of a misinterpretation of particulars leadin, to incorrect particular premises and so incorrect syllo,isms and actions+ "ost li&ely( e/perience mi,ht not lead one al)ays to use the most effecti*e means to achie*e an end( as e/perience does not necessitate inno*ati*e thin&in,( only imitation of impro*isation based on e/perience( )hich is necessarily limited+ Ho)e*er( this ob=ection criticiAes only one half of AristotleCs assertion( and that only insofar as it may not be fla)less+ His ar,ument is lar,ely <uite con*incin,+