Ignoring the Demon?

Spinoza's Way with Doubt

Richard Mason

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 31, Number 4, October 1993, pp. 545-564 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/hph.1993.0088

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v031/31.4mason.html

Access provided by PUC/RJ-Pontif-cia Universidade Catlica do Rio de Janeiro (3 Sep 2013 18:34 GMT)

Ignoring the Demon? Spinoza's Way with Doubt

RICHARD V. M A S O N

SPINOZA'S RESPONSES TO THE Cartesian m e t h o d o f d o u b t have not i m p r e s s e d c o m m e n t a t o r s . Richard Popkin stated the charge well: Considering how serious 'la crise pyrrhonniene' was in the middle of the seventeenth century, and especially how serious it was for Descartes, it is somewhat surprising to see how calmly Spinoza faced it, and how simple he found it was to dispose of it. Unlike Descartes, who had to fight his way through scepticism to arrive at dogmatic truth, Spinoza simply began with an assurance that his system was true, and anyone who didn't see this was either truth-blind (like color-blind) or was an ignoramus.' T h e reasons for this are not h a r d to see. In brief, Spinoza, who was extremely well-acquainted with the work o f Descartes, dismissed the d o u b t s o f the First Meditation in little m o r e t h a n a few words. His opinion that t r u t h is a s t a n d a r d o f itself (and o f falsity) looks like an intuitionism that, to a critical r e a d e r , can a p p e a r as dogmatism. Even a sympathetic c o m m e n t a t o r like H u b b e l i n g t h o u g h t that Spinoza h a d not "really struggled with d o u b t as f o r e x a m p l e Descartes did."' Recently, s o m e attempts have been m a d e to a r g u e Spinoza's case, b u t not, I shall claim, along the most effective lines.3 Historically a n d philosophically this matters. T h e epistemology o f Descartes p r e s e n t e d a challenge to philosophers for t h r e e centuries. Spinoza s e e m e d to ignore that challenge, o r at least he s e e m e d to p r o d u c e n o interesting response. T h i s must have b e e n o n e o f the main factors which placed him outside the m a i n s t r e a m o f the E u r o p e a n philosophical canon.
' R. H. Popkin, The History of Scepticismfrom Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), 239 and 245. 2H. G. Hubbeling, Spinoza's Methodology (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1967), 35. sSee for example M. B. Bohon, "Spinoza on Cartesian Doubt," No~ 19/3 (1985): 379-95; D. Garrett, "Truth and Ideas of Imagination in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione," Studia Spinozana 2 0986): 61-92; W. Doney, "Spinoza on Philosophical Skepticism," in M. Mandelbaum and E. Freeman, eds. Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation (La Salle: Open Court, 1975), 139-57.

[545]

546

J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 1 : 4

OCTOBER 1993

I n this p a p e r I w a n t to s h o w t h a t a r e s p o n s e to C a r t e s i a n d o u b t o t h e r t h a n d o g m a t i c i n t u i t i o n i s m was a v a i l a b l e to S p i n o z a . T h a t r e s p o n s e , I b e l i e v e , was a n d is a n i n t e r e s t i n g o n e . A l o n g t h e way, I a l s o w a n t to a r g u e , w i t h r a t h e r less c e r t a i n t y , t h a t it was a c t u a l l y a d o p t e d b y S p i n o z a , as w e l l as b e i n g a v a i l a b l e to h i m . H e r e , m y l a c k o f c e r t a i n t y is a p r o d u c t o f S p i n o z a ' s t e r s e n e s s . W h a t his positions entailed or presupposed seems straightforward logically. The schola r s h i p r e q u i r e d to d e t e r m i n e h o w f a r h e f o l l o w e d t h a t l o g i c is n o t , I t h i n k , conclusive. But the case should be stated.
1.

F i r s t , t h e c h a l l e n g e . H e r e is o n e w a y to s t a t e t h e t h i n k i n g o f D e s c a r t e s : (a) Descartes can imagine what is not actual: "Suppose then that I am d r e a m i n g , a n d that these p a r t i c u l a r s - - t h a t my eyes are open, that I a m moving my head a n d stretching out my h a n d s - - a r e not true. Perhaps, indeed, I do not even have such h a n d s or such a body at all."4 (b) Descartes can distinguish his imagination f r o m his "pure understanding"5 o r his "clear and distinct conception" (or "perception"). (c) W h e n Descartes clearly and distinctly conceives something, it is not possible at that time for him to be mistaken: "So long as we a t t e n d to a truth which we perceive very clearly, we cannot d o u b t it. ''6 (d) B u t u e v e n while perceiving a t r u t h - - D e s c a r t e s can present to himself the possibility that he might be mistaken. T h e introduction o f the d e m o n shows this in the First Meditation. M o r e directly (but p e r h a p s the same in practice), we see the use o f "an o m n i p o t e n t G o d who created us" in the Principles of Philosophy: " . . . we d o not know whether he may have wished to make us beings o f the sort who are always deceived even in those matters which seem to us supremely evident; for such constant d e c e p t i o n seems no less a possibility than the occasional deception which, as we have noticed on previous occasions, does occur."7 (e) T h e existence o f G o d rules out (d) for Descartes: " . . . no act o f awareness that can be r e n d e r e d d o u b t f u l seems fit to be called k n o w l e d g e . . , an a t h e i s t . . , cannot be certain that he is not being deceived on matters which seem to him to be very evid e n t . . , a l t h o u g h this d o u b t may not occur to him, it can still c r o p u p if s o m e o n e else raises the p o i n t o r if he looks into the matter himself. So he will never be free o f this doubt until he acknowledges that G o d exists. ''8 4Descartes, First Meditation, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (hereafter CSMK) trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch and A. Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984 and a991), 2:13; C. Adam and P. Tannery, eds., Oettvres de Descartes (hereafter AT) (Paris: Vrin, a964-76), 7: 195Descartes, Sixth Meditation, CSMK 2:5o-51 = AT 7:72-74 . SDescartes, Seventh Replies, CSMK 2:3o9 = AT 7:460. vDescartes, Principles, I, 5; CSMK l: 194 = AT 8A: 6. SDescartes, Second Replies, CSMK 2: aoa = AT 7: 141-

SPINOZA'S

WAY WITH

DOUBT

547

Descartes was well aware of the problems created by his thinking in this area, as we know from his responses to charges of circularity in the Objections and Replies and in his Conversation with Burman. His attitude to those problems is not the theme of this paper. It is relevant to note, though, what Spinoza took Descartes's attitude to be. In the Prolegomenon to the Principles of Philosophy DemonstTated in the Geometrical Manner he refers to Descartes's remarks about the uncertainty o f memory: he represents Descartes as relying on the validity o f immediate, continuous, clear perception: " . . . although God's existence cannot come to be known through itself, but only through something else, we will be able to attain a certain knowledge of his existence so long as we attend very accurately to all the premises from which we have inferred it. See Principles I, 13; Reply to Secondo Objections, 3, and Meditation 5, at the end."9 This, in effect, would be a reliance on point (c) to break the Cartesian circle: an insistence that clear and distinct conception cannot be trumped or outflanked while it is being used, a position that Descartes himself suggested at times, ~~but a hard position to maintain alongside (d), which was designed specifically to get around it. Spinoza went on to mention, laconically, that "this answer does not satisfy some people" and gave an alternative. The disentangling of his own position from his statement of Descartes's position cannot be decisive; but his suggestion of an alternative argument was significant. ~ He recognized that immediate, unsupported conception as a guarantee of knowledge d/d present problems. He did not say that these were insoluble, but he did see a point in offering another line of support. Why would he do this if he though that clear and distinct perception was the only way of dealing with doubt?
2.

Spinoza, with some qualification, agreed emphatically with (a). Simply, this is the thought that our imaginations can be fairly free. A qualification has to be added because, apparently, he felt some empirical limit: "... someone who is dreaming can think that he is awake, but no one who is awake can ever think that he is dreaming. ''~' This qualification seems, though, to be irrelevant to his main thinking: which is just as well, since it is plainly untrue. His adherence to (b) was entirely along the lines of the distinction drawn at
0 Spinoza, Principles of Philosophy, Prolegomenon (hereafter Prolegomenon) in Collected Works, ed. a n d trans. E. Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), l: 236; see Spinoza, Opera (hereafter G) ed. C. G e b h a r d t (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925), l: 147. 1oDescartes, Fourth Replies, CSMK 2:171 = A T 7: 946; Seventh Replies, CSMK 9 : 3 o 9 = A T 7: 46o; Letter to Regius, CSMK 3 : 1 4 7 = A T 3: 64-65. '~ I will r e t u r n to this i m p o r t a n t passage later. ~lShort Treatise, II, xv; Curiey, l: 12o = G 1: 79.

548

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 t : 4 0 C T O n E R X993

the beginning o f the Sixth Meditation, although it was supported by a wholly non-Cartesian substructure (for example, in Ethics II, i2 ff.) and was used to support wholly non-Cartesian consequences (for example, in Ethics II, 49 Cot. Sch.). Similarly, Spinoza's assent to (c) appears to differ from Descartes's only in its uncompromising dogmatism: "He who has a true idea at the same time knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing."~ On which he made his famous remark (which has caused so much difficulty in the interpretation o f his views): "As the light makes both itself and the darkness plain, so truth is the standard both of itself and of the false.",4 From there it is easy enough to construct a response for Spinoza to (d) and (e): (d) cannot arise because clear and distinct conception alone is enough to validate truth. It cannot be outflanked because it always does worl~ reliably. So (e) is not needed to block or rule out (d). This is easy and appealing but, I believe, wrong. Spinoza, it has to be admitted, did little to discourage this reading. It is appealing because, indisputably, it does represent a consequence of his position: (d) was indeed blocked for him, and so (e) was superfluous; but to throw the whole weight o f that consequence onto (c) alone is surely a mistake. Spinoza's theory o f knowledge, on those lines, could be summed up in one sentence without loss: once we distinguish clear perception from imagination, what we perceive clearly has to be true. Anyone who thought that that was his view could be excused for dismissing it as uninteresting.
.

There are some good reasons to believe that this is not what Spinoza thought. Above all, there was his otherwise sound grasp~s of Descartes. It scarcely seems credible that the author of the Principles of Philosophy Demonstrated in a Geometrical Manner could have misunderstood Descartes so badly as not to be have seen the force of hyperbolic doubt. The pages headed "Liberation from All Doubts" in his Prolegomenon portray the force of Descartes's point as strongly as anyone could wish. But we should put aside any principle of charitable interpretation and look at the arguments. Focussing first on (a) to (e), it is worth noting that Spinoza felt much more strongly than Descartes about the fallibility of the senses and of the imagination. Whereas Descartes ran through the factual evidence famil,sEthics II, 43; see also Principles I, 14, which he took to be Descartes's version.
,4 Ibid., Sch. l~ Here I differ from Curley (in his "Spinoza as an Expositor of Descartes," in Speculum Spinozanum, ed. S Hessing [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977], 133-42) but not on any important details.

S P I N O Z A ' S WAY W I T H D O U B T

549

iar to any r e a d e r o f ancient scepticism, Spinoza p r o d u c e d a fully worked-out psychological-physiological theory to explain how sense-perception a n d imagination could fail. Descartes's subsequent vindication o f scientia t h r o u g h the beneficence o f God leaves the irreligious reader puzzled as to why God did not trouble to finish the j o b by u n d e r w r i t i n g sense-perception and imagination as well. Dcscartes's theory of error, designed to cover this regrettable failure by God, rested on a flimsy and u n d e f e n d e d dichotomy between things taught by n a t u r e and other things "which in reality I acquired not from n a t u r e but f r o m a habit of making ill-considered j u d g m e n t s ; a n d it is therefore quite possible that these are false . . . . ,,~6 A critical factor in Spinoza's attitude to d o u b t was his acceptance of the standard sceptical line on sense-perception. For him, the traditional sceptical paraphernalia o f d r e a m s and illusions were not to be p u t aside as u n f o r t u n a t e aberrations. T h e y were welcomed as support in his scorn for empiricism. He had no wish to instate guarantees (divine or physiological) for the accuracy o f what we see, hear, or picture to ourselves. He h a d no t h o u g h t that the deliverances of sense-pcrception could have been the basis for a coherent, nonchaotic u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the world.'7 In this sense be, not Descartes, was plus sceptique que les sceptiques. Because for him, sense-perception was not where we should start for a knowledge o f nature, ~s unreliability in sense-perception (or in imagination, which is linked to it) had little significance. We see this interestingly in the Prolegomenon. After describing Descartes's a r g u m e n t s for doubting his senses, he comments: " F r o m all this he was able to conclude truly that the senses are not that most firm f o u n d a t i o n on which every science should be built (for they can be called into doubt), but that certainty d e p e n d s on other principles, of which we are m o r e certain."'9 T r u l y here, without doubt, is in the voice o f Spinoza. A n d this applied as m u c h to the possible threat o f systematic unreliability as it did to h a p h a z a r d error. Spinoza's apparent lack o f concern that his senses might deceive him systematically did not just come f r o m his own inability to think that he might be d r e a m i n g while he was actually awake. He might well have said that systematic failure in o u r perceptual processes would be inconsistent with his beliefs about the possibility of coherent explanation (the rules o f geometry, for instance). We can imagine some sort o f rationalist response to scepticism about sense-perception along the lines that a consistent ("clear a n d '6Descartes, Sixth Meditation, CSMK 2:56 = A T 7: 8 2 . '~This is not to say that they could not befitted into a rational understanding of nature. See E. M. Curley, "Experience in Spinoza'sTheory of Knowledge,"in M. Grene, ed., Spinoza: A Collection of CriticalEssays (Garden City, NY: Anchor-Doubleday, 1973), esp. 3o-4 o. 'sSee Ethics II, lo Cor. Sch., to be discussed later. 'gProlegomenon, Curley, l: 2 3 2 = G l : 1 4 2 .

55 ~

J O U R N A L OF THE H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 1 : 4

OCTOBER

1993

distinct") picture o f physical reality would not be available--walking t h r o u g h walls in d r e a m s a n d bent sticks in optical illusions may not fit into a consistent account o f physical reality. Maybe it is significant that this line of t h o u g h t is not f o u n d in Spinoza (though it is in Berkeley'~ Ethics II, 4 7 - - " T h e h u m a n Mind has an adequate knowledge o f God's eternal and infinite essence"--was probably m e a n t to be the bedrock for o u r confidence in the natural sciences; we can t h e n d e d u c e "a great m a n y things which we know adequately." But the detailed vindication or revalidation o f sense-perception did n o t matter to him. A n d that attitude must be part o f the cause o f the poor r e p u t a t i o n o f his theory o f knowledge. Many subsequent philosophers worried about senseperception a lot. Spinoza's attitude towards extreme doubt about rationality looks even more casual. T a k i n g (c) a n d (d) once more, it can seem as t h o u g h his approach was to agree enthusiastically with Descartes about the efficacy of clear a n d distinct c o n c e p d o n - - ( c ) - - b u t t h e n just to ignore Descartes's s u g g e s d o n - ( d ) - - t h a t clear and distinct conception might be liable to f a i l u r e - - o r o p e n to s u s p e n s i o n - - i n ways that could not be portrayed. This, I have said already, is an incorrect reading, but we should not think that it is a surprising one. Spinoza's attitude was not that the prospect p o s e d - - a s in ( d ) - - b y e x t r e m e doubt n e e d e d an answer. In the Ethics he seemed to believe that the prospect could never arise, that there was no real problem to be answered. T h e view o f Kant that scepticism might be "a resting-place for h u m a n reason," to be overcome by subsequent a r g u m e n t s , " would have had no appeal. E x t r e m e scepticism was, literally, an unattainable position. We n e e d to see why this was. Spinoza's own explanations, it has to be said, are not compelling. We see (d) blocked, for example, at Ethics II, 49 Cot. Sch. where he d e n i e d that "we have a free power of suspending j u d g m e n t . For when we say that s o m e o n e suspends j u d g m e n t , we are saying n o t h i n g but that he sees that he does not perceive the thing adequately. Suspension o f j u d g ment, therefore, is really a perception, not [an act of] free will. ''22 His own explanation for this was short and not by itself convincing: We can imagine something nonexistent, but if we try to conceive it clearly, or even to think h a r d about it as if it did exist, we will come to realize that o u r idea is inadequate (or maybe that it's not really an idea at all). Very surprisingly, the example chosen by Spinoza was not an impossible object (a square circle or an "~Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, l : 29-34t~ Insofar as this applies to reason rather than perception. Hubbeling, Spinoza's Methodology, 35, says righdy that Spinoza commended doubt about perception. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A761 = B789. ~'Curley, a: 488 = G 2: 134: "Est igitur judicii suspensio rever~ perceptio, & non iibera voluntas."

S P I N O Z A ' S WAY W I T H D O U B T

551

Escher-style never-ending staircase) but just an object that happens not to exist and which is not even (so to speak) biologically impossible, or totally unlikely: a winged horse. No laws of nature that Spinoza could have imagined at that time actually ruled out winged horses, and he could have seen stranger things through his microscope at any time. T h e "free power o f suspending judgment" is of virtually no interest in such examples.'s It is puzzling to think what Spinoza believed this example could show. Three better lines of reasoning were available to him. I will go over them in the next section o f this paper, then discuss how far they can actually be found in his work.
.

(i) The use of the demon by Descartes, or (its virtual equivalent) his supposition o f the nonbenevolent action o f God, was essentially, not incidentally, nonnatural or supernatural. (d) says that Descartes was unable to present to himself the possibility that he was mistaken. It was impossible by natural means, but by supposing a supernatural intervention he could suggest a possibility that it might have been possible. Putting his point in extreme termsmwhich is surely what he intended--everyone, using the most concentrated clear and distinct perception available to them, might see something as true; but it would still be possible to represent the possibility of deception by the intervention of some agency in a way that, ex hypothesi, could not be represented. This statement o f his position should be distinguished from two weaker ones sketched in the Second Replies. First, Descartes had no interest in the thought that clear and distinct perceptionsmthe best we can manage, as it w e r e ~ c o u l d be systematically in error (they might never be right), and that truth might be really only accessible to "God or to an angel." His attitude--"the evident clarity of our perceptions does not allow us to listen to anyone who makes up this kind of story"--might have struck some of his medieval predecessors as a little brisk.*4 Secondly, there is a plain difference from Descartes's unconvincing appeals to the weakness of memory. T h e genuinely powerful logical point was the introduction of possibly possible error. The thought that we might be systematically or randomly forgetting steps in our arguments or calculations

9s As Descartes saw, in the Conversation withBurman, CSMK 3 : 3 4 3 - 4 4 = AT 5: 16o. May I join the notion of existence to the idea o f a yeti roaming through the Himalayas to get an adequate idea? How could it matter? This would be an easy way to discover the Loch Ness monster, but not perhaps a finally convincing one. 94CSMK ~: l o 4 = AT 7: 146. T h e argument is discussed interestingly in S. Gaukroger, Cartesian Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 63-69.

552

,JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 1 : 4

OCTOBER

1993

has the air o f a desperate attempt to leap out of the Cartesian circle. We can see from the Prolegomenonthat this type of argument did not impress Spinoza. Now it is important to see why the demon has to be an essentially nonnatural device. T h e whole force of clear and distinct conception derives from the thought that it is the best we can do. This itself is a belief that rests on factual assumptions about the constitution of humanity: we are all made up in roughly the same way, within reasonably well-appreciated limits. What the sense of Descartes's arguments suggests is a picture of the best-equipped, most clearsighted mind, concentrating to its best ability in the most ideal circumstances and in that way conceiving a truth to be true. Even t h e n - - w e are asked to supposewit can he conjectured that some other agency might be producing an error, although there is no way for us to represent what that error might be. (If we could, o f course, we would represent it.) T h e whole a r g u m e n t rests on a notion o f limited natural capacity and then the supposition o f its nonnatural suspension. Every philosophy student's first lesson is that the d e m o n was only an artificial device introduced to make a point; but it is as well for the student to go on to ask two further questions: What was the point? and, Why did Descartes need to resort to such bizarre means to make it? For Spinoza there could be nothing beyond nature. Nonnatural or supernatural suppositions had no place. This principle had more force than a circular pseudoargument that nonnatural suppositions are excluded because nature excludes them, and a great deal more force than a crude willingness to ignore what one cannot imagine. The burden of supposition was entirely on the side of Descartes. Starting with the familiar notion of known capacities, he posited s u p e r h u m a n capacities that were by definition beyond our access. At first sight this only seems open-mindedly liberal. Maybe we can't think o f everything; why not try the supposition that there are some things we can't conceive? Isn't it only dogmatism to deny that? Part I o f Spinoza's Ethicsreminds us of the context. It offers a world in which the comprehensiveness of explanation is taken seriously.~5 If the explanatory power of God was to be taken seriously as well, Spinoza thought that God had to be identified with that world. This is not the place to debate those conclusions, and nothing depends on them now; but we should see where Descartes's position took him: towards an assumption of some plane of sense or explanation that was unintelligible or inaccessible by definition. This was more than the modest thought that reason could fail. It was the permanent possibility that,
,s S. Hampshire, Sp/noza (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951), 218: "What must we suppose if Nature as a whole is to be regarded as completely intelligible? This is the question from which Spinozism begins."

SPINOZA'S WAY

WITH

DOUBT

553

however m u c h our natural capacities wcrc refined, something beyond might overrule or impede them. That view presupposed, as we shall see shortly, a definite position on the nature of possibility. It also presupposed other positions on the inclusiveness of nature and on the cornplctcncss of explanation. W h a t Descartes needed to make his argument hold was a natural order defined as finite and a G o d by definition not limited by any canons of explanation accessible to us. T h e real problem is that the attribution of any force at allto the idea of nonnatural suspension of belief places a burden of proof on anyone w h o wants to show why this is worth considering, not why it is not. (ii) Secondly, a case can be constructed for Spinoza around the notion of modality. The supposition in (d) is that Descartes can present to himself the possibility that even his best perceptions might be m i s t a k e n - - i t may not be actually possible, but it is possibly possible. H e r e we have a rich brew of modalities. W h a t can we make of them? T h e r e is one a r g u m e n t which at first sight looks too short to be convincing: W h a t is the sense of "Descartes can present to himself"? I f it is "imagine" then he should attach no importance to it. I f it is "clearly a n d distinctly conceive" then it is ruled out ex hypothesi. So either way Descartes can't get a n y value from what he can present to himself. This compressed dilemma could be stated more fully, but the general point m a d e by it should be fatal for Cartesian thinking. Descartes supposed that he could suspend his j u d g m e n t . =6 Supposition could consist only of some f o r m of presentation to himself o f a possibility. But what room for this was there in his metaphysics, or even his psychology? His fallible imagination h a d already been t r u m p e d in the m e t h o d o f doubt by the presence o f clear a n d distinct perceptions. Those in turn could not be t r u m p e d again by imagination: that would have been circular. O n the other hand, his supposition could not be strengthened into a clear a n d distinct conception. It was, after all, as a counterfactual, false, and should have been obvious as such. So the supposition should have been ruled out of court. Despite this, maybe Descartes could make use o f some wholly d i f f e r e n t f o r m o f representation, outside the confines o f his metaphysics? Well, yes; but this is another way o f stating my f o r m e r point, that the d e m o n has to be an essentially, not incidentally, n o n n a t u r a l device. A conception that is not possible naturally might be possible nonnaturally. Superficially, that might not 9 6He thought, too, of course, that he could conceive ideas clearly without makingjudgments about them at all. Spinoza took a dim view of this: see below, p. 555.

554

JOURNAL

OF THE HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

3 1:4 OCTOBER

1993

seem too bad an outcome. Nonnatural possibility, viewed in a generous light, looks not too different from some later notions, like thoughts in the infinite mind of God, or truth in all possible worlds. Having satisfied himself that truth seemed to be available through the best natural apparatus--clear and distinct conception--why couldn't Descartes postulate nonnatural circumstances in which that apparatus might fail? Quite apart from the problems I mentioned just n o w - - ( i ) - - t h a t escape was barred. To see this, we need to focus on the notion of possibility. For Descartes, as for many philosophers, it was closely allied to a notion o f representability or intelligibility.*7 (This sense of possibility was an ancestor of the later logical possibility.) And possibility seen in these terms allows no access to higherorder, possible possibility. This can be seen in a recasting of the previous argument. How is the possibility of a higher-order possibility to be represented? Not, obviously, in terms of imagination. Imagination is no touchstone for truths even at the most basic level where clear and distinct perceptions are supposed to work. I may, for example, be totally unable to imagine how the theorem o f Pythagoras could apply to some shapes of right-angled triangles; but I know that it does; or I may imagine the sun to be very close, even though I know that it is very far away. *s Nor, more seriously, will clear and distinct perception do what Descartes would need. T h e story he would need to tell would be that he could conceive o f God possibly conceiving the possible falsity of something he (Descartes) himself clearly conceived to be true. And this would not work.~0 The problem illustrates the weakness o f any link between modality and representation and, just as fundamentally, the difficulty in dissociating clear and distinct perception from visual imagination while at the same time making liberal use o f visual metaphors to explain it.3o Spinoza could be on firmer ground. But not, I think, because of the theory about affirmation or j u d g m e n t which might look to be his overt response, and
97 For e x a m p l e : "It s e e m s very clear to m e that possible existence is c o n t a i n e d in e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h we clearly u n d e r s t a n d , b e c a u s e f r o m t h e fact that we clearly u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g it follows that it c a n be c r e a t e d by G o d . " L e t t e r to M e r s e n n e , 31 D e c e m b e r , 6 4 o , C S M K 3 : 1 6 6 = A T 3: 274. ~SEthics II, 35 Sch. ,9 T h e issue was well-aired in Descartes's letter to Mesland o f 2 May 1644, C S M K 3: 235 = A T 4 : 1 1 8 - a 9. so A c o n t r a d i c t i o n m u c h exploited by Descartes. C o n t r a s t his letter to M e r s e n n e o f J u l y x64 x, C S M K 3 : 1 8 6 -- A T 3: 395: " w h a t e v e r we conceive w i t h o u t a n i m a g e is a n idea o f t h e p u r e m i n d " with, m o s t strikingly, Rule Nine for the Direction of the Mind: "We m u s t c o n c e n t r a t e o u r m i n d ' s e y e . . , to a c q u i r e t h e h a b i t o f i n t u i t i n g t h e t r u t h clearly a n d distinctly," C S M K a: 33 = A T ao: 4oo, or, m u c h later, to Silhon, in 1648, C S M K 3 : 3 3 a = A T 5: 138: t h e m i n d "sees, feels a n d handles."

SPI~OZ^'S WAY WXa'H DOUSa"

555

which seems like his first line o f defense. H e suggests that the suspension o f beliefs is contradictory w h e r e we really affirm t h e m to be true. This is because o f his view that holding an idea includes making some j u d g m e n t o n its truth.s~ We can see what h e means, and it has some value o f its own, but alone it is not the most plausible bulwark against the machinations o f the d e m o n . T o say that I can't suspend my belief in an idea because I have taken an attitude towards its t r u t h may well be right; b u t it immediately invites questions about how m y attitude was f o r m e d , w h e t h e r it could be u n d e r m i n e d , a n d so on. A d i f f e r e n t strategy asks what is implied by thinking that I can't suspend my belief. How exactly would that be impossible? Spinoza's views about possibility could have h e l p e d him here. H e did not tie possibility at all to what could be imagined o r conceived. W h a t was possible for him was what could follow f r o m a state o f affairs, given the laws o f nature, including the rules o f mathematics. T h e most plausible way o f seeing this is in geometrical terms. T h e r e are an infinite n u m b e r o f possible chords o f a circle; it is not possible to trisect an angle with compasses a n d a ruler. T h i s view o f possibility is m u c h n e a r e r to a prosaic view o f what is allowable o r what can happen t h a n a view o f logical possibility in terms o f what can be represented. Naturally, it was not without its difficulties, but n e i t h e r was the m o r e usual view taken by Descartes.s" Its relevance now should be plain. What actually h a p p e n s (and what is true) in accordance with the laws o f n a t u r e a n d mathematics will be conceivable by clear a n d distinct perception.33 What is possible (what can h a p p e n o r what can be true) will not be d e t e r m i n a b l e by the use o f o u r imagination, o r by the use o f metaphorical extensions f r o m o u r conception. It will be d e t e r m i n e d by calculation or e x p e r i m e n t , in a c c o r d a n c e with the laws o f n a t u r e and the rules o f mathematics.34 This is why the d e m o n can be ignored. T h e possibility p r e s e n t e d by it would be an illicit one. T h e reason for not raising the possibility that clear a n d distinct p e r c e p t i o n might itself be t h r o w n into d o u b t was not just dogmatism. Spinoza could place a construction on might--on the n a t u r e o f this m o d a l i t y - - w h i c h would have m a d e it o f no significant interest. I can o f

s,Ethics, II, 49 Cor. Sch., Curley, ~: 488-89 = G 2: 134. 3, See Eth/cs II, 8 Sch., G 9:9 I. I have discussed this fully in my "Spinoza on Modality," The PhilosophicalQuarterly 36 (1986): 3 1 3 - 4 2 . ss Or, even more strongly, knournadequately. But this point--leading to Spinoza's critique of clear and distinct conception--is a separate point, not needed for this argument. See G. Deleuze, Spinoza et le problkraede l'expression(Paris: s de Minuit, 1968), chaps. 9-1o. s4The contrast between what is determinable by imagination and by the intellect appears interestingly, if laconically, in the Theological-Political Treatise, chap. II, G 3: ~8: the prophets imagined all sorts of things, but these were very different from the kind of possibilities available in the order of nature and natural law.

556

,JOURNAL OF THE H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 1 : 4 OCTOBER 1 9 9 3

course iraagine t h e d e m o n m a k i n g chaos o f rationality; b u t t h e r e is n o w o r t h while link b e t w e e n t h a t sort o f i m a g i n i n g a n d w h a t can h a p p e n o r w h a t m i g h t be true. Such a line o f t h i n k i n g n e e d not be seen as a corollary o f e x p l a n a t o r y d e t e r m i n i s m , a n assertion t h a t t h e r e a r e rules o f m a t h e m a t i c s o r physics which are so i m m u t a b l e t h a t we c a n ' t e v e n s u s p e n d o u r belief in t h e m f o r the sake o f a r g u m e n t . I t c a n be seen m o r e constructively as o f f e r i n g s o m e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a notion o f possibility outside the cul-de-sac o f f e r e d by a n y a n a l o g y with representability. T o m a k e the d e m o n t h r e a t e n i n g , a n i n f e r e n c e is n e e d e d f r o m 'Descartes can r e p r e s e n t to h i m s e l f the o p e r a t i o n o f the d e m o n ' to ' T h e o p e r a t i o n o f the d e m o n is possible', a n d Descartes could h a v e no s u p p o r t f o r that inference.ss S p i n o z a m i g h t h a v e h a d access to a view o f possibility t h a t r u l e d it out. (iii) T h i r d l y , a g e n e r a l case can be m a d e by c o n s i d e r i n g the reasons for doubt in Descartes's a r g u m e n t s . T h e m e t h o d o f d o u b t did n o t rely u p o n a use o f equipollence f a m i l i a r in ancient scepticism:s6 t h e r e are reasons f o r A, r e a sons against A (or f o r not-A), so we would do well to s u s p e n d o u r belief in A (and not-A). F r o m the first p a g e o f the First Meditation, Descartes u s e d the s t r o n g principle t h a t d o u b t is advisable w h e r e a n y possibility o f d o u b t can b e introduced. Plainly, this was f a r s t r o n g e r t h a n the t h o u g h t that we should d o u b t only if t h e r e a r e m o r e reasons to d o u b t t h a n not to doubt. A p p l i e d to s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n , a n d to the j u d g m e n t s said to be d e r i v e d f r o m it, this s t r o n g principle can be persuasive. T h e r e will seldom be m o r e reasons to d o u b t m y senses t h a n n o t to d o u b t t h e m ; b u t t h e r e m a y o f t e n be some r e a s o n to d o u b t t h e m . H e n c e the a p p e a l o f his i m a g e o f the rotten apples in the basket.a7 T h e r e is n o n e e d to c o m m e n t o n the use o f this line o f a r g u m e n t with s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n . Spinoza s e e m s to have accepted it, in that his caution a b o u t empirical k n o w l e d g e w e n t f a r b e y o n d Descartes. T h e p o i n t o f interest n o w is the application to rationality, o r to clear a n d distinct p e r c e p t i o n . Obviously, to say the least, t h e r e are not m o r e reasons f o r the likelihood o f the m a c h i n a t i o n s o f the d e m o n t h a n t h e r e are reasons against it. I f the issue w e r e a balance o f probabilities t h e r e would be n o p r o b l e m . T h e suggestion is that any likelihood is a threat. T h i s looks like a g o o d a r g u m e n t . U s i n g a m o d e r n parallel, I d o not n e e d a 5o:5 ~ possibility that t h e r e is a virus in m y s5Its logic is exhibited plainly in the argument for the Real Distinction: "... the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from another is enough to make me certain that the two things are distinct, since they are capable of being separated, at least by God" (S/xth Meditation, CSMK, 2:54 = AT 7: 78)9 3SFor example, see J. Annas and J. Barnes, eds., The Modes of Scephci.~ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 24-25sTDescartes, Seventh Objections,CSMK 2:324 = AT 7:481.

S P I N O Z A ' S WAY W I T H D O U B T

557

computer before I get worried. Any possibility at all is bad news: I have to check to find out. But this does not work with reason itself. Clear and distinct perception was presented by Descartes as the best natural means for the detection of truth. Suspension of belief in it ought to be rational, in the minimal sense of being persuasive for some reason, in the vaguest sense. Using my example, if I am very worried about the fate of this paper on my word-processor, I may check my computer for viruses every day, in case someone has stolen into my study to introduce one overnight. If I do this every hour, while continuously in the room with my (unnetworked) computer, my behavior is illsupported to the point of neurosis: if someone asks for an explanation of my behavior I can't give it in any form that could be accepted. And the point about the demon is much stronger than that. Descartes gave every reason to believe in his clear and distinct perception. He would not introduce doubt there because of the possibility of occasional errors--in analogy with the doubt he had applied to sense-perception--since this, for him, was ruled out ex hypothesi. So doubt had to consist o f the suspension of credence in the whole apparatus. What was the support for this? I have already argued t h a t - - a c c o r d i n g to a line of thought available to Spinoza--Descartes had to appeal to nonnatural reasons and to a notion of possibility for which he had no sound basis. To make credible his suspension of belief in his clear and distinct perception he needed to offer some kind of persuasion to weigh in the balance against his overwhelming confidence in his rational apparatus. T h e criterion of persuasiveness to be applied was not evident, and was certainly less a priori than Descartes hoped. Just as, factually, for instance, there are people for whom neither the cogito nor the arguments from dreams will work at all,s8 so it must be a matter of context (not logic) to say what counts as adequate persuasion. Popkin mentions the likely origin o f the demon in the witch hunts of the 163os.39 This is not just an irrelevant detail. To get some support for his suspension of belief, Descartes had to have some form of explanatory context. N o reason at all would have had no persuasive power. Readers of Spinoza's correspondence will know how little any appeal to supernatural agencies would have had for him. Most of us would now agree, to the extent that it is hard to envisage the mental world in which Descartes's image could have had any influence. We may still try, though, to modernize the explanatory context. Hypnosis, mental or neurological illssPeople not capable of the required level of rationalreflection,for example. s9Popkin, History of Scepticism, x8o and note 38.

558

J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 1 : 4

OCTOBER

~993

ness, perhaps, might d e r a n g e my rationality at any time; p e r h a p s it is d o i n g so now.4o But t h e r e are two i m p o r t a n t things w r o n g here. First, b o t h Descartes a n d S p i n o z a would a g r e e m a n d so would we, in a d i f f e r e n t i d i o m - - t h a t if m y present c o n c e p t i o n is rationally d i s o r d e r e d , then even if I d o n ' t realize this, it can't be clear a n d distinct. T h i s is not simply a reversion to c r u d e intuitionism, but a r e m i n d e r that clear a n d distinct conception must i n c o r p o r a t e some attention to a minimal consistency o f beliefs. Such consistency may fall far short o f the d e m a n d s o f a c o h e r e n c e t h e o r y o f truth. T h e r e is also the point, well a r g u e d at length by Bolton,4' that "the evidence o f truths" can be p r i o r to assurance a b o u t their "epistemic credentials." No one wants to posit the possibility o f a (deluded) d e a r a n d distinct perception that 3 + 2 = 6. T h e whole point a b o u t clear a n d distinct perception, after all, is that it has passed a test o f what we might call superficial rationality.4, Secondly, t h e r e is the m u c h m o r e telling point that the r o t t e n apples a r g u m e n t will not project f r o m p e r c e p t i o n to rationality. It is not h a r d to p e r s u a d e m e - - i f I am d u e to be a witness in court, for e x a m p l e - - t h a t my p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s may be less t h a n 1o0% reliable, and that d o g m a t i s m a b o u t t h e m is inadvisable. A n y d o u b t will do. In Cartesian terms, s u s p e n d i n g belief in sensep e r c e p t i o n still leaves m e with rational j u d g m e n t . S u s p e n d i n g belief in rational j u d g m e n t leaves m e with nothing, to the e x t e n t that this suspension itself is not o p e r a t i n g rationally. A n d then the facile objection, But why not suspend j u d g m e n t irrationally? betrays its own mistake. T h e answer is: because t h e r e is n o r e a s o n to d o so.4s T h e logic h e r e - - a n d the logic available to S p i n o z a - - c a n be misleading. It is not pragmatic, in the sense that being rational, o r j u s t consistent, works better t h a n being nonrational. A n d it is not circular, in the sense that it is radonal to be rational. T h e point, in minimal terms, is that if you p u r p o r t to be rational at all, t h e n you n e e d some reasons to suspend that rationality. T h e y n e e d not be d e m o n s t r a t i o n s o r even r e a s o n e d a r g u m e n t s , b u t they d o n e e d to be some sort o f considerations that have some p o w e r that is persuasive by criteria you claim to accept. T h a t is very far f r o m "rationalism" in a pejorative sense. 40Peter Unger, for instance, thinks the demon can be modernized in much this way, replacing the evil demon by a mad scientist (Ignorance [Oxford: Clarendon Press, t975], 7-8). Bernard Williams apparently agrees. See his Descartes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, x978), 56. 4, See Bolton, "Spinoza on Cartesian Doubt," 392. 4, Descartes's letter to Mesland (see note 28 above) is relevant here. 4sThis is an echo of the view attributed to Descartes by Harry Frankfurt. His argument is said to be "an attempt to show that there are no good reasons for believing that reason is unreliable" ("Descartes' Validation of Reason," American Philosophical Quarterly 2 [1965]: 155).

SPINOZA'$ WAY WITH DOUBT

559

5" I have indicated t h r e e lines o f a r g u m e n t that Spinoza might use to block Cartesian doubt: f r o m the n o n n a t u r a l i s m o f e x t r e m e doubt, f r o m the type o f modality it implied, and f r o m considerations about the reasons why d o u b t should arise. All t h r e e have the same t e n d e n c y : to a r g u e not that e x t r e m e d o u b t can be answered, b u t that it can o r should n e v e r occur. It is also possible to stress o t h e r types o f a r g u m e n t . Bolton, for instance, says a lot about Spinoza's a r g u m e n t against the n e e d f o r a "correct epistemic t h e o r y " to u n d e r write knowledge. A l t h o u g h this is justifiable, I am inclined to think it second a r y in the sense that Spinoza saw epistemology as secondary to metaphysics. In fact, the great strength o f his r e s p o n s e to d o u b t was to draw in the wider metaphysical a n d logical context instead o f relying on epistemology alone (or even subjectivist epistemology, in the m a n n e r o f so m a n y o f his successors). Can we find these t h r e e lines o f a r g u m e n t in Spinoza? Not, to be sure, in the f o r m s disdUed here. His writing o n modality, for instance, t h o u g h o f great interest, was an inexcusable j u m b l e in t e r m s o f its exposition.44 T h e r e are additional difficulties. Some o f the a r g u m e n t s he d/d use were b o t h bad a n d misleading. I have m e n t i o n e d that his account o f a f f i r m a t i o n - - a g a i n s t Descartes's t h e o r y o f e r r o r - - t h o u g h o f value in its own right did not help his case w h e r e it was i n t r o d u c e d . T h e r e is also the impression, g r e a d y r e i n f o r c e d by a r e a d i n g o f his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , o f u n h e l p f u l dogmatism. Despite all this, the a r g u m e n t s described in this p a p e r are m o r e than an optimistically speculative reconstruction. We n e e d to pay attention to t h r e e texts in particular: w167 7 7 - 8 0 in the Treatise, the Prolegomenon, a n d towards the e n d o f Part II o f the Ethics. (A little is said in the Short Treatise II, xv, w167 3-4, but it adds nothing.) T h e first point to notice is what seems to be an interesting d e v e l o p m e n t in Spinoza's viewpoint. In the Treatise, he seems unclear a b o u t the possibility o f doubt. H e differentiates real d o u b t in the m i n d (vera dubitatione in mente) f r o m "what we c o m m o n l y see h a p p e n , w h e n s o m e o n e says in words that he doubts, a l t h o u g h his m i n d does not doubt." But he t h e n goes o n to say that "all d o u b t is r e m o v e d " w h e n we see that an idea is clear and distinct. I n particular, knowledge o f God, o f the kind that we have o f the n a t u r e o f a triangle, is sufficient to " r e m o v e every d o u b t we can have c o n c e r n i n g clear a n d distinct ideas."45 W h a t he means is p e r h a p s that we can believe we can have doubts about clear ideas, or say this, b u t if we think a b o u t t h e m we will realize that we It never seemed to occur to him, for example, that it might be a good idea to say how he understood logical terms before starting to use them. Essenceis the worst case, defined at the beginning of Eth/cs II after copious use in Part I. 4sTreatise, w Curley, x: 35 = G 2: 3o.

560

JOURNAL

OF T H E H I S T O R Y

OF P H I L O S O P H Y

3 1:4 OCTOBER

199 3

cannot. B u t d o u b t can at least be supposed, if only in an illusory form.46 His presentation o f Descartes's a r g u m e n t in the Prolegomenon makes it h a r d to see w h e t h e r h e maintains that view there.47 In Part II o f the Ethics the position was different: d o u b t could not arise because the suspension o f clear a n d distinct ideas is not available. Spinoza d e n i e d "that we have a free p o w e r o f suspending judgment."4s T h e d i f f e r e n c e is a fine one, a m a t t e r o f clearing u p an ambiguity, b u t it is significant. T h e impression is that even a mistaken possibility o f d o u b t is r e m o v e d . It is a mistake to think We can even p r e t e n d to suspend belief in clear and distinct ideas. I f an idea is really a p p r e h e n d e d , t h e n it is a p p r e h e n d e d as clear a n d distinct. I f it is a p p r e h e n d e d as clear a n d distinct, t h e n the supposition o f its possible falsity is not available. So t h e r e is no r o o m f o r doubt. What Spinoza may have been d o i n g is not ruling out d o u b t by intensified dogmatism, but focussing his t h o u g h t in the areas I have m e n t i o n e d : H o w could hyperbolic d o u b t fit into the view o f n a t u r e he h a d developed? W h a t could its place be? Not in nature; so, f o r Spinoza, n o w h e r e . This is an i m p o r t a n t c o n c e p t u a l point, I think, in discussing the possibility o f doubt. Gewirth's excellent early article o n the Cartesian circle claimed that Descartes showed the "logical impossibility o f general doubt."40 But if d o u b t was logically impossible, how was Descartes able to make use o f it? A n d how could it have b e e n at all tempting? I f something is completely impossible it should be completely ruled out, not half-discussed. Next, we should consider the a r g u m e n t s used for the "Liberation f r o m All Doubts" in the Prolegomenon. Spinoza states a problem in entirely Cartesian terms: "Since God's existence does not become known to us t h r o u g h itself, we seem unable to be e v e r certain o f anything; n o r will we ever c o m e to know God's existence. F o r we have said that everything is u n c e r t a i n so long as we are ignorant o f o u r origin, and f r o m uncertain premises, n o t h i n g certain can be inferred."5o " T o r e m o v e this difficulty, Descartes makes the following reply," he says, a n d goes o n to give a fair account o f Descartes's u n h a p p y evasions about the fallibility o f m e m o r y . As I have noted, he t h e n gives a n o t h e r reply, "since this answer does not satisfy some people." Curley c o m m e n t s that Spinoza's suggested reply is "at least consistent with Cartesian principles." In effect, he tries to state the Cartesian case as well as it can be put. A clear a n d 46H. H. Joachim's Commentary(Oxford: Clarendon, x94o), 195-97, rightly passed a harsh verdict on this view and implicitly, I think, suggested a subsequent change from it in the Ethics. 47Although remarks at the end of his argument, about to be discussed, suggest that he had seen its weakness: Curley, l: 238 = G l: 149. 4SEthics II, 49 Cor. Sch., Curley, 1:488 = G 2: 134. 49A. Gewirth, "The Cartesian Circle," The PhilosophicalReview50 (194 x): 394. Gewirth wrote much more on the circle, but his views on this point did not alter, as far as I know. ~~ Curley, 1:236 = G 1: 146.

SPINOZA'S WAY WITH DOUBT

561

distinct idea o f G o d - - n o t a k n o w l e d g e o f his e x i s t e n c e - - i s e n o u g h to r e m o v e the possibility o f d o u b t . v B u t the final lines o f this section take a j a r r i n g step int9 Spinoza's direct s p e e c h a n d t h e n seems, to a d d a significant t u r n to his a r g u m e n t : " . . . we h a v e a clear distinct idea o f a T r i a n g l e , a l t h o u g h we do not know w h e t h e r the a u t h o r o f o u r n a t u r e deceives us; a n d p r o v i d e d we have such an idea [of God] (as I h a v e j u s t s h o w n abundantly), we will be able to d o u b t n e i t h e r his existence, n o r any M a t h e m a t i c a l truth."53 T h e idea o f the triangle, in characterist i d y Spinozistic fashion, can be a p r o x y or equivalent f o r the idea o f God.54 T h e exact sense o f these sentences is n o t clear, a n d m a y b e we should not m a k e too m u c h o f t h e m . Nevertheless, I d o think that D o n e y misses this point in his insistence that it is the or/g/n o f o u r clear a n d distinct ideas that matters. H e thinks that Spinoza is satisfied o n c e h e has established t h e m to be G o d - g i v e n . But this is surely n o t right. T h e whole notion o f G o d as a s u p e r n a t u r a l g u a r a n t o r " s u p r e m e l y g o o d a n d veracious" is wholly o u t o f k e e p i n g with Spinoza's metaphysics. Rather, the point o f Spinoza's a p p a r e n t a f t e r t h o u g h t to his e x p o sition o f Descartes m u s t have b e e n t h a t k n o w l e d g e o f any clear a n d distinct idea is e n o u g h to r e m o v e the possibility o f a g e n e r a l s u s p e n s i o n o f reason. F a r f r o m b e i n g consistent with Descartes's opinions, this would be inconsistent with t h e m (or at least with some o f t h e m , since it would be flattering to suggest that they are consistent). Spinoza's t h o u g h t , I believe, was that a real u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a n y t h i n g , that is, o f a n y p a r t o f n a t u r e - - g e o m e t r y , f o r e x a m p l e - will be inconsistent with the kind o f a n o m a l i e s entailed by the s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t "the a u t h o r o f o u r n a t u r e deceives us." T h i s alone will not be convincing, because the disentangling o f Spinoza's views f r o m his exposition o f Descartes will always r e m a i n o p e n f o r debate. We m u s t t u r n to the Ethics for a b e t t e r picture. E v e n there, Spinoza's discussions o f d o u b t could be m o r e explicit. T h e o r d e r o f his t h i n k i n g o u g h t to strike us first. His earlier exposition o f Descartes not only o p e n e d in a Cartesian spirit, b u t h a d a preface, wholly supplem e n t a r y to the m a i n a r g u m e n t , d e a l i n g with doubt. Its o p e n i n g w o r d s w e r e s, Curley, l: 236, note 8. Garrett, "Truth and Ideas of Imagination," 66-67, suggests a different reading, stressing the origin of ideas. 5. But not to Bolton, "Spinoza on Cartesian Doubt," 584-86, who sees no discontinuity in Spinoza's arguments here, and hence believes that he thought Cartesian method did succeed against Cartesian doubt. 5sPrinciples, Curley, l: 238 = G 1: 149: "Habemus enim daram, & distinctam ideam Trianguli, quamvis nesciamus, an nostr~e naturae autor nos decipiat; & modo talem Dei ideam, ut modo fuse ostendi, habeamus, nec de eius existentii, nec de ull~i veritate Mathematica dubitare poterimus." Curley does not translate Dei. %.. natura trianguli in natura divina ab ~eterno continetur . . . . " for example, in the Theological-Political Treatise, chap. IV, G 3: 62. Note VI to chap. VI is also relevant.

562

J O U R N A L OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 1 : 4 OCTOBER x99 3

direct: " B e f o r e we c o m e to the Propositions themselves a n d their D e m o n s t r a tions, it seems desirable to explain concisely why Descartes d o u b t e d everything, how he b r o u g h t to light solid f o u n d a t i o n s for the sciences, a n d finally, by what m e a n s h e f r e e d himself f r o m all doubts."55 It is h a r d to believe that these words could have been written by a n y o n e who had failed to see the i m p o r t a n c e o f philosophical doubt. B u t then, speaking for himself in the Ethics, Spinoza gets to d o u b t only at the e n d o f Part II. This can only m e a n that he does not share the view o f Descartes that d o u b t has to be r e m o v e d b e f o r e p h i l o s o p h y can begin. His own views o n "the o r d e r o f Philosophizing" are given in Part II, lO Cor. Sch. T h e e r r o r o f some previous philosophers (who must be t a k e n to include Descartes), h e says, is that "they believed that the divine n a t u r e which they should have c o n t e m p l a t e d b e f o r e all else (because it is p r i o r b o t h in knowledge a n d in nature) is last in the o r d e r o f knowledge, and that the things that are called objects o f the senses are p r i o r to all." T h i s view is well reflected by the o r d e r o f the Ethics,58 G o d o r n a t u r e comes first, the m i n d second. Doubt, far f r o m c o m i n g first, c a n n o t even be fitted into nature. As G a r r e t t puts it: " . . . Spinoza's t r u e idea o f G o d will presumably block the hypothesis o f d e c e p t i o n not in virtue o f God's benevolence, but r a t h e r in virtue o f his lack o f p e r s o n h o o d , and, m o r e generally, t h r o u g h a resulting u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the f u n d a m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e o f the universe and the place o f the h u m a n m i n d within it."57 Now this looks like begging the question. T h e story told by Descartes was that he could not know a b o u t n a t u r e outside his mind until h e knew a b o u t himself, a n d so on. It seems a p o o r r e s p o n s e to suggest that an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f n a t u r e makes such an a p p r o a c h , at best, secondary. This is not the place for a wider discussion o f the o r d e r o f priority between epistemology a n d metaphysics. I only want to say that the o r d e r o f Spinoza's exposition in the Ethics lends s u p p o r t to m y r e a d i n g o f his response to Cartesian doubt. T h e crucial point, l think, again, is that Spinoza implies that hyperbolic d o u b t has to be outside the o r d e r o f n a t u r e m i n a sense acceptable to Descartes, too (and also to us, so far as we retain these concepts). Spinoza's writing o n possibility c a n n o t be called clear, and to that extent, the view o f possibility which I have d e p l o y e d on his b e h a l f is not easy to ascribe to him conclusively. Again, t h e r e is an interesting c h a n g e o f position f r o m his

55Prolegomenon, Curley, 1:~3 a = G l: t41. # The correct order of investigation--rather different--was not stressed in the Ethics as it had been in the Treatise, w "if... someone had proceeded in this way in investigating Nature.., he would never have doubted the truth he possessed . . . . " Curley, 1: e a = G 2: 17. 5~Garrett, "Truth and Ideas of Imagination," 7 i. Doney suggests this similarly, in the opening words of his paper.

SPINOZA'S

WAY WITH

DOUBT

563

early work to what we take to be his considered view in the Ethics. In the Treatise we find a lengthy discussion o f the limits of what we can feign (/ingere). We find some a priori psychology: if we think we can conceive something impossible we are really only assembling images; so possibility bears some relation to our powers of conception. T h e early Spinoza would have had some sympathy with the remark of the early Wittgenstein that "we cannot think anything unlogical, for otherwise we should have to think unlogically."ss Later, all this c h a n g e d - - o r so we must assume, because there is no trace o f it in the Ethics. One problem with tying possibility to representability is exactly that it opens the door for the demon. Whether or not this was his motivation, or even in his mind, Spinoza's final account o f modality seems to have been logical or geometrical, not psychological. He seems to have been aware himself that his own exposition in Ethics II, 8 Sch., which attempts to explain the status of nonexistent but potential or possible objects, is hardly satisfying. There are, for instance, infinite possible geometrical constructions. His compressed exposition can best be expanded by saying that possible constructions are available by the laws of nature exhibited in the nature o f space and the rules o f geometry.~9 T h e y are not explained in terms of what we (or God) can conceive. Possible doubt, on these lines, is not doubt we can imagine: it is the postulation only of what is allowable in nature. 6. No one should underestimate the pervasive power of the demon released by Descartes into European philosophy. Against that, is there any value in the views I have ascribed to Spinoza? His approach to Cartesian doubt contains two steps. First is the view concerning sense-perception. Error and illusion there do not matter, because the place given to judgments based on sense-perception is subordinated to the place given to judgments incorporated in a reasoned account of nature. Second: it is at that level that doubt does matter. And it is there that doubt cannot be raised in the way that Descartes suggested. What I think we see in the Ethics is the construction of a framework in which extreme doubt will not fit. That is not to say, implausibly, that doubt is just defined out of existence. It is that perception, supposition, imagination, conception, and doubt have their places in an understood picture of nature, both logically and psychologically. What is possible is seen as what can be related to that picture. To wonder about imagined possibilities is therefore pointless, or without content.
ss Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 3.0359T h i s relates to the role o f infinite modes.

564

JOURNAL

OF T H E H I S T O R Y

OF P H I L O S O P H Y

3 t : 4 OCTOBER x 9 9 3

Both steps a r e i m p o r t a n t , a n d go t o g e t h e r noncircularly. Because d o u b t a b o u t s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n can be p u t in its place, s u p p o s e d d o u b t a b o u t clear a n d distinct p e r c e p t i o n b e c o m e s the real issue. Because clear a n d distinct p e r c e p tion is safe, d o u b t s a b o u t individual s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n s do n o t m a t t e r . Clearly, in b o t h a historical a n d a philosophical sense it m u s t be profitless to claim that S p i n o z a was r i g h t w h e r e Descartes was not. H o w f a r we can step back f r o m the l a n g u a g e a n d the a s s u m p t i o n s o f the s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y to consider these questions m o r e generally is debatable. At least we can least reflect that we d o not h a v e to be d o c t r i n a i r e rationalists to find the s u s p e n s i o n o f d o u b t a b o u t rationality to be u n r e a s o n a b l e . I f we w a n t to say that it is possible t h a t we a r e mistaken, we h a d b e t t e r find s o m e c o n t e n t f o r that possibility. I f we w a n t to say that o u r best n a t u r a l calculations can be wrong, we h a d b e t t e r say h o w , a n d w h e r e . 6~

University of Cambridge
6oThis paper is a revised version of one read at a seminar at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. I am grateful for comments there from Dr. Fokke Akkerman, Piet Steenbakkers and others, as well as for comments from theJHP'sreviewers.