Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 3

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner v. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Respondent [G.R. No.

170498, January 9, 2013]

Facts: Metrobank filed the petition for review on certiorari which seeks reversal of RTCs decision denying its Motion for Leave and to admit fourth-party complaint against Jose L. Chuas estate. Petitioner alleged that Chuas estate should reimburse Metrobank in case it would be adjudged liable in the thirdparty complaint filed against it by Absolute Management Corporation (AMC). The denial of the RTC to the Petitioners motion is because it categorized Metrobanks allegation in the fourth-party complaint as cobro de lo indebido a kind of quasi contract that mandates recovery for what has been improperly paid. Quasi-contracts fall within the concept of implied contracts must be included in the claims required to be filed with the judicial settlement of the deceased estate under section 5, rule 86 of the rules of court. As such claim, it should have been filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023, not before the RTC. Hence, Metrobank filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 before Court of Appeals (CA) however, CA affirmed the RTCs rulings. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not Section 6, rule 5 of rules of court should apply over Metrobanks fourth -party complaint against Chuas estate? Held: No. Metrobanks fourth-party complaint as a contingent claim falls within the claims that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of Rules of Court. A comparison of the respective provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 and Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court readily shows that section 11, rule 6 applies to ordinary civil actions while section 5, rule 86 specifically applies to money claims against the estate. The specific provisions of section 5, rule 86 xxx must prevail over the general provisions of section 11, rule 6. The Supreme Court (SC) adopted the CAs use of statutory construction principle of lex specialis derogate generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of sec. 5, rule 86 of rules of court should prevail over the general provisions of sec. 11, rule 6 of the rules of court.

Digested by: CHARLOTTE A. ARIVE, LLB-1E

BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent [G.R. Nos. 154470-71, September 24, 2012] x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x BANGKO CENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, Respondent [G.R. Nos. 154589-90] FACTS: This controversy commenced when Planters Development Bank (PDB) acquired two sets of Central Bank (CB) Bills, the first set had seven (7) CBs was obtained from Bank of Commerce (BOC) which was sold by the RCBC to the latter. It was later on bought by BOC. However, the three (3) of which was allegedly sold back by the BOC to the PDB, which was transferred to Bancap and later on reacquired by BOC. The remaining four was sold to Capital One Equities Corporation which was transferred to All Asia which transferred the same to RCBC. One of which was sold back to All Asia but the BSP refused to released the amount covering the said CB. The other three CB was sold by RCBC to IVI, payment of which was also refused by BSP which was subsequently acquired by BOC. The second set is consist of two (2) CB bill which was sold to PDB by RCBC. The latter delivered the same to Bancap in turn Bancap sold the CB to Almanah Islamic Investment Bank which was bought by BOC. The PDB requested to record its claim over the said CBs in the BSPs books, explaining that its non-possession of the CB bills is "on account of imperfect negotiations thereof and/or subsequent setoff or transfer. But it was denied by BSP on the ground that under Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28 it requires the presentation of the bond before a registered bond may be transferred on the books of the BSP. PDB also asked BSP Deputy Governor Edgardo Zialcita that (i) a notation in the BSPs books be made against the transfer, exchange, or payment of the bonds and the payment of interest thereon; and (ii) the presenter of the bonds upon maturity be required to submit proof as a holder in due course (of the first set of CB bills). The PDB relied on Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 however; Nuqui again denied the request, reiterating the BSPs previous stand. PDB claimed that there was no intent on its part to transfer title of the CB bills, as shown by its nonissuance of a detached assignment in favor of the BOC and Bancap, respectively. The PDB particularly alleges that it merely "warehoused" the first set of CB bills with the BOC, as security collateral. The RTC temporarily enjoined Nuqui and the BSP from paying the face value of the CB bills on maturity and the PDB filed an Amended Petition impleading the BOC and All Asia. The BOC filed its answer praying the dismissal of the petition arguing that PDB has no cause of action since PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. The BOC adds that Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 cannot apply to the PDBs case because the PDB is not in possession of the CB bills. On the other hand, the BSP countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 because this section applies only to an "owner" and a "person presenting the bond," of which the PDB is neither. However, the RTC dismissed the PDBs petition as well as the counterclaim and the counter complaint/cross-claim for interpleader of BOC and BSP respectively assailing that it has no jurisdiction over the case.

Digested by: CHARLOTTE A. ARIVE, LLB-1E

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 is the applicable circular that will govern over question of an allegedly fraudulently assigned CB Bills? 2. Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable in this case. HELD: 1. No. The SC held that even without resorting to statutory construction aids, matters involving the subject CB bills should necessarily be governed by CB Circular No. 769-80. Even granting, however, that reliance on CB Circular No. 769-80 alone is not enough, we find that CB Circular No. 769-80 impliedly repeals CB Circular No. 28. An implied repeal transpires when a substantial conflict exists between the new and the prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an ire concilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old laws. Repeal by implication is not favored, unless manifestly intended by the legislature, or unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated, that the laws or orders are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent with one another so that they cannot co-exist; the legislature is presumed to know the existing law and would express a repeal if one is intended. In the present case, both CB Circular No. 28 and CB Circular No. 769-80 provide the BSP with a course of action in case of an allegedly fraudulently assigned certificate of indebtedness. Under CB Circular No. 28, in case of fraudulent assignments, the BSP would have to "call upon the owner and the person presenting the bond to substantiate their respective claims" and, from there, determine who has a better right over the registered bond. On the other hand, under CB Circular No. 769-80, the BSP shall merely "issue and circularize a stop order against the transfer, exchange, redemption of the [registered] certificate" without any adjudicative function (which is the precise root of the present controversy). As the two circulars stand, the patent irreconcilability of these two provisions does not require elaboration. Section 5, Article V of CB Circular No. 769-80 inescapably repealed Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28. 2. No. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction can only be applied in matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies and if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body." The absence of any express or implied statutory power to adjudicate conflicting claims of ownership or entitlement to the proceeds of its certificates of indebtedness finds complement in the similar absence of any technical matter that would call for the B SPs special expertise or competence. In fact, what the PDBs petitions bear out is essentially the nature of the transaction it had with the subsequent transferees of the subject CB bills (BOC and Bancap) and not any matter more appropriate for special determination by the BSP or any administrative agency.

Digested by: CHARLOTTE A. ARIVE, LLB-1E