UNIT 5 Organizing For Safety CONCEPT OF ORGANIZING Organizing is the process of identification and categorization of the tasks to be performed

ed by suitably delegating powers, responsibility etc. as well as establishing coordination between people so as to result in utmost efficiency and smooth functioning related to various activities. This implies that the coordination is sought at all levels in addition to building up of an efficient authority in the entire organizational set-up. Organising demands a meticulous observance of the following rules or measures : 1) Employment of knowledgeable and experienced people to carry out important jobs or tasks. 2) Clearly defining the relationship between the various groups or individuals at same or different levels. 3) Clear identification of the tasks so that the goal or the objectives may be attained without confusion. 4) To allocate functions with proper subdivisions as to the jobs to be performed taking due account of responsibility and credibility of the persons concerned. 5) Proper facilities are to be provided so that people can discharge their duties quite faithfully. 6) Last but not the least the delegation of authority or powers should be vested upon proper people specially those having proven track-record and an ublemished previous performance. ORGANISATIONAL SYSTEMS IN CONTEXT TO SAFETY Generally speaking the line manager shoulders the main responsibility of safety management in an organization. However, the safety department as well as the safety specialist have their definite roles in safety management as both of them advise and provide due assistance to the line managers in the matters of safety. Since the line manager has to perform his duties and arduous tasks, it is not expected of him to shoulder the whole gamut of responsibility involved in the safety management. With

the safety literatures growing in volume by leaps and bounds every year and the introduction of new safety techniques, the line manager becomes extremely burdened if he has to look after the whole arena of safety. Hence, creation of separate safety departments fortified with safety specialist is warranted under the changed circumstances in industries. The safety specialist under special circumstances can be entrusted with line authority in a restricted sense in case of emergencies and special delegation of powers can be vested to the specialist by the managers themselves. The safety specialist is expected to include the value and importance of safety in the whole system through persuations and timely advice. DEFINITION According to Theo Haimann, Organizing is the process of defining and grouping the activities of the enterprise and establishing the authority relationships among them. According to Louis Allen, "Organizing is the process of identifying and grouping the work to be performed, defining and delegating responsibility and authority and establishing relationships for the purpose of enabling people to work most effectively together in accomplishing objectives." NEEDS

If you have ever gotten lost in library stacks while looking for a book, you already know good organization makes a search process so much easier. As nonprofits set up their GiFTgive accounts and begin posting all the specific needs of their daily operations, they learn that it helps to step back and think about possibly organizing those needs in a different way. Donors probably dont see the needs in quite the same context as someone working inside the nonprofit. If you think about how a restaurant works, this is intuitively clear.

In a restaurant, the kitchen staff sees ingredients on the shelf that will be used in the preparation of food, but the patron out in the dining room only sees the dishes that the menu describes two completely different perspectives on what is essentially the same thing. We expect a diner to order cake; not flour, eggs and sugar. If we just listed all the ingredients we use on the menu, diners would not know what to order or where to start. In the same way, nonprofits who are just getting accustomed to listing out their specific needs to donors, quickly recognize that the way they talk about and organize their needs internally is not quite sufficient to their new presentation effort. At GiFTgive, we use words like campaign, bundle and grouping to describe the way individual needs are organized; and we encourage nonprofits to keep two objectives in mind throughout the process: 1) do anything you can to help the donor find the needs, and 2) do everything you can to help the donor to make sense of the needs. Finding the needs is a product of organization. Donors are surfing quickly through the nonprofits pages as they look for the need they want to fund. The more easily they can navigate their way through, the better their experience, and the less they have to work at making a contribution. Naturally, we all want the donor to have an easy and fun giving experience that will bring him back again, but that is tougher to accomplish if he is forced to stumble his way through a haphazardly categorized pile of needs. But it is not enough just to find the needs if, once found, they are grouped in ways that dont make sense to donors. We could find needs easily enough if we list them alphabetically, but carburetor and carton of milk just dont make any sense next to one another on a list of needs. On the other hand, one of our beta customers bundled up every need they had that was related to bedding, because donors understand that if you need pillows, it makes sense that you probably also need pillowcases. It doesnt matter to the donor if the pillows are headed for one location and the pillowcases happen to be needed in another; they still make logical sense together. And dont overlook one happy by-product of this kind of bundling: donors may just choose to fund bothneeds.

As nonprofits showcase their needs, they are in effect opening up their operations to inspection by donors who prefer to contribute at this more granular level. The process goes a long way toward helping the donor feel that he is more a part of the effort, because he can gain a more personal sense of how his donation is making a specific difference. In this regard, thoughtful organization of the needs just makes sense.

NATURE AND PRINCIPLES SAFETY PRINCIPLES INTRODUCTION For the purposes of this publication, safety means the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks, and the safety of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks. Safety as used here and in the IAEA safety standards includes the safety of nuclear installations, radiation safety, the safety of radioactive waste management and safety in the transport of radioactive material; it does not include non-radiation-related aspects of safety. normal circumstances and radiation risks as a consequence of incidents4, as well as with other possible direct consequences of a loss of control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source or any other source of radiation. Safety measures include actions to prevent incidents and arrangements put in place to mitigate their consequences if they were to occur. Principle 1: Responsibility for safety The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or organization responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks. Safety is concerned with both radiation risks under

i) The person or organization responsible for any facility or activity that gives rise to radiation risks or for carrying out a programme of actions to reduce radiation exposure has the prime responsibility for safety5. ii) Authorization to operate a facility or conduct an activity may be granted to an operating organization or to an individual, known as the licensee6. iii) The licensee retains the prime responsibility for safety throughout the lifetime of facilities and activities, and this responsibility cannot be delegated. Other groups, such as designers, manufacturers and constructors, employers, contractors, and consignors and carriers, also have legal, professional or functional responsibilities with regard to safety.

iv) The licensee is responsible for: Establishing and maintaining the necessary competences; Providing adequate training and information; Establishing procedures and arrangements to maintain s a f e t y under a l l conditions; Verifying appropriate design and the adequate quality of facilities and activities and of their associated equipment; Ensuring the safe c o n t r o l of all radioactive material that is used, produced, stored or transported; Ensuring the safe control of all radioactive waste that is generated. These responsibilities are to be fulfilled in accordance with applicable safety objectives and requirements as established or approved by the regulatory body, and their fulfilment is to be ensured through the implementation of the management system. v) Since radioactive waste management can span many human generations, consideration must be given to the fulfillment of the licensees (and regulators) responsibilities in relation to present and likely future operations. Provision must also be made for the continuity of responsibilities and the fulfillment of funding requirements in the long term.

Principle 2: Role of government An effective legal and governmental framework for safety, including an independent regulatory body, must be established and sustained. i) A properly established legal and governmental framework provides for the regulation of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks and for the clear assignment of responsibilities. The government is responsible for the adoption within its national legal system of such legislation, regulations, and other standards and measures as may be necessary to fulfil all its national responsibilities and international obligations effectively, and for the establishment of an independent regulatory body. ii) Government authorities have to ensure that arrangements are made for preparing programmes of actions to reduce radiation risks, including actions in emergencies, for monitoring releases of radioactive substances to the environment and for disposing of radioactive waste. Government authorities have to provide for control over sources of radiation for which no other organization has responsibility, such as some natural sources, orphan sources7 and radioactive residues from some past facilities and activities. iii) The regulatory body must: Have adequate legal authority, technical and managerial competence, and human and financial resources to fulfill its responsibilities; Be effectively independent of the licensee and of any other body, so that it is free from any undue pressure from interested parties; Set up appropriate means of informing parties in the vicinity, the public and other interested parties, and the information media about the safety aspects (including health and environmental aspects) of facilities and activities and about regulatory processes; Consult parties in the vicinity, the public and other interested parties, as appropriate, in an open and inclusive process. Governments and regulatory bodies thus have an important

responsibility in establishing standards and establishing the regulatory framework for protecting people and the environment against radiation risks. However, the prime responsibility for safety rests with the licensee. iv) In the event that the licensee is a branch of government, this branch must be clearly identified as distinct from and effectively independent of the branches of government with responsibilities for regulatory functions. Principle 3: Leadership and management for safety Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and sustained in organizations concerned with, and facilities and activities that give rise to, radiation risks. i) Leadership in safety matters has to be demonstrated at the highest levels in an organization. Safety has to be achieved and maintained by means of an effective management system. This system has to integrate all elements of management so that requirements for safety are established and applied coherently with other requirements, including those for human performance, quality and security, and so that safety is not compromised by other requirements or demands. The management system also has to ensure the promotion of a safety culture, the regular assessment of safety performance and the application of lessons learned from experience. ii) A safety culture that governs the attitudes and behaviour in relation to safety of all organizations and individuals concerned must be integrated in the management system. Safety culture includes: Individual and collective commitment to safety on the part of the leadership, the management and personnel at all levels; Accountability of organizations and of individuals at all levels for safety; Measures to encourage a questioning and learning attitude and to discourage complacency with regard to safety. iii) An important factor in a management system is the

recognition of the entire range of interactions of individuals at all levels with technology and with organizations. To prevent human and organizational failures, human factors have to be taken into account and good performance and good practices have to be supported. iv) Safety has to be assessed for all facilities and activities, consistent with a graded approach. Safety assessment involves the systematic analysis of normal operation and its effects, of the ways in which failures might occur and of the consequences of such failures. Safety assessments cover the safety measures necessary to control the hazard, and the design and engineered safety features are assessed to demonstrate that they fulfil the safety functions required of them. Where control measures or operator actions are called on to maintain safety, an initial safety assessment has to be carried out to demonstrate that the arrangements made are robust and that they can be relied on. A facility may only be constructed and commissioned or an activity may only be commenced once it has been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the regulatory body that the proposed safety measures are adequate. v) The process of safety assessment for facilities and activities is repeated in whole or in part as necessary later in the conduct of operations in order to take into account changed circumstances (such as the application of new standards or scientific and technological developments), the feedback of operating experience, modifications and the effects of ageing. For operations that continue over long periods of time, assessments are reviewed and repeated as necessary. Continuation of such operations is subject to these reassessments demonstrating to the satisfaction of the regulatory body that the safety measures remain adequate. vi) Despite all measures taken, accidents may occur. The precursors to accidents have to be identified and analysed, and measures have to be taken to prevent the recurrence of accidents. The feedback of operating experience from facilities and activities and, where relevant, from elsewhere is a key means of enhancing safety. Processes must be put in place for the feedback and analysis of operating experience, including initiating events, accident precursors, near misses, accidents and unauthorized acts, so that lessons may be learned, shared and acted upon.

Principle 4: Justification of facilities and activities Facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks must yield an overall benefit. i) For facilities and activities to be considered justified, the benefits that they yield must outweigh the radiation risks to which they give rise. For the purposes of assessing benefit and risk, all significant consequences of the operation of facilities and the conduct of activities have to be taken into account. ii) In many cases, decisions relating to benefit and risk are taken at the highest levels of government, such as a decision by a State to embark on a nuclear power programme. In other cases, the regulatory body may determine whether proposed facilities and activities are justified. iii) Medical radiation exposure of patients whether for diagnosis or treatment is a special case, in that the benefit is primarily to the patient. The justification for such exposure is therefore considered first with regard to the specific procedure to be used and then on a patient by patient basis. The justification relies on clinical judgement as to whether a diagnostic or therapeutic procedure would be beneficial. Such clinical judgement is mainly a matter for medical practitioners. For this reason, medical practitioners must be properly trained in radiation protection.

Principle 5: Optimization of protection Protection must be optimized to provide the highest level of safety that can reasonably be achieved. i) The safety measures that are applied to facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks are considered optimized if they provide the highest level of safety that can reasonably be achieved throughout the lifetime of the facility or activity, without unduly limiting its utilization. ii) To determine whether radiation risks are as low as reasonably achievable, all such risks, whether arising from normal operations or from abnormal or accident conditions, must be assessed (using

a graded approach) a priori and periodically reassessed throughout the lifetime of facilities and activities. Where there are interdependences between related actions or between their associated risks (e.g. for different stages of the lifetime of facilities and activities, for risks to different groups or for different steps in radioactive waste management), these must also be considered. Account also has to be taken of uncertainties in knowledge. iii) The optimization of protection requires judgements to be made about the relative significance of various factors, including: The number of people (workers and the public) who may be exposed to radiation; The likelihood of their incurring exposures; The magnitude and distribution of radiation doses received; Radiation risks arising from foreseeable events; Economic, social and environmental factors. The optimization of protection also means using good practices and common sense to avoid radiation risks as far as is practical in day to day activities. iv) The resources devoted to safety by the licensee, and the scope and stringency of regulations and their application, have to be commensurate with the magnitude of the radiation risks and their amenability to control. Regulatory control may not be needed where this is not warranted by the magnitude of the radiation risks.

Principle 6: Limitation of risks to individuals Measures for controlling radiation risks must ensure that no individual bears an unacceptable risk of harm. i) Justification and optimization of protection do not in themselves guarantee that no individual bears an unacceptable risk of harm. Consequently, doses and radiation risks must be controlled within specified limits. ii) Conversely, because dose limits and risk limits represent a legal

upper bound of acceptability, they are insufficient in themselves to ensure the best achievable protection under the circumstances, and they therefore have to be supplemented by the optimization of protection. Thus both the optimization of protection and the limitation of doses and risks to individuals are necessary to achieve the desired level of safety. Principle 7: Protection of present and future generations People and the environment, present and future, must be protected against radiation risks. i) Radiation risks may transcend national borders and may persist for long periods of time. The possible consequences, now and in the future, of current actions have to be taken into account in judging the adequacy of measures to control radiation risks. In particular: Safety standards apply not only to local populations but also to populations remote from facilities and activities. Where effects could span generations, subsequent generations have to be adequately protected without any need for them to take significant protective actions. ii) Whereas the effects of radiation exposure on human health are relatively well understood, albeit with uncertainties8, the effects of radiation on the environment have been less thoroughly investigated. The present system of radiation protection generally provides appropriate protection of ecosystems in the human environment against harmful effects of radiation exposure. The general intent of the measures taken for the purposes of environmental protection has been to protect ecosystems against radiation exposure that would have adverse consequences for populations of a species (as distinct from individual organisms). iii) Radioactive waste must be managed in such a way as to avoid imposing an undue burden on future generations; that is, the generations that produce the waste have to seek and apply safe, practicable and environmentally acceptable solutions for its long term management. The generation of radioactive waste must be kept to the minimum practicable level by means of appropriate design measures and procedures, such as the recycling and reuse of

material. Principle 8: Prevention of accidents All practical efforts must be made to prevent and mitigate nuclear or radiation accidents. 3.30. The most harmful consequences arising from facilities and activities have come from the loss of control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source or other source of radiation. Consequently, to ensure that the likelihood of an accident having harmful consequences is extremely low, measures have to be taken: To prevent the occurrence of failures or abnormal conditions (including breaches of security) that could lead to such a loss of control; To prevent the escalation of any such failures or abnormal conditions that do occur; To prevent the loss of, or the loss of control over, a radioactive source or other source of radiation. i) The primary means of preventing and mitigating the consequences of accidents is defence in depth. Defence in depth is implemented primarily through the combination of a number of consecutive and independent levels of protection that would have to fail before harmful effects could be caused to people or to the environment. If one level of protection or barrier were to fail, the subsequent level or barrier would be available. When properly implemented, defence in depth ensures that no single technical, human or organizational failure could lead to harmful effects, and that the combinations of failures that could give rise to significant harmful effects are of very low probability. The independent effectiveness of the different levels of defence is a necessary element of defence in depth. ii) Defence in depth combination of: is provided by an appropriate

An effective management system with a strong management commitment to safety and a strong safety culture. Adequate site selection and the incorporation of good design and

engineering features providing safety margins, diversity and redundancy, mainly by the use of: a) Design, technology and materials of high quality and reliability; b) Control, limiting and protection systems and surveillance features; c) An appropriate combination of inherent and engineered safety features. Comprehensive operational procedures and practices as well as accident management procedures. iii) Accident management procedures must be developed in advance to provide the means for regaining control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction or other source of radiation in the event of a loss of control and for mitigating any harmful consequences. Principle 9: Emergency preparedness and response Arrangements must be made for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear or radiation incidents. i) The primary goals of preparedness and nuclear or radiation emergency are: response for a

To ensure that arrangements are in place for an effective response at the scene and, as appropriate, at the local, regional, national and international levels, to a nuclear or radiation emergency; To ensure that, for reasonably foreseeable incidents, radiation risks would be minor; For any incidents that do occur, to take practical measures to mitigate any consequences for human life and health and the environment. ii) The licensee, the employer, the regulatory body and appropriate branches of government have to establish, in advance, arrangements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiation emergency at the scene, at local, regional and national levels and, where so agreed between States, at the international level.

iii) The scope and extent of arrangements for preparedness and response have to reflect:

emergency

The likelihood and the possible consequences of a nuclear or radiation emergency; The characteristics of the radiation risks; The nature and location of the facilities and activities. Such arrangements include: Criteria set in advance for use in determining when to take different protective actions; The capability to take actions to protect and inform personnel at the scene, and if necessary the public, during an emergency. iv) In developing the emergency response arrangements, consideration has to be given to all reasonably foreseeable events. Emergency plans have to be exercised periodically to ensure the preparedness of the organizations having responsibilities in emergency response. v) When urgent protective actions must be taken promptly in an emergency, it may be acceptable for emergency workers to receive, on the basis of informed consent, doses that exceed the occupational dose limits normally applied but only up to a predetermined level.

Principle 10: Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks must be justified and optimized. i) Radiation risks may arise in situations other than in facilities and activities that are in compliance with regulatory control. In such situations, if the radiation risks are relatively high, consideration has to be given to whether protective actions can reasonably be taken to reduce radiation exposures and to remediate adverse conditions. One type of situation concerns radiation of essentially natural origin.

Such situations include exposure to radon gas in dwellings and workplaces, for example, for which remedial actions can be taken if necessary. However, in many situations there is little that can practicably be done to reduce exposure to natural sources of radiation. A second type of situation concerns exposure that arises from human activities conducted in the past that were never subject to regulatory control, or that were subject to an earlier, less rigorous regime of control. An example is situations in which radioactive residues remain from former mining operations. A third type of situation concerns protective actions, such as remediation measures, taken following an uncontrolled release of radionuclides to the environment. ii) In all of these cases, the protective actions considered each have some foreseeable economic, social and, possibly, environmental costs and may entail some radiation risks (e.g. to workers carrying out such actions). The protective actions are considered justified only if they yield sufficient benefit to outweigh the radiation r i s k s and other detriments a s s o c i a t e d with taking them. Furthermore, protective actions m u s t be optimized t o produce the greatest benefit that is reasonably achievable in relation to the costs.

ORGANISATION STRUCTURE AND SAFETY DEPARTMENT Role of Safety Department The role of safety department in an organization should be viewed in the light of the following: i) Place of safety department in the organization, and ii) Organizational structure of the safety department. Place of safety Department in the Organization - The place or safety department in the organization could be conceived in the following ways: a) Direct channel of communication could be established between the safety director and the top management. This implies that the safety director may be directly placed under the managing director or the general manager.

b) The channel of communication between the safety director and the top management through the line manager having direct access to the top management. c) The safety director may be placed under such persons (as for example personnel manager etc.) who weilds enough power and influence in the organization itself. In this case the personnel manager should have a good rapport with the line officer. d) The safety director may be placed under such a boss who has real interest in the safety matters as for example the production manager. Organizational Structure of the Safety Department Organizational structure of the safety department depends upon the factors namely the size of the organization in the terms of small or large and the territorial location of the organization. The territorials location may also be referred to as geographical location. Organisational Structures in Small Undertakings These undertakings being small do not engage a full-time safety expert. Sometimes the safety responsibility may be shouldered by a qualified, experienced and safety trained foreman to cater for the health and medical needs. A physician and a nurse assisted by para-medical staff can be engaged on a part-time basis. A few personnel may be trained to render first-aid services to cope with any minor injury and ailments. Organisational Structure in Large Undertakings In case of large undertakings where there is a single large plant, a centralized safety department is desirable where safety specialists have to be engaged on a full-time basis. In this case a director of safety may be installed under whom various safety managers dealing with safety planning, safety maintenance, safety inspection, safety research etc. have to perform their duties sincerely. However, in an organization of the multi-plant type characterized by scattered operations, a decentralized safety department may be the right choice. In this system the general manager may be installed under whom a personnel manager may be placed. The personnel manager may become the incharge of the safety department may operate under the personnel manager. A workshop superintendent may be placed under a safety manager. Finally a foreman and a safety officer might operate under the workshop superintendent. Under the same general manager, a production manager may function. A

number of workshop superintendents may operate under the production manager. Furthermore, a foreman and a safety officer might be placed under each workshop superintendents. Thus, in the above context decentralization is achieved since the safety activities are performed through separate and distinct streams. Territorial Organizational Structure In case of organization characterized by scattered operations in far-flung regions, a proper strategy to cope with such situations is warranted. In this arrangement the production manager and the personnel manager work under the same general manager. Different regional deputy general managers are deputed under the production manager. The deputy managers may look after the work of different territories or regions as for example eastern region, northern region, southern region, western region. Foremen and safety officers work under these regional deputy managers. In order to synchronise all the activities of the various territorial regions, a safety department at the headquarters is necessary. The top management frames safety policies which should be followed by the various regional and local units. A regional manager assisted by foreman and safety officers should have the freedom to chalk out and implement general safety plans. It is the onus of the chief safety personnel at the headquarters that the general safety policy is being followed at all locations. He should also provide assistance and necessary directions to uphold the safety policy. SAFETY COMMITTEE Safety Committee is a part of industrial management, is composed of members from supervisors, workers and safety representatives, some managers or Heads of Departments or their representatives, doctor, hygienist, psychologist and is headed by the Safety Director or Manager or Officer. If the Chief Executive is the Chairman, it will be easy to have decisions quickly. The personnel officer or safety officer should work as secretary as they have wide contacts with all departments. Workers representatives should be decided by them. A new provision is added under section 41 G of the Factories Act to set up a safety Committee consisting of equal number of representative of workers and management to promote co-operation between the workers and the management in maintaining proper safety and health at work and to review periodically the measures taken in that behalf.

The main object of the committee is to advise to Managing Director and the Safety Board or the top executive of the company on all matters of safety and health of work people. Advantage 1) It brings together varying view points, yield sounder decisions than the individual members, 2) Widens interest by allowing participation of work people in their own work and 3) Allows checks and cross-checks by different opinions which are essential for safety. Disadvantages 1) It causes delay in decisions till the meetings are held and 2) Consumes more time in meetings 3) May sometimes turn into a trade union meeting if so pulled by the employees. Therefore its good control to the point is necessary.

STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONIts essential requirement are : 1) Set-up should be appropriate to the work (main committee to include key executives) 2) Members should be well-known and have respect to fellow-members 3) Members must be well aware of working conditions, work methods, practices, hazards, causes of accidents and remedial measures, and 4) It should be as small as possible with minimum members from the sections necessary. Policy and Procedure :When a Committee is formed, written instruction should be issued covering 1) Scope of activities

2) Extent of authorities and 3) Procedure as to time/place of meeting, frequency of meeting, order of business, records to be kept and attendance requirements. The management should make it clear that it wants results and should give effective executive supervision over the affairs of the committee. The committee members should have firm determination to advance the cause of Safety. Functions of Main / Central Safety Committee are : 1) To decide safety policy and planning for purchase of equipments with in-built safety devices, relationship between departments, standards to be followed in guarding, testing, designing, layout, housekeeping, material handling and placing, inspections, accident investigation and records etc. 2) To plan and supervise programmes of safety propaganda, education, training and maintaining interest of employees in safety. 3) To make arrangement or develop safe work practices and procedures; inspection, audit and appraisal systems and all efforts to avoid or reduce accidents. To discuss and control the accident rates. 4) To discuss and initiate action for correction of unsafe conditions and actions. Action plan should be drawn and unsafe conditions and actions. Action plan should be drawn and suitable dates fixed for completion of each task. 5) To approve safety devices and protective equipments. 6) To carry out fire drill and rehearsal of on-site emergency plan. 7) To scrutinize safety suggestions received through plant safety committees and to initiate action to implement the accepted suggestions. 8) To arrange safety competitions and to decide awards for encouragement. 9) To improve co-operative spirit between management and employees and among various departments to promote safety. 10) The safety knowledge of committee members should be increased by arranging lectures of safety experts of the plant and outside and by sending the members to seminars. Factories inspectors and safety specialists can be utilized for this purpose.

11) To discuss and approve safety budget. 12) To discuss, distribute and supervise responsibilities for quick compliance of safety remarks. 13) To approve changes in safety organization and its activities. 14) To approve safety aspects of new design and construction of plant, machinery and equipments and 15) To decide disciplinary procedures and disposal of specific problems of safety education and training, safety engineering, hygiene engineering and occupational health. Functions of Plant Safety Committees are : 1) To review accident record of various departments 2) To investigate accidents and to implement corrective actions 3) To implement directives of the Central Safety Committee 4) Enforcement of safety rules, procedures and accepted safe practices 5) To encourage and enforce the use of personal protective equipments 6) Safety inspection rounds of various shops and sections 7) To encourage safety suggestions from workers and to forward them to the Central Safety Committee. Technical Safety Committee is useful for specialized knowledge viz. guard design, process and engineering revision, hazard and risk analysis, special investigation etc. It comprises chief engineer, safety engineer/officer, head mechanic, chief chemist and similar expert technicians. Special Purpose Safety Committee can be set up for specific jobs and dissolved when its purpose is accomplished. Such jobs include special accident investigation, specific problems of worker behavior, off-the job safety, rehabilitation or relief problem, safety celebration or contest or award occasions etc. For a big concern different safety committees as stated above are possible, but in a small factory a single committee can carry out all functions. Works safety and health committees have to play an important role in industries.

 LINE AND STAFF FUNCTIONS FOR SAFETY Organizational structure involves, in addition to task organizational boundary considerations, the designation of jobs within an organization and the relationships among those jobs. There are numerous ways to structure jobs within an organization, but two of the most basic forms include simple line structures and line-and-staff structures. In a line organization, top management has complete control, and the chain of command is clear and simple. Examples of line organizations are small businesses in which the top manager, often the owner, is positioned at the top of the organizational structure and has clear "lines" of distinction between him and his subordinates. The line-and-staff organization combines the line organization with staff departments that support and advise line departments. Most medium and large-sized firms exhibit line-and-staff organizational structures. The distinguishing characteristic between simple line organizations and lineand-staff organizations is the multiple layers of management within lineand-staff organizations. The following sections refer primarily to lineand-staff structures, although the advantages and disadvantages discussed apply to both types of organizational structures. Several advantages and disadvantages are present within a line-and-staff organization. An advantage of a line-and-staff organization is the availability of technical specialists. Staff experts in specific areas are incorporated into the formal chain of command. A disadvantage of a lineand-staff organization is conflict between line and staff personnel. LINE AND STAFF POSITIONS A wide variety of positions exist within a line-and-staff organization. Some positions are primary to the company's mission, whereas others are secondaryin the form of support and indirect contribution. Although positions within a line-and-staff organization can be differentiated in several ways, the simplest approach classifies them as being either line or staff. A line position is directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the organization, such as producing or selling a product or service. Line

positions are occupied by line personnel and line managers. Line personnel carry out the primary activities of a business and are considered essential to the basic functioning of the organization. Line managers make the majority of the decisions and direct line personnel to achieve company goals. An example of a line manager is a marketing executive.

Figure 1 Line-and-Staff Organization Although a marketing executive does not actually produce the product or service, he or she directly contributes to the firm's overall objectives through market forecasting and generating product or service demand. Therefore, line positions, whether they are personnel or managers, engage in activities that are functionally and directly related to the principal workflow of an organization. Staff positions serve the organization by indirectly supporting line functions. Staff positions consist of staff personnel and staff managers. Staff personnel use their technical expertise to assist line personnel and aid top management in various business activities. Staff managers provide support, advice, and knowledge to other individuals in the chain of command. Although staff managers are not part of the chain of command related to direct production of products or services, they do have authority over

personnel. An example of a staff manager is a legal adviser. He or she does not actively engage in profit-making activities, but does provide legal support to those who do. Therefore, staff positions, whether personnel or managers, engage in activities that are supportive to line personnel. LINE AND STAFF AUTHORITY Authority within a line-and-staff organization can be differentiated. Three types of authority are present: line, staff, and functional. Line authority is the right to carry out assignments and exact performance from other individuals. LINE AUTHORITY Line authority flows down the chain of command. For example, line authority gives a production supervisor the right to direct an employee to operate a particular machine, and it gives the vice president of finance the right to request a certain report from a department head. Therefore, line authority gives an individual a certain degree of power relating to the performance of an organizational task. Two important clarifications should be considered, however, when discussing line authority: (1) line authority does not ensure effective performance, and (2) line authority is not restricted to line personnel. The head of a staff department has line authority over his or her employees by virtue of authority relationships between the department head and his or her directly-reporting employees.

STAFF AUTHORITY Staff authority is the right to advise or counsel those with line authority. For example, human resource department employees help other departments by selecting and developing a qualified workforce. A quality control manager aids a production manager by determining the acceptable quality level of products or services at a manufacturing company, initiating quality programs, and carrying out statistical analysis to ensure compliance with quality standards. Therefore, staff authority gives staff personnel the right to offer advice in an effort to improve line operations.

FUNCTIONAL AUTHORITY Functional authority is referred to as limited line authority. It gives a staff person power over a particular function, such as safety or accounting. Usually, functional authority is given to specific staff personnel with expertise in a certain area. For example, members of an accounting department might have authority to request documents they need to prepare financial reports, or a human resource manager might have authority to ensure that all departments are complying with equal employment opportunity laws. Functional authority is a special type of authority for staff personnel, which must be designated by top management. LINE AND STAFF CONFLICT Due to different positions and types of authority within a line-and-staff organization, conflict between line and staff personnel is almost inevitable. Although minimal conflict due to differences in viewpoints is natural, conflict on the part of line and staff personnel can disrupt an entire organization. There are many reasons for conflict. Poor human relations, overlapping authority and responsibility, and misuse of staff personnel by top management are all primary reasons for feelings of resentment between line and staff personnel. This resentment can result in various departments viewing the organization from a narrow stance instead of looking at the organization as a whole. Fortunately, there are several ways to minimize conflict. One way is to integrate line and staff personnel into a work team. The success of the work team depends on how well each group can work together in efforts to increase productivity and performance. Another solution is to ensure that the areas of responsibility and authority of both line and staff personnel are clearly defined. With clearly defined lines of authority and responsibility, each group may better understand their role in the organization. A third way to minimize conflict is to hold both line and staff personnel accountable for the results of their own activities. In other

words, line personnel should not be entirely responsible for poor performance resulting from staff personnel advice. Line-and-staff organizations combine the direct flow of authority present within a line organization with staff departments that offer support and advice. A clear chain of command is a consistent characteristic among line-and-staff organizational structures. Problems of conflict may arise, but organizations that clearly delineate responsibility can help minimize such conflict.