Case Digest

Administrative Law
G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009 ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011 RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA vs. ERMITA G.R. No. 150270 November 26, 2008 CITY ENGINEER OF BAGUIO and HON. MAURICIO DOMOGAN vs. BANIQUED G.R. No. 164242 November 28, 2008 DESTILERIA LIMTUACO & CO., INC. and CONVOY MARKETING CORPORATION vs. ADVERTISING BOARD OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 175803 December 4, 2009 GOVERNOR ORLANDO A. FUA* vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 191427 May 30, 2011 UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION) vs. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY G.R. No. 170463 February 2, 2011 THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. ALBERT M. VELASCO and MARIO I. MOLINA G.R. No. 166471 March 22, 2011 TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT G.R. No. 171427 March 30, 2011 STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION vs. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY G.R. No. 180141 May 31, 2011 RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Prepared by: Analyn M. Giba

G.R. No. 164785

April 29, 2009

ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA

Facts: Petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan made the following remarks against respondents one of the minister of Iglesia ni cristo and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. The MTRCB sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan. After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. Issue: WON the order of preventive suspension is null and void for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Ruling: NO. Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed. A perusal of the MTRCBs basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision. But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. The preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCBs duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986 bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.

G.R. No. 180050

April 12, 2011

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA vs. ERMITA

Facts: Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina aver that they are taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte. They have served the Province of Surigao del Norte once as Vice- Governor and members of the Provincial Board, respectively. They claim to have previously filed a similar petition, which was dismissed on technical grounds. They allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province, if uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of Congress, and unjustly deprives the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of its territory, Internal Revenue Allocation and rich resources from the area. Issue: WON the IRR is null and void considering that it added an exemption to the standard prescribed by the LGC in the creation of a province as regards the land area requirement. Ruling: Yes. R. A. 9355 An act creating the province of Dinagat Islands is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the province and the election of the officials thereof are declared null and void. The provision in the rules and regulation implementing the LGC of 1991 stating, the land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one or more islands is declared null and void. In this case it does not merely fill but added which exemption is not found in the code. The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the purpose of the law to develop territorial and political subdivisions because in the first place it already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating territorial subdivision.

G.R. No. 150270

November 26, 2008

CITY ENGINEER OF BAGUIO and HON. MAURICIO DOMOGAN vs. BANIQUED

Facts: Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya, Milagros Villar, Minerva Baluyut and Israel de Leon filed a complaint with the Office of the Mayor of Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house built on a parcel of land located at Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City. On May 19, 1999, Domogan, the then city mayor of Baguio City, issued Notice of Demolition No. 55, Series of 1999, against spouses Rolando and Fidela Baniqued. Aggrieved, Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint for prohibition with TRO/injunction. Baniqued alleged that the intended demolition of his house was done without due process of law and "was arrived at arbitrarily and in a martial-law like fashion. He contends that there should be a court proceeding before he can be ousted from the lot. And he also attack the power of the mayor to order the demolition of anything unless the interested party was afforded prior hearing and unless the provisions of law pertaining to demolition are satisfied. Issue: WON the act of the mayor in issuing a notice of demolition a quasi judicial function which may be corrected by prohibition. Ruling: Yes. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law. As its name indicates, the writ is one that commands the person or tribunal to whom it is directed not to do something which he or she is about to do. The Mayor, although performing executive functions, also exercises quasijudicial function which may be corrected by prohibition. As a parting argument, petitioners contend that the complaint of Baniqued is outside the scope of the rule on prohibition which covers the proceedings of any "tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions." The issuance of the notice of demolition by the City Mayor is never a judicial, ministerial or rulemaking function. It is strictly an act of law enforcement and implementation, which is purely an executive function. Neither is the Office of the City Mayor a quasi-judicial body.

G.R. No. 164242

November 28, 2008

DESTILERIA LIMTUACO & CO., INC. and CONVOY MARKETING CORPORATION vs. ADVERTISING BOARD OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts: Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its advertising agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied with the AdBoard for a clearance of the airing of a radio advertisement entitled, "Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos)." AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement but was swept with complaints from the public. This prompted AdBoard to ask SLG for a replacement but there was no response. With the continued complaints from the public, AdBoard, this time, asked SLG to withdraw its advertisement, to no avail. AdBoard decided to recall the clearance previously issued, effective immediately. Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a constitutionally protected right, as well as a property right. Petitioners believe that requiring a clearance from AdBoard before advertisements can be aired amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. They also argue that AdBoard's regulation is an exercise of police power which must be subject to constitutional proscriptions. Issue: WON the writ of prohibition will lie on this case. Ruling: No. Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. What is at contest here is the power and authority of a private organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power and authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or group of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private individuals or corporations so acting.

G.R. No. 175803

December 4, 2009

GOVERNOR ORLANDO A. FUA* vs.THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Siquijor adopted Resolution No. 2003-247 segregating the sum of P8,600,000.00 as payment for the grant of extra Christmas bonus at P20,000.00 each to all its officials and employees. On the same date, corresponding Appropriation Ordinance No. 029 was passed. Thereafter, Resolution No. 2003-239 was adopted requesting President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo for an authority to the Provincial Government of Siquijor to grant such bonus who wrote a marginal note, NO OBJECTION. The provincial government, relying on the aforementioned resolutions and the Presidents marginal note, then proceeded to release the extra Christmas bonus to its officials and employees. However, a post-audit was and thereafter limiting the grant of the bonus.AOM Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022 were then reviewed by Atty. Roy L. Ursal, Regional Cluster Director, Legal and Adjudication Sector, Commission on Audit Region VII. Atty. Ursal disallowed the payments and issued Notices of Disallowance. Respondents, on the other hand, argued that the petition should not be given due course because of petitioners failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.4 Moreover, respondents emphasized that the marginal note allegedly written by the President stating No Objection had never been authenticated and was effectively revoked by Budget Circular No. 2003-7 and Administrative Circular No. 88, limiting extra cash-gift to all government and local government personnel to P5,000.00 only. Petitioner counters that the present case should be deemed an exception to the abovementioned general rule, because the issue raised here is a purely legal one. Issue: WON there is an observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies. Ruling: No. The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation. x x x The non-observance of the doctrine results in the petition having no cause of action, thus, justifying its dismissal. In this case, the necessary consequence of the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is obvious: the disallowance as ruled by the LAO-C has now become final and executory. There is nothing in this case to convince us that it should be considered as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. The issue presented is not a purely legal one. The Commission Proper, which is the tribunal possessing special knowledge, experience and tools to determine technical and intricate matters of fact involved in the conduct of the audit, would still be the best body to determine whether the marginal note of No Objection on petitioners letter request to the President is indeed authentic and tantamount to the required approval.

G.R. No. 191427

May 30, 2011

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION) vs. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Facts: Universal Robina Corp. (petitioner) is engaged in, among other things, the manufacture of animal feeds at its plant in Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, through its Pollution Control Division Monitoring and Enforcement Section, found that it failed to comply with government standards provided under DAOs Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. LLDA later issued on May 30, 2000 an Ex-Parte Order requiring petitioner to explain why no order should be issued for the cessation of its operations due to its discharge of pollutive effluents into the Pasig River and why it was operating without a clearance/permit from the LLDA. The LLDA, after receiving a phone-in complaint conducted on August 31, 2000, another analysis of petitioners wastewater, which showed its continued failure to conform to its effluent standard. Hearings on petitioners pollution case were thereafter commenced and despite subsequent compliance monitoring and inspections conducted by the LLDA, petitioners wastewater failed to conform to the parameters set by the aforementioned DAOs. Issue: WON there is an observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies. Ruling: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed. Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous.

G.R. No. 170463

February 2, 2011

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. ALBERT M. VELASCO and MARIO I. MOLINA Facts: Petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct and placed them under preventive suspension for 90 days. Respondents were charged for their alleged participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees denouncing the alleged corruption in the GSIS and calling for the ouster of its president and general manager, petitioner Winston F. Garcia. Respondent Mario I. Molina requested GSIS Senior Vice President Concepcion L. Madarang for the implementation of his step increment. On 22 April 2003, SVP Madarang denied the request citing GSIS Board Resolution No. 372 issued by petitioner Board of Trustees of the GSIS which approved the new GSIS salary structure, its implementing rules and regulations, and the adoption of the supplemental guidelines on step increment and promotion. Respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents claimed that they were denied the benefits which GSIS employees were entitled under Resolution No. 306. Respondents also sought to restrain and prohibit petitioners from implementing Resolution Nos. 197 and 372. Respondents claimed that the denial of the employee benefits due them on the ground of their pending administrative cases violates their right to be presumed innocent and that they are being punished without hearing. Respondent Molina also added that he had already earned his right to the step increment before Resolution No. 372 was enacted. Respondents also argued that the three resolutions were ineffective because they were not registered with the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Issue: WON the resolutions are ineffective for failure to registered with UP Law Center. Ruling: NO. Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. According to the UP Law Centers guidelines for receiving and publication of rules and regulations, "interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not the public," need not be filed with the UP Law Center. Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law Center.

G.R. No. 166471

March 22, 2011

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT Facts: Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a cooperative, registered with the Cooperative Development Authority, and organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPCs application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive. Issue: WON Sec. 47 of P.D. 198 is valid which states the the franchise given was exclusive. Ruling: No. The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 8, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution states that: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Empahsis supplied) Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that, "nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character." There is no exception.

G.R. No. 171427

March 30, 2011

STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION vs. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Facts: Petitioner is a company engaged in the fabrication of sterling silver jewelry. Its products are manufactured in the home of its principal stockholders, Asuncion Maria and Juan Luis Faustmann (Faustmanns), located in Barangay (Brgy.) Mariana, New Manila, Quezon City. A complaint was filed with the Office of the Chairman of Brgy. Mariana against petitioner for "creating loud unceasing noise and emitting toxic fumes," coming from the manufacturing plant of the latters predecessor, Unson, Faustmann and Company, Inc. During conciliation proceedings, petitioners management undertook to relocate its operations within a month. The parties signed an Agreement to that effect but petitioners failed to abide it. Alicia P. Maceda (Maceda), another neighbor of petitioner, wrote a letter to the Brgy. Chairman to complain about the same and filed a formal complaint with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-National Capital Region office. The complaint was endorsed by the DENR to one of the agencies under it, respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), which had territorial and functional jurisdiction over the matter.7 Subsequently, the Monitoring and Enforcement Section-Pollution Control Division of LLDA conducted an inspection of petitioners premises. According to the LLDA, it was observed that the wastewater generated by petitioners operations was drained directly to the sewer canal. A Notice of Violation and a Cease and Desist Order (CDO) were served on petitioner after it was found that it was operating without an LLDA Clearance and Permit, as required by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850. Meanwhile, Macedas complaint was endorsed by the LLDA to the Office of the Mayor of Quezon City. After hearing and investigation, the Office of the Mayor issued a Closure Order against petitioner after finding that it was operating without the requisite business permit, since it was running a jewelry manufacturing plant with an "Office Only" permit, and for violation of Zoning and Environmental Laws. Issue: WON the petitioner is exempted from complying with clearance requirements because it is a cottage industry. Ruling: It is clear that petitioner cannot be considered a cottage industry. Therefore, it is not exempted from complying with the clearance requirement of the LLDA. It is a doctrine of long-standing that factual findings of administrative bodies on technical matters within their area of expertise should be accorded not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if they are not overwhelming or preponderant. Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency. The exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that is best discharged by the government agency concerned and not by the courts.

G.R. No. 180141

May 31, 2011

RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Facts: Respondents Ricardo Barien, Inocencio M. Navallo, Ligaya M. Gando, Lea Molleda, Fe R. Vetonio, Primo V. Babiano, Patiga J., Jose Taeza, G. Delos Santos, Losbaes, W., Ave Pediglorio and Cresencia Roque (Barien, et al.) who are stockholders and board members of United Workers Transport Corp. (UWTC), filed a verified complaint before the PNP Inspectorate Division at Camp Crame, charging petitioner with Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting with Urgent Prayer for Preventive Suspension and Disarming. Barien, et al. are former drivers, conductors, mechanics and clerks of the defunct Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC). In April 1995, UWTC started operating MMTCs buses which it acquired under a conditional sale with right of repossession. At about the same time, petitioner was allegedly employed by Atty. Roy G. Gironella, the general manager appointed by the Board of Directors of UWTC, as his personal bodyguard with compensation coming from UWTC. In October 1995, Barien, et al. representing the majority stockholders of UWTC sued Atty. Gironella and five other members of the UWTC Board of Directors for gross mismanagement. Barien, et al. further alleged that upon orders of Atty. Gironella, the buses regularly driven by them and other stockholders/drivers/workers were confiscated by a "task force" composed of former drivers, conductors and mechanics led by petitioner. Armed with deadly weapons such as guns and knives, petitioner and his group intimidated and harassed the regular bus drivers and conductors, and took over the buses. Petitioner is not authorized to use his firearm or his authority as police officer to act as bodyguard of Atty. Gironella and to intimidate and coerce the drivers/stockholders and the bus passengers. Barien, et al. thus prayed for the preventive suspension of petitioner, the confiscation of his firearm and his termination after due hearing. Issue: WON administrative due process had been observed. Ruling: No. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.22 As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Petitioners assertion that the complainants/witnesses against him have not been cross examined by him, is likewise bereft of merit. While the right to cross-examine is a vital element of procedural due process, the right does not necessarily require an actual cross examination but merely an opportunity to exercise this right if desired by the party entitled to it. In this case, while Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 provides that the sworn statements of witnesses shall take the place of oral testimony but shall be subject to cross-examination, petitioner missed this opportunity precisely because he did not appear at the deadline for the filing of his supplemental answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly the hearing officer considered the case submitted for decision.