Mercado vs.

Spouses Espinocilla CASE DIGESTS, CASES, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS, OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS CASES, PRESCRIPTION CASESNovember 30th, 2012 | No Comments inShare Facts: Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land, Lot No. 552, (570 sq. m.) at Sorsogon. After he died, his five children, Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia divided it equally among themselves. Later, Dionisia died (no descendants) and Macario took possession of Dionisias share. In an affidavit of transfer of real property dated November 1948, Macario claimed that Dionisia had donated her share to him in May 1945. August 1977, Macario and his daughters Betty and Saida sold 225 sq. m. to his son Roger, husband of respondent Belen and father of respondent Ferdinand. March 1985, Roger Espinocilla sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. (So in Lot No. 552: Belen Espinocilla= 109 sq. m., Caridad Atienza = 120 sq. m., Caroline Yu = 209 sq. m., and petitioner, Salvacions son = 132 sq. m). Petitioner sued the respondents to recover two portions: an area of 28.58 sq. m. which he bought from Aspren and another 28.5 sq. m. which allegedly belonged to him but was. He claims it must be returned to him. He avers that he is entitled to own and possess 171 sq. m. having inherited 142.5 sq. m. from his mother Salvacion (Doroteo= 114sq m + Dionisia 28.5 sq m) and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt Aspren. He occupies only 132 sq. m., he claims that respondents encroach on his share by 39 sq. m. Respondents claim that they rightfully possess the land they occupy by virtue of acquisitive prescription and that there is no basis for petitioners claim of encroachment. RTC: 1. Petitioner entitled to 171 sq. m. The RTC computed that Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel and Macario each inherited 114 sq. m. from Doroteo and 28.5 sq. m. from Dionisia. 2. Macario was not entitled to 228 sq. m. Thus, respondents must return 39 sq. m. to petitioner who occupies only 132 sq. m.13 3. Macarios affidavit is void (no public document of donation) 4. Accordingly, Macario cannot acquire said shares by prescription. 5. Partially declared the nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale by Macario, Betty and Saida to

Roger as it affects the portion or the share belonging to Salvacion CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that extraordinary acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of respondents since petitioners complaint was filed only on July 13, 2000. Issue: The core issue to be resolved is whether petitioners action to recover the subject portion is barred by prescription. Petitioner concludes that if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party. Held: We affirm the CA ruling dismissing petitioners complaint on the ground of prescription. Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith. Respondents uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of 109 sq. m. of Lot No. 552 was established. Macario occupied Dionisias share in 1945 although his claim that Dionisia donated it to him in 1945 was only made in a 1948 affidavit. We also agree with the CA that Macarios possession of Dionisias share was public and adverse since his other co-owners, his three other sisters, also occupied portions of Lot No. 552. Indeed, the 1977 sale made by Macario and his two daughters in favor of his son Roger confirms the adverse nature of Macarios possession because said sale of 225 sq. m. was an act of ownership. Roger also exercised an act of ownership when he sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. It was only in the year 2000, upon receipt of the summons to answer petitioners complaint, that respondents peaceful possession of the remaining portion was interrupted. By then, however, extraordinary acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of respondents. That the RTC found Macarios 1948 affidavit void is of no moment.

Extraordinary prescription is unconcerned with Macarios title or good faith. Petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents possession with his assertion that Macarios fraudulent acquisition of Dionisias share created a constructive trust. Prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the relationship. Moreover, the CA correctly dismissed petitioners complaint as an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years from the time the right of action accrues( extinctive prescription), where rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time. Petitioners action for recovery of possession having been filed 55 years after Macario occupied Dionisias share, it is also barred by extinctive prescription. The CA while condemning Macarios fraudulent act of depriving his three sisters of their shares in Dionisias share, equally emphasized the fact that Macarios sisters wasted their opportunity to question his acts. NAVALES VS. RIAS et al G.R. No. L-3489 September 7, 1907 Facts: Navales constructed a house in the land owned by Rias. By virtue of the decision of justice of the peace for the action instituted by Rias against the plaintiff herein, the constructedhouse of Navales was ejected by mere execution of the Sheriff to the rendered decision. SoNavales filed a complaint claiming for damages against defendants for destroying his housewith the Court of First Instance. The Court favoured Navales declaring decision of justice of thepeace was illegal as well as the execution of said order by the Sheriff, making defendants liablefor damages. Issue: Whether a not appeled res adjudicata (an issue already decided b y court) be deemedfinal and executory Held: Since the judgement rendered by the justice of the peace for the ejectment of Navaleshouse, has not been appealed, the decision is deemed final. By virtue of the final decisionagainst Vicente Navales, the deputy sheriff have just carried out the judgment into executionthus obliged to destroy the said house and removed it from the land, in accordance to the usualprocedure in the action for ejectment.Section 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:Execution. If no appeal from a judgment of a justice of the peace shall be perfected as hereinprovided, the justice of the peace shall, at the request of the successful party, issue executionfor the enforcement of the judgment, and the expiration of the time limited by law for theperfection of an appeal.There was no shown of illegality of the

judgment of the justice of the peace, on the writ of execution or of the acts performed by the sheriff for the enforcement of the judgment.Wherefore the judgment appealed was reversed in favor of defendants, and the complaint for damages filed by Vicente Navales against Eulogia Rias and Maximo Requiroso is dismissedwithout special ruling as to costs. Candida Virata vs Victorio Ochoa on July 23, 2011 81 SCRA 472 Torts and Damages Double Recovery of Civil Liability In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby causing the latters death. The heirs of Virata sued Borilla through an action for homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Rizal. Viratas lawyer reserved their right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew said motion. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas again reserved their right to file a separate civil action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a mere accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the jeep and employer of Borilla) for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit alleging that Borilla was already acquitted and that the Viratas were merely trying to recover damages twice. The lower court agreed with Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit. ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit. HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery. People vs panitrece Before Us is an appeal filed by Domingo Paniterce y Martinez (Paniterce) assailing the Decision[1] dated August 22, 2008

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01001, entitled People of the Philippines v. Domingo Paniterce, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated March 2, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37, in Criminal Case Nos. 6076, 6077, 6078, 6079, 6080 and 6081.[2] The RTC found Paniterce guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness. In four Informations, all dated February 11, 2002, 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Hedy S. Aganan charged Paniterce with four counts of rape of his daughter AAA. Except for the dates[3] of the commission of the rapes, the four Informations identically read: Criminal Case 6077, 6078 and 6079 Nos. 6076,

accused, with grave abuse of confidence being the father of the offended party with lewd designs by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously committed RAPE upon his 12- year old daughter BBB by then and there, caressing and inserting his finger inside her vagina against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded by the Honorable Court.[6] When arraigned, Paniterce pleaded not guilty to all the charges. After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision on March 2, 2005, with the following dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the prosecution having proved the guilt of accused Domingo Paniterce of the crimes of Rape as charged in the aforementioned Informations, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalties of imprisonment, to wit: In Criminal Case No. 6076, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as maximum for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code as the alleged molestation took place in April 1997 and RA 8353 took effect only on October 22, 1997; In Criminal Cases Nos. 6077, 6078, 6080 and 6081, he is hereby sentenced to suffer in each every case the penalty of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS,

That sometime in the year 1997 in x x x Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with grave abuse of confidence being the father of the offended party with lewd designs by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with his daughter AAA, a 10 year-old minor, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded by the Honorable Court.[4] In two Amended Informations, both dated December 3, 2002, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Daniel M. Salvadora charged Paniterce with two counts of rape of his other daughter BBB. Aside from the dates[5] of the commission of the rapes, the Informations similarly state: Criminal Case Nos. 6080 and 6081 That on or about 6:00 oclock in the morning of August 26, 2000 x x x Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named

TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum and to pay AAA and BBB Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each as moral damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; In Criminal Case No. 6079, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.[7] On June 4, committed to the in Muntinlupa City. 2005, Bureau Paniterce was of Corrections

Pesos (P50,000.00) each as moral damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; and 2. For Rape, in Criminal Case No. 6079, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages.

Paniterce filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01001. The appellate court rendered a Decision on August 22, 2008 affirming the RTC judgment with modifications, to wit: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court convicting DOMINGO PANITERCE is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications: 1. For Acts of Lasciviousness, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6077, 6078, 6080 and 6081, appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer in each [and] every case an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum and to pay AAA and BBB Fifty Thousand

The decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty for Acts of Lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 6076 is AFFIRMED without any modification.[8] On 16 September 2008, Paniterce, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals conveying his intention to appeal to us the aforementioned Decision dated August 22, 2008 of the appellate court. The Court of Appeals gave due course to Paniterces Notice of Appeal on September 23, 2008,[9] and directed its Judicial Records Division to elevate to us the original records in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01001. On 15 April 2009, we required[10] the parties to file their supplemental briefs, and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to confirm the commitment of Paniterce at the Bureau of Corrections and submit his report thereon within 10 days from notice. Paniterce filed his Supplemental Brief[11] on June 16, 2009, while the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation[12] on June 18, 2009 stating that it would no longer file a supplemental brief considering that Paniterce did not raise any

new issue in his appeal. On July 22, 2009, we submitted G.R. No. 186382 for resolution. However, in a letter dated October 12, 2009, Julio A. Arciaga, the Assistant Director for Prisons and Security of the Bureau of Corrections, informed us that Paniterce had died on August 22, 2009 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital. Paniterces Death Certificate was attached to said letter. Given Paniterces death, we are now faced with the question of the effect of such death on the present appeal. Paniterces death on August 22, 2009, during the pendency of his appeal, extinguished not only his criminal liabilities for the rape and acts of lasciviousness committed against his daughters, but also his civil liabilities solely arising from or based on said crimes. According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) b) c) Law Contracts Quasi-contracts

xxxx e) 3. Quasi-delicts

Applying the foregoing provision, we laid down the following guidelines in People v. Bayotas[13]: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal

Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4.

Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.[14]

6080, and 6081 before the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City are DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.

MANUEL M. SERRANO, petitioner, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES; OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA; EMERITO M. RAMOS, SUSANA B. RAMOS, EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR., JOSEFA RAMOS DELA RAMA, HORACIO DELA RAMA, ANTONIO B. RAMOS, FILOMENA RAMOS LEDESMA, RODOLFO LEDESMA, VICTORIA RAMOS TANJUATCO, and TEOFILO TANJUATCO, respondents. Rene Diokno for petitioner. F.E. Evangelista & Glecerio T. Orsolino for respondent Central Bank of the Philippines. Feliciano C. Tumale, Pacifico T. Torres and Antonio B. Periquet for respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Josefina G. Salonga for all other respondents.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

Clearly, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on Paniterces appeal. Whether or not he was guilty of the crimes charged has become irrelevant since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and our disquisition in Bayotas, even assuming Paniterce had incurred criminal liabilities, they were totally extinguished by his death. Moreover, because Paniterces appeal was still pending and no final judgment of conviction had been rendered against him when he died, his civil liabilities arising from the crimes, being civil liabilities ex delicto, were likewise extinguished by his death. Consequently, the appealed Decision dated August 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals finding Paniterce guilty of rape and acts of lasciviousness, sentencing him to imprisonment, and ordering him to indemnify his victims had become ineffectual. WHEREFORE, in view of the death of accused-appellant Domingo Paniterce y Martinez, the Decision dated August 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 01001 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 6076, 6077, 6078, 6079,

Petition for mandamus and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, that seeks the establishment of joint and solidary liability to the amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos, with interest, against respondent Central Bank of the Philippines and Overseas Bank of Manila and its stockholders, on the alleged failure of the Overseas Bank of Manila to return the time deposits made by petitioner and assigned to him, on the ground that respondent Central Bank failed in its duty to exercise strict supervision over respondent Overseas Bank of Manila to protect depositors and the general public. 1 Petitioner also prays that both respondent banks be ordered to execute the proper and necessary documents to constitute all properties fisted in Annex "7" of the Answer of respondent Central Bank of the Philippines in G.R. No. L-29352, entitled "Emerita M. Ramos, et al vs. Central Bank of the Philippines," into a trust fund in favor of petitioner and all other depositors of respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. It is also prayed that the respondents be prohibited permanently from honoring, implementing, or doing any act predicated upon the validity or efficacy of the deeds of mortgage, assignment. and/or conveyance or transfer of whatever nature of the

properties listed in Annex "7" of the Answer of respondent Central Bank in G.R. No. 29352. 2 A sought for ex-parte preliminary injunction against both respondent banks was not given by this Court. Undisputed pertinent facts are: On October 13, 1966 and December 12, 1966, petitioner made a time deposit, for one year with 6% interest, of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) with the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. 3 Concepcion Maneja also made a time deposit, for one year with 6-% interest, on March 6, 1967, of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the same respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. 4 On August 31, 1968, Concepcion Maneja, married to Felixberto M. Serrano, assigned and conveyed to petitioner Manuel M. Serrano, her time deposit of P200,000.00 with respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. 5 Notwithstanding series of demands for encashment of the aforementioned time deposits from the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, dating from December 6, 1967 up to March 4, 1968, not a single one of the time deposit certificates was honored by respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. 6 Respondent Central Bank admits that it is charged with the duty of administering the banking system of the Republic and it exercises supervision over all doing business in the Philippines, but denies the petitioner's allegation that the Central Bank has the duty to exercise a most rigid and stringent supervision of banks, implying that respondent Central Bank has to watch every move or activity of all banks, including respondent Overseas Bank of Manila. Respondent Central Bank claims that as of March 12, 1965, the Overseas Bank of Manila, while operating, was only on a limited degree of banking operations since the Monetary Board decided in its Resolution No. 322, dated March 12, 1965, to prohibit the Overseas Bank of Manila from making new loans and investments in view of its chronic reserve deficiencies against its deposit liabilities. This limited operation of respondent Overseas Bank of Manila continued up to 1968. 7 Respondent Central Bank also denied that it is guarantor of the permanent solvency of any banking institution as claimed by petitioner. It claims that neither the law nor sound banking supervision requires respondent Central Bank to advertise or represent to the public any remedial

measures it may impose upon chronic delinquent banks as such action may inevitably result to panic or bank "runs". In the years 1966-1967, there were no findings to declare the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as insolvent. 8 Respondent Central Bank likewise denied that a constructive trust was created in favor of petitioner and his predecessor in interest Concepcion Maneja when their time deposits were made in 1966 and 1967 with the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as during that time the latter was not an insolvent bank and its operation as a banking institution was being salvaged by the respondent Central Bank. 9 Respondent Central Bank avers no knowledge of petitioner's claim that the properties given by respondent Overseas Bank of Manila as additional collaterals to respondent Central Bank of the Philippines for the former's overdrafts and emergency loans were acquired through the use of depositors' money, including that of the petitioner and Concepcion Maneja. 10 In G.R. No. L-29362, entitled "Emerita M. Ramos, et al. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines," a case was filed by the petitioner Ramos, wherein respondent Overseas Bank of Manila sought to prevent respondent Central Bank from closing, declaring the former insolvent, and liquidating its assets. Petitioner Manuel Serrano in this case, filed on September 6, 1968, a motion to intervene in G.R. No. L-29352, on the ground that Serrano had a real and legal interest as depositor of the Overseas Bank of Manila in the matter in litigation in that case. Respondent Central Bank in G.R. No. L-29352 opposed petitioner Manuel Serrano's motion to intervene in that case, on the ground that his claim as depositor of the Overseas Bank of Manila should properly be ventilated in the Court of First Instance, and if this Court were to allow Serrano to intervene as depositor in G.R. No. L29352, thousands of other depositors would follow and thus cause an avalanche of cases in this Court. In the resolution dated October 4, 1968, this Court denied Serrano's, motion to intervene. The contents of said motion to intervene are substantially the same as those of the present petition. 11 This Court rendered decision in G.R. No. L-29352 on October 4, 1971, which became final and executory on March 3, 1972, favorable to the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, with the dispositive portion to wit:

WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for in the petition are hereby granted and respondent Central Bank's resolution Nos. 1263, 1290 and 1333 (that prohibit the Overseas Bank of Manila to participate in clearing, direct the suspension of its operation, and ordering the liquidation of said bank) are hereby annulled and set aside; and said respondent Central Bank of the Philippines is directed to comply with its obligations under the Voting Trust Agreement, and to desist from taking action in violation therefor. Costs against respondent Central Bank of the Philippines. 12
Because of the above decision, petitioner in this case filed a motion for judgment in this case, praying for a decision on the merits, adjudging respondent Central Bank jointly and severally liable with respondent Overseas Bank of Manila to the petitioner for the P350,000 time deposit made with the latter bank, with all interests due therein; and declaring all assets assigned or mortgaged by the respondents Overseas Bank of Manila and the Ramos groups in favor of the Central Bank as trust funds for the benefit of petitioner and other depositors. 13 By the very nature of the claims and causes of action against respondents, they in reality are recovery of time deposits plus interest from respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, and recovery of damages against respondent Central Bank for its alleged failure to strictly supervise the acts of the other respondent Bank and protect the interests of its depositors by virtue of the constructive trust created when respondent Central Bank required the other respondent to increase its collaterals for its overdrafts said emergency loans, said collaterals allegedly acquired through the use of depositors money. These claims shoud be ventilated in the Court of First Instance of proper jurisdiction as We already pointed out when this Court denied petitioner's motion to intervene in G.R. No. L-29352. Claims of these nature are not proper in actions for mandamus and prohibition as there is no shown clear abuse of discretion by the Central Bank in its exercise of supervision over the other respondent Overseas Bank of Manila, and if there was, petitioner here is not the proper party to raise that question, but rather the Overseas Bank of Manila, as it did in G.R. No. L-29352. Neither is

there anything to prohibit in this case, since the questioned acts of the respondent Central Bank (the acts of dissolving and liquidating the Overseas Bank of Manila), which petitioner here intends to use as his basis for claims of damages against respondent Central Bank, had been accomplished a long time ago. Furthermore, both parties overlooked one fundamental principle in the nature of bank deposits when the petitioner claimed that there should be created a constructive trust in his favor when the respondent Overseas Bank of Manila increased its collaterals in favor of respondent Central Bank for the former's overdrafts and emergency loans, since these collaterals were acquired by the use of depositors' money. Bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits. They are really loans because they earn interest. All kinds of bank deposits, whether fixed, savings, or current are to be treated as loans and are to be covered by the law on loans. 14 Current and savings deposit are loans to a bank because it can use the same. The petitioner here in making time deposits that earn interests with respondent Overseas Bank of Manila was in reality a creditor of the respondent Bank and not a depositor. The respondent Bank was in turn a debtor of petitioner. Failure of he respondent Bank to honor the time deposit is failure to pay s obligation as a debtor and not a breach of trust arising from depositary's failure to return the subject matter of the deposit WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Antonio, Abad Santos, JJ., concur. Barredo (Chairman) J., concur in the judgment on the of the concurring opinion of Justice Aquino.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

The petitioner prayed that the Central Bank be ordered to pay his time deposits of P350,000, plus interests, which he could not recover from the distressed Overseas Bank of Manila, and to declare all the assets assigned or mortgaged by that bank and the Ramos group to the Central Bank as trust properties for the benefit of the petitioner and other depositors. The petitioner has no causes of action agianst the Central Bank to obtain those reliefs. They cannot be granted in petitioner's instant original actions in this Court for mandamus and prohibition. It is not the Central Bank's ministerial duty to pay petitioner's time deposits or to hold the mortgaged properties in trust for the depositors of the Overseas Bank of Manila. The petitioner has no cause of action for prohibition, a remedy usually available against any tribunal, board, corporation or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions. Since the Overseas Bank of Manila was found to be insolvent and the Superintendent of Banks was ordered to take over its assets preparatory to its liquidation under section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 (p. 197, Rollo, Manifestation of September 19, 1973), petitioner's remedy is to file his claim in the liquidating proceeding (Central Bank vs. Morfe, L38427, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA 114; Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., L-29791, January 10, 1978, 81 SCRA 75).

cause of action for prohibition, a remedy usually available against any tribunal, board, corporation or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions. Since the Overseas Bank of Manila was found to be insolvent and the Superintendent of Banks was ordered to take over its assets preparatory to its liquidation under section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 (p. 197, Rollo, Manifestation of September 19, 1973), petitioner's remedy is to file his claim in the liquidating proceeding (Central Bank vs. Morfe, L38427, March 12, 1975, 63 SCRA 114; Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., L-29791, January 10, 1978, 81 SCRA 75).

Santos vs. Ca
LEOUEL SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIASANTOS, Respondents. G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995 FACTS: Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the country. In 1991, Leoul filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal. ISSUE: Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years constitute psychological incapacity? RULING: No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of the Family Code, include

Separate Opinions AQUINO, J., concurring: The petitioner prayed that the Central Bank be ordered to pay his time deposits of P350,000, plus interests, which he could not recover from the distressed Overseas Bank of Manila, and to declare all the assets assigned or mortgaged by that bank and the Ramos group to the Central Bank as trust properties for the benefit of the petitioner and other depositors. The petitioner has no causes of action agianst the Central Bank to obtain those reliefs. They cannot be granted in petitioner's instant original actions in this Court for mandamus and prohibition. It is not the Central Bank's ministerial duty to pay petitioner's time deposits or to hold the mortgaged properties in trust for the depositors of the Overseas Bank of Manila. The petitioner has no

their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. PETITION IS DENIED.