Assumption of Risk Volenti fit non injuria - to a willing person, injury is not done.

If someone willingly places themselves in a position where harm might result, knowing that some degree of harm might result, they are not able to bring a claim against the other party in tort or delict Requisites for Assumption of Risk: 1. The plaintiff must know that the risk is present. 2. He must further understand its nature. 3. His choice to incur it is free and voluntary. In relation to the third requisite, one is excused from the doctrine when: 1. An emergency exists 2. When the life or property of another is in peril. 3. When one seeks to rescue his endangered property. Kinds of Assumption of Risk A. Express waiver of the right to recover. Under this perspective, there is assumption of risk if the plaintiff, in advance, has expressly waived his right to recover damages for the negligent act of the defendant. That is, to take his chances after being informed of the risks. It cannot be applied to waivers of rights in contracts as it is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (If waiver is made after the negligence/ breach has happened, it is construed as a condonation of the obligation.) B. Implied Assumption Dangerous Conditions-A person who, knowing that he is exposed to a dangerous condition, voluntarily assumes the risk of such dangerous condition may not recover from the defendant who maintained such dangerous conditions. Similarly, spectators at sports events, customers at amusement parks, and guests who find dangerous conditions when they enter business premises are deemed to have assumed the risk ordinarily attendant thereto, so long as proper warning was made. Contractual Relations - the employee assumes the ordinary risks inherent in the industry in which he is employed. But as to those abnormal risks arising from unusual conditions, the new view of the doctrine requires the question of fact and to require cogent and convincing evidence of such consent. Dangerous activities - Persons who voluntarily participate in dangerous activities assume the risks which are usually present in such activities.. Awareness of defendants negligence Nikko Hotel V. Reyes Assumption of risk applies but , under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. FACTS Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to

Roberto Reyes aka Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist. There are two versions of the story: Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket of fruits, the latters gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation. Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filarts group. She wasnt able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over the phone and doesnt want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party. During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes

answered very close because we nearly kissed each other. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the request only be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what happened. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. HELD: Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of illmotive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Oni: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury" refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. Ilocos Norte v. CA in application of the excemption that the doctrine of assumption of

risk does not apply to one who seeks to rescue his own property. FACTS 5- 6AM June 29, 1967 - strong typhoon "Gening" inIlocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain. Isabel Lao Juan, (Nana Belen) went to her store, Five Sisters Emporium, to look after the merchandise to see if they were damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood, Juan suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into thewater. Her companions, two girls (sales girls)attempted to help, but were afraid because they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Yabes, the son-in law,upon hearing the electrocution of his mother-in-law,passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cutoff the electric current. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post. 4AM June 29, 1967- Engineer Juan, Power Plant Engineer of NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant,noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. - 6-6:30AM June 29, 1967- he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection and saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. When he went to INELCO office, he could not see any INELCO lineman. - Engr. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but his efforts proved futile.Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm of the deceased, there was a hollowwound. In the afternoon, the dangling wire was no longer there.

- Dr. Castro examined the body and noted that the skin was grayish or cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" or a first degree burn.About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. The cause of' death was circulatory shock electrocution" - In defense and exculpation, INELCO presented the testimonies of its officers and employees, which soughtto prove that (1) on and even before June 29, 1967 the electric service system of the INELCO in the wholefranchise area did not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property. (2) The service lines and devices had been newly-installed prior to the date in question. (3) Also, safety devices were installed to prevent and avoid injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods,typhoons, fire and others. (4) 12 linesmen are charged with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively assigned to them. (5) They also presented own medical expert and said that cyanosis could not have been noted 3 hours after the death because it is only manifest in live persons. (6) Lastly,the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to INELCO becauseof the installation of a burglar deterrent by connectinga wire from the main house to the iron gate and fenceof steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. The switch must have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that earlymorning of June 29, 1967.

- CFI: awarded P25,000 moral damages; P45,000 attysfees - CA: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 forthe victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeralexpenses); P50,000 in compensatory damages,computed in accordance with the formula set in theVilla-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of the deceased;P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees. ISSUE WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars private respondents from collecting damages from INELCO HELD NO Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of aroof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by the salesgirls, the deceased went to the Five StarEmporium "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to aknown danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril, or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as

the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss.Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to INELCOs consent as she was onher way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by INELCOs negligence Reasoning - INELCO can be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it istrue that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused thevictim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. - In times of calamities such as the one which occurredin Laoag City on the night of June 28 until the earlyhours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be inconstant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area,nor even manning its office. - INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be." The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it

may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event." When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" Calalas v. CA- Calalas contends that Sunga assumed risk by sitting at the extension seat of the jeepney. (NO) Facts: Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case for quasidelict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of contract of carriage. Issues: (1) Whether the decision in the case for quasi delict between Calalas on one hand and Salva and Verena on the other hand, is res judicata to the issue in this case (2) Whether Calalas exercised the extraordinary diligence required in the contract of carriage

(3) Whether moral damages should be awarded Held: (1) The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasidelict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasidelict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in

actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. (2) We do not think so. First, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the

debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. (3) As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220. In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Oni: Taking a normal seat, however, does not give the assumption. As a rule, when a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the risks incidental to the mode of travel he has taken. After all, a carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers and is not bound absolutely and at all events to carry them safely without injury.

Last Clear Chance The law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. ONI: is this crap applicable only on cases where justice is needed? I hold yes. This monstrosity of a doctrine is time and again used by the courts to apply not what the law mandates, but the need for justifying what is just. -in this jurisdiction, the doctrine is used to determine proximate cause. -Phoenix Construction inc V.IAC, through Justice Feliciano says: If the common law rule on contributory negligence which absolutely bars the plaintiffs recovery for damages is not accepted here, why then, will its mitigating doctrine, that is, last clear chance be accepted? This jurisdictions task is tio determine whose negligence was the legal and proximate cause of the injury. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Glan Peoples Hardware V. IAC FACTS: Engineer Orlando Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos were on the withCalibo at the wheel, as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towardsthe direction of Davao City. At about that time, a cargo track driven by Paul Zacarias, coming from the opposite direction of Davao City had just crossed saidbridge. At about 59 yards after crossing the

bridge, the cargo truck and the jeepcollided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patossustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. The instant case for damages wasfiled by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo against thedriver and owners of the cargo truck. The court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Accordingly,moments before its collission with the truck being operated by Zacarias, the jeep of the deceased Calibo was zigzagging. Further, that there were skid marks left by thetruck's tires at the scene, and none by the jeep, demonstrates that the driver of thetruck had applied the brakes and the jeep's driver had not, and that the jeep had onimpact fallen on its right side is indication that it was running at high speed. Underthe circumstances, given the curvature of the road and the descending grade of the jeep's lane, it was negligence on the part of the driver of the jeep for not reducinghis speed upon sight of the truck and failing to apply the brakes as he got withincollision range with the truck. And even if it be considered that there was someantecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias shortly before the collision in that hehad caused his truck to run some 25 centimeters to the left of the center of theroad, Engr. Calibo had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident because he stillhad ample room in his own lane to steer clear of the truck, or he could simply havebraked to a full stop. The Court of Appeals however reversed the trial court, stating that the truck drivenby defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the collision occurred,and although Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of about 150 meters, he did notdrive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision with the oncoming jeep.

ISSUE:Whether or not Zacarias is guilty of negligence. RULING:No. The finding that the truck driven by Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep whenthe collision occurred is a loose one. It ignores the fact that by the uncontradicted evidence, the actual center line of the road was not that indicated by the paintedstripe but, according to measurements made and testified by Patrolman Dimaano,correctly lay thirty-six (36) centimeters farther to the left of the truck's side of saidstripe. Thus, although it was not disputed that the truck overrode the painted stripeby twenty-five (25) centimeters, it was still at least eleven (11) centimeters awayfrom its side of the true center line of the road and well inside its own lane when theaccident occurred. Since it was unquestionably the jeep that rammed into thestopped truck, it may also be deduced that the jeep was at the time travellingbeyond its own lane and intruding into the lane of the truck by at least the same 11centimeter width of space. ONI: read full case: bullshit decision. Phillipine Bank of Commerce V. IAC Rommels Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. The RMC General Manager Lipana entrusted to his secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing the same to RMCs account with PBC. However, it turned out that Yabut deposited the amounts in her husbands account instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthly statement of accounts regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabuts modus operandi went on for the span of more than one year.

ISSUE: What is the proximate cause of the loss Lipanas negligence in not checking his monthly statements or the banks negligence through its teller in validating the deposit slips? HELD: The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the selfimposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate. The bank tellers negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, not the latters entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. Xxx Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriate the funds, she would not have been able to deposit those funds in her husbands current account, and then make plaintiff believe that it was in the latters accounts wherein she had deposited them, had it not been for the bank tellers aforesaid gross and reckless negligence. (This is a previous case, hope it is already read by yall)

Tiu vs. Arriesgado FACTS: At about 10:00 pm of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck marked " Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise" was loaded with firewood in Bogo, Cebu and left or Cebu City. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies, Poblacion Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck passed over the bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the bridge and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop. Pedrano left his helper, Jose Militante Jr. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a spare tire 6 fathoms behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles. The truck's tail lights were also left on. At abount 4:45 am., D rough Riders Passenger bus driven by Virgilio te Las Pinas was crushing along the national highway of Sitio Aggies also bound for Cebu City. Among its passengers were the Sposes Pedro A. Arriesgado and Felisa Pepito Arriesgado, who were seated at the right side of the bus. As the bus was approaching the bridge, Las Pinas saw the stalled truck. He applied the brakes and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into the truck's left rear. Pedro Arriesgado lost consciousness and suffered a fracture in his colles. His wife Felisa died after being transferred to Island Medical Center. Arriesgado then filed a complaint against Wiliam Tiu, operator of D Rough and his driver Las Pinas for breach of contract of carriage. ISSUE:

Whether the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable as the petitioner asserts. HELD: Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where the passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty negligence. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. The rules which common carriers should observe as to the safety of their passengers are set forth in the Civil Code, Articles 1733, 1755and 1756. It is undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the destination agreed upon. In actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such contract, and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need to be proved. This is because under the said contract of carriage, the petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all circumstances. Any injury suffered by the passengers in the course thereof is immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier. Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove

that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. It must be stressed that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. While evidence may be submitted to overcome such presumption of negligence, it must be shown that the carrier observed the required extraordinary diligence, which means that the carrier must show the utmost diligence of very cautious persons as far as human care and foresight can provide, or that the accident was caused by fortuitous event. As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut such presumption. The negligence of petitioner Laspias as driver of the passenger bus is, thus, binding against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a common carrier. Fortuitous Event Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. Elements: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation mustbe independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such asto render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and

(d) the debtor must be free from anyparticipation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor NAPOCOR v. CA FACTS: Four separate complaints for damages were filed against the NPC. Plaintiffs sought to recover actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to property caused by the floodof the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan. The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of waterthrough the spillways of the Angat Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). In said complaints, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that:1) Defendant NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray,Bulacan;2) Defendant Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor at the time of the incident in question;3) Despite the defendants' knowledge, as early as 24 October 1978, of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading," theyfailed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam;4) when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the defendantssuddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam's spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of waterwhich inundated the banks of the Angat River; and5) As a consequence, members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals, drowned, and theirproperties were washed away in the evening of 26 October and the early hours of 27 October 1978.

In their Answers, the defendants alleged that the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitousevent or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. Likewise, written notices were sent tothe different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of waterwith the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advising them to take the necessary precautions. RTC dismissed the complaints for lack of sufficient and credible evidence. CA reversed the appealed decision and awarded damages based on the public respondent's conclusion that the petitionerswere guilty of:". . . a patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence . . . in the management and operation of Angat Dam. The unholiness of the hour, the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the waterreleased, are all but products of defendants-appellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness. The resulting flashflood and inundation of even areas (sic) one (1) kilometer away from the Angat River bank would have been avoided haddefendantsappellees prepared the Angat Dam by maintaining in the first place, a water elevation which would allowroom for the expected torrential rains." The appellate court rejected the petitioners' defense that they had sent "early warning written notices". Said notice is ineffectual, insufficient and inadequate for purposes of the opening of the spillway gates at midnight of October26, 1978 and on October 27, 1978. It did not prepare or warn the persons so served, for the volume of

water to be released,which turned out to be of such magnitude, that residents near or along the Angat River, even those one (1) kilometer away,should have been advised to evacuate. Said notice, addressed `TO ALL CONCERN (sic),' was delivered to a policeman (CivilCase No. SM-950, TSN, Leonardo Nepomuceno, March 7, 1985, pp. 1012 and Exhibit "2-A") for the municipality of Norzagaray. Said notice was not thus addressed and delivered to the proper and responsible municipal officials who couldhave disseminated the warning to the residents directly affected."TO ALL CONCERN (sic):'Please be informed that at the present our reservoir (dam) is full and that we have been releasing water intermittentlyfor the past several days. 'With the coming of typhoon 'Rita' (Kading) we expect to release greater (sic) volume of water,if it pass (sic) over our place. 'In view of this kindly advise people residing along Angat River to keep alert and stay in safeplaces.'BENJAMIN L. CHAVEZ'Power Plant Superintendent" ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable? HELD: YES, (see elements of caso fortuito) Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by the private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasionedexclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factornegligence or imprudencehad intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the wholeoccurrence was thereby humanized,

as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. Prescription Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment. (n) Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years: (1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff; (2) Upon a quasi-delict; However, when the action arises from or out of any act, activity, or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year. Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought. The Supreme Court explained in Kramer, Jr. (ibid.) that the right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff. The prescriptive period must be counted when the last element of commission

of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises. Doctrine of relations back That principle of law by which an act done at one time is considered by fiction of law to have been done at some antecedent period. It is a doctrine which, although of equitable origin, has a well recognized application to proceedings at law; a legal fiction invented to promote the ends of justice or prevent injustice and occurrence of injuries where otherwise there would be no remedy. The doctrine, when invoked, must have connection with actual fact, must be based on some antecedent lawful rights. It has also been referred to as the doctrine of relation back.
For example, a doctor negligently transfused blood to a patient that was contaminated with HIV. If the effect became apparent only after five (5) years, the four (4) year prescriptive period should commence only when it was discovered after five (5) years and not when the negligent act was committed. At the very least, the filing of an action after the expiration of the prescriptive period should, by fiction of law, be considered as having been filed within said period Kramer v. CA

FACTS The F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figuredin a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V AsiaPhilippines owned by Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. Asa consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.

The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was due to the negligence of theemployees of Trans-Asia. The Kramers instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in PasayCity. Trans-Asia filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. Heargued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, theprescriptive period for instituting a Complaint fordamages arising from a quasidelict like a maritimecollision is four years. He maintained that thepetitioners should have filed their Complaint within fouryears from the date when their cause of action accrued,i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision tookplace, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-yearprescriptive period. Petitioners claim:that maritime collisions have peculiarities andcharacteristics which only persons with special skill,training and experience like the members of the Boardof Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve- that the running of the prescriptive period was tolledby the filing of the marine protest and that their causeof action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date whenthe Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that thefour-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of theCivil Code should be computed from the said date. ISSUE WON a Complaint for damages instituted by thepetitioners against the private respondent arising froma marine collision is barred by presciption

HELD YES- Under A1146 CC, an action based upon a quasi-delictmust be instituted within four (4) years. Theprescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delictis committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruledthat in an action for damages arising from the collisionof two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must becounted from the day of the collision. (see notes of the running of prescriptive period) Double Recovery Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Involuntariness There is no specific provision dealing with the effect of involuntariness in quasi delictual actions. In the law on contracts, force and intimidation result in vitiated consent and the resulting contract is considered voidable. On the other hand, under the Revised Penal Code, the person acting because of the force or intimidation employed upon him is subsidiarily liable to the offended party. In such a case, however, the liability is not based on negligence but may be classified as strict liability.

It is believed that involutariness is a complete defense in quasi-delict cases and the defendant is therefore not liable if force was exerted on him. This may happen, for instance, when the defendant was forced to drive his vehicle by armed men. He was, at pain of death, forced to drive at a very fast clip because the armed men were escaping from policemen. It is believed that the defendant cannot be held liable, if a bystander is hit as a consequence.