FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-NINE (479) QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Culled

!"# S$%&$ $'(&) L(*+ (&d De'$+$"&+ " ),e Su-!e#e C"u!)) A))"!&e. EDWIN REY SANDOVAL (As of August 25, 2006) PART I A/ POLITICAL LAW

LE9 REVIEWS AND SE:INARS INC; NATIONAL BAR REVIEW CENTER

That branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the governmental organs of the tate and defines the relations of the tate with the inhabitants of its territor!" S'"-e0D$1$+$"&+ " P"l$)$'(l L(*2 3) #onstitutional $aw%the stud! of the maintenance of the proper balance between authorit! as represented b! the three inherent powers of the state and libert! as guaranteed b! the &ill of 'ights" 4) Administrative $aw(( That branch of public law which fi)es the organization, determines the competence of administrative authorities who e)ecutes the law, and indicates to the individual remedies for the violation of his right" 5) $aw on *unicipal #orporations 4) $aw of +ublic ,fficers 6) -lections $aw B(+$+2 3) ./01 #onstitution 4) ./12 and ./25 #onstitutions 5) ,rganic laws made to appl! to the +hilippines% () +hilippine &ill of ./02 7) 3ones $aw of ./.6 ') T!dings(*c4uffie $aw of ./25 4) tatutes, e)ecutive orders and decrees, and 6udicial decisions 6) 7 #onstitution C"&+)$)u)$"& legislation direct from the people states general principles8 intended not merel! to meet e)isting conditions8 it is the fundamental law of the tate S)()u)e legislation from the people;s representative8 provides the details of the sub6ect matter of which it treats8 intended primaril! to meet e)isting conditions onl!8 it conforms to the #onstitution

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION C"&+)$)u)$"&8it is the document, which serves as the fundamental law of the tate8 that bod! of rules and ma)ims in accordance with which the power of sovereignt! are habituall! e)ercised" That written instrument enacted b! direct action of the people b! which the fundamental powers of the government are established, limited and defined, and b! which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful e)ercise for the benefit of the bod! politic" 9t is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer" :o act shall be valid, how noble its intention, if it conflicts with the #onstitution" The #onstitution must ever remain supreme" All must bow to the mandate of this law" 'ight or wrong, the #onstitution must be upheld as long as the sovereign people have not changed it"

Cl(++$ $'()$"&2 3/ <ritten or unwritten W!$))e& one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents (consists of rules which have not been

U&*!$))e& integrated into a single, concrete form but are scattered in various sources E<(#-le+= a" statutes of fundamentalcharacter8 b" 6udicial decisions8 c" commentaries of publicists8 d" customs and traditions8 e" certain common law principles

4/ E&(')ed ('"&1e&)$"&(l) "! E1"l1ed (Cu#ul()$1e) E&(')ed ('"&1e&)$"&(l) formall! struc@ off at a definite time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort ta@en b! a constituent bod! or ruler E1"l1ed (Cu#ul()$1e) the result of political evolution, not inaugurated at an! specific time but changing b! accretion rather than b! an! s!stematic method

5/ R$%$d Fle<$7le R$%$d one that can be amended onl! b! a formal and usuall! difficult process Fle<$7le one that can be changed b! ordinar! legislation

( The +hilippine #onstitution is written, conventional and rigid" 9t is embodied in one document and can be amended onl! b! a formal and usuall! difficult process" I&)e!-!e)()$"&2 3) Verba Legis8whenever possible, the words used in the #onstitution must be given their ordinar! meaning e<'e-) where technical terms are emplo!ed" 4) <hen there is Ambiguit!8ratio legis et anima--A doubtful provision shall be e)amined in the light of the histor! of the times and the conditions and circumstances under which the #onstitution was framed" (Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCR !1"# 5) Ut magis valeat $uam %ereat8the #onstitution has to be interpreted as a whole" (&rancisco vs. 'R, (.R. )o. 1*+,*1, )ovember 1+, ,++!# 9f the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available%construe the #onstitution from what >appears upon its face?" The proper interpretation, therefore, depends more on how it was understood b! the people adopting it than in the framers; understanding thereof" 9n case of doubt, the provision should be considered as self(e)ecuting8 mandator! rather than director!8 and prospective rather than retroactive" Sel -e<e'u)$&% -!"1$+$"&8one which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementar! or enabling legislation, or that which supplies a sufficient rule b! means of which the right it grants ma! be en6o!ed or protected" E++e&)$(l Qu(l$)$e+ " ),e W!$))e& C"&+)$)u)$"&2 3) &road8 4) &rief8 and 5) 4efinite" E++e&)$(l -(!)+ " () #onstitution citizens and securing the ( %""d *!$))e& C"&+)$)u)$"&2 of $ibert!%sets forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the imposes limitations on the powers of the government as a means of en6o!ment of those rights" e.g. &ill of 'ights

7) #onstitution of Aovernment%outlines the organization of the government, enumerates its powers, la!s down certain rules relative to its administration and defines the electorate" e.g. $egislative, -)ecutive and 3udicial 4epartments, #onstitutional #ommissions ') #onstitution of overeignt!%the provisions pointing out the mode or procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law ma! be brought about" e.g. Art" BC99(Amendments or 'evisions E e')+ " De'l(!()$"& " U&'"&+)$)u)$"&(l$).2 4 V$e*+2 () ORTHODO9 VIEW8 i" an unconstitutional act is not a law8 ii" it confers no rights8 iii" it imposes no duties8 iv" it affords no protection8 v" it creates no office8 vi" it is inoperative, as if it had not been passed at all" 7) :ODERN VIEW%#ourts simpl! refuse to recognize the law and determine the rights of the parties as if the statute had no e)istence" #ertain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionalit! ma! be recognized" Thus, a public officer who implemented an unconstitutional law prior to the declaration of unconstitutionalit! cannot be held liable (-not vs. . C)" P(!)$(l U&'"&+)$)u)$"&(l$). Re=u$+$)e+2 () The legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usuall! shown b! the presence of a separabilit! clause in the law%9:T-:T ,D TE- $-A9 $AT9C-8 and 7) The valid portion can stand independentl! as law%9:4-+-:4-:#- ,D TE+',C9 9,: " /istinguis0 sovereignty 1rom 2ominion. Held2 Sovereignty is the right to e)ercise the functions of a tate to the e)clusion of an! other tate" 9t is often referred to as the power of imperium, which is defined as the government authorit! possessed b! the tate . ,n the other hand, dominion, or dominium, is the capacit! of the tate to own or acFuire propert! such as lands and natural resources" (Se%arate 3%inion, 4a%unan, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 /E)R, (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc, See &ootnote 8*# :0at is t0e /octrine o1 Constitutional Su%remacy; Held2 7nder the doctrine of constitutional supremacy , if a law or contract violates an! norm of the #onstitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated b! the legislative or b! the e)ecutive branch or entered into b! private persons for private purposes, is null and void and without an! force and effect" Thus, since the #onstitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in ever! statute and contract. (<anila =rince 'otel v. (S.S, ,*" SCR 4+8 >199"? >9ellosillo?# :0at are sel1@executing an2 non@sel1 executing %rovisions o1 t0e Constitution; Held2 A provision which la!s down a general principle, such as those found in Article 99 of the ./01 #onstitution, is usuall! not self(e)ecuting" &ut a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementar! or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule b! means of which the right it grants ma! be en6o!ed or protected, is self(e)ecuting" Thus a constitutional provision is self(e)ecuting if the nature and e)tent of the right conferred and the liabilit! imposed are fi)ed b! the #onstitution itself, so that the! can be determined b! an e)amination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the sub6ect is referred to the legislature for action . (<anila =rince 'otel v. (S.S, ,*" SCR 4+8 >199"? >9ellosillo?# re %rovisions o1 t0e Constitution sel1@executing or non@sel1 executing; :0y; Held2 7nless it is e)pressl! provided that a legislative act is necessar! to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions are self(e)ecuting" 9f the constitutional provisions are treated as reFuiring legislation instead of self(e)ecuting, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practicall! nullif! the mandate of the 3

fundamental law" This can be catacl!smic" (<anila =rince 'otel v. (S.S, ,*" SCR >199"? >9ellosillo?# :0at is t0e A&ili%ino &irstB =olicy ens0rine2 in t0e Constitution;

4+8

A&+/2 9n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national econom! and patrimon!, the tate shall give preference to Fualified Dilipinos" (Sec. 1+, ,n2 %ar., rt. C.., 198" Constitution# .s t0e A&ili%ino &irstB =olicy ex%resse2 in Section 1+, Constitution a sel1@executing %rovision; rticle C.. o1 t0e

Held2 Ges" 9t is a mandator!, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement" Drom its ver! words the provision does not reFuire an! legislation to put it in operation" 9t is per se 6udiciall! enforceable" <hen our #onstitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means 6ust that H Fualified Dilipinos must be preferred" (<anila =rince 'otel v. (S.S, (.R. )o. 118,97, <ay ,, 199", ,*" SCR 4+8 >9ellosillo?# (ive exam%les o1 non@sel1 executing %rovisions o1 t0e Constitution. Held2 &! its ver! nature, Article 99 of the #onstitution is a >declaration of principles and state policies"? These principles in Article 99 are not intended to be self(e)ecuting principles read! for enforcement through the courts" The! are used b! the 6udiciar! as aids or as guides in the e)ercise of its power of 6udicial review, and b! the legislature in its enactment of laws" As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, ncorporated v. !orato ("#$ S%&' (#), ($#, *uly +,, +--(), the principles and state policies enumerated in Article 99 and some sections of Article B99 are not >self(e)ecuting provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in courts" The! do not embod! 6udiciall! enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation"? (Dana2a v. ngara, ,", SCR 18 >199"?, En 9anc >=anganiban?# :0en are acts o1 %ersons consi2ere2 AState actionB covere2 by t0e Constitution; Held2 9n constitutional 6urisprudence, the act of persons distinct from the government are considered >state action? covered b! the #onstitution (.) when the activit! it engages in is a >public function?8 (2) when the government is so significantl! involved with the private actor as to ma@e the government responsible for his action8 and (2) when the government has approved or authorized the action" (<anila =rince 'otel v. (S.S, ,*" SCR 4+8 >199"? >9ellosillo?# PREA:BLE WE> THE SOVEREI?N FILIPINO PEOPLE> I:PLORIN? THE AID OF AL:I?HTY ?OD> IN ORDER TO BUILD A @UST AND HU:ANE SOCIETY AND ESTABLISH A ?OVERN:ENT THAT SHALL E:BODY OUR IDEALS AND ASPIRATIONS> PRO:OTE THE CO::ON ?OOD> CONSERVE AND DEVELOP OUR PATRI:ONY> AND SECURE TO OURSELVES AND OUR POSTERITY THE BLESSIN?S OF INDEPENDENCE AND DE:OCRACY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW AND A RE?I:E OF TRUTH> @USTICE> FREEDO:> LOVE> EQUALITY> AND PEACE> DO ORDAIN AND PRO:UL?ATE THIS CONSTITUTION/ The +reamble is not a source of power or right for an! department of government" 9t sets down the origin, scope, and purpose of the #onstitution" 9t bears witness to the fact that the #onstitution is the manifestation of the sovereign will of the Dilipino people" The identification of the Dilipino people as the author of the constitution calls attention to an important principle= that the document is not 6ust the wor@ of representatives of the people but of the people themselves who put their mar@ approval b! ratif!ing it in a plebiscite" 3) 9t does not confer rights nor impose duties" 4) 9ndicates authorship of the #onstitution8 enumerates the primar! aims and aspirations of the framers8 and serves as an aid in the construction of the #onstitution" ARTICLE I NATIONAL TERRITORY D0e national territory com%rises t0e =0ili%%ine arc0i%elago, Eit0 all t0e islan2s an2 Eaters embrace2 t0erein, an2 all ot0er territories over E0ic0 t0e =0ili%%ines 0as sovereignty or Furis2iction, consisting o1 its terrestrial, 1luvial an2 aerial 2omains, inclu2ing its territorial sea, t0e seabe2, t0e subsoil, t0e insular s0elves, 4

an2 ot0er submarines areas. D0e Eaters aroun2, betEeen an2 connecting t0e islan2s o1 t0e arc0i%elago, regar2less o1 t0eir brea2t0 an2 2imensions, 1orm %art o1 t0e internal Eaters o1 t0e =0ili%%ines.B T*" (4) P(!)+ " ),e N()$"&(l Te!!$)"!.2 3) The +hilippine archipelago with all the islands and waters embraced therein8 and 4) All other territories over which the +hilippines has sovereignt! or 6urisdiction" D" ."u '"&+$de! ),e S-!()l.+ ?!"u- " I+l(&d+ (+ -(!) " P,$l$--$&e A!',$-el(%"A I pratl!s Aroup of 9slands is not part of the +hilippine Archipelago because it is too far awa! from the three main islands of the +hilippines" 9t is found, geographicall!, almost in the middle of the outh #hina ea" 9t is not part of the +hilippine Archipelago" Eistoricall!, when we tal@ about +hilippine Archipelago, we refer to those islands and waters that were ceded b! the pain to the 7nited tates b! virtue of Treat! of +aris in .0/0" And that did not include the pratl!s Aroup of 9slands !et" 7nder the treat!, the islands that were ceded b! pain were identified%the main islands%$uzon, Cisa!as and *indanao" #learl!, it did not include the pratl!s Aroup of 9slands" pratl!s Aroup of 9slands was onl! discovered sometime in the ./50;s b! a Dilipino, Tomas #loma" The latter waived his rights over the islands in favor of the +hilippine Aovernment" 9n effect, the government stepped into the shoes of the discoverer" &! then +resident *arcos, what he did the moment Tomas #loma waived his rights over the pratl!s Aroup of 9slands, is to have the islands immediatel! occupied b! +hilippine troops" Ee then issued +4 .5/6, constituting the pratl!s Aroup of 9slands as a regular municipalit! claiming it the *unicipalit! of Jala!aan placing it under the +rovince of +alawan" And then he had the elections immediatel! held in the islands so from that time on until now, we continue to hold elections there" The +hilippine e)ercises not onl! 6urisdiction but also sovereignt! over the pratl!s Aroup of 9slands, !et it is not part of the +hilippine Archipelago" Aeographicall!, it is too far awa! from the +hilippine Archipelago" ,n *a! 20, ./00, the +hilippines registered its claim with the 7: ecretariat" The +hilippine claim to the islands is 6ustified b! reason of histor!, indispensable need, and effective occupation and control" Thus, in accordance with the international law, the pratl!s Aroup of islands is sub6ect to the sovereignt! of the +hilippines" D" ."u '"&+$de! ),e S-!()l.+ %!"u- " I+l(&d+ (+ -(!) " "u! N()$"&(l Te!!$)"!.A Ges" Article 9 of the #onstitution provides= >.he national territory comprises the /hilippine archipelago, 0 0 0, and all other territories over 1hich the /hilippines has sovereignty or 2urisdiction, 0 0 0.3 The pratl!s Aroup of islands falls under the second phrase >and all other territories over which the +hilippines has sovereignt! or 6urisdiction?" 9t is part of our national territor! because +hilippines e)ercise sovereignt! (through election of public officials) over pratl!s Aroup of 9slands" W,() *(+ ),e 7(+$+ " ),e P,$l$--$&e+B 'l($# "1e! ),e S-!()l.+A Through discover! of Tomas #loma and occupation :"de+ " ('=u$!$&% )e!!$)"!$e+2 3) 4iscover! and ,ccupation%which are terra nullius (land belonging to no one) D"')!$&e " E e')$1e O''u-()$"&8discover! alone is not enough" *ere discover! gives onl! an inchoate right to the discoverer" Dor title to finall! vest, discover! must be followed b! e e')$1e "''u-()$"& in a reasonable time and attestation of the same" 4) Ce++$"& 7. T!e()." -)amples are Treat! of +aris, treat! between Drance and 7 ceding $ouisiana to the latter and treat! between 'ussia and 7 ceding Alas@a to the latter8 5) +rescription%which is a concept under the #ivil #ode" Territor! ma! also be acFuired through continuous and uninterrupted possession over a long period of time" Eowever, in international law, there is no rule of thumb as to the length of time for acFuisition of territor! through prescription" 9n this connection, consider the ?!")$u+ D"')!$&e " $##e#"!$(l -!e+'!$-)$"&> which spea@s of uninterrupted possession going be!ond memor!" 4) C"&=ue+) "! Su7Cu%()$"& ('"&=u$+)(d"!e+)%this is no longer recognized inasmuch as the 7: #harter prohibits resort to threat or use of force against the territorial integrit! or political independence of an! state8 and 6) A''!e)$"&%another concept in the #ivil #ode" 9t is the increase in the land area of the tate, either through natural means, or artificiall!, through human labor" O),e! )e!!$)"!$e+ "1e! *,$', ),e P,$l$--$&e+ ,(+ +"1e!e$%&). "! Cu!$+d$')$"&2 3/ &atanes%(./25 #onstitution)8 4/ Those contemplated under Article 9, ./12 #onstitution%belonging to the 5

+hilippines b! historic right or legal title8 +4 .5/6, 3une .., ./10(( constituting the pratl!;s Aroup of 9slands as a regular municipalit! claiming it the *unicipalit! of Jala!aan, placing it under the +rovince of +alawan" Axxx D0e Eaters aroun2, betEeen an2 connecting t0e islan2s o1 t0e arc0i%elago, regar2less o1 t0eir brea2t0 an2 2imensions, 1orm %art o1 t0e internal Eaters o1 t0e =0ili%%ines.B This second sentence of Article 9 is &") the Archipelago 4octrine" This is onl! our restatementKreaffirmation of our adherence to the Archipelago 4octrine simpl! because we are an archipelago consisting of 1,.01 islands" 9t is essential for our national survival that we adhere to the archipelago principle" A!',$-el(%" D"')!$&e8merel! emphasizes the unit! of lands and waters" 9t is a bod! of waters interconnected with other natural features" 7nder the 7nited :ation #onvention on the $aw of ea (7:#$, ), it consists of drawing imaginar! baseline connecting the outermost islands of the archipelago in which all waters, islands is considered as one integrated whole" An archipelago is defined as group of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closel! interrelated that such islands, waters and natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economical and political entit!, or which historicall! been regarded as such" #orrelate this doctrine to right of innocent of passage, right of arrival under stress and 7:#$, reFuiring the designation of archipelagic seawa!s so that foreign vessels ma! pas through an archipelago" C"#-"&e&)+ " N()$"&(l Te!!$)"!.2 $/ Terrestrial%land mass on which the inhabitants live8 $$/ Dluvial%maritime8 (/ I&)e!&(l "! &()$"&(l *()e!+%bodies of water within the land mass, among them are= $/ R$1e!+%which ma! be= 3/ :ational 4/ &oundar!%divides the territories of tates 5/ 9nternational%flows thru various tates (/ T,(l*e% D"')!$&e8for boundar! rivers, in the absence of an agreement between the riparian states, the boundar! line is laid on the middle of the main navigable channel" 7/ :$ddle " ),e B!$d%e D"')!$&e%where there is a bridge over a boundar! river, the boundar! line is the middle or center of the bridge" $$/ B(.+ (&d %ul +%a ba! is a well(mar@ed indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain a land(loc@ed waters and constitutes more than a curvature of the coast" Also referred to as Cu!$d$'(l 7(./ The area must be as large as, or larger than, a semi(circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of such indentation, or if the mouth is less than 25 miles wide" e.g. 4udson 5ay in %anada, one whose waters are considered internal because of the e)istence of a historic title" $$$/ S)!($)+%narrow passagewa!s connecting 2 bodies of water" 9f the distance between the 2 opposite coast is not more than 6 miles, the! are considered internal waters" 9n international law, when a strait within a countr! has a width of more than si) (6) miles, the center lane in e)cess of the three (2) miles on both sides is considered international waters" $1/ C(&(l+%the most famous is the uez #anal, which is neutralized, and the +anama #anal, which is open to ever!one in times of war or peace" 7/ A!',$-el(%$' *()e!+%are the waters enclosed b! the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast" A!',$-el(%$' S)()e%a state made up wholl! of one or two archipelagos" 9t ma! include other islands" S)!($%,) A!',$-el(%$' B(+el$&e%to determine the archipelagic waters, the state shall draw straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands and dr!ing reefs, provided that the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between .=. and /=." The length of such baselines shall not e)ceed .00 nautical miles, e)cept up to 2L of the total number of baselines enclosing an! archipelago ma! e)ceed that length, up to a ma)imum .25 miles" The baselines drawn should not depart, to an! appreciable e)tent, from the general 6

configuration of the archipelago" All the waters within the baselines shall then be considered internal waters" The breadth of the .2(mile territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the e)clusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall then be measured from the archipelagic baselines" Cessels ma! be allowed $&&"'e&) -(++(%e within the archipelagic waters, but this right ma! be suspended, after publication, in the interest of international securit!" The coastal state ma! also designate archipelagic sea lanes for continuous, unobstructed transit of vessels" '/ Te!!$)"!$(l Se(%the belt of the sea located between the coast and the internal waters of the coastal state on the other hand, and the high seas on the other, e)tending up to .2 nautical miles from the lo161ater mar7, or in the case of archipelagic states, from the baselines" B(+el$&e8is a line from which the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the e)clusive economic zone is measured in order to determine the maritime boundar! of the coastal state" T.-e+ " 7(+el$&e2 $/ :ormal &aseline *ethod $$/ traight &aseline method d/ C"&)$%u"u+ D"&e8e)tends up to .2 nautical miles from the territorial sea8 this shall not e)ceed 25 nautical miles from the archipelagic baselines" The coastal state ma! e)ercise limited 6urisdiction over the contiguous zone= 3/ To prevent infringement of customs, fiscal immigration or sanitar! laws and regulations within its territor! or territorial sea8 and 4/ To punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territor!" e/ E<'lu+$1e E'"&"#$' D"&e8shall not e)tend be!ond 200 nautical miles from the archipelagic baselines" / C"&)$&e&)(l +,el %it is the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas e)tending be!ond the +hilippine territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of the land territor!" 9t e)tends up to= $/ The outer edge of the continental margin8 or $$/ A distance of 200 nautical miles from the archipelagic baselines, whichever is the farthest" The continental shelf d"e+ &") form part of the +hilippine territor!" The +hilippines has the sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the purpose of e)ploring it and e)ploiting its natural resources" %/ H$%, Se(+%treated as res communes, thus, not territor! of an! particular tate" These are the waters which do not constitute the internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea and e)clusive economic zones of a state" The! are be!ond the 6urisdiction and sovereign rights of tates" F!eed"# " &(1$%()$"&8refers to the right to sail ship on the high sea, sub6ect to international law and the laws of the flag of the state" $$$/ Aerial%this refers to the air space above the land and waters of the tate (See 8iscussions under nternational 9a1)

ARTICLE II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Se'/ 3> A!)$'le II

D0e =0ili%%ines is a 2emocratic an2 re%ublican State. Sovereignty resi2es in t0e %eo%le an2 all government aut0ority emanates 1rom t0em. (Rel()e ),$+ )" A!)$'le 9I) E++e&)$(l e()u!e+= 'epresentation and 'enovation" :(&$ e+)()$"&+=

3) ,urs is a government of law and not of men (:illavicencio vs. 9u7ban, ;- /hil ,,<) 4) 'ule of the ma6orit!" (+luralit! in elections) 5) Accountabilit! of public officials 4) &ill of rights 6) $egislature cannot pass irrepealable laws" E) eparation of powers" Re-u7l$'(&$+# :0at is a re%ublican 1orm o1 government; 9t is a government of the people, b! the people, and for the people, a representative government wherein the powers and duties of government are e)ercised and discharged for the common good and welfare"thus, the supreme power resides on the bod! of people" C,(!(')e!$+)$'+ " ( !e-u7l$'(& "!# " %"1e!&#e&)2 3) The people do not govern themselves directl! but through their representatives8 4) 9t is founded upon popular suffrage8 5) There is the tripartite s!stem of the government, the mutual interdependence of the three departments of the government" STATE8a communit! of persons, more or less numerous, permanentl! occup!ing a definite portion of territor!, independent of e)ternal control, and possessing a government to which a great bod! of inhabitants render habitual obedience" (% & vs. %ampos &ueda, #" S%&' ";) S)()e 1+/ N()$"& S)()e is a legal or 6uristic concept while a N()$"& is an ethnic or racial concept S)()e 1+/ ?"1e!&#e&) S)()e possesses a government to which a great bod! of inhabitants render habitual obedience while a ?"1e!&#e&) $+ merel! an instrumentalit! of the tate through which the will of the tate is implemented and realized" Ele#e&)+ " S)()e2 3) Pe"-le%the inhabitants of the tate8 the M of which is capable for self( sufficienc! and self(defense8 of both se)es for perpetuit!" (/ 9nhabitants8 7" #itizens8 '/ -lectors" 4) Te!!$)"!.%a fi)ed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited b! the people of the tate" 5) ?"1e!&#e&)%the agenc! or instrumentalit! through which the will of the tate is formulated, e)pressed and realized" De @u!e 1+/ De F(')" De @u!e has a rightful title but no power or control, either because the same has been withdrawn from it or because it has not !et actuall! entered into the e)ercise thereof *,$le a De F(')" Actuall! e)ercises the power or control but without legal title" a) De (')" -!"-e!8government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, b! force or b! the voice of the ma6orit!, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter8 b) ?"1e!&#e&) " P(!(#"u&) F"!'e+8established and maintained b! the militar! forces who invade and occup! a territor! of the enem! in the course of war8 c) I&de-e&de&) ?"1e!&#e&)8established b! the inhabitants of the countr! who rise in insurrection against the parent tate" P!e+$de&)$(l 1+/ P(!l$(#e&)(!. 3) 9n P!e+$de&)$(l> there is separation of legislative and e)ecutive powers" The first is lodged in the +resident and the second is vested in #ongress while in
8

+arliamentar! there is fusion of both e)ecutive and legislative powers $& P(!l$(#e&), although the actual e)ercise of the e)ecutive powers is vested in a +rime *inister who is chosen b!, and accountable to, +arliament" 4) 9n P!e+$de&)$(l it embodies interdependence b! separation and coordination while in P(!l$(#e&)(!., 9t embodies interdependence b! integration" D"')!$&e " P(!e&+ P()!$(e8the government as guardian of the rights of the people ma! initiate legal actions for and in behalf of particular individual" ((overnment o1 t0e =0ili%%ine .slan2s vs. <onte 2e =ie2a2, !7 SCR "!8G CabaHas vs. =ila%il, 78 SCR 94# 4) S"1e!e$%&).%9t is the right to e)ercise the functions of a e)clusion of an! other tate" tate to the

<hile sovereignt! has traditionall! been deemed absolute and all(encompassing on the domestic level, it is however sub6ect to restrictions and limitations voluntaril! agreed to b! the +hilippines, e)pressl! or impliedl!, as a member of the famil! of nations" 9n its 4eclaration of +rinciples and tate +olicies, the #onstitution adopts the generall! accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the polic! of peace, eFualit!, 6ustice, freedom, cooperation and amit!, with all nations" &! the doctrine of incorporation, the countr! is bound b! generall! accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automaticall! part of our own laws" F?"1e!&#e&) " L(*+ (&d N") " :e&/G8sovereignt! of the people also includes the concept that government officials have onl! the authorit! given them b! law and defined b! law, and such authorit! continues onl! with the consent of the people" H$&d+ " S"1e!e$%&).= () $egal%the power to issue final commands8 7) +olitical%the sum total of all the influences which lie behind the law8 ') 9nternal%the supreme power over ever!thing within its territor!8 d) -)ternal%also @nown as $&de-e&de&'e%freedom from e)ternal control" C,(!(')e!$+)$'+2 $/ +ermanence $$/ -)clusiveness $$$/ #omprehensiveness $1/ Absoluteness 1/ 9ndivisibilit! 1$/ 9nalienabilit! 1$$/ 9mprescriptibilit! overeignt!, often referred to as I#-e!$u#8is the tate;s authorit! to govern8 it includes passing laws governing a territor!, maintaining peace and order over it, and defending it against foreign invasion" 9t is the government authorit! possessed b! the tate e)pressed in the concept of sovereignt!" D"#$&$u#8is the capacit! of the tate to own or acFuire propert! such as lands and natural resources" (Lee 'ong 'oI vs. /avi2, )o. L@!+!89, /ecember ,", 19",G Se%arate 3%inion o1 5ustice 4a%unan in Cru6 vs. Secretary o1 /E)R, (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ecember ,+++# E e') " Bell$%e!e&) O''u-()$"&8there is no change in sovereignt!" Eowever, political laws, e)cept those of treason, are suspended8 municipal laws remain in force unless changed b! the belligerent occupant" P!$&'$-le " 5us =ostliminium8at the end of the occupation, when the occupant is ousted from the territor!, the political laws which have been suspended shall
9

automaticall! become effective again" (=eralta vs. /irector o1 =risons, )o. L+49, )ovember 1,, 1947# E e') " C,(&%e " S"1e!e$%&). %political laws of the former sovereign are abrogated unless the! are e)pressl! reenacted b! the affirmative act of the new sovereign" *unicipal laws remain in force" (<acariola vs. suncion, 2m. Case )o. 1!!@5, <ay!1, 198,# E e') " Re1"lu)$"&(!. ?"1e!&#e&)8it is bound b! no constitution" Eowever, it did not repudiate the #ovenant or 4eclaration in the same wa! it repudiated the #onstitution" As the de 2ure government, the revolutionar! government could not escape responsibilit! for the tate;s good faith compliance with its treat! obligations under international law" 4uring the interregnum when no constitution or &ill of 'ights e)isted, directives and orders issued b! government officers did not e)ceed the authorit! granted them b! the revolutionar! government" The directives or orders should not have also violated the #ovenant or the 4eclaration" (Re%ublic vs. San2iganbayan, (.R. )o. 1+4"*8, 5uly ,1, ,++!# @u!$+d$')$"&8is the manifestation of sovereignt!" () Territorial%power of the tate over persons and things within its territor! sub6ect to its control and protection" 7) +ersonal%power of the tate over its nationals, which ma! be e)ercised b! the state even if the individual is outside the territor! of the tate" ') -)traterritorial%power of the tate over persons, things or acts be!ond its territorial limits b! reason of their effects to its territor!"

T,e D"')!$&e " S)()e I##u&$). !"# Su$) /iscuss t0e basis o1 t0e 2octrine o1 State immunity 1rom suit. Held2 The basic postulate enshrined in the #onstitution that >NtOhe tate ma! not be sued without its consent,? reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the tate and an e)press affirmation of the unwritten rule effectivel! insulating it from the 6urisdiction of courts. 9t is based on the ver! essence of sovereignt!" As has been aptl! observed b! 3ustice Eolmes, a sovereign is e)empt from suit, not because of an! formal conception or obsolete theor!, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authorit! that ma@es the law on which the right depends . True, the doctrine, not too infreFuentl!, is derisivel! called >the ro!al prerogative of dishonest!? because it grants the state the prerogative to defeat an! legitimate claim against it b! simpl! invo@ing its non(suabilit!" <e have had occasion to e)plain in its defense, however, that a continued adherence to the doctrine of non(suabilit! cannot be deplored, for the loss of governmental efficienc! and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions would be far greater in severit! than the inconvenience that ma! be caused private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availabilit! of 6udicial remed! is not to be accordingl! restricted" (/e%artment o1 griculture v. )LRC, ,," SCR *9!, )ov. 11, 199! >Vitug?# .s t0e rule absolute, i.e., t0at t0e State may not be sue2 at all; 'oE may consent o1 t0e State to be sue2 given; Held2 The rule, in an! case, is not reall! absolute for it does not sa! that the state ma! not be sued under an! circumstances" ,n the contrar! ) ) ) the doctrine onl! conve!s, >the state ma! not be sued without its consent8? its clear import then is that the tate ma! at times be sued. The tatePs consent ma! be given either e)pressl! or impliedl!" -)press consent ma! be made through a general law (i.e., %ommon1ealth 'ct =o. ;",, as amended by /residential 8ecree =o. +##( [Sections #-6()], 1hich requires that all money claims against the government must first be filed 1ith the %ommission on 'udit 1hich must act upon it 1ithin si0ty days. &e2ection of the claim 1ill authori>e the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme %ourt on certiorari and, in effect, sue the State thereby) or a special law. 9n this 6urisdiction, the general law waiving the immunit! of the state from suit is found in Act :o" 2002, where the +hilippine government >consents and submits to be sued upon an! mone! claim involving liabilit! arising from contract, e)press or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between the private parties"? 9mplied consent, on the other 10

hand, is conceded when the tate itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract" 9n this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting part! and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunit!" (/e%artment o1 griculture v. )LRC, ,," SCR *9!, )ov. 11, 199! >Vitug?# D0e rule t0at E0en t0e State enters into a contract Eit0 a %rivate in2ivi2ual or entity, it is 2eeme2 to 0ave 2escen2e2 to t0e level o1 t0at %rivate in2ivi2ual or entity an2, t0ere1ore, is 2eeme2 to 0ave tacitly given its consent to be sue2, is t0at Eit0out any $uali1ication; :0at is t0e Restrictive /octrine o1 State .mmunity 1rom Suit; Held2 This rule ) ) ) is not ) ) ) without Fualification" :ot all contracts entered into b! the government operate as a waiver of its non(suabilit!8 distinction must still be made between one which is e)ecuted in the e)ercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietar! capacit!" 9n ?nited States of 'merica v. &ui> (+;$ S%&' #<,), where the Fuestioned transaction dealt with the improvements on the wharves in the naval installation at ubic &a!, we held= >The traditional rule of immunit! e)empts a tate from being sued in the courts of another tate without its consent or waiver" This rule is a necessar! conseFuence of the principle of independence and eFualit! of tates" Eowever, the rules of 9nternational $aw are not petrified8 the! are constantl! developing and evolving" And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessar! to distinguish them ( between sovereign and governmental acts (2ure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietar! acts (2ure gestionis). The result is that tate immunit! now e)tends onl! to acts 2ure imperii. The restrictive application of tate immunit! is now the rule in the 7nited tates, the 7nited Jingdom and other states in <estern -urope" B)) The restrictive application of tate immunit! is proper onl! when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs" tated differentl!, a tate ma! be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitl! given its consent to be sued onl! when it enters into business contracts" 9t does not appl! where the contracts relate to the e)ercise of its sovereign functions" 9n this case the pro6ects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the 7nited tates and the +hilippines, indisputabl! a function of the government of the highest order8 the! are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes"? (/e%artment o1 griculture v. )LRC, ,," SCR *9!, )ov. 11, 199! >Vitug?# :0en is a suit against a %ublic o11icial 2eeme2 to be a suit against t0e State; /iscuss. Held2 ." The doctrine of state immunit! from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties" The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the tate where the satisfaction of the 6udgment against the public official concerned will reFuire the tate itself to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessar! to pa! the damages awarded to the plaintiff" The rule does not appl! where the public official is charged in his official capacit! for acts that are unlawful and in6urious to the rights of others" +ublic officials are not e)empt, in their personal capacit!, from liabilit! arising from acts committed in bad faith" :either does it appl! where the public official is clearl! being sued not in his official capacit! but in his personal capacit!, although the acts complained of ma! have been committed while he occupied a public position" ( ma2o 5. Lansang v. C , (.R. )o. 1+,**", &eb. ,!, ,+++, ,n2 /iv. >Juisumbing?# 2" As earl! as ./55, this #ourt has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself b! the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholl! without authorit!" 7ntil recentl! in .//. (%have> v. Sandiganbayan, +-; S%&' "<" [+--+]), this doctrine still found application, this #ourt sa!ing that immunit! from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibilit! and non(accountabilit! nor grant a privileged status not 11

claimed b! an! other official of the 'epublic" <arc0 19, 199!, En 9anc >Cam%os, 5r.?#

(Re%ublic v. San2oval, ,,+ SCR

1,4,

State instances E0en a suit against t0e State is %ro%er. Held2 ome instances when a suit against the tate is proper are=

.) <hen the 'epublic is sued b! name8 2) <hen the suit is against an unincorporated government agenc!8 2) <hen the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liabilit! will belong not to the officer but to the government" Re%ublic v. San2oval, ,,+ SCR 1,4, <arc0 19, 199!, En 9anc >Cam%os, 5r.?# 'un2re2s o1 lan2less %easants, 1armers an2 1armEorIers marc0e2 in <en2iola on t0eir Eay to <alacanang %rotesting against t0e im%lementation o1 t0e Com%re0ensive grarian Re1orm =rogram o1 t0e government. s t0e 2emonstration became unruly, %olice an2 military %ersonnel assigne2 in t0e area violently 2is%erse2 t0e rallyists causing 2eat0s an2 inFuries to several 2emonstrators, in E0at is noE re1erre2 to as t0e in1amous A<en2iola <assacre.B D0e next 2ay, an in2ignation rally Eas 0el2 E0ere no less t0an t0e =resi2ent 0ersel1 Foine2. .n t0at rally, s0e %romise2 to looI into t0e %lig0t o1 t0e victims an2 t0eir 0eirs an2 s0e create2 a DasI &orce to investigate t0e cause o1 t0e <en2iola massacre. 1ter investigation, t0e DasI &orce 1oun2 t0at alt0oug0 initially, t0e %olice an2 military %ersonnel assigne2 in t0e area %er1orme2 t0eir 1unctions in accor2ance Eit0 laE but E0en later t0ey 1ire2 t0eir guns 2irectlty at t0e 2emonstrators, t0ey excee2e2 t0eir aut0ority. Conse$uently, t0e DasI &orce recommen2e2 t0at t0e in2ivi2ual %olice an2 military o11icers involve2 be %rosecute2 criminally an2 1or t0e government to in2emni1y t0e victims an2Kor t0eir 0eirs. &or t0e governmentLs 1ailure to in2emni1y t0e victims an2 t0eir 0eirs, t0e latter broug0t an action 1or 2amages against t0e government. D0e Solicitor (eneral 1ile2 a motion to 2ismiss invoIing State immunity 1rom suit. D0e %lainti11s o%%ose2 t0e motion conten2ing t0at t0e government 0as Eaive2 its immunity 1rom suit base2 on t0e acts an2 %ronouncements o1 t0e =resi2ent, as Eell as t0e recommen2ation o1 t0e DasI &orce to in2emni1y t0e victims an2Kor t0eir 0eirs. 'as t0e government Eaive2 its immunity 1rom suit in t0e <en2iola massacre, an2, t0ere1ore, s0oul2 in2emni1y t0e 0eirs an2 victims o1 t0e <en2iola inci2ent; Conse$uently, is t0e suit 1ile2 against t0e Re%ublic by %etitioners in sai2 case really a suit against t0e State; Held2 +etitioners ) ) ) advance the argument that the tate has impliedl! waived its sovereign immunit! from suit" 9t is their considered view that b! the recommendation made b! the #ommission for the government to indemnif! the heirs and victims of the *endiola incident and b! the public addresses made b! then +resident AFuino in the aftermath of the @illings, the tate has consented to be sued" B)) This is not a suit against the tate with its consent" Dirstl!, the recommendation made b! the #ommission regarding indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident b! the government does not in an! wa! mean that liabilit! automaticall! attaches to the tate" 9t is important to note that A"," .. e)pressl! states that the purpose of creating the #ommission was to have a bod! that will conduct an >investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that too@ place"? 9n the e)ercise of its functions, A"," .. provides guidelines, and what is relevant to ,ur discussion reads= >." 9ts conclusions regarding the e)istence of probable cause for the commission of an! offense and of the persons probabl! guilt! of the same shall be sufficient compliance with the rules on preliminar! investigation and the charges arising therefrom ma! be filed directl! with the proper court"? 9n effect, whatever ma! be the findings of the #ommission, the same shall onl! serve as the cause of action in the event that an! part! decides to litigate hisKher claim" Therefore, the #ommission is merel! a preliminar! venue" The #ommission is not the end in itself" <hatever recommendation it ma@es cannot in an! wa! bind the tate immediatel!, such recommendation not having become final and e)ecutor!" This is precisel! the essence of it being a fact6finding body. econdl!, whatever acts or utterances that then +resident AFuino ma! have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the tate having waived its immunit! from suit" The 12

+resident;s act of 6oining the marchers, da!s after the incident, does not mean that there was an admission b! the tate of an! liabilit!" 9n fact to borrow the words of petitioner ) ) ), >it was an act of solidarit! b! the government with the people"? *oreover, petitioners rel! on +resident AFuino;s speech promising that the government would address the grievances of the rall!ists" &! this alone, it cannot be inferred that the tate has admitted an! liabilit!, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit" Although consent to be sued ma! be given impliedl!, still it cannot be maintained that such consent was given considering the circumstances obtaining in the instant case" Thirdl!, the case does not Fualif! as a suit against the tate" B)) <hile the 'epublic in this case is sued b! name, the ultimate liabilit! does not pertain to the government" Although the militar! officers and personnel, then part! defendants, were discharging their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment the! e)ceeded their authorit!" &ased on the #ommission findings, there was lac@ of 6ustification b! the government forces in the use of firearms" *oreover, the members of the police and militar! crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under &"+" &lg" 000 as there was unnecessar! firing b! them in dispersing the marchers" As earl! as ./55, this #ourt has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself b! the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholl! without authorit!" 7ntil recentl! in .//. (%have> v. Sandiganbayan, +-; S%&' "<" [+--+]) , this doctrine still found application, this #ourt sa!ing that immunit! from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibilit! and non(accountabilit! nor grant a privileged status not claimed b! an! other official of the 'epublic" The militar! and police forces were deplo!ed to ensure that the rall! would be peaceful and orderl! as well as to guarantee the safet! of the ver! people that the! are dut!(bound to protect" Eowever, the facts as found b! the trial court showed that the! fired at the unrul! crowd to disperse the latter" <hile it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts e)cept when it has given its consent, it cannot be invo@ed b! both the militar! officers to release them from an! liabilit!, and b! the heirs and victims to demand indemnification from the government" The principle of state immunit! from suit does not appl!, as in this case, when the relief demanded b! the suit reFuires no affirmative official action on the part of the tate nor the affirmative discharge of an! obligation which belongs to the tate in its political capacit!, even though the officers or agents 1ho are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. This #ourt has made it Fuite clear that even a >high position in the government does not confer a license to persecute or rec@lessl! in6ure another"? The inescapable conclusion is that the tate cannot be held civill! liable for the deaths that followed the incident" 9nstead, the liabilit! should fall on the named defendants in the lower court" 9n line with the ruling of this #ourt in Shauf v. %ourt of 'ppeals (+-+ S%&' ,+; [+--)]), herein public officials, having been found to have acted be!ond the scope of their authorit!, ma! be held liable for damages" (Re%ublic v. San2oval, ,,+ SCR 1,4, <arc0 19, 199!, En 9anc >Cam%os, 5r.?# <ay t0e (overnment vali2ly invoIe t0e 2octrine o1 State immunity 1rom suit i1 its invocation Eill serve as an instrument 1or %er%etrating an inFustice on a citi6en; Held2 To our mind, it would be the ape) of in6ustice and highl! ineFuitable for us to defeat petitioners(contractors; right to be dul! compensated for actual wor@ performed and services rendered, where both the government and the public have, for !ears, received and accepted benefits from said housing pro6ect and reaped the fruits of petitioners(contractors; honest toil and labor" 9ncidentall!, respondent li@ewise argues that the tate ma! not be sued in the instant case, invo@ing the constitutional doctrine of =on6suability of the State, otherwise @nown as the &oyal /rerogative of 8ishonesty. 'espondent;s argument is misplaced inasmuch as the principle of finds no application in the case before us" tate immunit!

7nder these circumstances, respondent ma! not validl! invo@e the &oyal /rerogative of 8ishonesty and convenientl! hide under the State@s cloa7 of invincibility against suit, 13

considering that this principle !ields to certain settled e)ceptions" True enough, the rule, in an! case, is not absolute for it does not sa! that the state ma! not be sued under an! circumstances" Thus, in 'migable v. %uenca, this #ourt, in effect, shred the protective shroud which shields the state from suit, reiterating our decree in the landmar@ case of !inisterio v. %F of %ebu that Athe doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an in2ustice on a citi>en.3 9t is 6ust as important, if not more so, that there be fidelit! to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained" (%itations omitted) Although the 'migable and !inisterio cases generousl! tac@led the issue of the tate;s immunit! from suit vis a vis the pa!ment of 6ust compensation for e)propriated propert!, this #ourt nonetheless finds the doctrine enunciated in the aforementioned cases applicable to the instant controvers!, considering that the ends of 6ustice would be subverted if we were to uphold, in this particular instance, the tate;s immunit! from suit" To be sure, this #ourt H as the staunch guardian of the citizens; rights and welfare H cannot sanction an in6ustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof" 3ustice and eFuit! sternl! demand that the tate;s cloa@ of invincibilit! against suit be shred in this particular instance, and that petitioners(contractors be dul! compensated H on the basis of quantum meruit H for construction done on the public wor@s housing pro6ect" (E=( Construction Co. v. Vigilar, !74 SCR 7**, <ar.1*, ,++1, , n2 /iv. >9uena?# C$)$Ie&+,$+. Bhat citi>enship principle do the /hilippines adhere toC case. D0plain, and give illustrative

Held2 The +hilippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of 2us sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationalit! or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of hisKher birth, as opposed to the doctrine of 2us soli which determines nationalit! or citizenship on the basis of place of birth" (Valles v. C3<ELEC, !!" SCR 74!, ug. 9, ,+++, En 9anc >=urisima?# ". &osalind Ebasco 9ope> 1as born on !ay +$, +-;# in =apier .errace, 5roome, Bestern 'ustralia, to the spouses, .elesforo Ebasco, a Filipino citi>en and native of 8aet, %amarines =orte, and .heresa !arque>, an 'ustralian. s she a Filipino citi>en and, therefore, qualified to run for Fovernor of her provinceC Held2 +rivate respondent 'osalind Gbasco $opez was born on *a! .6, ./25 in :apier Terrace, &roome, <estern Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Gbasco, a Dilipino citizen and native of 4aet, #amarines :orte, and Theresa *arFuez, an Australian" Eistoricall!, this was a !ear before the ./25 #onstitution too@ into effect and at that time, what served as the #onstitution of the +hilippines were the principal organic acts b! which the 7nited tates governed the countr!" These were the +hilippine &ill of 3ul! ., ./02 and the +hilippine Autonom! Act of August 2/, ./.6, also @nown as the 3ones $aw" Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the +hilippine 9slands" ) ) ) 7nder both organic acts, all inhabitants of the +hilippines who were panish sub6ects on April .., .0// and resided therein including their children are deemed to be +hilippine citizens" +rivate respondent;s father, Telesforo Gbasco, was born on 3anuar! 5, .01/ in 4aet, #amarines :orte, a fact dul! evidenced b! a certified true cop! of an entr! in the 'egistr! of &irths" Thus, under the +hilippine &ill of ./02 and the 3ones $aw, Telesforo Gbasco was deemed to be a +hilippine citizen" &! virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo;s daughter, herein private respondent 'osalind Gbasco $opez, is li@ewise a citizen of the +hilippines" The signing into law of the ./25 +hilippine #onstitution has established the principle of 2us sanguinis as basis for the acFuisition of +hilippine citizenship ) ) )" o also, the principle of 2us sanguinis, which confers citizenship b! virtue of blood relationship, was subseFuentl! retained under the ./12 and ./01 #onstitutions" Thus, the herein private respondent, 'osalind Gbasco $opez, is a Dilipino citizen, having been born to a Dilipino father" The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her +hilippine citizenship" 9f Australia follows the principle of 2us soli, then at most, private respondent can 14

also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship" (Valles v. C3<ELEC, !!" SCR 74!, ug. 9, ,+++, En 9anc >=urisima?# ;. 8oes a legitimate child born under the +-;( %onstitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father 1ho elected /hilippine citi>enship fourteen (+#) years after attaining the age of ma2ority become a FilipinoC Held2 7nder Article 9C, ection .(2) of the ./25 #onstitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Dilipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of ma6orit!, the child elected +hilippine citizenship" #"A" :o" 625 which was enacted pursuant to ection .(2), Article 9C of the ./25 #onstitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to ma@e a valid election of +hilippine citizenship" Eowever, the ./25 #onstitution and #"A" :o" 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of +hilippine citizenship should be made" The ./25 #harter onl! provides that the election should be made >upon reaching the age of ma6orit!"? The age of ma6orit! then commenced upon reaching twent!(one (2.) !ears" 9n the opinions of the ecretar! of 3ustice on cases involving the validit! of election of +hilippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved b! basing the time period on the decisions of this #ourt prior to the effectivit! of the ./25 #onstitution" 9n these decisions, the proper period for electing +hilippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the 4epartment of tate of the 7nited tates Aovernment to the effect that the election should be made within a >reasonable time? after attaining the age of ma6orit!" The phrase >reasonable time? has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (2) !ears from reaching the age of ma6orit!" The span of fourteen (.5) !ears that lapsed from the time that person reached the age of ma6orit! until he finall! e)pressed his intention to elect +hilippine citizenship is clearl! wa! be!ond the contemplation of the reFuirement of electing >upon reaching the age of ma6orit!"? +hilippine citizenship can never be treated li@e a commodit! that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient . ,ne who is privileged to elect +hilippine citizenship has onl! an inchoate right to such citizenship" As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude" (ReM %%lication 1or 2mission to t0e =0ili%%ine 9ar, Vicente /. C0ing, 9ar <atter )o. 914, 3ct. 1, 1999, En 9anc >4a%unan?# #. s F/* a natural6born Filipino citi>en and, therefore, qualified to run for /residentC

Held2 The term >natural(born citizens,? is defined to include >those who are citizens of the +hilippines from birth without having to perform an! act to acFuire or perfect their +hilippine citizenship"? ( ection 2, Article 9C, ./01 #onstitution) The date, month and !ear of birth of D+3 appeared to be 20 August ./2/ during the regime of the ./25 #onstitution" Through its histor!, four modes of acFuiring citizenship H naturalization, 2us soli, res 2udicata and 2us sanguinis G had been in vogue" ,nl! two, i.e., 2us soli and 2us sanguinis, could Fualif! a person to being a >natural(born? citizen of the +hilippines" *us soli, per &oa v. %ollector of %ustoms ("; /hil. ;+( [+-+"]), did not last long" <ith the adoption of the ./25 #onstitution and the reversal of &oa in .an %hong v. Secretary of 9abor ( upra, which held that 2us soli was never applied in the +hilippines), 2us sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primar! basis of citizenship b! birth" 4ocumentar! evidence adduced b! petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of D+3 was his paternal grandfather $orenzo +ou, married to *arta 'e!es, the father of Allan D" +oe" <hile the records of birth of $orenzo +ou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Dilipino, a resident of an #arlos, +angasinan, and 05 !ears old at the time of his death on .. eptember ./55" The certificate of birth of the father of D+3, Allan D" +oe, showed that he was born on .1 *a! ./.5 to an -spanol father, $orenzo +ou, and a mestiza -spanol mother, *arta 'e!es" 9ntroduced b! petitioner was an >uncertified? cop! of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan D" +oe and +aulita Aomez on 05 3ul! ./26" The marriage certificate of Allan D" +oe and &essie Jelle! reflected the date of their marriage to be on .6 eptember ./50" 9n the same certificate, Allan D" +oe was stated to be twent!(five !ears old, unmarried, and a Dilipino citizen, and &essie Jelle! to be twent!(two !ears old, unmarried, and an American citizen" The birth certificate of D+3, would disclose that he was born on 20 August ./2/ to Allan D" +oe, a Dilipino, twent!(four !ears old, married to &essie Jelle!, an American citizen, twent!(one !ears old and married"

15

#onsidering the reservations made b! the parties on the veracit! of some of entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the onl! conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certaint! from the documents would be that H ." The parents of D+3 were Allan D" +oe and &essie Jelle!8 2" D+3 was born to them on 20 August ./2/8 2" Allan D" +oe and &essie Jelle! were married to each other on .6 eptember, ./508 5" The father of Allan D" +oe was $orenzo +oe8 and 5" At the time of his death on .. eptember ./55, $orenzo +oe was 05 !ears old" <ould the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that D+3 is a natural(born citizenQ The marriage certificate of Allan D" +oe and &essie Jelle!, the birth certificate of D+3, and the death certificate of $orenzo +ou are documents of public record in the custod! of a public officer" The documents have been submitted in evidence b! both contending parties during the proceedings before the #,*-$-#" B)) &eing public documents, the death certificate of $orenzo +ou, the marriage certificate of Allan D" +oe and &essie Jell!, and the birth certificate of D+3, constitute prima facie proof of their contents" ection 55, 'ule .20, of the 'ules of #ourt provides= ADntries in official records. -ntries in official records made in the performance of his dut! b! a public officer of the +hilippines, or b! a person in the performance of a dut! speciall! en6oined b! law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated"? B)) The death certificate of $orenzo +ou would indicate that he died on .. eptember ./55, at the age of 05 !ears, in an #arlos, +angasinan" 9t could thus be assumed that $orenzo +ou was born sometime in the !ear .010 when the +hilippines was still a colon! of pain" +etitioner would argue that $orenzo +ou was not in the +hilippines during the crucial period of from .0/0 to ./02 considering that there was no e)isting record about such fact in the 'ecords *anagement and Archives ,ffice" +etitioner, however, li@ewise failed to show that $orenzo +ou was at an! other place during the same period" 9n his death certificate, the residence of $orenzo +ou was stated to be an #arlos, +angasinan" 9n the absence of an! evidence to the contrar!, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death" 9t would be e)tremel! doubtful if the 'ecords *anagement and Archives ,ffice would have had complete records of all residents of the +hilippines from .0/0 to ./02" B)) +etitioner submits, in an! case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father Nor motherO) or paternit! (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, D+3 evidentl! being an illegitimate son according the petitioner, the mandator! rules under civil law must be used" B)) 9t should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the ac@nowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to brea@ awa! from the traditional idea of @eeping well apart legitimate and non(legitimate relationships within the famil! in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child" The provisions are intended merel! to govern the private and personal affairs of the famil!" There is little, if an!, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the tate" <hile, indeed, provisions on >citizenship? could be found in the #ivil #ode, such provisions must be ta@en in the conte)t of private relations, the domain of civil law ) ) )" The relevance of >citizenship? or >nationalit!? to #ivil $aw is best e)emplified in Article .5 of the #ivil #ode ) ) ) that e)plains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the #onstitutional provisions on citizenship" imilarl!, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the #ivil #ode ) ) )" 9n adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction e)tended onl! to define his rights 16

under civil law ( ee #hing $eng v" Aalang, $(../2., ,ctober ./50, unreported) and not his political status" #ivil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimac!" This discriminator! attitude ma! be traced to the panish famil! and propert! laws, which, while defining proprietar! and successional rights of members of the famil!, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children" B ) ) These distinctions between legitimac! and illegitimac! were codified in the panish #ivil #ode, and the invidious discrimination survived when the panish #ivil #ode became the primar! source of our own #ivil #ode" uch distinction, however, remains and should remain onl! in the sphere of civil law and not undul! impede or impinge on the domain of political law" The proof of filiation or paternit! for purposes of determining his citizenship status should be deemed independent from and not ine)tricabl! tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes" The #ivil #ode or Damil! #ode provisions on proof of filiation or paternit!, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and famil! relations" The ordinar! rules on evidence could well and should govern" Dor instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessaril! precluded from being applicable b! the #ivil #ode or Damil! #ode provisions" B)) Thus, the dul! notarized declaration made b! 'ub! Jelle! *angahas, sister of &essie Jelle! +oe submitted as -)hibit 20 before the #,*-$-#, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan D" +oe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with D+3, i.e., living together with &essie Jelle! and his children (including respondent D+3) in one house, and as one famil! ) ) )" B)) +etitioner would have it that even if Allan D" +oe were a Dilipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent D+3, the latter being an illegitimate child" B ) ) &ut the documentar! evidence introduced b! no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that D+3 was born on 20 August ./2/ to a Dilipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a !ear later, or on .6 eptember ./50" &irth to unmarried parents would ma@e D+3 an illegitimate child" +etitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, D+3 so followed the citizenship of his mother, &essie Jelle!, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this #ourt in !orano v. :ivo (") S%&' ($", /aa v. %han, "+ S%&' ,(;), citing %hiongbian v. de 9eon (<" /hil. ,,+) and Serra v. &epublic (-+ /hil. -+#, unreported). ,n the above score, the disFuisition made b! amicus curiae 3oaFuin A" &ernas, most convincing8 he states H 3, is

><e must anal!ze these cases and as@ what the lis mota was in each of them" 9f the pronouncement of the #ourt on 2us sanguinis was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. &ut if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine" 9 therefore invite the #ourt to loo@ closel! into these cases" >Dirst, !orano v. :ivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Dilipino father" 9t was about a stepson of a Dilipino, a stepson who was the child of a #hinese mother and a #hinese father" The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather" :othing about 2us sanguinis there" The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized father" > econd, %hiongbian v. de 9eon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Dilipino father" 9t was about a legitimate son of a father who had become Dilipino b! election to public office before the ./25 #onstitution pursuant to Article 9C, ection .(2) of the ./25 #onstitution" :o one was illegitimate here" >Third, Serra v. &epublic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Dilipino father" erra was an illegitimate child of a #hinese father and a Dilipino mother" The issue was whether one who was alread! a Dilipino because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized" There is nothing there about invidious 2us sanguinis. 17

>Dinall!, /aa v. %han ("+ S%&' ,(;). This is a more complicated case" The case was about the citizenship of Ruintin #han who was the son of $eoncio #han" Ruintin #han claimed that his father, $eoncio, was the illegitimate son of a #hinese father and a Dilipino mother" Ruintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from $eoncio, his father" &ut the upreme #ourt said that there was no valid proof that $eoncio was in fact the son of a Dilipina mother" The #ourt therefore concluded that $eoncio was not Dilipino" 9f $eoncio was not Dilipino, neither was his son Ruintin" Ruintin therefore was not onl! not a natural(born Dilipino but was not even a Dilipino" >The #ourt should have stopped there" &ut instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The #ourt said obiter that even if $eoncio, Ruintin;s father, were Dilipino, Ruintin would not be Dilipino because Ruintin was illegitimate" This statement about Ruintin, based on a contrar! to fact assumption, was absolutel! unnecessar! for the case" B ) ) 9t was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simpl! repeating the obiter dictum in !orano v. :ivo. B)) >Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no te)tual foundation in the #onstitution, it would also violate the eFual protection clause of the #onstitution not once but twice" Dirst, it would ma@e an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would ma@e an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Dilipino father and the illegitimate child of a Dilipino mother" >The doctrine on constitutionall! allowable distinctions was established long ago b! +eople v" #a!at (60 +hil" .2)" 9 would grant that the distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences" B ) ) &ut real differences alone do not 6ustif! invidious distinction" 'eal differences ma! 6ustif! distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose" >) ) ) <hat is the relevance of legitimac! or illegitimac! to elective public serviceQ <hat possible state interest can there be for disFualif!ing an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer" 9t was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison" <h! deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his ownQ To disFualif! an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents" There is neither 6ustice nor rationalit! in that" And if there is neither 6ustice nor rationalit! in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the eFual protection clause and must be reprobated"? The other amici curiae, *r" 3ustice *endoza (a former member of this #ourt), +rofessor 'uben &alane and 4ean *erlin *agallona, at bottom, have e)pressed similar views" The thesis of petitioner, unfortunatel! hinging solel! on pure obiter dicta, should indeed fail" <here 6urisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as ta@ing after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit of the child" 9t was to ensure a Dilipino nationalit! for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custod!, would e)ercise parental authorit! and had the dut! to support her illegitimate child" 9t was to help the child, not to pre6udice or discriminate against him" The fact of the matter H perhaps the most significant consideration H is that the ./25 #onstitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the da!, month and !ear of birth of respondent D+3, can never be more e)plicit than it is" +roviding neither conditions nor distinctions, the #onstitution states that among the citizens of the +hilippines are >those whose fathers are citizens of the +hilippines"? There utterl! is no cogent 6ustification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearl! are none provided" (<aria 5eanette Decson, et al. v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 1*14!4, <arc0 !, ,++4, En 9anc >Vitug?# (. 4o1 may /hilippine citi>enship be renouncedC s the application for an alien certificate of registration, and the possession of foreign passport, tantamount to acts of renunciation of /hilippine citi>enshipC Held2 9n order that citizenship ma! be lost b! renunciation, such renunciation must be e)press" +etitioner;s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit" This issue was put 18

to rest in the case of '>nar v. %H!D9D% (+<( S%&' ,); [+--)]) and in the more recent case of !ercado v. !an>ano and %H!D9D% (F.&. =o. +;()<;, ;), S%&' $;), !ay "$, +---). 9n the case of Aznar, the #ourt ruled that the mere fact that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Dilipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his +hilippine citizenship" And, in !ercado v. !an>ano and %H!D9D%, it was held that the fact that respondent *anzano was registered as an American citizen in the &ureau of 9mmigration and 4eportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, .//1, onl! a !ear before he filed a certificate of candidac! for vice(ma!or of *a@ati, were 6ust assertions of his American nationalit! before the termination of his American citizenship" Thus, the mere fact that private respondent 'osalind Gbasco $opez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Dilipino citizenship" Dor renunciation to effectivel! result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be e)press" As held b! this #ourt in the aforecited case of '>nar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an e)press renunciation or repudiation of one;s citizenship" The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of !ercado v. !an>ano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectivel! renounced the same" Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship H she was an Australian and a Dilipino, as well" *oreover, under #ommonwealth Act 62, the fact that a child of Dilipino parentKs was born in another countr! has not been included as a ground for losing one;s +hilippine citizenship" ince private respondent did not lose or renounce her +hilippine citizenship, petitioner;s claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water" (Valles v. C3<ELEC, !!" SCR 74!, ug. 9, ,+++, En 9anc >=urisima?# $. Bhat are the 1ays of acquiring citi>enshipC 8iscuss. Held2 There are two wa!s of acFuiring citizenship= (.) b! birth, and (2) b! naturalization" These wa!s of acFuiring citizenship correspond to the two @inds of citizens= the natural(born citizen, and the naturalized citizen" A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular countr!, is a natural(born citizen thereof" As defined in the ) ) ) #onstitution, natural(born citizens >are those citizens of the +hilippines from birth without having to perform an! act to acFuire or perfect his +hilippine citizenship"? ,n the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Dilipino citizens through naturalization, generall! under #ommonwealth Act :o" 512, otherwise @nown as the 'evised :aturalization $aw, which repealed the former :aturalization $aw (Act :o" 2/21), and b! 'epublic Act :o" 520" ( ntonio 9engson ... v. 'RED, (.R. )o. 14,84+, <ay ", ,++1, En 9anc >4a%unan?# ,. .o be naturali>ed, 1hat must an applicant proveC Bhen and 1hat are the conditions before the decision granting /hilippine citi>enship becomes e0ecutoryC Held2 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the Fualifications and none of the disFualifications provided b! law to become a Dilipino citizen" The decision granting +hilippine citizenship becomes e)ecutor! onl! after two (2) !ears from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (.) not left the +hilippines8 (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession8 (2) has not been convicted of an! offense or violation of government promulgated rules8 or (5) committed an! act pre6udicial to the interest of the nation or contrar! to an! government announced policies (Section +, &.'. (;)). ( ntonio 9engson ... v. 'RED, (.R. )o. 14,84+, <ay ", ,++1, En 9anc >4a%unan?# <. Bhat qualifications must be possessed by an applicant for naturali>ationC Held2 ection 2, Act 512 provides the following Fualifications=

(a) Ee must be not less than 2. !ears of age on the da! of the hearing of the petition8 (b) Ee must have resided in the +hilippines for a continuous period of not less than ten !ears8 19

(c) Ee must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underl!ing the +hilippine #onstitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the +hilippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the communit! in which he is living8 (d) Ee must own real estate in the +hilippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, +hilippine currenc!, or must have some @nown lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation8 (e) Ee must be able to spea@ and write -nglish or panish and an! of the principal languages8 and (f) Ee must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in an! of the public schools or private schools recognized b! the &ureau of +rivate chools of the +hilippines where +hilippine histor!, government and civic are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the +hilippines reFuired of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as +hilippine citizen" ( ntonio 9engson ... v. 'RED, (.R. )o. 14,84+, <ay ", ,++1, En 9anc >4a%unan?# -. Bhat are the disqualifications under Section #, 'ct #,;, in an application for naturali>ationC Held2 ection 5, Act 512, provides the following disFualifications=

(a) Ee must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with an! association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments8 (b) Ee must not be defending or teaching the necessit! or propriet! of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas8 (c) Ee must not be a pol!gamist or believer in the practice of pol!gam!8 (d) Ee must not have been convicted of an! crime involving moral turpitude8 (e) Ee must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases8 (f) Ee must have, during the period of his residence in the +hilippines (or not less than si) months before filing his application), mingled sociall! with the Dilipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Dilipinos8 (g) Ee must not be a citizen or sub6ect of a nation with whom the +hilippines is at war, during the period of such war8 (h) Ee must not be a citizen or sub6ect of a foreign countr! whose laws do not grant Dilipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or sub6ects thereof" ( ntonio 9engson ... v. 'RED, (.R. )o. 14,84+, <ay ", ,++1, En 9anc >4a%unan?# +). 8istinguish naturali>ation from repatriation, and discuss the applicable la1s in each. Held2 :aturalization is a mode for both acFuisition and reacFuisition of +hilippine citizenship" As a mode of initiall! acFuiring +hilippine citizenship, naturalization is governed b! #ommonwealth Act :o" 512, as amended" ,n the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacFuiring +hilippine citizenship is governed b! #ommonwealth Act :o" 62 ('n 'ct /roviding for the Bays in Bhich /hilippine %iti>enship !ay 5e 9ost or &eacquired [+-;$]). 7nder this law, a former Dilipino citizen who wishes to reacFuire +hilippine citizenship must possess certain Fualifications and none of the disFualifications mentioned in ection 5 of #"A" 512" 'epatriation, on the other hand, ma! be had under various statutes b! those who lost their citizenship due to= (.) desertion of the armed forces (Section #, %.'. =o. $;)I (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in <orld <ar 99 (Section +, &epublic 'ct =o. -$( [+-(;])I (2) service in the Armed Dorces of the 7nited tates at an! other time (Sec. +, &epublic 'ct =o. "$;) [+-$)])I (5) marriage of a Dilipino woman to an alien (Sec. +, &epublic 'ct =o. <+,+ [+--(])I and (5) political and economic necessit! ( bid). As distinguished from the length! process of naturalization, repatriation simpl! consists of the ta@ing of an oath of allegiance to the 'epublic of the +hilippines and registering said oath in the $ocal #ivil 'egistr! of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided" B))

20

*oreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Dilipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Dilipino citizen" ,n the other hand, if he was originall! a natural(born citizen before he lost his +hilippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural( born Dilipino" ( ntonio 9engson ... v. 'RED, (.R. )o. 14,84+, <ay ", ,++1, En 9anc >4a%unan?# ++. 4o1 may Filipino citi>ens 1ho lost their citi>enship reacquire the sameC A&+*e!2 Dilipino citizens who have lost their citizenship ma! ) ) ) reacFuire the same in the manner provided b! law" #ommonwealth Act :o" 62 enumerates the three modes b! which +hilippine citizenship ma! be reacFuired b! a former citizen= (.) b! naturalization, (2) b! repatriation, and (2) b! direct act of #ongress . (&rival2o v. C3<ELEC, ,7" SCR ",", 5une ,8, 199*, En 9anc >=anganiban?G ntonio 9engson ... v. 'RED, (.R. )o. 14,84+, <ay ", ,++1, En 9anc >4a%unan?# +". Bho may validly avail of repatriation under &.'. =o. <+,+C Held2 '"A" :o" 0.1., which has lapsed into law on ,ctober 22, .//5, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Dilipino women who have lost their +hilippine citizenship b! marriage to aliens and (b) of natural(born Dilipinos who have lost their +hilippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessit!" ((erar2o ngat v. Re%ublic, (.R. )o. 1!,,44, Se%t. 14, 1999 >Vitug?# +;. 5efore 1hat agency should application for repatriation under &.' <+,+ be filedC Held2 7nder ection . of +"4" :o" 125, dated 3une 5, ./15, amending #"A" :o" 62, an application for repatriation could be filed with the Special %ommittee on =aturali>ation chaired b! the olicitor Aeneral with the 7ndersecretar! of Doreign Affairs and the 4irector of the :ational 9ntelligence #oordinating Agenc! as the other members" Although the agenc! was deactivated b! virtue of +resident #orazon #" AFuino;s *emorandum of *arch 21, ./01, it was not, however, abrogated" The #ommittee was reactivated on 3une 0, .//5 . Eence, the application should be filed with said Agenc!, not with the 'egional Trial #ourt" ((erar2o ngat v. Re%ublic, (.R. )o. 1!,,44, Se%t. 14, 1999 >Vitug?# +#. !ay a natural6born Filipino 1ho became an 'merican citi>en still be considered a natural6born Filipino upon his reacquisition of /hilippine citi>enship and, therefore, qualified to run for %ongressmanC Held2 'epatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Dilipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Dilipino citizen" ,n the other hand, if he was originall! a natural(born citizen before he lost his +hilippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural( born Dilipino" 9n respondent #ruz;s case, he lost his Dilipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Dorces of the 7nited tates" Eowever, he subseFuentl! reacFuired +hilippine citizenship under '"A" :o" 2620 ) ) )" Eaving thus ta@en the reFuired oath of allegiance to the 'epublic and having registered the same in the #ivil 'egistr! of *angatarem, +angasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent #ruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural(born citizen, a status which he acFuired at birth as the son of a Dilipino father . 9t bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his /hilippine citi>enship. +etitioner;s contention that respondent #ruz is no longer a natural(born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable" NTOhe term >natural(born citizen? was first defined in Article 999, ection 5 of the ./12 #onstitution as follows= ection 5" A natural(born citizen is one who is a citizen of the +hilippines from birth without having to perform an! act to acFuire or perfect his +hilippine citizenship" Two reFuisites must concur for a person to be considered as such= (.) a person must be a Dilipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform an! act to obtain or perfect his +hilippine citizenship"

21

7nder the ./12 #onstitution definition, there were two categories of Dilipino citizens which were not considered natural(born= (.) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before 3anuar! .1, ./12 (the date of effectivity of the +-,; %onstitution) , of Dilipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of ma6orit!, elected +hilippine citizenship" Those >naturalized citizens? were not considered natural(born obviousl! because the! were not Dilipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acFuire +hilippine citizenship" Those born of Dilipino mothers before the effectivit! of the ./12 #onstitution were li@ewise not considered natural(born because the! also had to perform an act to perfect their +hilippine citizenship" The present #onstitution, however, now considers those born of Dilipino mothers before the effectivit! of the ./12 #onstitution and who elected +hilippine citizenship upon reaching the ma6orit! age as natural(born" After defining who are natural(born citizens, ection 2 of Article 9C adds a sentence= >Those who elect +hilippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (2), ection . hereof shall be deemed natural(born citizens"? #onseFuentl!, onl! naturalized Dilipinos are considered not natural(born citizens" 9t is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present #onstitution that there are onl! two classes of citizens= (.) those who are natural(born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law" A citizen who is not a naturalized Dilipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain +hilippine citizenship, necessaril! is a natural(born Dilipino" :oteworth! is the absence in the said enumeration of a separate categor! for persons who, after losing +hilippine citizenship, subseFuentl! reacFuire it" The reason therefore is clear= as to such persons, the! would either be natural(born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed b! the applicable law for the reacFuisition thereof" As respondent #ruz was not reFuired b! law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacFuire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural(born Dilipino" As such, he possessed all the necessar! Fualifications to be elected as member of the Eouse of 'epresentatives" ( ntonio 9engson ... v. 'RED, (.R. )o. 14,84+, <ay ", ,++1, En 9anc >4a%unan?# +(. 8istinguish 8ual %iti>enship from 8ual 'llegiance. Held2 4ual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneousl! considered a national b! the said states" Dor instance, such a situation ma! arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of 2us sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of 2us soli. uch a person, ipso facto and without an! voluntar! act on his part, is concurrentl! considered a citizen of both states" 4ual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneousl! owes, b! some positive act, lo!alt! to two or more states" <hile dual citizenship is involuntar!, dual allegiance is the result of an individual;s volition" (<erca2o v. <an6ano, !+" SCR *!+, <ay ,*, 1999, En 9anc ><en2o6a?# +$. Bhat is the main concern of Section (, 'rticle :, +-<, %onstitution, on citi>enshipC %onsequently, are persons 1ith mere dual citi>enship disqualified to run for elective local positions under Section #)(d) of the 9ocal Fovernment %odeC Held2 9n including ection 5 in Article 9C on citizenship, the concern of the #onstitutional #ommission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization" Eence, the phrase >dual citizenship? in '"A" :o" 1.60, ection 50(d) ($ocal Aovernment #ode) must be understood as referring to >dual allegiance"? #onseFuentl!, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disFualification" 7nli@e those with dual allegiance, who must ) ) ) be sub6ect to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificate of candidac!, the! elect +hilippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable conseFuence of conflicting laws of different states" &! electing +hilippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other countr! of which the! are also citizens and thereb! terminate their status as dual citizens" 9t ma! be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectivel! renounced his foreign citizenship" That is of no moment" (<erca2o v. <an6ano, (.R. )o. 1!7+8!, !+" SCR *!+, <ay ,*, 1999 ><en2o6a?# +,. %ite instances 1hen a citi>en of the /hilippines may possess dual citi>enship considering the citi>enship clause ('rticle :) of the %onstitution. 22

Held2 .) Those born of Dilipino fathers andKor mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of 2us soli8 2) Those born in the +hilippines of Dilipino mothers and alien fathers if b! the laws of their father;s countr! such children are citizens of that countr!8 2) Those who marr! aliens if b! the laws of the latter;s countr! the former are considered citizens, unless b! their act or omission the! are deemed to have renounced +hilippine citizenship" (<erca2o v. <an6ano, (.R. )o. 1!7+8!, !+" SCR *!+, <ay ,*, 1999 ><en2o6a?# +<. .he general rule is that res A2udicata does3 not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citi>enshipC Bhat is the e0ception to this ruleC 8iscuss. Held2 +etitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in 6udicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generall! not considered res 6udicata in an! subseFuent proceeding challenging the same8 citing the case of !oy Ea 9im Eao v. %ommissioner of mmigration (#+ S%&' "-" [+-,+]). Ee insists that the same issue of citizenship ma! be threshed out anew" +etitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e., the principle of res 2udicata generall! does not appl! in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship" Eowever, in the case of 5urca v. &epublic ((+ S%&' "#< [+-,;]), an e)ception to this general rule was recognized" The #ourt ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res 2udicata ma! be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present= .) a person;s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controvers! where said person is a part!8 2) the olicitor Aeneral or his authorized representative too@ active part in the resolution thereof, and 2) the finding on citizenship is affirmed b! this #ourt" Although the general rule was set forth in the case of !oy Ea 9im Eao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship" 9t elucidated that reliance ma! somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not reall! binding, to ma@e the effort easier or simpler" (Valles v. C3<ELEC, !!" SCR 74!, ug. 9, ,+++, En 9anc >=urisima?# C$1$l$(& Su-!e#('. Cl(u+e +-. .he /resident issued 9etter of nstruction (9H ) ordering the deployment of members of the /hilippine !arines in the metropolis to conduct 2oint visibility patrols 1ith members of the /hilippine =ational /olice in various shopping malls. Bill this not violate the civilian supremacy clause under Section ;, 'rticle of the %onstitutionC Bill this not amount to an Jinsidious incursionJ of the military in the tas7 of la1 enforcement in violation of Section ((#), 'rticle K: of the %onstitutionC Held2 The deplo!ment of the *arines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremac! clause" The calling of the marines in this case constitutes permissible use of militar! assets for civilian law enforcement" ) ) )" The limited participation of the *arines is evident in the provisions of the $,9 itself, which sufficientl! provides the metes and bounds of the *arinesP authorit!" 9t is noteworth! that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibilit! patrols at all times, the real authorit! belonging to the +:+" 9n fact, the *etro *anila +olice #hief is the overall leader of the +:+(+hilippine *arines 6oint visibilit! patrols" 7nder the $,9, the police forces are tas@ed to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures" 9t is their responsibilit! to direct and manage the deplo!ment of the *arines" 9t is, li@ewise, their dut! to provide the necessar! eFuipment to the *arines and render logistical support to these soldiers" 9n view of the foregoing, it cannot be properl! argued that militar! authorit! is supreme over civilian authorit!" *oreover, the deplo!ment of the *arines to assist the +:+ does not unma@e the civilian character of the police force" :either does it amount to an >insidious incursion? of the militar! in the tas@ of law enforcement in violation of ection 5N5O, Article BC9 of the #onstitution" 9n this regard, it is not correct to sa! that Aeneral Angelo 'e!es, #hief of taff of the AD+, b! his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been virtuall! appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision" The real authorit! in these 23

operations, as stated in the $,9, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the +:+, and not with the militar!" uch being the case, it does not matter whether the AD+ #hief actuall! participates in the Tas@ Dorce .ulungan since he does not e)ercise an! authorit! or control over the same" ince none of the *arines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the +:+, there can be no appointment to a civilian position to spea@ of" Eence, the deplo!ment of the *arines in the 6oint visibilit! patrols does not destro! the civilian character of the +:+" #onsidering the above circumstances, the *arines render nothing more than assistance reFuired in conducting the patrols" As such, there can be no >insidious incursion? of the militar! in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremac! clause in the #onstitution" 9t is worth mentioning that militar! assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in +hilippine 6urisdiction" The +hilippine e)perience reveals that it is not averse to reFuesting the assistance of the militar! in the implementation and e)ecution of certain traditionall! >civil? functions" ) ) ) N Oome of the multifarious activities wherein militar! aid has been rendered, e)emplif!ing the activities that bring both the civilian and the militar! together in a relationship of cooperation, are= ." -lections8 2" Administration of the +hilippine :ational 'ed #ross8 2" 'elief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters8 5" Amateur sports promotion and development8 5" 4evelopment of the culture and the arts8 6" #onservation of natural resources8 1" 9mplementation of the agrarian reform program8 0" -nforcement of customs laws8 /" #omposite civilian(militar! law enforcement activities8 .0" #onduct of licensure e)aminations8 .." #onduct of nationwide tests for elementar! and high school students8 .2" Anti(drug enforcement activities8 .2" anitar! inspections8 .5" #onduct of census wor@8 .5" Administration of the #ivil Aeronautics &oard8 .6" Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices8 .1" +eace and order polic! formulation in local government units" This unFuestionabl! constitutes a gloss on e)ecutive power resulting from a s!stematic, unbro@en, e)ecutive practice, long pursued to the @nowledge of #ongress and, !et, never before Fuestioned" <hat we have here is mutual support and cooperation between the militar! and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremac!" (.9= v. 'on. Ronal2o 9. Namora, (.R. )o. 141,84, ug. 17, ,+++, En 9anc >4a%unan?# T,e R$%,) )" ( B(l(&'ed (&d He(l), ul E'"l"%. "). s the right to a balanced and healthful ecology any less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the 5ill of &ightsC D0plain. Held2 <hile the right to a balanced and healthful ecolog! is to be found under the 4eclaration of +rinciples and tate +olicies and not under the &ill of 'ights, it does not follow that it is less important than an! of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter" uch a right belongs to a different categor! of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self(preservation and self(perpetuation, the advancement of which ma! even be said to predate all governments and constitutions" As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the #onstitution for the! are assumed to e)ist from the inception of human@ind" 9f the! are now e)plicitl! mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well(founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecolog! and to health are mandated as state policies b! the #onstitution itself ) ) ) the da! would not be too far when all else would be lost not onl! for the present generation, but also for those to come H generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life" (3%osa v. &actoran, 5r., ,,4 SCR "9, >199!?>/avi2e?# "+. .he /rovince of /ala1an and the %ity of /uerto /rincesa enacted ordinances prohibiting the catching andLor e0portation of live tropical fishes, and imposing penalties for violations thereof, in order to stop the illegal practice of cyanide fishing 1hich destroys the corals and other marine resources. Several fishermen apprehended for violating the ordinances in question challenged their constitutionality contending that the ordinances violated their preferential right as subsistence and marginal fishermen to the use of our 24

communal marine resources guaranteed by the %onstitution, under Section ,, 'rticle K . Bill you sustain the challengeC Held2 The >preferential right? of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not absolute" 9n accordance with the &egalian 8octrine, marine resources belong to the tate, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of ection 2, Article B99 of the #onstitution, their >e)ploration, development and utilization ) ) ) shall be under the full control and supervision of the tate"? *oreover, their mandated protection, development and conservation ) ) ) impl! certain restrictions on whatever right of en6o!ment there ma! be in favor of an!one" <hat must be borne in mind is the tate polic! enshrined in the #onstitution regarding the dut! of the tate to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecolog! in accord with the rh!thm and harmon! of nature (Section +$, 'rticle )" The ordinances in Fuestion are meant precisel! to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their en6o!ment ma! be guaranteed not onl! for the present generation, but also for the generations to come" The right to a balanced and healthful ecolog! carries with it a correlative dut! to refrain from impairing the environment" (Dano v. (ov. Salva2or =. Socrates, (.R. )o. 11+,49, ug. ,1, 199"# A'(de#$' F!eed"# "". 4o1 should the State@s po1er to regulate educational institutions be e0ercisedC Held2 ection 5N.O, Article B9C of the #onstitution recognizes the regulate educational institutions= tate;s power to

The tate recognizes the complementar! roles of public and private institutions in the educational s!stem and shall e)ercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions" As ma! be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulate is sub6ect to the reFuirement of reasonableness. *oreover, the #onstitution allows merel! the regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights" (<iriam College &oun2ation, .nc. v. Court o1 %%eals, !48 SCR ,*7, ,88, /ec. 17, ,+++, 1st /iv. >4a%unan?# ";. 8efine and discuss the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning. Held2 Academic freedom of educational institutions has been defined as the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and ob6ectives, and how best to attain them ( free from outside coercion or interference save possibl! when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint" 9t has a wide sphere of autonom! certainl! e)tending to the choice of students" aid constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardl! manner or in a grudging fashion" That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullif! its intent" <hile it is true that an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunit! to complete the course the! see@ to pursue, since a contract creates reciprocal rights and obligations, the obligation of the school to educate a student would impl! a corresponding obligation on the part of the student to stud! and obe! the rules and regulations of the school . <hen a student commits a serious breach of discipline or failed to maintain the reFuired academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right" 9n this connection, this #ourt recognizes the e)pertise of educational institutions in the various fields of learning" Thus, the! are afforded ample discretion to formulate reasonable rules and regulations in the admission of students, including setting of academic standards" <ithin the parameters thereof, the! are competent to determine who are entitled to admission and re(admission" (University o1 San gustin, .nc. v. Court o1 %%eals, ,!+ SCR "*1, ""4@""7, <arc0 ", 1994 >)ocon?# "#. Bhat are the essential freedoms subsumed in the term Aacademic freedom3C Held2 ." 9n 'teneo de !anila ?niversity v. %apulong (F.&. =o. --;",, ", !ay +--;), this #ourt cited with approval the formulation made b! 3ustice Deli) Dran@furter of the essential freedoms subsumed in the term >academic freedom? encompassing not onl! >the freedom to determine ) ) ) on academic grounds who ma! teach, what ma! be taught (and) how it shall be taught,? but li@ewise >who ma! be admitted to stud!"? <e have thus sanctioned its invocation b! a school in re6ecting students who are academicall! delinFuent, or a la!woman see@ing admission to a seminar!, or students violating > chool 'ules on 4iscipline"? (.sabelo, 5r. v. =er%etual 'el% College o1 Ri6al, .nc., ,," SCR 797@79", )ov. 8, 199!, En 9anc >Vitug?# 25

2" The essential freedoms subsumed in the term >academic freedom? encompass the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds= (.) (2) (2) (5) <ho ma! teach, <hat ma! be taught, Eow it shall be taught, and <ho ma! be admitted to stud!"

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e., >how it shall be taught"? A school certainl! cannot function in an atmosphere of anarch!" Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution reFuires rules and regulations necessar! for the maintenance of an orderl! educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning" uch rules and regulations are eFuall! necessar! for the protection of the students, facult!, and propert! ('ngeles v. Sison, ++" S%&' "$, ;, [+-<"]). *oreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessar!, if not indispensable, value in an! field of learning" &! instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline" Accordingl!, the right to discipline the student li@ewise finds basis in the freedom >what to teach"? 9ncidentall!, the school not onl! has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students" The #onstitution no less imposes such dut!" NAll educational institutionsO shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanit!, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the countr!, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thin@ing, broaden scientific and technological @nowledge, and promote vocational efficienc! (Section ;["], 'rticle K :, %onstitution). 9n 'ngeles v. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to carr! out its responsibilit! to help its students >grow and develop into mature, responsible, effective and worth! citizens of the communit!"? Dinall!, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident than in >who ma! be admitted to stud!"? 9f a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to e)clude or e)pel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges" Thus, in 'teneo de !anila v. %apulong (""" S%&' $#; [+--;]), the #ourt upheld the e)pulsion of students found guilt! of hazing b! petitioner therein, holding that= :o one can be so m!opic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and found guilt! b! the 4isciplinar! &oard to have violated petitioner universit!;s disciplinar! rules and standards will certainl! undermine the authorit! of the administration of the school" This we would be most loathe to do" *ore importantl!, it will seriousl! impair petitioner universit!;s academic freedom which has been enshrined in the ./25, ./12 and the present ./01 #onstitution. (<iriam College &oun2ation, .nc. v. Court o1 %%eals, !48 SCR ,*7, /ec. 17, ,+++, 1st /iv. >4a%unan?# "(. !ay a university validly revo7e a degree or honor it has conferred to a student after the graduation of the latter after finding that such degree or honor 1as obtained through fraudC Held2 9n Farcia v. Faculty 'dmission %ommittee, 9oyola School of .heology ($< S%&' ",, [+-,(]), the # pointed out that academic freedom of institutions of higher learning is a freedom granted to >institutions of higher learning? which is thus given a >wide sphere of authorit! certainl! e)tending to the choice of students"? 9f such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot stud! in it, it certainl! can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates" 26

<here it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a universit! has the right to revo@e or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred" This freedom of a universit! does not terminate upon the >graduation? of a student, for it is precisel! the >graduation? of such a student that is in Fuestion" (U= 9oar2 o1 Regents v. 'on. Court o1 %%eals an2 roIiasEamy :illiam <argaret Celine, (.R. )o. 1!4*,7, ug. !1, 1999, ,n2 /iv. ><en2o6a?# E'"&"#$' P"l$'. "$. 8oes the %onstitutional policy of a Aself6reliant and independent national economy3 rule out foreign competitionC Held2 The constitutional polic! of a >self(reliant and independent national econom!? does not necessaril! rule out the entr! of foreign investments, goods and services" 9t contemplates neither >economic seclusion? nor >mendicanc! in the international communit!"? Aside from envisioning a trade polic! based on >eFualit! and reciprocit!,? the fundamental law encourages industries that are >competitive in both domestic and foreign mar@ets,? thereb! demonstrating a clear polic! against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign mar@ets" (Dana2a v. ngara, ,", SCR 18 >199"?# ",. s /4 9SD%H (/hilippine Shipyard and Dngineering %orporation), as a shipyard, a public utility and, hence, could be operated only by a corporation at least $)M of 1hose capital is o1ned by Filipino citi>ens in accordance 1ith 'rticle K , Section +) of the %onstitutionC Held= +etitioner asserts that a ship!ard is a public utilit! pursuant to ection .2 (b) of #ommonwealth Act :o" .56" 'espondents, on the other hand, contend that ship!ards are no longer public utilities b! e)press provision of +residential 4ecree :o" 666, which provided incentives to the shipbuilding and ship repair industr!" 9ndeed, +"4" :o" 666 dated *arch 5, ./15 e)plicitl! stated that a >ship!ard? was not a >public utilit!"? ) ) ) Eowever, ection . of +"4" :o" 666 was e)pressl! repealed b! ection 20 of &atas +ambansa &lg" 2/., the 9nvestment 9ncentive +olic! Act of ./02" ubseFuentl!, -)ecutive ,rder :o" 226, the ,mnibus 9nvestments #ode of ./01, was issued and ection 05 thereof e)pressl! repealed &"+" &lg" 2/." The e)press repeal of &"+" &lg" 2/. b! -"," :o" 226 did not revive ection . of +"4" :o" 666, declassif!ing the shipbuilding and ship repair industr! as a public utilit!, as said e)ecutive order did not provide otherwise" <hen a law which e)pressl! repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereb! revived unless e)pressl! so provided ('dministrative %ode of +-<,, 5oo7 , %hapter (, Section "+). #onseFuentl!, when the A+T NAsset +rivatization TrustO drafted the A &' NAsset pecific &idding 'ulesO sometime in .//2, +"4" :o" 666 no longer e)isted in our statute boo@s" <hile it is true that the repeal of a statute does not operate to impair rights that have become vested or accrued while the statute was in force, there are no vested rights of the parties that should be protected in the case at bar" The reason is simple= said decree was alread! ine)istent when the A &' was issued" A ship!ard such as +E9$ -#, being a public utilit! as provided b! law, the following provision of the Article B99 of the #onstitution applies= > ec" .." :o franchise, certificate, or an! other form of authorization for the operation of a public utilit! shall be granted e)cept to citizens of the +hilippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the +hilippines at least si0ty per centum of 1hose capital is o1ned by such citi>ens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be e)clusive in character or for a longer period than fift! !ears" :either shall an! such franchise or right be granted e)cept under the condition that it shall be sub6ect to amendment, alteration, or repeal b! the #ongress when the common good so reFuires" The tate shall encourage eFuit! participation in public utilities b! the general public" .he participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the e0ecutive and managing officers of such corporation or association shall be citi>ens of the /hilippines.3 27

The progenitor of this constitutional provision, Article B9C, ection 5 of the ./12 #onstitution, reFuired the same proportion of 60L(50L capitalization" The 3CA N3oint Centure AgreementO between :94# N:ational 9nvestment and 4evelopment #orporationO and Jawasa@i NJawasa@i Eeav! 9ndustries, $td" of Jobe, 3apanO entered into on 3anuar! 21, ./11 manifests the intention of the parties to abide b! the constitutional mandate on capitalization of public utilities" ) ) ) A 6oint venture is an association of persons or companies 6ointl! underta@ing some commercial enterprise with all of them generall! contributing assets and sharing ris@s" ) ) )" #onsidered more of a partnership, a 6oint venture is governed b! the laws on contracts and on partnership" The 6oint venture created between :94# and Jawasa@i falls within the purview of an >association? pursuant to ection 5 of Article B9C of the ./12 #onstitution and ection .. of Article B99 of the ./01 #onstitution" #onseFuentl!, a 6oint venture that would engage in the business of operating a public utilit!, such as a ship!ard, must observe the proportion of 60L(50L Dilipino(foreign capitalization" (5( Summit 'ol2ings, .nc. v. Court o1 %%eals, !47 SCR 14!, )ov. ,+, ,+++, 1 st /iv. >-nares@Santiago?# T,e R$%,)+ " I&d$%e&"u+ Cul)u!(l C"##u&$)$e+0I&d$%e&"u+ Pe"-le+ "<. Dnumerate the %onstitutional provisions recogni>ing and protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples. Held2 The framers of the ./01 #onstitution, loo@ing bac@ to the long destitution of our less fortunate brothers, fittingl! saw the historic opportunit! to actualize the ideals of people empowerment and social 6ustice, and to reach out particularl! to the marginalized sectors of societ!, including the indigenous peoples" The! incorporated in the fundamental law several provisions recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples, to wit= ection 22" The tate recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framewor@ of national unit! and development" ('rticle of the %onstitution, entitled State /rinciples and /olicies) ection 5" The tate, sub6ect to the provisions of the #onstitution and national development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well(being" The #ongress ma! provide for the applicabilit! of customar! laws governing propert! rights and relations in determining the ownership and e)tent of ancestral domains" ('rticle K of the %onstitution, entitled =ational Dconomy and /atrimony) ection ." The #ongress shall give the highest priorit! to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignit!, reduce social, economic and political ineFualities, and remove cultural ineFualities b! eFuitabl! diffusing wealth and political power for the common good" To this end, the tate shall regulate the acFuisition, ownership, use and disposition of propert! and its increments" ('rticle K of the %onstitution, entitled Social *ustice and 4uman &ights) ection 6" The tate shall appl! the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession, sub6ect to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands" ( bid.) ection .1" The tate shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions" 9t shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies" ('rticle K : of the %onstitution, entitled Dducation, Science, .echnology, 'rts, %ulture, and Sports) ection .2" The #ongress ma! create a consultative bod! to advise the +resident on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the ma6orit! of the members of which shall come from such communities" ('rticle K: of the %onstitution, entitled Feneral /rovisions) 28

(Se%arate 3%inion, 4a%unan, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 Environment an2 )atural Resources, et al., (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc# "-. 8iscuss the ndigenous /eoples &ights 'ct (&.'. =o. <;,+). Held2 'epublic Act :o" 021. is entitled SAn Act to 'ecognize, +rotect and +romote the 'ights of 9ndigenous #ultural #ommunitiesK9ndigenous +eoples, #reating a :ational #ommission on 9ndigenous +eoples, -stablishing 9mplementing *echanisms, Appropriating Dunds Therefor, and for ,ther +urposes"S 9t is simpl! @nown as SThe 9ndigenous +eoples 'ights Act of .//1S or the 9+'A" The 9+'A recognizes the e)istence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (9##sK9+s) as a distinct sector in +hilippine societ!" 9t grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the e)tent of these lands and domains" The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customar! law which traces its origin to native title" B)) <ithin their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the 9##sK9+s are given the right to self(governance and empowerment ( ections .2 to 20), social 6ustice and human rights ( ections 2. to 20), the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, institutions and communit! intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies ( ections 2/ to 21)" (Se%arate 3%inion, =uno, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 /E)R, et al., (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc# ;). 8efine Jindigenous peoplesLindigenous cultural communities.J Held2 ." 4rawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international law, 9+'A now emplo!s the politicall!(correct con6unctive term >indigenous peoplesKindigenous cultural communities? as follows= ection 2" 8efinition of .erms" ( Dor purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean= (i) 9ndigenous peoplesK9ndigenous cultural communities" ( refer to a group of people or homogenous societies identified b! self(ascription and ascription b! others, who have continuousl! lived as organized communit! on communall! bounded and defined territor!, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non(indigenous religions and cultures, became historicall! differentiated from the ma6orit! of Dilipinos" 9ndigenous peoples shall li@ewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the countr! at the time of conFuest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non(indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present tate boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who ma! have been displaced from their traditional domains or who ma! have resettled outside their ancestral domains ) ) )" (Se%arate 3%inion, 4a%unan, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 Environment an2 )atural Resources, et al., (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc# 2" The 9+'A is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i"e", the 9ndigenous #ultural #ommunities (9##s) or the 9ndigenous +eoples (9+s)" The term >9##s? is used in the ./01 #onstitution while that of >9+s? is the contemporar! international language in the 9nternational $abor ,rganization (9$,) #onvention .6/ and the 7nited :ations (7:) 4raft 4eclaration on the 'ights of 9ndigenous +eoples. ndigenous %ultural %ommunities or ndigenous /eoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies 1ho have continuously lived as an organi>ed community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actuall! occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial" The! share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, the!, b! their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non(indigenous religions and cultures, became historicall! differentiated from the Dilipino ma6orit!" 9##sK9+s also include descendants of 9##sK9+s who inhabited the countr! at the time of conFuest or colonization, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who ma! have been displaced from their traditional territories or who ma! have resettled outside their ancestral domains" (Se%arate 3%inion, 29

=uno, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 /E)R, et al., (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc# ;+. 8efine Aancestral domains3 and Aancestral lands.3 8o they constitute part of the land of the public domainC Held2 Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private propert! of indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public domain" The 9+'A grants to 9##sK9+s a distinct @ind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands" Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains" These are defined in ection 2(a) and (b) of the 9ndigenous +eoples 'ights Act ) ) )" 'ncestral domains are all areas belonging to 9##sK9+s held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed b! 9##sK9+s b! themselves or through their ancestors, communall! or individuall! since time immemorial, continuousl! until the present, e)cept when interrupted b! war, force ma6eure or displacement b! force, deceit, stealth or as a conseFuence of government pro6ects or an! other voluntar! dealings with government andKor private individuals or corporations" Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individuall! owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources" The! also include lands which ma! no longer be e)clusivel! occupied b! 9##sK9+s but from which the! traditionall! had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularl! the home ranges of 9##sK9+s who are still nomadic andKor shifting cultivators (Section ;[a], /&'). 'ncestral lands are lands held b! the 9##sK9+s under the same conditions as ancestral domains e)cept that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merel! occupied and possessed but are also utilized b! the 9##sK9+s under claims of individual or traditional group ownership" These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots (Section ;[b], /&'). (Se%arate 3%inion, =uno, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 /E)R, et al., (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc# ;". 4o1 may %%sL /s acquire rights to their ancestral domains and ancestral landsC Held2 The rights of the 9##sK9+s to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands ma! be acFuired in two modes= (.) b! native title over both ancestral lands and domains8 or (2) b! torrens title under the +ublic $and Act and the $and 'egistration Act with respect to ancestral lands onl!" (Se%arate 3%inion, =uno, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 /E)R, et al., (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc# ;;. Bhat is the concept of Anative titleC3 Bhat is a %ertificate of 'ncestral 8omain .itle (%'8.)C Held2 =ative title refers to 9##sK9+s preconFuest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far bac@ as memor! reaches" These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputabl! presumed to have been held that wa! since before the panish #onFuest" The rights of 9##sK9+s to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) b! virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected (Section ++, /&'). Dormal recognition, when solicited b! 9##sK9+s concerned, shall be embodied in a #ertificate of Ancestral 4omain Title (#A4T), which shall recognize the title of the concerned 9##sK9+s over the territories identified and delineated . $i@e a torrens title, a #A4T is evidence of private ownership of land b! native title" =ative title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarl! granted to 9##sK9+s over their ancestral lands and domains" The 9+'A categoricall! declares ancestral lands and domains held b! native title as never to have been public land" 4omains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputabl! presumed to have never been public lands and are private" The concept of native title in the 9+'A was ta@en from the ./0/ case of %arino v. nsular Fovernment (#+ /hil. -;( [+-)-], "+" ?.S. ##-, (; 9. Dd. (-#). %arino firml! established a concept of private land title that e)isted irrespective of an! ro!al grant from the tate" (Se%arate 3%inion, =uno, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 /E)R, et al., (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc# ;#. 8istinguish o1nership of land under native title and o1nership by acquisitive prescription against the State. 30

Held2 ,wnership b! virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held b! its possessor and his predecessor(in(interest in the concept of an owner since time immemorial" The land is not acFuired from the tate, that is, pain or its successor(in( interest, the 7nited tates and the +hilippine Aovernment" There has been no transfer of title from the tate as the land has been regarded as private in character as far bac@ as memor! goes" 9n contrast, ownership of land b! acFuisitive prescription against the tate involves a conversion of the character of the propert! from alienable public land to private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the tate to a private person" (Se%arate 3%inion, 4a%unan, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 /E)R, (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc# ;(. 8iscuss the concept of A2ura regalia3 and ho1 it evolved in the /hilippines. negate native title to lands held in private o1nership since time immemorialC 8oes it

Held2 Aenerall!, under the concept of 2ura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant, e)press or implied, from the panish #rown or its successors, the American #olonial government, and thereafter, the +hilippine 'epublic" The belief that the panish #rown is the origin of all land titles in the +hilippines has persisted because title to land must emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere . 9n its broad sense, the term A2ura regalia3 refers to ro!al grants, or those rights which the Jing has b! virtue of his prerogatives . 9n panish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over an!thing in which a sub6ect has a right of propert! or propriedad. These were rights en6o!ed during feudal times b! the @ing as the sovereign" The theor! of the feudal s!stem was that title to all lands was originall! held b! the Jing, and while the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the Jing theoreticall! retained the title . &! fiction of law, the Jing was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true and onl! source of title, and from him all lands were held . The theor! of 2ura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conFuest. The 'egalian theor!, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial" 9n the landmar@ case of %arino v. nsular Fovernment (#+ /hil. -;(, "+" ?.S. ##-, (; 9. Dd. (-# [+-)-]), the 7nited tates upreme #ourt, reversing the decision of the pre(war +hilippine upreme #ourt, made the following pronouncement= ) ) ) -ver! presumption is and ought to be ta@en against the Aovernment in a case li@e the present" 9t might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to sa! that 1hen, as far bac7 as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private o1nership, it 1ill be presumed to have been held in the same 1ay from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. 0 0 0 (%arino v. nsular Fovernment, supra note ,(, at -#+) The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the e)istence of native title to land, or ownership of land b! Dilipinos b! virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of an! grant from the panish #rown, as an e)ception to the theor! of 2ura regalia. B)) %arino was decided b! the 7" " upreme #ourt in ./0/, at a time when decisions of the 7" " #ourt were binding as precedent in our 6urisdiction (Section +), /hilippine 5ill of +-)"). <e applied the %arino doctrine in the ./56 case of Hh %ho v. 8irector of 9ands (,( /hil. <-) [+-#$]), where we stated that >NaOll lands that were not acFuired from the Aovernment either b! purchase or b! grant, belong to the public domain, but NaOn e)ception to the rule would be an! land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would 6ustif! the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private propert! even before the panish conFuest . (Se%arate 3%inion, 4a%unan, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 /E)R, (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc# ;$. 8oes &.'. <;,+, other1ise 7no1n as Athe ndigenous /eople@s &ights 'ct3 infringe upon the State@s o1nership over the natural resources 1ithin the ancestral domainsC Held2 +etitioners posit that 9+'A deprives the tate of its ownership over mineral lands of the public domain and other natural resources, as well as the tate;s full control and 31

supervision over the e)ploration, development and utilization of natural resources" pecificall!, petitioners and the olicitor Aeneral assail ections 2NaO, 5, and 1 of 9+'A as violative of ection 2, Article B99 of the #onstitution which states, in part, that >NaOll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energ!, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned b! the tate"? (Section ", 'rticle K , %onstitution) The! would have the #ourt declare as unconstitutional ection 2NaO of 9+'A because the inclusion of natural resources in the definition of ancestral domains purportedl! results in the abdication of tate ownership over these resources" B)) ection 2NaO merel! defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the e)tent, limit and composition of ancestral domains b! setting forth the standards and guidelines in determining whether a particular area is to be considered as part of and within the ancestral domains" 9n other words, ection 2NaO serves onl! as a !ardstic@ which points out what properties are within the ancestral domains" 9t does not confer or recognize an! right of ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous peoples" 9ts purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title" The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is ) ) ) important to ensure that no unnecessar! encroachment on private properties outside the ancestral domains will result during the delineation process" The mere fact that ection 2NaO defines ancestral domains to include the natural resources found therein does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private propert! of the indigenous peoples" imilarl!, ection 5 in relation to ection 2NaO cannot be construed as a source of ownership rights of indigenous peoples over the natural resources simpl! because it recognizes ancestral domains as their >private but communit! propert!"? The phrase >private but communit! propert!? is merel! descriptive of the indigenous peoples; concept of ownership as distinguished from that provided in the #ivil #ode" ) ) )" 9n contrast, the indigenous peoples; concept of ownership emphasizes the importance of communal or group ownership" &! virtue of the communal character of ownership, the propert! held in common >cannot be sold, disposed or destro!ed? because it was meant to benefit the whole indigenous communit! and not merel! the individual member" That 9+'A is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the indigenous peoples is also clear from the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee on ection 1 which recites the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains ) ) )" Durther, ection 1 ma@es no mention of an! right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over the natural resources" 9n fact, ection 1NaO merel! recognizes the >right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionall! and actuall! occupied b! indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made b! them at an! time within the domains"? :either does ection 1NbO, which enumerates certain rights of the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found within their ancestral domains, contain an! recognition of ownership vis6N6vis the natural resources" <hat is evident is that the 9+'A protects the indigenous peoples; rights and welfare in relation to the natural resources found within their ancestral domains, including the preservation of the ecological balance therein and the need to ensure that the indigenous peoples will not be undul! displaced when the tate(approved activities involving the natural resources located therein are underta@en" (Se%arate 3%inion, 4a%unan, 5., in Cru6 v. Secretary o1 Environment an2 )atural Resources, !4" SCR 1,8, ,84@,9!, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc >=er Curiam?# ;,. 4as the concept of native title to natural resources, li7e native title to land, been recogni>ed in the /hilippinesC Held2 The concept of native title to natural resources, unli@e native title to land, has not been recognized in the +hilippines" :#9+ and Dlavier, et al. invo@e the case of &eavies v. Fian>a (#) /hil. +)+, [+-)-], "+( ?S +$, (# 9 Dd ,") in support of their thesis that native title to natural resources has been upheld in this 6urisdiction" B ) )" Eowever, a 6udicious e)amination of &eavies reveals that, contrar! to the position of :#9+ and Dlavier, et al., the #ourt did not recognize native title to natural resources" 'ather, it merel! upheld the right of the indigenous peoples to claim ownership of minerals under the /hilippine 5ill of +-)". 32

<hile ) ) ) native title to land or private ownership b! Dilipinos of land b! virtue of time immemorial possession in the concept of an owner was ac@nowledged and recognized as far bac@ during the panish colonization of the +hilippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as regards natural resources" (Se%arate 3%inion, 4a%unan, 5., in Cru6 v. Secretary o1 Environment an2 )atural Resources, !4" SCR 1,8, ,84@,9!, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc >=er Curiam?# ;<. Bhat is the underlying reason for the State@s consistent assertion of o1nership and control over natural resources from the Spanish regime up to the presentC Held2 The uniFue value of natural resources has been ac@nowledged b! the tate and is the underl!ing reason for its consistent assertion of ownership and control over said natural resources from the panish regime up to the present" :atural resources, especiall! minerals, were considered b! pain as an abundant source of revenue to finance its battle in wars against other nations" Eence, pain, b! asserting its ownership over minerals wherever these ma! be found, whether in public or private lands, recognized the separabilit! of title over lands and that over minerals which ma! be found therein" ,n the other hand, the 7nited tates viewed natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals" As the owner of natural resources over the +hilippines after the latter;s cession from pain, the 7nited tates saw it fit to allow both Dilipino and American citizens to e)plore and e)ploit minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private mineral lands" ) ) )" Although the 7nited tates made a distinction between minerals found in public lands and those found in private lands, title in these minerals was in all cases sourced from the tate" The framers of the ./25 #onstitution found it necessar! to maintain the tate;s ownership over natural resources to insure their conservation for future generations of Dilipinos, to prevent foreign control of the countr! through economic domination8 and to avoid situations whereb! the +hilippines would become a source of international conflicts, thereb! posing danger to its internal securit! and independence" (Se%arate 3%inion, 4a%unan, 5., in Cru6 v. Secretary o1 Environment an2 )atural Resources, !4" SCR 1,8, ,84@,9!, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc >=er Curiam?# ;-. Bhat 1as the basis for the early Spanish decrees embracing the theory of 2ura regaliaC s this also the basis of the declaration in Section ", 'rticle K of the +-<, %onstitution that all lands of the public domain are o1ned by the StateC %onsequently, did Spain acquire title over all lands in the /hilippines in the +$ th centuryC Held2 8ominium was the basis for the earl! panish decrees embracing the theor! of 2ura regalia. The declaration in ection 2, Article B99 of the ./01 #onstitution that all lands of the public domain are owned b! the tate is li@ewise founded on dominium. 9f dominium, not imperium, is the basis of the theor! of 2ura regalia, then the lands which pain acFuired in the .6th centur! were limited to non(private lands, because it could onl! acFuire lands which were not !et privatel!(owned or occupied b! the Dilipinos" Eence, pain acFuired title onl! over lands which were unoccupied and unclaimed, i.e., public lands" (Se%arate 3%inion, 4a%unan, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 /E)R, (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc, See &ootnote 8*# T,e R$%,) " ),e S)()e )" Re'"1e! P!"-e!)$e+ U&l(* ull. A'=u$!ed 7. Pu7l$' O $'$(l+ "! E#-l".ee+ #). 8oes the right of the State to recover properties unla1fully acquired by public officials or employees 1hich may not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel under Section +(, 'rticle K of the %onstitution apply to criminal cases for the recovery of ill6gotten 1ealthC Held2 ection .5, Article B9, ./01 #onstitution provides that >NTOhe right of the tate to recover properties unlawfull! acFuired b! public officials or emplo!ees, from them or from their nominees as transferees, shall not be barred b! prescription, laches, or estoppel"? Drom the proceedings of the #onstitutional #ommission of ./06, however, it was clear that this provision applies onl! to civil actions for recover! of ill(gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases" Thus, the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving ill(gotten wealth contemplated in ection .5, Article B9 of the #onstitution ma! be barred b! prescription" (=resi2ential 2 'oc &act@&in2ing Committee on 9e0est Loans, et al. v. 'on. niano . /esierto, et al., (.R. )o. 1!+14+, 3ct. ,7, 1999, En 9anc >/avi2e, C.5.?#

33

STRUCTURE OF ?OVERN:ENT T,e D"')!$&e " Se-(!()$"& " P"*e!+ #+. !ay the Fovernment, through the /%FF, validly bind itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the !arcos heirs pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts in a %ompromise 'greement entered into bet1een the former and the latterC Held2 This is a direct encroachment on 6udicial power, particularl! in regard to criminal 6urisdiction" <ell(settled is the doctrine that once a case has been filed before a court of competent 6urisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the 6udge" 9n a criminal case, the manner in which the prosecution is handled, including the matter of whom to present as witnesses, ma! lie within the sound discretion of the government prosecutor8 but the court decides, based on the evidence proffered, in what manner it will dispose of the case" 3urisdiction, once acFuired b! the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even b! the 6ustice secretar!, to withdraw the information or to dismiss the complaint" The prosecution;s motion to withdraw or to dismiss is not the least binding upon the court" ,n the contrar!, decisional rules reFuire the trial court to ma@e its own evaluation of the merits of the case, because granting such motion is eFuivalent to effecting a disposition of the case itself" Thus, the +#AA, as the government prosecutor of ill(gotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the *arcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion" (C0ave6 v. =C((, ,99 SCR "44, /ec. 9, 1998 >=anganiban?# Dele%()$"& " P"*e!+ #". Bhat are the tests of a valid delegation of po1erC Held2 N9On ever! case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid" 9t is valid onl! if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the polic! to be e)ecuted, carried out, or implemented b! the delegate8 and (b) fi)es a standard H the limits of which are sufficientl! determinate and determinable H to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions . A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative polic!, mar@s its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agenc! to appl! it" 9t indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. (Santiago v. C3<ELEC, ,"+ SCR 1+*, <arc0 19, 199"# T,e Le%$+l()$1e De-(!)#e&) #;. 8iscuss the nature of the /arty69ist system. s it, 1ithout any qualification, open to allC Held2 ." The part!(list s!stem is a social 6ustice tool designed not onl! to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawma@ers themselves, empowered to participate directl! in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them" 9t intends to ma@e the marginalized and the underrepresented not merel! passive recipients of the tate;s benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative democrac!" Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunit! to participate in part!(list elections would desecrate this loft! ob6ective and mongrelize the social 6ustice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics" ( ng 9agong 9ayani O 3&: Labor =arty v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 14"789, 5une ,*, ,++1, En 9anc >=anganiban?# 2" #rucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social 6ustice principle that those who have less in life should have more in law" The part!(list s!stem is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life" 9t gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power" 9t is a message to the destitute and the pre6udiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible" 9t is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunit!" #learl!, therefore, the #ourt cannot accept the submissions ) ) ) that the part!(list s!stem is, without an! Fualification, open to all" uch position does not onl! wea@en the electoral chances of the marginalized and underrepresented8 it also pre6udices them" 9t would gut the substance of the part!(list s!stem" 9nstead of generating hope, it would create a mirage" 9nstead of enabling the marginalized, it would further wea@en them and 34

aggravate their marginalization" ( ng 9agong 9ayani O 3&: Labor =arty v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 14"789, 5une ,*, ,++1, En 9anc >=anganiban?# ##. 're political parties G even the ma2or ones G prohibited from participating in the party6list electionsC Held2 7nder the #onstitution and 'A 1/5., private respondents cannot be disFualified from the part!(list elections, merel! on the ground that the! are political parties" ection 5, Article C9 of the #onstitution, provides that members of the Eouse of 'epresentatives ma! >be elected through a part!(list s!stem of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations" Durthermore, under ections 1 and 0, Article 9B N#O of the #onstitution, political parties ma! be registered under the part!(list s!stem" B ) ) 4uring the deliberations in the #onstitutional #ommission, #omm" #hristian " *onsod pointed out that the participants in the part!(list s!stem ma! >be a regional part!, a sectoral part!, a national part!, 7:94,, *agsasa@a, or a regional part! in *indanao"? ) ) )" B)) Dor its part, ection 2 of 'A 1/5. also provides for >a part!(list s!stem of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, ) ) )"? ection 2 e)pressl! states that a >part!? is >either a political part! or a sectoral part! or a coalition of parties"? *ore to the point, the law defines >political part!? as >an organized group of citizens advocating an ideolog! or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularl! nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office"? Durthermore, ection .. of 'A 1/5. leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the part!(list s!stem" B ) ) 9ndubitabl!, therefore, political parties H even the ma6or ones H ma! participate in the part!(list elections" That political parties ma! participate in the part!(list elections does not mean, however, that any political part! H or an! organization or group for that matter H ma! do so" The reFuisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the part!(list s!stem, as laid down in the #onstitution and 'A 1/5." B ) ) ( ng 9agong 9ayani O 3&: Labor =arty v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 14"789, 5une ,*, ,++1, En 9anc >=anganiban?# #(. s the enumeration of marginali>ed and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party6list system in &' ,-#+ e0clusiveC Bill it be correct to assert that the party6list system is not e0clusive to the marginali>ed and underrepresented sectors, but that even the super6rich and overrepresented can validly participate in party6list electionsC Held2 <hile the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not e)clusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the part!(list s!stem" B ) ) N<Oe stress that the part!(list s!stem see@s to enable certain Dilipino citizens H specificall! those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties H to be elected to the Eouse of 'epresentatives" The assertion ) ) ) that the part!(list s!stem is not e)clusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutor! polic!" 9ts claim that even the super(rich and overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the part!(list s!stem" 9ndeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantage of +a!atas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated b! the mansion owners of Dorbes +ar@" The interests of these two sectors are manifestl! disparate8 hence, the ) ) ) position to treat them similarl! defies reason and common sense" B ) ) <hile the business moguls and the mega(rich are, numericall! spea@ing, a tin! minorit!, the! are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the star@ realit! is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation" Traditionall!, political power does not necessaril! emanate from the size of one;s 35

constituenc!8 indeed, it is li@el! to arise more directl! from the number and amount of one;s ban@ accounts" 9t is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the ma6orit! who wallow in povert!, destitution and infirmit!" 9t was for them that the part!( list s!stem was enacted H to give them not onl! genuine hope, but genuine power8 to give them opportunit! to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies8 and simpl! to give them a direct vote in #ongress and in the larger affairs of the tate" 9n its noblest sense, the part!(list s!stem trul! empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change" Ceril!, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past H the farm hands, the fisher fol@, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement H to come out and participate, as indeed man! of them came out and participated during the last elections" The tate cannot now disappoint and frustrate them b! disabling the desecrating this social 6ustice vehicle" &ecause the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections normall! dominated b! traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the Eouse of 'epresentatives were set aside for the part!( list s!stem" 9n arguing that even those sectors who normall! controlled 00 percent of the seats in the Eouse could participate in the part!(list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the , A and the #omelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the part!(list elections" As earlier noted, the purpose of the part!(list provision was to open up the s!stem, in order to enhance the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the Eouse of 'epresentatives through the simplest scheme possible" $ogic shows that the s!stem has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it H those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the >simplest scheme possible? to do so" #onversel!, it would be illogical to open the s!stem to those who have long been within it H those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections" B)) Ceril!, allowing the non(marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the part!(list s!stem would not onl! dilute, but also pre2udice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrar! to the intention of the law to enhance it" The part!(list s!stem is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged8 the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the pre6udice of the intended beneficiaries" ( ng 9agong 9ayani O 3&: Labor =arty v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 14"789, 5une ,*, ,++1, En 9anc >=anganiban?# #$. Section (("), 'rticle : of the %onstitution provides that A[t]he party6list representatives shall constitute t1enty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party6list.3 8oes the %onstitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstancesC Held2 The #onstitution simpl! states that >NtOhe part!(list representatives shall constitute twent! per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the part!(list"? B)) <e rule that a simple reading of ection 5, Article C9 of the #onstitution, easil! conve!s the eFuall! simple message that #ongress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the part!(list s!stem of representation" The #onstitution e)plicitl! sets down onl! the percentage of the total membership in the Eouse of 'epresentatives reserved for part!(list representatives" 9n the e)ercise of its constitutional prerogative, #ongress enacted 'A 1/5." As said earlier, #ongress declared therein a polic! to promote >proportional representation? in the election of part!(list representatives in order to enable Dilipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them" 9t however deemed it necessar! to reFuire parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the s!stem to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the part!(list s!stem in order to be entitled to a part!(list seat" Those garnering more than this percentage could have >additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes"? Durthermore, no winning part!, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the Eouse of 'epresentatives" B ) ) 36

#onsidering the foregoing statutor! reFuirements, it will be shown ) ) ) that ection 5(2), Article C9 of the #onstitution is not mandator!" 9t merel! provides a ceiling for part!(list seats in #ongress" (Veterans &e2eration =arty v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 1!*"81, 3ct. *, ,+++, En 9anc >=anganiban?# #,. Bhat are the inviolable parameters to determine the 1inners in a /hilippine6style party6 list electionC Held2 To determine the winners in a +hilippine(st!le part!(list election, the #onstitution and 'epublic Act :o" 1/5. mandate at least four inviolable parameters" These are= First, ),e )*e&). -e!'e&) (ll"'()$"& ( the combined number of all part!(list congressmen shall not e)ceed twent! percent of the total membership of the Eouse of 'epresentatives, including those elected under the part! list" Second, ),e )*" -e!'e&) ),!e+,"ld ( onl! those garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the part!(list s!stem are SFualifiedS to have a seat in the Eouse of 'epresentatives" .hird, ),e ),!ee +e() l$#$) ( each Fualified part!, regardless of the number of votes it actuall! obtained, is entitled to a ma)imum of three seats8 that is, one SFualif!ingS and two additional seats" Fourth, -!"-"!)$"&(l !e-!e+e&)()$"& ( the additional seats which a Fualified part! is entitled to shall be computed Sin proportion to their total number of votes"S (Veterans &e2eration =arty v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 1!*"81 an2 Com%anion Cases, 3ct. *, ,+++, En 9anc >=anganiban?# #<. .o determine the Atotal votes cast for the party6list system,3 should the votes tallied for the disqualified candidates be deductedC Held2 The instant *otions for proclamation contend that the disFualification of man! part!(list organizations has reduced the >total number of votes cast for the part!(list elections"? &ecause of this reduction, the two(percent benchmar@ reFuired b! law has now been allegedl! attained b! movants" Eence, the! now pra! for their proclamation as winners in the last part!(list elections" 'ecall that under ection ..(b) of 'A 1/5. (the +art!($ist Act), onl! those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total votes cast for the part!(list s!stem are entitled to have a seat in the Eouse of 'epresentatives" The critical Fuestion now is this= To determine the >total votes cast for the part!(list s!stem,? should the votes tallied for the disFualified candidates be deductedQ ,therwise stated, does the clause >total votes cast for the part!(list s!stem? include onl! those ballots cast for qualified part!(list candidatesQ To answer this Fuestion, there is a need to review related 6urisprudence on the matter, especiall! 9abo v. %omelec and Frego v. %omelec, which were mentioned in our Debruar! .0, 2002 'esolution" 9abo and Frego =ot 'pplicable 9n 9abo, the #ourt declared that >the ineligibilit! of a candidate receiving ma6orit! votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the ne)t highest number of votes to be declared elected" A minorit! or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office"? 9n other words, the votes cast for an ineligible or disFualified candidate cannot be considered >stra!"? Eowever, >this rule would be different if the electorate, full! aware in fact and in law of a candidate;s disFualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriet!, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible" 9n such case, the electorate ma! be said to have waived the validit! and efficac! of their votes b! notoriousl! misappl!ing their franchise or throwing awa! their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the ne)t higher number of votes ma! be deemed elected"? 9n short, the votes cast for a >notoriousl! disFualified? candidate ma! be considered >stra!? and e)cluded from the canvass" The foregoing pronouncement was reiterated in Arego, which held that the e)ception mentioned in $abo v" #omelec >is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, 37

namel!= .) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disFualified8 and 2) the electorate is full! aware in fact and in law of a candidate;s disFualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriet! but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate"? :ote, however, that the foregoing pronouncements (.) referred to regular elections for local offices and (2) involved the interpretation of ection 6 of 'A 6656" The! were not meant to cover part!(list elections, which are specificall! governed b! 'A 1/5." ection .0 of this latter law clearl! provides that the votes cast for a part!, a sectoral organization or a coalition Anot entitled to be voted for shall not be counted3O B)) The language of the law is clear8 hence, there is room, not for interpretation, but merel! for application" $i@ewise, no recourse to e)trinsic aids is warranted when the language of the law is plain and unambiguous" Another reason for not appl!ing 9abo and Frego is that these cases involve single elective posts, while the present controvers! pertains to the acFuisition of a number of congressional seats depending on the total election results H such that even those garnering second, third, fourth or lesser places could be proclaimed winners depending on their compliance with other reFuirements" 'A 1/5. is a special statute governing the election of part!(list representatives and is the controlling law in matters pertaining thereto" ince 9abo and ection 6 of 'A 6656 came into being prior to the enactment of 'A 1/5., the latter is a Fualification of the former ruling and law" ,n the other hand, Frego and other related cases that came after the enactment of 'A 1/5. should be construed as inapplicable to the latter" ubtracting the votes garnered b! these disFualified part!(list groups from the total votes cast under the part!(list s!stem will reduce the base figure to 6,522,.05" This means that the two(percent threshold can be more easil! attained b! the qualified marginalized and under(represented groups" Eence, disregarding the votes of disFualified part!(list participants will increase and broaden the number of representatives from these sectors" 4oing so will further concretize and give flesh to the polic! declaration in 'A 1/5. ) ) )" ( ng 9agong 9ayani O 3&: Labor =arty v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 14"789, 5une ,7, ,++!, En 9anc >=anganiban?# #-. State the guidelines for screening /arty69ist /articipants. Held2 9n this light, the #ourt finds it appropriate to la! down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the #onstitution, to assist the #omelec in its wor@" First, the political part!, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in ection 5 of 'A 1/5." 9n other words, it must show H through its constitution, articles of incorporation, b!laws, histor!, platform of government and trac@ record H that it represents and see@s to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors" Ceril!, ma6orit! of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented" And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interest, it has chosen or is li@el! to choose the interest of such sectors" Second, while even ma6or political parties are e)pressl! allowed b! 'A 1/5. and the #onstitution to participate in the part!(list s!stem, the! must compl! with the declared statutor! polic! of enabling >Dilipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors ) ) ) to be elected to the Eouse of 'epresentatives"? 9n other words, while the! are not disFualified merel! on the ground that the! are political parties, the! must show, however, that the! represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented" B ) ) .hird, in view of the ob6ections directed against the registration of Ang &uha! Ea!aang Gumabong, which is allegedl! a religious group, the #ourt notes the e)press constitutional provision that the religious sector ma! not be represented in the part!(list s!stem" ) ) ) Durthermore, the #onstitution provides that >religious denominations and sects shall not be registered"? (Sec. " [(], 'rticle K [%]) The prohibition was e)plained b! a member of the #onstitutional #ommission in this wise= >NTOhe prohibition is on an! religious organization registering as a political part!" 9 do not see an! prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate" That is not prohibited here8 it is the registration of a religious sect as a political part!"? 38

Fourth, a part! or an organization must not be disFualified under 1/5., which enumerates the grounds for disFualification as follows=

ection 6 of 'A

.) 9t is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes8 2) 9t advocates violence or unlawful means to see@ its goal8 2) 9t is a foreign part! or organization8 5) 9t is receiving support from an! foreign government, foreign political part!, foundation, organization, whether directl! or through an! of its officers or members or indirectl! through third parties for partisan election purposes8 5) 9t violates or fails to compl! with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections8 6) 9t declares untruthful statements in its petition8 1) 9t has ceased to e)ist for at least one (.) !ear8 or 0) 9t fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2L) of the votes cast under the part!(list s!stem in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituenc! in which it had registered"? :ote should be ta@en of paragraph 5, which disFualifies a part! or group for violation of or failure to compl! with election laws and regulations" These laws include ection 2 of 'A 1/5., which states that the part!(list s!stem see@s to >enable Dilipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties ) ) ) to become members of the Eouse of 'epresentatives"? A part! or organization, therefore, that does not compl! with this polic! must be disFualified" Fifth, the part! or organization must not be an ad6unct of, or a pro6ect organized or an entit! funded or assisted b!, the government" &! the ver! nature of the part!(list s!stem, the part! or organization must be a group of citizens, organized b! citizens and operated b! citizens" 9t must be independent of the government" The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a part!(list candidate is not onl! illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the ob6ective of the law= to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organization to be elected to the Eouse of 'epresentatives" Si0th, the part! must not onl! compl! with the reFuirements of the law8 its nominees must li@ewise do so" ) ) ) Seventh, not onl! the candidate part! or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors8 so also must its nominees" To repeat, under ection 2 of 'A 1/5., the nominees must be Dilipino citizens >who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties"? urel!, the interests of the !outh cannot be full! represented b! a retiree8 neither can those of the urban poor or the wor@ing class, b! an industrialist" To allow otherwise is to betra! the tate polic! to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented" Dighth, ) ) ) while lac@ing a well(defined political constituenc!, the nominee must li@ewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole" ( ng 9agong 9ayani O 3&: Labor =arty v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 14"789, 5une ,*, ,++1, En 9anc >=anganiban?# (). 8iscuss the history of the constitutional provision granting immunity from arrest or detention of !embers of %ongress, and ho1 should it be construedC Held2 The immunit! from arrest or detention of enators and members of the Eouse of 'epresentatives ) ) ) arises from a provision of the #onstitution" The histor! of the provision shows that the privilege has alwa!s been granted in a restrictive sense" The provision granting an e)emption as a special privilege cannot be e)tended be!ond the ordinar! meaning of its terms" 9t ma! not be e)tended b! intendment, implication or eFuitable considerations" The ./25 #onstitution provided in its Article C9 on the $egislative 4epartment= ec" .5" The enators and *embers of the Eouse of 'epresentatives shall in all cases e)cept treason, felon!, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of #ongress, and in going to and returning from the same8 ) ) )" &ecause of the broad coverage of felon! and breach of the peace, the e)emption applied onl! to civil arrests" A congressman li@e the accused( appellant, convicted under 39

Title -leven of the 'evised +enal #ode could not claim parliamentar! immunit! from arrest" Ee was sub6ect to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal" The ./12 #onstitution broadened the privilege of immunit! as follows= Article C999, ec" /" A *ember of the &atasang +ambansa shall, in all offenses punishable b! not more than si) !ears imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same" Dor offenses punishable b! more than si) !ears imprisonment, there was no immunit! from arrest" The restrictive interpretation of immunit! and the intent to confine it within carefull! defined parameters is illustrated b! the concluding portion of the provision, to wit= B ) ) but the &atasang +ambansa shall surrender the member involved to the custod! of the law within twent! four hours after its ad6ournment for a recess or for its ne)t session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so" The present #onstitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of #ongress to surrender the sub6ect #ongressman to the custod! of the law" The reFuirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed" Dor relativel! minor offenses, it is enough that #ongress is in session" (=eo%le v. 5alosFos, !,4 SCR *89, &eb. !, ,+++, En 9anc >-nares@Santiago?# (+. 'ccused6appellant %ongressman &omeo F. *alos2os filed a motion before the %ourt as7ing that he be allo1ed to fully discharge the duties of a %ongressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non6bailable offense. 4e contended that his reelection being an e0pression of popular 1ill cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest G not even the police po1er of the State. &esolve. Held2 The accused(appellant argues that a member of #ongress; function to attend sessions is underscored b! ection .6(2), Article C9 of the #onstitution which states that H (2) A ma6orit! of each Eouse shall constitute a Fuorum to do business, but a smaller number ma! ad6ourn from da! to da! and ma! compel the attendance of absent *embers in such manner, and under such penalties, as such Eouse ma! provide" Eowever, the accused(appellant has not given an! reason wh! he should be e)empted from the operation of ection .., Article C9 of the #onstitution" The members of #ongress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one" The confinement of a #ongressman charged with a crime punishable b! imprisonment of more than si) !ears is not merel! authorized b! law, it has constitutional foundations" Accused(appellant;s reliance on the ruling in 'guinaldo v. Santos ("+" S%&' ,$<, at ,,; [+--"]), which states, inter alia, that H The #ourt should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office" To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers" <hen the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that the! did this with the @nowledge of his life and character, and that the! disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilt! of an!" 9t is not for the #ourt, b! reason of such fault or misconduct, to practicall! overrule the will of the people" will not e)tricate him from his predicament" 9t can be readil! seen ) ) ) that the 'guinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office" 9t does not appl! to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law" *oreover, in the same wa! that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal" Ee remains a #ongressman unless e)pelled b! #ongress or, otherwise, disFualified" ,ne rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self(defense" ociet! must protect itself" 9t also serves as an e)ample and warning to others" 40

A person charged with crime is ta@en into custod! for purposes of the administration of 6ustice" As stated in ?nited States v. Fustilo (+- /hil. ")<, "+"), it is the in6ur! to the public which tate action in criminal law see@s to redress" 9t is not the in6ur! to the complainant" After conviction in the 'egional Trial #ourt, the accused ma! be denied bail and thus sub6ected to incarceration if there is ris@ of his absconding . The accused(appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted b! unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement" 9t will be recalled that when a warrant for accused(appellant;s arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the Eouse of 'epresentatives for him to attend the sessions ands to surrender voluntaril! to the authorities" 9ronicall!, it is now the same bod! whose call he initiall! spurned which accused(appellant is invo@ing to 6ustif! his present motion" This can not be countenanced because ) ) ) aside from its being contrar! to well(defined #onstitutional restraint, it would be a moc@er! of the aims of the tate;s penal s!stem" Accused(appellant argues that on several occasions, the 'egional Trial #ourt of *a@ati granted several motions to temporaril! leave his cell at the *a@ati #it! 3ail, for official or medical reasons ) ) )" Ee also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the :ew &ilibid +rison in *untinlupa #it!, when he was li@ewise allowedKpermitted to leave the prison premises ) ) )" There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of #ongress" -mergenc! or compelling temporar! leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders" <hat the accused(appellant see@s is not of an emergenc! nature" Allowing accused( appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) da!s or more in a wee@ will virtuall! ma@e him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position" uch an aberrant situation not onl! elevates accused(appellant;s status to that of a special class, it also would be a moc@er! of the purposes of the correction s!stem" B ) ) The accused(appellant avers that his constituents in the Dirst 4istrict of Tamboanga del :orte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the Eouse of 'epresentatives, the latter urges a co(eFual branch of government to respect his mandate" Ee also claims that the concept of temporar! detention does not necessaril! curtail his dut! to discharge his mandate and that he has alwa!s complied with the conditionsKrestrictions when he is allowed to leave 6ail" <e remain unpersuaded" B)) <hen the voters of his district elected the accused(appellant to #ongress, the! did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action" The! did so with the @nowledge that he could achieve onl! such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison" To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full @nowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, the! do so @nowing that at an! time, he ma! no longer serve his full term in office" (=eo%le v. 5alosFos, !,4 SCR *89, &eb. !, ,+++, En 9anc >-nares@Santiago?# (". !ay the Supreme %ourt properly inquire into the motives of the la1ma7ers in conducting legislative investigationsC %an it en2oin the %ongress or any of its regular and special committees from ma7ing inquiries in aid of legislationC Held2 The >allocation of constitutional boundaries? is a tas@ that this #ourt must perform under the #onstitution" *oreover, as held in a recent case (=eptali '. Fon>ales, et al. v. 4on. %atalino !acaraig, *r., et al., F.&. =o. <,$;$, +- =ovember +--), +-+ S%&' #(", #$;), >NtOhe political Fuestion doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to 6udicial determination of the rival claims" The 6urisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this #ourt" 9t cannot abdicate that obligation mandated b! the ./01 #onstitution, although said provision b! no means does awa! with the applicabilit! of the principle in appropriate cases"? (Section +, 'rticle : of the +-<, %onstitution)

41

The #ourt is thus of the considered view that it has 6urisdiction over the present controvers! for the purpose of determining the scope and e)tent of the power of the enate &lue 'ibbon #ommittee to conduct inFuires into private affairs in purported aid of legislation" (9eng6on, 5r. v. Senate 9lue Ribbon Committee, ,+! SCR "*", )ov. ,+, 1991, En 9anc >=a2illa?# (;. s the po1er of both houses of %ongress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation absolute or unlimitedC Held2 The ./01 #onstitution e)pressl! recognizes the power of both houses of #ongress to conduct inFuiries in aid of legislation ( n 'rnault v. =a>areno, <, /hil. "-, this %ourt held that although there 1as no e0press provision in the +-;( %onstitution giving such po1er to both houses of %ongress, it 1as so incidental to the legislative function as to be implied.). Thus, ection 2., Article C9 provides ) ) )" The power of both houses of #ongress to conduct inFuiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited" 9ts e)ercise is circumscribed b! the afore(Fuoted provision of the #onstitution" Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be >in aid of legislation in accordance with its dul! published rules of procedure? and that >the rights of persons appearing in or affected b! such inFuiries shall be respected"? 9t follows then that the rights of persons under the &ill of 'ights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testif! against one;s self" The power to conduct formal inFuiries or investigations is specificall! provided for in ec" . of the Senate &ules of /rocedure Foverning nquiries in 'id of 9egislation. uch inFuiries ma! refer to the implementation or re(e)amination of an! law or in connection with an! proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation" The! ma! also e)tend to an! and all matters vested b! the #onstitution in #ongress andKor in the enate alone" As held in *ean 9. 'rnault v. 9eon =a>areno, et al, (=o. 96;<"), *uly +<, +-(), <, /hil. "-), the inFuir!, to be within the 6urisdiction of the legislative bod! ma@ing it, must be material or necessar! to the e)ercise of a power in it vested b! the #onstitution, such as to legislate or to e)pel a member" 7nder ec" 5 of the aforementioned 'ules, the enate ma! refer to an! committee or committees an! speech or resolution filed b! an! enator which in its 6udgment reFuires an appropriate inFuir! in aid of legislation" 9n order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inFuir!, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inFuir! is proposed to be made" (9eng6on, 5r. v. Senate 9lue Ribbon Committee, ,+! SCR "*", )ov. ,+, 1991, En 9anc >=a2illa?# (#. Hn +; September +-<<, the Senate !inority Floor 9eader, 4on. *uan /once Dnrile delivered a speech Aon a matter of personal privilege3 before the Senate on the alleged Ata7e6over of SH9H 9 ncorporated, the flagship on the First !anila !anagement of %ompanies (F!!%) by &icardo 9opa3 and called upon Athe Senate to loo7 into the possible violation of the la1 in the case, particularly 1ith regard to &epublic 'ct =o. ;)+-, the 'nti6Fraft and %orrupt /ractices 'ct.3 Hn motion of Senator Hrlando !ercado, the matter 1as referred by the Senate to the %ommittee on 'ccountability of /ublic Hfficers (5lue &ibbon %ommittee). .hereafter, the Senate 5lue &ibbon %ommittee started its investigation on the matter. /etitioners and &icardo 9opa 1ere subpoenaed by the %ommittee to appear before it and testify on A1hat they 7no13 regarding the Asale of the thirty6si0 (;$) corporations belonging to 5en2amin PKo7oy@ &omualde>.3 't the hearing held on "; !ay +-<-, &icardo 9opa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may Aunduly pre2udice3 the defendants in %ivil %ase =o. ));( before the Sandiganbayan. /etitioner *ose F.S. 5eng>on, *r. li7e1ise refused to testify invo7ing his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the publicity generated by respondent %ommittee@s inquiry could adversely affect his rights as 1ell as those of the other petitioners 1ho are his co6defendants in %ivil %ase =o. ));( before the Sandiganbayan. .he Senate 5lue &ibbon %ommittee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after 1hich, it issued a resolution dated ( *une +-<- re2ecting the petitioners@ plea to be e0cused from testifying, and the %ommittee voted to pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. K 0 0 42

%laiming that the Senate 5lue &ibbon %ommittee is poised to subpoena and require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the %ommittee, in e0cess of its 2urisdiction and legislative rights, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of la1, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition 1ith a prayer for temporary restraining order andLor in2unctive relief. Held2 A perusal of the speech of enator -nrile reveals that he ( enator -nrile) made a statement which was published in various newspapers on 2 eptember ./00 accusing *r" 'icardo >&ab!? $opa of >having ta@en over the D**# Aroup of #ompanies"? B )) Ceril!, the speech of enator -nrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation8 he merel! called upon the enate to loo@ into a possible violation of ec" 5 of 'A :o" 20./, otherwise @nown as >The Anti(Araft and #orrupt +ractices Act"? 9n other words, the purpose of the inFuir! to be conducted b! respondent &lue 'ibbon #ommittee was to find out whether or not the relatives of +resident AFuino, particularl! *r" 'icardo $opa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 26 or 2/ corporations belonging to &en6amin >Jo@o!? 'omualdez to the $opa Aroup" There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved" B)) 9t appears, therefore, that the contemplated inFuir! b! respondent #ommittee is not reall! >in aid of legislation? because it is not related to a purpose within the 6urisdiction of #ongress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the +resident or *r" 'icardo $opa had violated ection 5 of 'A :o" 20./, the >Anti(Araft and #orrupt +ractices Act?, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature" &esides, the #ourt ma! ta@e 6udicial notice that *r" 'icardo $opa died during the pendenc! of this case" 9n *ohn .. Bat7ins v. ?nited States, it was held= >) ) )" The power of #ongress to conduct inFuiries in aid of legislation is inherent in the legislative process" That power is broad" 9t encompasses inFuiries concerning the administration of e)isting laws as well as proposed or possibl! needed statutes" 9t includes surve!s of defects in our social, economic, or political s!stem for the purpose of enabling #ongress to remed! them" 9t comprehends probes into departments of the Dederal Aovernment to e)pose corruption, inefficienc! or waste" 5ut broad as is this po1er of inFuir!, it is not unlimited" .here is no general authority to e0pose the private affairs of individuals 1ithout 2ustification in terms of the functions of %ongress. .his 1as freely conceded by the Solicitor Feneral in his arguments in this case. =or is the %ongress a la1 enforcement or trial agency. .hese are functions of the e0ecutive and 2udicial departments of government. =o inquiry is an end in itselfI it must be related to and in furtherance of a legislative tas7 of %ongress. nvestigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandi>ement of the investigators or to Ppunish@ those investigated are indefensible.3 (italics supplied) 9t cannot be overloo@ed that when respondent #ommittee decided to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in #ivil #ase :o" 0025 had alread! been filed with the andiganba!an" A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 26 (or 2/) corporations belonging to &en6amin >Jo@o!? 'omualdez" ince the issues in said complaint had long been 6oined b! the filing of petitioners; respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated b! the respondent #ommittee is one over which 6urisdiction had been acFuired b! the andiganba!an" 9n short, the issue has been pre(empted b! that court" To allow the respondent #ommittee to conduct its own investigation of an issue alread! before the andiganba!an would not onl! pose the possibilit! of conflicting 6udgments between a legislative committee and a 6udicial tribunal, but if the #ommittee;s 6udgment were to be reached before that of the andiganba!an, the possibilit! of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate 6udgment of the andiganba!an can not be discounted" 9n fine, for the respondent #ommittee to probe and inFuire into the same 6usticiable controvers! alread! before the andiganba!an, would be an encroachment into the e)clusive domain of 6udicial 6urisdiction that had much earlier set in" (9eng6on, 5r. v. Senate 9lue Ribbon Committee, ,+! SCR "*", )ov. ,+, 1991, En 9anc >=a2illa?# ((. /etitioners@ contention is that &epublic 'ct =o. ,,+$ (.he D0panded6:'. 9a1) did not Aoriginate e0clusively3 in the 4ouse of &epresentatives as required by 'rt. : , Sec. "# of the %onstitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of t1o distinct bills, 43

4. =o. +++-, and S. =o. +$;). n this connection, petitioners point out that although 'rt. : , Sec. "# 1as adopted from the 'merican Federal %onstitution, it is notable in t1o respectsO the verb Ashall originate3 is qualified in the /hilippine %onstitution by the 1ord Ae0clusively3 and the phrase Aas on other bills3 in the 'merican version is omitted. .his means, according to them, that to be considered as having originated in the 4ouse, &epublic 'ct =o. ,,+$ must retain the essence of 4. =o. +++-,. Held2 This argument will not bear anal!sis" To begin with, it is not the law ( but the revenue bill ( which is reFuired b! the #onstitution to >originate e)clusivel!? in the Eouse of 'epresentatives" 9t is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the Eouse ma! undergo such e)tensive changes in the enate that the result ma! be a rewriting of the whole" The possibilit! of a third version b! the conference committee will be discussed later" At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the enate action, a distinct bill ma! be produced" To insist that a revenue statute ( and not onl! the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law ( must substantiall! be the same as the Eouse bill would be to den! the enatePs power not onl! to Aconcur 1ith amendments3 but also to >propose amendments.3 9t would be to violate the coeFualit! of legislative power of the two houses of #ongress and in fact ma@e the Eouse superior to the enate" The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the enatePs power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the enate of the treat!(ratif!ing power and thereb! eFualize its powers and those of the Eouse overloo@s the fact that the powers being compared are different" <e are dealing here with the legislative power which under the #onstitution is vested not onl! in an! particular chamber but in the #ongress of the +hilippines, consisting of >a enate and a Eouse of 'epresentatives"? The e)ercise of the treat!(ratif!ing power is not the e)ercise of legislative power" 9t is the e)ercise of a chec@ on the e)ecutive power" There is, therefore, no 6ustification for comparing the legislative powers of the Eouse and of the enate on the basis of the possession of a similar non(legislative power b! the enate" The possession of a similar power b! the 7" " enate has never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the Eouse of 'epresentatives" B ) ) Aiven, then, the power of the enate to propose amendments, the enate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are reFuired b! the #onstitution to originate in the Eouse" 9t is insisted, however, that " :o" .620 was passed not in substitution of E" :o" .../1 but of another enate bill ( " :o" ..2/) earlier filed and that what the enate did was merel! to >ta@e (E" :o" .../1) into consideration? in enacting " :o" .620" There is reall! no difference between the enate preserving E" :o" .../1 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment b! substitution), and, on the other hand, separatel! presenting a bill of its own on the same sub6ect matter" 9n either case the result are two bills on the same sub6ect" 9ndeed, what the #onstitution simpl! means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or ta) bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the Eouse of 'epresentatives on the theor! that, elected as the! are from the districts, the members of the Eouse can be e)pected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems" ,n the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are e)pected to approach the same problems from the national perspective" &oth views are thereb! made to bear on the enactment of such laws" :or does the #onstitution prohibit the filing in the enate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the Eouse, so long as action b! the enate as a bod! is withheld pending receipt of the Eouse bill" The #ourt cannot, therefore, understand the alarm e)pressed over the fact that on *arch ., .//2, eight months before the Eouse passed E" :o" .../1, " :o" ..2/ had been filed in the enate" After all it does not appear that the enate ever considered it" 9t was onl! after the enate had received E" :o" .../1 on :ovember 22, .//2 that the process of legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the enate #ommittee on <a!s and *eans of E" :o" .../1 and the submission b! the #ommittee on Debruar! 1, .//5 of " :o" .620" Dor that matter, if the Fuestion were simpl! the priorit! in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the Eouse that a bill (E" :o" 252) to amend the CAT law was first filed on 3ul! 22, .//2" everal other bills had been filed in the Eouse before " :o" ..2/ was filed in the enate, and E" :o" .../1 was onl! a substitute of those earlier bills" (Dolentino v. Secretary o1 &inance, ,!7 SCR *!+, **1@**!, ug. ,7, 1994, En 9anc ><en2o6a?# 44

($. 8iscuss the ob2ectives of Section "$(+), 'rticle : of the +-<, %onstitution, that J[e]very bill passed by the %ongress shall embrace only one sub2ect 1hich shall be e0pressed in the title thereof.J Held2 The ob6ectives of ection 26(.), Article C9 of the ./01 #onstitution are= .) To prevent hodge(podge or log(rolling legislation8 2) To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature b! means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overloo@ed and carelessl! and unintentionall! adopted8 and 2) To fairl! apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usuall! made, of the sub6ects of legislation that are being considered, in order that the! ma! have opportunit! of being heard thereon b! petition or otherwise if the! shall so desire" ection 26(.) of Article C9 of the ./01 #onstitution is sufficientl! complied with where ) ) ) the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general ob6ective it see@s to achieve, and if all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the sub6ect matter embodied in the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general sub6ect and title" ( gri%ino . /e (u6man, 5r., et al. v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 1,9118, 5uly 19, ,+++, en 9anc >=urisima?# (,. Section ## of &.'. =o. <+<- (.he :oterQs &egistration 'ct of +--$) 1hich provides for automatic transfer to a ne1 station of any Dlection Hfficer 1ho has already served for more than four years in a particular city or municipality 1as assailed for being violative of Section "$(+) of 'rticle : of the %onstitution allegedly because it has an isolated and different sub2ect from that of &' <+<- and that the same is not e0pressed in the title of the la1. Should the challenge be sustainedC Held2 ection 55 of 'A 0.0/ is not isolated considering that it is related and germane to the sub6ect matter stated in the title of the law" The title of 'A 0.0/ is SThe CoterPs 'egistration Act of .//6S with a sub6ect matter enunciated in the e)planator! note as SA: A#T +',C949:A D,' A A-:-'A$ '-A9 T'AT9,: ,D C,T-' , A4,+T9:A A G T-* ,D #,:T9:79:A '-A9 T'AT9,:, +'- #'9&9:A TE- +',#-47'- TE-'-,D A:4 A7TE,'9T9:A TE- A++',+'9AT9,: ,D D7:4 TE-'-D,'"S ection 55, which provides for the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the sub6ect matter of registration as it see@s to ensure the integrit! of the registration process b! providing guideline for the #,*-$-# to follow in the reassignment of election officers" 9t is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters" 9n this regard, it bears stressing that the #onstitution does not reFuire #ongress to emplo! in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, full! inde) or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein" ( gri%ino . /e (u6man, 5r., et al. v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 1,9118, 5uly 19, ,+++, En 9anc >=urisima?# (<. 8o courts have the po1er to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a la1, a 4ouse of %ongress failed to comply 1ith its o1n rulesC Held2 The cases, both here and abroad, in var!ing forms of e)pression, all den! to the courts the power to inFuire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a Eouse of #ongress failed to compl! with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the right of private individuals" 9n Hsmena v. /endatun, it was held= >At an! rate, courts have declared that Uthe rules adopted b! deliberative bodies are sub6ect to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the bod! adopting them"; And it has been said that U+arliamentar! rules are merel! procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern" The! ma! be waived or disregarded b! the legislative bod!"; #onseFuentl!, Umere failure to conform to parliamentar! usage will not invalidate that action (ta@en b! a deliberative bod!) when the reFuisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure";? 9t must be realized that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others ma! not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests" 4ue regard for the wor@ing of our s!stem of government, more than mere comit!, compels reluctance on the part of the courts to enter upon an inFuir! into an alleged violation of the rules of the Eouse" #ourts must accordingl! decline the invitation to e)ercise their power" ( rroyo v. /e Venecia, ,"" SCR ,*8, ug. 14, 199" ><en2o6a?# (-. Bhat is the 5icameral %onference %ommitteeC 8iscuss the nature of its function and its 2urisdiction. 45

Held2 <hile it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the enate and the Eouse, it is not limited in its 6urisdiction to this Fuestion" 9ts broader function is described thus= A conference committee ma! deal generall! with the sub6ect matter or it ma! be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses" -ven where the conference committee is not b! rule limited in its 6urisdiction, legislative custom severel! limits the freedom with which new sub6ect matter can be inserted into the conference bill" &ut occasionall! a conference committee produces une)pected results, results be!ond its mandate" These e)cursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee 6urisdiction" This is s!mptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee. (=0ili%%ine 5u2ges ssociation v. =ra2o, ,," SCR "+!, )ov. 11, 199!, En 9anc >Cru6?# $). 8iscuss the Dnrolled 5ill 8octrine. Held2 7nder the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of E" &ill :o" 1.0/ b! the pea@er of the Eouse and the +resident of the enate and the certification b! the secretaries of both Eouses of #ongress that it was passed on :ovember 2., .//6 are conclusive of its due enactment" ) ) ) To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the -CAT cases (.olentino v. Secretary of Finance) that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption" 9n one case ('storga v. :illegas) we >went behind? an enrolled bill and consulted the 3ournal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved b! the enate" &ut, where as here there is no evidence to the contrar!, this #ourt will respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Eouses that a bill has been dul! passed" 7nder this rule, this #ourt has refused to determine claims that the three(fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the #onstitution had not been obtained, because >a dul! authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verit! and is binding on the courts"? ) ) ) This #ourt has refused to even loo@ into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the +resident contained provisions which had been >surreptitiousl!? inserted in the conference committee ) ) )" (.olentino v. Secretary of Finance) 9t has refused to loo@ into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art" C9, ec" 26(2) of the #onstitution that >upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed"? (/hilippine *udges 'ss@n v. /rado) 9n other cases, this #ourt has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified b! the presiding officers of both Eouses of #ongress" The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well(established" 9t is cited with approval b! te)t writers here and abroad" The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations= B ) ) As the +resident has no authorit! to approve a bill not passed b! #ongress, an enrolled Act in the custod! of the ecretar! of tate, and having the official attestations of the pea@er of the Eouse of 'epresentatives, of the +resident of the enate, and of the +resident of the 7nited tates, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance b! the legislative and e)ecutive departments of the government, charged, respectivel!, with the dut! of enacting and e)ecuting the laws, that it was passed b! #ongress" The respect due to coeFual and independent departments reFuires the 6udicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed #ongress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated8 leaving the court to determine, when the Fuestion properl! arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformit! with the #onstitution" (!arshall Field R %o. v. %lar7, +#; ?.S. $#-, $,", ;$ 9. Dd. "-#, ;); [+<-+]) To overrule the doctrine now, ) ) ) is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence" ( rroyo v. /e Venecia, ,"" SCR ,*8, ug. 14, 199" ><en2o6a?# $+. Bhen should the 9egislative *ournal be regarded as conclusive upon the courts, and 1hyC Held2 The 3ournal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are reFuired b! the #onstitution to be recorded therein" <ith respect to other matters, in the 46

absence of evidence to the contrar!, the 3ournals have also been accorded conclusive effects" Thus, in ?nited States v. /ons, this #ourt spo@e of the imperatives of public polic! for regarding the 3ournals as >public memorials of the most permanent character,? thus= >The! should be public, because all are reFuired to conform to them8 the! should be permanent, that rights acFuired toda! upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destro!ed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, b! facts resting onl! in the memor! of individuals"? ( rroyo v. /e Venecia, ,"" SCR ,*8, ,98@,99, ug. 14, 199" ><en2o6a?# $". Bhat matters are required to be entered on the *ournalC Held2 .) The !eas and na!s on the third and final reading of a bill ('rt. : , Sec. "$["])8 2) The !eas and na!s on an! Fuestion, at the reFuest of one(fifth of the members present ( d., Sec. +$[#])I 2) The !eas and na!s upon repassing a bill over the +resident;s veto ( d., Sec. ",[+])8 and 5) The +resident;s ob6ection to a bill he had vetoed ( d.)" ( rroyo v. /e Venecia, ,"" SCR ,*8, ,98, ug. 14, 199" ><en2o6a?# $;. Bhat are the limitations on the veto po1er of the /residentC Held2 The act of the -)ecutive in vetoing the particular provisions is an e)ercise of a constitutionall! vested power" &ut even as the #onstitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its e)ercise" The veto power is not absolute" B)) The , A is correct when it states that the -)ecutive must veto a bill in its entiret! or not at all" Ee or she cannot act li@e an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she disli@es" 9n the e)ercise of the veto power, it is generall! all or nothing" Eowever, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the mone! to run the machiner! of government and it can not veto the entire bill even if it ma! contain ob6ectionable features" The +resident is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts" 9t is for this reason that the #onstitution has wisel! provided the >item veto power? to avoid ine)pedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure" The #onstitution provides that onl! a particular item or items ma! be vetoed" The power to disapprove an! item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authorit! to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item" (9eng6on v. /rilon, ,+8 SCR 1!!, 14!@147, %ril 17, 199,, En 9anc >(utierre6?# $#. 8istinguish an Aitem3 from a Aprovision3 in relation to the veto po1er of the /resident. Held2 The terms item and provision in budgetar! legislation and practice are concededl! different" An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts ) ) ) of the bill . 9t is an indivisible sum of mone! dedicated to a stated purpose. The 7nited tates upreme #ourt, in the case of 5eng>on v. Secretary of *ustice ("-- ?.S. #+), #+#, (, %t "(", <+ 9. Dd., ;+") declared Athat an item3 of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of mone!, not some general provision of la1, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill" (9eng6on v. /rilon, ,+8 SCR 1!!, 14!@147, %ril 17, 199,, En 9anc >(utierre6?# $(. !ay the /resident veto a la1C !ay she veto a decision of the S% 1hich has long become final and e0ecutoryC Held2 <e need no length! 6ustifications or citations of authorities to declare that no +resident ma! veto the provisions of a law enacted thirt!(five (25) !ears before his or her term of office" :either ma! the +resident set aside or reverse a final and e)ecutor! 6udgment of this #ourt through the e)ercise of the veto power" (9eng6on v. /rilon, ,+8 SCR 1!!, 14!@147, %ril 17, 199,, En 9anc >(utierre6?# $$. ' disqualification case 1as filed against a candidate for %ongressman before the election 1ith the %H!D9D%. .he latter failed to resolve that disqualification case before the election and that candidate 1on, although he 1as not yet proclaimed because of that pending disqualification case. s the %H!D9D% no1 ousted of 2urisdiction to resolve the pending disqualification case and, therefore, should dismiss the case, considering that 2urisdiction is no1 vested 1ith the 4ouse of &epresentatives Dlectoral .ribunal (4&D.)C

47

Held2 ." N+Oetitioner vigorousl! contends that after the *a! 0, .//5 elections, the #,*-$-# lost its 6urisdiction over the Fuestion of petitioner;s Fualifications to run for member of the Eouse of 'epresentatives" Ee claims that 6urisdiction over the petition for disFualification is e)clusivel! lodged with the Eouse of 'epresentatives -lectoral Tribunal (E'-T)" Aiven the !et(unresolved Fuestion of 6urisdiction, petitioner avers that the #,*-$-# committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his proclamation as the winning candidate in the econd #ongressional 4istrict of *a@ati #it!" <e disagree" +etitioner convenientl! confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the Eouse of 'epresentatives and a member of the same" ,btaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automaticall! vest the position in the winning candidate" ection .1 of Article C9 of the ./01 #onstitution reads= The enate and the Eouse of 'epresentatives shall have an -lectoral Tribunal which shall be the sole 6udge of all contests relating to the election, returns and Fualifications of their respective *embers" 7nder the above(stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearl! assumes 6urisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and Fualifications of candidates for either the enate or the Eouse onl! when the latter become members of either the enate or the Eouse of 'epresentatives" A candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not ta@en his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the Eouse of 'epresentatives sub6ect to ection .1 of Article C9 of the #onstitution" <hile the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, &"+" &lg" 00. in con6unction with ec" 6 of '"A" 6656 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein" Thus, petitioner;s contention that >after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral e)ercise from the moment of election, the #,*-$-# is automaticall! divested of authorit! to pass upon the Fuestion of Fualification? finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the #,*-$-# is empowered b! ection 6 (in relation to ection 1) of '"A" 6656 to continue to hear and decide Fuestions relating to Fualifications of candidates" ( $uino v. C3<ELEC, ,48 SCR 4++, 41"@419, Se%t. 18, 1997, En 9anc >4a%unan, 5.?# 2" As to the Eouse of 'epresentatives -lectoral Tribunal;s supposed assumption of 6urisdiction over the issue of petitioner;s Fualifications after the *a! 0, .//5 elections, suffice it to sa! that E'-T;s 6urisdiction as the sole 6udge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and Fualifications of members of #ongress begins onl! after a candidate has become a member of the Eouse of 'epresentatives ('rt. : , Sec. +,, +-<, %onstitution). +etitioner not being a member of the Eouse of 'epresentatives, it is obvious that the E'-T at this point has no 6urisdiction over the Fuestion" (Romual2e6@<arcos v. C3<ELEC, ,48 SCR !++, !4+@!41, Se%t. 18, 1997, En 9anc >4a%unan, 5.?# $,. Bill the rule be the same if that candidate 1ins and 1as proclaimed 1inner and already assumed office as %ongressmanC Held2 <hile the #,*-$-# is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidac!, its refusal to e)ercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position b! Darinas is a recognition of the 6urisdictional boundaries separating the #,*-$-# and the -lectoral Tribunal of the Eouse of 'epresentatives (E'-T)" 7nder Article C9, ection .1 of the #onstitution, the E'-T has sole and e)clusive 6urisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and Fualifications of members of the Eouse of 'epresentatives" Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, ta@en his oath, and assumed office as a member of the Eouse of 'epresentatives, #,*-$-#;s 6urisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and Fualifications ends, and the E'-T;s own 6urisdiction begins. Thus, the #,*-$-#;s decision to discontinue e)ercising 6urisdiction over the case is 6ustifiable, in deference to the E'-T;s own 6urisdiction and functions" ((uerrero v. C3<ELEC, !!* SCR 478, 5uly ,*, ,+++, En 9anc >Juisumbing?# $<. +etitioner further argues that the E'-T assumes 6urisdiction onl! if there is a valid proclamation of the winning candidate" Ee contends that if a candidate fails to satisf! the statutor! reFuirements to Fualif! him as a candidate, his subseFuent proclamation is void ab initio. <here the proclamation is null and void, there is no proclamation at all and the mere assumption of office b! the proclaimed candidate does not deprive the #,*-$-# at all of its power to declare such nullit!, according to petitioner" Held2 &ut ) ) ) in an electoral contest where the validit! of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has ta@en his oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is 48

raised, that issue is best addressed to the E'-T . The reason for this ruling is self(evident, for it avoids duplicit! of proceedings and a clash of 6urisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people;s mandate" ((uerrero v. C3<ELEC, !!* SCR 478, 5uly ,*, ,+++, En 9anc >Juisumbing?# $-. s there an appeal from a decision of the Senate or 4ouse of &epresentatives Dlectoral .ribunalC Bhat then is the remedy, if anyC Held2 The #onstitution mandates that the Eouse of 'epresentatives -lectoral Tribunal and the enate -lectoral Tribunal shall each, respectivel!, be the sole 6udge of all contests relating to the election, returns and Fualifications of their respective members" The #ourt has stressed that >) ) ) so long as the #onstitution grants the E'-T the power to be the sole 6udge of all contests relating to the election, returns and Fualifications of members of the Eouse of 'epresentatives, an! final action ta@en b! the E'-T on a matter within its 6urisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed b! this #ourt" The power granted to the -lectoral Tribunal ) ) ) e)cludes the e)ercise of an! authorit! on the part of this #ourt that would in an! wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same"? The #ourt did recognize, of course, its power of 6udicial review in e)ceptional cases" 9n &obles v. 4&D., the #ourt has e)plained that while the 6udgments of the Tribunal are be!ond 6udicial interference, the #ourt ma! do so, however, but onl! >in the e)ercise of this #ourt;s so(called e)traordinar! 6urisdiction ) ) ) upon a determination that the Tribunal;s decision or resolution was rendered without or in e)cess of its 6urisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing !orrero v. 5ocar ($$ /hil. #"-), upon a clear showing of such arbitrar! and improvident use b! the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a ver! clear unmitigated error, manifestl! constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remed! for such abuse"? The #ourt does not ) ) ) venture into the perilous area of correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the Aovernment8 it comes in onl! when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the #onstitution itself calls for remedial action" (Libanan v. 'RED, ,8! SCR 7,+, /ec. ,,, 199" >Vitug?# T,e E<e'u)$1e De-(!)#e&) ,). 8id former /resident Dstrada resign as /resident or should be considered resigned as of *anuary "), "))+ 1hen /resident Floria !acapagal 'rroyo too7 her oath as the +# th /resident of the &epublicC Held2 'esignation ) ) ) is a factual Fuestion and its elements are be!ond Fuibble= there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validit! of a resignation is not governed b! an! formal reFuirement as to form" 9t can be oral" 9t can be written" 9t can be e)press" 9t can be implied" As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect" 9n the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write an! formal letter of resignation before he evacuated *alacanang +alace in the afternoon of 3anuar! 20, 200. after the oath(ta@ing of respondent Arro!o" #onseFuentl!, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after 3anuar! 20, 200. or b! the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. 7sing this totalit! test, 1e hold that petitioner resigned as /resident. B)) 9n sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted" 9t was confirmed b! his leaving *alacanang" 9n the press release containing his final statement, (.) he ac7no1ledged the oath6ta7ing of the respondent as /resident of the 'epublic albeit with reservation about its legalit!8 (2) he emphasized he was leaving the +alace, the seat of the presidenc!, for the sa@e of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation" 4e did not say he 1as leaving the /alace due to any 7ind of inability and that he 1as going to re6assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears 8 (2) he e)pressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunit! to serve them" <ithout doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as +resident8 (5) he assured that he will not shir@ from an! future challenge that ma! come ahead on the same service of our 49

countr!" +etitioner;s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up8 and (5) he called on his supporters to 6oin him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarit!" %ertainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner;s valedictor!, his final act of farewell" 4is presidency is no1 in the past tense. (Estra2a v. /esierto, (.R. )os. 14*"1+@17, <arc0 ,, ,++1, En 9anc >=uno?# ,+. 8iscuss our legal history on e0ecutive immunity. Held2 The doctrine of e)ecutive immunit! in this 6urisdiction emerged as a case la1" 9n the +-+) case of Forbes, etc. v. %huoco .iaco and %rossfield , the respondent Tiaco, a #hinese citizen, sued petitioner <" #ameron Dorbes, Aovernor(Aeneral of the +hilippine 9slands, 3"-" Earding and #"'" Trowbridge, #hief of +olice and #hief of the ecret ervice of the #it! of *anila, respectivel!, for damages for allegedl! conspiring to deport him to #hina" 9n granting a writ of prohibition, this #ourt, spea@ing thru *r" 3ustice 3ohnson, held= >The principle of nonliabilit! ) ) ) does not mean that the 6udiciar! has no authorit! to touch the acts of the Aovernor(Aeneral8 that he ma!, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained" uch a construction would mean that t!rann!, under the guise of the e)ecution of the law, could wal@ defiantl! abroad, destro!ing rights of person and of propert!, wholl! free from interference of courts or legislatures" This does not mean, either, that a person in6ured b! the e)ecutive authorit! b! an act un6ustifiable under the law has no remed!, but must submit in silence" ,n the contrar!, it means, simpl!, that the Aovernor(Aeneral, li@e the 6udges of the courts and the members of the $egislature, ma! not be personall! mulcted in civil damages for the conseFuences of an act e)ecuted in the performance of his official duties" The 6udiciar! has full power to, and will, when the matter is properl! presented to it and the occasion 6ustl! warrants it, declare an act of the Aovernor(Aeneral illegal and void and place as nearl! as possible in status quo an! person who has been deprived his libert! or his propert! b! such act" This remed! is assured to ever! person, however humble or of whatever countr!, when his personal or propert! rights have been invaded, even b! the highest authorit! of the state" The thing which the 6udiciar! can not do is mulct the Aovernor(Aeneral personall! in damages which result from the performance of his official dut!, an! more than it can a member of the +hilippine #ommission or the +hilippine Assembl!" +ublic polic! forbids it" :either does this principle of nonliabilit! mean that the chief e)ecutive ma! not be personall! sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official" ,n the contrar!, it clearl! appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularl! that portion which touched the liabilit! of 6udges and drew an analog! between such liabilit! and that of the Aovernor(Aeneral, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainl! outside of his power and authorit! that he can not be said to have e)ercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act" <hat is held here is that he will be protected from personal liabilit! for damages not onl! when he acts within his authorit!, but also when he is without authorit!, provided he actuall! used discretion and 6udgment, that is, the 6udicial facult!, in determining whether he had authorit! to act or not" 9n other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. 9f he decide wrongl!, he is still protected provided the Fuestion of his authorit! was one over which two men, reasonabl! Fualified for that position, might honestl! differ8 but he is not protected if the lac@ of authorit! to act is so plain that two such men could not honestl! differ over its determination" 9n such case, he acts, not as Aovernor(Aeneral but as a private individual, and, as such, must answer for the conseFuences of his act"? *r" 3ustice 3ohnson underscored the conseFuences if the #hief -)ecutive was not granted immunit! from suit, vi>O >) ) )" Action upon important matters of state dela!ed8 the time and substance of the chief e)ecutive spent in wrangling litigation8 disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the tate and for the office he occupies8 a tendenc! to unrest and disorder8 resulting in a wa!, in a distrust as to the integrit! of government itself"? ,ur +-;( %onstitution too@ effect but it did not contain any specific provision on e0ecutive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law !ears under the late +resident Derdinand -" *arcos and the ./12 #onstitution was born" 9n ./0., it was amended and one of the amendments involved e0ecutive immunity " ection .1, Article C99 stated= >The +resident shall be immune from suit during his tenure" Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done b! him or b! others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure" 50

The immunities herein provided shall appl! to the incumbent +resident referred to in Article BC99 of this #onstitution"? 9n his second Cicente A" inco +rofessorial #hair $ecture entitled, >+residential 9mmunit! And All The Jing;s *en= The $aw ,f +rivilege As A 4efense To Actions Dor 4amages,? (62 +hil" $"3" ..2 N./01O) petitioner;s learned counsel, former 4ean of the 7+ #ollege of $aw, Att!" +acifico Agabin, brightened the modifications effected b! this constitutional amendment on the e)isting law on e)ecutive privilege" To Fuote his disFuisition= >9n the +hilippines though, we sought to do the American one better b! enlarging and fortif!ing the absolute immunit! concept" Dirst, we e)tended it to shield the +resident not onl! from civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims" econd, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the +resident outside the scope of official duties" And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not onl! the +resident but also other persons, be the! government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the +resident" 9t can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from A94 (or absolute immunit! defense s!ndrome)"? .he Hpposition in the then 5atasang /ambansa sought the repeal of this !arcosian concept of e0ecutive immunity in the +-,; %onstitution " The move was led b! then *ember of +arliament, now ecretar! of Dinance, Alberto 'omulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to +resident *arcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust" Ee denounced the immunit! as a return to the anachronism >the @ing can do no wrong"? The effort failed" The ./12 #onstitution ceased to e)ist when +resident *arcos was ousted from office b! the +eople +ower revolution in ./06" <hen the +-<, %onstitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the e)ecutive immunit! provision of the ./12 #onstitution" ) ) ) (Estra2a v. /esierto, (.R. )os. 14*"1+@17, <arc0 ,, ,++1, en 9anc >=uno?# ,". %an former /resident Dstrada still be prosecuted criminally considering that he 1as not convicted in the impeachment proceedings against himC Held2 <e re6ect his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings" The impeachment trial of petitioner -strada was aborted b! the wal@out of the prosecutors and b! the events that led to his loss of the presidenc!" 9ndeed, on Debruar! 1, 200., the enate passed enate 'esolution :o" 02 >'ecognizing that the 9mpeachment #ourt is Functus Hfficio.3 ince the 9mpeachment #ourt is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted" The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution" uch a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non(sitting +resident who has not been sub6ected to impeachment proceedings and !et can be the ob6ect of a criminal prosecution" To be sure, the debates in the #onstitutional #ommission ma@e it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the +resident, the proper criminal and civil cases ma! alread! be filed against him ) ) )" This is in accord with our ruling in n &eO Saturnino 5ermude> that >incumbent +residents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbenc! and tenure? but not beyond/ #onsidering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidenc!, petitioner -strada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the ,mbudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings" (Estra2a v. /esierto, (.R. )os. 14*"1+@17, <ar. ,, ,++1, En 9anc >=uno?# ,;. s Section +<.( of &.'. =o. -+<- in relation to Section # of the same 'ct in contravention of Section #, 'rticle : of the %onstitutionC Held2 ection 5 of '"A" :o" /.0/ provides that the overseas absentee voter ma! vote for president, vice(president, senators and part!(list representatives" B)) +etitioner claims that the provision of ection .0"5 of '"A" :o" /.0/ empowering the #,*-$-# to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice(president, is unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of paragraph 5, ection 5 of Article C99 of the #onstitution ) ) ) which gives to #ongress the dut! to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for president and vice(president" 51

B)) 9ndeed, the phrase, proclamation of 1inning candidates , in ection .0"5 of '"A" :o" /.0/ is far too sweeping that it necessaril! includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidenc! and the vice(presidenc!" ection .0"5 of '"A" :o" /.0/ appears to be repugnant to ection 5, Article C999 of the #onstitution onl! insofar as said ection totall! disregarded the authorit! given to #ongress b! the #onstitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vice(president" 9n addition, the #ourt notes that ection .0"5 of the law ) ) ) clashes with paragraph 5, ection 5, Article C99 of the #onstitution which provides that the returns of ever! election for +resident and Cice(+resident shall be certified b! the board of canvassers to #ongress" #ongress should not have allowed the #,*-$-# to usurp a power that constitutionall! belongs to it or ) ) ) to encroach >on the power of #ongress to canvass the votes for president and vice(president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions"? The provisions of the #onstitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of .he Hverseas 'bsentee :oting 'ct of ")); and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice(president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of #ongress" (<aIalintal v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 17"+1!, 5uly 1+, ,++!, En 9anc > ustria@<artine6?# ,#. 8iscuss the 2urisdiction of the Supreme %ourt to hear and decide cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the /resident and :ice6/resident. Held2 +etitioners Tecson, et al" ) ) ) and Celez ) ) ) invo@e the provisions of Article C99, ection 5, paragraph 1, of the ./01 #onstitution in assailing the 6urisdiction of the #,*-$-# when it too@ cognizance of +A :o" 05(002 and in urging the upreme #ourt to instead ta@e on the petitions the! directl! instituted before it" B ) ) B)) ,rdinar! usage would characterize a >contest? in reference to a -"+)-ele')$"& scenario" -lection contests consist of either an election protest or a quo 1arranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one ob6ective in view, i.e", to dislodge the winning candidate from office" A perusal of the phraseolog! in 'ule .2, 'ule .2, and 'ule .5 of the A&ules of the /residential Dlectoral .ribunal,3 promulgated b! the upreme #ourt en banc on .0 April .//2, would support this premise ) ) )" The rules categoricall! spea@ of the 6urisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and Fualifications of the >+resident? or >Cice(+resident? of the +hilippines, and not of >candidates? for +resident or Cice(+resident" A quo 1arranto proceeding is generall! defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfull! holds or e)ercises a public office" 9n such conte)t, the election contest can onl! contemplate a post(election scenario. 9n 'ule .5, onl! a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest" This rule again presupposes a post(election scenario. 9t is fair to conclude that the 6urisdiction of the upreme #ourt, defined b! ection 5, paragraph 1, of the ./01 #onstitution, would not include cases directl! brought before it Fuestioning the Fualifications of a candidate for the presidenc! or vice(presidenc! before the elections are held" Accordingl!, A"'" :o" .6.525 ) ) ) and A"'" :o" .6.625 ) ) ) would have to be dismissed for want of 6urisdiction" (<aria 5eanette Decson, et al. v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 1*14!4, <arc0 !, ,++4, En 9anc >Vitug?# ,(. State the reason 1hy not all appointments made by the /resident under the +-<, %onstitution 1ill require confirmation by the %ommission on 'ppointments. Held2 The aforecited provision (Section +$, 'rticle : ) of the #onstitution has been the sub6ect of several cases on the issue of the restrictive function of the #ommission on Appointments with respect to the appointing power of the +resident" This #ourt touched upon the historical antecedent of the said provision in the case of Sarmiento v. !ison in which it was ratiocinated upon that ection .6 of Article C99 of the ./01 #onstitution reFuiring confirmation b! the #ommission on Appointments of certain appointments issued b! the +resident contemplates a s!stem of chec@s and balances between the e)ecutive and 52

legislative branches of government" -)perience showed that when almost all presidential appointments reFuired the consent of the #ommission on Appointments, as was the case under the ./25 #onstitution, the commission became a venue of >horse trading? and similar malpractices. ,n the other hand, placing absolute power to ma@e appointments in the +resident with hardl! an! chec@ b! the legislature, as what happened under the ./12 #onstitution, leads to abuse of such power" Thus was perceived the need to establish a >middle ground? between the ./25 and ./12 #onstitutions" The framers of the ./01 #onstitution deemed it imperative to sub6ect certain high positions in the government to the power of confirmation of the #ommission on Appointments and to allow other positions within the e)clusive appointing power of the +resident" (<analo v. Sisto6a, !1, SCR ,!9, ug. 11, 1999, En 9anc >=urisima?# ,$. Bho are the officers to be appointed by the /resident under Section +$, 'rticle : of the +-<, %onstitution 1hose appointments shall require confirmation by the %ommission on 'ppointments, and those 1hose appointments shall no longer require such confirmationC Held2 #onformabl!, as consistentl! interpreted and ruled in the leading case of Sarmiento v. !ison, and in the subseFuent cases of 5autista v. Salonga, Suintos68eles v. %onstitutional %ommission, and %alderon v. %arale, under ection .6, Article C99, of the #onstitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed b! the +resident= Dirst, the heads of the e)ecutive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the ran@ of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this #onstitution8 econd, all other officers of the Aovernment whose appointments are not otherwise provided for b! law8 Third, those whom the +resident ma! be authorized b! law to appoint8 Dourth, officers lower in ran@ whose appointments the #ongress ma! b! law vest in the +resident alone" 9t is well(settled that onl! presidential appointees belonging to the first group reFuire the confirmation b! the #ommission on Appointments" (<analo v. Sisto6a, !1, SCR ,!9, ug. 11, 1999, En 9anc >=urisima?# ,,. ?nder &epublic 'ct $-,( (the 8 9F 'ct of +--)), the 8irector Feneral, 8eputy 8irector Feneral, and other top officials of the /hilippine =ational /olice (/=/) shall be appointed by the /resident and their appointments shall require confirmation by the %ommission on 'ppointments. &espondent Sisto>a 1as appointed 8irector Feneral of the /=/ but he refused to submit his appointment papers to the %ommission on 'ppointments for confirmation contending that his appointment shall no longer require confirmation despite the e0press provision of the la1 requiring such confirmation. Should his contention be upheldC Held2 9t is well(settled that onl! presidential appointees belonging to the first group (enumerated under the first sentence of ection .6, Article C99 of the ./01 #onstitution) reFuire the confirmation b! the #ommission on Appointments" The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first categor!, need not be confirmed b! the #ommission on Appointments" As held in the case of .arrosa v. Singson, #ongress cannot b! law e)pand the power of confirmation of the #ommission on Appointments and reFuire confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of ection .6 of Article C99 of the ./01 #onstitution" #onseFuentl!, unconstitutional are ections 26 and 2. of 'epublic Act 6/15 which empower the #ommission on Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are not reFuired b! the #onstitution to be confirmed" (<analo v. Sisto6a, !1, SCR ,!9, ug. 11, 1999, En 9anc >=urisima?# ,<. Bill it be correct to argue that since the /hilippine =ational /olice is a7in to the 'rmed Forces of the /hilippines, therefore, the appointments of police officers 1hose ran7 is equal to that of colonel or naval captain 1ill require confirmation by the %ommission on 'ppointmentsC Held2 This contention is ) ) ) untenable" The +hilippine :ational +olice is separate and distinct from the Armed Dorces of the +hilippines" The #onstitution, no less, sets forth the distinction" 7nder ection 5 of Article BC9 of the ./01 #onstitution, 53

>The Armed Dorces of the +hilippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo militar! training and service, as ma! be provided b! law" 9t shall @eep a regular force necessar! for the securit! of the tate"? ,n the other hand, ection 6 of the same Article of the #onstitution ordains that= >The tate shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be administered and controlled b! a national police commission" The authorit! of local e)ecutives over the police units in their 6urisdiction shall be provided b! law"? To so distinguish the police force from the armed forces, #ongress enacted 'epublic Act 6/15 ) ) )" Thereunder, the police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ran@s in the militar! are not similar to those in the +hilippine :ational +olice" Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the +:+ ) ) ) do not fall under the first categor! of presidential appointees reFuiring confirmation b! the #ommission on Appointments" (<analo v. Sisto6a, !1, SCR ,!9, ug. 11, 1999, En 9anc >=urisima?# ,-. 8iscuss the nature of an ad6interim appointment. s it temporary and, therefore, can be 1ithdra1n or revo7ed by the /resident at her pleasureC Held2 An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it ta@es effect immediatel! and can no longer be withdrawn b! the +resident once the appointee has Fualified into office" The fact that it is sub6ect to confirmation b! the #ommission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character" The #onstitution itself ma@es an ad interim appointment permanent in character b! ma@ing it effective until disapproved b! the #ommission on Appointments or until the ne)t ad6ournment of #ongress" The second paragraph of ection .6, Article C99 of the #onstitution provides as follows= >The +resident shall have the power to ma@e appointments during the recess of the #ongress, whether voluntar! or compulsor!, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval b! the #ommission on Appointments or until the ne)t ad6ournment of the #ongress"? Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or ne)t ad6ournment, signif!ing that it can no longer be withdrawn or revo@ed b! the +resident" The fear that the +resident can withdraw or revo@e at an! time and for an! reason an ad interim appointment is utterl! without basis" *ore than half a centur! ago, this #ourt had alread! ruled that an ad interim appointment is permanent in character" 9n Summers v. H>aeta, decided on ,ctober 25, ./50, we held that= >) ) ) an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (5), ection .0, Article C99 of the #onstitution, which provides that the U+resident shall have the power to ma@e appointments during the recess of the #ongress, but such appointments shall be effective onl! until disapproval b! the #ommission on Appointments or until the ne)t ad6ournment of the #ongress"; t is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is sub2ect to confirmation by the %ommission on 'ppointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainl! for a reason other than that its provisional period has e)pired" aid appointment is of course distinguishable from an Uacting; appointment which is merel! temporar!, good until another permanent appointment is issued"? The #onstitution imposes no condition on the effectivit! of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment ta@es effect immediatel!" The appointee can at once assume office and e)ercise, as a de 2ure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office" 9n /acete v. Secretary of the %ommission on 'ppointments , this #ourt elaborated on the nature of an ad interim appointment as follows= >A distinction is thus made between the e)ercise of such presidential prerogative reFuiring confirmation b! the #ommission on Appointments when #ongress is in session and when it is in recess" 9n the former, the +resident nominates, and onl! upon the consent of the #ommission on Appointments ma! the person thus named assume office" t is not so 1ith reference to ad interim appointments. t ta7es effect at once. .he individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function 1ithout loss of time. 4is title to such office is 54

complete. 9n the language of the #onstitution, the appointment is effective Uuntil disapproval b! the #ommission on Appointments or until the ne)t ad6ournment of the #ongress";? +etitioner cites &lac@;s $aw 4ictionar! which defines the term Aad interim3 to mean >in the meantime? or >for the time being"? Eence, petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment is undoubtedl! temporar! in character" This argument is not new and was answered b! this #ourt in /amantasan ng 9ungsod ng !aynila v. ntermediate 'ppellate %ourt, where we e)plained that= >) ) ) Drom the arguments, it is eas! to see wh! the petitioner should e)perience difficult! in understanding the situation" +rivate respondent had been e)tended several Pad interim@ appointments which petitioner mista@enl! understands as appointments temporar! in nature" +erhaps, it is the literal translation of the word Pad interim@ which creates such belief" The term is defined b! &lac@ to mean Uin the meantime; or Ufor the time being;" Thus, an officer ad interim is one appointed to fill a vacanc!, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or temporar! incapacit! of its regular incumbent (5lac7@s 9a1 8ictionary, &evised Fourth Ddition, +-,<)" &ut such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the conte)t of +hilippine law" 9n referring to 4r" -steban;s appointments, the term is not descriptive of the nature of the appointments given to him" &ather, it is used to denote the manner in 1hich said appointments 1ere made, that is, done by the /resident of the /amantasan in the meantime, 1hile the 5oard of &egents, 1hich is originally vested by the ?niversity %harter 1ith the po1er of appointment, is unable to act. B ) )"? Thus, the term >ad interim appointment?, as used in letters of appointment signed b! the +resident, means a permanent appointment made b! the +resident in the meantime that %ongress is in recess. 9t does not mean a temporar! appointment that can be withdrawn or revo@ed at an! time" The term, although not found in the te)t of the #onstitution, has acFuired a definite legal meaning under +hilippine 6urisprudence" The #ourt had again occasion to e)plain the nature of an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of !arohombsar v. %ourt of 'ppeals, where the #ourt stated= ><e have alread! mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is temporar! or in an acting capacit!, rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment was made" 9n the instant case, the appointment e)tended to private respondent b! then * 7 +resident Alonto, 3r" was issued without condition nor limitation as to tenure" The permanent status of private respondent;s appointment as -)ecutive Assistant 99 was recognized and attested to b! the #ivil ervice #ommission 'egional ,ffice :o" .2" /etitioner@s submission that private respondent@s ad interim appointment is synonymous 1ith a temporary appointment 1hich could be validly terminated at any time is clearly untenable. 'd interim appointments are permanent appointment but their terms are only until the 5oard disapproves them.3 An ad interim appointee who has Fualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government emplo!ee and therefore part of the civil service" Ee en6o!s the constitutional protection that >NnOo officer or emplo!ee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended e)cept for cause provided b! law"? (Section "[;], 'rticle K65 of the %onstitution) Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has Fualified into office" The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible onl! if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he Fualifies, and an! withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office . ,nce an appointee has Fualified, he acFuires a legal right to the office which is protected not onl! b! statute but also b! the #onstitution" Ee can onl! be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the reFuirements of due process" (<atibag v. 9eni%ayo, !8+ SCR 49, %ril ,, ,++,, En 9anc >Car%io?# <). 4o1 is an ad interim appointment terminatedC Held2 An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the #onstitution" The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment b! the #ommission on Appointments" The second cause is the ad6ournment of #ongress without the #ommission on Appointments acting on his appointment" These two causes are resolutor! conditions e)pressl! imposed b! the #onstitution on all ad interim appointments" These resolutor! conditions constitute, in effect, a word of 4amocles over the heads of ad interim appointees" :o one, however, can complain because it is the #onstitution itself that places the word of 4amocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees" (<atibag v. 9eni%ayo, !8+ SCR 49, %ril ,, ,++,, En 9anc >Car%io?# 55

<+. 4o1 is an ad interim appointment distinguished from an appointment or designation in an acting or temporary capacityC Held2 <hile an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable e)cept as provided b! law, an appointment or designation in a temporar! or acting capacit! can be withdrawn or revo@ed at the pleasure of the appointing power . A temporar! or acting appointee does not en6o! an! securit! of tenure, no matter how briefl!" (<atibag v. 9eni%ayo, !8+ SCR 49, %ril ,, ,++,, En 9anc >Car%io?# <". 5enipayo, .uason and 5orra 1ere appointed %hairman and %ommissioners, respectively, of the %ommission on Dlections, by the /resident 1hen %ongress 1as not in session. 8id their appointment violate the Sec. +("), 'rt. K6% of the %onstitution that substantially provides that A=o member of the %ommission (on Dlections) shall be appointed in an acting or temporary capacityC Held2 9n the instant case, the +resident did in fact appoint permanent #ommissioners to fill the vacancies in the #,*-$-#, sub6ect onl! to confirmation b! the #ommission on Appointments" &enipa!o, &orra and Tuason were e)tended permanent appointments during the recess of #ongress" The! were not appointed or designated in a temporar! or acting capacit!, unli@e #ommissioner Ea!dee Gorac in 5rillantes v. Eorac and olicitor Aeneral Deli) &autista in =acionalista /arty v. 5autista" The ad interim appointments of &enipa!o, &orra and Tuason are e)pressl! allowed b! the #onstitution which authorizes the +resident, during the recess of #ongress, to ma@e appointments that ta@e effect immediatel!" <hile the #onstitution mandates that the #,*-$-# >shall be independent,? this provision should be harmonized with the +resident;s power to e)tend ad interim appointments" To hold that the independence of the #,*-$-# reFuires the #ommission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the +resident;s power to ma@e ad interim appointments" This is contrar! to the rule on statutor! construction to give meaning and effect to ever! provision of the law" 9t will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the #onstitution" B)) The +resident;s power to e)tend ad interim appointments ma! indeed briefl! put the appointee at the merc! of both the appointing and confirming powers" This situation, however, in onl! for a short period H from the time of issuance of the ad interim appointment until the #ommission on Appointments gives or withholds its consent" The #onstitution itself sanctions this situation, as a trade(off against the evil of disruptions in vital government services" This is also part of the chec@(and(balance under the separation of powers, as a trade(off against the evil of granting the +resident absolute and sole power to appoint" The #onstitution has wisel! sub6ected the +resident;s appointing power to the chec@ing power of the legislature" This situation, however, does not compromise the independence of the #,*-$-# as a constitutional bod!" The vacancies in the #,*-$-# are precisel! staggered to insure that the ma6orit! of its members hold confirmed appointments, and no one +resident will appoint all the #,*-$-# members" ) ) ) The special constitutional safeguards that insure the independence of the #,*-$-# remain in place (See Sections, ;, #, ( and $, 'rticle K6' of the %onstitution). 9n fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments e)tended b! the +resident to &enipa!o, &orra and Tuason, as #,*-$-# #hairman and #ommissioners, respectivel!, do not constitute temporar! or acting appointments prohibited b! ection . (2), Article 9B(# of the #onstitution" (<atibag v. 9eni%ayo, !8+ SCR 49, %ril ,, ,++,, En 9anc >Car%io?# <;. 8iscuss the reason 1hy the framers of the +-<, %onstitution thought it 1ise to reinstate the +-;( %onstitution provision on ad interim appointments of the /resident. Held2 The original draft of ection .6, Article C99 of the #onstitution H on the nomination of officers sub6ect to confirmation b! the #ommission on Appointments H did not provide for ad interim appointments" The original intention of the framers of the #onstitution was to do awa! with ad interim appointments because the plan was for #ongress to remain in session throughout the !ear e)cept for a brief 20(da! compulsor! recess" Eowever, because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential government services, the framers of the #onstitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the ./25 #onstitution on ad interim appointments" B ) ) 56

B)) #learl!, the reinstatement in the present #onstitution of the ad interim appointing power of the +resident was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three constitutional commissions" 9n his concurring opinion in Fuevarra v. nocentes, decided under the ./25 #onstitution, 3ustice 'oberto #oncepcion, 3r" e)plained the rationale behind ad interim appointments in this manner= >:ow, wh! is the lifetime of ad interim appointments so limitedQ &ecause, if the! e)pired before the session of #ongress, the evil sought to be avoided G interruption in the discharge of essential functions G ma! ta@e place" &ecause the same evil would result if the appointments ceased to be effective during the session of #ongress and before its ad6ournment" 7pon the other hand, once #ongress has ad6ourned, the evil aforementioned ma! easil! be con6ured b! the issuance of other ad interim appointments or reappointments"? (<atibag v. 9eni%ayo, !8+ SCR 49, %ril ,, ,++,, En 9anc >Car%io?# <#. .he ad interim appointments of 5enipayo, 5orra and .uason as %hairman and %ommissioners, respectively, of the %H!D9D% 1ere by6passed by the %ommission on 'ppointments. 4o1ever, they 1ere subsequently reappointed by the /resident to the same positions. 8id their subsequent reappointment violate the prohibition against reappointment under Section +("), 'rticle K6% of the +-<, %onstitutionC Held2 There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved b! the #ommission on Appointments can no longer be e)tended a new appointment" The disapproval is a final decision of the #ommission on Appointments in the e)ercise of its chec@ing power on the appointing authorit! of the +resident" The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal b! the #ommission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the Fualifications of the appointee" ince the #onstitution does not provide for an! appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power" 9n this instance, the +resident can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on appointment, but because of a final decision b! the #ommission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment" An ad interim appointment that is b!(passed because of lac@ of time or failure of the #ommission on Appointments to organize is another matter" A b!(passed appointment is one that has not been finall! acted upon on the merits b! the #ommission on Appointments at the close of the session of #ongress" There is no final decision b! the #ommission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as reFuired b! the #onstitution" Absent such decision, the +resident is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a b!(passed appointee" This is recognized in ection .1 of the 'ules of the #ommission on Appointments ) ) )" Eence, under the 'ules of the #ommission on Appointments, a b!(passed appointment can be considered again if the +resident renews the appointment" 9t is well(settled in this 6urisdiction that the +resident can renew the ad interim appointments of b!(passed appointees" 3ustice 'oberto #oncepcion, 3r" lucidl! e)plained in his concurring opinion in Fuevarra v. nocentes wh! b!(passed ad interim appointees could be e)tended new appointments, thus= >9n short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon disapproval b! the #ommission, because the incumbent can not continue holding office over the positive ob6ection of the #ommission" 9t ceases, also, upon >the ne)t ad6ournment of the #ongress?, simpl! because the +resident ma! then issue new appointments H not because of implied disapproval of the #ommission deduced from its intention during the session of #ongress, for, under the #onstitution, the #ommission ma! affect adversel! the interim appointments onl! b! action, never b! omission" 9f the ad6ournment of #ongress were an implied disapproval of ad interim appointments made prior thereto, then the +resident could no longer appoint those so b!(passed b! the #ommission" &ut, the fact is that the /resident may reappoint them, thus clearl! indicating that the reason for said termination of the ad interim appointments is not the disapproval thereof allegedl! inferred from said omission of the #ommission, but the circumstance that upon said ad2ournment of the %ongress, the /resident is free to ma7e ad interim appointments or reappointments.3 Fuevarra was decided under the ./25 #onstitution from where the second paragraph of ection .6, Article C99 of the present #onstitution on ad interim appointments was lifted verbatim. The 6urisprudence under the ./25 #onstitution governing ad interim 57

appointments b! the +resident is doubtless applicable to the present #onstitution" The established practice under the present #onstitution is that the +resident can renew the appointments of b!(passed ad interim appointees" This is a continuation of the well( recognized practice under the ./25 #onstitution, interrupted onl! b! the ./12 #onstitution which did not provide for a #ommission on Appointments but vested sole appointing power in the +resident" The prohibition on reappointment in ection . (2), Article 9B(# of the #onstitution applies neither to disapproved nor b!(passed ad interim appointments" A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revived b! another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under ection .6, Article C99 of the #onstitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under ection . (2), Article 9B(# of the #onstitution" A b!( passed ad interim appointment cannot be revived b! a new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under ection .6, Article C99 of the #onstitution, and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving be!ond the fi)ed term of seven !ears" B)) The framers of the #onstitution made it Fuite clear that an! person who has served an! term of office as #,*-$-# member H whether for a full term of seven !ears, a truncated term of five or three !ears, or even an une)pired term for an! length of time H can no longer be reappointed to the #,*-$-#" B ) ) B)) 9n :isarra v. !iraflor, 3ustice Angelo &autista, in his concurring opinion, Fuoted =acionalista v. 8e :era that a NrOeappointment is not prohibited when a #ommissioner has held, office onl! for, sa!, three or si) !ears, provided his term will not e)ceed nine !ears in all"? This was the interpretation despite the e)press provision in the ./25 #onstitution that a #,*-$-# member >shall hold office for a term of nine !ears and ma! not be reappointed"? To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase >without reappointment? appears twice in ection . (2), Article 9B(# of the present #onstitution" The first phrase prohibits reappointment of an! person previousl! appointed for a term of seven !ears" The second phrase prohibits reappointment of an! person previousl! appointed for a term of five or three !ears pursuant to the first set of appointees under the #onstitution" 9n either case, it does not matter if the person previousl! appointed completes his term of office for the intention is to prohibit an! reappointment of an! @ind" Eowever, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed b! inaction of the #ommission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office" The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fi)ed term nor an une)pired term" To hold otherwise would mean that the +resident b! his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the #,*-$-# without the consent of the #ommission on Appointments" This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the #ommission on Appointments" The phrase >without reappointment? applies onl! to one who has been appointed b! the +resident and confirmed b! the #ommission on Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office" There must be a confirmation b! the #ommission on Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can appl!" To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the +resident;s power to ma@e ad interim appointments" 9n the great ma6orit! of cases, the #ommission on Appointments usuall! fails to act, for lac@ of time, on the ad interim appointments first issued to appointees" 9f such ad interim appointments can no longer be renewed, the +resident will certainl! hesitate to ma@e ad interim appointments because most of her appointees will effectivel! be disapproved b! mere inaction of the #ommission on Appointments" This will nullif! the constitutional power of the +resident to ma@e ad interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services" This #ourt cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wrea@ havoc on vital government services" The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional commissions" The framers of the present #onstitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons" The first is to prevent a second appointment for those who have been previousl! appointed and confirmed even if the! served for less than seven !ears" The second is to insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not serve be!ond the fi)ed term of seven !ears" ) ) )" B)) 58

+lainl!, the prohibition on reappointment is intended to insure that there will be no reappointment of an! @ind" ,n the other hand, the prohibition on temporar! or acting appointments is intended to prevent an! circumvention of the prohibition on reappointment that ma! result in an appointee;s total term of office e)ceeding seven !ears" The evils sought to be avoided b! the twin prohibitions are ver! specific H reappointment of an! @ind and e)ceeding one;s term in office be!ond the ma)imum period of seven !ears" :ot contented with these ironclad twin prohibitions, the framers of the #onstitution tightened even further the screws on those who might wish to e)tend their terms of office" Thus, the word >designated? was inserted to plug an! loophole that might be e)ploited b! violators of the #onstitution ) ) )" The ad interim appointments and subseFuent renewals of appointments of &enipa!o, &orra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on reappointments because there were no previous appointments that were confirmed b! the #ommission on Appointments" A reappointment presupposes a previous confirmed appointment" The same ad interim appointments and renewal of appointments will also not breach the seven(!ear term limit because all the appointments and rene1als of appointments of 5enipayo, 5orra and .uason are for a fi0ed term e0piring on February ", "))<. An! dela! in their confirmation will not e)tend the e)pir! date of their terms of office" #onseFuentl!, there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of the ad interim appointments of these three respondents will result in an! of the evils intended to be e)orcised b! the twin prohibitions in the #onstitution" The continuing renewal of the ad interim appointment of these three respondents, for so long as their terms of office e)pire on Debruar! 2, 2000, does not violate the prohibition on reappointments in ection . (2), Article 9B(# of the #onstitution" (<atibag v. 9eni%ayo, !8+ SCR 49, %ril ,, ,++,, En 9anc >Car%io?# <(. Bhat are the four situations 1here Section +("), 'rticle K6% of the +-<, %onstitution 1hich provides that A[t]he %hairman and the %ommissioners (of the %H!D9D%) shall be appointed 0 0 0 for a term of seven years 1ithout reappointment3 1ill applyC Held2 ection . (2), Article 9B(# of the #onstitution provides that >NtOhe #hairman and the #ommissioners shall be appointed ) ) ) for a term of seven years 1ithout reappointment.? There are four situations where this provision will appl!" The first situation is where an ad interim appointee to the #,*-$-#, after confirmation b! the #ommission on Appointments, serves his full seven(!ear term" uch person cannot be reappointed to the #,*-$-#, whether as a member or as a chairman, because he will then be actuall! serving more than seven !ears" The second situation is where the appointee, after confirmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns before his seven(!ear term of office ends" uch person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or as a chair, to a vacanc! arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven !ears" The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the une)pired term of someone who died or resigned, and the appointee completes the une)pired term" uch person cannot be reappointed, whether as a member or chair, to a vacanc! arising from retirement because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven !ears" The fourth situation is where the appointee has previousl! served a term of less than seven !ears, and a vacanc! arises from death or resignation" -ven if it will not result in his serving more than seven !ears, a reappointment of such person to serve an une)pired term is also prohibited because his situation will be similar to those appointed under the second sentence of ection . (2), Article 9B(# of the #onstitution" This provision refers to the first appointees under the #onstitution whose terms of office are less than seven !ears, but are barred from ever being reappointed under an! situation" (<atibag v. 9eni%ayo, !8+ SCR 49, %ril ,, ,++,, En 9anc >Car%io?# <$. .o 1hat types of appointments is Section +(, 'rticle : of the +-<, %onstitution (prohibiting the /resident from ma7ing appointments t1o months before the ne0t presidential elections and up to the end of his term) directed againstC Held2 ection .5, Article C99 is directed against two t!pes of appointments= (.) those made for bu!ing votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations" The first refers to those appointments made within two months preceding the +residential election and are similar to those which are declared election offenses in the ,mnibus -lection #ode8 while the second consists of the so(called >midnight? appointments" The # in .n ReM 'on. <ateo . Valen6uela an2 'on. =laci2o 9. Vallarta, (,98 SCR 4+8, )ov. 9, 1998, En 9anc >)arvasa C.5.?# clarified this when it held= > ection .5, Article C99 has a broader scope than the 'ytona ruling" 9t ma! not unreasonabl! be deemed to contemplate not onl! >midnight? appointments H those made 59

obviousl! for partisan reasons as shown b! their number and the time of their ma@ing H but also appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the +residential election"? <,. !a. Dvelyn S. 'be2a 1as a municipal mayor. She ran for reelection but lost. 5efore she vacated her office, though, she e0tended permanent appointments to fourteen ne1 employees of the municipal government. .he incoming mayor, upon assuming office, recalled said appointments contending that these 1ere Amidnight appointments3 and, therefore, prohibited under Sec. +(, 'rt. : of the +-<, %onstitution. Should the act of the ne1 mayor of recalling said appointments on the aforestated ground be sustainedC Held2 The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the fourteen (.5) private respondents before the # #, the onl! reason he cited to 6ustif! his action was that these were >midnight appointments? that are forbidden under Article C99, ection .5 of the #onstitution" Eowever, the # # ruled, and correctl! so, that the said prohibition applies onl! to presidential appointments" 9n truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from ma@ing appointments during the last da!s of his or her tenure" (/e Rama v. Court o1 %%eals, !7! SCR 94, &eb. ,8, ,++1, En 9anc >-nares@Santiago?# <<. 8istinguish the /resident@s po1er of general supervision over local governments from his control po1er. Held2 ,n man! occasions in the past, this #ourt has had the opportunit! to distinguish the power of supervision from the power of control" 9n .aule v. Santos, we held that the #hief -)ecutive wielded no more authorit! than that of chec@ing whether a local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided b! statutor! enactments" Ee cannot interfere with local governments provided that the same or its officers act within the scope of their authorit!" upervisor! power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior bod!8 it does not include an! restraining authorit! over such bod!" ,fficers in control la! down the rules in the doing of an act" 9f the! are not followed, it is discretionar! on his part to order the act undone or redone b! his subordinate or he ma! even decide to do it himself" upervision does not cover such authorit!" upervising officers merel! see to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not la! down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modif! or replace them" 9f the rules are not observed, he ma! order the wor@ done or re(done to conform to the prescribed rules" Ee cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act" (9ito@ 3non v. &ernan2e6, !7+ SCR "!,, 5an. !1, ,++1, !r2 /iv. >(on6aga@Reyes?# <-. s the prior recommendation of the Secretary of *ustice a mandatory requirement before the /resident may validly appoint a provincial prosecutorC Held2 This Fuestion would ) ) ) pivot on the proper understanding of the provision of the 'evised Administrative #ode of ./01 (5oo7 :, .itle , %hapter , Section -) to the effect that H >All provincial and cit! prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed b! the +resident upon the recommendation of the ecretar!"? +etitioners contend that an appointment of a provincial prosecutor mandatoril! reFuires a prior recommendation of the ecretar! of 3ustice endorsing the intended appointment ) ) )" <hen the #onstitution or the law clothes the +resident with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessaril! carr!ing with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint" 9t should be here pertinent to state that the +resident is the head of government whose authorit! includes the power of control over all >e)ecutive departments, bureaus and offices"? #ontrol means the authorit! of an empowered officer to alter or modif!, or even nullif! or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the 6udgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate" -)pressed in another wa!, the +resident has the power to assume directl! the functions of an e)ecutive department, bureau and office" 9t can accordingl! be inferred therefrom that the +resident can interfere in the e)ercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations" 9t is the considered view of the #ourt ) ) ) that the phrase Aupon recommendation of the Secretary,3 found in ection /, #hapter 99, Title 999, &oo@ 9C, of the 'evised Administrative #ode, should be interpreted ) ) ) to be a mere advise, e)hortation or indorsement, which is essentiall! persuasive in character and not binding or obligator! upon the part! to whom it is made" The recommendation is here nothing reall! more than advisor! in nature" The 60

+resident, being the head of the -)ecutive 4epartment, could ver! well disregard or do awa! with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the e)ercise of discretionar! authorit!, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted be!ond the scope of his authorit!" (9ermu2e6 v. Executive Secretary Ruben Dorres, (.R. )o. 1!14,9, ug. 4, 1999, !r2 /iv. >Vitug?# -). 8istinguish the /resident@s po1er to call out the armed forces as their %ommander6in6 %hief in order to prevent or suppress la1less violence, invasion or rebellion, from his po1er to proclaim martial and suspend the privilege of the 1rit of habeas corpus. D0plain 1hy the former is not sub2ect to 2udicial revie1 1hile the latter t1o are. Held2 There is a clear te)tual commitment under the #onstitution to bestow on the +resident full discretionar! power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessit! for the e)ercise of such power" ection .0, Article C99 of the #onstitution, which embodies the powers of the +resident as #ommander(in(#hief, provides in part= The +resident shall be the #ommander(in(#hief of all armed forces of the +hilippines and whenever it becomes necessar!, he ma! call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion" 9n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safet! reFuires it, he ma!, for a period not e)ceeding si)t! da!s, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the +hilippines or an! part thereof under martial law" The full discretionar! power of the +resident to determine the factual basis for the e)ercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of ection .0, Article C99 ) ) )" 7nder the foregoing provisions, #ongress ma! revo@e such proclamations (of martial law) or suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) and the #ourt ma! review the sufficienc! of the factual basis thereof" Eowever, there is no such eFuivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the +residentPs action to call out the armed forces" The distinction places the calling out power in a different categor! from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the #onstitution would have simpl! lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without an! Fualification" D0pressio unios est e0clusio alterius. B ) ) That the intent of the #onstitution is e)actl! what its letter sa!s, i.e., that the power to call is full! discretionar! to the +resident, is e)tant in the deliberation of the #onstitutional #ommission ) ) )" The reason for the difference in the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the +resident the widest leewa! and broadest discretion in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards b! #ongress and review b! this #ourt" *oreover, under ection .0, Article C99 of the #onstitution, in the e)ercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur= (.) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safet! must reFuire it" These conditions are not reFuired in the case of the power to call out the armed forces" The onl! criterion is that >whenever it becomes necessar!,? the +resident ma! call the armed forces >to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion"? The implication is that the +resident is given full discretion and wide latitude in the e)ercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers" 9f the petitioner fails, b! wa! of proof, to support the assertion that the +resident acted without factual basis, then this #ourt cannot underta@e an independent investigation be!ond the pleadings" The factual necessit! of calling out the armed forces is not easil! Fuantifiable and cannot be ob6ectivel! established since matters considered for satisf!ing the same is a combination of several factors which are not alwa!s accessible to the courts" &esides the absence of te)tual standards that the court ma! use to 6udge necessit!, information necessar! to arrive at such 6udgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts" #ertain pertinent information might be difficult to verif!, or wholl! unavailable to the courts" 9n man! instances, the evidence upon which the +resident might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces ma! be of a nature not constituting technical proof" ,n the other hand, the +resident as #ommander(in(#hief has a vast intelligence networ@ to gather information, some of which ma! be classified as highl! confidential or 61

affecting the securit! of the state" 9n the e)ercise of the power to call, on(the(spot decisions ma! be imperativel! necessar! in emergenc! situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of propert!" 9ndeed, the decision to call out the militar! to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftl! and decisivel! if it were to have an! effect at all" uch a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in *indanao, where the insurgenc! problem could spill over the other parts of the countr!" The determination of the necessit! for the calling out power if sub6ected to unfettered 6udicial scrutin! could be a veritable prescription for disaster as such power ma! be undul! strait6ac@eted b! an in6unction or a temporar! restraining order ever! time it is e)ercised" Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the #onstitution to vest upon the +resident, as #ommander(in(#hief of the Armed Dorces, full discretion to call forth the militar! when in his 6udgment it is necessar! to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion" 7nless the petitioner can show that the e)ercise of such discretion was gravel! abused, the +residentPs e)ercise of 6udgment deserves to be accorded respect from this #ourt" (.ntegrate2 9ar o1 t0e =0ili%%ines v. 'on. Ronal2o 9. Namora, (.R. )o. 141,84, ug. 17, ,+++, En 9anc >4a%unan?# -+. 5y issuing a .&H on the date convicted rapist 9eo Dchegaray is to be e0ecuted by lethal in2ection, the Supreme %ourt 1as critici>ed on the ground, among others, that it encroached on the po1er of the /resident to grant reprieve under Section +-, 'rticle : , +-<, %onstitution. *ustify the S%Qs act. Held2 ection ./, Article C99 of the ./01 #onstitution is simply the source of po1er of the +resident to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction b! final 6udgment" This provision, however, cannot be interpreted as den!ing the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after the finalit!" 9n truth, an accused who has been convicted b! final 6udgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts" Dor instance, a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be e)ecuted while in a state of insanit! (See 'rticle ,- of the &evised /enal %ode). The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputabl! an e)ercise of 6udicial power" 9t is not usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effect is the same H the temporar! suspension of the e)ecution of the death convict" 9n the same vein, it cannot be denied that #ongress can at an! time amend '"A" :o" 165/ b! reducing the penalt! of death to life imprisonment" The effect of such an amendment is li@e that of commutation of sentence" &ut b! no stretch of the imagination can the e)ercise b! #ongress of its plenar! power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the +resident;s power to commute final sentences of conviction" .he po1ers of the D0ecutive, the 9egislative and the *udiciary to save the life of a death convict do not e0clude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. (Ec0egaray v. Secretary o1 5ustice, !+1 SCR 9*, 5an. 19, 1999, En 9anc >=uno?# -". 8iscuss the nature of a conditional pardon. sub2ect to 2udicial revie1C s its grant or revocation by the /resident

Held2 A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the #hief -)ecutive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter sub6ect to the condition that if he does not compl! with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the une)pired portion of the sentence or an additional one. &! the pardonee;s consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereb! placed himself under the supervision of the #hief -)ecutive or his delegate who is dut!(bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon" 7nder ection 65(i) of the 'evised Administrative #ode, the #hief -)ecutive is authorized to order >the arrest and re(incarceration of an! such person who, in his 6udgment, shall fail to compl! with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence"? 9t is now a well(entrenched rule in this 6urisdiction that this e)ercise of presidential 6udgment is be!ond 6udicial scrutin!" The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests e)clusivel! in the sound 6udgment of the #hief -)ecutive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his libert! on conditional pardon upon the 6udgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invo@e the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings ma! be upon which his recommitment was ordered" B)) 7ltimatel!, solel! vested in the #hief -)ecutive, who in the first place was the e)clusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corollar! prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own 6udgment, the acFuittal of the pardonee from the subseFuent charges filed against him, warrants the same" #ourts have no authorit! to interfere with the grant b! the +resident of a pardon to a convicted criminal" 9t has been our 62

fortified ruling that a final 6udicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a reFuirement for the +resident to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon" There is li@ewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revo@ed b! the +resident in the e)ercise of powers undisputabl! solel! and absolutel! in his office" (.n ReM :il1re2o Sumulong Dorres, ,71 SCR "+9, /ec. ,9, 1997 >'ermosisima?# -;. Bho has the po1er to ratify a treatyC Held2 9n our 6urisdiction, the power to ratif! is vested in the +resident and not, as commonl! believed, in the legislature" The role of the enate is limited onl! to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification . (9 - ) >9agong lyansang <aIabayan? v. Executive Secretary Ronal2o Namora, (.R. )o. 1!87"+, 3ct. 1+, ,+++, En 9anc >9uena?# -#. Bhich provision of the %onstitution applies 1ith regard to the e0ercise by the Senate of its constitutional po1er to concur 1ith the :isiting Forces 'greement (:F')C Held2 The ./01 +hilippine #onstitution contains two provisions reFuiring the concurrence of the enate on treaties or international agreements" ection 2., Article C99 ) ) ) reads= >:o treat! or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in b! at least two(thirds of all the *embers of the enate"? ection 25, Article BC999, provides= >After the e)piration in .//. of the Agreement between the 'epublic of the +hilippines and the 7nited tates of America concerning *ilitar! &ases, foreign militar! bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the +hilippines e)cept under a treat! dul! concurred in b! the enate and, when the #ongress so reFuires, ratified b! a ma6orit! of the votes cast b! the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treat! b! the other contracting tate"? ection 2., Article C99 deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two(thirds (2K2) of all the *embers of the enate is reFuired to ma@e the sub6ect treat!, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the +hilippines" This provision la!s down the general rule on treaties or international agreements and applies to an! form of treat! with a wide variet! of sub6ect matter, such as, but not limited to, e)tradition or ta) treaties or those economic in nature" All treaties or international agreements entered into b! the +hilippines, regardless of sub6ect matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, reFuires the concurrence of the enate to be valid and effective" 9n contrast, ection 25, Article BC999 is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign militar! bases, troops or facilities in the +hilippines" 7nder this provision, the concurrence of the enate is onl! one of the reFuisites to render compliance with the constitutional reFuirements and to consider the agreement binding on the +hilippines" ection 25, Article BC999 further reFuires that >foreign militar! bases, troops, or facilities? ma! be allowed in the +hilippines onl! b! virtue of a treat! dul! concurred in b! the enate, ratified b! a ma6orit! of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so reFuired b! #ongress, and recognized as such b! the other contracting tate" 9t is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, actuall! share some common ground" These constitutional provisions both embod! phrases in the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitor! in mandate and character" 9n particular, ection 2. opens with the clause >:o treat! ) ) ),? and ection 25 contains the phrase >shall not be allowed"? Additionall!, in both instances, the concurrence of the enate is indispensable to render the treat! or international agreement valid and effective" To our mind, the fact that the +resident referred the CDA to the enate under ection 2., Article C99, and that the enate e)tended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial" Dor in either case, whether under ection 2., Article C99 or ection 25, Article BC999, the fundamental law is cr!stalline that the concurrence of the enate is mandator! to compl! with the strict constitutional reFuirements" ,n the whole, the CDA is an agreement which defines the treatment of 7nited tates troops and personnel visiting the +hilippines" 9t provides for the guidelines to govern such 63

visits of militar! personnel, and further defines the rights of the 7nited tates and the +hilippine government in the matter of criminal 6urisdiction, movement of vessels and aircraft, importation and e)portation of eFuipment, materials and supplies" 7ndoubtedl!, ection 25, Article BC999, which specificall! deals with treaties involving foreign militar! bases, troops, or facilities, should appl! in the instant case" To a certain e)tent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of ection 2., Article C99 will find applicabilit! with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes reFuired to obtain the valid concurrence of the enate ) ) )" 9t is a finel!(imbedded principle in statutor! construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one" 9e0 specialis derogat generali. (9 - ) >9agong lyansang <aIabayan? v. Executive Secretary Ronal2o Namora, (.R. )o. 1!87"+ an2 Com%anion Cases, 3ct. 1+, ,+++, !4, SCR 449, 481@49,, En 9anc >9uena?# -(. Should the contention that since the :F' merely involved the temporary visits of ?nited States personnel engaged in 2oint military e0ercises and not a basing agreement, therefore, Sec. "(, 'rt. K: of the %onstitution is inapplicable to the :F', be upheldC Held2 9t is specious to argue that ection 25, Article BC999 is inapplicable to mere transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a militar! base" ,n this score, the #onstitution ma@es no distinction between >transient? and >permanent?" #ertainl!, we find nothing in ection 25, Article BC999 that reFuires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the +hilippines" 9t is a rudiment in legal hermeneutics that when no distinction is made b! law, the #ourt should not distinguish ( ?bi le0 non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. (9 - ) >9agong lyansang <aIabayan? v. Executive Secretary Ronal2o Namora, (.R. )o. 1!87"+ an2 Com%anion Cases, 3ct. 1+, ,+++, !4, SCR 449, 481@49,, En 9anc >9uena?# -$. Bill it be correct to argue that since no foreign military bases, but merely troops and facilities, are involved in the :F', therefore, Section "(, 'rticle K: of the %onstitution is not controllingC Held2 9n li@e manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that ection 25, Article BC999 is not controlling since no foreign militar! bases, but merel! foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the CDA" :otabl!, a perusal of said constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers Aforeign military bases, troops, or facilities.3 tated differentl!, this prohibition is not limited to the entr! of troops and facilities without an! foreign bases being established" The clause does not refer to Aforeign military bases, troops, or facilities3 collectivel! but treats them as separate and independent sub6ects" The use of comma and dis6unctive word J"!J clearl! signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from the others included in the enumeration, such that, the provision contemplates three different situations ( a militar! treat! the sub6ect of which could be either (a) foreign bases (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities ( an! of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of ection 25, Article BC999" To this end, the intention of the framers of the #harter ) ) ) is consistent with this interpretation ) ) )" *oreover, militar! bases established within the territor! of another state is no longer viable because of the alternatives offered b! new means and weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can sta! afloat in the sea even for months and !ears without returning to their home countr!" These militar! warships are actuall! used as substitutes for a land(home base not onl! of militar! aircraft but also of militar! personnel and facilities" &esides, vessels are mobile as compared to a land(based militar! headFuarters" (9 - ) >9agong lyansang <aIabayan? v. Executive Secretary Ronal2o Namora, (.R. )o. 1!87"+ an2 Com%anion Cases, 3ct. 1+, ,+++, !4, SCR 449, 481@49,, En 9anc >9uena?# -,. Bere the requirements of Sec. "(, 'rt. K: of the +-<, %onstitution complied 1ith 1hen the Senate gave its concurrence to the :F'C Held2 ection 25, Article BC999 disallows foreign militar! bases, troops, or facilities in the countr!, unless the following conditions are sufficientl! met, vi>O (a) it must be under a treaty8 (b) the treat! must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so reFuired b! 64

#ongress, ratified b! a ma6orit! of the votes cast b! the people in a national referendum8 and (c) recogni>ed as a treaty b! the other contracting state" There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two reFuisites in the case of the CDA" The concurrence handed b! the enate through 'esolution :o" .0 is in accordance with the provisions of the #onstitution, whether under the general reFuirement in ection 2., Article C99, or the specific mandate mentioned in ection 25, Article BC999, the provision in the latter article reFuiring ratification b! a ma6orit! of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessar! since #ongress has not reFuired it" As to the matter of voting, Section "+, 'rticle : particularl! reFuires that a treat! or international agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least t1o6 thirds of all the members of the Senate. ,n the other hand, Section "(, 'rticle K: simpl! provides that the treat! be Aduly concurred in by the Senate.3 Appl!ing the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two(thirds vote of all the members of the enate is clearl! reFuired so that the concurrence contemplated b! law ma! be validl! obtained and deemed present" <hile it is true that ection 25, Article BC999 reFuires, among other things, that the treat! ( the CDA, in the instant case ( be >dul! concurred in b! the enate,? it is ver! true however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied in ection 2., Article C99, which in more specific terms, reFuires that the concurrence of a treat!, or international agreement, be made b! a two( thirds vote of all the members of the enate" 9ndeed, ection 25, Article BC999 must not be treated in isolation to ection 2., Article C99" As noted, the >concurrence reFuirement? under ection 25, Article BC999 must be construed in relation to the provisions of ection 2., Article C99" 9n a more particular language, the concurrence of the enate contemplated under ection 25, Article BC999 means that at least two(thirds of all the members of the enate favorabl! vote to concur with the treat! ( the CDA in the instant case" ))) Eaving resolved that the first two reFuisites prescribed in ection 25, Article BC999 are present, we shall now pass upon and delve on the reFuirement that the CDA should be recognized as a treat! b! the 7nited tates of America" ))) This #ourt is of the firm view that the phrase > recogni>ed as a treaty3 means that the other contracting part! accepts or ac7no1ledges the agreement as a treat!. To reFuire the other contracting state, The 7nited tates of America in this case, to submit the CDA to the 7nited tates enate for concurrence pursuant to its #onstitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase" <ell(entrenched is the principle that the words used in the #onstitution are to be given their ordinar! meaning e)cept where technical terms are emplo!ed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails" 9ts language should be understood in the sense the! have in common use" *oreover, it is inconseFuential whether the 7nited tates treats the CDA onl! as an e)ecutive agreement because, under international law, an e)ecutive agreement is as binding as a treat!. To be sure, as long as the CDA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be ta@en eFuall! as a treat!" ))) The records reveal that the 7nited tates Aovernment, through Ambassador Thomas #" Eubbard, has stated that the 7nited tates government has full! committed to living up to the terms of the CDA" Dor as long as the 7nited tates of America accepts or ac@nowledges the CDA as a treat!, and binds itself further to compl! with its obligations under the treat!, there is indeed mar@ed compliance with the mandate of the #onstitution" <orth stressing too, is that the ratification, b! the +resident, of the CDA and the concurrence of the enate should be ta@en as a clear and uneFuivocal e)pression of our nationPs consent to be bound b! said treat!, with the concomitant dut! to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder" ))) 65

<ith the ratification of the CDA, which is eFuivalent to final acceptance, and with the e)change of notes between the +hilippines and the 7nited tates of America, it now becomes obligator! and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound b! the terms of the agreement" (9 - ) >9agong lyansang <aIabayan? v. Executive Secretary Ronal2o Namora, (.R. )o. 1!87"+ an2 Com%anion Cases, 3ct. 1+, ,+++, !4, SCR 449, 481@49,, En 9anc >9uena?# -<. 're the A5ali7atan3 e0ercises covered by the :isiting Forces 'greementC Held2 The holding of >&ali@atan 02(.? must be studied in the framewor@ of the treat! antecedents to which the +hilippines bound itself" The first of these is the *utual 4efense Treat! (*4T, for brevit!)" The *4T has been described as the >core? of the defense relationship between the +hilippines and its traditional all!, the 7nited tates" 9ts aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through 6oint training with its American counterparts8 the >&ali@atan? is the largest such training e)ercise directl! supporting the *4T;s ob6ectives" 9t is this treat! to which the CDA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it see@s to reaffirm" The lapse of the 7 (+hilippine &ases Agreement in .//2 and the decision not to renew it created a vacuum in 7 (+hilippine defense relations, that is, until it was replaced b! the Cisiting Dorces Agreement" 9t should be recalled that on ,ctober .0, 2000, b! a vote of eleven to three, this #ourt upheld the validit! of the CDA (5'E'=, et. al. v. Tamora, et. al., ;#" S%&' ##- [")))]). The CDA provides the >regulator! mechanism? b! which >7nited tates militar! and civilian personnel Nma! visitO temporaril! in the +hilippines in connection with activities approved b! the +hilippine Aovernment"? 9t contains provisions relative to entr! and departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle registration, criminal 6urisdiction, claims, importation and e)portation, movement of vessels and aircraft, as well as the duration of the agreement and its termination" 9t is the CDA which gives continued relevance to the *4T despite the passage of !ears" 9ts primar! goal is to facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between American and +hilippine militar! forces in the event of an attac@ b! a common foe" The first Fuestion that should be addressed is whether >&ali@atan 02(.? is covered b! the Cisiting Dorces Agreement" To resolve this, it is necessar! to refer to the CDA itself" :ot much help can be had therefrom, unfortunatel!, since the terminolog! emplo!ed is itself the source of the problem" The CDA permits 7nited tates personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in >activities,? the e)act meaning of which was left undefined" The e)pression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of underta@ings sub6ect onl! to the approval of the +hilippine government" The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that 7nited tates personnel must >abstain from an! activit! inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from an! political activit!"? All other activities, in other words, are fair game" <e are not completel! unaided, however" The Cienna #onvention on the $aw of Treaties, which contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements, state ) ) )" 9t is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an e)amination of the te)t, which is presumed to verbalize the parties; intentions" The #onvention li@ewise dictates what ma! be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the conte)t of the treat!, as well as other elements ma! be ta@en into account alongside the aforesaid conte)t" B ) ) The Terms of 'eference rightl! fall within the conte)t of the CDA" After studied reflection, it appeared farfetched that the ambiguit! surrounding the meaning of the word >activities? arose from accident" 9n our view, it was deliberatel! made that wa! to give both parties a certain leewa! in negotiation" 9n this manner, visiting 7 forces ma! so6ourn in +hilippine territor! for purposes other than militar!" As conceived, the 6oint e)ercises ma! include training on new techniFues of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation;s marine resources, sea search(and(destro! operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action pro6ects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the li@e" 7nder these auspices, the CDA gives legitimac! to the current &ali@atan e)ercises" 9t is onl! logical to assume that >&ali@atan 02(.,? a >mutual anti(terrorism advising, assisting and training e)ercise,? falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the conte)t of the agreement" &oth the histor! and intent of the *utual 4efense Treat! and the 66

CDA support the conclusion that combat6related activities H as opposed to combat itself H such as the one sub6ect of the instant petition, are indeed authorized" ( rt0ur /. Lim an2 =aulino R. Ersan2o v. 'onorable Executive Secretary, (.R. )o. 171447, %ril 11, ,++,, En 9anc >/e Leon?# --. Bhat is the po1er of impoundment of the /residentC Bhat are its principal sourcesC Held2 9mpoundment refers to the refusal of the +resident, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available b! #ongress" 9t is the failure to spend or obligate budget authorit! of an! t!pe" +roponents of impoundment have invo@ed at least three principal sources of the authorit! of the +resident" Doremost is the authorit! to impound given to him either e)pressl! or impliedl! b! #ongress" econd is the e)ecutive power drawn from the +resident;s role as #ommander(in(#hief" Third is the Daithful -)ecution #lause" The proponents insist that a faithful e)ecution of the laws reFuires that the +resident desist from implementing the law if doing so would pre6udice public interest" An e)ample given is when through efficient and prudent management of a pro6ect, substantial savings are made" 9n such a case, it is sheer foll! to e)pect the +resident to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law" (='.LC3)S v. Enri$ue6, ,!7 SCR 7+*, ug. 9, 1994 >Juiason?# T,e @ud$'$(l De-(!)#e&) +)). Bhat are the requisites before the %ourt can e0ercise the po1er of 2udicial revie1C

Held2 ." The time(tested standards for the e)ercise of 6udicial review are= (.) the e)istence of an appropriate case8 (2) an interest personal and substantial b! the part! raising the constitutional Fuestion8 (2) the plea that the function be e)ercised at the earliest opportunit!8 and (5) the necessit! that the constitutional Fuestion be passed upon in order to decide the case (Se%arate 3%inion, 4a%unan, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 Environment an2 )atural Resources, et al., (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc# 2" <hen Fuestions of constitutional significance are raised, the #ourt can e)ercise its power of 6udicial review onl! if the following reFuisites are complied with, namel!= (.) the e)istence of an actual and appropriate case8 (2) a personal and substantial interest of the part! raising the constitutional Fuestion8 (2) the e)ercise of 6udicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunit!8 and (5) the constitutional Fuestion is the lis mota of the case. (.ntegrate2 9ar o1 t0e =0ili%%ines v. 'on. Ronal2o 9. Namora, (.R. )o. 141,84, ug. 17, ,+++, En 9anc >4a%unan?# +)+. Bhat are the requisites for the proper e0ercise of the po1er of 2udicial revie1C llustrative case. Held2 'espondents assert that the petition fails to satisf! all the four reFuisites before this #ourt ma! e)ercise its power of 6udicial review in constitutional cases" ,ut of respect for the acts of the -)ecutive department, which is co(eFual with this #ourt, respondents urge this #ourt to refrain from reviewing the constitutionalit! of the ad interim appointments issued b! the +resident to &enipa!o, &orra and Tuason unless all the four reFuisites are present" B ) ) 'espondents argue that the second, third and fourth reFuisites are absent in this case" 'espondents maintain that petitioner does not have a personal and substantial interest in the case because she has not sustained a direct in6ur! as a result of the ad interim appointments of &enipa!o, &orra and Tuason and their assumption of office" 'espondents point out that petitioner does not claim to be lawfull! entitled to an! of the positions assumed b! &enipa!o, &orra or Tuason" :either does petitioner claim to be directl! in6ured b! the appointments of these three respondents" 'espondents also contend that petitioner failed to Fuestion the constitutionalit! of the ad interim appointments at the earliest opportunit!" +etitioner filed the petition onl! on August 2, 200. despite the fact that the ad interim appointments of &enipa!o, &orra and Tuason were issued as earl! as *arch 22, 200." *oreover, the petition was filed after the third time that these three respondents were issued ad interim appointments"

67

'espondents insist that the real issue in this case is the legalit! of petitioner;s reassignment from the -94 to the $aw 4epartment" #onseFuentl!, the constitutionalit! of the ad interim appointments is not the lis mota of this case" <e are not persuaded" &enipa!o reassigned petitioner from the -94, where she was Acting 4irector, to the $aw 4epartment, where she was placed on detail" 'espondents claim that the reassignment was Apursuant to 0 0 0 5enipayo@s authority as %hairman of the %ommission on Dlections, and as the %ommission@s %hief D0ecutive Hfficer.3 -videntl!, respondents; anchor the legalit! of petitioner;s reassignment on &enipa!o;s authorit! as #hairman of the #,*-$-#" The real issue then turns on whether or not &enipa!o is the lawful #hairman of the #,*-$-#" -ven if petitioner is onl! an Acting director of the -94, her reassignment is without legal basis if &enipa!o is not the lawful #,*-$-# #hairman, an office created b! the #onstitution" ,n the other hand, if &enipa!o is the lawful #,*-$-# #hairman because he assumed office in accordance with the #onstitution, then petitioner;s reassignment is legal and she has no cause to complain provided the reassignment is in accordance with the #ivil ervice $aw" #learl!, petitioner has a personal and material sta@e in the resolution of the constitutionalit! of &enipa!o;s assumption of office" +etitioner;s personal and substantial in6ur!, if &enipa!o is not the lawful #,*-$-# #hairman, clothes her with the reFuisite locus standi to raise the constitutional issue in this petition" 'espondents harp on petitioner;s belated act of Fuestioning the constitutionalit! of the ad interim appointments of &enipa!o, &orra and Tuason" +etitioner filed the instant petition onl! on August 2, 200., when the first ad interim appointments were issued as earl! as *arch 22, 200." Eowever, it is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunit!" The earliest opportunit! to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, >if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered on appeal"? +etitioner Fuestioned the constitutionalit! of the ad interim appointments of &enipa!o, &orra and Tuason when she filed her petition before this #ourt, which is the earliest opportunit! for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent bod!" Durthermore, this #ourt ma! determine, in the e)ercise of sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue ma! be passed upon . There is no doubt petitioner raised the constitutional issue on time" *oreover, the legalit! of petitioner;s reassignment hinges on the constitutionalit! of &enipa!o;s ad interim appointment and assumption of office" 7nless the constitutionalit! of &enipa!o;s ad interim appointment and assumption of office is resolved, the legalit! of petitioner;s reassignment from the -94 to the $aw 4epartment cannot be determined" #learl!, the lis mota of this case is the ver! constitutional issue raised b! petitioner" 9n an! event, the issue raised b! petitioner is of paramount importance to the public" The legalit! of the directives and decisions made b! the #,*-$-# in the conduct of the *a! .5, 200. national elections ma! be put in doubt if the constitutional issue raised b! petitioner is left unresolved" 9n @eeping with this #ourt;s dut! to determine whether other agencies of government have remained within the limits of the #onstitution and have not abused the discretion given them, this #ourt ma! even brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve an! constitutional issue raised . Eere the petitioner has complied with all the reFuisite technicalities" *oreover, public interest reFuires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised b! petitioner" (<atibag v. 9eni%ayo, !8+ SCR 49, %ril ,, ,++,, En 9anc >Car%io?# +)". Bhat is an Aactual case or controversy3C

Held2 An >actual case or controvers!? means an e)isting case or controvers! which is both ripe for resolution and susceptible of 6udicial determination, and that which is not con6ectural or anticipator!, or that which see@s to resolve h!pothetical or feigned constitutional problems" A petition raising a constitutional Fuestion does not present an >actual controvers!,? unless it alleges a legal right or power" *oreover, it must show that a conflict of rights e)ists, for inherent in the term >controvers!? is the presence of opposing views or contentions. ,therwise, the #ourt will be forced to resolve issues which remain unfocused because the! lac@ such concreteness provided when a Fuestion emerges precisel! framed from a clash of adversar! arguments e)ploring ever! aspect of a multi( faceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests" The controvers! must also be 6usticiable8 that is, it must be susceptible of 6udicial determination . (.ntegrate2 9ar o1 68

t0e =0ili%%ines v. 'on. Ronal2o 9. Namora, (.R. )o. 141,84, 9anc >4a%unan?#

ug. 17, ,+++, En

+);. /etitioners sagani %ru> and %esar Duropa brought a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citi>ens and ta0payers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of &epublic 'ct =o. <;,+, other1ise 7no1n as the ndigenous /eoples &ights 'ct of +--, ( /&'), and its mplementing &ules and &egulations. ' preliminary issue resolved by the S% 1as 1hether the petition presents an actual controversy. Held2 #ourts can onl! decide actual controversies, not h!pothetical Fuestions or cases. The threshold issue, therefore, is whether an >appropriate case? e)ists for the e)ercise of 6udicial review in the present case" B)) 9n the case at bar, there e)ists a live controvers! involving a clash of legal rights" A law has been enacted, and the 9mplementing 'ules and 'egulations approved" *one! has been appropriated and the government agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute" 9t cannot be successfull! maintained that we should await the adverse conseFuences of the law in order to consider the controvers! actual and ripe for 6udicial resolution" 9t is precisel! the contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of tate ownership over lands of the public domain and other natural resources" *oreover, when the tate machiner! is set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this #ourt possesses sufficient authorit! to resolve and prevent imminent in6ur! and violation of the constitutional process" (Se%arate 3%inion, 4a%unan, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 Environment an2 )atural Resources, et al., (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc# +)#. Bhen is an action considered Amoot3C !ay the court still resolve the case once it has become moot and academicC Held2 ." 9t is alleged b! respondent that, with respect to the +##' N+reparator! #ommission on #onstitutional 'eformO, this case has become moot and academic" <e agree" An action is considered >moot? when it no longer presents a 6usticiable controvers! because the issues involved have become academic or dead" 7nder -"," :o" 52, the +##' was instructed to complete its tas@ on or before 3une 20, .///" Eowever, on Debruar! ./, .///, the +resident issued -)ecutive ,rder :o" 10 (-"," :o" 10), which e)tended the time frame for the completion of the commission;s wor@ ) ) )" The +##' submitted its recommendations to the +resident on 4ecember 20, ./// and was dissolved b! the +resident on the same da!" 9t had li@ewise spent the funds allocated to it" Thus, the +##' has ceased to e)ist, having lost its raison d@ Utre" ubseFuent events have overta@en the petition and the #ourt has nothing left to resolve" The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest b! the impossibilit! of granting the relief pra!ed for b! petitioner" &asicall!, petitioner as@s this #ourt to en6oin the +##' from acting as such" #learl!, prohibition is an inappropriate remed! since the bod! sought to be en6oined no longer e)ists" 9t is well(established that prohibition is a preventive remed! and does not lie to restrain an act that is alread! fait accompli. At this point, an! ruling regarding the +##' would simpl! be in the nature of an advisor! opinion, which is definitel! be!ond the permissible scope of 6udicial power" ((on6ales v. )arvasa, !!" SCR "!!, ug. 14, ,+++, En 9anc >(on6aga@Reyes?# 2" The petition which was filed b! private respondents before the trial court sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus, to command petitioners to admit them for enrolment" Ta@ing into account the admission of private respondents that the! have finished their :ursing course at the $anting #ollege of :ursing even before the promulgation of the Fuestioned decision, this case has clearl! been overta@en b! events and should therefore be dismissed" Eowever, the case of Dastern 5roadcasting %orporation (8E&D) v. 8ans is the authorit! for the view that >even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not onl! of the parties but of others similarl! situated .? <e shall adhere to this view and proceed to dwell on the merits of this petition" (University o1 San gustin, .nc. v. Court o1 %%eals, ,!+ SCR "*1, ""+, <arc0 ", 1994 >)ocon?# +)(. Should the %ourt still resolve the case despite that the issue has already become moot and academicC D0ception. 69

Held2 :either do we agree that merel! because a plebiscite had alread! been held in the case of the proposed &aranga! :apico, the petition of the *unicipalit! of #ainta has alread! been rendered moot and academic" The issue raised b! the *unicipalit! of #ainta in its petition before the #,*-$-# against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of &aranga! :apico are still pending determination before the Antipolo 'egional Trial #ourt" 9n .an v. %ommission on Dlections, we struc@ down the moot and academic argument as follows H >#onsidering that the legalit! of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non( compliance with constitutional reFuisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before 7s cannot trul! be viewed as alread! moot and academic" #ontinuation of the e)istence of this newl! proclaimed province which petitioners strongl! profess to have been illegall! born, deserves to be inFuired into b! this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegalit! attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the ver! e)cuse for perpetration of such wrong" Dor this #ourt to !ield to the respondents; urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this #ourt should passivel! accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion" 4ismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief" 'espondents; submission will create a dangerous precedent" hould this #ourt decline now to perform its dut! of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to rec@lessl! and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide andKor alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenl! or stealthil!, confident that this #ourt will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if the! manage to bring about a fait accompli.? (City o1 =asig v. C3<ELEC, !14 SCR 1"9, Se%t. 1+, 1999, En 9anc >-nares@ Santiago?# +)$. Hn !ay +, "))+, /resident !acapagal6'rroyo, faced by an Aangry and violent mob armed 1ith e0plosives, firearms, bladed 1eapons, clubs, stones and other deadly 1eapons3 assaulting and attempting to brea7 into !alacanang, issued /roclamation =o. ;< declaring that there 1as a state of rebellion in the =ational %apital &egion. She li7e1ise issued Feneral Hrder =o. + directing the 'rmed Forces of the /hilippines and the /hilippine =ational /olice to suppress the rebellion in the =ational %apital &egion. Barrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the Arebellion3 1ere thereafter effected. 4ence, several petitions 1ere filed before the S% assailing the declaration of State of &ebellion by /resident Floria !acapagal6'rroyo and the 1arrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Held2 All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of state of rebellion b! +resident Aloria *acapagal(Arro!o and the warrantless arrests allegedl! effected b! virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law" ignificantl!, on *a! 6, 200., +resident *acapagal(Arro!o ordered the lifting of the declaration of a >state of rebellion? in *etro *anila" Accordingl!, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic" As to petitioners; claim that the proclamation of a >state of rebellion? is being used b! the authorities to 6ustif! warrantless arrests, the ecretar! of 3ustice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in connection with the >rebellion"? Ee states that what is e)tant are general instructions to law enforcement officers and militar! agencies to implement +roclamation :o" 20" ) ) )" <ith this declaration, petitioners; apprehensions as to warrantless arrests should be laid to rest" (Lacson v. =ere6, !7" SCR "7*, <ay 1+, ,++1, En 9anc ><elo?# +),. n connection 1ith the !ay ++, +--< elections, the %H!D9D% issued a resolution prohibiting the conduct of e0it polls on the ground, among others, that it might cause disorder and confusion considering the randomness of selecting intervie1ees, 1hich further ma7es the e0it polls unreliable. .he constitutionality of this resolution 1as challenged by '5S6%5= 5roadcasting %orporation as violative of freedom of e0pression. .he Solicitor Feneral contends that the petition has been rendered moot and academic because the !ay ++, +--< election has already been held and done 1ith and, therefore, there is no longer any actual controversy to be resolved. &esolve. Held2 <hile the assailed 'esolution referred specificall! to the *a! .., .//0 election, its implications on the people;s fundamental freedom of e)pression transcend the past election" The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government" &! its ver! nature, e)it polling is tied up with elections" To set aside the resolution of the issue now will onl! postpone a tas@ that could well crop up again in future elections" 70

9n an! event, in Salonga v. %ru> /ano, the #ourt had occasion to reiterate that it >also has the dut! to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules" 9t has the s!mbolic function of educating bench and bar on the e)tent of protection given b! constitutional guarantees"? ince the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invo@ed here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterit!, whether the! li@ewise protect the holding of e)it polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom" ( 9S@C9) 9roa2casting Cor%oration v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 1!!48*, 5an. ,8, ,+++, En 9anc >=anganiban?# +)<. Bhat is the meaning of Jlegal standingJ or locus standiC

Held2 ." >$egal standing? or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the part! has sustained or will sustain direct in6ur! as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged . The term >interest? means a material interest, an interest in issue affected b! the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the Fuestion involved, or a mere incidental interest . The gist of the Fuestion of standing is whether a part! alleges >such personal sta@e in the outcome of the controvers! as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional Fuestions"? (.ntegrate2 9ar o1 t0e =0ili%%ines v. 'on. Ronal2o 9. Namora, (.R. )o. 141,84, ug. 17, ,+++# 2" 9n addition to the e)istence of an actual case or controvers!, a person who assails the validit! of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or will sustain, a direct in6ur! as a result of its enforcement . -videntl!, the rights asserted b! petitioners as citizens and ta)pa!ers are held in common b! all the citizens, the violation of which ma! result onl! in a >generalized grievance? . Get, in a sense, all citizenPs and ta)pa!erPs suits are efforts to air generalized grievances about the conduct of government and the allocation of power" (Se%arate 3%inion, 4a%unan, 5., in .sagani Cru6 v. Secretary o1 Environment an2 )atural Resources, et al., (.R. )o. 1!7!87, /ec. *, ,+++, En 9anc# +)-. 'sserting itself as the official organi>ation of Filipino la1yers tas7ed 1ith the bounden duty to uphold the rule of la1 and the %onstitution, the ntegrated 5ar of the /hilippines ( 5/) filed a petition before the S% questioning the validity of the order of the /resident commanding the deployment and utili>ation of the /hilippine !arines to assist the /hilippine =ational /olice (/=/) in la1 enforcement by 2oining the latter in visibility patrols around the metropolis. .he Solicitor Feneral questioned the legal standing of the 5/ to file the petitionC &esolve. Held2 9n the case at bar, the 9&+ primaril! anchors its standing on its alleged responsibilit! to uphold the rule of law and the #onstitution" Apart from this declaration, however, the 9&+ asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation b! the 9&+ of its dut! to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedl! true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case" This is too general an interest which is shared b! other groups and the whole citizenr!" &ased on the standards above(stated, the 9&+ has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case" 9ts fundamental purpose which, under ection 2, 'ule .2/(A of the 'ules of #ourt, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of 6ustice is alien to, and cannot be affected b! the deplo!ment of the *arines" ) ) ) *oreover, the 9&+ ) ) ) has not shown an! specific in6ur! which it has suffered or ma! suffer b! virtue of the Fuestioned governmental act" 9ndeed, none of its members ) ) ) has sustained an! form of in6ur! as a result of the operation of the 6oint visibilit! patrols" :either is it alleged that an! of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated b! the deplo!ment of the *arines" <hat the 9&+ pro6ects as in6urious is the supposed >militarization? of law enforcement which might threaten +hilippine democratic institutions and ma! cause more harm than good in the long run" :ot onl! is the presumed >in6ur!? not personal in character, it is li@ewise too vague, highl! speculative and uncertain to satisf! the reFuirement of standing" ince petitioner has not successfull! established a direct and personal in6ur! as a conseFuence of the Fuestioned act, it does not possess the personalit! to assail the validit! of the deplo!ment of the *arines" (.ntegrate2 9ar o1 t0e =0ili%%ines v. 'on. Ronal2o 9. Namora, (.R. )o. 141,84, ug. 17, ,+++, En 9anc >4a%unan?# ++). %onsidering the lac7 of requisite standing of the 5/ to file the petition questioning the validity of the order of the /resident to deploy and utili>e the /hilippine !arines to assist the /=/ in la1 enforcement, may the %ourt still properly ta7e cogni>ance of the caseC 71

Held2 Eaving stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this #ourt has the discretion to ta@e cognizance of a suit which does not satisf! the reFuirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved . 9n not a few cases, the #ourt has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people . Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the #ourt ma! brush aside technicalities of procedure . 9n this case, a reading of the petition shows that the 9&+ has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this #ourt in view of their seriousness, novelt! and weight as precedents" *oreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedl! aggravated b! the *indanao insurgenc! problem, the legal controvers! raised in the petition almost certainl! will not go awa!" 9t will stare us in the face again" 9t, therefore, behooves the #ourt to rela) the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later" (.ntegrate2 9ar o1 t0e =0ili%%ines v. 'on. Ronal2o 9. Namora, (.R. )o. 141,84, ug. 17, ,+++# +++. 8iscuss the nature of a ta0payer@s suit. Bhen may it be allo1edC

Held2 ." +etitioner and respondents agree that to constitute a ta)pa!erPs suit, two reFuisites must be met, namel!, that public funds are disbursed b! a political subdivision or instrumentalit! and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularit! is committed, and that the petitioner is directl! affected b! the alleged ultra vires act . The same pronouncement was made in Kilosbayan, nc. v. Fuingona, *r., where the #ourt also reiterated its liberal stance in entertaining so(called ta)pa!erPs suits, especiall! when important issues are involved" A closer e)amination of the facts of this case would readil! demonstrate that petitionerPs standing should not even be made an issue here, >since standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional Fuestion is actuall! involved"? 9n the case at bar, disbursement of public funds was onl! made in ./15 when the +rovince bought the lands from ,rtigas at +..0"00 per sFuare meter in line with the ob6ectives of +"4" 615" +etitioner never referred to such purchase as an illegal disbursement of public funds but focused on the alleged fraudulent reconve!ance of said propert! to ,rtigas because the price paid was lower than the prevailing mar@et value of neighboring lots" The first reFuirement, therefore, which would ma@e this petition a ta)pa!erPs suit is absent" The onl! remaining 6ustification for petitioner to be allowed to pursue this action is whether it is, or would be, directl! affected b! the act complained of" As we stated in Kilosbayan, nc. v. !orato, > tanding is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not b! parties who have been personall! in6ured b! the operation of a law or b! official action ta@en, but b! concerned citizens, ta)pa!ers or voters who actuall! sue in the public interest" Eence the Fuestion in standing is whether such parties have Palleged such a personal sta@e in the outcome of the controvers! as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largel! depends for illumination of difficult constitutional Fuestions"P (%iting 5a7er v. %arr, ;$- ?.S. +<$, , 9. Dd. "d $;; [+-$"])3 7ndeniabl!, as a ta)pa!er, petitioner would somehow be adversel! affected b! an illegal use of public mone!" <hen, however, no such unlawful spending has been shown ) ) ), petitioner, even as a ta)pa!er, cannot Fuestion the transaction validl! e)ecuted b! and between the +rovince and ,rtigas for the simple reason that it is not priv! to said contract" 9n other words, petitioner has absolutel! no cause of action, and conseFuentl! no locus standi, in the instant case" (D0e nti@(ra1t League o1 t0e =0ili%%ines, .nc. v. San 5uan, ,*+ SCR ,7+, ,7!@,77, ug. 1, 199*, En 9anc >Romero?# 2" A ta)pa!er is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the #onstitution. Thus, a ta)pa!er;s action is properl! brought onl! when there is an e)ercise b! #ongress of its ta)ing or spending power. This was our ruling in a recent case wherein petitioners Telecommunications and &roadcast Attorne!s of the +hilippines (T-$-&A+) and A*A :etwor@, 9nc" Fuestioned the validit! of ection /2 of &"+" &lg" 00. (otherwise @nown as the >,mnibus -lection #ode?) reFuiring radio and television stations to give free air time to the #ommission on -lections during the campaign period (.elecommunications and 5roadcast 'ttorneys of the /hilippines, nc. v. %ommission on Dlections, "<- S%&' ;;, [+--<]). The #ourt held that petitioner T-$-&A+ did not have an! interest as a ta)pa!er since the assailed law did not involve the ta)ing or spending power of #ongress" *an! other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to ta)pa!ers upon whether or not the case involved a disbursement of public funds b! the legislature" 9n 72

Sanidad v. %ommission on Dlections, the petitioners therein were allowed to bring a ta)pa!er;s suit to Fuestion several presidential decrees promulgated b! then +resident *arcos in his legislative capacit! calling for a national referendum, with the #ourt e)plaining that H B ) ) NiOt is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute H +residential 4ecrees are of such nature H ma! be contested b! one who will sustain a direct in6ur! as a result of its enforcement" At the instance of ta)pa!ers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds ma! be en6oined, upon the theor! that the e)penditure of public funds b! an officer of the tate for the purpose of e)ecuting an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds" The breadth of +residential 4ecree :o" //. carries an appropriation of Dive *illion +esos for the effective implementation of its purposes" +residential 4ecree :o" .02. appropriates the sum of -ight *illion +esos to carr! out its provisions" The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as ta)pa!ers in the lawful e)penditure of these amounts of public mone! sufficientl! clothes them with that personalit! to litigate the validit! of the 4ecrees appropriating said funds ) ) )" 9n still another case, the #ourt held that petitioners H the +hilippine #onstitution Association, 9nc", a non(profit civic organization H had standing as ta)pa!ers to Fuestion the constitutionalit! of 'epublic Act :o" 2026 insofar as it provides for retirement gratuit! and commutation of vacation and sic@ leaves to enators and 'epresentatives and to the elective officials of both houses of #ongress (/hilippine %onstitution 'ssociation, nc. v. Fimene>). And in /ascual v. Secretary of /ublic Bor7s, the #ourt allowed petitioner to maintain a ta)pa!er;s suit assailing the constitutional soundness of 'epublic Act :o" /20 appropriating +05,000 for the construction, repair and improvement of feeder roads within private propert!" All these cases involved the disbursement of public funds b! means of a law" *eanwhile, in 5ugnay %onstruction and 8evelopment %orporation v. 9aron, the #ourt declared that the trial court was wrong in allowing respondent 'avanzo to bring an action for in6unction in his capacit! as a ta)pa!er in order to Fuestion the legalit! of the contract of lease covering the public mar@et entered into between the #it! of 4agupan and petitioner" The #ourt declared that 'avanzo did not possess the reFuisite standing to bring such ta)pa!er;s suit since >NoOn its face, and there is no evidence to the contrar!, the lease contract entered into between petitioner and the #it! shows that no public funds have been or will be used in the construction of the mar@et building"? #oming now to the instant case, it is readil! apparent that there is no e)ercise b! #ongress of its ta)ing or spending power" The +##' was created b! the +resident b! virtue of -"," :o" 52, as amended b! -"," :o" 10" 7nder ection 1 of -"," :o" 52, the amount of +2 million is >appropriated? for its operational e)penses >to be sourced from the funds of the ,ffice of the +resident"? ) ) ) The appropriations for the +##' were authorized b! the +resident, not b! #ongress" 9n fact, there was no appropriation at all" >9n a strict sense, appropriation has been defied Uas nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed b! the #onstitution that mone! ma! be paid out of the Treasur!,; while appropriation made by la1 refers to Uthe act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the pa!ment of debt or dues from the tate to its creditors";? The funds used for the +##' were ta@en from funds intended for the ,ffice of the +resident, in the e)ercise of the #hief -)ecutive;s power to transfer funds pursuant to ection 25 (5) of Article C9 of the #onstitution" 9n the final anal!sis, it must be stressed that the #ourt retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a ta)pa!er;s suit . 9n the case at bar, there being no e)ercise b! #ongress of its ta)ing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to Fuestion the creation of the +##' in his capacit! as a ta)pa!er, but rather, he must establish that he has a >personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct in6ur! as a result of its enforcement"? 9n other words, petitioner must show that he is a real part! in interest H that he will stand to be benefited or in6ured b! the 6udgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit" :owhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to ma@e such a representation" ((on6ales v. )arvasa, !!" SCR "!!, ug. 14, ,+++, En 9anc >(on6aga@Reyes?# ++". Bhat is the meaning of A2usticiable controversy3 as requisite for the proper e0ercise of the po1er of 2udicial revie1C llustrative case. Held2 Drom a reading of the records it appears to us that the petition was prematurel! filed" 7nder the undisputed facts there is as !et no 6usticiable controvers! for 73

the court to resolve and the petition should have been dismissed b! the appellate court on this ground" <e gather from the allegations of the petition and that of the petitioner;s memorandum that the alleged application for certificate of ancestral land claim (#A$#) filed b! the heirs of #arantes under the assailed 4-:' special orders has not been granted nor the #A$# applied for, issued" The 4-:' is still processing the application of the heirs of #arantes for a certificate of ancestral land claim, which the 4-:' ma! or ma! not grant" 9t is evident that the adverse legal interests involved in this case are the competing claims of the petitioners and that of the heirs of #arantes to possess a common portion of a piece of land" As the undisputed facts stand there is no 6usticiable controvers! between the petitioners and the respondents as there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitioners; asserted right to possess the land b! reason of the implementation of the Fuestioned administrative issuance" A 6usticiable controvers! has been defined as, >a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests? which ma! be resolved b! a court of law through the application of a law . #ourts have no 6udicial power to review cases involving political Fuestions and as a rule, will desist from ta@ing cognizance of speculative or h!pothetical cases, advisor! opinions and in cases that has become moot . ub6ect to certain well(defined e)ceptions courts will not touch an issue involving the validit! of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validit! . 9n the case of /'%? v. Secretary of Dducation the petition contesting the validit! of a regulation issued b! the ecretar! of -ducation reFuiring private schools to secure a permit to operate was dismissed on the ground that all the petitioners have permits and are actuall! operating under the same" The petitioners Fuestioned the regulation because of the possibilit! that the permit might be denied them in the future" This #ourt held that there was no 6usticiable controvers! because the petitioners suffered no wrong b! the implementation of the Fuestioned regulation and therefore, the! are not entitled to relief" A mere apprehension that the ecretar! of -ducation will withdraw the permit does not amount to 6usticiable controvers!" The Fuestioned regulation in the +A#7 case ma! be Fuestioned b! a private school whose permit to operate has been revo@ed or one whose application therefore has been denied. This #ourt cannot rule on the basis of petitioners; speculation that the 4-:' will approve the application of the heirs of #arantes" There must be an actual governmental act which directl! causes or will imminentl! cause in6ur! to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess the land before the 6urisdiction of this #ourt ma! be invo@ed" There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land b! the heirs of #arantes under orders from the 4-:'" The petitioners; allegation that certain documents from the 4-:' were shown to them b! the heirs of #arantes to 6ustif! eviction is vague, and it would appear that the petitioners did not verif! if indeed the respondent 4-:' or its officers authorized the attempted eviction" uffice it to sa! that b! the petitioners; own admission that the respondents are still processing and have not approved the application of the heirs of #arantes, the petitioners alleged right to possess the land is not violated nor is in imminent danger of being violated, as the 4-:' ma! or ma! not approve #arantes; application" 7ntil such time, the petitioners are simpl! speculating that the! might be evicted from the premises at some future time" &orrowing from the pronouncements of this #ourt in the +A#7 case, >The! (the petitioners) have suffered no wrong under the terms of the law H and, naturall! need no relief in the form the! now see@ to obtain"? 9f indeed the heirs of #arantes are tr!ing to enter the land and disturbing the petitioners; possession thereof even without prior approval b! the 4-:' of the claim of the heirs of #arantes, the case is simpl! one of forcible entr!" (Cutaran v. /E)R, !7+ SCR *9", 5an. !1, ,++1, !r2 /iv. >(on6aga@Reyes?# ++;. Bhat is a 2usticiable controversyC Bhat are political questionsC

Held2 As a general proposition, a controvers! is 6usticiable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review. 9t pertains to issues which are inherentl! susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized b! law" :evertheless, the #ourt does not automaticall! assume 6urisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution" ,ne class of cases wherein the #ourt hesitates to rule on are >political Fuestions"? The reason is that political Fuestions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legalit!, of a particular act or measure being assailed" *oreover, the political Fuestion being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normall! interfere with the wor@ings of another co(eFual branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the #onstitution" 74

As .anada v. 'ngara puts it, political Fuestions refer >to those Fuestions which, under the #onstitution, are to be decided b! the people in their sovereign capacit!, or in regard to which full discretionar! authorit! has been delegated to the legislative or e)ecutive branch of government"? Thus, if an issue is clearl! identified b! the te)t of the #onstitution as matters for discretionar! action b! a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political Fuestion" 9n the classic formulation of 3ustice &rennan in 5a7er v. %arr, >NpOrominent on the surface of an! case held to involve a political Fuestion is found a te)tuall! demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department8 or a lac@ of 6udiciall! discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it8 or the impossibilit! of deciding without an initial polic! determination of a @ind clearl! for non6udicial discretion8 or the impossibilit! of a courtPs underta@ing independent resolution without e)pressing lac@ of the respect due coordinate branches of government8 or an unusual need for unFuestioning adherence to a political decision alread! made8 or the potentialit! of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements b! various departments on the one Fuestion"? The ./01 #onstitution e)pands the concept of 6udicial review b! providing that >NTOhe 3udicial power shall be vested in one upreme #ourt and in such lower courts as ma! be established b! law" 3udicial power includes the dut! of the courts of 6ustice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legall! demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac@ or e)cess of 6urisdiction on the part of an! branch or instrumentalit! of the Aovernment"? ('rticle : , Sec. + of the +-<, %onstitution) 7nder this definition, the #ourt cannot agree ) ) ) that the issue involved is a political Fuestion be!ond the 6urisdiction of this #ourt to review" <hen the grant of power is Fualified, conditional or sub6ect to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed Fualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is 6usticiable ( the problem being one of legalit! or validit!, not its wisdom . *oreover, the 6urisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this #ourt . <hen political Fuestions are involved, the #onstitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac@ or e)cess of 6urisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being Fuestioned" &! grave abuse of discretion is meant simpl! capricious or whimsical e)ercise of 6udgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive dut! or a virtual refusal to perform a dut! en6oined b! law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is e)ercised in an arbitrar! and despotic manner b! reason of passion or hostilit!" 7nder this definition, a court is without power to directl! decide matters over which full discretionar! authorit! has been delegated" &ut while this #ourt has no power to substitute its 6udgment for that of #ongress or of the +resident, it ma! loo@ into the Fuestion of whether such e)ercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion" A showing that plenar! power is granted either department of government ma! not be an obstacle to 6udicial inFuir!, for the improvident e)ercise or abuse thereof ma! give rise to 6usticiable controvers!. (.ntegrate2 9ar o1 t0e =0ili%%ines v. 'on. Ronal2o 9. Namora, (.R. )o. 141,84, ug. 17, ,+++, En 9anc >4a%unan?# ++#. s the legitimacy of the assumption to the /residency of /resident Floria !acapagal 'rroyo a political question and, therefore, not sub2ect to 2udicial revie1C 8istinguish D8S' /eople /o1er from D8S' /eople /o1er . Held2 'espondents rel! on the case of 9a1yers 9eague for a 5etter /hilippines andLor Hliver '. 9o>ano v. /resident %ora>on %. 'quino, et al. and related cases to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimac! of the government of respondent Arro!o, ergo, the! present a political Fuestion" A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that the! are inapplicable" 9n the cited cases, we held that the government of former +resident AFuino was the result of a successful revolution b! the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one" :o less than the Dreedom #onstitution declared that the AFuino government was installed through a direct e)ercise of the power of the Dilipino people >in defiance of the provisions of the ./12 #onstitution, as amended"? 9t is familiar learning that the legitimac! of a government sired b! a successful revolution b! people power is be!ond 6udicial scrutin! for that government automaticall! orbits out of the constitutional loop" 9n chec@ered contrast, the government of respondent Arro!o is not revolutionar! in character" The oath that she too@ at the -4 A hrine is the oath under the ./01 #onstitution" 9n her oath, she categoricall! swore to preserve and defend the ./01 #onstitution" 9ndeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidenc! under the authorit! of the ./01 #onstitution" 9n fine, the legal distinction between -4 A +eople +ower 9 and -4 A +eople +ower 99 is clear" -4 A 9 involves the e)ercise of the people power of revolution which overthrows the whole government" -4 A 99 is an e)ercise of people power of freedom of speech and 75

freedom of assembl! to petition the government for redress of grievances which onl! affected the office of the +resident" -4 A 9 is e)tra constitutional and the legitimac! of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the sub6ect of 6udicial review, but -4 A 99 is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting +resident that it caused and the succession of the Cice +resident as +resident are sub6ect to 6udicial review" -4 A 9 presented a political Fuestion8 -4 A 99 involves legal Fuestions" B ) ) :eedless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political Fuestions" The principal issues for resolution reFuire the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the ./01 #onstitution, notabl! ection . of Article 99, and ection 0 of Article C99, and the allocation of governmental powers under ection .. of Article C99" The issues li@ewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunit! from suit" The! also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against pre6udicial publicit!" As earl! as the .002 case of !arbury v. !adison> the doctrine has been laid down that Ait is emphatically the province and duty of the 2udicial department to say 1hat the la1 is 0 0 0.3 Thus, respondent;s invocation of the doctrine of political Fuestion is but a fora! in the dar@" (5ose%0 E. Estra2a v. niano /esierto, (.R. )os. 14*"1+@17, <arc0 ,, ,++1, En 9anc >=uno?# ++(. s the /resident@s po1er to call out the armed forces as their %ommander6in6%hief in order to prevent or suppress la1less violence, invasion or rebellion sub2ect to 2udicial revie1, or is it a political questionC %larify. Held2 <hen the +resident calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessaril! e)ercises a discretionar! power solel! vested in his wisdom" This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the te)t of the #onstitution itself" The #ourt, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the +residentPs wisdom or substitute its own" Eowever, this does not prevent an e)amination of whether such power was e)ercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was e)ercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion" 9n view of the constitutional intent to give the +resident full discretionar! power to determine the necessit! of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the +residentPs decision is totall! bereft of factual basis" The present petition fails to discharge such heav! burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there e)ists no 6ustification for calling out the armed forces" There is, li@ewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was e)ercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremac! over the militar!" 9n the performance of this #ourtPs dut! of >purposeful hesitation? before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, onl! where such grave abuse of discretion is clearl! shown shall the #ourt interfere with the +residentPs 6udgment" To doubt is to sustain" (.ntegrate2 9ar o1 t0e =0ili%%ines v. 'on. Ronal2o 9. Namora, (.R. )o. 141,84, ug. 17, ,+++, En 9anc >4a%unan?# ++$. 8o lo1er courts have 2urisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a la1C f so, ho1 should they act in the e0ercise of this 2urisdictionC Held2 <e stress at the outset that the lower court had 6urisdiction to consider the constitutionalit! of ection .01, this authorit! being embraced in the general definition of the 6udicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws b! the criterion of their conformit! to the fundamental law" pecificall!, &+ .2/ vests in the regional trial courts 6urisdiction over all civil cases in which the sub6ect of the litigation is incapable of pecuniar! estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to Fuestion in his defense the constitutionalit! of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings ta@en against him, particularl! as the! contravene the &ill of 'ights" *oreover, Article C999, ection 5(2), of the #onstitution vests in the upreme #ourt appellate 6urisdiction over final 6udgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionalit! or validit! of an! treat!, international or e)ecutive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in Fuestion" 9n the e)ercise of this 6urisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the conseFuences of a declaration of unconstitutionalit! upon the stabilit! of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers" As the Fuestioned act is usuall! the handiwor@ of the legislative or the e)ecutive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if onl! out of a becoming modest!, to defer to the higher 6udgment of this #ourt in the consideration of its validit!, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation b! a collegiate bod! and with the concurrence of the ma6orit! of those who participated in its discussion" (/rilon v. Lim, ,!7 SCR 1!7, 1!9@14+, ug. 4, 1994, En 9anc >Cru6?# ++,. Bhat cases are to be heard by the Supreme %ourt en bancC 76

Held2 7nder upreme #ourt #ircular :o" 2(0/, dated Debruar! 1, ./0/, as amended b! the 'esolution of :ovember .0, .//2= B ) ) NtOhe following are considered en banc cases= .) #ases in which the constitutionalit! or validit! of an! treat!, international or e)ecutive agreement, law, e)ecutive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in Fuestion8 2) #riminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalt!8 2) #ases raising novel Fuestions of law8 5) #ases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls8 5) #ases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the #ivil ervice #ommission, #ommission on -lections, and #ommission on Audit8 6) #ases where the penalt! to be imposed is the dismissal of a 6udge, officer or emplo!ee of the 6udiciar!, disbarment of a law!er, or either the suspension of an! of them for a period of more than one (.) !ear or a fine e)ceeding +.0,000"00 or both8 1) #ases where a doctrine or principle laid down b! the court en banc or in division ma! be modified or reversed8 0) #ases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (2) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a ma6orit! of the actual membership of the court en banc8 and /) All other cases as the court en banc b! a ma6orit! of its actual membership ma! deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention" (&irestone Ceramics, .nc. v. Court o1 %%eals, !!4 SCR 4*7, 4"1@4",, 5une ,8, ,+++, En 9anc >=urisima?# ++<. Bhat is fiscal autonomyC .he fiscal autonomy clauseC

Held2 As envisioned in the #onstitution, the fiscal autonom! en6o!ed b! the 3udiciar!, the #ivil ervice #ommission, the #ommission on Audit, the #ommission on -lections, and the ,ffice of the ,mbudsman contemplates a guarantee of full fle)ibilit! to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs reFuire" 9t recognizes the power and authorit! to lev!, assess and collect fees, fi) rates of compensation not e)ceeding the highest rates authorized b! law for compensation and pa! plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as ma! be provided b! law or prescribed b! them in the course of the discharge of their functions" Discal autonom! means freedom from outside control" The 3udiciar!, the #onstitutional #ommissions, and the ,mbudsman must have the independence and fle)ibilit! needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties" The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonom! and violative not onl! of the e)press mandate of the #onstitution but especiall! as regards the upreme #ourt, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional s!stem is based" (9eng6on v. /rilon, ,+8 SCR 1!!, %ril 17, 199,, En 9anc >(utierre6?# ++-. !ay the Hmbudsman validly entertain criminal charges against a 2udge of the regional trial court in connection 1ith his handling of cases before the court. Held2 +etitioner criticizes the 6urisprudence (!aceda v. :asque>, ""+ S%&' #$# [+--;] and 8olalas v. Hffice of the Hmbudsman6!indanao, "$( S%&' <+< [+--$]) cited b! the ,ffice of the ,mbudsman as erroneous and not applicable to his complaint" Ee insists that since his complaint involved a criminal charge against a 6udge, it was within the authorit! of the ,mbudsman not the upreme #ourt to resolve whether a crime was committed and the 6udge prosecuted therefor" The petition cannot succeed" B)) <e agree with the olicitor Aeneral that the ,mbudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion warranting the writs pra!ed for" The issues have been settled in the case of n &eO *oaquin 5orromeo. There, we laid down the rule that before a civil or criminal action against a 6udge for a violation of Arts" 205 and 205 (@nowingl! rendering an un6ust 6udgment or order) can be entertained, there must first be >a final and authoritative 6udicial 77

declaration? that the decision or order in Fuestion is indeed >un6ust"? The pronouncement ma! result from either= (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validit! of the 6udgment8 or (b) an administrative proceeding in the upreme #ourt against the 6udge precisel! for promulgating an un6ust 6udgment or order" $i@ewise, the determination of whether a 6udge has maliciousl! dela!ed the disposition of the case is also an e)clusive 6udicial function ( n &eO 5orromeo, supra, at #$+). >To repeat, no other entit! or official of the government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch , not an! functionar! thereof, has competence to review a 6udicial order or decision H whether final and e)ecutor! or not H and pronounce it erroneous so as to la! the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an un6ust 6udgment or order" That prerogative belongs to the courts alone. This having been said, we find that the ,mbudsman acted in accordance with law and 6urisprudence when he referred the cases against 3udge +ela!o to the upreme #ourt for appropriate action" (/e Vera v. =elayo, !!7 SCR ,81, 5uly *, ,+++, 1st /iv. >=ar2o?# +"). Bhat is a !emorandum 8ecisionC

Held2 A *emorandum 4ecision is a >specie of succinctl! written decisions b! appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of ection 50, &"+" &lg" .2/ on the grounds of e)pedienc!, practicalit!, convenience and doc@et status of our courts"? (&rancisco v. =ermsIul, 1"! SCR !,4, !!! >1989?# +"+. 8iscuss the validity of A!emorandum 8ecisions.3

Held2 ." The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered b! an! court without e)pressing therein clearl! and distinctl! the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validit! of >memorandum decisions? which adopt b! reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals" B ) ) Eence, even in this 6urisdiction, incorporation b! reference is allowed if onl! to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decisions of the higher court" This is particularl! true when the decision sought to be incorporated is a length! and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at ) ) )" (3il an2 )atural (as Commission v. Court o1 %%eals, ,9! SCR ,*, 5uly ,!, 1998 ><artine6?# 2" <e have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantiall! or sufficientl! complied with the constitutional in6unction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which the! were written and even if >there Nwas leftO much to be desired in terms of NtheirO clarit!, coherence and comprehensibilit!? provided that the! eventuall! set out the facts and the law on which the! were based, as when the! stated the legal Fualifications of the offense constituted b! the facts proved, the modif!ing circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalt! imposed and the civil liabilit!8 or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and accordingl! rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalt!8 or Fuoted the facts narrated in the prosecution;s memorandum but made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before finall! agreeing with the prosecution;s evaluation of the case . <e have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions ) ) )" <e have also declared that memorandum decisions compl! with the constitutional mandate" 9n Francisco v. /erms7ul, however, we laid the conditions for the validit! of memorandum decisions, thus= The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court onl! b! remote reference, which is to sa! that the challenged decision is not easil! and immediatel! available to the person reading the memorandum decision" Dor the incorporation b! reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision" 9n other words, the memorandum decision authorized under ection 50 of &"+" &lg" .2/ should actuall! 78

embod! the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an anne) attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision" 9t is e)pected that this reFuirement will alla! the suspicion that no stud! was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merel! affirmed without a prior e)amination of the facts and the law on which it is based" The pro0imity at least of the anne)ed statement should suggest that such e)amination has been underta@en" 9t is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, compl! with Article C999, ection .5 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectif! its violation" The #ourt finds necessar! to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingl! used lest it become an additive e)cuse for 6udicial sloth" 9t is an additional condition for the validit! of this @ind of decision ma! be resorted to onl! in cases where the facts are in the main accepted b! both parties and easil! determinable b! the 6udge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will reFuire an e)tended discussion of the laws involved" The memorandum decision ma! be emplo!ed in simple litigations onl!, such as ordinar! collection cases, where the appeal is obviousl! groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it" B)) Eenceforth, all memorandum decisions shall compl! with the reFuirements herein set forth as to the form prescribed and the occasions when the! ma! be rendered" An! deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article C999, ection .5 of the #onstitution and stri@e down the flawed 6udgment as a lawless disobedience" Tested against these standards, we find that the 'T# decision at bar miserabl! failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the constitutional in6unction" The 'T# decision is brief indeed, but it is star@l! hallow, otiosel! written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form" 9t achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even at a simple summation of facts which could easil! be done" 9ts inadeFuac! spea@s for itself" <e cannot even consider or affirm said 'T# decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to compl! with the measures of validit! laid down in Francisco v. /erms7ul. 9t merel! affirmed in toto the *eT# decision without sa!ing more" A decision or resolution, especiall! one resolving an appeal, should directl! meet the issues for resolution8 otherwise, the appeal would be pointless <e therefore reiterate our admonition in =icos ndustrial %orporation v. %ourt of 'ppeals, in that while we conceded that brevit! in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot be substituted for substance8 and again in Francisco v. /erms7ul, where we cautioned that e)pedienc! alone, no matter how compelling, cannot e)cuse non(compliance with the constitutional reFuirements" This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and concise decisions, but never at the e)pense of scholarl! anal!sis, and more significantl!, of 6ustice and fair pla!, lest the fears e)pressed b! 3ustice Deria as the ponente in &omero v. %ourt of 'ppeals come true, i.e., if an appellate court failed to provide the appeal the attention it rightfull! deserved, said court deprived the appellant of due process since he was accorded a fair opportunit! to be heard b! a fair and responsible magistrate" This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in this case, where not onl! propert! rights are at sta@e but also the libert! if not the life of a human being" Daithful adherence to the reFuirements of ection .5, Article C999 of the #onstitution is indisputabl! a paramount component of due process and fair pla!" 9t is li@ewise demanded b! the due process clause of the #onstitution . The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an e)planation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court" The court cannot simpl! sa! that 6udgment is rendered in favor of B and against G and 6ust leave it at that without an! 6ustification whatsoever for its action" The losing part! is entitled to @now wh! he lost, so he ma! appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed" A decision that does not clearl! and distinctl! state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dar@ as to how it was reached and is precisel! pre6udicial to the losing part!, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review b! a higher tribunal . *ore than that, the reFuirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching 6udgment, the 6udge did so through the processes of legal reasoning" 9t is, thus, a safeguard against the 79

impetuosit! of the 6udge, preventing him from deciding ipse di0it" Couchsafed neither the sword nor the purse b! the #onstitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing 6udgment on the life, libert! or propert! of his fellowmen, the 6udge must ultimatel! depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the 6ustness of his decision. Thus the #ourt has struc@ down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the #ourt of Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest e)posed their sometimes cavalier attitude not onl! to their magisterial responsibilities but li@ewise to their avowed fealt! to the #onstitution" Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to compl! with ection .5, Article C999 of the #onstitution, a decision, resolution or order which= contained no anal!sis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to an! legal basis in reaching its conclusions8 contained nothing more than a summar! of the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties8 convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite an! legal authorit! or principle to support conclusions that the letter in Fuestion was libelous8 consisted merel! of one (.) paragraph with mostl! sweeping generalizations and failed to support its conclusion of parricide8 consisted of five (5) pages, three (2) pages of which were Fuotations from the labor arbiter;s decision including the dispositive portion and barel! a page (two N2O short paragraphs of two N2O sentences each) of its own discussion or reasonings8 was merel! based on the findings of another court sans transcript of stenographic notes, or failed to e)plain the factual and legal bases for the award of moral damages" 9n the same vein do we stri@e down as a nullit! the 'T# decision in Fuestion" (-ao v. Court o1 %%eals, !44 SCR ,+,, 3ct. ,4, ,+++, 1 st /iv. >/avi2e?# +"". Bhat are the distinctive features and purpose of a memorandum decisionC

Held2 9n Francisco v. /erms7ul (+,; S%&' ;"#, ;;; [+-<-] , the #ourt described >NtOhe distinctive features of a memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered b! an appellate court, second, it incorporates b! reference the findings of fact or the conclusions of law contained in the decision, order, or ruling under review" *ost li@el!, the purpose is to affirm the decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of the findings of facts b! the lower court ma! lead to a different conclusion of law b! the higher court" At an! rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation b! reference is evidentl! to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court" The idea is to avoid having to repeat in the bod! of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since the! are being approved or adopted an!wa!" (-ao v. Court o1 %%eals, !44 SCR ,+,, 3ct. ,4, ,+++, 1 st /iv. >/avi2e?# +";. 8oes the period for decision ma7ing under Section +(, 'rticle : , +-<, %onstitution, apply to the SandiganbayanC D0plain. Held2 The above provision does not appl! to the andiganba!an" The provision refers to regular courts of lower collegiate level that in the present hierarch! applies onl! to the #ourt of Appeals. The andiganba!an is a special court of the same level as the #ourt of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of 6ustice, with functions of a trial court" Thus, the andiganba!an is not a regular court but a special one . (ReM =roblem o1 /elays in Cases 9e1ore t0e San2iganbayan, .<. )o. ++@8@+7@SC, )ov. ,8, ,++1, En 9anc >=ar2o?# T,e C"&+)$)u)$"&(l C"##$++$"&+ +"#. Bhy does the %onstitution prohibit the /resident from appointing in an acting or temporary capacity the %hairman and %ommissioners of the %onstitutional %ommissionsC D0plain. Held2 NAO temporar! or acting appointee does not en6o! securit! of tenure, no matter how briefl!" This is the @ind of appointment that the #onstitution prohibits the +resident from ma@ing to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the #,*-$-#" Thus, in 5rillantes v. Eorac, this #ourt struc@ down as unconstitutional the designation b! then 80

+resident #orazon AFuino of Associate #ommissioner Ea!dee Gorac as Acting #hairperson of the #,*-$-#" This #ourt ruled that= >A designation as Acting #hairman is b! its ver! terms essentiall! temporar! and therefore revocable at will" :o cause need be established to 6ustif! its revocation" Assuming its validit!, the designation of the respondent as Acting #hairman of the #ommission on -lections ma! be withdrawn b! the +resident of the +hilippines at an! time and for whatever reason she sees fit" 9t is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal" The #onstitution provides for man! safeguards to the independence of the #ommission on -lections, foremost among which is the securit! of tenure of its members" That guarantee is not available to the respondent as Acting #hairman of the #ommission on -lections b! designation of the +resident of the +hilippines"? -arlier, in =acionalista /arty v. 5autista, a case decided under the ./25 #onstitution, which did not have a provision prohibiting temporar! or acting appointments to the #,*-$-#, this #ourt nevertheless declared unconstitutional the designation of the olicitor Aeneral as acting member of the #,*-$-#" This #ourt ruled that the designation of an acting #ommissioner would undermine the independence of the #,*-$-# and hence violate the #onstitution" <e declared then= >9t would be more in @eeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the #onstitution to appoint a permanent #ommissioner than to designate one to act temporaril!"? (<atibag v. 9eni%ayo, !8+ SCR 49, %ril ,, ,++,, En 9anc >Car%io?# +"(. s the constitutional po1er of the %H' to e0amine and audit government ban7s and agencies e0clusiveC 8oes it preclude a concurrent audit by a private e0ternal auditorC Held2 The resolution of the primordial issue of whether or not the #,A has the sole and e)clusive power to e)amine and audit government ban@s involves an interpretation of ection 2, Article 9B(4 of the ./01 #onstitution" This ection provides as follows= > ec" 2" (.) The #ommission on Audit shall have the po1er, authority, and duty to e0amine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and e)penditures or uses of funds and propert!, owned and held in trust b!, or pertaining to, the Aovernment, or an! of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government(owned or controlled corporations with original charters, ) ) )" >(2) The #ommission shall have the e0clusive authority , sub6ect to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and e)amination, establish the techniFues and methods reFuired therefore, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessar!, e)cessive, e)travagant, or unconscionable e)penditures, or uses of government funds and properties"? (-mphasis supplied) The #,A vigorousl! asserts that under the first paragraph of ection 2, the #,A en6o!s the sole and e)clusive power to e)amine and audit all government agencies, including the 4&+" The #,A contends this is similar to its sole and e)clusive authorit!, under the same paragraph of the same section, to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, including rules on the disallowance of unnecessar! e)penditures of government agencies" The bare language of ection 2, however, shows that the #,A;s power under the first paragraph is not declared e)clusive, while its authorit! under the second paragraph is e)pressl! declared >e)clusive"? There is a significant reason for this mar@ed difference in language" 4uring the deliberations of the #onstitutional #ommission, #ommissioner erafin Auingona proposed the addition of the word >e)clusive? in the first paragraph of ection 2, thereb! granting the #,A the sole and e)clusive power to e)amine and audit all government agencies" Eowever, the #onstitutional #ommission re6ected the addition of the word >e)clusive? in the first paragraph of ection 2 and Auingona was forced to withdraw his proposal" B ) ) B)) 9n sharp contrast, the #onstitutional #ommission placed the word >e)clusive? to Fualif! the authorit! of the #,A under the second paragraph of the same ection 2" This word >e)clusive? did not appear in the counterpart provisions of ection 2 in the ./25 and ./12 #onstitutions" There is no dispute that the #,A;s authorit! under the second 81

paragraph of ection 2 is e)clusive as the language of the #onstitution admits of no other meaning" Thus, the #,A has the e)clusive authorit! to decide on disallowances of unnecessar! government e)penditures" ,ther government agencies and their officials, as well as private auditors engaged b! them, cannot in an! wa! intrude into this e)clusive function of the #,A" The Fualif!ing word >e)clusive? in the second paragraph of ection 2 cannot be applied to the first paragraph which is another sub(section of ection 2" A Fualif!ing word is intended to refer onl! to the phrase to which it is immediatel! associated, and not to a phrase distantl! located in another paragraph or sub(section. Thus, the first paragraph of ection 2 must be read the wa! it appears, without the word >e)clusive,? signif!ing that non(#,A auditors can also e)amine and audit government agencies" &esides, the framers of the #onstitution intentionally omitted the word >e)clusive? in the first paragraph of ection 2 precisel! to allow concurrent audit b! private e)ternal auditors" The clear and unmista@able conclusion from a reading of the entire ection 2 is that the #,A;s power to e)amine and audit is non(e)clusive" ,n the other hand, the #,A;s authorit! to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessar! e)penditures is e)clusive" B)) *anifestl!, the e)press language of the #onstitution, and the clear intent of its framers, point to onl! one indubitable conclusion H the #,A does not have the e)clusive power to e)amine and audit government agencies" The framers of the #onstitution were full! aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the #,A audit, as when there is a private investment in a government(controlled corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or publicl! listed, or as in the case at bar when the government borrows mone! from abroad" 9n these instances the government enters the mar@etplace and competes with the rest of the world in attracting investments or loans" To succeed, the government must abide with the reasonable business practices of the mar@etplace" ,therwise no investor or creditor will do business with the government, frustrating government efforts to attract investments or secure loans that ma! be critical to stimulate moribund industries or resuscitate a badl! shattered national econom! as in the case at bar" &! design the #onstitution is fle)ible enough to meet these e)igencies" An! attempt to nullif! this fle)ibilit! in the instances mentioned, or in similar instances, will be ultra vires, in the absence of a statute limiting or removing such fle)ibilit!" The deliberations of the #onstitutional #ommission reveal eloFuentl! the intent of ection 2, Article 9B(4 of the #onstitution" As this #ourt has ruled repeatedl!, the intent of the law is the controlling factor in the interpretation of the law . 9f a law needs interpretation, the most dominant influence is the intent of the law . The intent of the law is that which is e)pressed in the words of the law, which should be discovered within its four corners aided, if necessar!, b! its legislative histor!" 9n the case of ection 2, Article 9B(4 of the #onstitution, the intent of the framers of the #onstitution is evident from the bare language of ection 2 itself" The deliberations of the #onstitutional #ommission confirm e)pressl! and even elucidate further this intent be!ond an! doubt whatsoever" There is another constitutional barrier to the #,A;s insistence of e)clusive power to e)amine and audit all government agencies" The #,A;s claim clashes directl! with the #entral &an@;s constitutional power of >supervision? over ban@s under ection 20, Article B99 of the #onstitution" B ) ) Eistoricall!, the #entral &an@ has been conducting periodic and special e)amination and audit of ban@s to determine the soundness of their operations and the safet! of the deposits of the public" 7ndeniabl!, the #entral &an@;s power of >supervision? includes the power to e)amine and audit ban@s, as the ban@ing laws have alwa!s recognized this power of the #entral &an@" Eence, the #,A;s power to e)amine and audit government ban@s must be reconciled with the #entral &an@;s power to supervise the same ban@s" The inevitable conclusion is that the #,A and the #entral &an@ have concurrent 6urisdiction, under the #onstitution, to e)amine and audit government ban@s" Eowever, despite the #entral &an@;s concurrent 6urisdiction over government ban@s, the #,A;s audit still prevails over that of the #entral &an@ since the #,A is the constitutionall! mandated auditor of government ban@s" And in matters falling under the second paragraph of ection 2, Article 9B(4 of the #onstitution, the #,A;s 6urisdiction is e)clusive" Thus, the #entral &an@ is devoid of authorit! to allow or disallow e)penditures of 82

government ban@s since this function belongs e)clusivel! to the #,A" (/evelo%ment 9anI o1 t0e =0ili%%ines v. Commission on u2it, !"! SCR !7*, 5anuary 1*, ,++,, En 9anc >Car%io?# +"$. 5et1een the %H'@s findings and conclusions and that of private auditors, 1hich should prevailC Held2 *oreover, as the constitutionall!(mandated auditor of all government agencies, the #,A;s findings and conclusions necessaril! prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are concerned" The superiorit! or preponderance of the #,A audit over private audit can be gleaned from the records of the #onstitutional #ommission ) ) )" The findings and conclusions of the private auditor ma! guide private investors or creditors who reFuire such private audit" Aovernment agencies and officials, however, remain bound b! the findings and conclusions of the #,A, whether the matter falls under the first or second paragraph of ection 2, unless of course such findings and conclusions are modified or reversed b! the courts" +",. !ay the po1er of the %H' to e0amine and audit government agencies be validly ta7en a1ay from itC Held2 The power of the #,A to e)amine and audit government agencies, while non( e)clusive, cannot be ta@en awa! from the #,A" ection 2, Article 9B(# of the #onstitution mandates that= > ec" 2" :o law shall be passed e)empting an! entit! of the Aovernment or its subsidiar! in an! guise whatsoever, or an! investment of public funds, from the 6urisdiction of the #ommission on Audit"? The mere fact that private auditors ma! audit government agencies does not divest the #,A of its power to e)amine and audit the same government agencies" (/evelo%ment 9anI o1 t0e =0ili%%ines v. Commission on u2it, !"! SCR !7*, 5anuary 1*, ,++,, En 9anc >Car%io?# B/ CONSTITUTIONAL LAW +"<. Bhat is the effect of declaration of unconstitutionality of a la1C llustrative case.

Held2 'espondents are see@ing a reconsideration of the #ourt;s 25 3anuar! 2000 decision, wherein we declared ection 0 of 'epublic Act :o" 055. ('A 055.) to be violative of petitioners; constitutionall! mandated right to securit! of tenure" As a conseFuence of our ruling, we held that petitioners; removal as commissioners of the :ational +olice #ommission (:A+,$#,*) and the appointment of new #ommissioners in their stead were nullities and ordered the reinstatement of petitioners and the pa!ment of full bac@wages to be computed from the date the! were removed from office" B)) An unconstitutional act is not a law8 it confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. Therefore, the unavoidable conseFuence of the #ourt;s declaration that ection 0 of 'A 055. violates the fundamental law is that all acts done pursuant to such provision shall be null and void, including the removal of petitioners and Adiong from their positions in the :A+,$#,* and the appointment of new commissioners in their stead" <hen a regular government emplo!ee is illegall! dismissed, his position does not become vacant and the new appointment made in order to replace him is null and void ab initio" 'udimentar! is the precept that there can be no valid appointment to a non(vacant position . Accordingl!, Adiong;s appointment on .. *arch .//0 for a term of two !ears, pursuant to ection 0 of 'A 055., is null and void" B ) )" Therefore, based on our foregoing disFuisition, there should no longer be an! doubt as to the proper e)ecution of our 25 3anuar! 2000 decision H all the #ommissioners appointed under 'A 055. should be removed from office, in order to give wa! to the reinstatement of petitioners and respondent Adiong" (Canoni6a2o v. guirre, !71 SCR *79, &eb. 17, ,++1, En 9anc >(on6aga@Reyes?# THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE P"l$'e P"*e! +"-. 8efine /olice /o1er and clarify its scope. 83

Held2 ." +olice power is an inherent attribute of sovereignt!" 9t has been defined as the power vested b! the #onstitution in the legislature to ma@e, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the #onstitution, as the! shall 6udge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the sub6ects of the same . The power is plenar! and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and 6ustif!ing measures for public health, public safet!, public morals, and the general welfare" 9t bears stressing that police power is lodged primaril! in the :ational $egislature . 9t cannot be e)ercised b! an! group or bod! of individuals not possessing legislative power . The :ational $egislature, however, ma! delegate this power to the +resident and administrative boards as well as the lawma@ing bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. ,nce delegated, the agents can e)ercise onl! such legislative powers as are conferred on them b! the national lawma@ing bod! . (<etro%olitan <anila /evelo%ment ut0ority v. 9el@ ir Village ssociation, .nc., !,8 SCR 8!*, 84!@ 844, <arc0 ,", ,+++, 1st /iv. >=uno?# 2" +olice power as an inherent attribute of sovereignt! is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safet! and general welfare of the people (5inay v. 8omingo, ")+ S%&' ()<). The tate, through the legislature, has delegated the e)ercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the tate, in order to effectivel! accomplish and carr! out the declared ob6ects of their creation (.atel v. !uncipality of :irac, "), S%&' +(,). This delegation of police power is embodies in the general welfare clause of the $ocal Aovernment #ode ) ) )" The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safet!, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the communit!" +olice power is essentiall! regulator! in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if e)ercised for a regulator! and not revenue(raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power (/rocter and Famble /hils. v. .he !uncicipality of *agna, -# S%&' <-#). ( cebe2o 3%tical Com%any, .nc. v. Court o1 %%eals, !,9 SCR !14, !,7@!,*, <arc0 !1, ,+++, En 9anc >=urisima?# +;). 4o1 should la1s that grant the right to e0ercise a part of the police po1er of the State be construedC Held2 $est the idea gets lost in the shoals of our subconsciousness, let us not forget that +AA#,' is engaged in business affected with public interest" The phrase >affected with public interest? means that an industr! is sub6ect to control for the public good8 it has been considered as the eFuivalent of >sub6ect to the e)ercise of the police power"? +erforce, a legislative franchise to operate 2ai6alai is imbued 1ith public interest and involves an e0ercise of police po1er. .he familiar rule is that la1s 1hich grant the right to e0ercise a part of the police po1er of the state are to be construed strictly and any doubt must be resolved against the grant. .he legislature is regarded as the guardian of society, and therefore is not presumed to disable itself or abandon the discharge of its duty. .hus, courts do not assume that the legislature intended to part a1ay 1ith its po1er to regulate public morals. The presumption is influenced b! constitutional considerations" #onstitutions are widel! understood to withhold from legislatures an! authorit! to bargain awa! their police power for the power to protect the public interest is be!ond abnegation" 9t is stressed that the case at bar does not involve a franchise to operate a public utilit! (such as water, transportation, communication or electricit!) H the operation of which undoubtedl! redounds to the benefit of the general public" <hat is claimed is an alleged legislative grant of a gambling franchise H a franchise to operate 6ai(alai" A statute which legalizes a gambling activit! or business should be strictl! construed and ever! reasonable doubt must be resolved to limit the powers and rights claimed under its authorit! . (/el <ar v. = (C3R, !4* SCR 487, )ov. ,9, ,+++, En 9anc >=uno?# +;+. 8iscuss 1hy rates to be charged by public utilities li7e !D&'9%H are sub2ect to State regulation. Held2 The regulation of rates to be charged b! public utilities is founded upon the police power of the tate and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulations of public utilities are a valid e)ercise thereof" <hen private propert! is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be 2uris privati onl! and becomes sub6ect to regulation" The regulation is to promote the common good" ubmission to regulation ma! be withdrawn b! the owner b! discontinuing use8 but as long as the use of the propert! is continued, the same is sub6ect to public regulation . 84

9n regulating rates charged b! public utilities, the tate protects the public against arbitrar! and e)cessive rates while maintaining the efficienc! and Fualit! of services rendered" Eowever, the power to regulate rates does not give the tate the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utilit! of a reasonable return on investment" T,u+> ),e !()e+ -!e+'!$7ed 7. ),e S)()e #u+) 7e "&e ),() .$eld+ ( ($! !e)u!& "& ),e -u7l$' u)$l$). u-"& ),e 1(lue " ),e -!"-e!). -e! "!#$&% ),e +e!1$'e (&d "&e ),() $+ !e(+"&(7le )" ),e -u7l$' "! ),e +e!1$'e !e&de!ed . The fi)ing of 6ust and reasonable rates involves a 7(l(&'$&% of the investor and the consumer interests . (Re%ublic o1 t0e =0ili%%ines v. <anila Electric Com%any, (.R. )o. 141!14, )ov. 17, ,++,, !r2 /iv. >=uno?# +;". 8iscuss the nature of the authority of local government units to issue or grant licenses or permits. Held2 NTOhe issuance of business licenses and permits b! a municipalit! or cit! is essentiall! regulator! in nature" The authorit!, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentiall! in the e)ercise of the police power of the tate within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the $ocal Aovernment #ode" ( cebe2o 3%tical Com%any, .nc. v. Court o1 %%eals, !,9 SCR !14, !!7, <arc0 !1, ,+++, En 9anc >=urisima?# +;;. 8oes 'rticle "$;(g) of the 9abor %ode (vesting upon the Secretary of 9abor the discretion to determine 1hat industries are indispensable to the national interest and thereafter, assume 2urisdiction over disputes in said industries) violate the 1or7ers@ constitutional right to stri7eC Held2 aid article does not interfere with the wor@ers; right to stri@e but merel! regulates it, when in the e)ercise of such right, national interests will be affected" The rights granted b! the #onstitution are not absolute" The! are still sub6ect to control and limitation to ensure that the! are not e)ercised arbitraril!" The interests of both the emplo!ers and the emplo!ees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue preference" The $abor #ode vests upon the ecretar! of $abor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to national interest" Thus, upon the determination of the ecretar! of $abor that such industr! is indispensable to the national interest, it will assume 6urisdiction over the labor dispute of said industr!" The assumption of 6urisdiction is in the nature of police power measure" This is done for the promotion of the common good considering that a prolonged stri@e or loc@out can be inimical to the national econom!" The ecretar! of $abor acts to maintain industrial peace" Thus, his certification for compulsor! arbitration is not intended to impede the wor@ers; right to stri@e but to obtain a speed! settlement of the dispute" (=0iltrea2 :orIers Union >=D:U? v. Con1esor, ,*9 SCR !9!, <arc0 1,, 199"# +;#. !ay solicitation for religious purposes be sub2ect to proper regulation by the State in the e0ercise of police po1erC Held2 <hence, even the e)ercise of religion ma! be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the tate ma! protect its citizens from in6ur!" <ithout doubt, a tate ma! protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation b! reFuiring a stranger in the communit!, before permitting him publicl! to solicit funds for an! purpose, to establish his identit! and his authorit! to act for the cause which he purports to represent" The tate is li@ewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generall!, in the interest of public safet!, peace, comfort, or convenience" 9t does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guarantees of the free e)ercise of religion that ever!thing which ma! be so called can be tolerated . 9t has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessaril! invalid as one interfering with the >free e)ercise? of religion merel! because it also incidentall! has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion . Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve an! religious test and does not unreasonabl! obstruct or dela! the collection of funds, is not open to an! constitutional ob6ection, even though the collection be for a religious purpose" uch regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free e)ercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its e)ercise. -ven with numerous regulative laws in e)istence, it is surprising how man! operations are carried on b! persons and associations who, secreting their activities under the guise of benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and defrauding a generous public" 9t 85

is in fact amazing how profitable the fraudulent schemes and practices are to people who manipulate them" The tate has authorit! under the e)ercise of its police power to determine whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting b! unscrupulous persons or for unworth! causes or for fraudulent purposes" That solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossl! abused is a matter of common @nowledge" #ertainl! the solicitation of contributions in good faith for worth! purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worth! from the unworth! . The ob6ectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are pre6udicial to worth! and proper charities which naturall! suffer when the confidence of the public in campaigns for the raising of mone! for charit! is lessened or destro!ed. ome regulation of public solicitation is, therefore, in the public interest. To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes ma! be sub6ect to proper regulation b! the tate in the e)ercise of police power" (Centeno v. Villalon@=ornillos, ,!* SCR 19", Se%t. 1, 1994 >Regala2o?# +;(. 8oes a corporation or individual not himself licensed, have a right to hire and employ licensed optometristsC Bill the employment of a qualified optometrist by a corporation go against public policyC Held2 Drom the foregoing, it is thus evident that #ongress has not adopted a unanimous position on the matter of prohibition of indirect practice of optometr! b! corporations, specificall! on the hiring and emplo!ment of licensed optometrists b! optical corporations" 9t is clear that #ongress left the resolution of such issue for 6udicial determination, and it is therefore proper for this #ourt to resolve the issue" -ven in the 7nited tates, 6urisprudence varies and there is a conflict of opinions among the federal courts as to the right of a corporation or individual not himself licensed, to hire and emplo! licensed optometrists (+"< '9& (<$). #ourts have distinguished between optometr! as a learned profession in the categor! of law and medicine, and optometr! as a mechanical art" And, insofar as the courts regartd optometr! as merel! a mechanical art, the! have tended to find nothing ob6ectionable in the ma@ing and selling of e!eglasses, spectacles and lenses b! corporations so long as the patient is actuall! e)amined and prescribed for b! Fualified practitioners (4ouse of V<.() Dyeglasses, nc. v. State 5oard of Hptometry, "<< 'la ;#-, "$+ So "d ",I State e0. &el. 5oard of Hptometry v. Sears &oebuc7 and %o., +)" 'ri> +,(, #", /d +"$). The primar! purpose of the statute regulating the practice of optometr! is to insure that optometrical services are to be rendered b! competent and licensed persons in order to protect the health and ph!sical welfare of the people from the dangers engendered b! unlicensed practice" uch purpose ma! be full! accomplished although the person rendering the service is emplo!ed b! a corporation (Silver v. 9ansburgh and 5rother, ," 'pp 8% ,,, ++ F"d (+<, +"< '9& (<"I $+ 'm *ur "d "<-). Durthermore, it was ruled that the emplo!ment of a Fualified optometrist b! a corporation is not against public polic! (Feorgia State D0aminers v. Friedman@s *e1elers, +<; Fa $$-, +<- SD ";<). 7nless prohibited b! statutes, a corporation has all the contractual rights that an individual has (State e0 rel. !cKittric7 v. Fate %ity Hptical %o., ;;!o #",, -, SB "d <-) and it does not become the practice of medicine or optometr! because of the presence of a ph!sician or optometrist (8ic7son v. Flynn, "#$ 'pp 8iv ;#+, "<$ =ES ""(). The manufacturing, selling, trading and bartering of e!eglasses and spectacles as articles of merchandise do not constitute the practice of optometr! (State e0 rel. 5rother v. 5ec7 *e1elry Dnterprises, nc. "") nd. ",$, #+ =D "d $"", +#+ '9& <,$ [$+ 'm *ur +<,]I Kindy Hpticians, nc. v. State 5oard of D0aminers in Hptometry, +-;-, "-+ !ich +(", "<- =B ++", ++;I =e1 *ersey State 5d. Hf Hptometrists v. S.S. Kresge %o., ++; =*9 "<,, +,# ' ;(;). B)) To accomplish the ob6ective of the regulation, a state ma! provide b! statute that corporations cannot sell e!eglasses, spectacles, and lenses unless a dul! licensed ph!sician or a dul! Fualified optometrist is in charge of, and in personal attendance at the place where such articles are sold (&oschen v. Bard, ",- ?S ;;,, ,; 9 Dd ,"", #- S %t ;;$). 9n such a case, the patient;s primar! and essential safeguard lies in the optometrist;s control of the >treatment? b! means of prescription and preliminar! and final e)amination (Small and !aine 5oard of &egistration and D0amination in Hptometry, "-; ' "d ,<$). 86

9n analog!, it is noteworth! that private hospitals are maintained b! corporations incorporated for the purpose of furnishing medical and surgical treatment" 9n the course of providing such treatments, these corporations emplo! ph!sicians, surgeons and medical practitioners, in the same wa! that in the course of manufacturing and selling e!eglasses, e!e frames and optical lenses, optical shops hire licensed optometrists to e)amine, prescribe and dispense ophthalmic lenses" :o one has ever charged that these corporations are engaged in the practice of medicine" There is indeed no valid basis for treating corporations engaged in the business of running optical shops differentl!" ( cebe2o 3%tical Com%any, .nc. v. Court o1 %%eals, !,9 SCR !14, !!1@!!!, <arc0 !1, ,+++, En 9anc >=urisima?# +;$. Bhat po1ers of the State are involved in the implementation of the %omprehensive 'grarian &eform 9a1 (%'&9)C 8iscuss. Held2 The implementation of the #A'$ is an e)ercise of the tate;s police power and the power of eminent domain" To the e)tent that the #A'$ prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an e)ercise of police power for the regulation of private propert! in accordance with the #onstitution . &ut where, to carr! out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands the! own in e)cess of the ma)imum area allowed, there is also a ta@ing under the power of eminent domain" The ta@ing contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land" <hat is reFuired is the surrender of the title to and ph!sical possession of the said e)cess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiar!. The &ill of 'ights provides that >NnOo person shall be deprived of life, libert! or propert! without due process of law"? The #A'$ was not intended to ta@e awa! propert! without due process of law. The e)ercise of the power of eminent domain reFuires that due process be observed in the ta@ing of private propert!" (Roxas P Co., .nc. v. Court o1 %%eals, !,1 SCR 1+*, /ec. 1", 1999, En 9anc >=uno?# T,e P"*e! " E#$&e&) D"#($& +;,. Bhat is Dminent 8omainC

Held2 ." -minent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private propert! to particular uses to promote public welfare. 9t is an indispensable attribute of sovereignt!8 a power grounded in the primar! dut! of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare . Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to ever! independent government without the necessit! for constitutional recognition . The provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the ta@ing of propert! for the public use do not b! implication grant the power to the government, but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit . Thus, our own #onstitution provides that >NpOrivate propert! shall not be ta@en for public use without 6ust compensation"? Durthermore, the due process and eFual protection clauses act as additional safeguards against the arbitrar! e)ercise of this governmental power" ince the e)ercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individual;s right to private propert!, a constitutionall!(protected right necessar! for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignit! and intimatel! connected with the rights to life and libert! , the need for its circumspect operation cannot be overemphasized" 9n %ity of !anila v. %hinese %ommunity of !anila we said= The e)ercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directl! b! the tate, or b! its authorized agents, is necessaril! in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authorit! must be strictl! construed" :o species of propert! is held b! individuals with greater tenacit!, and none is guarded b! the #onstitution and the laws more sedulousl!, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants" <hen the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of ah individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged b! doubtNfulO interpretation" (5ensley v. !ountainla7e Bater %o., +; %al., ;)$ and cases cited [,; 'm. 8ec., (,$]) The statutor! power of ta@ing propert! from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate e)ercise of governmental authorit!" 9t is to be watched with 6ealous scrutin!" 9mportant as the power ma! be to the government, the inviolable sanctit! which all free constitutions attach to the right of propert! of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the e)ercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse ) ) ) .

87

The power of eminent domain is essentiall! legislative in nature" 9t is firml! settled, however, that such power ma! be validl! delegated to local government units, other public entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessaril! narrower than that of the delegating authorit! and ma! onl! be e)ercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law . ('eirs o1 lberto Suguitan v. City o1 <an2aluyong, !,8 SCR 1!", 144@14*, <arc0 14, ,+++, ! r2 /iv. >(on6aga@ Reyes?# 2" -minent domain is a fundamental tate power that is inseparable from sovereignt!" 9t is government;s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsor! sale to the tate, private propert! for public use or purpose" 9nherentl! possessed b! the national legislature, the power of eminent domain ma! be validl! delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities" Dor the ta@ing of private propert! b! the government to be valid, the ta@ing must be for public purpose and there must be 6ust compensation" (<o2ay v. Court o1 %%eals, ,*8 SCR 78*, &ebruary ,+, 199"# +;<. 8iscuss the nature of the right of eminent domain and the limitations thereof.

Held2 The right of eminent domain is usuall! understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate an! propert! within its territorial sovereignt! for a public purpose. Dundamental to the independent e)istence of a tate, it reFuires no recognition b! the #onstitution, whose provisions are ta@en as being merel! confirmator! of its presence and as being regulator!, at most, in the due e)ercise of the power" 9n the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of ta)ation, even that of police power itself, in man! respects" 9t reaches to ever! form of propert! the tate needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in propert! are held under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the propert! whenever the public interest so reFuires it" The ubiFuitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the e)propriation proceedings" -)propriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authorit! is not reFuired to assert an! conflicting interest in the propert!" Thus, b! filing the action, the condemnor in effect merel! serves notice that it is ta@ing title and possession of the propert!, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the propert!, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the ta@ing" ,bviousl!, however, the power is not without its limits= first, the ta@ing must be for public use, and second, that 6ust compensation must be given to the private owner of the propert!. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessit! for achieving balance between the tate interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, b! effectivel! restraining the former and affording protection to the latter . 9n determining >public use,? two approaches are utilized H the first is public emplo!ment or the actual use b! the public, and the second is public advantage or benefit . 9t is also useful to view the matter as being sub6ect to constant growth, which is to sa! that as societ! advances, its demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual ma! be devoted . (Re%ublic o1 t0e =0ili%%ines v. D0e 'on. Court o1 %%eals, (.R. )o. 14*78", 5uly ,, ,++,, 1st /iv. >Vitug?# +;-. State some limitations on the e0ercise of the po1er of Dminent 8omain.

Held2 The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed" The upreme #ourt, ta@ing cognizance of such issues as the adeFuac! of compensation, necessit! of the ta@ing and the public use character or the purpose of the ta@ing, has ruled that the necessit! of e)ercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character" Aovernment ma! not capriciousl! choose what private propert! should be ta@en" (<o2ay v. Court o1 %%eals, ,*8 SCR 78*, &ebruary ,+, 199"# +#). 8iscuss the e0panded notion of Apublic use3 in eminent domain proceedings.

Held2 The #it! of *anila, acting through its legislative branch, has the e)press power to acFuire private lands in the cit! and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low(salaried emplo!ees of the cit!" That onl! a few could actuall! benefit from the e)propriation of the propert! does not diminish its public character" 9t is simpl! not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them" 88

#orollar! to the e)panded notion of public use, e)propriation is not an!more confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates . 9t is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be e)propriated in this case is less than half a hectare onl!" Through the !ears, the public use reFuirement in eminent domain has evolved into a fle)ible concept, influenced b! changing conditions . +ublic use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and housing" (&ilstream .nternational .ncor%orate2 v. C , ,84 SCR "1*, 5an. ,!, 1998 >&rancisco?# +#+. Bhat is the meaning of Apublic use3 in eminent domain proceedingsC case. llustrative

Held2 This #ourt holds that respondent (+hilippine -)port +rocessing Tone) has the legal authorit! to e)propriate the sub6ect $ot .506(& and that the same was for a valid public purpose" 9n Sumulong v. Fuerrero, this #ourt has ruled that, The >public use? reFuirement for a valid e)ercise of the power of eminent domain is a fle)ible and evolving concept influenced b! changing conditions" 9n this 6urisdiction, the statutor! and 6udicial trend has been summarized as follows= This #ourt has ruled that the ta@ing to be valid must be for public use" There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a reFuirement" <hatever pro6ect is underta@en must be for the public to en6o!, as in the case of streets or par@s" ,therwise, e)propriation is not allowable" 9t is not an!more" As long as the purpose of the ta@ing is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into pla! " " " 9t is accurate to state then that at present whatever ma! be beneficiall! emplo!ed for the general welfare satisfies the reFuirement of public use" (4eirs of *uancho 'rdona v. &eyes, +"( S%&' "") [+-<;] at ";#6";( quoting D. Fernando, the %onstitution of the /hilippines (";6# ["nd Dd. +-,,]) The term >public use? has acFuired a more comprehensive coverage" To the literal import of the term signif!ing strict use or emplo!ment b! the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage" 9n !anosca v. %ourt of 'ppeals, this #ourt has also held that what ultimatel! emerged is a concept of public use which is 6ust as broad as >public welfare"? 'espondent +-TA e)propriated the sub6ect parcel of land pursuant to +roclamation :o" ./00 ) ) ) issued b! former +resident Derdinand *arcos" *eanwhile, the power of eminent domain of respondent is contained in its original charter, +residential 4ecree :o" 66 ) ) )" Accordingl!, sub6ect $ot .506(& was e)propriated >for the construction " " " of terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto"? The authorit! is broad enough to give the respondent substantial leewa! in deciding for what public use the e)propriated propert! would be utilized" +ursuant to this broad authorit!, respondent leased a portion of the lot to commercial ban@s while the rest was made a transportation terminal" aid public purposes were even reaffirmed b! 'epublic Act :o" 1/.6, a law amending respondent +-TA;s original charter ) ) )" 9n !anila &ailroad %o. v. !itchel, this #ourt has ruled that in the e)ercise of eminent domain, onl! as much land can be ta@en as is necessar! for the legitimate purpose of the condemnation" The term >necessar!,? in this connection, does not mean absolutel! indispensable but reFuires onl! a reasonable necessit! of the ta@ing for the stated purpose, growth and future needs of the enterprise" The respondent cannot attain a self(sustaining and viable -#,T,:- if inevitable needs in the e)pansion in the surrounding areas are hampered b! the mere refusal of the private landowners to part with their properties" The purpose of creating an -#,T,:- and other facilities is better served if respondent directl! owns the areas sub6ect of the e)pansion program" B ) ) The e)propriation of $ot .506(& for the purpose of being leased to ban@s and for the construction of a terminal has the purpose of ma@ing ban@ing and transportation facilities easil! accessible to the persons wor@ing at the industries located in +-TA" The e)propriation of ad6acent areas therefore comes as a matter of necessit! to bring life to the purpose of the law" 9n such a manner, +-TA;s goal of being a ma6or force in the economic 89

development of the countr! would be realized" Durthermore, this #ourt has alread! ruled that= B ) ) NTOhe $egislature ma! directl! determine the necessit! for appropriating private propert! for a particular improvement for public use, and it ma! select the e)act location of the improvement" 9n such a case, it is well(settled that the utilit! of the proposed improvement, the e)istence of the public necessit! for its construction, the e)pedienc! of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected, are all Fuestions e)clusivel! for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people" 9n the absence of some constitutional or statutor! provisions to the contrar!, the necessit! and e)pedienc! of e)ercising the right of eminent domain are Fuestions essentiall! political and not 6udicial in their character" (%ity of !anila v. %hinese %ommunity of !anila, #) /hil. ;#- [+-+-]) 9nasmuch as both +residential 4ecree :o" 66 and 'epublic Act :o" 1/.6, bestow respondent with authorit! to develop terminal facilities and ban@ing centers, this #ourt will not Fuestion the respondent;s lease of certain portions of the e)propriated lot to ban@s, as well as the construction of terminal facilities" +etitioner contends that respondent is bound b! the representations of its #hief #ivil -ngineer when the latter testified before the trial court that the lot was to be devoted for the construction of government offices" Anent this issue, suffice it to sa! that +-TA can var! the purpose for which a condemned lot will be devoted to, provided that the same is for public use" +etitioner cannot impose or dictate on the respondent what facilities to establish for as long as the same are for public purpose" (Estate o1 Salu2 5imene6 v. =EN , !49 SCR ,4+, 5an. 1*, ,++1, ,n2 /iv. >/e Leon?# +#". 8iscuss the meaning of A2ust compensation3 in eminent domain proceedings. 8oes it include the payment of Ainterest3 and, if so, ho1 is it to be computedC Held2 ." The constitutional limitation of >6ust compensation? is considered to be the sum eFuivalent to the mar@et value of the propert!, broadl! described to be the price fi)ed b! the seller in open mar@et in the usual and ordinar! course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the propert! as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell it, fi)ed at the time of the actual ta@ing b! the government . Thus, if propert! is ta@en for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having 6urisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its 6ust value to be computed from the time the propert! is ta@en to the time when compensation is actuall! paid or deposited with the court. 9n fine, between the ta@ing of the propert! and the actual pa!ment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the ta@ing occurred . (Re%ublic o1 t0e =0ili%%ines v. D0e 'on. Court o1 %%eals, (.R. )o. 14*78", 5uly ,, ,++,, 1st /iv. >Vitug?# 2" <e have ruled that the concept of 6ust compensation embraces not onl! the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the pa!ment of the land within a reasonable time from its ta@ing" <ithout prompt pa!ment, compensation cannot be considered >6ust? inasmuch as the propert! owner is made to suffer the conseFuences of being immediatel! deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actuall! receiving the amount necessar! to cope with his loss . +a!ment of 6ust compensation should follow as a matter of right immediatel! after the order of e)propriation is issued" An! dela! in pa!ment must be counted from said order" Eowever, the dela! to constitute a violation of due process must be unreasonable and ine)cusable8 it must be deliberatel! done b! a part! in order to defeat the ends of 6ustice" (Estate o1 Salu2 5imene6 v. =EN , !49 SCR ,4+, 5an. 1*, ,++1, , n2 /iv. >/e Leon?# +#;. .he constitutionality of Sec. -" of 5./. 5lg. <<+ (requiring radio and television station o1ners and operators to give to the %omelec radio and television time free of charge) 1as challenged on the ground, among others, that it violated the due process clause and the eminent domain provision of the %onstitution by ta7ing airtime from radio and television broadcasting stations 1ithout payment of 2ust compensation. /etitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of radio and television stations is the sale of airtime to advertisers and that to require these stations to provide free airtime is to authori>e a ta7ing 1hich is not Aa de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property.3 Bill you sustain the challengeC

90

Held2 All broadcasting, whether b! radio or b! television stations, is licensed b! the government" Airwave freFuencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are freFuencies to assign" A franchise is thus a privilege sub6ect, among other things, to amendment b! #ongress in accordance with the constitutional provision that >an! such franchise or right granted ) ) ) shall be sub6ect to amendment, alteration or repeal b! the #ongress when the common good so reFuires"? ('rt. K , Sec. ++) 9ndeed, provisions for #omelec Time have been made b! amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and such provisions have not been thought of as ta@ing propert! without 6ust compensation" Art" B99, ec" .. of the #onstitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for >the common good"? <hat better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free airtime for the benefit not onl! of candidates but even more of the public, particularl! the voters, so that the! will be full! informed of the issues in an electionQ >N9Ot is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount"? :or indeed can there be an! constitutional ob6ection to the reFuirement that broadcast stations give free airtime" -ven in the 7nited tates, there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionall! be instituted to ensure diversit! of views and attention to public affairs to further the s!stem of free e)pression" Dor this purpose, broadcast stations ma! be reFuired to give free airtime to candidates in an election" 9n truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and freFuencies through which the! transmit broadcast signals and images" The! are merel! given the temporar! privilege of using them" ince a franchise is a mere privilege, the e)ercise of the privilege ma! reasonabl! be burdened with the performance b! the grantee of some form of public service" 9n the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast stations and thereafter supervising radio and television stations, the tate spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising such stations" 9t would be strange if it cannot even reFuire the licensees to render public service b! giving free airtime" The claim that petitioner would be losing +52,200,000"00 in unrealized revenue from advertising is based on the assumption that airtime is >finished product? which, it is said, become the propert! of the compan!, li@e oil produced from refining or similar natural resources after undergoing a process for their production" As held in &ed 9ion 5roadcasting %o. v. F.%.%., which upheld the right of a part! personall! attac@ed to repl!, >licenses to broadcast do not confer ownership of designated freFuencies, but onl! the temporar! privilege of using them"? #onseFuentl!, >a license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio freFuenc! to the e)clusion of his fellow citizens" There is nothing in the Dirst Amendment which prevents the government from reFuiring a licensee to share his freFuenc! with others and to conduct himself as a pro)! or fiduciar! with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his communit! and which would otherwise, b! necessit!, be barred from the airwaves"? As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private propert! is ta@en b! the reFuirement that the! provide airtime to the #omelec" (DELE9 =, .nc. v. C3<ELEC, ,89 SCR !!", %ril ,1, 1998 ><en2o6a?# +##. !ay eminent domain be barred by Jres 2udicataJ or Jla1 of the caseJC

Held2 The principle of res 2udicata, which finds application in generall! all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the tate or its agents to e)propriate private propert!" The ver! nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the tate, dictates that the right to e)ercise the power be absolute and unfettered even b! a prior 6udgment or res 2udicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenar! and, li@e police power, can >reach ever! form of propert! which the tate might need for public use"? All separate interests of individuals in propert! are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation" :otwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most e)act idea of propert!, remains in the government, or in the aggregate bod! of the people in their sovereign capacit!8 and the! have the right to resume the possession of the propert! whenever the public interest reFuires it"? Thus, the tate or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from e)ercising said right b! reason alone of previous non( compliance with an! legal reFuirement" <hile the principle of res 2udicata does not denigrate the right of the tate to e)ercise eminent domain, it does appl! to specific issues decided in a previous case" Dor 91

e)ample, a final 6udgment dismissing an e)propriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue8 it cannot, however, bar the tate or its agent from thereafter compl!ing with this reFuirement, as prescribed b! law, and subseFuentl! e)ercising its power of eminent domain over the same propert!" (<unici%ality o1 =arana$ue v. V.<. Realty Cor%oration, ,9, SCR *"8, 5uly ,+, 1998 >=anganiban?# +#(. 8iscuss ho1 e0propriation may be initiated, and the t1o stages in e0propriation. 9n both

Held2 -)propriation ma! be initiated b! court action or b! legislation . instances, 6ust compensation is determined b! the courts .

The e)propriation of lands consists of two stages" As e)plained in !unicipality of 5inan v. Farcia, reiterated in =ational /o1er %orp. v. *ocsonO The first is concerned with the determination of the authorit! of the plaintiff to e)ercise the power of eminent domain and the propriet! of its e)ercise in the conte)t of the facts involved in the suit" 9t ends with an order, if not dismissal of the action, Sof condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to ta@e the propert! sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose declared in the complaint, upon the pa!ment of 6ust compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaintS ) ) )" The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination b! the court of >the 6ust compensation for the propert! sought to be ta@en"? This is done b! the court with the assistance of not more than three (2) commissioners ) ) )" 9t is onl! upon the completion of these two stages that e)propriation is said to have been completed" (Re%ublic v. Salem .nvestment Cor%oration, et. al., (.R. )o. 1!"7*9, 5une ,!, ,+++, ,n2 /iv. ><en2o6a?# +#$. !ay the o1ner of the property e0propriated still dispose of that property before the payment of 2ust compensationC Bhen does title over the property e0propriated pass to the e0propriatorC Held2 ." N9Ot is onl! upon pa!ment of 6ust compensation that title over the propert! passes to the government . Therefore, until the action for e)propriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the propert! being e)propriated remains with the registered owner" #onseFuentl!, the latter can e)ercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his propert!, sub6ect to the power of the tate ultimatel! to acFuire it through e)propriation" (Re%ublic v. Salem .nvestment Cor%oration, et. al., (.R. )o. 1!"7*9, 5une ,!, ,+++, ,n2 /iv. ><en2o6a?# 2" The 4e la 'amas ma@e much of the fact that ownership of the land was transferred to the government because the eFuitable and the beneficial title was alread! acFuired b! it in ./02, leaving them with onl! the na@ed title" Eowever, as this #ourt held in 'ssociation of Small 9ando1ners in the /hil., nc. v. Secretary of 'grarian &eformO The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the propert! e)propriated shall pass from the owner to the e)propriator onl! upon full pa!ment of the 6ust compensation" 3urisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic 6urisdictions" B ) ) (Re%ublic v. Salem .nvestment Cor%oration, et. al., (.R. )o. 1!"7*9, 5une ,!, ,+++, ,n2 /iv. ><en2o6a?# +#,. 8o the t1o (") stages in e0propriation apply only to 2udicial, and not to legislative, e0propriationC Held2 <e see no point in distinguishing between 6udicial and legislative e)propriation as far as the two stages mentioned above are concerned" &oth involve these stages and in both the process is not completed until pa!ment of 6ust compensation is made" (Re%ublic v. Salem .nvestment Cor%oration, et. al., (.R. )o. 1!"7*9, 5une ,!, ,+++, ,n2 /iv. ><en2o6a?# +#<. s prior unsuccessful negotiation a condition precedent for the e0ercise of eminent domainC

92

Held2 #iting ron and Steel 'uthority v. %ourt of 'ppeals, petitioner insists that before eminent domain ma! be e)ercised b! the state, there must be a showing of prior unsuccessful negotiation with the owner of the propert! to be e)propriated" This contention is not correct" As pointed out b! the olicitor Aeneral the current effective law on delegated authorit! to e)ercise the power of eminent domain is found in ection .2, &oo@ 999 of the 'evised Administrative #ode, which provides= > -#" .2" /o1er of Dminent 8omain H The +resident shall determine when it is necessar! or advantageous to e)ercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the :ational Aovernment, and direct the olicitor Aeneral, whenever he deems the action advisable, to institute e)propriation proceedings in the proper court"? The foregoing provision does not reFuire prior unsuccessful negotiation as a condition precedent for the e)ercise of eminent domain" 9n ron and Steel 'uthority v. %ourt of 'ppeals, the +resident chose to prescribe this condition as an additional reFuirement instead" 9n the instant case, however, no such voluntar! restriction was imposed" (S<. /evelo%ment Cor%oration v. Re%ublic, !,! SCR 8*,, 5an. ,8, ,+++, ! r2 /iv. >=anganiban?# +#-. Bhen may the property o1ner be entitled to the return of the e0propriated property in eminent domain casesC Held2 ." 9n insisting on the return of the e)propriated propert!, respondents would e)hort on the pronouncement in /rovincial Fovernment of Sorsogon v. :da. 8e :illaroya where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remed! of recover! of the propert! there in Fuestion" 9t might be borne in mind that the case involved the municipal government of orsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merel! delegated and of limited application" The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under 'epublic Act :o" 1.60 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all(encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government" Dor local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, b! enabling law, be delegated to it b! the national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictl! spea@ing, a power of eminent, but onl! of inferior, domain or onl! as broad or confined as the real authorit! would want it to be" Thus, in :aldehue>a v. &epublic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten !ears after the termination of the e)propriation proceedings, this #ourt ruled H >The points in dispute are whether such pa!ment can still be made and, if so, in what amount" aid lots have been the sub6ect of e)propriation proceedings" &! final and e)ecutor! 6udgment in said proceedings, the! were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the government" ) ) ) 9t follows that both b! virtue of the 6udgment, long final, in the e)propriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their e)propriated lots H which are still devoted to the public use for which the! were e)propriated H but onl! to demand the fair mar@et value of the same" aid relief ma! be granted under plaintiffs; pra!er for= Usuch other remedies, which ma! be deemed 6ust and eFuitable under the premises;"? The #ourt proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in 'lfonso v. /asay %ity where the recover! of possession of propert! ta@en for public use pra!ed for b! the unpaid landowner was denied even while no reFuisite e)propriation proceedings were first instituted" The landowner was merel! given the relief of recovering compensation for his propert! computed at its mar@et value at the time it was ta@en and appropriated b! the tate" The 6udgment rendered b! the &ulacan 'T# in ./1/ on the e)propriation proceedings provides not onl! for the pa!ment of 6ust compensation to herein respondents but li@ewise ad6udges the propert! condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their privies, are bound" +etitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, e)ercised dominion over the propert! pursuant to the 6udgment" The e)ercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of the ./1/ 6udgment, thereb! preempting an! claim of bar b! prescription on grounds of non(e)ecution" 9n arguing for the return of their propert! on the basis of non( pa!ment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the e)propriator! authorit! is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinar! sales, to which the remed! of rescission might perhaps appl!" An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the propert!" After condemnation, 93

the paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title8 thus, b! giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a 6udicial process for securing better title against all the world than ma! be obtained b! voluntar! conve!ance . (Re%ublic o1 t0e =0ili%%ines v. D0e 'on. Court o1 %%eals, (.R. )o. 14*78", 5uly ,, ,++,, 1st /iv. >Vitug?# 2" Though the respondent has committed a misdeed to petitioner, we cannot, however, grant the petitioner;s pra!er for the return of the e)propriated $ot :o" .506(&" The ,rder of e)propriation dated 3ul! .., .//., has long become final and e)ecutor!" +etitioner cited /rovincial Fovernment of Sorsogon v. &osa D. :da. 8e :illaroya to support its contention that it is entitled to a return of the lot where this #ourt ruled that >under ordinar! circumstances, immediate return to the owners of the unpaid propert! is the obvious remed!"? Eowever, the said statement was not the ruling in that case" As in other cases where there was no prompt pa!ment b! the government, this #ourt declared in Sorsogon that >the +rovincial Aovernment of orsogon is e)pected to immediatel! pa! as directed" hould an! further dela! be encountered, the trial court is directed to seize an! patrimonial propert! or cash savings of the province in the amount necessar! to implement this decision"? Eowever, this #ourt also stressed and declared in that case that >in cases where land is ta@en for public use, public interest, however, must be considered"? (Estate o1 Salu2 5imene6 v. =EN , !49 SCR ,4+, 5an. 1*, ,++1, , n2 /iv. >/e Leon?# T,e P"*e! " T(<()$"& +(). %an ta0es be sub2ect to off6setting or compensationC

Held2 Ta)es cannot be sub6ect to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the ta)pa!er are not creditors and debtors of each other . There is a material distinction between a ta) and debt" 4ebts are due to the Aovernment in its corporate capacit!, while ta)es are due to the Aovernment in its sovereign capacit! . 9t must be noted that a distinguishing feature of a ta) is that it is compulsor! rather than a matter of bargain" Eence, a ta) does not depend upon the consent of the ta)pa!er" 9f an! ta)pa!er can defer the pa!ment of ta)es b! raising the defense that it still has a pending claim for refund or credit, this would adversel! affect the government revenue s!stem" A ta)pa!er cannot refuse to pa! his ta)es when the! fall due simpl! because he has a claim against the government or that the collection of a ta) is contingent on the result of the lawsuit it filed against the government" (=0ilex <ining Cor%oration v. Commissioner o1 .nternal Revenue, ,94 SCR *8", ug. ,8, 1998 >Romero?# +(+. ?nder 'rticle : , Section "<, paragraph ; of the +-<, %onstitution, J[%]haritable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non6 profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly and e0clusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be e0empt from ta0ation.J E!%' claims that the income earned by its building leased to private entities and that of its par7ing space is li7e1ise covered by said e0emption. &esolve. Held2 The debates, interpellations and e)pressions of opinion of the framers of the #onstitution reveal their intent that which, in turn, ma! have guided the people in ratif!ing the #harter" uch intent must be effectuated" Accordingl!, 3ustice Eilario A" 4avide, 3r", a former constitutional commissioner, who is now a member of this #ourt, stressed during the #oncom debates that S) ) ) what is e)empted is not the institution itself ) ) )8 those e)empted from real estate ta)es are lands, buildings and improvements actuall!, directl! and e)clusivel! used for religious, charitable or educational purposes" Dather 3oaFuin A" &ernas, an eminent authorit! on the #onstitution and also a member of the #oncom, adhered to the same view that the e)emption created b! said provision pertained onl! to propert! ta)es" 9n his treatise on ta)ation, *r" 3ustice 3ose #" Citug concurs, stating that SNtOhe ta) e)emption covers property ta)es onl!"S (Commissioner o1 .nternal Revenue v. C , ,98 SCR 8!, 3ct. 14, 1998 >=anganiban?# +(". ?nder 'rticle K :, Section #, paragraph ; of the +-<, %onstitution, J[']ll revenues and assets of non6stoc7, non6profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and e0clusively for educational purposes shall be e0empt from ta0es and duties.J E!%' alleged that it Jis a non6profit educational institution 1hose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and e0clusively for educational purposes so it is e0empt from ta0es on its properties and income.J 94

Held2 <e reiterate that private respondent is e)empt from the pa!ment of propert! ta), but not income ta) on the rentals from its propert!" The bare allegation alone that it is a non(stoc@, non(profit educational institution is insufficient to 6ustif! its e)emption from the pa!ment of income ta)" N$Oaws allowing ta) e)emption are construed strictissimi 2uris. Eence, for the G*#A to be granted the e)emption it claims under the abovecited provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that (.) it falls under the classification non6stoc7, non6profit educational institutionI and (2) the income it see@s to be e)empted from ta)ation is used actually, directly, and e0clusively for educational purposes. Eowever, the #ourt notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted b! private respondent to prove that it met the said reFuisites" (Commissioner o1 .nternal Revenue v. C , ,98 SCR 8!, 3ct. 14, 1998 >=anganiban?# +(;. s the E!%' an educational institution 1ithin the purvie1 of 'rticle K :, Section #, par. ; of the %onstitutionC Held2 <e rule that it is not" The term >educational institution? or >institution of learning? has acFuired a well(@nown technical meaning, of which the members of the #onstitutional #ommission are deemed cognizant. 7nder the -ducation Act of ./02, such term refers to schools" The school s!stem is s!non!mous with formal education, which >refers to the hierarchicall! structured and chronologicall! graded learnings organized and provided b! the formal school s!stem and for which certification is reFuired in order for the learner to progress through the grades or move to the higher levels"? The #ourt has e)amined the >Amended Articles of 9ncorporation? and >&!($aws? of the G*#A, but found nothing in them that even hints that it is a school or an educational institution" Durthermore, under the -ducation Act of ./02, even non(formal education is understood to be school(based and >private auspices such as foundations and civic(spirited organizations? are ruled out" 9t is settled that the term >educational institution,? when used in laws granting ta) e)emptions, refers to a >) ) ) school seminar!, college or educational establishment ) ) )"? (<# %*S ($$) Therefore, the private respondent cannot be deemed one of the educational institutions covered b! the constitutional provision under consideration" (Commissioner o1 .nternal Revenue v. C , ,98 SCR 8!, 3ct. 14, 1998 >=anganiban?# +(#. !ay the /%FF validly commit to e0empt from all forms of ta0es the properties to be retained by the !arcos heirs in a %ompromise 'greement bet1een the former and the latterC Held2 The power to ta) and to grant e)emptions is vested in the #ongress and, to a certain e)tent, in the local legislative bodies" ection 20(5), Article C9 of the #onstitution, specificall! provides= >:o law granting an! ta) e)emption shall be passed without the concurrence of a ma6orit! of all the members of the #ongress"? The +#AA has absolutel! no power to grant ta) e)emptions, even under the cover of its authorit! to compromise ill( gotten wealth cases" -ven granting that #ongress enacts a law e)empting the *arcoses from pa!ing ta)es on their properties, such law will definitel! not pass the test of the eFual protection clause under the &ill of 'ights" An! special grant of ta) e)emption in favor onl! of the *arcos heirs will constitute class legislation" 9t will also violate the constitutional rule that >ta)ation shall be uniform and eFuitable.? (C0ave6 v. =C((, ,99 SCR "44, /ec. 9, 1998 >=anganiban?# +((. 8iscuss the purpose of ta0 treatiesC

Held2 The '+(7 Ta) Treat! is 6ust one of a number of bilateral treaties which the +hilippines has entered into for the avoidance of double ta)ation" The purpose of these international agreements is to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties in order to help the ta)pa!er avoid simultaneous ta)ation in two different 6urisdictions. *ore precisel!, the ta) conventions are drafted with a view towards the elimination of international 2uridical double ta0ation ) ) )" (Commissioner o1 .nternal Revenue v. S.C. 5o0nson an2 Son, .nc., !+9 SCR 8", 1+1@1+,, 5une ,7, 1999, ! r2 /iv. >(on6aga@Reyes?# +($. Bhat is Ainternational 2uridical double ta0ation3C

Held2 9t is defined as the imposition of comparable ta)es in two or more states on the same ta)pa!er in respect of the same sub6ect matter and for identical periods" 95

(Commissioner o1 .nternal Revenue v. S.C. 5o0nson an2 Son, .nc., !+9 SCR 1+,, 5une ,7, 1999#

8",

+(,. Bhat is the rationale for doing a1ay 1ith international 2uridical double ta0ationC Bhat are the methods resorted to by ta0 treaties to eliminate double ta0ationC Held2 The apparent rationale for doing awa! with double ta)ation is to encourage the free flow of goods and services and the movement of capital, technolog! and persons between countries, conditions deemed vital in creating robust and d!namic economies" Doreign investments will onl! thrive in a fairl! predictable and reasonable international investment climate and the protection against double ta)ation is crucial in creating such a climate" 4ouble ta)ation usuall! ta@es place when a person is resident of a contracting state and derives income from, or owns capital in, the other contracting state and both states impose ta) on that income or capital" 9n order to eliminate double ta)ation, a ta) treat! resorts to several methods" Dirst, it sets out the respective rights to ta) of the state of source or situs and of the state of residence with regard to certain classes of income or capital" 9n some cases, an e)clusive right to ta) is conferred on one of the contracting states8 however, for other items of income or capital, both states are given the right to ta), although the amount of ta) that ma! be imposed b! the state of source is limited" The second method for the elimination of double ta)ation applies whenever the state of source is given a full or limited right to ta) together with the state of residence" 9n this case, the treaties ma@e it incumbent upon the state of residence to allow relief in order to avoid double ta)ation" There are two methods of relief ( the e)emption method and the credit method" 9n the e)emption method, the income or capital which is ta)able in the state of source or situs is e)empted in the state of residence, although in some instances it ma! be ta@en into account in determining the rate of ta) applicable to the ta)pa!erPs remaining income or capital" ,n the other hand, in the credit method, although the income or capital which is ta)ed in the state of source is still ta)able in the state of residence, the ta) paid in the former is credited against the ta) levied in the latter" The basic difference between the two methods is that in the e)emption method, the focus is on the income or capital itself, whereas the credit method focuses upon the ta)" (Commissioner o1 .nternal Revenue v. S.C. 5o0nson an2 Son, .nc., !+9 SCR 8", 1+,@1+!, 5une ,7, 1999# +(<. Bhat is the rationale for reducing the ta0 rate in negotiating ta0 treatiesC

Held2 9n negotiating ta) treaties, the underl!ing rationale for reducing the ta) rate is that the +hilippines will give up a part of the ta) in the e)pectation that the ta) given up for this particular investment is not ta)ed b! the other countr!" (Commissioner o1 .nternal Revenue v. S.C. 5o0nson an2 Son, .nc., !+9 SCR 8", 1+!, 5une ,7, 1999# THE BILL OF RI?HTS T,e Due P!"'e++ Cl(u+e +(-. 8iscuss the 8ue /rocess %lause. procedural due process. 8istinguish substantive due process from

Held2 ection . of the &ill of 'ights la!s down what is @nown as the >due process clause? of the #onstitution" 9n order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namel!, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process" <hen one spea@s of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance" 9n essence, procedural due process >refers to the method or manner b! which the law is enforced,? while substantive due process >reFuires that the law itself, not merel! the procedures b! which the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and 6ust"? (Corona v. Unite2 'arbor =ilots ssociation o1 t0e =0ils., ,8! SCR !1, /ec. 1,, 199" >Romero?# +$). &espondents ?nited 4arbor /ilots 'ssociation of the /hilippines argue that due process 1as not observed in the adoption of //'6'H =o. )#6-" 1hich provides thatO A(a)ll e0isting regular appointments 1hich have been previously issued by the 5ureau of %ustoms or the //' shall remain valid up to ;+ 8ecember +--" only,3 and A(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (+) year from date of effectivity sub2ect to rene1al or cancellation by 96

the /hilippine /orts 'uthority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance,3 allegedly because no hearing 1as conducted 1hereby Arelevant government agencies3 and the harbor pilots themselves could ventilate their vie1s. .hey also contended that the sole and e0clusive right to the e0ercise of harbor pilotage by pilots has become vested and can only be A1ithdra1n or shortened3 by observing the constitutional mandate of due process of la1. Held2 The! are obviousl! referring to the procedural aspect of the enactment" Dortunatel!, the #ourt has maintained a clear position in this regard, a stance it has stressed in the recent case of 9umiqued v. 4on. D0evea, where it declared that >(a)s long as a part! was given the opportunit! to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunit! to be heard is the ver! essence of due process" *oreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunit! to see@ reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of"? 9n the case at bar, respondents Fuestioned ++A(A, :o" 05(/2 no less than four times before the matter was finall! elevated to this Tribunal" Their arguments on this score, however, failed to persuade" B ) ) :either does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in an! wa! taint the validit! of the administrative order" As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental reFuirements of procedural due process, are essential onl! when an administrative bod! e)ercises its Fuasi(6udicial function" 9n the performance of its e)ecutive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative bod! need not compl! with the reFuirements of notice and hearing" 7pon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and e)clusive right to the e)ercise of harbor pilotage b! pilots is a settled issue" 'espondents aver that said right has become vested and can onl! be >withdrawn or shortened? b! observing the constitutional mandate of due process of law" Their argument has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance" 9t is here where ++A(A, :o" 05(/2 fails to meet the condition set b! the organic law" +ilotage, 6ust li@e other professions, ma! be practiced onl! b! dul! licensed individuals" $icensure is >the granting of license especiall! to practice a profession"? 9t is also >the s!stem of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with established standards"? A license is a right or permission granted b! some competent authorit! to carr! on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal" &efore harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, the! literall! have to pass through the proverbial e!e of a needle b! ta@ing, not one but five e)aminations, each followed b! actual training and practice" B ) ) Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage until the! retire at the age of 10 !ears" This is a vested right" 7nder the terms of ++A(A, :o" 05(/2, >NaOll e)isting regular appointments which have been previousl! issued b! the &ureau of #ustoms or the ++A shall remain valid up to 2. 4ecember .//2 onl!,? and >(a)ll appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be onl! for a term of one (.) !ear from date of effectivit! sub6ect to renewal or cancellation b! the Authorit! after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance"? 9t is readil! apparent that ++A(A, :o" 05(/2 undul! restricts the right of harbor pilots to en6o! their profession before their compulsor! retirement" 9n the past, the! en6o!ed a measure of securit! @nowing that after passing five e)aminations and undergoing !ears of on(the(6ob training, the! would have a license which the! could use until their retirement, unless sooner revo@ed b! the ++A for mental or ph!sical unfitness" 7nder the new issuance, the! have to contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporar! or permanent depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation" Ceteran pilots and neoph!tes ali@e are suddenl! confronted with one(!ear terms which ipso facto e)pire at the end of that period" 'enewal of their license is now dependent on a >rigid evaluation of performance? which is conducted onl! after the license has alread! been cancelled" Eence, the use of the term >renewal"? 9t is this pre(evaluation cancellation which primaril! ma@es ++A(A, :o" 05(/2 unreasonable and constitutionall! infirm" 9n a real sense, it is a deprivation of propert! without due process of law" (Corona v. Unite2 'arbor =ilots ssociation o1 t0e =0ils., ,8! SCR !1, /ecember 1,, 199" >Romero?# +$+. 8oes the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiryC 97

Held2 The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation" 9t is not an absolute right and ma!, thus, be invo@ed or re6ected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inFuir!" 9n the case at bar, petitioners invo@e the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice" $umiFued, however, was not accused of an! crime in the proceedings below" The investigation conducted b! the committee ) ) ) was for the sole purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him" ) ) ) As such, the hearing conducted b! the investigating committee was not part of a criminal prosecution" B ) ) <hile investigations conducted b! an administrative bod! ma! at times be a@in to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under e)isting laws, a part! in an administrative inFuir! may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondentPs capacit! to represent himself, and no dut! rests on such a bod! to furnish the person being investigated with counsel" 9n an administrative proceeding ) ) ) a respondent ) ) ) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not" ) ) ) Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inFuiries are conducted merel! to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinar! measures against erring public officers and emplo!ees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignit! of government service" The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless reFuired b! the #onstitution or the law" Lumi$ue2 v. Exevea, ,8, SCR 1,7, )ov. 18, 199" >Romero?# +$". 8iscuss the A:oid for :agueness3 8octrine, and 1hy is it repugnant to the %onstitution. 8istinguish a Aperfectly vague act3 from Alegislation couched in imprecise language.3 Held2 ." 4ue process reFuires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficientl! e)plicit to inform those who are sub6ect to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties" A criminal statute that >fails to give a person of ordinar! intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden b! the statute,? or is so indefinite that >it encourages arbitrar! and erratic arrests and convictions,? is void for vagueness . The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the in6ustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning" <e reiterated these principles in /eople v. =a>ario= As a rule, a statute or act ma! be said to be vague when it lac@s comprehensible standards that men >of common intelligence must necessaril! guess at its meaning and differ as to its application"? 9t is repugnant to the #onstitution in two respects= (.) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especiall! the parties targeted b! it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid8 and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carr!ing out its provisions and become an arbitrar! fle)ing of the Aovernment muscle" <e added, however, that= B ) ) the act must be utterl! vague on its face, that is to sa!, it cannot be clarified b! either a saving clause or b! construction" Thus, in %oates v. %ity of %incinnati, the 7" " upreme #ourt struc@ down an ordinance that had made it illegal for >three or more persons to assemble on an! sidewal@ and there conduct themselves in a manner anno!ing to persons passing b!"? #learl!, the ordinance imposed no standard at all >because one ma! never @now in advance what anno!s some people but does not anno! others"? %oates highlights what has been referred to as a >perfectl! vague? act whose obscurit! is evident on its face" 9t is to be distinguished, however, from legislation coached in imprecise language H but which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectivel! phrased H in which case, it ma! be >saved? b! proper construction" B ) ) (=eo%le v. /ela =ie2ra, !7+ SCR 1*!, 5an. ,4, ,++1, 1 st /iv. >4a%unan?# 2" The doctrine has been formulated in various wa!s, but is commonl! stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinar! intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited b! the statute" 9t can onl! be invo@ed against that specie of legislation that is utterl! vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either b! a saving clause or b! construction" 98

A statute or act ma! be said to be vague when it lac@s comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessaril! guess at its meaning and differ in its application" 9n such instance, the statute is repugnant to the #onstitution in two (2) respects H it violated due process for failure to accord persons, especiall! the parties targeted b! it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid8 and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carr!ing out its provisions and becomes an arbitrar! fle)ing of the Aovernment muscle . &ut the doctrine does not appl! as against legislations that are merel! couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specif! a standard though defectivel! phrased8 or to those that are apparentl! ambiguous !et fairl! applicable to certain t!pes of activities" The first ma! be >saved? b! proper construction, while no challenge ma! be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities . <ith more reason, the doctrine cannot be invo@ed where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguit!, as in this case" The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertaint! is whether the language conve!s a sufficientl! definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured b! common understanding and practice . 9t must be stressed, however, that the >vagueness? doctrine merel! reFuires a reasonable degree of certaint! for the statute to be upheld H not absolute precision or mathematical e)actitude, as petitioner seems to suggest" Dle)ibilit!, rather than meticulous specificit!, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearl! delineated" An act will not be held invalid merel! because it might have been more e)plicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especiall! where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes" (5ose%0 EFercito Estra2a v. San2iganbayan >D0ir2 /ivision?, (.R. )o. 1487*+, )ov. 19, ,++1, En 9anc >9ellosillo?# +$;. 8oes 'rticle +; (b) of the 9abor %ode defining Arecruitment and placement3 violate the due process clauseC Held2 9n support of her submission that Article .2 (b) is void for vagueness, appellant invo@es /eople v. /anis, where this #ourt ) ) ) >criticized? the definition of >recruitment and placement? ) ) )" Appellant further argues that the acts that constitute >recruitment and placement? suffer from overbreadth since b! merel! >referring? a person for emplo!ment, a person ma! be convicted of illegal recruitment" These contentions cannot be sustained" Appellant;s reliance on /eople v. /anis is misplaced" The issue in /anis was whether, under the proviso of Article .2(b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed onl! >whenever two or more persons are in an! manner promised or offered an! emplo!ment for a fee"? The #ourt held in the negative ) ) )" B ) ) The #ourt, in /anis, merel! bemoaned the lac@ of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso" The absence of such records notwithstanding, the #ourt was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso b! appl!ing principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself" ection .2(b), therefore, is not a >perfectl! vague act? whose obscurit! is evident on its face" 9f at all, the proviso therein is merel! couched in imprecise language that was salvaged b! proper construction" 9t is not void for vagueness" B)) That ection .2(b) encompasses what appellant apparentl! considers as customar! and harmless acts such as >labor or emplo!ment referral? (>referring? an applicant, for emplo!ment to a prospective emplo!er) does not render the law overbroad" -videntl!, appellant misapprehends concept of overbreadth" A statute ma! be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the e)ercise of individual freedoms affirmativel! guaranteed b! the #onstitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion" A generall! worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionall! punished is unconstitutionall! vague to the e)tent that it fails to give adeFuate warning of the boundar! between the constitutionall! permissible and the constitutionall! impermissible applications of the statute . 9n 5lo ?mpar 'diong v. %ommission on Dlections , for instance, we struc@ down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting the posting of election propaganda in an! place H including private vehicles H other than in the common poster areas sanctioned b! the 99

#,*-$-#" <e held that the challenged provisions not onl! deprived the owner of the vehicle the use of his propert! but also deprived the citizen of his right to free speech and information" The prohibition in 'diong, therefore, was so broad that it covered even constitutionall! guaranteed rights and, hence, void for overbreadth" 9n the present case, however, appellant did not even specif! what constitutionall! protected freedoms are embraced b! the definition of >recruitment and placement? that would render the same constitutionall! overbroad" (=eo%le v. /ela =ie2ra, !7+ SCR 1*!, 5an. ,4, ,++1, 1 st /iv. >4a%unan?# +$#. s the /lunder 9a1 unconstitutional for being vagueC

Held2 As it is written, the +lunder $aw contains ascertainable standards and well( defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation" ection 2 is sufficientl! e)plicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions reFuired or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certaint! and particularit!" B ) ) As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are sub6ect to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validit! would be sustained" 9t must sufficientl! guide the 6udge in its application8 the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation8 and more importantl!, the accused, in identif!ing the realm of the proscribed conduct" 9ndeed, it can be understood with little difficult! that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill(gotten wealth of at least +50,000,000"00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in ec" ., par" (d), of the +lunder $aw" 9n fact, the amended 9nformation itself closel! trac@s the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certaint! the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed ) ) )" <e discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous H as there is obviousl! none H that will confuse petitioner in his defense" Although sub6ect to proof, these factual assertions clearl! show that the elements of the crime are easil! understood and provide adeFuate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts" 7pon such uneFuivocal assertions, petitioner is completel! informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense" +etitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutor! definition of the terms >combination? and >series? in the @e! phrase >a combination or series of overt or criminal acts? found in ec" ., par" (d), and ec" 2, and the word >pattern? in ec" 5" These omissions, according to petitioner, render the +lunder $aw unconstitutional for being impermissibl! vague and overbroad and den! him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process" The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistr!" A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merel! because general terms are used therein, or because of the emplo!ment of terms without defining them8 much less do we have to define ever! word we use" &esides, there is no positive constitutional or statutor! command reFuiring the legislature to define each and ever! word in an enactment" #ongress is not restricted in the form of e)pression of its will, and its inabilit! to so define the words emplo!ed in a statute will not necessaril! result in the vagueness or ambiguit! of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctl! e)pressed in the +lunder $aw" *oreover, it is a well(settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinar! acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words" The intention of the lawma@ers H who are, ordinaril!, untrained philologists and le)icographers H to use statutor! phraseolog! in such a manner is alwa!s presumed" Thus, <ebster;s :ew #ollegiate 4ictionar! contains the following commonl! accepted definition of the words >combination? and >series"? %ombination H the result or product of combining8 the act or process of combining" To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters" Series H a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession" 100

That #ongress intended the words >combination? and >series? to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinel! evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventuall! became 'A 1000 or the +lunder $aw ) ) )" B)) Thus when the +lunder $aw spea@s of >combination,? it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories or enumeration provided in ec" ., par" (d), e.g., raids on the public treasur! in ec" ., par" (d), subpar" (.), and fraudulent conve!ance of assets belonging to the :ational Aovernment under ec" ., par" (d), subpar" (2)" ,n the other hand, to constitute a >series? there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same categor! of enumeration found in ec" ., par" (d), sa!, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasur!, all of which fall under ec" ., par" (d), subpar" (.)" Ceril!, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for >combination? and >series,? it would have ta@en greater pains in specificall! providing for it in the law" As for >pattern,? we agree with the observations of the andiganba!an that this term is sufficientl! defined in ec" 5, in relation to ec" ., par" (d), and ec" 2 H 0 0 0 under Sec. + (d) of the la1, a Ppattern@ consists o1 at least a combination or series o1 overt or criminal acts enumerate2 in subsections (1# to (*# o1 Sec. 1 (2#. Secondly, pursuant to Sec. " of the la1, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is 2irecte2 toEar2s a common %ur%ose or goal E0ic0 is to enable t0e %ublic o11icer to amass, accumulate or ac$uire ill@gotten Eealt0. 'nd thirdly, there must either be an Qoverall unlaE1ul sc0emeL or Qcons%iracyL to achieve said common goal. 's commonly understood, the term Poverall unla1ful scheme@ indicates a Pgeneral plan of action or method@ 1hich the principal accused and public officer and others conniving 1ith him follo1 to achieve the aforesaid common goal. n the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or 1here the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal. B)) Eence, it cannot plausibl! be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it see@s to penalize" 7nder the circumstances, petitioner;s reliance on the >void(for(vagueness? doctrine is manifestl! misplaced" B)) *oreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of *r" 3ustice Cicente C" *endoza during the deliberations of the #ourt that the allegations that the +lunder $aw is vague and overbroad do not 6ustif! a facial review of its validit! H The void(for(vagueness doctrine states that >a statute which either forbids or reFuires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessaril! guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law"? (%onnally v. Feneral %onstr. %o., "$- ?.S. ;<(, ;-+, ,) 9. Dd. ;"< [+-"$] cited in Drmita6!alate 4otel and !otel Hperators 'ss@n. v. %ity !ayor, ") S%&' <#-, <$, [+-$,]) The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that >a governmental purpose ma! not be achieved b! means which sweep unnecessaril! broadl! and thereb! invade the area of protected freedoms"? (=''%/ v. 'labama, ;,, ?.S. "<<, ;),, +", " 9. Dd ;"(, ;;< [+-(<]I Shelton v. .uc7er, ;$# ?.S. #,-, ( 9. Dd. "d ";+ [+-$)]) A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible >chilling effect? upon protected speech" The theor! is that >NwOhen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readil! apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all societ! of constitutionall! protected e)pression is deemed to 6ustif! allowing attac@s on overl! broad statutes with no reFuirement that the person ma@ing the attac@ demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated b! a statute drawn with narrow specificit!"? (Fooding v. Bilson, #)( ?.S. (+<, ("+, ;+ 9. Dd. "d #)<, #+; [+-,"] [internal quotation mar7s omitted]) The possible harm to societ! in permitting some unprotected speed to go unpunished is outweighed b! the possibilit! that the protected speech of others ma! 101

be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitor! effects of overl! broad statutes" This rationale does not appl! to penal statutes" #riminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their ver! e)istence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the tate ma! well be prevented from enacting laws against sociall! harmful conduct" 9n the area of criminal law, the law cannot ta@e chances as in the area of free speech" The overbreadth and vagueness doctrine then have special application onl! to free speech cases" The! are inapt for testing the validit! of penal statutes" As the 7" " upreme #ourt put it, in an opinion b! #hief 3ustice 'ehnFuist, >we have not recognized an Uoverbreadth; doctrine outside the limited conte)t of the Dirst Amendment"? 9n 5road1ic7 v. H7lahoma (#+; ?.S. $)+, $+"6$+;, ;, 9 Dd. "d <;), <#)6<#+ [+-,;]), the #ourt ruled that >claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, b! their terms, see@ to regulate onl! spo@en words? and, again, that >overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invo@ed against ordinar! criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct"? Dor this reason, it has been held that >a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfull!, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances e)ists under which the Act would be valid"? (?nited States v. Salerno, supra.) As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant ma! challenge a statute on its face onl! if it is vague in all its possible applications" >A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearl! proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others"? (:illage of 4offman Dstates v. Flipside, 4offman Dstates, nc., #(( ?.S. #<-, #-#6-(, ,+ 9 Dd. "d ;$", ;$- [+-<"]) 9n sum, the doctrines of strict scrutin!, overbreadth, and vagueness are anal!tical tools developed for testing >on their faces? statutes in free speech cases or, as the! are called in American law, Dirst Amendment cases" The! cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute" <ith respect to such statute, the established rule is that >one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attac@ the statute on the ground that impliedl! it might also be ta@en as appl!ing to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional"? (?nited States v. &aines, ;$" ?.S. +,, "+, # 9. Dd. "d ("#, ("- [+-$)]. .he paradigmatic case is Ea>oo R !ississippi :alley &&. v. *ac7son :inegar %o., ""$ ?.S. "+,, (, l. Dd. +-; [+-+"]) As has been pointed out, >vagueness challenges in the Dirst Amendment conte)t, li@e overbreadth challenges t!picall! produce facial invalidation, while statutes found to be vague as a matter of due process t!picall! are invalidated Nonl!O Uas applied; to a particular defendant"? (F. Funther R K. Sullivan, %onstitutional 9a1 +"-- ["))+]) #onseFuentl!, there is no basis for petitioner;s claim that this #ourt review the Anti(+lunder $aw on its face and in its entiret!" 9ndeed, >on its face? invalidation of statutes results in stri@ing them down entirel! on the ground that the! might be applied to parties not before the #ourt whose activities are constitutionall! protected ( d. at +;"<). 9t constitutes a departure from the case and controvers! reFuirement of the #onstitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract conte)ts (%onstitution, 'rt. : , Sections + and (. %ompare 'ngara v. Dlectoral %ommission, $; /hil. +;-, +(< [+-;$])" &ut, as the 7" " upreme #ourt pointed out in Eounger v. 4arris (#)+ ?.S. ;,, ("6(;, ", 9. Dd. "d $$-, $<) [+-,+]I others omitted.) NTOhe tas@ of anal!zing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and reFuiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarel! if ever an appropriate tas@ for the 6udiciar!" The combination of the relative remoteness of the controvers!, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the reFuired line(b!(line anal!sis of detailed statutes, ) ) ) ordinaril! results in a @ind of case that is wholl! unsatisfactor! for deciding constitutional Fuestions, whichever wa! the! might be decided" Dor these reasons, >on its face? invalidation of statutes has been described as >manifestl! strong medicine,? to be emplo!ed >sparingl! and onl! as a last resort,? (5road1ic7 v. H7lahoma, #+; ?.S. at $+;, ;, 9.Dd."d at <#+I =ational Dndo1ment for the 'rts v. Finley, ("# ?.S. ($-, (<) [+--<]) and is generall! disfavored (FBL/5S, nc. v. %ity of 8allas, #-; ?.S. "";, +), 9.Dd."d $); [+--)]I %ru> v. Secretary of Dnvironment and =atural &esources, F.&. =o. +;(;<(, $ 8ecember "))) [!endo>a, 102

*., Separate Hpinion]). 9n determining the constitutionalit! of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be e)amined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged (?nited States v. =ational 8airy /rod. %orp., ;," ?.S. "-, ;"6;;, - 9.Dd."d ($+, ($(6$ [+-$;]) 9n light of the foregoing disFuisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguit! of the +lunder $aw, so tenaciousl! claimed and argued at length b! petitioner, is more imagined than real" Ambiguit!, where none e)ists, cannot be created b! dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law" -ver! provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to ever! other part" To be sure, it will ta@e more than nitpic@ing to overturn the well(entrenched presumption of constitutionalit! and validit! of the +lunder $aw" A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the +lunder $aw is all about" &eing one of the enators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was e)tensivel! deliberated upon b! the enate and its appropriate committees b! reason of which he even registered his affirmative vote with full @nowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage" (5ose%0 EFercito Estra2a v. San2iganbayan >D0ir2 /ivision?, (.R. )o. 1487*+, )ov. 19, ,++1, En 9anc >9ellosillo?# +$(. 8oes an e0traditee have the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an e0tradition proceedingC Held2 #onsidering that in the case at bar, the e)tradition proceeding is onl! at its evaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed b! the private respondent is nebulous and the degree of pre6udice he will allegedl! suffer is wea@, we accord greater weight to the interests espoused b! the government thru the petitioner ecretar! of 3ustice" B)) n tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the %ourt stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the e0tradition proceedings. +rocedural due process reFuires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is due" tated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to 1hether procedural protections are at all due and 1hen they are due, 1hich in turn depends on the e0tent to 1hich an individual 1ill be Jcondemned to suffer grievous loss.J <e have e)plained wh! an e)traditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the e)tradition process" As aforesaid, +"4" :o" .06/ which implements the '+(7 -)tradition Treat! affords an e)traditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the e)traditee to @now the basis of the reFuest for his e)tradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition for e)tradition" The e)traditeePs right to @now is momentarily 1ithheld during the evaluation stage of the e)tradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the tate to prevent escape of potential e)traditees which can be precipitated b! premature information of the basis of the reFuest for his e)tradition" :o less compelling at that stage of the e)tradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the 6udgment of a co(eFual branch of the government, the -)ecutive, which has been endowed b! our #onstitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations" :eedless to state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be ad6usted as the e)tradition process moves from the administrative stage to the 6udicial stage and to the e)ecution stage depending on factors that will come into pla!" 9n sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private respondentPs privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the reFuest for his e)tradition to the 7nited tates" .here is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party. (Secretary o1 5ustice v. 'on. Ral%0 C. Lantion, (.R. )o. 1!94*7, 3ct. 1", ,+++, En 9anc >=uno?# +$$. Bill !ar7 *imene>@s detention prior to the conclusion of the e0tradition proceedings not amount to a violation of his right to due processC Held2 #ontrar! to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the e)tradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due process" <e iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunit! to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not alwa!s call for a prior opportunit! to be heard. <here the circumstances H such as those present in an e)tradition case H call for it, a subsequent opportunit! to be heard is enough . 9n the present case, respondent will be given full opportunit! to be heard subseFuentl!, when the e)tradition court hears the +etition for -)tradition" Eence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness" 103

#ontrar! to the contention of 3imenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his libert! prior to his being heard" That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrar! is sufficientl! ensured b! (.) the 4,3;s filing in court the +etition with its supporting documents after a determination that the e)tradition reFuest meets the reFuirements of the law and the relevant treat!8 (2) the e)tradition 6udge;s independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of 6ustice before the issuance of a warrant for his arrest8 and (2) his opportunit!, once he is under the court;s custod!, to appl! for bail as an e)ception to the no(initial(bail rule" 9t is also worth noting that before the 7 government reFuested the e)tradition of respondent, proceedings had alread! been conducted in that countr!" &ut because he left the 6urisdiction of the reFuesting state before those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws" Eis invocation of due process now had thus become hollow" Ee alread! had that opportunit! in the reFuesting state8 !et, instead of ta@ing it, he ran awa!" 9n this light, would it be proper and 6ust for the government to increase the ris@ of violating its treat! obligations in order to accord 'espondent 3imenez his personal libert! in the span of time that it ta@es to resolve the +etition for -)traditionQ Eis supposed immediate deprivation of libert! without due process that he had previousl! shunned pales against the government;s interest in fulfilling its -)tradition Treat! obligations and in cooperating with the world communit! in the suppression of crime" 9ndeed, >NcOonstitutional liberties do not e)ist in a vacuum8 the due process rights accorded to individuals must be carefull! balanced against e)igent and palpable government interest"? Too, we cannot allow our countr! to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and wea@lings who, instead of facing the conseFuences of their actions, choose to run and hide" Eence, it would not be good polic! to increase the ris@ of violating our treat! obligations if, through overprotection or e)cessivel! liberal treatment, persons sought to be e)tradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custod!" 9n the absence of an! provision H in the #onstitution, the law or the treat! H e)pressl! guaranteeing the right to bail in e)tradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the +hilippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors" The denial of bail as a matter of course in e)tradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article .5 (9t states= >9f the person sought consents in writing to surrender to the 'eFuesting tate, the 'eFuested tate ma! surrender the person as e)peditiousl! as possible without further proceedings"?) of the Treat!, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntaril! surrender to the reFuesting state to cut short their detention here" $i@ewise, their detention pending the resolution of e)tradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the -)tradition $aw on the summar! nature of e)tradition cases and the need for their speed! disposition" ((overnment o1 t0e Unite2 States o1 merica v. 'on. (uillermo =urganan, (.R. )o. 1487"1, Se%t. ,4, ,++,, En 9anc >=anganiban?# T,e E=u(l P!")e')$"& Cl(u+e +$,. D0plain and discuss the equal protection of the la1 clause.

Held2 ." The eFual protection of the law is embraced in the concept of due process, as ever! unfair discrimination offends the reFuirements of 6ustice and fair pla!" 9t has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article 999, ec" ., of the #onstitution to provide for a more specific guarant! against an! form of undue favoritism or hostilit! from the government" Arbitrariness in general ma! be challenged on the basis of the due process clause" &ut if the particular act assailed parta@es of an unwarranted partialit! or pre6udice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the eFual protection clause" According to a long line of decisions, eFual protection simpl! reFuires that all persons or things similarl! situated should be treated ali@e, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. imilar sub6ects, in other words, should not be treated differentl!, so as to give undue favor to some and un6ustl! discriminate against others" The eFual protection clause does not reFuire the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction" This might in fact sometimes result in uneFual protection, as where, for e)ample, a law prohibiting mature boo@s to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the !outh but violate the libert! of adults" <hat the clause reFuires is eFualit! among eFuals as determined according to a valid classification" 104

&! classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars . (=0ili%%ine 5u2ges ssociation v. =ra2o, ,," SCR "+!, "11@"1,, )ov. 11, 199!, En 9anc >Cru6?# 2" The eFual protection clause e)ists to prevent undue favor or privilege" 9t is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on ineFualit!" 'ecognizing the e)istence of real difference among men, the eFual protection clause does not demand absolute eFualit!" 9t merel! reFuires that all persons shall be treated ali@e, under li@e circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced . Thus, the eFual protection clause does not absolutel! forbid classifications ) ) )" 9f the classification is based on real and substantial differences8 is germane to the purpose of the law8 applies to all members of the same class8 and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification ma! not be impugned as violating the #onstitutionPs eFual protection guarantee" A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose ) ) ) is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded" ('imagan v. =eo%le, ,!" SCR 7!8, 3ct. ", 1994, En 9anc >4a%unan?# +$<. %ongress enacted &.'. =o. <+<- 1hich provides, in Section ## thereof, that J=o Dlection Hfficer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (#) years. 'ny election officer 1ho, either at the time of the approval of this 'ct or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (#) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the %ommission to a ne1 station outside the original congressional district.J /etitioners, 1ho are %ity and !unicipal Dlection Hfficers, theori>e that Section ## of &' <+<- is violative of the Jequal protection clauseJ of the +-<, %onstitution because it singles out the %ity and !unicipal Dlection Hfficers of the %H!D9D% as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (#) years. .hey maintain that there is no substantial distinction bet1een them and other %H!D9D% officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to 2ustify the ob2ective of the provision of la1 under attac7. &esolve. Held2 The #ourt is not persuaded b! petitionersP arguments" The SeFual protection clauseS of the ./01 #onstitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions= .) 2) 2) 5) The The The The classification classification classification classification must must must must rest on substantial distinction8 be germane to the purpose of the law8 not be limited to e)isting conditions onl!8 and appl! eFuall! to all members of the same class"

After a careful stud!, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under ection 55 of 'A 0.0/ satisfies the aforestated reFuirements" The singling out of election officers in order to Sensure the impartialit! of election officials b! preventing them from developing familiarit! with the people of their place of assignmentS does not violate the eFual protection clause of the #onstitution" 9n 9ut> v. 'raneta, it was held that Sthe legislature is not reFuired b! the #onstitution to adhere to a polic! of Pall or nonePS" This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification" 9t ma! be true that all other officers of #,*-$-# referred to b! petitioners are e)posed to the same evils sought to be addressed b! the statute" Eowever, in this case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficientl! served b! brea@ing an important lin@ in the chain of corruption than b! brea@ing up each and ever! lin@ thereof" Ceril!, under ection 2(n) of 'A 0.0/, election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the #,*-$-# in a cit! or municipalit!" 9t is safe to sa! that without the complicit! of such officials, large(scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardl! be carried out" ( gri%ino . /e (u6man, 5r., et al. v. C3<ELEC ((.R. )o. 1,9118, 5uly 19, ,+++, en 9anc >=urisima?# +$-. 're there substantial distinctions bet1een print media and broadcast media to 2ustify the requirement for the latter to give free airtime to be used by the %omelec to inform the public of qualifications and program of government of candidates and political parties during the campaign periodC 8iscuss. Held2 There are important differences in the characteristics of the two media which 6ustif! their differential treatment for free speech purposes" &ecause of the ph!sical limitations of the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of necessit!, allocate broadcast freFuencies to those wishing to use them" There is no similar 6ustification for government allocation and regulation of the print media"

105

9n the allocation of limited resources, relevant conditions ma! validl! be imposed on the grantees or licensees" The reason for this is that the government spends public funds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast industr!, which it does not do in the case of print media" To reFuire radio and television broadcast industr! to provide free airtime for the #omelec Time is a fair e)change for what the industr! gets" Drom another point of view, the # has also held that pervasive influence of the broadcast media, >NnOecessaril! ) ) and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than newspaper and print media"? (DELE9 =, .nc. v. C3<ELEC, 1998 ><en2o6a?# because of the uniFue and ) the freedom of television the freedom accorded to ,89 SCR !!", %ril ,1,

+,). 8oes the death penalty la1 (&.'. =o. ,$(-) violate the equal protection clause considering that, in effect, it punishes only people 1ho are poor, uneducated, and 2oblessC Held2 '"A" :o" 165/ specificall! provides that >NTOhe death penalt! shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed ) ) ) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (1) !ears old"? Apparentl!, the death penalt! law ma@es no distinction" 9t applies to all persons and to all classes of persons H rich or poor, educated or uneducated, religious or non(religious" :o particular person or classes of persons are identified b! the law against whom the death penalt! shall be e)clusivel! imposed" The law punishes with death a person who shall commit rape against a child below seven !ears of age" Thus, the perpetration of rape against a 5(!ear old girl does not absolve or e)empt an accused from the imposition of the death penalt! b! the fact that he is poor, uneducated, 6obless, and lac@s catechetical instruction" To hold otherwise will not eliminate but promote ineFualities" 9n %ecilleville &ealty and Service %orporation v. %', the # clarified that compassion for the poor is an imperative of ever! humane societ! but onl! when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege" (=eo%le v. 5immy <iFano y Damora, (.R. )o. 1,911,, 5uly ,!, 1999, En 9anc >=er Curiam?# +,+. .he nternational School 'lliance of Dducators ( S'D) questioned the point6of6hire classification employed by nternational School, nc. to 2ustify distinction in salary rates bet1een foreign6hires and local6hires, i.e., salary rates of foreign6hires are higher by "(M than their local counterparts, as discriminatory and, therefore, violates the equal protection clause. .he nternational School contended that this is necessary in order to entice foreign6hires to leave their domicile and 1or7 here. &esolve. Held2 That public polic! abhors ineFualit! and discrimination is be!ond contention" ,ur #onstitution and laws reflect the polic! against these evils" B ) ) 9nternational law, which springs from general principles of law , li@ewise proscribes discrimination ) ) )" The 7niversal 4eclaration of Euman 'ights, the 9nternational #ovenant on -conomic, ocial and #ultural 'ights, the 9nternational #onvention on the -limination of All Dorms of 'acial 4iscrimination, the #onvention against 4iscrimination in -ducation, the #onvention (:o" ...) #oncerning 4iscrimination in 'espect of -mplo!ment and ,ccupation ( all embod! the general principle against discrimination, the ver! antithesis of fairness and 6ustice" The +hilippines, through its #onstitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws" N9Ot would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the tate, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure eFual emplo!ment opportunities, closes its e!es to uneFual and discriminator! terms and conditions of emplo!ment ) ) )" 4iscrimination, particularl! in terms of wages, is frowned upon b! the $abor #ode" Article .25, for e)ample, prohibits and penalizes the pa!ment of lesser compensation to a female emplo!ee as against a male emplo!ee for wor@ of eFual value" Article 250 declares it an unfair labor practice for an emplo!er to discriminate in regards to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in an! labor organization" B ) ) The foregoing provisions impregnabl! institutionalize in this 6urisdiction the long honored legal truism of >-Fual pa! for eFual wor@"? +ersons who wor@ with substantiall! eFual Fualifications, s@ill, effort and responsibilit!, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries" This rule applies to the chool (9nternational chool, 9nc"), its Sinternational characterS notwithstanding" The chool contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local(hires perform wor@ eFual to that of foreign(hires" The #ourt finds this argument a little cavalier" 9f 106

an emplo!er accords emplo!ees the same position and ran@, the presumption is that these emplo!ees perform eFual wor@" This presumption is borne b! logic and human e)perience" 9f the emplo!er pa!s one emplo!ee less than the rest, it is not for that emplo!ee to e)plain wh! he receives less or wh! the others receive more" That would be adding insult to in6ur!" The emplo!er has discriminated against that emplo!ee8 it is for the emplo!er to e)plain wh! the emplo!ee is treated unfairl!" The emplo!er in this case failed to discharge this burden" There is no evidence here that foreign(hires perform 25L more efficientl! or effectivel! than the local(hires" &oth groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which the! perform under similar wor@ing conditions" The chool cannot invo@e the need to entice foreign(hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salar! rates without violating the principle of eFual wor@ for eFual pa!" B)) <hile we recognize the need of the chool to attract foreign(hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the pre6udice of local(hires" The local(hires perform the same services as foreign(hires and the! ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter" Dor the same reason, the Sdislocation factorS and the foreign(hiresP limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salar! rates" The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign(hires are adeFuatel! compensated b! certain benefits accorded them which are not en6o!ed b! local(hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, ta)es and home leave travel allowances" The #onstitution en6oins the tate to >protect the rights of wor@ers and promote their welfare?, >to afford labor full protection"? The tate, therefore, has the right and dut! to regulate the relations between labor and capital . These relations are not merel! contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must !ield to the common good . hould such contracts contain stipulations that are contrar! to public polic!, courts will not hesitate to stri@e down these stipulations" 9n this case, we find the point(of(hire classification emplo!ed b! respondent chool to 6ustif! the distinction in the salar! rates of foreign(hires and local(hires to be an invalid classification" There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered b! foreign( hires and local(hires" The practice of the chool of according higher salaries to foreign(hires contravenes public polic! and, certainl!, does not deserve the s!mpath! of this #ourt" (.nternational Sc0ool lliance o1 E2ucators (.S E# v. 'on. Leonar2o . Juisumbing, (.R. )o. 1,8847, 5une 1, ,+++, 1st /iv. >4a%unan?# +,". 'ccused6appellant &omeo F. *alos2os filed a motion before the %ourt as7ing that he be allo1ed to fully discharge the duties of a %ongressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non6bailable offense. 8oes being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allo1s different treatmentC s being a %ongressman a substantial differentiation 1hich removes the accused6appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under la1C Held2 9n the ultimate anal!sis, the issue before us boils down to a Fuestion of constitutional eFual protection" B)) The performance of legitimate and even essential duties b! public officers has never been an e)cuse to free a person validl! in prison" The duties imposed b! the >mandate of the people? are multifarious" The accused(appellant asserts that the dut! to legislate ran@s highest in the hierarch! of government" The accused(appellant is onl! one of 250 members of the Eouse of 'epresentatives, not to mention the 25 members of the enate, charged with the duties of legislation" #ongress continues to function well in the ph!sical absence of one or a few of its members" 4epending on the e)igenc! of Aovernment that has to be addressed, the +resident or the upreme #ourt can also be deemed the highest for that particular dut!" The importance of a function depends on the need for its e)ercise" The dut! of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature" A doctor with uniFue s@ills has the dut! to save the lives of those with a particular affliction" An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents" A police officer must maintain peace 107

and order" :ever had the call of a particular dut! lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validl! restrained b! law" A strict scrutin! of classifications is essential lest wittingl! or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or t!pes of individuals . The #ourt cannot validate badges of ineFualit!" The necessities imposed b! public welfare ma! 6ustif! e)ercise of government authorit! to regulate even if thereb! certain groups ma! plausibl! assert that their interests are disregarded . <e, therefore, find that election to the position of #ongressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement" The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in libert! of movement" $awful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and appl! to all those belonging to the same class" B)) 9t can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, b! its nature, changes an individual;s status in societ!. +rison officials have the difficult and often than@less 6ob of preserving the securit! in a potentiall! e)plosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepare inmates for re(entr! into the social mainstream" :ecessaril!, both these demands reFuire the curtailment and elimination of certain rights . +remises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused(appellant;s claim that re(election to public office gives priorit! to an! other right or interest, including the police power of the tate" (=eo%le v. 5alosFos, !,4 SCR *89, &eb. !, ,+++, En 9anc >-nares@Santiago?# +,;. 'ppellant, 1ho 1as charged 1ith llegal &ecruitment in the &.% of Tamboanga %ity, invo7es the equal protection clause in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly sho1s that *asmine 'le2andro handed out application forms and even received 9ourdes !odesto@s payment, appellant 1as the only one criminally charged. 'le2andro, on the other hand, remained scot6free. From this, appellant concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. 'ppellant is a %ebuana 1hile 'le2andro is a Tamboanguena, and the alleged crime too7 place in Tamboanga %ity. Held2 The argument has no merit" The prosecution of one guilt! while others eFuall! guilt! are not prosecuted, however, is not, b! itself, a denial of the eFual protection of the laws" <here the official action purports to be in conformit! to the statutor! classification, an erroneous or mista@en performance of the statutor! dut!, although a violation of the statute, is not 1ithout more a denial of the eFual protection of the laws" The unlawful administration b! officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its uneFual application to those who are entitled to be treated ali@e, is not a denial of eFual protection, unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination" This ma! appear on the face of the action ta@en with respect to a particular class or person, or it ma! onl! be shown b! e)trinsic evidence showing a discriminator! design over another not to be inferred from the action itself" &ut a discriminator! purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of >clear and intentional discrimination"? Appellant has failed to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there was a >clear and intentional discrimination? on the part of the prosecuting officials" The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution;s sound assessment whether the evidence before it can 6ustif! a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense. The presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularl! performed their duties, and this presumption can be overcome onl! b! proof to the contrar!, not b! mere speculation" 9ndeed, appellant has not presented an! evidence to overcome this presumption" The mere allegation that appellant, a #ebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Tamboanguena, the guilt! part! in appellant;s e!es, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant eFual protection of the laws" There is also common sense practicalit! in sustaining appellant;s prosecution" <hile all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of eFualit! before the law, it does not follow that the! are to be protected in the commission of 108

crime" 9t would be unconscionable, for instance, to e)cuse a defendant guilt! of murder because others have murdered with impunit!" The remed! for uneFual enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the e)oneration of the guilt! at the e)pense of societ! ) ) )" +rotection of the law will be e)tended to all persons eFuall! in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime (/eople v. !ontgomery, ++, /."d #;, [+-#+]). $i@ewise, NiOf the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to some persons should be converted into a defense for others charged with crime, the result would be that the trial of the district attorne! for nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of man! persons charged with heinous crimes and the enforcement of law would suffer a complete brea@down (State v. 4ic7s, ;"( /."d ,-# [+-(<]). (=eo%le v. /ela =ie2ra, !7+ SCR 1*!, 5an. ,4, ,++1, 1 st /iv. >4a%unan?# T,e R$%,) (%($&+) U&!e(+"&(7le Se(!',e+ (&d Se$Iu!e+ +,#. 8iscuss the constitutional requirement that a 2udge, in issuing a 1arrant of arrest, must determine probable cause Apersonally.3 8istinguish determination of probable cause by the prosecutor and determination of probable cause by the 2udge. Held2 9t must be stressed that the ./01 #onstitution reFuires the 6udge to determine probable cause >personall!,? a reFuirement which does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous constitutions" This emphasis evinces the intent of the framers to place a greater degree of responsibilit! upon trial 6udges than that imposed under previous #onstitutions. 9n Soliven v. !a7asiar, this #ourt pronounced= ><hat the #onstitution underscores is the e)clusive and personal responsibilit! of the issuing 6udge to satisf! himself of the e)istence of probable cause" 9n satisf!ing himself of the e)istence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the 6udge is not reFuired to personall! e)amine the complainant and his witnesses" Dollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall= (.) personall! evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted b! the fiscal regarding the e)istence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest8 or (2) if in the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he ma! disregard the fiscal;s report and reFuire the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the e)istence of probable cause"? 4o v. /eople ( bid.) summarizes e)isting 6urisprudence on the matter as follows= >$est we be too repetitive, we onl! wish to emphasize three vital matters once more= First, as held in nting, the determination of probable cause b! the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made b! the 6udge" <hether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilt! of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon" The 6udge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessit! for placing him under immediate custod! in order not to frustrate the ends of 6ustice" Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct ob6ectives" Second, since their ob6ectives are different, the 6udge cannot rel! solel! on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to 6ustif! the issuance of a warrant of arrest" ,bviousl! and understandabl!, the contents of the prosecutor;s report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and hold him for trial" Eowever, the 6udge must decide independently. Eence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor;s bare report, upon which to legall! sustain his own findings on the e)istence (or none)istence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order" This responsibilit! of determining personall! and independentl! the e)istence or none)istence of probable cause is lodged in him b! no less than the most basic law of the land" +arentheticall!, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the 6udge and speed up the litigation process b! forwarding to the latter not onl! the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable the Eis Eonor to 109

ma@e his personal and separate 6udicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest" 9astly, it is not reFuired that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminar! investigation be submitted to and e)amined b! the 6udge" <e do not intend to undul! burden trial courts b! obliging them to e)amine the complete records of ever! case all the time simpl! for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused" <hat is reFuired, rather, is that the 6udge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter(affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of stenographic notes, if an!) upon which to ma@e his independent 6udgment or, at the ver! least, upon which to verif! the findings of the prosecutor as to the e)istence of probable cause" The point is= he cannot rel! solel! and entirel! on the prosecutor;s recommendation, as 'espondent #ourt did in this case" Although the prosecutor en6o!s the legal presumption of regularit! in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accurac!, the #onstitution, we repeat, commands the 6udge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest" This #ourt has consistentl! held that a 6udge fails in his bounden dut! if he relies merel! on the certification or the report of the investigating officer"? (%itations omitted) 9n the case at bench, respondent admits that he issued the Fuestioned warrant as there was >no reason for (him) to doubt the validit! of the certification made b! the Assistant +rosecutor that a preliminar! investigation was conducted and that probable cause was found to e)ist as against those charged in the information filed"? The statement is an admission that respondent relied solel! and completel! on the certification made b! the fiscal that probable cause e)ists as against those charged in the information and issued the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor;s findings and recommendations" Ee adopted the 6udgment of the prosecutor regarding the e)istence of probable cause as his own" ( b2ula v. (uiani, !,* SCR 1, &eb. 18, ,+++, ! r2 /iv. >(on6aga@Reyes?# +,(. n an application for search 1arrant, the application 1as accompanied by a s7etch of the compound at (+$ San *ose de la !ontana St., !abolo, %ebu %ity, indicating the "6 storey residential house of private respondent 1ith a large AK3 enclosed in a square. Bithin the same compound are residences of other people, 1or7shops, offices, factories and 1arehouse. .he search 1arrant issued, ho1ever, merely indicated the address of the compound 1hich is (+$ San *ose de la !ontana St., !abolo, %ebu %ity. 8id this satisfy the constitutional requirement under Section ", 'rticle that the place to be searched must be particularly describedC Held2 This #ourt has held that the applicant should particularl! describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, 1herever and 1henever it is feasible. 9n the present case, it must be noted that the application for a search warrant was accompanied b! a s@etch of the compound at 5.6 an 3ose de la *ontana t", *abolo, #ebu #it!" The s@etch indicated the 2(store! residential house of private respondent with a large SBS enclosed in a sFuare" <ithin the same compound are residences of other people, wor@shops, offices, factories and warehouse" <ith this s@etch as the guide, it could have been ver! eas! to describe the residential house of private respondent 1ith sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. &ut the search warrant merel! indicated the address of the compound which is 5.6 an 3ose de la *ontana t", *abolo, #ebu #it!" This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent" Thus, the inadeFuac! of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the Fuestioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional reFuirement" (=eo%le v. Estra2a, ,9* SCR !8!, 4++, ><artine6?# +,$. %an the place to be searched, as set out in the 1arrant, be amplified or modified by the officers@ o1n personal 7no1ledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduce in support of their application for the 1arrantC Held2 uch a change is proscribed b! the #onstitution which reFuires inter alia the search warrant to particularl! describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized" 9t would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant" 9t would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers e)ecuting a search warrant that discretion which the #onstitution has precisel! removed from them" The particularization of the description of the place to be searched ma! properl! be done onl! b! the 3udge, and onl! in 110

the warrant itself8 it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search" 9t is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actuall! searched H although not that specified in the warrant H is e)actl! what the! had in view when the! applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence" <hat is material in determining the validit! of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs the! submitted to the court issuing the warrant" (=eo%le v. Court o1 %%eals, ,91 SCR 4++, 5une ,*, 1998 >)arvasa?# +,,. s a respondent in an D0tradition /roceeding entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a 1arrant of arrestC Held2 &oth parties cite ection 6 of +4 .06/ in support of their arguments" B ) ) 4oes this provision sanction 'T# 3udge +urganan;s act of immediatel! setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrestQ <e rule in the negative" ." ,n the &asis of the -)tradition $aw 9t is significant to note that ection 6 of +4 .06/, our -)tradition $aw, uses the word >immediate? to Fualif! the arrest of the accused" This Fualification would be rendered nugator! b! setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant" Eearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments" Arrest subseFuent to a hearing can no longer be considered >immediate"? The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluit! but, on the whole, as a means of impairing a sense of urgenc! and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued" &! using the phrase >if it appears,? the law further conve!s that accurac! is not as important as speed at such earl! stage" The trial court is not e)pected to ma@e an e0haustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediatel! upon the filing of the petition" Drom the @nowledge and the material then available to it, the court is e)pected merel! to get a good first impression H a prima facie finding H sufficient to ma@e a speed! initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused" B)) <e stress that the prima facie e)istence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was alread! evident from the +etition itself and its supporting documents" Eence, after having alread! determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did e)ist, respondent 6udge gravel! abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of 3imenez" *oreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons" 9n connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word >hearing? is notabl! absent from the provision" -videntl!, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easil! so provided" 9t also bears emphasizing at this point that e)tradition proceedings are summar! ( ee ec" /, +4 .06/) in nature" Eence, the silence of the $aw and the Treat! leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing ever! little step in the entire proceedings" B)) Ceril! ) ) ) sending to persons sought to be e)tradited a notice of the reFuest for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunit! to prepare and e)ecute an escape" :either the Treat! nor the $aw could have intended that conseFuence, for the ver! purpose of both would have been defeated b! the escape of the accused from the reFuested state" 2" ,n the &asis of the #onstitution -ven ection 2 of Article 999 of our #onstitution ) ) ) does not reFuire a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest" B ) ) To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the #onstitution itself reFuires onl! the e)amination H under oath or affirmation H of complainants and the 111

1itnesses they may produce. There is no reFuirement to notif! and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest" 9n 4o v. /eople and in all the cases cited therein, never was a 6udge reFuired to go to the e)tent of conducting a hearing 6ust for the purpose of personall! determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest" All we reFuired was that the >6udge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to ma@e his independent 6udgment, or at the ver! least, upon which to verif! the findings of the prosecutor as to the e)istence of probable cause"? 9n Bebb v. 8e 9eon, the #ourt categoricall! stated that a 6udge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest ) ) )" At most, in cases of clear insufficienc! of evidence on record, 6udges merel! further e)amine complainants and their witnesses" 9n the present case, validating the act of respondent 6udge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this earl! stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire s!stem" 9f the accused were allowed to be heard and necessaril! to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage H if he so desires H in his effort to negate a prima facie findingC uch a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full(blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibl! ma@e trial of the main case superfluous" This scenario is also anathema to the summar! nature of e)traditions" ((overnment o1 t0e Unite2 States o1 merica v. 'on. (uillermo =urganan, (.R. )o. 1487"1, Se%t. ,4, ,++,, En 9anc >=anganiban?# +,<. Bhat is Asearch incidental to a la1ful arrest3C 8iscuss.

Held2 <hile a contemporaneous search of a person arrested ma! be effected to discover dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the crime and which search ma! e)tend to the area within his immediate control where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destro!, a valid arrest must precede the search" The process cannot be reversed" 9n a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validit! of the incidental search, the legalit! of the arrest is Fuestioned in a large ma6orit! of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merel! used as a prete)t for conducting a search" 9n this instance, the law reFuires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made H the process cannot be reversed" (!alacat v. %ourt of 'ppeals, "<; S%&' +(-, +,( [+--,]) (=eo%le v. C0ua 'o San, !+8 SCR 4!,, 5une 1", 1999, En 9anc >/avi2e, 5r., C.5.?# +,-. Bhat is the Aplain vie13 doctrineC Bhat are its requisitesC 8iscuss.

Held2 ." ,b6ects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are sub6ect to seizure even without a search warrant and ma! be introduced in evidence. The >plain view? doctrine applies when the following reFuisites concur= (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior 6ustification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area8 (b) the discover! of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent8 (c) it is immediatel! apparent to the officer that the item he observes ma! be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise sub6ect to seizure" The law enforcement officer must lawfull! ma@e an initial intrusion or properl! be in a position from which he can particularl! view the area . 9n the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertentl! across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused . The ob6ect must be open to e!e and hand and its discover! inadvertent" 9t is clear that an ob6ect is in plain view if the ob6ect itself is plainl! e)posed to sight" The difficult! arises when the ob6ect is inside a closed container" <here the ob6ect seized was inside a closed pac@age, the ob6ect itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant" Eowever, if the pac@age proclaims its contents, whether b! its distinctive configuration, its transparenc!, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and ma! be seized . 9n other words, if the pac@age is such that an e)perienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view" 9t must be immediatel! apparent to the police that the items that the! observe ma! be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise sub6ect to seizure" (=eo%le v. /oria, !+1 SCR **8, 5an. ,,, 1999, En 9anc >=uno, 5.?# 2" Dor the doctrine to appl!, the following elements must be present= 112

a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legall! present in the pursuit of their official duties8 b) the evidence was inadvertentl! discovered b! the police who have the right to be where the! are8 and c) the evidence must be immediatel! apparent8 and d) plain view 6ustified mere seizure of evidence without further search" 9n the instant case, recall that +,2 &alut testified that the! first located the mari6uana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant" Eence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant;s premises" :ote further that the police team was dispatched to appellant;s 7aingin precisel! to search for and uproot the prohibited flora" The seizure of evidence in >plain view? applies onl! where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertentl! comes across an incriminating ob6ect. #learl!, their discover! of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent" <e also note the testimon! of +,2 Tipa! that upon arriving at the area, the! first had to >loo@ around the area? before the! could spot the illegal plants" +atentl!, the seized mari6uana plants were not >immediatel! apparent? and >further search? was needed" 9n sum, the mari6uana plants in Fuestion were not in >plain view? or >open to e!e and hand"? The >plain view? doctrine, thus, cannot be made to appl!" :or can we sustain the trial court;s conclusion that 6ust because the mari6uana plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invo@e the protection afforded b! the #harter against unreasonable searches b! agents of the tate" The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunit! of one;s person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions" The guarantee refers to >the right of personal securit!? of the individual" B ) ), what is sought to be protected against the tate;s unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. To conclude otherwise would not onl! mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced !ard or a private place" The &ill of 'ights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuar! of his bedroom" (=eo%le v. be Val2e6, (.R. )o. 1,9,9*, Se%t. ,7, ,+++, En 9anc >Juisumbing?# 2" doctrine. #onsidering its factual milieu, this case falls sFuarel! under the plain vie1

<hen pencer wrenched himself free from the grasp of +,2 Aaviola, he instinctivel! ran towards the house of appellant" The members of the bu!(bust team were 6ustified in running after him and entering the house without a search warrant for the! were hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal" ,nce inside the house, the police officers cornered pencer and recovered the bu!(bust mone! from him" The! also caught appellant in flagrante delicto repac@ing the mari6uana bric@s which were in full view on top of a table" ) ) )" Eence, appellant;s subseFuent arrest was li@ewise lawful, coming as it is within the purview of ection 5(a) of 'ule ..2 of the ./05 'ules on #riminal +rocedure ) ) )" ection 5(a) is commonl! referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrests. Eere two elements must concur= (.) the person to be arrested must e)ecute an overt act indicating that he has 6ust committed, is actuall! committing, or is attempting to commit a crime8 and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or 1ithin the vie1 of the arresting officer. Thus, when appellant was seen repac@ing the mari6uana, the police officers were not onl! authorized but also dut!(bound to arrest him even without a warrant" (=eo%le v. Elam%aro, !,9 SCR 4+4, 414@417, <arc0 !1, ,+++, ,n2 /iv. >Juisumbing?# +<). Bhat is a Astop6and6fris73 searchC

Held2 ." 9n the landmar@ case of .erry v. Hhio, a stop(and(fris@ was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s)= >) ) ) (<)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonabl! to conclude in light of his e)perience that criminal activit! ma! be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing ma! be armed and presentl! dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and ma@e reasonable inFuiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others; safet!, he is entitled for the protection of himself or others in the area to conduct a carefull! limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover 113

weapons which might be used to assault him" uch a search is a reasonable search under the Dourth Amendment, and an! weapon seized ma! properl! be introduced in evidence against the person from whom the! were ta@en"? (4errera, ' 4andboo7 on 'rrest, Search and Sei>ure and %ustodial nvestigation, +--( ed., p. +<(I and .erry v. Hhio, supra, p. -++) 9n allowing such a search, the 7nited tates upreme #ourt held that the interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to ma@e an actual arrest" 9n admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop(and(fris@, the 7 upreme #ourt held that what 6ustified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in ta@ing steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could une)pectedl! and fatall! be used against him" 9t did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance 6udicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, e)cused onl! b! e)igent circumstances" (<analili v. C , ,8+ SCR 4++, 3ct. 9, 199" >=anganiban?# 2" <e now proceed to the 6ustification for and allowable scope of a >stop(and(fris@? as a >limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons,? as laid down in .erry, thus= <e merel! hold toda! that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonabl! to conclude in light of his e)perience that criminal activit! ma! be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing ma! be armed and presentl! dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and ma@es reasonable inFuiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others; safet!, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefull! limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him" uch a search is a reasonable search under the Dourth Amendment (.erry, at -++. n fact, the %ourt noted that the Psole 2ustification@ for a stop6and6fris7 1as the Pprotection of the police officer and others nearby@I 1hile the scope of the search conducted in the case 1as limited to patting do1n the outer clothing of petitioner and his companions, the police officer did not place his hands in their poc7ets nor under the outer surface of their garments until he had felt 1eapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns. .his did not constitute a general e0ploratory search, d.) ,ther notable points of .erry are that while probable cause is not reFuired to conduct a >stop(and(fris@,? it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a >stop(and(fris@"? A genuine reason must e)ist, in light of the police officer;s e)perience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Dinall!, a >stop(and(fris@? serves a two(fold interest= (.) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer ma!, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause8 and (2) the more pressing interest of safet! and self(preservation which permit the police officer to ta@e steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadl! weapon that could une)pectedl! and fatall! be used against the police officer" (<alacat v. Court o1 %%eals, ,8! SCR 179, /ec. 1,, 199" >/avi2e?# +<+. 're searches at chec7points validC 8iscuss.

Held2 This #ourt has ruled that not all chec@points are illegal" Those which are warranted b! the e)igencies of public order and are conducted in a wa! least intrusive to motorists are allowed. Dor, admittedl!, routine chec@points do intrude, to a certain e)tent, on motorists; right to >free passage without interruption,? but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves onl! a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle;s occupants are reFuired to answer a brief Fuestion or two" Dor as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants sub6ected to a bod! search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine chec@s cannot be regarded as violative of an individual;s right against unreasonable search" 9n fact, these routine chec@s, when conducted in a fi)ed area, are even less intrusive" (=eo%le v. Usana, !,! SCR "74, 5an. ,8, ,+++, 1 st /iv. >/avi2e, C5?#

114

+<". llustrative case of valid search at chec7point conducted to implement the gun ban la1 during election. s it still necessary that chec7points be pre6announcedC Held2 Accused(appellants assail the manner b! which the chec@point in Fuestion was conducted" The! contend that the chec@point manned b! elements of the *a@ati +olice should have been announced" The! also complain of its having been conducted in an arbitrar! and discriminator! manner" <e ta@e 6udicial notice of the e)istence of the #,*-$-# resolution imposing a gun ban during the election period issued pursuant to ection 52(c) in relation to ection 26(F) of the ,mnibus -lection #ode (&atas +ambansa &lg" 00.)" The national and local elections in .//5 were held on 0 *a!, the second *onda! of the month" The incident, which happened on 5 April .//5, was well within the election period" B)) The chec@point herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced b! the #,*-$-#" The #,*-$-# would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians" 9t would also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted" Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would @now that the! onl! need a car to be able to easil! perpetrate their malicious designs" The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure" +,2 uba admitted that the! were merel! stopping cars the! deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavil! tinted 6ust to see if the passengers thereof were carr!ing guns" At best the! would merel! direct their flashlights inside the cars the! would stop, without opening the car;s doors or sub6ecting its passengers to a bod! search" There is nothing discriminator! in this as this is what the situation demands" <e see no need for chec@points to be announced ) ) )" :ot onl! would it be impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban" -ven so, badges of legitimac! of chec@points ma! still be inferred from their fi)ed location and the regularized manner in which the! are operated . (=eo%le v. Usana, !,! SCR "74, 5an. ,8, ,+++, 1st /iv. >/avi2e, C5?# +<;. 8o the ordinary rights against unreasonable searches and sei>ures apply to searches conducted at the airport pursuant to routine airport security proceduresC Held2 +ersons ma! lose the protection of the search and seizure clause b! e)posure of their persons or propert! to the public in a manner reflecting a lac@ of sub6ective e)pectation of privac!, which e)pectation societ! is prepared to recognize as reasonable" uch recognition is implicit in airport securit! procedures" <ith increased concern over airplane hi6ac@ing and terrorism has come increased securit! at the nation;s airports" +assengers attempting to board an aircraft routinel! pass through metal detectors8 their carr!(on baggage as well as chec@ed luggage are routinel! sub6ected to )(ra! scans" hould these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious ob6ects, ph!sical searches are conducted to determine what the ob6ects are" There is little Fuestion that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravit! of the safet! interests involved, and the reduced privac! e)pectations associated with airline travel . 9ndeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address s!stems, signs, and notices in their airline tic@ets that the! are sub6ect to search and, if an! prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be sub6ect to seizure" These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinar! constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not appl! to routine airport procedures" (=eo%le v. Leila 5o0nson, (.R. )o. 1!8881, /ec. 18, ,+++, ,n2 /iv. ><en2o6a?# +<#. !ay the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and sei>ures be e0tended to acts committed by private individualsC Held2 As held in /eople v. !arti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunit! of onePs person from interference b! government and it cannot be e)tended to acts committed b! private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion" (=eo%le v. <en2o6a, !+1 SCR **, 5an. 18, 1999, 1st /iv. ><elo?# +<(. Should the sei>ed drugs (1hich are pharmaceutically correct but not properly documented) sub2ect of an illegal search (because the applicant Afailed to allege in the application for search 1arrant that the sub2ect drugs for 1hich she 1as applying for 115

search 1arrant 1ere either fa7e, misbranded, adulterated, or unregistered,3) be returned to the o1nerC A&+/2 :o" 9nstead, the! should be promptl! disposed of in the manner provided b! law in order to insure that the same do not fall into the wrong hands who might use the drugs underground" As clarified in =eo%le v. 5u2ge Estrella D. Estra2a ((.R )o. 1,44*1, 5une ,*, ,+++, S%cl. ,n2 /iv. >-nares@Santiago?#= ><ith the tatePs obligation to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them ('rticle , Section +(, +-<, %onstitution), in order to develop a health! and alert citizenr! ('rticle K :, Section +-[+]), it became mandator! for the government to supervise and control the proliferation of drugs in the mar@et" The constitutional mandate that Sthe tate shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to ma@e essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable costS ('rticle K , Section ++) cannot be neglected" This is wh! Sthe tate shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulator! s!stem"S ('rticle K , Section +") The &DA4 is the government agenc! vested b! law to ma@e a mandator! and authoritative determination of the true therapeutic effect of drugs because it involves technical s@ill which is within its special competence" The health of the citizenr! should never be compromised" To the la!man, medicine is a cure that ma! lead to better health" 9f the seized 52 bo)es of drugs are pharmaceuticall! correct but not properl! documented, the! should be promptl! disposed of in the manner provided b! law in order to ensure that the same do not fall into the wrong hands who might use the drugs underground" B ) )" The polic! of the law enunciated in '"A" :o" 0202 is to protect the consumers as well as the licensed businessmen" Doremost among these consumers is the government itself which procures medicines and distributes them to the local communities through direct assistance to the local health centers or through outreach and charit! programs" ,nl! with the proper government sanctions can medicines and drugs circulate the mar@et" <e cannot afford to ta@e an! ris@, for the life and health of the citizenr! are as precious as the e)istence of the tate"? +<$. 8o &egional .rial %ourts have competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of sei>ure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the 5ureau of %ustoms and to en2oin or other1ise interfere 1ith these proceedingsC Held2 9n *ao v. %ourt of 'ppeals, this #ourt, reiterating its rulings ) ) ) said= There is no Fuestion that 'egional Trial #ourts are devoid of an! competence to pass upon the validit! or regularit! of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted b! the &ureau of #ustoms and to en6oin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings" The #ollector of #ustoms sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has e0clusive 2urisdiction to hear and determine all Fuestions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods" The 'egional Trial #ourts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus" 9t is li@ewise well(settled that the provisions of the Tariff and #ustoms #ode and that of 'epublic Act :o" ..25, as amended, otherwise @nown as >An Act #reating the #ourt of Ta) Appeals,? specif! the proper fora and procedure for the ventilation of an! legal ob6ections or issues raised concerning these proceedings" Thus, actions of the #ollector of #ustoms are appealable to the #ommissioner of #ustoms, whose decision, in turn, is sub6ect to the e)clusive appellate 6urisdiction of the #ourt of Ta) Appeals and from there to the #ourt of Appeals" The rule that 'egional Trial #ourts have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the polic! of placing no unnecessar! hindrance on the government;s drive, not onl! to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon #ustoms, but more importantl!, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and e)port duties due the tate, which enables the government to carr! out the functions it has been instituted to perform" -ven if the seizure b! the #ollector of #ustoms were illegal, ) ) ) we have said that such act does not deprive the &ureau of #ustoms of 6urisdiction thereon" (9ureau o1 Customs v. 3gario, !,9 SCR ,89, ,9*@,98, <arc0 !+, ,+++, , n2 /iv. ><en2o6a?# 116

+<,. 'ccused6appellant assails the validity of his arrest and his subsequent convictions for the t1o crimes. 5oth the trial court and the %ourt of 'ppeals found that the arrest and subsequent sei>ure 1ere legal. Held2 9n the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tuc@ed in appellant;s waist when he stood up" The gun was plainl! visible" :o search was conducted as none was necessar!" Accused(appellant could not show an! license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter" Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers" :o warrant of arrest was necessar! in such a situation, it being one of the recognized e)ceptions under the 'ules" As a conseFuence of appellant;s valid warrantless arrest, he ma! be lawfull! searched for dangerous weapons or an!thing which ma! be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant, as provided in 'ule .26, ection .2" This is a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest" The subseFuent discover! in his car of drug paraphernalia and the cr!stalline substance, which, was later identified as shabu, though in a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said to have been made during an illegal search" As such, the seized items do not fall within the e)clusionar! clause ) ) )" Eence, not being fruits of the poisonous tree ) ) ) the ob6ects found at the scene of the crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and the drug paraphernalia, can be used as evidence against appellant" &esides, it has been held that drugs discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in evidence" (%itations omitted.) (=eo%le v. (o, !74 SCR !!8, <ar. 14, ,++1, 1st /iv. >-nares@Santiago?# +<<. 8iscuss the nature of an Ain flagrante delicto3 1arrantless arrest. llustrative case.

Held2 9n the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its 6udgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accused(appellants, and the subseFuent search conducted b! the peace officers, are valid because accused(appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs" This brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized e)ceptions to the warrant reFuirement" 9n /eople v. %hua 4o San, the #ourt held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person ma!, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuall! committing, or is attempting to commit an offense" The arresting office, therefore, must have personal @nowledge of such fact or, as a recent case law adverts to, personal @nowledge of facts or circumstances convincingl! indicative or constitutive of probable cause" As discussed in /eople v. 8oria, probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion" The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probabl! guilt! of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported b! circumstances sufficientl! strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested" A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers ma@ing the arrest" As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that >reliable information? alone, absent an! overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would 6ustif! an in flagrante delicto arrest" Thus, in /eople v. 'minnudin, it was held that >the accused(appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had 6ust done so" <hat he was doing was descending the gangplan@ of the *KC <ilcon / and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest" To all appearances, he was li@e an! of the other passengers innocentl! disembar@ing from the vessel" 9t was onl! when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the mari6uana that he suddenl! became suspect and so sub6ect to apprehension"? $i@ewise, in /eople v. !engote, the #ourt did not consider >e!es ) ) ) darting from side to side ) ) ) NwhileO holding ) ) ) None;sO abdomen,? in a crowded street at ..=20 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause" According to the #ourt, >NbO! no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had 6ust been committed, or was actuall! being committed, or was at least being attempted in Nthe arresting officers;O presence"? o also, in /eople v. Dncinada, the #ourt ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic bab! chairs" Then, too, in !alacat v. %ourt of 'ppeals, the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to commit a crime as he was >;standing at the corner of +laza *iranda and 117

Ruezon &oulevard; with his e!es Umoving ver! fast; and Uloo@ing at ever! person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them";? 9n declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the #ourt said= Eere, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto V arrest preceding the search in light of the lac@ of personal @nowledge on the part of Gu, the arresting officer, or an overt ph!sical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had 6ust been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed" 9t went on to state that H econd, there was nothing in petitioner;s behavior or conduct which could have reasonabl! elicited even mere suspicion other than that his e!es were >moving ver! fast? H an observation which leaves us incredulous since Gu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was alread! 6=60 p"m", thus presumabl! dus@" +etitioner and his companions were merel! standing at the corner and were not creating an! commotion or trouble ) ) )" Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a deadl! weapon" :one was visible to Gu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was >discovered? >inside the front waistline? of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Gu and petitioner, an! telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Gu" #learl!, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two reFuisites must concur= (.) the person to be arrested must e)ecute an overt act indicating that he has 6ust committed, is actuall! committing, or is attempting to commit a crime8 and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer" 9n the case at bar, accused(appellants manifested no outward indication that would 6ustif! their arrest" 9n holding a bag on board a trisi7ad, accused(appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime" 9t matters not that accused(appellant *olina responded >&oss, if possible we will settle this? to the reFuest of +,. +amplona to open the bag" uch response which allegedl! reinforced the >suspicion? of the arresting officers that accused(appellants were committing a crime, is an eFuivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest" :ote that were it not for +,. *arino +aguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merel! pointed accused(appellants to the arresting officers), accused( appellants could not be sub6ect of an! suspicion, reasonable or otherwise" <hile +,. +aguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accused(appellant *ula, +,. +aguidopon, however, admitted that he onl! learned *ula;s name and address after the arrest" <hat is more, it is doubtful if +,. +aguidopon indeed recognized accused(appellant *ula" 9t is worth! to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see *ula in person onl! once, pinpointed to him b! his informer while the! were on the side of the road" These circumstances could not have afforded +,. +aguidopon a closer loo@ at accused(appellant *ula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorc!cle when +,. +aguidopon caught a glimpse of him" <ith respect to accused(appellant *olina, +,. +aguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest" This belies the claim of +,. +amplona that he @new the name of accused(appellants even before the arrest ) ) )" The aforesaid testimon! of +,. +amplona, therefore, is entirel! baseless" +,. +amplona could not have learned the name of accused(appellants from +,. +aguidopon because +aguidopon himself, who allegedl! conducted the surveillance, was not even aware of accused(appellants; name and address prior to the arrest" -videntl!, +,. +aguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the arresting officers themselves, could not have been certain of accused(appellants; identit!, and were, from all indications, merel! fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest" #ompared to /eople v. Dncinada, the arresting officer in the said case @new appellant -ncinada even before the arrest because of the latter;s illegal gambling activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of validit! on the arrest effected b! the peace officers" :evertheless, the #ourt declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and the conseFuent search were illegal, holding that >NtOhe prosecution;s evidence did not show an! suspicious behavior when the appellant disembar@ed from the ship or while he rode the 118

motorela. :o act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances"? (/eople v. Dncinada, supra.) *oreover, it could not be said that accused(appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure" 9mplied acFuiescence to the search, if there was an!, could not have been more than mere passive conformit! given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. <ithal, the #ourt holds that the arrest of accused(appellants does not fall under the e)ceptions allowed b! the rules" Eence, the search conducted on their person was li@ewise illegal" #onseFuentl!, the mari6uana seized b! the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused(appellants, and the #ourt is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused(appellants" (=eo%le v. <olina, !7, SCR 1"4, &eb. 19, ,++1, En 9anc >-nares@Santiago?# T,e R$%,) )" P!$1('. " C"##u&$'()$"&+ (&d C"!!e+-"&de&'e +<-. Bhat is the 'nti6Bire .apping 'ct (&.'. #")))C ection .

A&+/2 '"A" 5200 is a special law prohibiting and penalizing wire(tapping" thereof provides=

Se'/ 3/ 9t shall be unlawful for an! person, not being authorized b! all the parties to an! private communication or spo@en word, to tap an! wire or cable, or b! using an! other device or arrangement, to secretl! overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spo@en word b! using a device commonl! @nown as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or wal@ie(tal@ie or tape(recorder, or however otherwise described= 9t shall also be unlawful for an! person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the ne)t preceding sentence, to @nowingl! possess an! tape record, wire record, disc record, or an! other such record, or copies thereof, of an! communication or spo@en word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited b! this law8 or to repla! the same for an! other person or persons8 or to communicate the contents thereof, either verball! or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to an! other person= /rovided, That the use of such record or an! copies thereof as evidence in an! civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 2 hereof, shall not be covered b! this prohibition" ection 5 thereof also provides= Se'/ 4/ An! communication or spo@en word, or the e)istence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or an! part thereof, or an! information therein contained obtained or secured b! an! person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in an! 6udicial, Fuasi(6udicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation" +-). /rivate respondent &afael S. Hrtane> filed 1ith the &egional .rial %ourt of Sue>on %ity a complaint for annulment of marriage 1ith damages against his 1ife, herein petitioner, .eresita Salcedo6Hrtane>, on grounds of lac7 of marriage license andLor psychological incapacity of the petitioner. 'mong the e0hibits offered by private respondent 1ere three (;) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations bet1een petitioner and unidentified persons. .he trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner 1ith unidentified persons. .hese tape recordings 1ere made and obtained 1hen private respondent allo1ed his friends from the military to 1ire tap his home telephone. 8id the trial court act properly 1hen it admitted in evidence said tape recordingsC Held2 'epublic Act :o" 5200 entitled >An Act to +rohibit and +enalize <ire Tapping and ,ther 'elated Ciolations of the +rivac! of #ommunication, and Dor ,ther +urposes? e)pressl! ma@es such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence" ) ) )" #learl!, respondent trial court and #ourt of Appeals failed to consider the afore( Fuoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in Fuestion" Absent 119

a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibilit! of the sub6ect tapes is mandator! under 'ep" Act :o" 5200" Additionall!, it should be mentioned that the above(mentioned 'epublic Act in ection 2 thereof imposes a penalt! of imprisonment of not less than si) (6) months and up to si) (6) !ears for violation of said Act" (Salce2o@3rtane6 v. Court o1 %%eals, ,!7 SCR 111, ug. 4, 1994 >=a2illa?# +-+. .1o local media men in 9ucena %ity 1ent to the police station to report alleged indecent sho1 in one night establishment in the %ity. 't the station, there 1as a heated argument bet1een police officer =avarro and 9ingan, one of the t1o media men, 1hich led to fisticuffs. 9ingan fell and his head hit the pavement 1hich caused his death. 8uring the trial, *albuena, the other media man, testified. /resented in evidence to confirm his testimony 1as a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at the police station bet1een accused police officer =avarro and the deceased, 9ingan, 1hich 1as ta7en 1ithout the 7no1ledge of the t1o. s the voice recording admissible in evidence in vie1 of &.'. #")), 1hich prohibits 1ire6tappingC Held2 N3Oalbuena;s testimon! is confirmed b! the voice recording he had made" 9t ma! be as@ed whether the tape is admissible in view of '"A" :o" 5200, which prohibits wire tapping" The answer is in the affirmative" ) ) )" NTOhe law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications (&amire> v. %ourt of 'ppeals, "#< S%&' (-) [+--(]). ince the e)change between petitioner :avarro and $ingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited" (&eli%e )avarro v. Court o1 %%eals, (.R. )o. 1,1+8", ug. ,*, 1999, , n2 /iv. ><en2o6a?# T,e R$%,) )" P!$1('. +-". s there a constitutional right to privacyC

Held2 The essence of privac! is the >right to be let alone"? 9n the ./65 case of Fris1old v. %onnecticut (;<+ ?.S. #,-, +# 9. ed. "8 (+) [+-$(]), the 7nited tates upreme #ourt gave more substance to the right of privac! when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation" 9t held that there is a right of privac! which can be found within the penumbras of the Dirst, Third, Dourth, Difth and :inth Amendments ) ) )" 9n the ./60 case of !orfe v. !utuc ("" S%&' #"#, ###6##(), we adopted the Fris1old ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy 0 0 0. ndeed, if 1e e0tend our 2udicial ga>e 1e 1ill find that the right of privacy is recogni>ed and enshrined in several provisions of our %onstitution. (!orfe v. !utuc, "" S%&' #"#, ### [+-$<]I %ortes, .he %onstitutional Foundations of /rivacy, p. +< [+-,)]). 9t is e)pressl! recognized in ection 2(.) of the &ill of 'ights ) ) )" ,ther facets of the right to privac! are protected in various provisions of the 5ill of &ights (viz= ecs" ., 2, 6, 0, and .1" (3%le v. Dorres, (.R. )o. 1,"*87, 5uly ,!, 1998 >=uno?# +-;. Bhat are the >ones of privacy recogni>ed and protected in our la1sC

Held2 The %ivil %ode provides that >NeOver! person shall respect the dignit!, personalit!, privac! and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons? and punishes as actionable torts several acts b! a person of meddling and pr!ing into the privac! of another" 9t also holds a public officer or emplo!ee or an! private individual liable for damages for an! violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privac! of letters and other private communications" The &evised /enal %ode ma@es a crime the violation of secrets b! an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling" 9nvasion of privac! is an offense in special la1s li@e the Anti(<iretapping $aw ('"A" 5200), the ecrec! of &an@ 4eposits ('"A" .505) and the 9ntellectual +ropert! #ode ('"A" 02/2)" The &ules of %ourt on privileged communication li@ewise recognize the privac! of certain information ( ection 25, 'ule .20NcO, 'evised 'ules on -vidence) . (3%le v. Dorres, (.R. )o. 1,"*87, 5uly ,!, 1998 >=uno?# +-#. 8iscuss 1hy 'dministrative Hrder =o. ;)< (issued by the /resident prescribing for a =ational 8 system for all citi>ens to facilitate business transactions 1ith government agencies engaged in the delivery of basic services and social security provisions) should be declared unconstitutional.

120

Held2 <e prescind from the premise that the right to privac! is a fundamental right guaranteed b! the #onstitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A"," :o" 200 is 6ustified b! some compelling state interest and that it is narrowl! drawn" A"," :o" 200 is predicated on two considerations= (.) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facilit! to convenientl! transact business with basic service and social securit! providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totall! eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations b! persons see@ing basic services" 9t is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A"," :o" 200" 5ut 1hat is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of '.H. =o. ;)< 1hich if implemented 1ill put our people@s right to privacy in clear and present danger. The heart of '.H. =o. ;)< lies in its ection 5 which provides for a +opulation 'eference :umber (+':) as a >common reference number to establish a lin@age among concerned agencies? through the use of >&iometrics Technolog!? and >computer application designs"? t is note1orthy that '.H. =o. ;)< does not state 1hat specific biological characteristics and 1hat particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people 1ho 1ill see7 its coverage. %onsidering the banquet of options available to the implementors of '.H. =o. ;)<, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless. '.H. =o. ;)< should also raise our antennas for a further loo7 1ill sho1 that it does not state 1hether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. 0 0 0. %learly, the indefiniteness of '.H. =o. ;)< can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his /&=. .he potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under '.H. =o. ;)< cannot be underplayed 0 0 0. .he more frequent the use of the /&=, the better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic lin7age of the files. .he data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposesI but the e0istence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. 9t is plain and we hold that A"," :o" 200 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will onl! be processed for uneFuivocall! specified purposes" The lac@ of proper safeguards in this regard of A"," :o" 200 ma! interfere with the individual;s libert! of abode and travel b! enabling authorities to trac@ down his movement8 it ma! also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self(incrimination8 it ma! pave the wa! for >fishing e)peditions? b! government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures" .he possibilities of abuse and misuse of the /&=, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated 1hen 1e consider that the individual lac7s control over 1hat can be read or placed on his 8, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. .hey threaten the very abuses that the 5ill of &ights see7s to prevent. The abilit! of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle6to6 grave dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national networ@ is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution" The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for varied purposes" ) ) )" 'etrieval of stored data is simple" <hen information of a privileged character finds its wa! into the computer, it can be e)tracted together with other data on the sub6ect" ,nce e)tracted, the information is putt! in the hands of an! person" The end of privac! begins" NTOhe #ourt will not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people;s libert! if it would not immediatel! smother the spar@s that endanger their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them" [']nd 1e no1 hold that 1hen the integrity of a fundamental right is at sta7e, this %ourt 1ill give the challenged la1, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. t 1ill not do for the authorities to invo7e the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. =or is it enough for the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even 1hen the government does not act irrationally. .hey must satisfactorily sho1 the presence of compelling state interest and that the la1, rule, or regulation is narro1ly dra1n to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded b! the ./01 #onstitution whose entire matri) is designed to protect human rights 121

and to prevent authoritarianism" 9n case of doubt, the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected b! the #onstitution" .he right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources H governments, 6ournalists, emplo!ers, social scientists, etc" 9n the case at bar, the threat comes from the e)ecutive branch of government which b! issuing A"," :o" 200 pressures the people to surrender their privac! b! giving information about themselves on the prete)t that it will facilitate deliver! of basic services" Fiven the record67eeping po1er of the computer, only the indifferent 1ill fail to perceive the danger that '.H. =o. ;)< gives the government the po1er to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citi>ens. ) ) ) N<Oe close with the statement that the right to privac! was not engraved in our #onstitution for flatter!" (3%le v. Dorres, (.R. )o. 1,"*87, 5uly ,!, 1998 >=uno?# +-(. Should in camera inspection of ban7 accounts be allo1edC under 1hat circumstances should it be allo1edC f in the affirmative,

Held2 The issue is whether petitioner ma! be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the documents reFuested b! the ,mbudsman" And whether the order of the ,mbudsman to have an in camera inspection of the Fuestioned account is allowed as an e)ception to the law on secrec! of ban@ deposits ('"A" :o" .505)" An e)amination of the secrec! of ban@ deposits law ('"A" :o" .505) would reveal the following e)ceptions= .) 2) 2) 5) 5) <here the depositor consents in writing8 9mpeachment cases8 &! court order in briber! or dereliction of dut! cases against public officials8 4eposit is sub6ect of litigation8 ec" 0, '"A" :o" 20./, in cases of une)plained wealth as held in the case of /=5 v. Fancayco (+"" /hil. ();, ()< [+-$(]).

The order of the ,mbudsman to produce for in camera inspection the sub6ect accounts with the 7nion &an@ of the +hilippines, 3ulia Cargas &ranch, is based on a pending investigation at the ,ffice of the ,mbudsman against Amado $agdameo, et. al. for violation of '"A" :o" 20./, ec" 2 (e) and (g) relative to the 3oint Centure Agreement between the +ublic -states Authorit! and A*A'9" <e rule that before an in camera inspection ma! be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent 6urisdiction" Durther, the account must be clearl! identified, the inspection limited to the sub6ect matter of the pending case before the court of competent 6urisdiction" The ban@ personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection ma! cover onl! the account identified in the pending case" 9n ?nion 5an7 of the /hilippines v. %ourt of 'ppeals , we held that > ection 2 of the $aw on ecrec! of &an@ 4eposits, as amended, declares ban@ deposits to be Uabsolutel! confidential; e)cept= .) 9n an e)amination made in the course of a special or general e)amination of a ban@ that is specificall! authorized b! the *onetar! &oard after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a ban@ fraud or serious irregularit! has been or is being committed and that it is necessar! to loo@ into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularit!, 2) 9n an e)amination made b! an independent auditor hired b! the ban@ to conduct its regular audit provided that the e)amination is for audit purposes onl! and the results thereof shall be for the e)clusive use of the ban@, 2) 7pon written permission of the depositor, 5) 9n cases of impeachment, 5) 7pon order of a competent court in cases of briber! or dereliction of dut! of public officials, or 6) 9n cases where the mone! deposited or invested is the sub6ect matter of the litigation?" 9n the case at bar, there is !et no pending litigation before an! court of competent authorit!" <hat is e)isting is an investigation b! the ,ffice of the ,mbudsman" 9n short, what the ,ffice of the ,mbudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formall! charge Amado $agdameo, et. al., with the andiganba!an" #learl!, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the ban@ account for inspection" 122

(Lour2es D. <ar$ue6 v. 'on. En 9anc >=ar2o?#

niano

. /esierto, (.R. )o. 1!788,, 5une ,", ,++1,

F!eed"# " E<-!e++$"& +-$. 8istinguish Acontent6based restrictions3 on free speech from Acontent6neutral restrictions,3 and give e0ample of each. Held2 %ontent6based restrictions are imposed because of the content of the speech and are, therefore, sub6ect to the clear(and(present danger test" Dor e)ample, a rule such as that involved in Sanidad v. %omelec, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutin!" These restrictions are censorial and therefore the! bear a heav! presumption of constitutional invalidit!" 9n addition, the! will be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness" %ontent6neutral restrictions, on the other hand, li@e ec" ..(b) of '"A" :o" 6656, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time to political candidates during the campaign period, are not concerned with the content of the speech" These regulations need onl! a substantial governmental interest to support them" A deferential standard of review will suffice to test their validit!" The clear(and(present danger rule is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validit! of laws, li@e ec" ..(b) of '"A" :o" 6656, which are not concerned with the content of political ads but onl! with their incidents" To appl! the clear(and(present danger test to such regulator! measures would be li@e using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed" The test for this difference in the level of 6ustification for the restriction of speech is that content(based restrictions distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usuall! imposed because of fear of how people will react to a particular speech" :o such reasons underlie content(neutral regulations, li@e regulation of time, place and manner of holding public assemblies under &"+" &lg" 000, the +ublic Assembl! Act of ./05" (3smena v. C3<ELEC, ,88 SCR 44", <arc0 !1, 1998 ><en2o6a?# +-,. Bhat is the most influential test for distinguishing content6based from content6 neutral regulationsC Held2 The 7nited tates upreme #ourt ) ) ) held in ?nited States v. H@ 5rienO NAO a governmental regulation is sufficientl! 6ustified (.) if it is within the constitutional power of the government8 (2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest8 (2) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free e)pression8 and (5) if the incidental restriction on alleged Dirst Amendment freedoms (of speech, e)pression and press) is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that intesrst (;-+ ?.S. ;$,, ") 9. Dd. "df $-", $<) [+-$<] [brac7eted numbers added]) This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content(based from content( neutral regulations and is said to have >become canonical in the review of such laws"? (F. Funther R K. Sullivan, %onstitutional 9a1 +"+, [+;th ed. +--,]). 9t is noteworth! that the H@ 5rien test has been applied b! this #ourt in at least two cases ('diong v. %omelec, "), S%&' ,+" [+--"]I Hsmena v. %omelec, supra.). 7nder this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is >not unrelated to the suppression of free e)pression"? *oreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of e)pression is greater than is necessar! to achieve the governmental purpose in Fuestion" (Social :eat0er Stations, .nc. v. Comelec, (.R. )o. 14"7"1, <ay 7, ,++1, En 9anc ><en2o6a?# +-<. 8oes the conduct of e0it poll by '5S %5= present a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process as it has the tendency to so1 confusion considering the randomness of selecting intervie1ees, 1hich further ma7es the e0it poll highly unreliable, to 2ustify the promulgation of a %omelec resolution prohibiting the sameC Held2 uch arguments are purel! speculative and clearl! untenable" First, b! the ver! nature of a surve!, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the 123

results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the communit! or group polled" Second, the surve! result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official #omelec count" 9t consists merel! of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probabl! voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals" Finally, not at sta@e are the credibilit! and the integrit! of the elections, which are e)ercises that are separate and independent from the e)it polls" The holding and the reporting of the results of e)it polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is onl! part of the latter" 9f at all, the outcome of one can onl! be indicative of the other" The #,*-$-#;s concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of e)it polls H disorder and confusion in the voting centers H does not 6ustif! a total ban on them" 7ndoubtedl!, the assailed #omelec 'esolution is too broad, since its application is without Fualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not" There is no showing, however, that e)it polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers" :either has an! evidence been presented proving that the presence of e)it poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters" *oreover, the prohibition incidentall! prevents the collection of e)it poll data and their use for an! purpose" The valuable information and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters; answers to the surve! Fuestions will forever remain un@nown and une)plored" 7nless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of election(da! and other factors on voters; choices" The absolute ban imposed b! the #omelec cannot, therefore, be 6ustified" 9t does not leave open an! alternative channel of communication to gather the t!pe of information obtained through e)it polling" ,n the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable wa!s and means to achieve the #omelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that ma! be brought about b! e)it surve!s" <ith foregoing premises, it is concluded that the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed b! the drastic abridgment of the constitutionall! guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate" Ruite the contrar!, instead of disrupting elections, e)it polls H properl! conducted and publicized H can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderl!, peaceful and credible elections8 and for the elimination of election(fi)ing, fraud and other electoral ills" ( 9S@C9) 9roa2casting Cor%oration v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 1!!48*, 5an. ,8, ,+++, En 9anc >=anganiban?# +--. Section (.# of &.'. =o. -))$ (Fair Dlection 'ct) 1hich providesO ASurveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (+() days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (,) days before an election.3 .he Social Beather Stations, nc. (SBS), a private non6stoc7, non6profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fieldsI and Kamahalan /ublishing %orporation, publisher of the !anila Standard, a ne1spaper of general circulation, 1hich features ne1s1orthy items of information including election surveys, challenged the constitutionality of aforesaid provision as it constitutes a prior restraint on the e0ercise of freedom of speech 1ithout any clear and present danger to 2ustify such restraint. Should the challenge be sustainedC Held2 Dor reason hereunder given, we hold that ection 5"5 of '"A" :o" /006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, e)pression, and the press" To be sure, ection 5"5 la!s a prior restraint on freedom of speech, e)pression, and the press b! prohibiting the publication of election surve! results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (.5) da!s immediatel! preceding a national election and seven (1) da!s before a local election" &ecause of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, e)pression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated b! a weight! presumption of invalidit!. 9ndeed, >an! s!stem of prior restraints of e)pression comes to this #ourt bearing a heav! presumption against its constitutional validit! ) ) )" The Aovernment Uthus carries a heav! burden of showing 6ustification for the enforcement of such restraint";? There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validit! that inheres in ever! legislation" :or ma! it be argued that because of Art" 9B(#, ec" 5 of the #onstitution, which gives the #omelec supervisor! power to regulate the en6o!ment or utilization of franchise for the operation of media of communication, no presumption of invalidit! attaches to a measure li@e ec" 5"5" Dor as we have pointed out in sustaining the ban on media political advertisements, the grant of power to the #omelec under Art" 9B(#, ec" 5 is limited to 124

ensuring >eFual opportunit!, time, space, and the right to repl!? as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities for >public information campaigns and forums among candidates"? B)) :or can the ban on election surve!s be 6ustified on the ground that there are other countries ) ) ) which similarl! impose restrictions on the publication of election surve!s" At best this surve! is inconclusive" 9t is noteworth! that in the 7nited tates no restriction on the publication of election surve! results e)ists" 9t cannot be argued that this is because the 7nited tates is a mature democrac!" :either are there laws imposing an embargo on surve! results, even for a limited period, in other countries" ) ) )" <hat test should then be emplo!ed to determine the constitutional validit! of ection 5"5Q The 7nited tates upreme #ourt ) ) ) held in ?nited States v. H@ 5rienO NAO government regulation is sufficientl! 6ustified (.) if it is within the constitutional power of the government8 (2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest8 (2) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free e)pression8 and (5) if the incidental restriction on alleged Dirst Amendment freedoms (of speech, e)pression and press) is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest (;-+ ?.S. ;$,, ") 9. Dd. "d $-", $<) [+-$<] [brac7eted numbers added]). This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content(based from content( neutral regulations and is said to have >become canonical in the review of such laws"? 9t is noteworth! that the H@ 5rien test has been applied b! this #ourt in at least two cases ('diong v. %omelecI Hsmena v. %omelec). 7nder this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is >not unrelated to the suppression of free e)pression"? *oreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of e)pression is greater than is necessar! to achieve the governmental purpose in Fuestion" ,ur inFuir! should accordingl! focus on these two considerations as applied to 5"5" First. ec" 5"5 fails to meet criterion (2) of the H@ 5rien test because the causal connection of e)pression to the asserted governmental interest ma@es such interest >not unrelated to the suppression of free e)pression"? &! prohibiting the publication of election surve! results because of the possibilit! that such publication might undermine the integrit! of the election, ec" 5"5 actuall! suppresses a whole class of e)pression, while allowing the e)pression of opinion concerning the same sub6ect matter b! newspaper columnists, radio and TC commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion ma@ers" 9n effect, ec" 5"5 shows a bias for a particular sub6ect matter, if not viewpoint, b! preferring personal opinion to statistical results" The constitutional guarantee of freedom of e)pression means that >the government has no power to restrict e)pression because of its message, its ideas, its sub6ect matter, or its contents"? The inhibition of speech should be upheld onl! if the e)pression falls within one of the few unprotected categories dealt with in %haplins7y v. =e1 4ampshire, thus= There are certain well(defined and narrowl! limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise an! #onstitutional problem" These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or Ufighting; words H those which b! their ver! utterance inflict in6ur! or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" N Ouch utterances are no essential part of an! e)position of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that an! benefit that ma! be derived from them is clearl! outweighed b! the social interest in order and moralit!" :or is there 6ustification for the prior restraint which speech" 9n =ear v. !innesota, it was held= ec" 5"5 la!s on protected ec"

NTOhe protection even as to previous restraint is not absolutel! unlimited" &ut the limitation has been recognized onl! in e)ceptional cases ) ) )" :o one would Fuestion but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and 125

location of troops" ,n similar grounds, the primar! reFuirements of decenc! ma! be enforced against obscene publications" The securit! of the communit! life ma! be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow b! force of orderl! government ) ) )" Thus, ) ) ) the prohibition imposed b! ec" 5"5 cannot be 6ustified on the ground that it is onl! for a limited period and is onl! incidental" The prohibition ma! be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of e)pression is direct, absolute, and substantial" 9t constitutes a total suppression of a categor! of speech and is not made less so because it is onl! for a period of fifteen (.5) da!s immediatel! before a national election and seven (1) da!s immediatel! before a local election" This sufficientl! distinguishes ec" 5"5 from '"A" :o" 6656, ec" ..(b), which this #ourt found to be valid in =ational /ress %lub v. %omelec, and Hsmena v. %omelec" Dor the ban imposed b! '"A" :o" 6656, ec" ..(b) is not onl! authorized b! a specific constitutional provision ('rt. K6%, Sec. #), but it also provided an alternative so that, as this #ourt pointed out in Hsmena, there was actuall! no ban but onl! a substitution of media advertisements b! the #omelec space, and #omelec hour" Second. -ven if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free e)pression is onl! incidental, ec" 5"5 nonetheless fails to meet criterion (5) of the H@ 5rien test, namel!, that the restriction be not greater than is necessar! to further the governmental interest" As alread! stated, ec" 5"5" aims at the prevention of last(minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, >6un@ing? of wea@ or >losing? candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called >dagdag(bawas"? +raiseworth! as these aims of the regulation might be, the! cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of e)pression, when such aim can be more narrowl! pursued b! punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils" Thus, under the Administrative #ode of ./01 (57. :, .it. , Subtit. %, %h +, Sec. ;[+]), the #omelec is given the power= To stop an! illegal activit!, or confiscate, tear down, and stop an! unla1ful, libelous, misleading or false election propaganda, after due notice and hearing" This is surel! a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in ec" 5"5" +ursuant to this power of the #omelec, it can confiscate bogus surve! results calculated to mislead voters" #andidates can have their own surve!s conducted" :o right of repl! can be invo@ed b! others" :o principle of eFualit! is involved" 9t is a free mar@et to which each candidate brings his ideas" As for the purpose of the law to prevent bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the Aovernment can deal with this natural(enough tendenc! of some voters" ome voters want to be identified with the >winners"? ome are susceptible to the herd mentalit!" #an these be legitimatel! prohibited b! suppressing the publication of surve! results which are a form of e)pressionQ 9t has been held that >NmereO legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience ma! well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to 6ustif! such as diminishes the e)ercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions"? To summarize then, we hold that ec" 5"5" is invalid because (.) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of e)pression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a categor! of e)pression even though such suppression is onl! for a limited period, and (2) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved b! means other than the suppression of freedom of e)pression" (Social :eat0er Stations, .nc., v. C3<ELEC, (.R. )o. 14"7"1, <ay 7, ,++1, En 9anc ><en2o6a?# ")). .he question for determination in this case is the liability for libel of a citi>en 1ho denounces a barangay official for misconduct in office. .he &egional .rial %ourt of !anila 0 0 0 found petitioner guilty 0 0 0 on the ground that petitioner failed to prove the truth of the charges and that he 1as Amotivated by vengeance in uttering the defamatory statement.3 Held2 The decision appealed from should be reversed" 9n denouncing the baranga! chairman in this case, petitioner and the other residents of the Tondo Doreshore Area were not onl! acting in their self(interest but engaging in the performance of a civic dut! to see to it that public dut! is discharged faithfull! and well b! those on whom such dut! is incumbent" The recognition of this right and dut! of ever! citizen in a democrac! is inconsistent with an! reFuirement placing on him the burden of proving that he acted with good motives and for 6ustifiable ends" 126

Dor that matter, even if the defamator! statement is false, no liabilit! can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice H that is, with @nowledge that it was false or with rec@less disregard of whether it was false or not" This is the gist of the ruling in the landmar@ case of =e1 Eor7 .imes v. Sullivan, which this #ourt has cited with approval in several of its own decisions" This is the rule of >actual malice"? 9n this case, the prosecution failed to prove not onl! that the charges made b! petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with @nowledge of their falsit! or with rec@less disregard of whether the! were false or not" A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct andKor good motives and 6ustifiable ends for ma@ing such allegations would not onl! be contrar! to Art" 26. of the 'evised +enal #ode" 9t would, above all, infringe on the constitutionall! guaranteed freedom of e)pression" uch a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of a self(governing communit!" <ithout free speech and assembl!, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled" As 3ustice &randies has said, >public discussion is a political dut!? and the >greatest menace to freedom is an inert people"? (Bhitney v. %alifornia) (Vas$ue6 v. Court o1 %%eals, !14 SCR 4*+, Se%t. 17, 1999, En 9anc ><en2o6a?# ")+. 8iscuss the Jdoctrine of fair commentJ as a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. Held2 Dair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander" The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general ever! discreditable imputation publicl! made is deemed false, because ever! man is presumed innocent until his guilt is 6udiciall! proved, and ever! false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacit!, it is not necessaril! actionable" 9n order that such discreditable imputation to a public official ma! be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition" 9f the comment is an e)pression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mista@en, as long as it might reasonabl! be inferred from the facts" (9orFal v. C , !+1 SCR 1, 5an. 14, 1999, ,n2 /iv. >9ellosillo?# ")". Bhat is the Araison d@etre3 for the =e1 Eor7 .imes v. Sullivan (;,$ ?S "(#) holding that honest criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are insulated from libel 2udgmentsC Held2 The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering damages for a defamator! falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, i.e., with @nowledge that it was false or with rec@less disregard of whether it was false or not" The raison d@etre for the =e1 Eor7 .imes doctrine was that to reFuire critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel 6udgments would lead to self(censorship, since would(be critics would be deterred from voicing out their criticisms even if such were believed to be true, or were in fact true, because of doubt whether it could be proved or because of fear of the e)pense of having to prove it . (9orFal v. C , !+1 SCR 1, 5an. 14, 1999, ,n2 /iv. >9ellosillo?# ");. %olumnist 'rt 5or2al of .he /hilippine Star 1rote in his column that petitioner (private respondent), the D0ecutive 8irector and Spo7esman of the F=%9. (First =ational %onference on 9and .ransportation), a 2oint pro2ect of the government and the private sector to raise funds to improve the state of land transportation in the country, engaged in shady and anomalous deals. 4e 1as sued for damages arising from libel by petitioner (private respondent) and subsequently found liable by the trial court and made to pay damages. Hn appeal, the S% reversed applying the doctrine of fair comment. Held2 N<Oe deem private respondent a public figure within the purview of the =e1 Eor7 .imes ruling" B ) ) The D:#$T (Dirst :ational #onference on $and Transportation) was an underta@ing infused with public interest" 9t was promoted as a 6oint pro6ect of the government and the private sector, and organized b! top government officials and prominent businessmen" Dor this reason, it attracted media mileage and drew public attention not onl! to the conference itself but to the personalities behind as well" As its -)ecutive 4irector and spo@esman, private respondent conseFuentl! assumed the status of a public figure" 127

&ut even assuming e06gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position he occupied in the D:#$T, would not Fualif! as a public figure, it does not necessaril! follow that he could not validl! be the sub6ect of a public comment even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue" 9f a matter is a sub6ect of public or general interest, it cannot suddenl! become less so merel! because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntaril! choose to become involved" The public;s primar! interest is in the event8 the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant;s prior anon!mit! or notoriet! . (9orFal v. C , !+1 SCR 1, 5an. 14, 1999, ,n2 /iv. >9ellosillo?# ")#. Bho is a Apublic figure,3 and therefore sub2ect to public commentC

Held2 At an! rate, we have also defined >public figure? in 'yers /roduction /ty., 9td. v. %apulong as H B ) ) a person who, b! his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or b! adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his character, has become a Upublic personage"; Ee is, in other words, a celebrit!" ,bviousl!, to be included in this categor! are those who have achieved some degree of reputation b! appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball pla!er, a pugilist, or an! other entertainer" The list is, however, broader than this" 9t includes public officers, famous inventors and e)plorers, war heroes and even ordinar! soldiers, infant prodig!, and no less a personage than the Areat -)alted 'uler of the lodge" 9t includes, in short, an!one who has arrived at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a person" (9orFal v. C , !+1 SCR 1, 5an. 14, 1999, ,n2 /iv. >9ellosillo?# ")(. Bhat are the types of privileged communicationsC

Held2 A privileged communication ma! be either absolutel! privileged or Fualifiedl! privileged" Absolutel! privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author acted in bad faith" An e)ample is found in ec" .., Art" C9, of the ./01 #onstitution which e)empts a member of #ongress from liabilit! for an! speech or debate in the #ongress or in an! #ommittee thereof" 7pon the other hand, Fualifiedl! privileged communications containing defamator! imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or 6ustifiable motive" To this genre belong >private communications? and >fair and true report without an! comments or remar@s"? (9orFal v. C , !+1 SCR 1, 5an. 14, 1999, ,n2 /iv. >9ellosillo?# ")$. s the enumeration of qualifiedly privileged communications under 'rticle ;(# of the &evised /enal %ode e0clusiveC Held2 9ndisputabl!, petitioner &or6al;s Fuestioned writings are not within the e)ceptions of Art" 255 of .he &evised /enal %ode for ) ) ) the! are neither private communications nor fair and true report 1ithout any comments or remar7s " Eowever, this does not necessaril! mean that the! are not privileged" To be sure, the enumeration under Art" 255 is not an e)clusive list of Fualifiedl! privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are li@ewise privileged" (9orFal v. C , !+1 SCR 1, 5an. 14, 1999, ,n2 /iv. >9ellosillo?# "),. 8iscuss the origin of the rule on privileged communication. 8id it originate in the nation@s penal la1s, or in the 5ill of &ights guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the pressC Held2 The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation;s penal code but in the &ill of 'ights of the #onstitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press" As earl! as ./.0, in ?nited States v. %anete (;< /hil. "(;, "$( [+-+<]) , this #ourt ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public polic! are protected b! the constitutional guarant! of freedom of speech" This constitutional right cannot be abolished b! the mere failure of the legislature to give it e)press recognition in the statute punishing libel" (9orFal v. C , !+1 SCR 1, 5an. 14, 1999, ,n2 /iv. >9ellosillo?# ")<. .he Hffice of the !ayor of 9as /inas refused to issue permit to petitioners to hold rally a rally in front of the *ustice 4all of 9as /inas on the ground that it 1as prohibited under Supreme %ourt Dn 5anc &esolution dated *uly ,,+--< in '.!. =o. -<6,6)"6S%, entitled, J&eO Fuidelines on the %onduct of 8emonstrations, /ic7ets, &allies and Hther Similar Fatherings in the :icinity of the Supreme %ourt and 'll Hther %ourts.J /etitioners thus initiated the instant proceedings. .hey submit that the Supreme %ourt gravely 128

abused its discretion andLor acted 1ithout or in e0cess of 2urisdiction in promulgating those guidelines. Held2 <e shall first dwell on the critical argument made b! petitioners that the rules constitute an abridgment of the peoplePs aggregate rights of free speech, free e)pression, peaceful assembl! and petitioning government for redress of grievances citing ec" 5, Article 999 of the ./01 #onstitution that >no law shall be passed abridging? them" 9t is true that the safeguarding of the peoplePs freedom of e)pression to the end that individuals ma! spea@ as the! thin@ on matters vital to them and that falsehoods ma! be e)posed through the processes of education and discussion, is essential to free government . &ut freedom of speech and e)pression despite its indispensabilit! has its limitations" 9t has never been understood as the absolute right to spea@ whenever, however, and wherever one pleases, for the manner, place, and time of public discussion can be constitutionall! controlled. NTOhe better polic! is not libert! untamed but libert! regulated b! law where ever! freedom is e)ercised in accordance with law and with due regard for the rights of others. #onventional wisdom tells us that the realities of life in a comple) societ! preclude an absolutist interpretation of freedom of e)pression where it does not involve pure speech but speech plus ph!sical actions li@e pic@eting" There are other significant societal values that must be accommodated and when the! clash, the! must all be weighed with the promotion of the general welfare of the people as the ultimate ob6ective" 9n balancing these values, this #ourt has accorded freedom of e)pression a preferred position in light of its more comparative importance" Eence, our rulings now must! in !ears hold that onl! the narrowest time, place and manner regulations that are specificall! tailored to serve an important governmental interest ma! 6ustif! the application of the balancing of interests test in derogation of the peoplePs right of free speech and e)pression . <here said regulations do not aim particularl! at the evils within the allowable areas of state control but, on the contrar!, sweep within their ambit other activities as to operate as an overhanging threat to free discussion, or where upon their face the! are so vague, indefinite, or ine)act as to permit punishment of the fair use of the right of free speech, such regulations are void" +rescinding from this premise, the #ourt reiterates that 6udicial independence and the fair and orderl! administration of 6ustice constitute paramount governmental interests that can 6ustif! the regulation of the publicPs right of free speech and peaceful assembl! in the vicinit! of courthouses" 9n the case of n &eO Dmil /. *urado, the #ourt pronounced in no uncertain terms that= >) ) ) freedom of e)pression needs on occasion to be ad6usted to and accommodated with the reFuirements of eFuall! important public interests" ,ne of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrit! and orderl! functioning of the administration of 6ustice" There is no antinom! between free e)pression and the integrit! of the s!stem of administering 6ustice" Dor the protection and maintenance of freedom of e)pression itself can be secured onl! within the conte)t of a functioning and orderl! s!stem of dispensing 6ustice, within the conte)t, in other words, of viable independent institutions for deliver! of 6ustice which are accepted b! the general communit!" ) ) )? ( n &eO Dmil /. *urado, "#; S%&' "--, ;";6;"# [+--(]) 9t is sadl! observed that 6udicial independence and the orderl! administration of 6ustice have been threatened not onl! b! contemptuous acts inside, but also b! irascible demonstrations outside, the courthouses" The! wittingl! or unwittingl!, spoil the ideal of sober, non(partisan proceedings before a cold and neutral 6udge" -ven in the 7nited tates, a prohibition against pic@eting and demonstrating in or near courthouses, has been ruled as valid and constitutional notwithstanding its limiting effect on the e)ercise b! the public of their liberties" B ) ) The administration of 6ustice must not onl! be fair but must also appear to be fair and it is the dut! of this #ourt to eliminate ever!thing that will diminish if not destro! this 6udicial desideratum" To be sure, there will be grievances against our 6ustice s!stem for there can be no perfect s!stem of 6ustice but these grievances must be ventilated through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings" uch a mode is in @eeping with the respect due to the courts as vessels of 6ustice and is necessar! if 6udges are to dispose their business in a fair fashion" 9t is the traditional conviction of ever! civilized societ! that courts must be insulated from ever! e)traneous influence in their decisions . The facts of a case should be determined upon evidence produced in court, and should be uninfluenced b! bias, pre6udice or s!mpathies" (.n ReM =etition to nnul En 9anc Resolution .<. 98@"@+,@SC @ 129

Ricar2o C. Valmonte an2 Union o1 LaEyers an2 2vocates 1or Drans%arency in (overnment >UL D?, (.R. )o. 1!4*,1, Se%t. ,9, 1998# ")-. 8id the Supreme %ourt commit an act of 2udicial legislation in promulgating Dn 5anc &esolution '.!. -<6,6)"6S%, entitled, A&eO Fuidelines on the %onduct of 8emonstrations, /ic7ets, &allies and Hther Similar Fatherings in the :icinity of the Supreme %ourt and 'll Hther %ourtsC3 Held2 +etitioners also claim that this #ourt committed an act of 6udicial legislation in promulgating the assailed resolution" The! charge that this #ourt amended provisions of &atas +ambansa (&"+") &lg" 000, otherwise @nown as >the +ublic Assembl! Act,? b! converting the sidewal@s and streets within a radius of two hundred (200) meters from ever! courthouse from a public forum place into a >no rall!? zone" Thus, the! accuse this #ourt of ) ) ) violating the principle of separation of powers" <e re6ect these low watts arguments" +ublic places historically associated with the free e)ercise of e)pressive activities, such as streets, sidewal@s, and par@s, are considered, 1ithout more, to be public fora. 9n other words, it is not an! law that can imbue such places with the public nature inherent in them" &ut even in such public fora, it is settled 6urisprudence that the government ma! restrict speech plus activities and enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions are content( neutral, are narrowl! tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication" #ontrar! therefore to petitioners; impression, &"+" &lg" 000 did not establish streets and sidewal@s, among other places, as public fora" A close loo@ at the law will reveal that it in fact prescribes reasonable time, place, and manner regulations" Thus, it reFuires a written permit for the holding of public assemblies in public places sub6ect, even, to the right of the ma!or to modif! the place and time of the public assembl!, to impose a rerouting of the parade or street march, to limit the volume of loud spea@ers or sound s!stem and to prescribe other appropriate restrictions on the conduct of the public assembl!" The e)istence of &"+" &lg" 000, however, does not preclude this #ourt from promulgating rules regulating conduct of demonstrations in the vicinit! of courts to assure our people of an impartial and orderl! administration of 6ustice as mandated b! the #onstitution" To insulate the 6udiciar! from mob pressure, friendl! or otherwise, and isolate it from public h!steria, this #ourt merel! moved awa! the situs of mass actions within a 200( meter radius from ever! courthouse" 9n fine, &"+" &lg" 000 imposes general restrictions to the time, place and manner of conducting concerted actions" ,n the other hand, the resolution of this #ourt regulating demonstrations adds specific restrictions as the! involve 6udicial independence and the orderl! administration of 6ustice" There is thus no discrepanc! between the two sets of regulator! measures" impl! put, &"+" &lg" 000 and the assailed resolution complement each other" <e so hold following the rule in legal hermeneutics that an apparent conflict between a court rule and a statutor! provision should be harmonized and both should be given effect if possible . (.n ReM =etition to nnul En 9anc Resolution .<. 98@"@+,@SC @ Ricar2o C. Valmonte an2 Union o1 LaEyers an2 2vocates 1or Drans%arency in (overnment >UL D?, (.R. )o. 1!4*,1, Se%t. ,9, 1998# "+). Should live media coverage of court proceedings be allo1edC

Held2 The propriet! of granting or den!ing permission to the media to broadcast, record, or photograph court proceedings involves weighing the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, the right of the public to information and the right to public trial, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the due process rights of the defendant and the inherent and constitutional power of the courts to control their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial administration of 6ustice" #ollaterall!, it also raises issues on the nature of the media, particularl! television and its role in societ!, and of the impact of new technologies on law" B)) #ourts do not discriminate against radio and television media b! forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television or news reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his t!pewriter or printing press into the courtroom . 9n Dstes v. .e0as, the 7nited tates upreme #ourt held that television coverage of 6udicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due process rights of a criminal 130

defendant" Coting 5(5, the #ourt through *r" 3ustice #lar@, identified four (5) areas of potential pre6udice which might arise from the impact of the cameras on the 6ur!, witnesses, the trial 6udge and the defendant" The decision in part pertinentl! stated= >-)perience li@ewise has established the pre6udicial effect of telecasting on witnesses" <itnesses might be frightened, pla! to the camera, or become nervous" The! are sub6ect to e)traordinar! out(of(court influences which might affect their testimon!" Also, telecasting not onl! increases the trial 6udgePs responsibilit! to avoid actual pre6udice to the defendant8 it ma! as well affect his own performance" 3udges are human beings also and are sub6ect to the same ps!chological reactions as la!men" Dor the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and sub6ects him to e)cessive public e)posure and distracts him from the effective presentation of his defense" >The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionall! or inadvertentl! can destro! an accused and his case in the e!es of the public"? 'epresentatives of the press have no special standing to appl! for a writ of mandate to compel a court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom a reporterPs constitutional rights are no greater than those of an! other member of the public" *assive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter or destro! the constitutionall! necessar! 6udicial atmosphere and decorum that the reFuirements of impartialit! imposed b! due process of law are denied the defendant and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time he enters or leaves the courtroom . #onsidering the pre6udice it poses to the defendantPs right to due process as well as to the fair and orderl! administration of 6ustice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information ma! be served and satisfied b! less distracting, degrading and pre6udicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed" Cideo footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the 6udicial officers, the parties and their counsel ta@en prior to the commencement of official proceedings" :o video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper" (Su%reme Court En 9anc Resolution ReM Live DV an2 Ra2io Coverage o1 t0e 'earing o1 =resi2ent Cora6on C. $uinoRs Libel Case, 2ate2 3ct. ,,, 1991# "++. Should the %ourt allo1 live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former /resident *oseph D. Dstrada before the Sandiganbayan in order Ato assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history3 as requested by the Kapisanan ng mga 5rod7aster ng /ilipinasC Held2 The propriet! of granting or den!ing the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial" <hen these rights race against one another, 6urisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win" <ith the possibilit! of losing not onl! the precious libert! but also the ver! life of an accused, it behooves all to ma@e absolutel! certain that an accused receives a verdict solel! on the basis of a 6ust and dispassionate 6udgment, a verdict that would come onl! after the presentation of credible evidence testified to b! unbiased witnesses unswa!ed b! an! @ind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, and decreed b! a 6udge with an unpre6udiced mind, unbridled b! running emotions or passions" 4ue process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrar! is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an ob6ect of public;s attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not b! an! outside force or influence but onl! b! evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignit! and calm ambiance is demanded" <itnesses and 6udges ma! ver! well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hard! climate, with ever! reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded that >television can wor@ profound changes in the behavior of the 131

people it focuses on"? -ven while it ma! be difficult to Fuantif! the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them directl! and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so man! wa!s and in var!ing degrees" The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage ma! have on the testimon! of witnesses and the decision of 6udges cannot be evaluated but, it can li@ewise be said, it is not at all unli@el! for a vote of guilt or innocence to !ield to it . 9t might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion" To sa! that actual pre6udice should first be present would leave to subtle threats to 6ustice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable deliberate dispensation of 6ustice can create . The effect of television ordinar! means of proof, but it is not far(fetched for it to graduall! conception of a trial such as we @now it now. near nirvana the to the calm and ma! escape the erode our basal

An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than an!one else, where his life or libert! can be held criticall! in balance" A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairl! dealt with and would not be un6ustl! condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago" A public trial is not s!non!mous with publicized trial8 it onl! implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process" 9n the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totall! free to report what the! have observed during the proceedings . The courts recognize the constitutionall! embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information" 9t also approves of media;s e)alted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conve!ing the proceedings to the public and in acFuainting the public with the 6udicial process in action8 nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions" 3ustice #lar@ thusl! pronounced, >while a ma)imum freedom must be allowed the press in carr!ing out the important function of informing the public in a democratic societ!, its e)ercise must necessaril! be sub6ect to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the 6udicial process"? B)) The 9ntegrated &ar of the +hilippines ) ) ) e)pressed its own concern on the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of *r" -strada8 to paraphrase= $ive television and radio coverage can negate the rule on e)clusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a fair trial8 at sta@e in the criminal trial is not onl! the life and libert! of the accused but the ver! credibilit! of the +hilippine criminal 6ustice s!stem, and live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the >hooting throng? to arrogate unto themselves the tas@ of 6udging the guilt of the accused, such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable onl! if popular8 and live television and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of 6ustice but will onl! pander to the desire for publicit! of a few grandstanding law!ers" B)) 7nli@e other government offices, courts do not e)press the popular will of the people in an! sense which, instead, are tas@ed to onl! ad6udicate controversies on the basis of what alone is submitted before them" A trial is not a free trade of ideas" :or is a competing mar@et of thoughts the @nown test of truth in a courtroom" (ReM Re$uest Ra2io@DV coverage o1 t0e Drial in t0e San2iganbayan o1 t0e =lun2er Cases against t0e 1ormer =resi2ent 5ose%0 E. Estra2a, .<. )o. +1@4@+!@SC, 5une ,9, ,++1, En 9anc >Vitug?# F!eed"# " Rel$%$"& "+". 8iscuss the t1o aspects of freedom of religion.

Held2 ." The right to religious profession and worship has a two(fold aspect, vi>., freedom to believe and freedom to act on onePs belief" The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought" The second is sub6ect to regulation where the 132

belief is translated into e)ternal acts that affect the public welfare" (.glesia )i Cristo v. C , ,79 SCR 7,9, 5uly ,*, 199* >=uno?# 2" The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the sub6ect of religion has a double aspect" ,n the one hand, it forestalls compulsion b! law of the acceptance of an! creed or the practice of an! form of worship" Dreedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual ma! choose cannot be restricted b! law" ,n the other hand, it safeguards the free e)ercise of the chosen form of religion" Thus, the #onstitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act" The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be" #onduct remains sub6ect to regulation for the protection of societ!" The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection" 9n ever! case, the power to regulate must be so e)ercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to undul! infringe on the protected freedom" <hence, even the e)ercise of religion ma! be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the tate ma! protect its citizens from in6ur!" B ) ) 9t does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guarantees of the free e)ercise of religion that ever!thing which ma! be so called can be tolerated . 9t has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessaril! invalid as one interfering with the >free e)ercise? of religion merel! because it also incidentall! has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion . (Centeno v. Villalon@ =ornillos, ,!* SCR 19", Se%t. 1, 1994 >Regala2o?# "+;. 8iscuss 1hy the (erona ruling (2ustifying the e0pulsion from public schools of children of *ehovah@s Bitnesses 1ho refuse to salute the flag and sing the national anthem during flag ceremony as prescribed by the Flag Salute 9a1) should be abandoned. Held2 ,ur tas@ here is e)tremel! difficult, for the 20(!ear old decision of this court in Ferona upholding the flag salute law and approving the e)pulsion of students who refuse to obe! it, is not lightl! to be trifled with" 9t is somewhat ironic however, that after the Ferona ruling had received legislative cachet b! its incorporation in the Administrative #ode of ./01, the present #ourt believes that the time has come to ree)amine it" The idea that one ma! be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremon! on pain of being dismissed from one;s 6ob or of being e)pelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Dilipinos who cut their teeth on the &ill of 'ights which guarantees their rights to free speech (.he flag salute, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge are all forms of utterances.) and the free e)ercise of religious profession and worship. 'eligious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priorit! and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his #reator. B)) +etitioners stress ) ) ) that while the! do not ta@e part in the compulsor! flag ceremon!, the! do not engage in >e)ternal acts? or behavior that would offend their countr!men who believe in e)pressing their love of countr! through the observance of the flag ceremon!" The! Fuietl! stand at attention during the flag ceremon! to show their respect for the rights of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings" ince the! do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their e)pulsion" >The sole 6ustification for a prior restraint or limitation on the e)ercise of religious freedom (according to the late %hief *ustice %laudio .eehan7ee in his dissenting opinion in Ferman v. 5arangan, +;( S%&' (+#, (+,) is the e)istence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safet!, public morals, public health or an! other legitimate public interest, that the tate has a right (and dut!) to prevent"? Absent such a threat to public safet!, the e)pulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not 6ustified" The situation that the #ourt directl! predicted in Ferona that= >NTOhe flag ceremon! will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with ver! few participants, and the time will come when we would have citizens 133

untaught and uninculcated in and not imbued with reverence for the flag and love of countr!, admiration for national heroes, and patriotism H a pathetic, even tragic situation, and all because a small portion of the school population imposed its will, demanded and was granted an e)emption"? has not come to pass" <e are not persuaded that b! e)empting the 3ehovah;s <itnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedl! comprises a >small portion of the school population? will sha@e up our part of the globe and suddenl! produce a nation >untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of countr! and admiration for national heroes. After all, what the petitioners see@ onl! is e)emption from the flag ceremon!, not e)clusion from the public schools where the! ma! stud! the #onstitution, the democratic wa! of life and form of government, and learn not onl! the arts, sciences, +hilippine histor! and culture but also receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of >patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. ;["], 'rt. K :, +-<, %onstitution) as part of the curricula" -)pelling or banning the petitioners from +hilippine schools will bring about the ver! situation that this #ourt had feared in Ferona. Dorcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremon! that violates their religious beliefs, will hardl! be conducive to love of countr! or respect for dul! constituted authorities" B)) *oreover, the e)pulsion of members of 3ehovah;s <itnesses from the schools where the! are enrolled will violate their right as +hilippine citizens, under the ./01 #onstitution, to receive free education, for it is the dut! of the tate to >protect and promote the right of all citizens to Fualit! education ) ) ) and to ma@e such education accessible to all? (Sec. +, 'rt. K :). 9n :ictoriano v. Dli>alde &ope Bor7ers@ ?nion, we upheld the e)emption of members of the 9glesia :i #risto, from the coverage of a closed shop agreement between their emplo!er and a union because it would violate the teaching of their church not to 6oin an! labor group ) ) )" B)) <e hold that a similar e)emption ma! be accorded to the 3ehovah;s <itnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremon! out of respect for their religious beliefs, however >bizarre? those beliefs ma! seem to others" :evertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremon! does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic e)ercises" +araphrasing the warning cited b! this #ourt in =on v. 8ames , while the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free e)ercise of their religion, >this should not be ta@en to mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them? if the! should commit breaches of the peace b! actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons" 9f the! Fuietl! stand at attention during the flag ceremon! while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct ma! possibl! disturb the peace, or pose >a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safet!, public morals, public health or an! other legitimate public interest that the tate has a right (and dut!) to prevent .3 (Ebralinag v. D0e /ivision Su%erinten2ent o1 Sc0ools o1 Cebu, ,19 SCR ,7*, ,*9@ ,"!, <arc0 1, 199!, En 9anc >(rino@ $uino?# "+#. ' pre6taped .: program of the glesia =i %risto ( =%) 1as submitted to the !.&%5 for revie1. .he latter classified it as Arated K3 because it 1as sho1n to be attac7ing another religion. .he =% protested by claiming that its religious freedom is per se beyond revie1 by the !.&%5. Should this contention be upheldC Held2 The 9glesia :i #ristoPs postulate that its religious freedom is per se be!ond review b! the *T'#& should be re6ected" 9ts public broadcast on TC of its religious programs brings it out of the bosom of internal belief" Television is a medium that reaches even the e!es and ears of children" The e)ercise of religious freedom can be regulated b! the tate when it will bring about the clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the tate is dut!(bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare" A laisse> faire polic! on the e)ercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but histor! counsels the #ourt against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our societ! toda!" >Dor sure, we shall continue to sub6ect an! act pinching the space for the free e)ercise of religion to a heightened scrutin! but we shall not leave its rational e)ercise to the irrationalit! of man" 134

Dor when religion divides and its e)ercise destro!s, the tate should not stand still"? (.glesia )i Cristo v. C , ,79 SCR 7,9, 5uly ,*, 199* >=uno?# "+(. 8id the !.&%5 act correctly 1hen it rated AK3 the glesia =i %ristoQs pre6taped .: program simply because it 1as found to be Aattac7ing3 another religionC Held2 The *T'#& ma! disagree with the criticisms of other religions b! the 9glesia :i #risto but that gives it no e)cuse to interdict such criticisms, however unclean the! ma! be" 7nder our constitutional scheme, it is not the tas@ of the tate to favor an! religion b! protecting it against an attac@ b! another religion" 'eligious dogma and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especiall! the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the tate from leaning towards an! religion" :is6N6vis religious differences, the tate en6o!s no banFuet of options" :eutralit! alone is its fi)ed and immovable stance" 9n fine, the *T'#& cannot sFuelch the speech of the 9:# simpl! because it attac@s another religion" 9n a tate where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the realit! of freedom of religion, the remed! against bad theolog! is better theolog!" The bedroc@ of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served b! encouraging the mar@etplace of dueling ideas" <hen the lu)ur! of time permits, the mar@etplace of ideas demands that speech should be met b! more speech for it is the spar@ of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas, that can fan the embers of truth" (.glesia )i Cristo v. C , ,79 SCR 7,9, 5uly ,*, 199* >=uno?# "+$. s solicitation for the construction of a church covered by /.8. =o. +($# and, therefore, punishable if done 1ithout the necessary permit for solicitation from the 8SB8C Held2 First. olicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not solicitation for >charitable or public welfare purpose? but for a religious purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessaril! a charitable or public welfare purpose" A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a church is not li@e fund drives for need! families or victims of calamit! or for the construction of a civic center and the li@e" $i@e solicitation of subscription to religious magazines, it is part of the propagation of religious faith or evangelization" uch solicitation calls upon the virtue of faith, not of charit!, save as those solicited for mone! or aid ma! not belong to the same religion as the solicitor" uch solicitation does not engage the philanthropic as much as the religious fervor of the person who is solicited for contribution" Second. The purpose of the 4ecree is to protect the public against fraud in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns for charit! and other civic pro6ects" ,n the other hand, since religious fund drives are usuall! conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need for public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not e)ist in as great a degree as does the need for protection with respect to solicitations for charit! or civic pro6ects as to 6ustif! state regulation" .hird. To reFuire a government permit before solicitation for religious purpose ma! be allowed is to la! a prior restraint on the free e)ercise of religion" uch restraint, if allowed, ma! well 6ustif! reFuiring a permit before a church can ma@e unda! collections or enforce tithing" &ut in 'merican 5ible Society v. %ity of !anila, we precisel! held that an ordinance reFuiring pa!ment of a license fee before one ma! engage in business could not be applied to the appellantPs sale of bibles because that would impose a condition on the e)ercise of a constitutional right" 9t is for the same reason that religious rallies are e)empted from the reFuirement of prior permit for public assemblies and other uses of public par@s and streets (&"+" &lg" 000, ec" 2NaO)" To read the 4ecree, therefore, as including within its reach solicitations for religious purposes would be to construe it in a manner that it violates the Dree -)ercise of 'eligion #lause of the #onstitution ) ) )" (Concurring 3%inion, <en2o6a, V.V., 5., in Centeno v. Villalon@=ornillos, ,!* SCR 19", Se%t. 1, 1994# "+,. Bhat is a purely ecclesiastical affair to 1hich the State can not meddleC

Held2 An ecclesiastical affair is >one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of e)cluding from such associations those deemed not worth! of membership"? &ased on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation" To be concrete, e)amples of this so(called ecclesiastical affairs to which the tate cannot meddle are proceedings for e)communication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious 135

significance" (=astor /ionisio V. /iv. >4a%unan?#

ustria v. )LRC, (.R. )o. 1,4!8,,

ug. 1*, 1999, 1 st

"+<. /etitioner is a religious minister of the Seventh 8ay 'dventist (S8'). 4e 1as dismissed because of alleged misappropriation of denominational funds, 1illful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and commission of an offense against the person of his employer@s duly authori>ed representative. 4e filed an illegal termination case against the S8' before the labor arbiter. .he S8' filed a motion to dismiss invo7ing the doctrine of separation of %hurch and State. Should the motion be grantedC Held2 <here what is involved is the relationship of the church as an emplo!er and the minister as an emplo!ee and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church, i.e., the minister was not e)communicated or e)pelled from the membership of the congregation but was terminated from emplo!ment, it is a purel! secular affair" #onseFuentl!, the suit ma! not be dismissed invo@ing the doctrine of separation of church and the state" (=astor /ionisio V. ustria v. )LRC, (.R. )o. 1,4!8,, ug. 1*, 1999, 1st /iv. >4a%unan?# T,e R$%,) " ),e Pe"-le )" I& "!#()$"& "& :())e!+ " Pu7l$' C"&'e!& "+-. 8iscuss the scope of the right to information on matters of public concern.

Held2 9n :almonte v. 5elmonte, *r., the #ourt emphasized that the information sought must be >matters of public concern,? access to which ma! be limited b! law" imilarl!, the state polic! of full public disclosure e)tends onl! to >transactions involving public interest? and ma! also be >sub6ect to reasonable conditions prescribed b! law"? As to the meanings of the terms >public interest? and >public concern,? the #ourt, in 9egaspi v. %ivil Service %ommission, elucidated= >9n determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied" U+ublic concern; li@e Upublic interest; is a term that eludes e)act definition" &oth terms embrace a broad spectrum of sub6ects which the public ma! want to @now, either because these directl! affect their lives, or simpl! because such matters naturall! arouse the interest of an ordinar! citizen" 9n the final anal!sis, it is for the courts to determine on a case b! case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public"? #onsidered a public concern in the above(mentioned case was the >legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions reFuiring civil service eligibilit! are occupied onl! b! persons who are eligibles"? o was the need to give the general public adeFuate notification of various laws that regulate and affect the actions and conduct of citizens, as held in .anada. $i@ewise did the >public nature of the loanable funds of the A 9 and the public office held b! the alleged borrowers (members of the defunct &atasang +ambansa)? Fualif! the information sought in :almonte as matters of public interest and concern" 9n 'quino6Sarmiento v. !orato, the #ourt also held that official acts of public officers done in pursuit of their official functions are public in character8 hence, the records pertaining to such official acts and decisions are within the ambit of the constitutional right of access to public records. 7nder 'epublic Act :o" 61.2, public officials and emplo!ees are mandated to >provide information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, NandO ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearing whenever appropriate ) ) ),? e)cept when >otherwise provided b! law or when reFuired b! the public interest"? 9n particular, the law mandates free public access, at reasonable hours, to the annual performance reports of offices and agencies of government and government(owned or controlled corporations8 and the statements of assets, liabilities and financial disclosures of all public officials and emplo!ees" 9n general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the polic! of transparenc! of governmental affairs" This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunit! to determine whether those to whom the! have entrusted the affairs of the government are honestl!, faithfull! and competentl! performing their functions as public servants . 7ndeniabl!, the essence of democrac! lies in the free(flow of thought8 but thoughts and ideas must be well(informed so that the public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner" #ertainl!, it is b! ensuring 136

an unfettered and uninhibited e)change of ideas among a well(informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired b! the people . (C0ave6 v. =C((, ,99 SCR "44, /ec. 9, 1998, >=anganiban?# ""). Bhat are some of the recogni>ed restrictions to the right of the people to information on matters of public concernC Held2 9n C0ave6 v. =C(( (,99 SCR "44, /ec. 9, 1998 >=anganiban?#, the # enumerated the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, as follows= .) :ational securit! matters and intelligence information" This 6urisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding militar!, diplomatic and other national securit! matters" $i@ewise, information on inter( government e)changes prior to the conclusion of treaties and e)ecutive agreements ma! be sub6ect to reasonable safeguards for the sa@e of national interest8 2) Trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the 9ntellectual +ropert! #ode N'"A" :o" 02/2, approved on 3une 6, .//1O and other related laws) and ban@ing transactions (pursuant to the ecrec! of &an@ 4eposits Act N'"A" :o" .505, as amendedO)8 2) #riminal matters, such as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts ma! not inFuire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution8 5) ,ther confidential information" The -thical tandards Act ('"A" :o" 61.2, enacted on Debruar! 20, ./0/) further prohibits public officials and emplo!ees from using or divulging >confidential or classified information officiall! @nown to them b! reason of their office and not made available to the public"? ( ec" 1NcO, ibid") ,ther ac@nowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door #abinet meetings and e)ecutive sessions of either house of #ongress, as well as the internal deliberations of the upreme #ourt" ""+. s the recovery of the alleged ill6gotten 1ealth of the !arcoses a matter of public concern sub2ect to this rightC Held2 <ith such pronouncements of our government ) ) ) there is no doubt that the recover! of the *arcoses; alleged ill(gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. <e ma! also add that >ill(gotten wealth? refers to assets and properties purportedl! acFuired, directl! or indirectl!, b! former +resident *arcos, his immediate famil!, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or properties8 or their having ta@en undue advantage of their public office8 or their use of powers, influences or relationships, >resulting in their un6ust enrichment and causing grave damage and pre6udice to the Dilipino people and the 'epublic of the +hilippines"? #learl!, the assets and properties referred to supposedl! originated from the government itself" To all intents and purposes, therefore, the! belong to the people" As such, upon reconve!ance the! will be returned to the public treasur!, sub6ect onl! to the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as ma! be ad6udged b! competent courts" Another declared overriding consideration for the e)peditious recover! of ill(gotten wealth is that it ma! be used for national economic recover!" <e believe the foregoing disFuisition settles the Fuestion of whether petitioner has a right to respondentsP disclosure of an! agreement that ma! be arrived at concerning the *arcoses; purported ill(gotten wealth" (C0ave6 v. =C((, ,99 SCR "44, /ec. 9, 1998 >=anganiban?# F!eed"# " A++"'$()$"& """. 8oes the right of civil servants to organi>e include their right to stri7eC %larify.

Held2 pecificall!, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positivel! recognized in 'ssociation of %ourt of 'ppeals Dmployees ('%'D) v. Ferrer6%alle2a. &ut, as in the e)ercise of the rights of free e)pression and of assembl!, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimac! of the purposes of the association , the overriding considerations of national securit! and the preservation of democratic institutions"

137

As regards the right to stri@e, the #onstitution itself Fualifies its e)ercise with the proviso >in accordance with law"? This is a clear manifestation that the state ma!, b! law, regulate the use of this right, or even den! certain sectors such right" -)ecutive ,rder :o" .00 which provides guidelines for the e)ercise of the right of government wor@ers to organize, for instance, implicitl! endorsed an earlier # # circular which >en6oins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and emplo!ees from staging stri@es, demonstrations, mass leaves, wal@outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporar! stoppage or disruption of public service? (%S% !emorandum %ircular =o. $, s. +-<,, dated 'pril "+, +-<,) b! stating that the #ivil ervice law and rules governing concerted activities and stri@es in the government service shall be observed. 9t is also settled in 6urisprudence that, in general, wor@ers in the public sector do not en6o! the right to stri@e" 'lliance of %oncerned Fovernment Bor7ers v. !inister of 9abor and Dmployment rationalized the proscription thus= >The general rule in the past and up to the present is that the Uterms and conditions of emplo!ment in the Aovernment, including an! political subdivision or instrumentalit! thereof are governed b! law"; ) ) )" ince the terms and conditions of government emplo!ment are fi0ed by la1, government wor@ers cannot use the same weapons emplo!ed b! the wor@ers in the private sector to secure concessions from their emplo!ers" The principle behind labor unionism in private industr! is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion b! law" 'elations between private emplo!ers and their emplo!ees rest on an essentiall! voluntar! basis" ub6ect to the minimum reFuirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of emplo!ment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining" 9n government emplo!ment, however, it is the legislature and, where properl! given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fi) the terms and conditions of emplo!ment" And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements"? After delving into the intent of the framers of the #onstitution, the #ourt affirmed the above rule in Social Security System Dmployees 'ssociation (SSSD') v. %ourt of 'ppeals and e)plained= >Aovernment emplo!ees ma!, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the #ongress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of emplo!ment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fi)ed b! law" 9f there be an! unresolved grievances, the dispute ma! be referred to the +ublic ector $abor(*anagement #ouncil for appropriate action" &ut emplo!ees in the civil service ma! not resort to stri@es, wal@outs and other temporar! wor@ stoppages, li@e wor@ers in the private sector, to pressure the Aovernment to accede to their demands" As now provided under ec" 5, 'ule 999 of the 'ules and 'egulations to Aovern the -)ercise of the 'ight of Aovernment -mplo!ees to elf( ,rganization, which too@ effect after the instant dispute arose, UNtOhe terms and conditions of emplo!ment in the government, including an! political subdivision or instrumentalit! thereof and government(owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed b! law and emplo!ees therein shall not stri@e for the purpose of securing changes NtheretoO";? (5acinto v. Court o1 %%eals, ,81 SCR *7", )ov. 14, 199", En 9anc >=anganiban?# "";. /etitioners public school teachers 1al7ed out of their classes and engaged in mass actions during certain dates in September +--) protesting the alleged unla1ful 1ithholding of their salaries and other economic benefits. .hey also raised national issues, such as the removal of ?S bases and the repudiation of foreign debts, in their mass actions. .hey refused to return to 1or7 despite orders to do so and subsequently 1ere found guilty of conduct pre2udicial to the best interests of the service for having absented themselves 1ithout proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, and penali>ed. .hey denied that they engaged in Astri7e3 but claimed that they merely e0ercised a constitutionally guaranteed right G the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances 6 and, therefore, should not have been penali>ed. Should their contention be upheldC Held2 +etitioners, who are public schoolteachers and thus government emplo!ees, do not see@ to establish that the! have a right to stri@e" 'ather, the! tenaciousl! insist that their absences during certain dates in eptember .//0 were a valid e)ercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful assembl! to petition the government for a redress 138

of grievances" The! claim that their gathering was not a stri@e, therefore, their participation therein did not constitute an! offense" !/S.' v. 9aguio and '%. v. %arino, in which this #ourt declared that >these Umass actions; were to all intents and purposes a stri@e8 the! constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, wor@ which it was the teachers; dut! to perform, underta@en for essentiall! economic reasons,? should not principall! resolve the present case, as the underl!ing facts are allegedl! not identical" Stri7e, as defined b! law, means any temporar! stoppage of wor@ done b! the concerted action of emplo!ees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute . A labor dispute includes an! controvers! or matter concerning terms and conditions of emplo!ment8 or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fi)ing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of emplo!ment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the pro)imate relation of emplo!ers and emplo!ees . <ith these premises, we now evaluate the circumstances of the instant petition" 9t cannot be denied that the mass action or assembl! staged b! the petitioners resulted in the non(holding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding period" +etitioners do not dispute that the grievances for which the! sought redress concerned the alleged failure of public authorities ( essentiall!, their >emplo!ers? ( to full! and 6ustl! implement certain laws and measures intended to benefit them materiall! ) ) )" And probabl! to clothe their action with permissible character, the! also raised national issues such as the removal of the 7" " bases and the repudiation of foreign debt" 9n 5alingasan v. %ourt of 'ppeals, however, this #ourt said that the fact that the conventional term >stri@e? was not used b! the participants to describe their common course of action was insignificant, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, was deemed controlling. !oreover, the petitioners here 0 0 0 1ere not penali>ed for the e0ercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. &ather, the %ivil Service %ommission found them guilty of conduct pre2udicial to the best interest of the service for having absented themselves 1ithout proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non6holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for 1hich they 1ere responsible. 4ad petitioners availed themselves of their free time 6 recess, after classes, 1ee7ends or holidays 6 to dramati>e their grievances and to dialogue 1ith the proper authorities 1ithin the bounds of la1, no one 6 not the 8D%S, the %S% or even this %ourt 6 could have held them liable for the valid e0ercise of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. 's it 1as, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against stri7es by government 1or7ers. .heir act by their nature 1as en2oined by the %ivil Service la1, rules and regulations, for 1hich they must, therefore, be made ans1erable. (5acinto v. C , ,81 SCR *7", )ov. 14, 199", En 9anc >=anganiban?# T,e N"&-I#-($!#e&) Cl(u+e ""#. s the constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations absoluteC

Held2 ." :or is there merit in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular violate the contract clause of the &ill of 'ights" The e)ecutive order creating the +,-A was enacted to further implement the social 6ustice provisions of the ./12 #onstitution, which have been greatl! enhanced and e)panded in the ./01 #onstitution b! placing them under a separate Article ('rticle K ). The Article on ocial 3ustice was aptl! described as the >heart of the new #harter? b! the +resident of the ./06 #onstitutional #ommission, retired 3ustice #ecilia *unoz +alma . ocial 6ustice is identified with the broad scope of the police power of the state and reFuires the e)tensive use of such power. ) ) )" The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal e)actness" 9t is restricted to contracts with respect to propert! or some ob6ect of value and which confer rights that ma! be asserted in a court of 6ustice8 it has no application to statutes relating to public sub6ects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the tate and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire communit! affected b! it" 9t does not prevent a proper e)ercise b! the tate of its police power b! enacting regulations reasonabl! necessar! to secure the health, safet!, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the communit!, even though contracts ma! thereb! 139

be affected, for such matters cannot be placed b! contract be!ond the power of the tate to regulate and control them" Ceril!, the freedom to contract is not absolute8 all contracts and all rights are sub6ect to the police power of the tate and not onl! ma! regulations which affect them be established b! the tate, but all such regulations must be sub6ect to change from time to time, as the general well(being of the communit! ma! reFuire, or as the circumstances ma! change, or as e)perience ma! demonstrate the necessit!. And under the #ivil #ode, contracts of labor are e)plicitl! sub6ect to the police power of the tate because the! are not ordinar! contracts but are impressed with public interest" Article .100 thereof e)pressl! provides= Art" .100" The relations between capital and labor are not merel! contractual" The! are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must !ield to the common good" Therefore, such contracts are sub6ect to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, stri@es and loc@outs, closed shop, wages, wor@ing conditions, hours of labor and similar sub6ects" The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of -"," :o" 1/1 (#reating the +,-A), which was enacted under the police power of the tate, the! cannot be struc@ down on the ground that the! violate the contract clause" To hold otherwise is to alter long(established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract clause" (D0e Con1erence o1 <aritime <anning gencies, .nc. v. =3E , ,4! SCR ***, %ril ,1, 1997 >/avi2e, 5r.?# 2" +etitioners pra! that the present action should be barred, because private respondents have voluntaril! e)ecuted Fuitclaims and releases and received their separation pa!" +etitioners claim that the present suit is a >grave derogation of the fundamental principle that obligations arising from a valid contract have the force of law between the parties and must be complied with in good faith"? The #ourt disagrees" 3urisprudence holds that the constitutional guarantee of non( impairment of contract is sub6ect to the police power of the state and to reasonable legislative regulations promoting health, morals, safet! and welfare" :ot all Fuitclaims are per se invalid or against public polic!, e)cept (.) where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face" 9n these cases, the law will step in to annul the Fuestionable transactions. uch Fuitclaim and release agreements are regarded as ineffective to bar the wor@ers from claiming the full measure of their legal rights" 9n the case at bar, the private respondents agreed to the Fuitclaim and release in consideration of their separation pa!" ince the! were dismissed allegedl! for business losses, the! are entitled to separation pa! under Article 202 of the $abor #ode" And since there was thus no e)tra consideration for the private respondents to give up their emplo!ment, such underta@ings cannot be allowed to bar the action for illegal dismissal" (9ogo@<e2ellin Sugarcane =lanters ssociation, .nc. v. )LRC, ,9* SCR 1+8, 1,4, >=anganiban?# 2" ,nl! slightl! less abstract but nonetheless h!pothetical is the contention of #'-&A that the imposition of the CAT on the sales and leases of real estate b! virtue of contracts entered prior to the effectivit! of the law would violate the constitutional provision that >:o law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed"? 9t is enough to sa! that the parties to a contract cannot, through the e)ercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the e)ercise of the ta)ing power of the tate" Dor not onl! are e)isting laws read into contracts in order to fi) obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order" The polic! of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which retains adeFuate authorit! to secure the peace and good order of societ!" 9n truth, the #ontract #lause has never been thought as a limitation on the e)ercise of the tatePs power of ta)ation save onl! where a ta) e)emption has been granted for a valid consideration. ) ) )" (Dolentino v. Secretary o1 &inance, ,!7 SCR *!+, *87@ *8*, ug. ,7, 1994, En 9anc ><en2o6a?# 5" ince timber licenses are not contracts, the non(impairment clause ) ) ) cannot be invo@ed"

140

B ) ), even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an e)ecutive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of e)isting timber licenses" Eence, the non(impairment clause cannot as !et be invo@ed" :evertheless, granting further that a law has actuall! been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non(impairment clause" This is because b! its ver! nature and purpose, such a law could have onl! been passed in the e)ercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecolog!, promoting their health and enhancing their general welfare" ) ) )" 9n short, the non(impairment clause must !ield to the police power of the state" Dinall!, it is difficult to imagine ) ) ) how the non(impairment clause could appl! with respect to the pra!er to en6oin the respondent ecretar! from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license for, save in cases of rene1al, no contract would have as !et e)isted in the other instances" *oreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right" (3%osa v. &actoran, 5r., ,,4 SCR "9, >199!?# 5" Anent petitioners; contention that the forcible refund of incentive benefits is an unconstitutional impairment of a contractual obligation, suffice it to state that >NnOot all contracts entered into b! the government will operate as a waiver of its non(suabilit!8 distinction must be made between its sovereign and proprietar! acts" The acts involved in this case are governmental" &esides, the #ourt is in agreement with the olicitor Aeneral that the incentive pa! or benefit is in the nature of a bonus which is not a demandable or enforceable obligation" (9la$uera v. lcala, ,97 SCR !**, 44*, Se%t. 11, 1998, En 9anc >=urisima?# T,e I&-Cu+)"d$(l I&1e+)$%()$"& R$%,)+ " (& A''u+ed Pe!+"& ""(. State the procedure, guidelines and duties 1hich the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of ma7ing an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation. Held2 $astl!, considering the heav! penalt! of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the #ourt, as guardian of the rights of the people la!s down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of ma@ing an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation in accordance with the #onstitution, 6urisprudence and 'epublic Act :o" 1520 ('n 'ct 8efining %ertain &ights of /erson 'rrested, 8etained or ?nder %ustodial nvestigation as 1ell as the 8uties of the 'rresting, 8etaining, and nvestigating Hfficers and /roviding /enalties for :iolations .hereof). 9t is high(time to educate our law(enforcement agencies who neglect either b! ignorance or indifference the so(called *iranda rights which had become insufficient and which the #ourt must update in the light of new legal developments= .) The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language @nown to and understood b! him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if an!" -ver! other warnings, information or communication must be in a language @nown to and understood b! said person8 2) Ee must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that an! statement he ma@es ma! be used as evidence against him8 2) Ee must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent law!er, preferabl! of his own choice8 5) Ee must be informed that if he has no law!er or cannot afford the services of a law!er, one will be provided for him8 and that a law!er ma! also be engaged b! an! person in his behalf, or ma! be appointed b! the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting on his behalf8 5) That whether or not the person arrested has a law!er, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in an! form shall be conducted e)cept in the presence of his counsel of after a valid waiver has been made8 6) The person arrested must be informed that, at an! time, he has the right to communicate or confer b! the most e)pedient means ( telephone, radio, letter or messenger ( with his law!er (either retained or appointed), an! member of his immediate famil!, or an! medical doctor, priest or minister chosen b! him or b! an! one from his immediate famil! or b! his counsel, or be visited b!Kconfer with 141

dul! accredited national or international non(government organization" 9t shall be the responsibilit! of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished8 1) Ee must be informed that he has the right to waive an! of said rights provided it is made voluntaril!, @nowingl! and intelligentl! and ensure that he understood the same8 0) 9n addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a law!er, he must be informed that it must be done in writing and in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to spea@8 /) That the person arrested must be informed that he ma! indicate in an! manner at an! time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be Fuestioned with warning that once he ma@es such indication, the police ma! not interrogate him if the same had not !et commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it has alread! begun8 .0) The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or an! of his rights does not bar him from invo@ing it at an! time during the process, regardless of whether he ma! have answered some Fuestions or volunteered some statements8 ..) Ee must also be informed that an! statement or evidence, as the case ma! be, obtained in violation of an! of the foregoing, whether inculpator! or e)culpator!, in whole or in part, shall be admissible in evidence" (=eo%le v. <a0inay, !+, SCR 477, &eb. 1, 1999, En 9anc >=er Curiam?# ""$. D0plain the 7ind of information that is required to be given by la1 enforcement officers to suspect during custodial investigation. Held2 N9Ot is settled that one;s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather 6ust the ceremonial and perfunctor! recitation of an abstract constitutional principle" 9t is not enough for the interrogator to merel! repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of ection .2, Article 999 of the ./01 #onstitution8 the former must also e)plain the effects of such provision in practical terms H e.g., what the person under investigation ma! or ma! not do H and in a language the sub6ect fairl! understands" The right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to e)plain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the sub6ect;s understanding of what is conve!ed" ince it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of e)planation reFuired will necessaril! var! and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person undergoing investigation" 9n further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the sub6ect is informed of such right8 he should also be as@ed if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he could as@ for counsel if he so desired or that one could be provided him at his reFuest" 9f he decides not to retain a counsel of his choice or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to be valid and effective, must still be made with the assistance of counsel, who, under prevailing 6urisprudence, must be a law!er" (=eo%le v. Canoy, !,8 SCR !87, <arc0 1", ,+++, 1st /iv. >/avi2e, C5?# "",. Bhat is the meaning of Acompetent counsel3 under Section +" of the 5ill of &ightsC

Held2 The meaning of >competent counsel? was e)plained in /eople v. 8eniega as follows= >) ) ) NTOhe law!er called to be present during such investigation should be as far as reasonabl! possible, the choice of the individual undergoing Fuestioning" 9f the law!er were one furnished in the accused;s behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing to full! safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merel! be giving a routine, peremptor! and meaningless recital of the individual;s rights" 9n /eople v. 5asay ("+- S%&' #)#, #+<), this #ourt stressed that an accused;s right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel Ucontemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than 6ust the ceremonial and perfunctor! recitation of an abstract constitutional principle"; >9deall! therefore, a law!er engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) Ushould be engaged b! the accused (himself), or b! the latter;s relative or person authorized b! him to engage an attorne! or b! the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized b! the accused to file such petition"; $aw!ers engaged b! the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probit! and supposed independence, are 142

generall! suspect, as in man! areas, the relationship between law!ers and law enforcement authorities can be s!mbiotic" >) ) ) The competent or independent law!er so engaged should be present from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonabl! at ever! turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he ma! either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview"? (=eo%le v. Es%iritu, !+, SCR 7!!, &eb. ,, 1999, ! r2 /iv. >=anganiban?# ""<. %an a /'H la1yer be considered an independent counsel 1ithin the contemplation of Section +", 'rticle , +-<, %onstitutionC Held2 9n /eople v. Hracoy and /eople v. 5andula, the # has held that a +A, law!er can be considered an independent counsel within the contemplation of the #onstitution considering that he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorne! whose interest is admittedl! adverse to that of the accused( appellant" Thus, the assistance of a +A, law!er satisfies the constitutional reFuirement of a competent and independent counsel for the accused" (=eo%le v. 9acor, !+* SCR 7,,, %ril !+, 1999, ,n2 /iv. ><en2o6a?# ""-. s the confession of an accused given spontaneously, freely and voluntarily to the !ayor admissible in evidence, considering that the !ayor has Aoperational supervision and control3 over the local police and may arguably be deemed a la1 enforcement officerC Held2 <hile it is true that a municipal ma!or has >operational supervision and control? over the local police and ma! arguabl! be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of appl!ing ection .2(.) and (2) of Article 999 of the #onstitution, however, appellant;s confession to the ma!or was not made in response to an! interrogation b! the latter" 9n fact, the ma!or did not Fuestion the appellant at all" :o police authorit! ordered appellant to tal@ to the ma!or" 9t was appellant himself who spontaneousl!, freel! and voluntaril! sought the ma!or for a private meeting" The ma!or did not @now that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him" Bhen appellant tal7ed 1ith the mayor as a confidant and not as a la1 enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not appl! to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through Fuestioning b! the authorities, but given in an ordinar! manner whereb! appellant orall! admitted having committed the crime" <hat the #onstitution bars is the compulsor! disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions" The rights under ection .2 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion b! the tate as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freel! and voluntaril! telling the truth" (=eo%le v. n2an, ,*9 SCR 97, <arc0 !, 199"# ";). 're confessions made in response to questions by ne1s reporters admissible in evidenceC A&+*e!2 Ges" #onfessions made in response to Fuestions b! news reporters, not b! the police or an! other investigating officer, are admissible" 9n /eople v. :i>carra, where the accused, under custod!, gave spontaneous answers to a televised interview b! several press reporters in the office of the chief of the #9 , it was held that statements spontaneousl! made b! a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntar! and are admissible in evidence" 9n /eople v. 'ndan, "$- S%&' -(, !arch ;, +--,, it was held that appellant;s confessions to the news reporters were given free from an! undue influence from the police authorities" The news reporters acted as news reporters when the! interviewed appellant" The! were not acting under the direction and control of the police" The! did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime" 9n fact, the! as@ed his permission before interviewing him" The upreme #ourt further ruled that appellant;s verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered b! ection .2(.) and (2) of Article 999 of the #onstitution and, therefore, admissible in evidence" ";+. 8iscuss 1hy lo1er court@s should act 1ith e0treme caution in admitting in evidence accused@s videotaped media confessions. Held2 Apropos the court a quo@s admission of accused(appellant;s videotaped confession, we find such admission proper" The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused(appellant unburdening his guilt willingl!, openl! and publicl! in the presence of newsmen" uch confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit s!mpath! and 143

forgiveness from the public" &esides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easil! sought succor from the newsmen who, in all li@elihood, would have been s!mpathetic with him" B ) ) B ) ) Eowever, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one;s guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases , it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that e)treme caution must be ta@en in further admitting similar confessions" Dor in all probabilit!, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, ma! attempt to legitimize coerced e)tra6udicial confessions and place them be!ond the e)clusionar! rule b! having an accused admit an offense on television" uch a situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal 6ustice s!stem" <e do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men b! an accused with the @nowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible" 9ndeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniFues and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularl! in cases such as this where it is essential to ma@e sharp 6udgments in determining whether a confession was given under coercive ph!sical or ps!chological atmosphere" A word of caution then to lower courts= we should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntar! have been freel! given" This t!pe of confession alwa!s remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughl! e)amined and scrutinized" 4etection of coerced confessions is admittedl! a difficult and arduous tas@ for the courts to ma@e" 9t reFuires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones" <e have a sworn dut! to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed b! the #onstitution" (=eo%le v. En2ino, !7! SCR !+", &eb. ,+, ,++1, ,n 2 /iv. >9ellosillo?# ";". 8iscuss the t1o 7inds of involuntary or coerced confessions under Section +", 'rticle of the +-<, %onstitution. llustrate ho1 the %ourt should appreciate said involuntary or coerced confessions.

Held2 There are two @inds of involuntar! or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision= (.) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of ection .2, and (2) those which are given without the benefit of *iranda warnings, which are the sub6ect of paragraph . of the same ection .2" Accused(appellant claims that his confession was obtained b! force and threat" Aside from this bare assertion, he has shown no proof of the use of force and violence on him" Ee did not see@ medical treatment nor even a ph!sical e)amination" Eis allegation that the fact that he was made to sign the confession five times is proof that he refused to sign it" B)) <e discern no sign that the confession was involuntaril! e)ecuted from the fact that it was signed b! accused(appellant five times" B)) -)tra6udicial confessions are presumed voluntar!, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarant;s consent in e)ecuting the same has been vitiated, such confession will be sustained" *oreover, the confession contains details that onl! the perpetrator of the crime could have given" ) ) )" 9t has been held that voluntariness of a confession ma! be inferred from its being replete with details which could possibl! be supplied onl! b! the accused, reflecting spontaneit! and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied. <hen the details narrated in an e)tra6udicial confession are such that the! could not have been concocted b! one who did not ta@e part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in the e)traction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence e)ists showing that the statement was voluntaril! e)ecuted, the confession is admissible against the declarant" There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntar! where it is corroborated b! evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession" &ut what renders the confession of accused(appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused(appellant was not given the *iranda warnings effectivel!" 7nder the #onstitution, an uncounseled statement, such as it is called in the 7nited tates from which Article 999, 144

ection .2(.) was derived, is presumed to be ps!chologicall! coerced" wept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded b! intimidating figures t!pical of the atmosphere of police interrogation, the suspect reall! needs the guiding hand of counsel" :ow, under the first paragraph of this provision, it is reFuired that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings= (.) he must be informed of his right to remain silent8 (2) he must be warned that an!thing he sa!s can and will be used against him8 and (2) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a law!er will be appointed to represent him. B)) There was thus onl! a perfunctor! reading of the *iranda rights to accused(appellant without an! effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and, if so, whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him" This @ind of giving of warnings, in several decisions of this #ourt, has been found to be merel! ceremonial and inadeFuate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect" -speciall! in this case, care should have been scrupulousl! observed b! the police investigator that accused(appellant was specificall! as@ed these Fuestions considering that he onl! finished the fourth grade of the elementar! school" ) ) ) *oreover, Article 999, ection .2(.) reFuires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and independent" Eere, accused(appellant was assisted b! Att!" 4e los 'e!es, who, though presumabl! competent, cannot be considered an >independent counsel? as contemplated b! the law for the reason that he was station commander of the <+4 at the time he assisted accused(appellant" ) ) )" This is error" As observed in /eople v. 5andula, the independent counsel reFuired b! Article 999, ection .2(.) cannot be special counsel, public or private prosecutor, municipal attorne!, or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedl! adverse to the accused" 9n this case, Att!" 4e los 'e!es, as +# #aptain and tation #ommander of the <+4, was part of the police force who could not be e)pected to have effectivel! and scrupulousl! assisted accused(appellant in the investigation" To allow such a happenstance would render illusor! the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation . (=eo%le v. 3brero, !!, SCR 19+, ,,+ O ,+8, <ay 1", ,+++, ,n2 /iv. ><en2o6a?# ";;. Bhat are the requirements for an e0tra62udicial confession of an accused to be admissible in evidenceC given= Held2 ." 9n 6urisprudence, no confession can be admitted in evidence unless it is

.) Dreel! and voluntaril!, without compulsion, inducement or tric@er!8 2) Jnowingl! based on an effective communication to the individual under custodial investigation of his constitutional rights8 and 2) 9ntelligentl! with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its conseFuences" ,nce admitted, the confession must inspire credibilit! or be one which the normal e)perience of man@ind can accept as being within the realm of probabilit!" A confession meeting all the foregoing reFuisites constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported b! the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will @nowingl!, freel! and deliberatel! confess that he is the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted b! truth and conscience" <hen all these reFuirements are met and the confession is admitted in evidence, the burden of proof that it was obtained b! undue pressure, threat or intimidation rests upon the accused" (=eo%le v. &abro, ,"" SCR 19, ug. 11, 199" >=anganiban?# 2" :umerous decisions of this #ourt rule that for an e)tra6udicial confession to be admissible, it must be= .) voluntar!8 2) made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel8 2) e)press8 and 5) in writing. The mantle of protection afforded b! the above(Fuoted constitutional provision covers the period from the time a person is ta@en into custod! for the investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the offense although not !et in custod! . The e)clusionar! rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere 145

running through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentialit! for compulsion, ph!sical or ps!chological is forcefull! apparent" Eowever, the rule is not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt if he voluntaril! and intelligentl! so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue . (=eo%le v. 9ase, !,9 SCR 178, 1*9@1"1, <arc0 !+, ,+++, 1st /iv. >-nares@Santiago?# ";#. s the choice of a la1yer by a person under custodial investigation 1ho cannot afford the services of a counsel e0clusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defenseC Held2 9t must be remembered in this regard that while the right to counsel is immutable, the option to secure the services of counsel de parte is not absolute. 9ndeed H The phrase >competent and independent? and >preferabl! of his own choice? were e)plicit details which were added upon the persistence of human rights law!ers in the ./06 #onstitutional #ommission who pointed out cases where, during the martial law period, the law!ers made available to the detainee would be one appointed b! the militar! and therefore beholden to the militar!" (%iting &ecord of the %onstitutional %ommission ,;+6,;#I 5ernas, .he %onstitution of the &epublic of the /hilippines, +-<, +st ed., p. ;#,) B)) ))) )))

<ithal, the word >preferabl!? under ection .2(.), Article 2 of the ./01 #onstitution does not conve! the message that the choice of a law!er b! a person under investigation is e)clusive as to preclude other eFuall! competent and independent attorne!s from handling his defense" 9f the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solel! in the hands of the accused who can impede, na!, obstruct the progress of the interrogation b! simpl! selecting a law!er who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest" This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated b! the framers of the charter" <hile the initial choice in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a law!er is naturall! lodged in the police investigators, the accused reall! has the final choice as he ma! re6ect the counsel chosen for him and as@ for another one" A law!er provided b! the investigators is deemed engaged b! the accused where he never raised an! ob6ection against the former;s appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracit! of his statement before the swearing officer" Ceril!, to be an effective counsel >NaO law!er need not challenge all the Fuestions being propounded to his client" The presence of a law!er is not intended to stop an accused from sa!ing an!thing which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our #onstitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.3 (=eo%le v. 9ase, !,9 SCR 178, 1*9@1"1, <arc0 !+, ,+++, 1st /iv. >-nares@Santiago?# ";(. Should courts be allo1ed to distinguish bet1een preliminary questioning and custodial investigation proper 1hen applying the e0clusionary ruleC Held2 The e)clusionar! rule sprang from a recognition that police interrogator! procedures la! fertile grounds for coercion, ph!sical and ps!chological, of the suspect to admit responsibilit! for the crime under investigation" 9t was not intended as a deterrent to the accused from confessing guilt, if he voluntaril! and intelligentl! so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admit although untrue . $aw enforcement agencies are reFuired to effectivel! communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to insure that it is full! understood" An! measure short of this reFuirement is considered a denial of such right . #ourts are not allowed to distinguish between preliminar! Fuestioning and custodial investigation proper when appl!ing the e)clusionar! rule" An! information or admission given b! a person while in custod! which ma! appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counsel should be struc@ down as inadmissible. 9t has been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a confidant of the accused is not covered b! the e)clusionar! rule . The admission allegedl! made b! the appellant is not in the form of a written e)tra( 6udicial confession8 the admission was allegedl! made to the arresting officer during an 146

>informal tal@? at the police station after his arrest as a prime suspect in the rape and @illing of ) ) )" The arresting policeman testified that the appellant admitted that he was with the victim on the evening of 3anuar! .2, .//5, the probable time of the commission of the crime and that he carried her on his shoulder but that he was too drun@ to remember what subseFuentl! happened" The arresting policeman admitted that he did not inform the appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel" <e note that the alleged admission is incriminating because it places the accused in the compan! of the victim at the time the crime was probabl! committed" The e)clusionar! rule applies" The accused was under arrest for the rape and @illing of ) ) ) and an! statement allegedl! made b! him pertaining to his possible complicit! in the crime without prior notification of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in evidence" The policeman;s apparent attempt to circumvent the rule b! insisting that the admission was made during an >informal tal@? prior to custodial investigation prior is not tenable" The appellant was not invited to the police station as part of a general inFuir! for an! possible lead to the perpetrators of the crime under investigation" At the time the alleged admission was made the appellant was in custod! and had been arrested as the prime suspect in the rape and @illing of ) ) )" The e)clusionar! rule presumes that the alleged admission was coerced, the ver! evil the rule stands to avoid" upportive of such presumption is the absence of a written e)tra(6udicial confession to that effect and the appellant;s denial in court of the alleged oral admission" The alleged admission should be struc@ down as inadmissible" (=eo%le v. 9ravo, !18 SCR 81,, )ov. ,,, 1999, En 9anc >(on6aga@Reyes?# ";$. D0plain the procedure for out6of6court identification of suspects and the test to determine the admissibility of such identification. Held2 ." 9n /eople v. .eehan7ee, *r., the #ourt ) ) ) e)plained the procedure for out(of(court identification and the test to determine the admissibilit! of such identification" 9t listed the following wa!s of identif!ing the suspects during custodial investigation= show( up, mug shots and line(ups" The #ourt there ruled= >) ) )" ,ut(of(court identification is conducted b! the police in various wa!s" 9t is done thru sho16ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification" 9t is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identif! the suspect" 9t is also done thru line ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose" ince corruption of out6of6court identification contaminates the integrit! of in court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the reFuirements of constitutional due process" 9n resolving the admissibilit! of and rel!ing on out(of( court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where the! consider the following factors, vi>O (.) the witness; opportunit! to view the criminal at the time of the crime8 (2) the witness; degree of attention at that time8 (2) the accurac! of an! prior description given b! the witness8 (5) the level of certaint! demonstrated b! the witness at the identification8 (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification8 and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure"? (=eo%le v. Dimon, ,81 SCR 7"", )ov. 1,, 199" >=anganiban?# 2" ) ) )" The totalit! test has been fashioned precisel! to assure fairness as well as compliance with constitutional reFuirements of due process in regard to out(of(court identification" These cited factors must be considered to prevent contamination of the integrit! of in(court identifications better" (=eo%le v. (amer, !,* SCR **+, &eb. ,9, ,+++, ,n2 /iv. >Juisumbing?# ";,. 8oes the prohibition for custodial investigation conducted 1ithout the assistance of counsel e0tend to a person in a police line6upC %onsequently, is the identification by private complainant of accused 1ho 1as not assisted by counsel during police line6up admissible in evidenceC Held2 The prohibition ) ) ) does not e)tend to a person in a police line(up because that stage of an investigation is not !et a part of custodial investigation . 9t has been repeatedl! held that custodial investigation commences when a person is ta@en into custod! and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation and the police officers begin to as@ Fuestions on the suspect;s participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. The stage of an investigation wherein a person is as@ed to stand in a police line(up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general inFuir! into an unsolved crime and is purel! investigator! in 147

nature" 9t has also been held that an uncounseled identification at the police line(up does not preclude the admissibilit! of an in(court identification . The identification made b! the private complainant in the police line(up pointing to +avillare as one of his abductors is admissible in evidence although the accused(appellant was not assisted b! counsel" ) ) ) (=eo%le v. =avillare, !,9 SCR *84, *94@*97, %ril 7, ,+++, En 9anc >=er Curiam?# ";<. /etitioner in a case A0 0 0 posits the theory that since he had no counsel during the custodial investigation 1hen his urine sample 1as ta7en and chemically e0amined, D0hibits A93 and A!,3 0 0 0 are also inadmissible in evidence since his urine sample 1as derived in effect from an uncounselled e0tra62udicial confession. /etitioner claims that the ta7ing of his urine sample allegedly violates 'rticle , Section " of the %onstitution 0 0 0.3 Should his contentions be upheldC Held2 <e are not persuaded" The right to counsel begins from the time a person is ta@en into custod! and placed under investigation for the commission of a crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to as@ Fuestions to elicit information andKor confession or admissions from the accused" uch right is guaranteed b! the #onstitution and cannot be waived e)cept in writing and in the presence of counsel" Eowever, what the #onstitution prohibits is the use of ph!sical or moral compulsion to e)tort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his bod! in evidence, when it ma! be material" 9n fact, an accused ma! validl! be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his bod! to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion . The situation in the case at bar falls within the e)emption under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be e)amined came from the bod! of the accused" This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain ph!sical attributes determinable b! simple observation" 9n fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co(accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but the! in fact voluntaril! gave the same when the! were reFuested to undergo a drug test" ((utang v. =eo%le, !!7 SCR 4"9, 5uly 11, ,+++, , n2 /iv. >/e Leon?# T,e R$%,) )" B($l ";-. n bail application 1here the accused is charged 1ith a capital offense, 1ill it be proper for the 2udge to grant bail 1ithout conducting hearing if the prosecutor interposes no ob2ection to such applicationC BhyC Held2 3urisprudence is replete with decisions compelling 6udges to conduct the reFuired hearings in bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense" The absence of ob6ection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the 6udge has no right to presume that the prosecutor @nows what he is doing on account of familiarit! with the case" > aid reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the dut! of e)ercising 6udicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong" 3udicial discretion is the domain of the 6udge before whom the petition for provisional libert! will be decided" The mandated dut! to e)ercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor"? 9mposed in 5aylon v. Sison was this mandator! dut! to conduct a hearing despite the prosecutionPs refusal to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fi) bail" (5oselito V. )arciso v. &lor <arie Sta. Romana@Cru6, (.R. )o. 1!47+4, <arc0 1", ,+++, !r2 /iv. >=anganiban?# "#). Bhat are the duties of the 2udge in cases of bail applications 1here the accused is charged 1ith capital offenseC Held2 5asco v. &apatalo enunciated the following duties of the trial 6udge in such petition for bail= .) :otif! the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or reFuire him to submit his recommendation8 2) #onduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to e)ercise its sound discretion8 2) 4ecide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summar! of evidence of the prosecution8 5) 9f the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond" ,therwise, petition should be denied" 148

The #ourt added= >The above(enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to the duties of the trial 6udge in cases of bail applications" o basic and fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount to 6udicial apostas! for an! member of the 6udiciar! to disclaim @nowledge or awareness thereof"? Additionall!, the courtPs grant or refusal of bail must contain a summar! of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the 6udgePs own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused" The summar! thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense8 its absence will invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail" (5oselito V. )arciso v. &lor <arie Sta. Romana@Cru6, (.R. )o. 1!47+4, <arc0 1", ,+++, !r2 /iv. >=anganiban?# "#+. Should the accused 1ho remained at large after their conviction be allo1ed provisional libertyC %an the bail bond that the accused previously posted be used during the entire period of appealC Held2 4espite an order of arrest from the trial court and two warnings from the #ourt of Appeals, petitioners had remained at large" 9t is a)iomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custod! of the law, or otherwise, deprived of libert!" The purpose of bail is to secure one;s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. +etitioners; #ompliance and *otion ) ) ) came short of an unconditional submission to respondent court;s lawful order and to its 6urisdiction" The trial court correctl! denied petitioners; motion that the! be allowed provisional libert! after their conviction, under their respective bail bonds. Apart from the fact that the! were at large, ection 5, 'ule ..5 of the 'ules of #ourt, as amended b! upreme #ourt Administrative #ircular .2(/5, provides that= B)) The #ourt, in its discretion, ma! allow the accused to continue on provisional libert! under the same bail bond during the period to appeal sub6ect to the consent of the bondsman" The bail bond that the accused previousl! posted can onl! be used during the .5(da! period to appeal ('ule .22) and not during the entire period of appeal. This is consistent with ection 2(a) of 'ule ..5 which provides that the bail >shall be effective upon approval and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner cancelled, until the promulgation of the 2udgment of the &egional .rial %ourt, irrespective of whether the case was originall! filed in or appealed to it"? This amendment, introduced b! # Administrative #ircular .2(/5 is a departure from the old rules which then provided that bail shall be effective and remain in force at all stages of the case until its full determination, and thus even during the period of appeal" *oreover, under the present rule, for the accused to continue his provisional libert! on the same bail bond during the period to appeal, consent of the bondsman is necessar!" Drom the record, it appears that the bondsman ) ) ) filed a motion in the trial court ) ) ) for the cancellation of petitioners; bail bond for the latter;s failure to renew the same upon its e)piration" ,btaining the consent of the bondsman was, thus, foreclosed" (<agu22atu v. Court o1 %%eals, !,* SCR !*,, &eb. ,!, ,+++, 1 st /iv. >4a%unan?# "#". s a condition in an application for bail that accused be first arraigned before he could be granted bail validC Held2 9n reFuiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial court apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, b! being absent, prevent his earl! arraignment and thereb! dela! his trial until the complainants got tired and lost interest in their cases" Eence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval of petitioner;s bail bonds should be deferred until he could be arraigned" After that, even if petitioner does not appear, trial can proceed as long as he is notified of the date of the hearing and his failure to appear is un6ustified, since under Art" 999, ec" .5(2) of the #onstitution, trial in absencia is authorized" This seems to be the theor! of the trial court in its ) ) ) order conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his arraignment" This theor! is mista@en" 9n the first place ) ) ) in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused ma! be precluded from filing a motion to Fuash" Dor if the information is Fuashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused" 9n the second place, the trial court 149

could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment precisel! b! granting bail and ordering his presence at an! stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment" 7nder 'ule ..5, ec" 2(b) of the 'ules on #riminal +rocedure, one of the conditions of bail is that >the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so reFuired b! the court or these 'ules,? while under 'ule ..6, ec" .(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is reFuired" ,n the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (.) filing a motion to Fuash and thus dela! his release on bail because until his motion to Fuash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to Fuash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail" These scenarios certainl! undermine the accused;s constitutional right not to be put on trial e)cept upon valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail" (Lavi2es v. C , !,4 SCR !,1, &eb. 1, ,+++, , n2 /iv. ><en2o6a?# "#;. s respondent !ar7 *imene> entitled to bail during the pendency of the D0tradition /roceedingC Held2 <e agree with petitioner" As suggested b! the use of the word >conviction,? the constitutional provision on bail ) ) ), as well as ection 5 of 'ule ..5 of the 'ules of #ourt, applies onl! when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of +hilippine criminal laws" 9t does not appl! to e)tradition proceedings, because e)tradition courts do not render 6udgments of conviction or acFuittal" *oreover, the constitutional right to bail >flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of ever! accused who should not be sub6ected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acFuittal, unless his guilt be proved be!ond reasonable doubt"? 9t follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not appl! to a case li@e e)tradition, where the presumption of innocence is not an issue" The provision in the #onstitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended? does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available onl! in criminal proceedings" 9t must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application >onl! to persons 6udiciall! charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directl! connected with invasion"? (Sec. +<, 'rticle : , %onstitution) Eence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merel! emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses" 9t cannot be ta@en to mean that the right is available even in e)tradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature" That the offenses for which 3imenez is sought to be e)tradited are bailable in the 7nited tates is not an argument to grant him one in the present case" To stress, e)tradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged" Ee should appl! for bail before the courts tr!ing the criminal cases against him, not before the e)tradition court" ((overnment o1 t0e Unite2 States o1 merica v. 'on. (uillermo =urganan, (.R. )o. 1487"1, Se%t. ,4, ,++,, En 9anc >=anganiban?# "##. Bhat is the e0ception to the A=o 5ail3 &ule in D0tradition /roceedingsC

Held2 The rule ) ) ) is that bail is not a matter of right in e)tradition cases" Eowever, the 6udiciar! has the constitutional dut! to curb grave abuse of discretion and t!rann!, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights" Durthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to e)traditees" 9ndeed, the right to due process e)tends to the >life, libert! or propert!? of every person" 9t is >d!namic and resilient, adaptable to ever! situation calling for its application"? Accordingl! and to best serve the ends of 6ustice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential e)traditee has been arrested or placed under the custod! of the law, bail ma! be applied for and granted as an e)ception, onl! upon a clear and convincing showing (.) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight ris@ or a danger to the communit!8 and (2) that there e)ist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocit!, those cited b! the highest court in the reFuesting state when it grants provisional libert! in e)tradition cases therein" ince this e)ception has no e)press or specific statutor! basis, and since it is derived essentiall! from general principles of 6ustice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two(tiered reFuirement with clarit!, precision and emphatic forcefulness" 150

The #ourt realizes that e)tradition is basicall! an e)ecutive, not a 6udicial, responsibilit! arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations" 9n its barest concept, it parta@es of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is not normall! a 6udicial prerogative" Eence, an! intrusion b! the courts into the e)ercise of this power should be characterized b! caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our countr! will not be unreasonabl! impeded or compromised" 9n short, while this #ourt is ever protective of >the sporting idea of fair pla!,? it also recognizes the limits of its own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations" ((overnment o1 t0e Unite2 States o1 merica v. 'on. (uillermo =urganan, (.R. )o. 1487"1, Se%t. ,4, ,++,, En 9anc >=anganiban?# "#(. 're there special circumstances compelling enough for the %ourt to grant !ar7 *imene>@s request for provisional release on bailC Held2 Along this line, 3imenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the #ourt to grant his reFuest for provisional release on bail" <e have carefull! e)amined these circumstances and shall now discuss them" ." Alleged 4isenfranchisement <hile his e)tradition was pending, 'espondent 3imenez was elected as a member of the Eouse of 'epresentatives" ,n that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his *anila district of 600,000 residents" <e are not persuaded" 9n /eople v. *alos2os, the #ourt has alread! debun@ed the disenfranchisement argument ) ) )" 9t must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in *anila, it was alread! of public @nowledge that the 7nited tates was reFuesting his e)tradition" Eence, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the conseFuences of the e)tradition case against their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the case" +remises considered and in line with *alos2os, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office is b! itself a compelling reason to grant him bail" 2" Anticipated 4ela! 'espondent 3imenez further contends that because the e)tradition proceedings are length!, it would be unfair to confine him during the pendenc! of the case" Again we are not convinced" <e must emphasize that e)tradition cases are summar! in nature" The! are resorted to merel! to determine whether the e)tradition petition and its anne)es conform to the -)tradition Treat!, not to determine his guilt or innocence" :either is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights available to the accused in a criminal action" <e are not overruling the possibilit! that petitioner ma!, in bad faith, undul! dela! the proceedings" This is Fuite another matter that is not at issue here" Thus, an! further discussion of this point would be merel! anticipator! and academic" Eowever, if the dela! is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be 6ustified" Aiving premium to dela! b! considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself" 9t would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonabl! dela! the e)tradition proceedings even more" This we cannot allow" 2" :ot a Dlight 'is@Q 3imenez further claims that he is not a flight ris@" To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the e)tradition reFuest in 3une .///8 !et, he has not fled the countr!" True, he has not actuall! fled during the preliminar! stages of the reFuest for his e)tradition" Get, this fact cannot be ta@en to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears the footsteps of the reFuesting government inching closer and closer" That he has not !et fled from the +hilippines cannot be ta@en to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and 1hen it matters8 that is, upon the resolution of the +etition for -)tradition" 9n an! event, it is settled that bail ma! be applied for and granted b! the trial court at an!time after the applicant has been ta@en into custod! and prior to 6udgment, even after bail has been previousl! denied" 9n the present case, the e)tradition court ma! continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which ma! be granted in accordance with the 151

guidelines in this 4ecision" ((overnment o1 t0e Unite2 States o1 merica v. 'on. (uillermo =urganan, (.R. )o. 1487"1, Se%t. ,4, ,++,, En 9anc >=anganiban?# T,e R$%,) )" 7e I& "!#ed " ),e N()u!e (&d C(u+e " A''u+()$"& (%($&+) ),e A''u+ed "#$. Bhat are the ob2ectives of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations against the accusedC Held2 9nstructive in this regard is ection 6, 'ule ..0 of the 'ules of #ourt ) ) )" The purpose of the above(Fuoted rule is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right guaranteed b! no less than the fundamental law of the land ('rticle , Section +#["], +-<, %onstitution). -laborating on the defendant;s right to be informed, the #ourt held in /echo v. /eople that the ob6ectives of this right are= .) To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to ma@e the defense8 2) To avail himself of his conviction or acFuittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause8 and 2) To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it ma! decide whether the! are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had" 9t is thus imperative that the 9nformation filed with the trial court be complete H to the end that the accused ma! suitabl! prepare for his defense" #orollar! to this, an indictment must full! state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed as it is the recital of the essentials of a crime which delineates the nature and cause of accusation against the accused" B)) 9n the case under scrutin!, the information does not allege the minority of the victim ) ) ) although the same was proven during the trial ) ) )" The omission is not merel! formal in nature since doctrinall!, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted for" 9t matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt ma! be, but an accused cannot be convicted of an! offense, not charged in the #omplaint or 9nformation on which he is tried or therein necessaril! included" Ee has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial" To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged in the #omplaint or 9nformation on which he is tried would constitute unauthorized denial of that right" (=eo%le v. 9ayya, !," SCR ""1, <arc0 1+, ,+++, En 9anc >=urisima?# T,e R$%,) )" ( F($! T!$(l "#,. Bhat is the purpose of the rule barring trial or sentence of an insane personC Bhat are the reasons underlying itC Held2 The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of the public . 9t has been held that it is inhuman to reFuire an accused disabled b! Aod to ma@e a 6ust defense for his life or libert! . To put a legall! incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial8 and this has several reasons underl!ing it" Dor one, the accurac! of the proceedings ma! not be assured, as an incompetent defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings ma! not appreciate what information is relevant to the proof of his innocence" *oreover, he is not in a position to e)ercise man! of the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right to effectivel! consult with counsel, the right to testif! in his own behalf, and the right to confront opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accurac! of the trial result" Second, the fairness of the proceedings ma! be Fuestioned, as there are certain basic decisions in the course of a criminal proceeding which a defendant is e)pected to ma@e for himself, and one of these is his plea" .hird, the dignit! of the proceedings ma! be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is li@el! to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner which ma! destro! the decorum of the court" -ven if the defendant remains passive, his lac@ of comprehension fundamentall! impairs the functioning of the trial process" A criminal proceeding is essentiall! an adversarial proceeding" 9f the defendant is not a conscious and intelligent participant, the ad6udication loses its character as a reasoned interaction between an individual and his communit! and becomes an invective against an insensible ob6ect" Fourth, it is important that the defendant @nows wh! he is being punished, a comprehension which is greatl! dependent 152

upon his understanding of what occurs at trial" An incompetent defendant ma! not realize the moral reprehensibilit! of his conduct" The societal goal of institutionalized retribution ma! be frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend its significance. (=eo%le v. Estra2a, !!! SCR *99, "18@"19, 5une 19, ,+++, En 9anc >=uno?# T,e R$%,) )" (& I#-(!)$(l T!$(l "#<. Bhat are the t1o principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on ho1 to deal 1ith the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile casesC Held2 There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicit! during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. The 5ritish approach the problem with the presumption that publicit! will pre6udice a 6ur!" Thus, -nglish courts readil! sta! and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The 'merican approach is different" 7 courts assume a s7eptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicit! on the right of an accused to a fair trial" The! have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probabilit! of irreparable harm, strong li@elihood, clear and present danger, etc" (Estra2a v. /esierto, (.R. )os. 14*"1+@17, <arc0 ,, ,++1, En 9anc >=uno?# "#-. Should the Hmbudsman be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against petitioner (former /resident) Dstrada due to the barrage of pre2udicial publicity on his guiltC Held2 +etitioner ) ) ) contends that the respondent ,mbudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of pre6udicial publicit! on his guilt" Ee submits that the respondent ,mbudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of his right to due process" B)) This is not the first time the issue of trial b! publicit! has been raised in this #ourt to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases" 9n /eople v. .eehan7ee, *r., later reiterated in the case of 9arranaga v. %ourt of 'ppeals, et al. , we laid down the doctrine that= ><e cannot sustain appellant;s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to pre6udicial publicit!" 9t is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicit!, 6ust li@e all high profile and high sta@e criminal trials" .hen and no1, 1e rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused;s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has alwa!s been regarded as the handmaiden of effective 6udicial administration, especiall! in the criminal field ) ) )" The press does not simpl! publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of 6ustice b! sub6ecting the police, prosecutors, and 6udicial processes to e)tensive public scrutin! and criticism" +ervasive publicit! is not per se pre6udicial to the right of an accused to fair trial" The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a da!(to(da!, gavel(to(gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicit! so permeated the mind of the trial 6udge and impaired his impartialit!" Dor one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre(trial and other off(court publicit! of sensational criminal cases" The state of the art of our communication s!stem brings news as the! happen straight to our brea@fast tables and right to our bedrooms" These news form part of our ever!da! menu of the facts and fictions of life" Dor another, our idea of a fair and impartial 6udge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world" <e have not installed the 6ur! s!stem whose members are overl! protected from publicit! lest the! lose their impartialit!" ) ) )" ,ur 6udges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off(court evidence and on(camera performances of parties to a litigation" Their mere e)posure to publications and publicit! stunts does not per se fatall! infect their impartialit!" At best, appellant can onl! con6ure possibility of pre2udice on the part of the trial 6udge due to the barrage of publicit! that characterized the investigation and trial of the case" 9n !artelino, et al. v. 'le2andro, et al., we re6ected this standard of possibilit! of pre6udice and adopted the test of actual pre2udice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of pre6udicial publicit!, there must be allegation and proof that the 6udges have been undul! influenced, not simpl! that the! might be, b! the barrage of publicit!" 9n the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial 6udge developed 153

actual bias against appellant as a conseFuence of the e)tensive media coverage of the pre(trial and trial of his case" The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial 6udge acFuired a fi0ed opinion as a result of pre6udicial publicit! which is incapable of change even b! evidence presented during the trial" Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden"? <e e)pounded further on this doctrine in the subseFuent case of Bebb v. 4on. &aul de 9eon, etc. and its companion cases, vi>.O >Again, petitioners raise the effect of pre6udicial publicit! on their right to due process while undergoing preliminar! investigation" <e find no procedural impediment to its earl! invocation considering the substantial ris@ to their libert! whole undergoing a preliminar! investigation" B)) The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its e)cessiveness has been aggravated b! @inetic developments in the telecommunications industr!" Dor sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocit! of publicit! that attended the preliminar! investigation of the case at bar" ,ur dail! diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even toda!" #ommentators still bombard the public with views not too man! of which are sober and sublime" 9ndeed, even the principal actors in the case H the :&9, the respondents, their law!ers and their s!mpathizers H have participated in this media blitz" The possibilit! of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completel! closed to the press and public" 9n the seminal case of &ichmond =e1spapers, nc. v. :irginia, it was wisel! held= U) ) ) (a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo(American 6ustice demonstrates conclusivel! that at the time this :ation;s organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in -ngland had long been presumptivel! open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairl! to all concerned and discouraging per6ur!, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partialit!" 9n addition, the significant communit! therapeutic value of public trials was recognized= when a shoc@ing crime occurs, a communit! reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of 6ustice serve an important proph!lactic purpose, providing an outlet for communit! concern, hostilit!, and emotion" To wor@ effectivel!, it is important that societ!;s criminal process Usatisf! the appearance of 6ustice,; ,ffutt v" 7nited tates, 250 7 .., .5, // $ -d .., 15 #t .., which can best be provided b! allowing people to observe such process" Drom this unbro@en, uncontradicted histor!, supported b! reasons as valid toda! as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the ver! nature of a criminal trial under this :ation;s s!stem of 6ustice, #f", e"g", $evine v" 7nited tates, 262 7 6.0, 5 $ -d 2d /0/, 00 #t .020" (b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembl!, e)pressl! guaranteed b! the Dirst Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government" 9n guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the Dirst Amendment can be read as protecting the right of ever!one to attend trials so as give meaning to those e)plicit guarantees8 the Dirst Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the conte)t of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summaril! closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the Dirst Amendment was adopted" *oreover, the right of assembl! is also relevant, having been regarded not onl! as an independent right but also as a catal!st to augment the free e)ercise of the other Dirst Amendment rights with which it was deliberatel! lin@ed b! the draftsmen" A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generall! H and representatives of the media H have a right to be present, and where their presence historicall! has been thought to enhance the integrit! and Fualit! of what ta@es place" (c) -ven though the #onstitution contains no provision which b! its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not e)pressl! guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the en6o!ment of enumerated rights" The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the 154

guarantees of the Dirst Amendment= without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have e)ercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated"; &e that as it ma!, we recognize that pervasive and pre6udicial publicit! under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial" Thus, in !artelino, et al. v. 'le2andro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of pre6udicial publicit! there must be allegation and proof that the 6udges have been undul! influenced, not simpl! that the! might be, b! the barrage of publicit!" 9n the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicit! that attended the investigation of petitioners fatall! infected the fairness and impartialit! of the 4,3 +anel" +etitioners cannot 6ust rel! on the subliminal effects of publicit! on the sense of fairness of the 4,3 +anel, for these are basicall! unbe@nown and be!ond @nowing" To be sure, the 4,3 +anel is composed of an Assistant #hief tate +rosecutor and enior tate +rosecutors" Their long e)perience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether the! can easil! be blinded b! the @lieg lights of publicit!" 9ndeed, their 26(page 'esolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that the! considered an! e)tra(record evidence e)cept evidence properl! adduced b! the parties" The length of time the investigation was conducted despite it summar! nature and the generosit! with which the! accommodated the discover! motions of petitioners spea@ well of their fairness" At no instance, we note, did petitioners see@ the disFualification of an! member of the 4,3 +anel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of pre6udicial publicit!"? Appl!ing the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to 1arrant this %ourt to en2oin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Hmbudsman. +etitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof . Ee needs to show more than weight! social science evidence to successfull! prove the impaired capacit! of a 6udge to render a bias(free decision" <ell to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminar! investigation b! a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent ,mbudsman" :o allegation whatsoever has been made b! the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have alread! been infected b! bias because of the pervasive pre6udicial publicit! against him" 9ndeed, the special panel has !et to come out with its findings and the #ourt cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner" (Estra2a v. /esierto, (.R. )os. 14*"1+@17, <arc0 ,, ,++1, En 9anc >=uno?# T,e R$%,) (%($&+) Sel -I&'!$#$&()$"& "(). 'ccused6appellant alleges that 1hile in the custody of police officers, some hair strands 1ere ta7en from him 1ithout his consent and submitted to the =5 for investigation, in violation of his right against self6incrimination. 'side from e0ecuting a 1aiver of the provisions of 'rticle +"( of the &evised /enal %ode, accused6appellant e0ecuted a 1aiver of the provisions of 'rticle , Section +" of the %onstitution regarding the rights of an accused during custodial investigation. t appears, ho1ever, that the 1aivers 1ere e0ecuted by the accused 1ithout the assistance of a counsel of his o1n choice. Held2 The use of evidence against the accused obtained b! virtue of his testimon! or admission without the assistance of counsel while under custodial investigation is proscribed under ections .2 and .1, Article 999 of the #onstitution ) ) )" The aforesaid rules are set forth in the #onstitution as a recognition of the fact that the ps!chological if not ph!sical atmosphere of custodial investigations in the absence of procedural safeguards is inherentl! coercive in nature" Eowever, to paraphrase 3ustice anchez in the case of %have> v. %ourt of 'ppeals ("# S%&' $$; [+-$<]), >#ompulsion does not necessaril! connote the use of violence8 it ma! be the product of unintentional statements" +ressure which operates to overbear his will, disable him from ma@ing a free and rational choice or impair his capacit! for ma@ing rational 6udgment would be sufficient" o is moral coercion tending to force testimon! from the unwilling lips of the defendant"? :eedless to sa!, the above(mentioned provisions are an affirmation that >coercion can be mental as well as ph!sical and that the blood of the accused is not the onl! hallmar@ of an unconstitutional inFuisition"? (5lac7burn v. 'labama, ;$+ ?S +--) 9t bears emphasis, however, that under the above(Fuoted provisions, what is actuall! proscribed is the use of ph!sical or moral compulsion to e)tort communication from the accused(appellant and not the inclusion of his bod! in evidence when it ma! be material" 155

Dor instance, substance emitted from the bod! of the accused ma! be received as evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness (?S v. .an .eng, "; /hil. +#( [+-+"]) and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused ma! also be used as evidence against him (?S v. Hng Siu 4ong, ;$ /hil. ,;( [+-+,]). #onseFuentl!, although accused(appellant insists that hair samples were forcibl! ta@en from him and submitted to the :&9 for forensic e)amination, the hair samples ma! be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or an! evidence communicative in nature acFuired from the accused under duress" (=eo%le v. Ron2ero, !,+ SCR !8!, !99@4+1, /ec. 9, 1999, En 9anc >=er Curiam?# "(+. 8oes the right against self6incrimination e0tend to administrative proceedingsC

Held2 9n /ascual v. 5oard of !edical D0aminers ("< S%&' ;## [+-$-]), we held that the right against self(incrimination under ection .1, Article 999 of the ./01 #onstitution which is ordinaril! available onl! in criminal prosecutions, e)tends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed ph!sician who is charged with immoralit!, which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilt!" The #ourt, citing the earlier case of %abal v. Kapunan ($ S%&' +)(- [+-$"]), pointed out that the revocation of one;s license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of propert!" (Secretary o1 5ustice v. Lantion, !,, SCR 1*+, 184, 5an. 18, ,+++, En 9anc ><elo?# "(". !ay the right against self6incrimination be validly invo7ed during inquiry in aid of legislationC Held2 N9Ot has been held that >a congressional committee;s right to inFuire is Usub6ect to all relevant limitations placed b! the #onstitution on governmental action,; including Uthe relevant limitations of the &ill of 'ights;"? 9n another case H >) ) ) the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not 6ustif! an inFuir! in the face of the &ill of 'ights" The critical element is the e)istence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the #ongress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness" <e cannot simpl! assume, however, that ever! congressional investigation is 6ustified b! a public need that over(balances an! private rights affected" To do so would be to abdicate the responsibilit! placed b! the #onstitution upon the 6udiciar! to insure that the #ongress does not un6ustifiabl! encroach upon an individual;s right to privac! nor abridge his libert! of speech, press, religion or assembl!"? (Bat7ins v. ?S, ;(# ?SS +,< citing ?S v. &umely, ;#( ?S #+) ,ne of the basic rights guaranteed b! the #onstitution to an individual is the right against self(incrimination. This right construed as the right to remain completel! silent ma! be availed of b! the accused in a criminal case8 but it ma! be invo@ed b! other witnesses onl! as Fuestions are as@ed of them" This distinction is enunciated b! the #ourt in &omeo %have> v. .he 4onorable %ourt of 'ppeals, et al. thus H >+etitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinar! witness" <hereas an ordinar! witness ma! be compelled to ta@e the witness stand and claim the privilege as each Fuestion reFuiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused ma! altogether refuse to ta@e the witness stand and refuse to answer an! and all Fuestions"? *oreover, this right of the accused is e)tended to respondents in administrative investigations but onl! if the! parta@e of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding" 9n Falman v. /amaran, the #ourt reiterated the doctrine in %abal v. Kapunan to illustrate the right of witnesses to invo@e the right against self(incrimination not onl! in criminal proceedings but also in all other t!pes of suit" 9t was held that= ><e did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, #abal cannot refuse to ta@e the witness stand and testif!, and that he can invo@e his right against self(incrimination onl! when a Fuestion which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him" #learl! then, it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls" The privilege has consistentl! been held to e)tend to all proceedings sanctioned b! 156

law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a part! or not"? <e do not here modif! these doctrines" 9f we presentl! rule that petitioners ma! not be compelled b! the respondent #ommittee to appear, testif! and produce evidence before it, it is onl! because we hold that the Fuestioned inFuir! is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the 6udicial departments of government, ordained b! the #onstitution" (9eng6on, 5r. v. Senate 9lue Ribbon Committee, ,+! SCR "*", )ov. ,+, 1991, En 9anc >=a2illa?# "(;. Bhat are the t1o types of immunity statutesC Bhich has broader scope of protectionC Held2 ,ur immunit! statutes are of American origin" 9n the 7nited tates, there are two t!pes of statutor! immunit! granted to a witness" The! are the transactional immunit! and the use(and(derivative(use immunit!" Transactional immunit! is broader in the scope of its protection" &! its grant, a witness can no longer be prosecuted for an! offense whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction . 9n contrast, b! the grant of use(and( derivative(use immunit!, a witness is onl! assured that his or her particular testimon! and evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subseFuent prosecution" (<a%a, 5r. v. San2iganbayan, ,!1 SCR "8!, "9"@"98, %ril ,*, 1994, En 9anc >=uno?# "(#. s the grant of immunity to an accused 1illing to testify for the government a special privilege and, therefore, must be strictly construed against the accusedC Held2 N<Oe re6ect respondent court;s ruling that the grant of section 5 immunit! must be strictl! construed against the petitioners" 9t simplisticall! characterized the grant as a special privilege, as if it was gifted b! the government, e0 gratia. 9n ta@ing this posture, it misread the raison d@ etre and the long pedigree of the right against self(incrimination vis6N6 vis immunit! statutes" The da!s of inFuisition brought about the most despicable abuses against human rights" :ot the least of these abuses is the e)pert use of coerced confessions to send to the guillotine even the guiltless" To guard against the recurrence of this totalitarian method, the right against self(incrimination was ensconced in the fundamental laws of all civilized countries" ,ver the !ears, however, came the need to assist government in its tas@ of containing crime for peace and order is a necessar! matri) of public welfare" To accommodate the need, the right against self(incrimination was stripped of its absoluteness" 9mmunit! statutes in var!ing shapes were enacted which would allow government to compel a witness to testif! despite his plea of the right against self(incrimination" To insulate these statutes from the virus of unconstitutionalit!, a witness is given what has come to be @nown as transactional or a use(derivative(use immunit! ) ) )" Ruite clearl!, these immunit! statutes are not a bonanza from government" Those given the privilege of immunit! paid a high price for it H the surrender of their precious right to be silent" ,ur hierarch! of values demands that the right against self(incrimination and the right to be silent should be accorded greater respect and protection" $aws that tend to erode the force of these preeminent rights must necessaril! be given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual" The government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it, rightl!" (<a%a, 5r. v. San2iganbayan, ,!1 SCR "8!, 8+7@8+*, %ril ,*, 1994, En 9anc >=uno?# T,e R$%,) (%($&+) D"u7le @e"-(!d. "((. 8iscuss the t1o 7inds of double 2eopardy. Held2 ,ur &ill of 'ights deals with two (2) @inds of double 6eopard!" The first sentence of #lause 20, ection ., Article 999 of the #onstitution ordains that >no person shall be twice put in 6eopard! of punishment for the same offense"? The second sentence of said clause provides that >if an act is punishable b! a law and an ordinance, conviction or acFuittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act"? Thus, the first sentence prohibits double 6eopard! of punishment for the same offense whereas, the second contemplates double 6eopard! of punishment for the same act" 7nder the first sentence, one ma! be twice put in 6eopard! of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case" The second sentence applies, even if the offense charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of statute" 9f the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acFuittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other" 9ncidentall!, such conviction or acFuittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double 6eopard! of punishment or the same offense" o long as 6eopard! has been attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the 157

defense ma! be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acFuittal in either case" -lsewhere stated, where the offense charged are penalized either b! different sections of the same statute or b! different statutes, the important inFuir! relates to the identit! of offenses charged" The constitutional protection against double 6eopard! is available onl! where an identit! is shown to e)ist between the earlier and the subseFuent offenses charged" The Fuestion of identit! or lac@ of identit! of offenses is addressed b! e)amining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved" (=eo%le v. JuiFa2a, ,79 SCR 191, 5uly ,4, 199*# "($. Bhat must be proved to substantiate a claim of double 2eopardyC Bhen may legal 2eopardy attachC Held2 To substantiate a claim of double 6eopard!, the following must be proven= (.) A first 6eopard! must have attached prior to the second8 (2) the first 6eopard! must have been validl! terminated8 (2) the second 6eopard! must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessaril! included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof" $egal 6eopard! attaches onl!= (.) upon a valid indictment8 (b) before a competent court8 (c) after arraignment8 (d) when a valid plea has been entered8 and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the e)press consent of the accused" (Cuison v. C , ,89 SCR 179, %ril 17, 1998 >=anganiban?# "(,. n its decision in a criminal case, the *udge promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal. Bill the promulgation of the criminal aspect later constitute double 2eopardyC Held2 +etitioner contends that Sthe promulgation b! 3udge 'amos on April 5, .//5 of the 'espondent #ourtPs decision of 3une 20, .//. b! reading its dispositive portion has effectively terminated the criminal cases against the petitioner 0 0 0.J 9n other words, petitioner claims that the first 6eopard! attached at that point" The #ourt is not persuaded" As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recover! of indemnit!" Eence, a decision in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the civil liabilities of an accused" Eere, trial court promulgated onl! the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal" NTOhe promulgation of the #A 4ecision was not complete" 9n fact and in truth, the promulgation was not merel! incomplete8 it was also void" 9n e)cess of its 6urisdiction, the trial 6udge rendered a substantiall! incomplete promulgation on April 5, .//5, and he repeated his mista@e in his April .2, .//6 ,rder" <e emphasize that grave abuse of discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial court void" ince the criminal cases have not !et been terminated, the first 6eopard! has not !et attached" Eence, double 6eopard! cannot prosper as a defense" <e must stress that 'espondent #ourtPs Fuestioned 4ecision did not modif! or amend its 3ul! 20, .//. 4ecision" 9t merel! ordered the promulgation of the 6udgment of conviction and the full e)ecution of the penalt! it had earlier imposed on petitioner" (Cuison v. C , ,89 SCR 179, %ril 17, 1998 >=anganiban?# "(<. Bhat are the e0ceptions to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal made 1ith the e0press consent of the accused or upon his o1n motion 1ill not place the accused in double 2eopardyC Held2 9n the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speed! trial was made upon motion b! counsel for petitioner before the trial court" 9t was made at the instance of the accused before the trial court, and with his e)press consent" Aenerall!, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acFuittal made with the e)press consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double 6eopard!" Eowever, this rule admits of two e)ceptions, namel!= insufficienc! of evidence and denial of the right to speed! trial" 4ouble 6eopard! ma! attach when the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonabl!, in violation of the accused;s right to speed! trial . ( lmario v. Court o1 %%eals, !77 SCR 1, <ar. ,,, ,++1, , n2 /iv. >Juisumbing?

158

"(-. f the criminal case 1as dismissed predicated on the right of the accused to speedy trial, but later the trial court reconsidered its decision and allo1ed the case to be reinstated as it noted that the delay in the trial 1as due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties and of the trial court, i.e., the presiding 2udge 1as promoted to the %ourt of 'ppeals, and his successor as trial 2udge 1as not immediately appointed, nor another 2udge detailed to his sala, is there violation of the accused@s right against double 2eopardyC Held2 Eere we must inFuire whether there was unreasonable dela! in the conduct of the trial so that violation of the right to speed! trial of the accused ) ) ) resulted" Dor it must be recalled that in the application of the constitutional guarant! of the right to speed! disposition of cases, particular regard must also be ta@en of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. &oth the trial court and the appellate court noted that after pre(trial of petitioner;s case was terminated ) ) ) continuous trial was set ) ) )" The scheduled hearings, however, were cancelled when the presiding 6udge was promoted to the #ourt of Appeals, and his successor as trial 6udge was not immediatel! appointed, nor another 6udge detailed to his sala" B)) As observed b! respondent appellate court, dela! in the trial was due to circumstances be!ond the control of the parties and of the trial court" ) ) )" Thus, after a closer anal!sis of these successive events, the trial court realized that the dates of the hearings were transferred for valid grounds" Eence, the trial court set aside its initial order and reinstated the cases against petitioner, which order the appellate court later sustained" That there was no unreasonable dela! of the proceedings is apparent from the chronolog! of the hearings with the reasons for their postponements or transfers" ) ) ) There being no oppressive dela! in the proceedings, and no postponements un6ustifiabl! sought, we concur with the conclusion reached b! the #ourt of Appeals that petitioner;s right to speed! trial had not been infringed" <here the right of the accused to speed! trial had not been violated, there was no reason to support the initial order of dismissal" 9t follows that petitioner cannot invo@e the constitutional right against double 6eopard! when that order was reconsidered seasonabl!" Dor as petitioner;s right to speed! trial was not transgressed, this e)ception to the fifth element of double 6eopard! H that the defendant was acFuitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the e)press consent of the accused H was not met" The trial court;s initial order of dismissal was upon motion of petitioner;s counsel, hence made with the e)press consent of petitioner" That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said order, double 6eopard! did not attach" As this #ourt had occasion to rule in /eople v. .ampal, reiterated in /eople v. 9eviste, where we overturned an order of dismissal b! the trial court predicated on the right to speed! trial H 9t is true that in an unbro@en line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is eFuivalent to an acFuittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense" 9t must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speed! trial" These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to speed! trial has not been violated b! the tate" Dor this reason, private respondents cannot invo@e their right against double 6eopard!" &oth the trial court and the #ourt of Appeals were thus not in error when the! allowed reinstatement of the cases against petitioner" ( lmario v. Court o1 %%eals, !77 SCR 1, <ar. ,,, ,++1, ,n2 /iv. >Juisumbing? "$). s there double 2eopardy 1hen an accused 1as acquitted in a criminal case for rec7less imprudence but the civil aspect of the case 1as elevated to the %ourt of 'ppeals and the latter found him liable for indemnity and damagesC Held2 +etitioner opines that the #ourt of Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of the trial court on the lac@ of negligence or rec@less imprudence under the guise of determining his civil liabilit!" Ee argues that the trial court;s finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acFuittal, and not reasonable doubt" Ee submits that in finding him liable for indemnit! and damages, the appellate court not onl! placed his acFuittal in suspicion, but also put him in >double 6eopard!"? 159

+rivate respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioner;s guilt had not been proven be!ond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and uneFuivocal terms that petitioner was not rec@lessl! imprudent or negligent" Eence, impliedl! the trial court acFuitted him on reasonable doubt" ince civil liabilit! is not e)tinguished in criminal cases, if the acFuittal is based on reasonable doubt, the #ourt of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnit! and damages" +reliminaril!, petitioner;s claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnit! placed him in double 6eopard! is misplaced" ) ) )" <hen a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either b! acFuittal or conviction or in an! manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. This is double 6eopard!" Dor double 6eopard! to e)ist, the following elements must be established= (.) a first 6eopard! must have attached prior to the second8 (2) the first 6eopard! must have terminated8 and (2) the second 6eopard! must be for the same offense as the first. 9n the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in 6eopard! b! the filing of #riminal #ase :o" 066 and the 6eopard! was terminated b! his discharge" The 6udgment of acFuittal became immediatel! final" :ote, however, that what was elevated to the #ourt of Appeals b! private respondents was the civil aspect of #riminal #ase :o" 066" +etitioner was not charged anew in #A(A"'" #C :o" ./250 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense" The records clearl! show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal" 9n modif!ing the lower court;s 6udgment, the appellate court did not modif! the 6udgment of acFuittal" :or did it order the filing of a second criminal cases against petitioner for the same offense" ,bviousl!, therefore, there was no second 6eopard! to spea@ of" +etitioner;s claim of having been placed in double 6eopard! is incorrect" ,ur law recognizes two @inds of acFuittal, with different effects on the civil liabilit! of the accused" Dirst is an acFuittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of" This instance closes the door to civil liabilit!, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of an! act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such or omission" There being no delict, civil liabilit! e0 delicto is out of the Fuestion, and the civil action, if an!, which ma! be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of" This is the situation contemplated in 'ule ... of the 'ules of #ourt" The second instance is an acFuittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused" 9n this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactoril! established, he is not e)empt from civil liabilit! which ma! be proved b! preponderance of evidence onl!. This is the situation contemplated in Article 2/ of the #ivil #ode, where the civil action for damages is >for the same act or omission"? Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case" Eowever, the 6udgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish an! fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondaril!, different rules of evidence are applicable" Eence, notwithstanding herein petitioner;s acFuittal, the #ourt of Appeals in determining whether Article 2/ applied, was not precluded from loo@ing into the Fuestion of petitioner;s negligence or rec@less imprudence" (<anantan v. Court o1 %%eals, !7+ SCR !8", 5an. ,9, ,++1, , n2 /iv. >Juisumbing?# T,e R$%,) (%($&+) E< P"+) F(')" L(* (&d B$ll " A))($&de! "$+. Bhat is a bill of attainderC s /.8. +<$$ a bill of attainderC

Held2 NTOhe #ourt, in /eople v. Ferrer, defined a bill of attainder as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a 6udicial trial" -ssential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lac@ of 6udicial trial" This last element, the total lac@ of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalt! to be imposed, is the most essential . +"4" :o" .066 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder" 9t does not see@ to inflict punishment without a 6udicial trial" :owhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment" <hat the decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalt! that ma! be imposed, specif!ing the Fualif!ing circumstances that would aggravate the offense" There is no encroachment on the power of the court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved be!ond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possession of firearms has been committed and that the Fualif!ing circumstances attached to it has been established also be!ond reasonable doubt as the #onstitution and 6udicial precedents reFuire" (<isolas v. =anga, 181 SCR *48, *79@ **+, 5an. !+, 199+, En 9anc >Cortes?# 160

"$".

Bhat is an e0 post facto la1C s &.'. =o. <"#- an e0 post facto la1C

Held2 D0 post facto law, generall!, prohibits retrospectivit! of penal laws" '"A" 025/ is not a penal law" 9t is a substantive law on 6urisdiction which is not penal in character" +enal laws are those acts of the $egislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations8 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment" '"A" 1/15, which amended +"4" .606 as regards the andiganba!an;s 6urisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared b! the #ourt as not a penal law, but clearl! a procedural statute, i.e., one which prescribes rules of procedure b! which courts appl!ing laws of all @inds can properl! administer 6ustice" :ot being a penal law, the retroactive application of '"A" 025/ cannot be challenged as unconstitutional" +etitioner;s and intervenors; contention that their right to a two(tiered appeal which the! acFuired under '"A" 1/15 has been diluted b! the enactment of '"A" 025/, is incorrect" The same contention has alread! been re6ected b! the court several times considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutor! in nature that can be regulated b! law" The mode of procedure provided for in the statutor! right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against e0 post facto laws" '"A" 025/ pertains onl! to matters of procedure, and being merel! an amendator! statute it does not parta@e the nature of an e0 post facto law" 9t does not mete out a penalt! and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition" *oreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial" 9t has been ruled that ad6ective statutes ma! be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage" At an! rate, '"A" 025/ has preserved the accused;s right to appeal to the upreme #ourt to review Fuestions of law" ,n the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the upreme #ourt still has the power of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingl! overcome" (=an1ilo <. Lacson v. D0e Executive Secretary, et. al., (.R. )o. 1,8+9*, 5an. ,+, 1999 ><artine6?# A,4 &$WWW

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