RULE 131 Burden of Proof and Presumptions (Dean Hildegardo F. Iigo/Dean Willard B. Riano) As compiled and expanded by Atty.

Jess Zachael B. Espejo Section 1. Burden of proof. - Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (1a, 2a) BURDEN OF PROOF Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. We have previously noted, in our initial discussions on the definition of evidence, that evidence is the device by which we discharge the burden of proof. Thus, to discharge the burden of proof is the end sought to be achieved by the presentation of evidence. Simply put, burden of proof, or "onus probandi," refers to the obligation of a party to the litigation to persuade the court that he is entitled to relief. LATIN MAXIM EI INCUMBIT PROBATIO QUI DICIT, NON QUI NEGAT - The burden of the proof lies upon him who affirms, not he who denies. The burden of proof is also often associated with the Latin maxim semper necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit, the best translation of which seems to be: "the necessity of proof always lies with the person who lays charges." WHO CARRIES THE BURDEN OF PROOF? Criminal Cases In criminal cases, the burden of proof is on the prosecution, because under Rule 133 the accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is demonstrated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the case of criminal prosecutions, burden of proof is said to be pinned institutionally due to the constitutional mandate that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven guilty. The obligation to convince the trier of facts to show the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt is upon the prosecution, as a rule, throughout the trial (Stafford vs. United States, 300 Fed 537). However, when the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the defense to prove that the killing was justified (People vs. Tan, 315 SCRA 75). Civil Cases In civil cases, the usual principle is that whoever makes an affirmative allegation has the burden of proof. A party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it (GAMBOA, RODRIGUEZ, RIVERA & CO. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 117456, May 6, 2005, DE LA CRUZ vs. SISON, 451 SCRA 754, February 17, 2005). For example, in an eminent domain case, the local government that seeks to expropriate private property has the burden of proving to show the existence of compliance with the elements for the valid exercise of the right of eminent domain (JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN FOUNDATION, INC. vs. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005). In infringement cases, the burden of proof to substantiate a charge of infringement is with the plaintiff. But where the plaintiff introduces the patent in evidence, and the same is in due form, there is created a prima facie presumption of its correctness and validity. The decision of the Commissioner of Patent (now the Director of the Intellectual Property Office), in granting the patent is presumed to be correct. It is a basic rule that he who alleges must prove what is alleged (NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN vs. REYES, 452 SCRA 532, February 28, 2005; ACABAL vs. ACABAL, 454 SCRA 555, March 31, 2005). It is thus, inaccurate to state that the burden of proof solely rests on the

shoulders of the plaintiff. The burden of proof, under the clear terms of Sec. 1 of Rule 131, is the duty to present evidence not only to establish a claim but also a defense. Thus, if the plaintiff alleges that the defendant owes him a sum of money, the plaintiff has the burden to prove the debt. Conversely, if the defendant admits the debt but defends by alleging that it has already been paid, waived or otherwise extinguished, he has the burden to prove the extinguishment of the alleged obligation (MAYON HOTEL & RESTAURANT vs. ADANA, 458 SCRA 609 [2005]).

TEST FOR DETERMINING WHERE BURDEN OF PROOF LIES The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to obtain. If the defendant has affirmative defenses, he bears the burden of proof as to those defenses which he sets up in answer to the plaintiff's cause of action. Hence, if the defendant sets up the affirmative defense of prescription, he must prove the date when prescription began to run (AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY CO. vs. AYING, G.R. No. 144773, May 16, 2005).

WHERE BURDEN OF PROOF IS FIXED The burden of proof is fixed by the pleadings. The claim of the plaintiff which he must prove, is spelled out in his complaint. The defendant's defenses which he must likewise prove, are to be found in his answer to the complaint. The burdens of proof of both parties do not shift during the course of the trial. The burden of proof to establish that the defendant owes the plaintiff remains with the plaintiff. The burden of proof to establish that the loan has been paid remains with the defendant throughout the litigation.

BURDEN OF PROOF VERSUS BENEFIT OF ASSUMPTION He who does not carry the burden of proof carries the BENEFIT OF ASSUMPTION, meaning he needs no evidence to support his claim. Fulfilling the burden of proof effectively captures the benefit of assumption, passing the burden of proof off to another party. For example, in a criminal case, the prosecution carries the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused, conversely, has the benefit of assumption such that if, after the prosecution presents its evidence and the same is not sufficient to convict, the benefit of assumption, i.e. that the accused is presumed innocent, operates to cause the acquittal of the accused. He doesnt even have to present evidence. However, if the evidence of the prosecution is strong, it is deemed to have established a PRIMA FACIE CASE. Where a prima facie case is established, the burden of proof is effectively passed off to the defending party. The accused therefore must present evidence to establish his innocence. We will discuss the term prima facie case when we go to presumptions. Another example is in a case for damages due to reckless imprudence or what is known as a quasi-delict and where the maxim RES IPSA LOQUITOR applies. RES IPSA LOQUITOR literally means the thing speaks for itself. Negligence must be proved in a suit on a quasi-delict, so that the plaintiff may recover. The plaintiff therefore has the burden of proof to establish that the defendant is liable, pursuant to the general rule that he who alleges must prove. The defendant has the benefit of assumption. In a case where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies, the presence of facts and circumstances surrounding the injury clearly indicate negligence on the part of the defendant (Example: collision between a barge and a stationary object in the case of REPUBLIC versus LUZON STEVEDORING, September 29, 1967. The maxim applies whenever it is so improbable that such accident would have happened without the fault of the defendant, that a reasonable man could find without further evidence that it was so caused. The maxim throws on to the defendant the burden of disproving negligence. This time the defendant carries the burden of proof while the plaintiff has the benefit of assumption.

TWO SEPARATE BURDENS IN BURDEN OF PROOF 1. BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD - that of producing evidence;

Illustration of going forward with the evidence: For example after the existence of a debt has been proven by the creditor the burden of proving payment devolves upon the debtor. Where the debtor introduces evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence - as distinct from the general burden of proof - shifts to the creditor who is then under the duty of producing evidence to show non-payment. (JIMENEZ, ET AL, vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No,. 116960, April 2, 1996) In short, the burden of going forward is the burden of producing evidence. 2. BURDEN OF PERSUASION - burden of persuading the trier of fact that the burdened party is entitled to prevail.

EFFECT OF ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE or no evidence is presented CRIMINAL CASE: Accused is acquitted CIVIL CASE: a. When defendant does not file an answer- Plaintiff wins b. When defendant files an answer and sets up purely negative defenses and no evidence is presented by both sides - Defendant wins because plaintiff has not carried his burden c. When defendant files an answer and sets up affirmative defenses and no evidence is presented by both sides - Plaintiff wins Example: The defendant filed an answer: I admit that I borr owed money from the plaintiff, but the plaintiff has no reason to run after me because I have paid that account long time ago. [If no evidence is presented by both sides then plaintiff wins because the defendant admitted the existence of loan. And it is the defendants burden to prove his affirmative defense.]

BURDEN OF EVIDENCE Burden of evidence the duty resting upon a party, by means of evidence, to create or meet a prima facie case. The burden of evidence is the duty of a party to go forward with the evidence to overthrow the prima facie evidence against him (Bautista vs. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587). The burden of going forward with the evidence may shift from one side to the other as the exigencies of the trial require and shifts with alternating frequency. BURDEN OF PROOF vs. BURDEN OF EVIDENCE Bar Question 2004 Distinguish clearly but briefly between burden of proof and burden of evidence. Burden of proof is the obligation of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law (Sec. 1, Rule 130, Rules of Court). Burden of evidence is the duty of a party to go forward with the evidence to overthrow any prima facie presumption against him (Bautista vs. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587). Burden of proof NEVER SHIFTS, while burden of evidence is TRANSFERRED from one litigant to another depending on the progress of trial. Illustration: Plaintiff files a complaint for recovery of a defaulted loan. Defendant files an answer with a negative defense, denying the existence of the loan. At the start, the plaintiff has the burden of proof and also burden of evidence, he should go to trial and present evidence to show that he has a cause of action. If he has introduced enough proof that he has a cause of action, the burden of evidence will now be shifted to the defendant. If defendant presents enough evidence to prove his negative defense then the burden of evidence is shifted again to the plaintiff on rebuttal evidence. QUERY Can the accused in a criminal/civil case before presenting his own evidence ascertain conditionally or provisionally whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is enough to

convict him? Yes. In a criminal/civil case, the accused(defendant/plaintiff) can easily determine the sentiment of the court concerning the quantum of evidence presented by the prosecution(defendant/plaintiff) by simply filing a demurrer to evidence with leave of court.

PRINCIPLE OF NEGATIVING AVERMENT A negative averment does not have to be proven UNLESS the negative averment is an essential part of the cause of action or defense. Example: In an information for illegal possession of firearms, the information will contain an averment that the accused does not have a license to possess the firearm [negative averment]. In this case, the negative averment is an essential part of the commission of the crime, hence this must be proven.

DOCTRINE OF EQUIPOISE OR EQUIPONDERANCE RULE The doctrine refers to a situation where the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates. In this case the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof. Hence, where the burden of proof is on the plaintiff and the evidence does not suggest that the scale of justice should weigh in his favor the court should render a verdict for the defendant (RIVERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 284 SCRA 673; MARUBENI CORP. vs. LIRAG, G.R. No. 130998, August 10, 2001). The equipoise doctrine is based on the principle that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law (Sec. 1, Art. III, Constitution of the Philippines). Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof fails upon that issue. (RIVERA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 115625, January 23, 1998) Therefore, as neither party was able to make out a case, neither side could establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no better off than before they proceeded to litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they are. (Rivera, supra citing Municipality of Candijay, Bohol v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 530)

CASES WHERE THERE IS NO EQUIPOISE In criminal cases, where the evidence of both the defense and the prosecution are in equipoise, the accused is entitled to acquittal. In labor cases, if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter (MAYON HOTEL & RESTAURANT vs. ADANA, G.R. No. 157637, May 16, 2005), Take note that, in both instances, the doctrine of equipoise is not applied because one of the litigants are institutionally favored by a constitutional rule (accused) or a rule of statutory construction (employee). Bar Question 1995 Explain the equipoise doctrine in the law of evidence and cite its constitutional basis.

PRESUMPTIONS WHAT IS A PRESUMPTION Presumption is an inference as to the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from the proof of other facts.

A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action (Black's, 5th Ed., 1067 citing Uniform Rule 13; NJ Evidence Rule 13). IS PRESUMPTION EVIDENCE? A presumption is not evidence (California Evidence Code cited in Black's, 5th Ed., 1167). They merely affect the burden of offering evidence (1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Sec. 64). It is not evidence in itself but it is an assumption resulting from the evidence. In a sense, a presumption is an inference which is mandatory unless rebutted (29 Am Jur 29, Evidence, 181). Example: D is the debtor of C, creditor for P1 million payable in twelve (12) equal monthly installments. If evidence is introduced that the installment payment for December has been received by the creditor, a presumption arises that previous installments have been paid. This is because under the law, the receipt of a later installment of a debt, without reservation as to prior installments, shall give rise to the presumption that such installments have been paid (Art. 1176, Civil Code of the Philippines).

INFERENCE DISTINGUISHED FROM A PRESUMPTION An inference is a factual conclusion that can rationally be drawn from other facts (Computer Identics Corp. vs. Southern Pacific Co. [CA1 Mass]). It is however, one that is a result of a reasoning process. It need not have a legal effect because it is not mandated by law. A presumption is mandated by law and establishes a legal relation between or among the facts.

WHY IS PRESUMPTION LUMPED WITH BURDEN OF PROOF? The matter of presumptions and the matter of burden of proof are lumped together in our Rules of Evidence. This is because of the intimate connection between the two. Again, as a rule, the burden of proof lies with one who alleges, not upon one who denies. However, when there is an applicable presumption, the burden actually shifts to the party who denies to dispute the presumption. Verily, an unrebutted presumption is equivalent to proof already. An example here would be the allied presumptions in Torts and Damages relating to motor vehicle mishaps, to wit: Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. (n) Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n) In both provisions, the driver of a motor vehicle is presumed negligent. Normally, the plaintiff must prove that the driver was negligent. However, in these cases, all the plaintiff had to do is to present proof of violations of traffic regulations, which may not necessarily equate to negligence. If the defendant-driver fails to prove that he was not negligent, the presumption would remain unrebutted. The defendant therefore becomes liable. In other words, what is the peculiar utility of presumptions in the law on evidence? Presumptions effectively shift the burden of proof.

CLASSIFICATIONS

1. PRESUMPTION JURIS OR OF LAW - a deduction which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts. A presumption of law is an assumption which the law requires to be made from a set of facts. It must be made whenever the facts appear which furnish the basis for the inference. Such type of presumption is reduced to fixed rules and form part of the system of jurisprudence; 2. PRESUMPTION HOMINIS OR OF FACT- a deduction which reason draws from facts proved without an express direction from the law to that effect. A presumption is one of fact when the assumption is made from the facts without any direction or positive requirement of a law. As such, it is totally discretionary on the court and is derived from circumstances of a particular case through common experience of mankind An assumption of fact does not arise from any direction of the law. It arises because reason itself allows a presumption from the facts. If A attacks B without provocation, the logical presumption arises that A does not have tender feelings towards B. A presumption of fact is actually a mere inference because it does not necessarily give rise to a legal effect. CLASSIFICATIONS OF PRESUMPTIONS OF LAW 1. Conclusive - (presumptions juris et de jure) not permitted to be overcome by any proof to the contrary. A presumption is conclusive when the presumption becomes irrebuttable upon the presentation of the evidence and any evidence tending to rebut the presumption is not admissible. This presumption is in reality a rule of substantive law (29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, 183); 2. Disputable - (presumptions juris tantum) law permits to be overcome or contradicted. A presumption is disputable or rebuttable if it may be contradicted or overcome by other evidence (Sec. 2[b], Rule 131, Rules of Court). When evidence that rebuts the presumption is introduced, the force of the presumption disappears. Example: While evidence of receipt of payment of a later installment gives rise to the presumption that previous installments have been paid, yet when evidence is shown that prior installments remain unpaid, the presumption falls. PRIMA FACIE PRIMA FACIE is a Latin expression meaning on its first appearance, or by first instance; at first sight. The literal translation would be "from first face", prima first, facie face. It is used in law to signify that on first examination, a matter appears to be self-evident from the facts. In common law jurisdictions, prima facie denotes evidence which unless rebutted would be sufficient to prove a particular proposition or fact. Most legal proceedings require a prima facie case to exist, following which proceedings may then commence to test it, and create a ruling. This may be called facile princeps, first principles.

PRIMA FACIE CASE AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF In legal proceedings, one party has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for all the essential facts in its case. If they cannot, their claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties. A prima facie case might not stand or fall on its own; if an opposing party introduces other evidence or asserts an affirmative defense it can only be reconciled with a full trial. Sometimes the introduction of prima facie evidence is informally called making a case or building a case. For example, in a trial under Criminal law the prosecution has the burden of presenting prima facie evidence of each element of the crime charged against the defendant. In a murder case, this would include evidence that the victim was in fact dead, that the defendant's act caused the death, and evidence that the defendant acted with malice aforethought. If no party introduces new evidence the case stands or falls just by the prima facie evidence. Prima facie evidence need not be conclusive or irrefutable: at this stage, evidence rebutting the case is not considered, only whether any party's case has enough merit to take it to a full trial.

AIM OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMA FACIE An aim of the doctrine of prima facie is to prevent litigants bringing spurious charges which simply waste all other parties' time.

PRIMA FACIE AND RES IPSA LOQUITUR Prima facie is often confused with res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself"), the common law doctrine that when the facts make it self-evident that negligence or other responsibility lies with a party, it is not necessary to provide extraneous details, since any reasonable person would immediately find the facts of the case. The difference between the two is that prima facie is a term meaning there is enough evidence for there to be a case to answer. If the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the defendant must present evidence of his own to rebut or destroy the prima facie case so established. Res ipsa loquitur means that because the facts are so obvious, a party need explain no more. If the defendant is clearly negligent, the plaintiff does not even need to go forward with evidence to establish a prima facie case. For example: "There is a prima facie case that the defendant is liable. They controlled the pump. The pump was left on and flooded the plaintiff's house. The plaintiff was away and had left the house in the control of the defendant. Res ipsa loquitur."

Section 2. Conclusive presumptions. - The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: (a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led to another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (3a)

CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTIONS The conclusive presumptions under the Rules of Court are based on the doctrine of estoppel. Under this doctrine, the person making the representation cannot claim benefit from the wrong he himself committed (Phil. Price Assurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 164). Example: Persons who assume to be a corporation without legal authority to act as such shall be considered a corporation by estoppel and shall be liable as general partners (Sec. 21, Corporation Code of the Philippines).

FIRST CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION Related to the first kind of conclusive presumption is Article 1431, governing estoppel in general. Thus: Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

SPS. ALCARAZ vs. PEDRO M. TANGGA-AN, ET AL. G.R. No. 128568, April 9, 2003 To support their argument that the house necessarily became Virgilios property as a result of the acquisition of the lot on which the same was built, the petitioner spouses invoke the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Being an accessory, the house is necessarily owned by the owner of the lot on which it is built. There is no need, however, to disturb and analyze the applicability of this well-entrenched principle because the petitioner spouses are estopped from raising the same. Both parties knew that their contract pertained only to the lease of the house, without including the land. The

contract states: "1. That the lessor is the owner of a building of mixed materials situated at 16 Premier St., Mabolo, Hipodromo, Cebu City." At the time of the perfection of the contract, the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were aware that the NHA, and not Virginia, the lessor, owned the land on which the rented house stood yet they signed the same, obliged themselves to comply with the terms thereof for five years and performed their obligations as lessees for two years. Now they assume a completely different legal position. They claim that the lease contract ceased to be effective because Virgilios assumption of ownership of the land stripped the respondents of ownership of the building. They argue that, under Article 440 of the Civil Code, Virgilios title over the lot necessarily included the house on the said lot, thus automatically canceling the contract. Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive presumption that: Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions: (a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it; xxx xxx xxx

After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio acquired title over the lot.

DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL DANILO D. MENDOZA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 116710, June 25, 2001 There is nothing in the record that even suggests that respondent PNB assented to the alleged five-year restructure of petitioners overdue loan obligations to PNB. However, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner Mendoza, holding that since petitioner has complied with the conditions of the alleged oral contract, the latter may not renege on its obligation to honor the five-year restructuring period, under the rule of promissory estoppel. Citing Ramos v. Central Bank, the trial court said: The broad general rule to the effect that a promise to do or not to do something in the future does not work an estoppel must be qualified, since there are numerous cases in which an estoppel has been predicated on promises or assurances as to future conduct. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is by no means new, although the name has been adopted only in comparatively recent years. According to that doctrine, an estoppel may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice. In this respect, the reliance by the promisee is generally evidenced by action or forbearance on his part, and the idea has been expressed that such action or forbearance would reasonably have been expected by the promissor. Xxx The doctrine of promissory estoppel is an exception to the general rule that a promise of future conduct does not constitute an estoppel. In some jurisdictions, in order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel, a party bears the burden of establishing the following elements: (1) a promise reasonably expected to induce action or forebearance; (2) such promise did in fact induce such action or forebearance, and (3) the party suffered detriment as a result. It is clear from the foregoing that the doctrine of promissory estoppel presupposes the existence of a promise on the part of one against whom estoppel is claimed. The promise must be plain and unambiguous and sufficiently specific so that the Judiciary can understand the obligation assumed and enforce the promise according to its terms. For petitioner to claim that respondent PNB is estopped to deny the five-year restructuring plan, he must first prove that respondent PNB had promised to approve the plan in exchange for the submission of the proposal. As discussed earlier, no such promise was proven, therefore, the doctrine does not apply to the case at bar. A cause of action for promissory estoppel does not lie where an alleged

oral promise was conditional, so that reliance upon it was not reasonable. It does not operate to create liability where it does not otherwise exist. SECOND CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION Also related to the second kind of conclusive presumption is Article 1436 on commodatum and lease: Art. 1436. A lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or received, as against the lessor or bailor.

DEFINITION DATALIFT MOVERS, INC. vs. BELGRAVIA REALTY G.R. No. 144268, August 30, 2006 Conclusive presumptions have been defined as "inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong." As long as the lessor-lessee relationship between the petitioners and Belgravia exists as in this case, the former, as lessees, cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that Belgravia has valid title to or better right of possession to the subject leased premises than they have.

APPLICABILITY JOSIE GO TAMIO vs. ENCARNACION TICSON G.R. No. 154895, November 18, 2004 We are not unmindful of the standing rule that a lessee is estopped or prevented from disputing the title of the landlord in an action for recovery of possession of the leased premises. In Geminiano v. Court of Appeals, we stated: "x x x. The private respondents, as lessees who had undisturbed possession for the entire term under the lease, are then estopped to deny their landlord's title, or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but also in some third person while they remain in possession of the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title." Indeed, the relation of lessor and lessee does not depend on the former's title but on the agreement between the parties, followed by the possession of the premises by the lessee under such agreement. As long as the latter remains in undisturbed possession, it is immaterial whether the lessor has a valid title -- or any title at all -- at the time the relationship was entered into. Between the present parties, the lease -- which was actually a sublease -- was effective. And respondent had a colorable right to lease the premises by virtue of the assignment even if, as against the owner, both the assignment and the sublease were ineffectual.

EXCEPTIONS The conclusive presumption set forth in Rule 131, Section 2(b) does not apply: 1. In a case where the landlord-tenant relationship has not been sufficiently established or where the very existence of the relationship is the very issue of the case; DIGNA CONSUMIDO vs. HON. REYNALDO G. ROS, ET AL. G.R. No. 166875, July 31, 2007 Neither is petitioner estopped in denying respondents title. The conclusive presumption set forth in Rule 131, Section 2(b) of the Rules of Court applies only when the landlord and tenant relationship has been sufficiently established. In the case at bar, this is precisely the issue to be resolved as petitioner has consistently alleged that there was no lease agreement between the parties. Moreover, respondents themselves have not asserted ownership over the leased premises, the truth of the matter being that respondents were never the registered owners of the leased premises.

2. If there was a change in the nature of the title of the landlord during the subsistence of the lease; FORTUNATO BORRE, ET AL vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL G.R. No. L-57204, March 14, 1988 The rule on estoppel against tenants is subject to a qualification. It does not apply if the landlord's title has expired, or has been conveyed to another, or has been defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the commencement of lessor-lessee relationship [VII Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines 87 (1973)]. In other words, if there was a change in the nature of the title of the landlord during the subsistence of the lease, then the presumption does not apply. Otherwise, if the nature of the landlord's title remains as it was during the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant, then estoppel lies against the tenant.

Section 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: IN GENERAL The presumptions contained in this provision are deemed disputable because they admit of proof to the contrary. They are thus termed prima facie presumptions only, prima facie because they are can, at first blush, be sufficient to form a conclusion. However, when adequate proof is presented, they may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. (a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong; This is of course related to the presumption of innocence in criminal cases as found in Article III. This also in consonance with the general rule in burden of proof that the prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused who therefore carries the benefit of assumption. A good question to ask at this point is: what provisions of law establish and strengthen the so-called presumption of innocence? 1. Article III, Section 14 (2). In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved xxx; 2. Rule 131, Section 3(a). That a person is innocent of crime or wrong. 3. Rule 133, Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. APPLICABILITY OF THE PRESUMPTION TO BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES The presumption applies to both criminal and civil cases inasmuch as the provision is worded innocent of a crime OR WRONG. A wrong may thus refer to the violation of a right that is the basis for a cause of action in a civil case. The effect of this presumption is to throw the burden of proof upon the party who alleges wrongdoing rather than the one who defends. (b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent; This is related to a basic principle in criminal law that criminal intent or mens rea is presumed. (c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; Revised Penal Code, Article 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

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Since a person is presumed to have intended the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act, even if the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. This is the principle of praeter intentionem in criminal law. The unintended effect is considered outside the intention. In civil law, there are also some incarnations of this doctrine specifically in the matter of damages, to wit: Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation. (1107a) Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. (d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; The presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns or that he would exercise diligence of a good father of a family or of a person of ordinary prudence. The diligence of a bonum pater familias is the default standard of care under the law. Thus, in the absence of any showing of irresponsibility on the part of the actor, he enjoys the benefit of being presumed to have acted with due care. However, take note that the reverse is true under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, otherwise known as the vicarious liability rule, to wit: Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) In the foregoing example, the persons mentioned are liable for the acts or omissions of others over whom they are responsible. Since the presumption is that a person always uses due care in all his concerns, he is deemed to have acted negligently in supervising his child, employee, student or ward when the latter causes damage. He may then escape liability by

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proving that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. If you analyze, this is what happens here: 1. The person who is responsible over another enjoys the presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. He thus enjoys the benefit of assumption; 2. When the child, employee, student or ward causes damage (FIAT ACCOMPLI), the benefit of assumption is lost. He is now adversely presumed to have been negligent in his supervision over the child, employee, student or ward. He therefore now bears the burden of proving that he was not negligent; 3. How does he discharge the burden and avoid liability? By proving that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced; This is known as the adverse presumption of suppression of evidence. This stems from human nature. A person with nothing to hide will not suppress. Only a man who will be affected by adverse evidence will attempt to hide it. EXCLUSIONS FROM THE PRESUMPTION Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not apply if: (a) The evidence is at the disposal of both parties. This means that the witness or evidence cannot really be produced by the party who seeks to use the adverse presumption against the suppressing party. It is subject to the exclusive control of the latter. Evidence can of course be produced by availing of compulsory processes of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum; In the same vein, if the prosecution witnesses who allegedly suppressed material evidence were presented in court and were cross-examined by the defense counsel, there can be no finding of suppression (PETER TARAPEN y CHONGOY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 173824, August 28, 2008). (b) The suppression was not willful. This means that the evidence cannot be produced by sheer force of circumstance and the suppression was not due solely to the suppressing partys will or caprice. In one case, the Supreme Court ruled that the suppression is not willful if the witness allegedly suppressed was suffering from a mental illness and could not stand judicial proceedings (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE, G.R. No. 137664, May 9, 2002); (c) The evidence is merely corroborative or cumulative. This means that the evidence allegedly suppressed must be one that would prove something for the first time and is thus not one that already exists on the record; and (d) The suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Examples of this principle are the following: 1. Matters covered by testimonial privilege such as Attorney-Client or Physician-Patient Privilege; The prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution.

2.

PROSECUTOR HAS EXCLUSIVE PREROGATIVE MARVIN ANGELES vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 175175, September 29, 2008 There was no suppression of evidence by the prosecution when it did not present Dennis as one of its witnesses. The prosecutor has the exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the prosecutor need not present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Besides, there is no showing that the witness who was not presented in court was not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that the adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4)

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the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if Angeles believed that the failure to present Dennis was because his testimony would be unfavorable to the prosecution, Angeles should have compelled Dennis appearance by compulsory process to testify as his own wi tness or even as a hostile witness.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO "RUDY" SORIANO G.R. No. 171085, March 17, 2009 Well settled is the rule that the testimony of a single, trustworthy and credible witness is sufficient for conviction. Likewise, the prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses. It need not present each and every witness but only such as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with if they are merely corroborative in nature. We have ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and is not fatal to t he prosecutions case.

THE PRESUMPTION APPLIES IF THE EVIDENCE ALREADY PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION STILL REQUIRES CORROBORATION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZENAIDA ISLA G.R. No. 96176, August 21, 1997 FACTS: A pregnant woman, the alleged kidnapper, was allegedly seen by 4 witnesses. One of the witnesses, Mr. Organez, had no personal knowledge. His testimony consisting solely of what was told him by other witnesses. RULING: While it may be true that the prosecution may not be compelled to present a witness or witnesses, it is undeniable that the non-presentation of a witness is tantamount to suppression of evidence, especially if the prosecution witnesses already presented, have no personal knowledge of the facts which could establish the elements of the crime charged. Hence, the non-presentation of witnesses, Cristy Manalastas, Julie and Baby Wycoco who allegedly saw the pregnant woman, raises serious doubt as to the truthfulness of the testimony of Mr. Organez.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO PADRIGONE G.R. No. 137664, May 9, 2002 Besides, the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be considered as suppression of evidence. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the rule that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not apply if (a) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; (b) the suppression was not willful; (c) it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and (d) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case. First, the defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the prosecution did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to call her to the witness stand. Second, Rowena was certified to be suffering from "Acute Psychotic Depressive Condition" and thus "cannot stand judicial proceedings yet." The non-presentation, therefore, of Rowena was not willful. Third, in any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister. SUMMARY: APPLICATION It applies to both criminal and civil cases. It can be used by either the prosecution or the defense, the plaintiff or the defendant. However, a survey of cases would hint that an invocation of the presumption by the accused rarely succeeds over the prosecution, the latter being held to have the prerogative of determining whom to present as witnesses. A similar survey of such cases would indicate that the adverse presumption of suppression of evidence affect the accused more than the prosecution.

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How do we harmonize this? 1. The accused is entitled to the presumption of innocence. Thus, the adverse presumption of suppression, being the weaker presumption, must yield to the first one. In principle, if the prosecution suppresses evidence, this can be used as reasonable doubt as to the moral certainty of the accuseds guilt; 2. The presumption will be taken against the accused ONLY if the application of the same does not impair his substantive rights or if the court does not base his guilt solely on the said presumption. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NICOLAS CARPIO, ET AL. G.R. No. 46109, September 22, 1939 Manuel Apruebo testified as a witness in his behalf, and presented as witnesses for the defense the accused Felino Constantino, Emiliano Santos and Nicanor Constantino, who were brought to the court from the Bilibid Prisons where they were confined, serving the penalties imposed on them. The prosecution failed to call the accused Nicolas Carpio, Cirilo Santos and Briccio Sarenas as State witnesses and, as they were not present in the court, neither did counsel for the defense of Apruebo present them as his witnesses. The court, commenting on this circumstance, stated that the suppression of these last three witnesses by counsel for Apruebo established the legal presumption that had they testified, their testimony would have been adverse to said appellant. The appellant alleges in his first assignment of error that the conclusion so arrived at by the court is erroneous and that it should have held that the prosecution was guilty of suppressing evidence. We find no merit in this assignment of error. It may be agreed with the defense that the non-presentation of the three witnesses did not create such presumption, basing our opinion on the fact that they were not appellant's Apruebo's witnesses but the prosecution's. However, the conclusion in question is immaterial and does not impair the substantial rights of the appellant, on the ground that the court did not base his guilt entirely on said presumption, but rather on the other evidence for the prosecution which establishes his conspiracy and direct participation in the crime. As to the alleged suppression of evidence by the prosecution, aside from the fact that there was no such thing, since it is the privilege of the prosecution to present the number of witnesses which it may deem sufficient, such suppression can neither be invoked nor assigned as error for the purpose of proving the innocence of the appellant. 3. While the prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine which evidence to produce, the presumption will lie against it if the evidence on record itself require further corroboration or are insufficient.

WHAT IS THE REMEDY OF THE ACCUSED? Considering the trend that the prosecution can rarely be affected by the adverse presumption in decided cases, what is the remedy of the accused who believes that the witness or evidence suppressed is adverse to the prosecution? His remedy is to compel the production of such evidence in court. For testimonial evidence, he must ask the court to subpoena the witness allegedly suppressed and use him as a hostile witness under Rule 132. For documentary evidence, he must also compel its production by means of a subpoena duces tecum. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMMEL DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 175929, December 16, 2008 If appellant felt that the prosecution was suppressing evidence, he should have asserted during trial his constitutional right "to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence on his behalf." This he did not do. Appellant cannot now be heard for the first time on appeal to complain that he could not secure the presence of witnesses at the trial. It does not appear that he made any effort to do so before or during the progress of the trial, or that he sought the aid of the court to compel the attendance of his witnesses, or objected to proceeding without them.

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RELATED PRESUMPTION OF FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE If a party resorts to fabrication of evidence, it is presumed that his case is weak for there would be no need to fabricate evidence if his case is strong. (f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter; This presumption stands to reason. There is no presumption of solutio indebiti or payment by mistake. On a lighter note, the law presumes a person to be careful when it comes to matters of money. One wouldnt part with his money unless he is entirely certain as to what it is being paid for. (g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter; There is no presumption of erroneous delivery such that when one delivers to another a thing, the latter or the person who accepts delivery is the owner of the thing. In civil law, delivery is an obligation to give. Delivery is thus a real obligation. In commodatum, for instance, the borrower delivers or returns the thing loaned to the lender who is the usually the owner of the thing. In sale, the seller delivers the thing sold to the buyer who, in the absence of conditions, then becomes the owner of the thing. NON NUDIS PACTIS SED TRADITIONEM DOMINIA RERUM TRANSFERANTUR. It is delivery as a consequence of certain contracts that transfers ownership. The presumption must be deemed to exclude deliveries made in pursuance of certain contracts. For instance, it does not apply to the perfection of contracts of bailment. In commodatum, when the lender delivers the thing to the borrower, the latter is clearly not the owner. In deposit, between the depositor and the depositary, it is the former who is the owner and not the latter. This is why the presumptions here are disputable which means that they are only sufficient if uncontroverted. (h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid; The term obligation here must be understood to mean evidence of the obligation. This could mean a promissory note or a bill of exchange such as a check. Where the maker of the check is already in possession of the same, there is a presumption that the obligation represented by the check has been paid. Related to this are the twin presumptions of payment under the Civil Code, to wit: Art. 1271. The delivery of a private document evidencing a credit, made voluntarily by the creditor to the debtor, implies the renunciation of the action which the former had against the latter. If in order to nullify this waiver it should be claimed to be inofficious, the debtor and his heirs may uphold it by proving that the delivery of the document was made in virtue of payment of the debt. (1188) Art. 1272. Whenever the private document in which the debt appears is found in the possession of the debtor, it shall be presumed that the creditor delivered it voluntarily, unless the contrary is proved. (1189) (i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for the later one is produced; Related to this is the following presumption: Art. 1253. If the debt produces interest, payment of the principal shall not be deemed to have been made until the interests have been covered. (1173) (j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possess, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him; There are two presumptions covered by this paragraph. First is known as the Adverse Presumption from the Possession of Stolen Goods. In Criminal Law, we can recall presumptions related to this. First is the presumption that the person in possession of the object of theft or robbery is deemed to be the author of the theft or robbery. Also, the person in possession of a

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falsified or forged document is deemed to be the author of the falsification or forgery. Take note that, in order for the presumption to apply, three guidelines must be met: COMMISSION (of theft or robbery must be established), POSSESSION (of the object stolen by the person against whom the presumption is to be taken against) and SUCCESSION (or more accurately, that the commission of the crime must be recent and the possession must immediately succeed the commission). The presumption, therefore, does not apply in cases where the possession is very remote in time from the crime committed. During the intervening period, the stolen property may have already changed hands so many times. The longer the time that elapses, the weaker the presumption becomes. Finally, the presumption applies only if the accused is unable to explain his possession satisfactorily.

(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment of the money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered the thing accordingly; This is related to the presumption in letter (h). (l) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or elected to it; There is no presumption of usurpation. (m) That official duty has been regularly performed; Together with (l), (m) constitutes the PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF OFFICIAL ACTS. RATIONALE PEOPLE vs. DE GUZMAN G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994 A disputable presumption has been as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly performed. Presumption of this nature is indulged by the law for the following fundamental reasons: first, innocence, and not wrong-doing, is to be presumed; second, an official oath will not be violated; and third, a republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed upon controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each governmental department or agent by every other such department or agent, at least to the extent of such presumption. Thus, this presumption evidences a rule of convenient public policy universally applied and without which great distress would spring in the affairs of men. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. REGULARITY versus INNOCENCE PEOPLE vs. DONALDO PADILLA G.R. No. 172603, August 24, 2007 The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by itself affect the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused, particularly if the evidence for the prosecution is weak. People v. Mirantes (1992) so teaches: The oft-cited presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot by itself affect the constitutional presumption of innocence enjoyed by an accused, particularly when the prosecutions evidence is weak. The evidence of the prosecution must be strong enough to pierce the shield of this presumptive innocence and to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. And where the

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evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to overcome this presumption, necessarily, the judgment of conviction of the court a quo must be set aside. The onus probandi on the prosecution is not discharged by casting doubts upon the innocence of an accused, but by eliminating all reasonable doubts as to his guilt.

(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction; (o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them; The foregoing presumptions are known collectively as the PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF JUDICIAL ACTS. (p) That private transactions have been fair and regular; This is the so-called PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS. DUTCH BOY PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. RONALD SENIEL G.R. No. 170008, January 19, 2009 Good faith is always presumed, and it is the burden of the party claiming otherwise to adduce clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

JOSEPH REMENTIZO vs. HEIRS OF PELAGIA VDA. DE MADARIETA G.R. No. 170318, January 15, 2009 Fraud is a question of fact which must be alleged and proved. Fraud cannot be presumed and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. (q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed; This presumption is still as to regularity. It is deemed broader because it appears to cover the ordinary course of business of both public and private transactions. (r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract; (s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration; Related to these is Article 1354 of the Civil Code: Art. 1354. Although the cause is not stated in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary. (1277) (t) That an endorsement of negotiable instrument was made before the instrument was overdue and at the place where the instrument is dated; A holder of a negotiable instrument is always presumed to be a holder in due course.

(u) That a writing is truly dated; (v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail; BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE G. R. No. 157064 August 7, 2006 Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that if the taxpayer denies ever having received an assessment from the BIR, it is incumbent upon the latter to prove by competent evidence that such notice was indeed received by the addressee. The onus probandi was shifted to respondent to prove by contrary evidence that the Petitioner received the assessment in the due course of mail. The Supreme Court has consistently held that while a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the course of mail, this is merely a disputable presumption subject to controversion and a direct denial thereof shifts the burden to the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee (Republic vs.

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Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 351). Thus as held by the Supreme Court in Gonzalo P. Nava vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA 104, January 30, 1965: "The facts to be proved to raise this presumption are (a) that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid, and (b) that it was mailed. Once these facts are proved, the presumption is that the letter was received by the addressee as soon as it could have been transmitted to him in the ordinary course of the mail. But if one of the said facts fails to appear, the presumption does not lie. (VI, Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed, 56-57 citing Enriquez vs. Sunlife Assurance of Canada, 41 Phil 269)." XXX In Protectors Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that when a mail matter is sent by registered mail, there exists a presumption, set forth under Section 3(v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that it was received in the regular course of mail. The facts to be proved in order to raise this presumption are: (a) that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid; and (b) that it was mailed. While a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, this is still merely a disputable presumption subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the burden upon the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee. Take note of the following provisions also under the rules of Civil Procedure: RULE 13 FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS AND OTHER PAPERS Sec. 12. Proof of filing. The filing of a pleading or paper shall be proved by its existence in the record of the case. If it is not in the record, but is claimed to have been filed personally, the filing shall be proved by the written or stamped acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk of court on a copy of the same; if filed by registered mail, by the registry receipt and by the affidavit of the person who did the mailing, containing a full statement of the date and place of depositing the mail in the post office in a sealed envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if not delivered. Sec. 13. Proof of service. Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. (w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft; (2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not been known for four years; (4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has well-founded belief that the absent

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spouse is already death. In case of disappearance, where there is a danger of death the circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case, before marrying again, the spouse present must institute a summary proceedings as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. SUMMARY General rule: The absentee is presumed dead for all purposes after an absences of SEVEN (7) YEARS. First, the absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of TEN (10) YEARS. Second, if the absentee disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of FIVE (5) YEARS shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. Third, the period of FOUR (4) YEARS is sufficient to presume a person dead for all purposes, including the opening of his succession under the following circumstances: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft with is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aircraft; (2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed hostilities, and has been missing for four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and whose existence has not been known for four years; (4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has wellfounded belief that the absent spouse is already death. Fourth, where there is a danger of death the circumstances hereinabove provided, an absence of only TWO (2) YEARS shall be sufficient for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. Take note of the following provision from the Family Code: Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or fact; (y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and ordinary nature habits of life; (z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of co-partneship; Under the Civil Code: Art. 1825. When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct, represents himself, or consents to another representing him to anyone, as a partner in an existing partnership or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is liable to any such persons to whom such

Exception:

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representation has been made, who has, on the faith of such representation, given credit to the actual or apparent partnership, and if he has made such representation or consented to its being made in a public manner he is liable to such person, whether the representation has or has not been made or communicated to such person so giving credit by or with the knowledge of the apparent partner making the representation or consenting to its being made: (1) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as though he were an actual member of the partnership; (2) When no partnership liability results, he is liable pro rata with the other persons, if any, so consenting to the contract or representation as to incur liability, otherwise separately. When a person has been thus represented to be a partner in an existing partnership, or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is an agent of the persons consenting to such representation to bind them to the same extent and in the same manner as though he were a partner in fact, with respect to persons who rely upon the representation. When all the members of the existing partnership consent to the representation, a partnership act or obligation results; but in all other cases it is the joint act or obligation of the person acting and the persons consenting to the representation. (n)

CORPORATION BY ESTOPPEL Take note also of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines: Section 21. Corporation by estoppel. - All persons who assume to act as a corporation knowing it to be without authority to do so shall be liable as general partners for all debts, liabilities and damages incurred or arising as a result thereof: Provided, however, That when any such ostensible corporation is sued on any transaction entered by it as a corporation or on any tort committed by it as such, it shall not be allowed to use as a defense its lack of corporate personality. One who assumes an obligation to an ostensible corporation as such, cannot resist performance thereof on the ground that there was in fact no corporation. LIM TONG LIM vs. PHILIPPINE FISHING GEAR INDUSTRIES, INC. G.R. No. 136448, November 3, 1999 Thus, even if the ostensible corporate entity is proven to be legally nonexistent, a party may be estopped from denying its corporate existence. "The reason behind this doctrine is obvious an unincorporated association has no personality and would be incompetent to act and appropriate for itself the power and attributes of a corporation as provided by law; it cannot create agents or confer authority on another to act in its behalf; thus, those who act or purport to act as its representatives or agents do so without authority and at their own risk. And as it is an elementary principle of law that a person who acts as an agent without authority or without a principal is himself regarded as the principal, possessed of all the right and subject to all the liabilities of a principal, a person acting or purporting to act on behalf of a corporation which has no valid existence assumes such privileges and obligations and becomes personally liable for contracts entered into or for other acts performed as such agent. The doctrine of corporation by estoppel may apply to the alleged corporation and to a third party. In the first instance, an unincorporated association, which represented itself to be a corporation, will be estopped from denying its corporate capacity in a suit against it by a third person who relied in good faith on such representation. It cannot allege lack of personality to be sued to evade its responsibility for a contract it entered into and by virtue of which it received advantages and benefits. On the other hand, a third party who, knowing an association to be unincorporated, nonetheless treated it as a corporation and received benefits from it, may be barred from denying its corporate existence in a suit brought against the alleged corporation. In such case, all those who benefited from the transaction made by the ostensible corporation, despite knowledge of its legal defects, may be held liable for contracts they impliedly assented to or took advantage of.

CHRISTIAN CHILDREN'S FUND vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. L-84502, June 30, 1989

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When a third person has entered into a contract with an association which represented itself to be a corporation, the association will be estopped from denying its corporate capacity in a suit against it by such third person. It cannot allege lack of capacity to be sued to evade responsibility on a contract it had entered into and by virtue of which it received advantages and benefits. REYNALDO M. LOZANO vs. DE LOS SANTOS G.R. No. 125221, June 19, 1997 Corporation by estoppel is founded on principles of equity and is designed to prevent injustice and unfairness. It applies when persons assume to form a corporation and exercise corporate functions and enter into business relations with third person. Where there is no third person involved and the conflict arises only among those assuming the form of a corporation, who therefore know that it has not been registered, there is no corporation by estoppel. (aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; (bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under void marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry. (cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other and who have acquire properly through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of money and evidences of credit are equal. (dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. Under the Family Code: Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage; (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of the nature; This is known as the PRESUMPTION OF CONTINUITY OF EXISTENCE (Please see IIGO Notes). (ff) That the law has been obeyed; (gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or published by public authority, was so printed or published; (hh) That a printed or published book, purporting contain reports of cases adjudged in tribunals of the country where the book is published, contains correct reports of such cases;

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(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him when such presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his successor in interest; (jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and the age of the sexes, according to the following rules: 1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have survived; 2. If both were above the age sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived; 3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have survived; 4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived, if the sex be the same, the older; 5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived. (kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time. (5a) Under the Civil Code: Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.

Section 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. - There is no presumption of legitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation. (6)

OTHER PRESUMPTIONS CIVIL CODE Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Art. 446. All works, sowing, and planting are presumed made by the owner and at his expense, unless the contrary is proved. (359) Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. Art. 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof. Art. 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved. Art. 554. A present possessor who shows his possession at some previous time, is presumed to have held possession also during the intermediate period, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Art. 659. The existence of an easement of party wall is presumed, unless there is a title, or exterior sign, or proof to the contrary: (1) In dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to the point of common elevation;

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(2) In dividing walls of gardens or yards situated in cities, towns, or in rural communities; (3) In fences, walls and live hedges dividing rural lands. Art. 661. Ditches or drains opened between two estates are also presumed as common to both, if there is no title or sign showing the contrary. There is a sign contrary to the part-ownership whenever the earth or dirt removed to open the ditch or to clean it is only on one side thereof, in which case the ownership of the ditch shall belong exclusively to the owner of the land having this exterior sign in its favor. Art. 759. There being no stipulation regarding the payment of debts, the donee shall be responsible therefor only when the donation has been made in fraud of creditors. The donation is always presumed to be in fraud of creditors, when at the time thereof the donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay his debts prior to the donation. Art. 940. In alternative legacies or devises, the choice is presumed to be left to the heir upon whom the obligation to give the legacy or devise may be imposed, or the executor or administrator of the estate if no particular heir is so obliged. Art. 1138. In the computation of time necessary for prescription the following rules shall be observed: (1) The present possessor may complete the period necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of his grantor or predecessor in interest; (2) It is presumed that the present possessor who was also the possessor at a previous time, has continued to be in possession during the intervening time, unless there is proof to the contrary; (3) The first day shall be excluded and the last day included. Art. 1196. Whenever in an obligation a period is designated, it is presumed to have been established for the benefit of both the creditor and the debtor, unless from the tenor of the same or other circumstances it should appear that the period has been established in favor of one or of the other. Art. 1208. If from the law, or the nature or the wording of the obligations to which the preceding article refers the contrary does not appear, the credit or debt shall be presumed to be divided into as many shares as there are creditors or debtors, the credits or debts being considered distinct from one another, subject to the Rules of Court governing the multiplicity of suits. Art. 1265. Whenever the thing is lost in the possession of the debtor, it shall be presumed that the loss was due to his fault, unless there is proof to the contrary, and without prejudice to the provisions of article 1165. This presumption does not apply in case of earthquake, flood, storm, or other natural calamity. Art. 1272. Whenever the private document in which the debt appears is found in the possession of the debtor, it shall be presumed that the creditor delivered it voluntarily, unless the contrary is proved. Art. 1302. It is presumed that there is legal subrogation: (1) When a creditor pays another creditor who is preferred, even without the debtor's knowledge; (2) When a third person, not interested in the obligation, pays with the express or tacit approval of the debtor; (3) When, even without the knowledge of the debtor, a person interested in the fulfillment of the obligation pays, without prejudice to the effects of confusion as to the latter's share. Art. 1319. Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer.

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Acceptance made by letter or telegram does not bind the offerer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The contract, in such a case, is presumed to have been entered into in the place where the offer was made. Art. 1354. Although the cause is not stated in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary. Art. 1387. All contracts by virtue of which the debtor alienates property by gratuitous title are presumed to have been entered into in fraud of creditors, when the donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay all debts contracted before the donation. Alienations by onerous title are also presumed fraudulent when made by persons against whom some judgment has been issued. The decision or attachment need not refer to the property alienated, and need not have been obtained by the party seeking the rescission. In addition to these presumptions, the design to defraud creditors may be proved in any other manner recognized by the law of evidence. Art. 1446. Acceptance by the beneficiary is necessary. Nevertheless, if the trust imposes no onerous condition upon the beneficiary, his acceptance shall be presumed, if there is no proof to the contrary. Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child. Art. 1572. If two or more animals are sold together, whether for a lump sum or for a separate price for each of them, the redhibitory defect of one shall only give rise to its redhibition, and not that of the others; unless it should appear that the vendee would not have purchased the sound animal or animals without the defective one. The latter case shall be presumed when a team, yoke pair, or set is bought, even if a separate price has been fixed for each one of the animals composing the same. Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases: (1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; (6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation. In any of the foregoing cases, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws. (n) Art. 1676. The purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that is not recorded in the Registry of Property may terminate the lease, save when there is a stipulation to the contrary in the contract of sale, or when the purchaser knows of the existence of the lease. If the buyer makes use of this right, the lessee may demand that he be allowed to gather the fruits of the harvest which corresponds to the current agricultural year and that the vendor indemnify him for damages suffered. If the sale is fictitious, for the purpose of extinguishing the lease, the supposed vendee cannot make use of the right granted in the first paragraph of this article. The sale is presumed to be fictitious if at the time the supposed vendee demands the termination of the lease, the sale is not recorded in the Registry of Property. Art. 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the

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preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733. Art. 1752. Even when there is an agreement limiting the liability of the common carrier in the vigilance over the goods, the common carrier is disputably presumed to have been negligent in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration. Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. Art. 1875. Agency is presumed to be for a compensation, unless there is proof to the contrary. Art. 1981. When the thing deposited is delivered closed and sealed, the depositary must return it in the same condition, and he shall be liable for damages should the seal or lock be broken through his fault. Fault on the part of the depositary is presumed, unless there is proof to the contrary. As regards the value of the thing deposited, the statement of the depositor shall be accepted, when the forcible opening is imputable to the depositary, should there be no proof to the contrary. However, the courts may pass upon the credibility of the depositor with respect to the value claimed by him. When the seal or lock is broken, with or without the depositary's fault, he shall keep the secret of the deposit. Art. 1982. When it becomes necessary to open a locked box or receptacle, the depositary is presumed authorized to do so, if the key has been delivered to him; or when the instructions of the depositor as regards the deposit cannot be executed without opening the box or receptacle. Art. 2163. It is presumed that there was a mistake in the payment if something which had never been due or had already been paid was delivered; but he from whom the return is claimed may prove that the delivery was made out of liberality or for any other just cause.

RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE RULE 6 ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions relation to electronic signature. Upon the authentication of an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that: (a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates; (b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or approving the electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such persons consent to the transaction embodied therein; and (c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verity the electronic signature operated without error or fault. SEC. 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. Upon the authentication of a digital signature, it shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that: (a) The information contained in a certificate is correct; (b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate; (c) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was signed; and (d) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein

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