ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) - Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No.

156052, February 13, 2008- Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced [to] relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or [local government unit] LGU's exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals' right to property, the former should prevail,". - Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. DSWD,et al., GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003)- When conditions so demand, as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process clause, must yield to the general welfare. - Yrasuegi vs. PAL, Inc., 565 SCRA 467- In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the constitution cannot be invoked. The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. - Procedural Due Process- Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca Serano vs NLRC, 323 SCRA 445- Due process clause of the constitution is a limitation on government powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code. - Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534- The license to carry firearm is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside of one's residence maybe revoked at anytime. - MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005- A license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the State, which may be suspended or revoked by the State in the exercise of police power. - Mercury Drug Corp. vs. Serrano, March 10, 2006- In dismissing an employee, the employer must serve the employee two notices: (1) the first to inform the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which the employer seeks his dismissal, and (2) the second to inform the employee of his employer's decision to terminate him. The first notice must state that the employer seeks dismissal for the act or omission charged against the employee, otherwise, the notice does not comply with the rules. - Macias vs. Macias, September 3, 2003- Denial of due process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever branch of the government the impress of nullity.

- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001- Alleged violations of the right to impartiality due to adverse publicity must be substantiated by proof of actual prejudice. - Alauya vs. COMELEC, 395 SCRA 742- due process is satisfied even if there was no oral argument if a party was able to file pleadings. - INSTANCES WHEN HEARINGS ARE NOT NECESSARY: 1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasilegislative functions; 2. Abatement of nuisance per se; 3. Granting by courts of provisional remedies; 4. Preventive suspension; (Co. Vs. Barbers) 5. Removal of temporary employees in the government service; 6. Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy by the BIR Commissioner; 7. Cancellation of passport of a person charged with a crime; 8. Issuance of sequestration orders 9. Judicial order which prevents an accused from traveling abroad 10. Suspension of bank's operations by the Monetary Board upon a prima facie finding of liquidity problems in such bank. 11. Extradition proceedings ([evaluation stage]- Sec of Justice vs. Lantion; Cuevas vs. Munoz, 2000) 12. Reinvestigation (criminal cases) Ang Tibay vs. CIR, Administrative Due Process Equal Protection of the Law - Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008 Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. - People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Election to the position of a Congressman is not reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

- USA vs. Puruganan, September 3, 2002- The position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

- Farias vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, December 10, 2003, Substantive distinctions exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the people while the latter hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing authority. - Quinto vs. COMELEC, December 1, 2009 - The Court held that there was no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. "In considering persons holding appointive positions ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment," the Court said. - The Court further said that the challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being overbroad for the following reasons: First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. The Court said for a government utility worker, who will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for 2010 elections, to use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world was unimaginable. - Second, the provision was directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non-partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal, or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale,

Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures - The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, GR No. 180908, October 7, 2008)-is a gurarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Art. III, Sec. 2.

- PROBABLE CAUSE- Read: Stone Hill vs. Diokno; Lim vs. Felix; Webb vs. de Leon; Roan vs. Gonzales; Papa vs. Mago; Aniag vs. COMELEC. - Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in plain view is justified only when: 1. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless

arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; 2. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be there where they are; 3. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and 4. plain view justified the seizure without further search conducted. - Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400- The following are valid warrantless searches and seizures: 1. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA 280; PP vs. Estella, 395 SCRA 553); 2. search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582); 3. seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was not apparent and established until after they have been turned over to the Chinese embassy and the Bureau of Immigration for verification. Hence, not considered as evidence in plain view); 4. customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005); 5. waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2. person waiving has knowledge of such right, actually or constructively; and 3. he/she has actual intention to relinquish the right.) Silahis Int'l Hotel vs. Soluta, Feb. 20, 2006; Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA 611)- It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. 6. stop & frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search - (Terry vs, Ohio, 1968; Malacat vs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is a stop of a person by law enforcement officer based upon "reasonable suspicion" that a person may have been engaged in criminal activity, whereas an arrest requires "probable cause" that a suspect committed a criminal offense. 7. Armed conflict (war time) 8. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escao, GR No. 129756-58, January 28, 2000); 9. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716), where a warrantless search was allowed where there was a prevailing general chaos and disorder because of an ongoing coup; 10. Conduct of "Area Target Zone" and "Saturation Drives" in the exercise of military powers of the President (Guanzon vs. Villa, 181 SCRA 623); 11. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October 23, 2003; PP vs. Johnson, GR No. 138881, December 18, 2000). WARRANTLESS ARREST HOT PURSUIT- Requisites: 1. The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer must be continuous from the time of the commission of the offense to the time of the arrest. 2. There must be no supervening event which breaks the continuity of the chase.

- Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June 1, 2007- Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant. - PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in flagrante delicto to be availed, the following requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit a crime. (2) such commission of a crime must be done in the presence and within the view of the arresting officer. - PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be immediacy between the time of the offense was time of the warrantless arrest. If there was an of time between the arrest and the commission warrant of arrest must be secured. a large measure of committed and the appreaciable lapse of the crime, a

- Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a crime committed in the presence of an arresting officer, it is not limited to actually seeing the commission of the crime. The requirement of the law is complied where the arresting officer was within an earshot from the scene although he did not personally witness the commission of the crime. - PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection against the State. The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Right applies only against the government and agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. - Only a judge may validly issue a warrant- EXCEPT: By administrative authorities (CID; BOC) only for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of violation of law. - Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner of the Immigration can issue a warrant of arrest against a foreigner who has been ordered to be deported. - SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been issued to more than one offense. - PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THINGS OR PERSONS TO BE SEIZED NOT REQUIRED- the constitution does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION IS NOT REQUIRED- It is only necessary that there be reasonable certainty or particularity as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. THE TEST as would be as to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the

discretion of the officer executing the warrant. VALLEJO VS. CA, 427 SCRA 658, April 14, 2004. Section 3- Privacy of communication & correspondenceIn the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Capt. G. Alejano, et al. vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005- The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees' personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen's privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights.

Roxas vs. Zuzuarregei, June 12, 2007- To prevent liability from attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his rights to free speech and privacy of communication. The invocation of these rights will not, however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one's irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.

Right to Privacy - Re Iggy Arroyo's right to privacy ( the right to be let alone) Read: PP vs. Molina, et al., - right to privacy may be waived by the defendant).

Basis: It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: Sections1; 2; 6; 8; and 17. Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information. (Ople vs. Torres, July 23, 1998.

In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Camilo Sabio, October 17, 2006- In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. - SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA, GR No. 157870, November 3, 2008- Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office and persons accused of crimes. However, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the said RA insofar as random drug testing for secondary and tertiary school students, as well as for officials and employees of public and private offices is concerned. The need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises.

Read: Ayer Productions vs. Capulong- The right of privacy or the right to be let alone is not an absolute right where the person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character.

Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law".

Relate to emails and other ways of communication.

RA 4200 (Anti-Wiretapping Act)-A violation of the Anti Wire Tapping Law (R.A. 4200) which prohibits not only the unauthorized taping of private conversations, but also: (a) the possession of such tapes with the knowledge of their nature as illegal wiretaps; (b) the replaying of the tapes to any person; and (c) to communicate the contents thereof either verbally or in writing, such as the provision of transcripts. The potential jail term, if convicted, ranges from six months to six years. - Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code - RA No. 9372 (Human Security Act)- The provisions of RA 4200 to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to intercept, and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion or spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons or any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. Provided, that surveillance, interception and recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized. Section 4- Freedom of expression- Bayan vs Ermita, April 25, 2006 - The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically codify the ruling in Reyes: | Reyes v. |Bagatsing | (G.R. No. L-65366, November 9, |1983, | 125 SCRA 553, |569) |8. By way of a summary. The | | B.P. |No. 880 | | | |Sec. 4. Permit when required | | | | | | |

|applicants for a permit to hold an |and when not required.-- A | |assembly should inform the |written permit shall be required| |licensing authority of the date, |for any person or persons to | |the public place where and the time|organize and hold a public | |when it will take place. If it |assembly in a public place. | |were a private place, only the |However, no permit shall be | |consent of the owner or the one |required if the public assembly | |entitled to its legal possession is|shall be done or made in a | |required. Such application should |freedom park duly established by| |be filed well ahead in time to |law or ordinance or in private | |enable the public official |property, in which case only the| |concerned to appraise whether there|consent of the owner or the one | |may be valid objections to the |entitled to its legal possession| |grant of the permit or to its grant|is required, or in the campus of| |but at another public place. It is|a government-owned and operated | |an indispensable condition to such |educational institution which | |refusal or modification that the |shall be subject to the rules | |clear and present danger test be |and regulations of said | |the standard for the decision |educational institution. | |reached. If he is of the view that|Political meetings or rallies | |there is such an imminent and grave|held during any election | |danger of a substantive evil, the |campaign period as provided for | |applicants must be heard on the |by law are not covered by this | |matter. Thereafter, his decision, |Act. | |whether favorable or adverse, must | | |be transmitted to them at the | | |earliest opportunity. Thus if so |Sec. 5. Application | |minded, they can have recourse to |requirements.-- All | |the proper judicial authority. |applications for a permit shall | | |comply with the following | | |guidelines: | | |(a) The applications shall be in| | |writing and shall include the | | |names of the leaders or | | |organizers; the purpose of such | | |public assembly; the date, time | | |and duration thereof, and place | | |or streets to be used for the | | |intended activity; and the | | |probable number of persons | | |participating, the transport and| | |the public address systems to be| | |used. | | |(b) The application shall | | |incorporate the duty and | | |responsibility of applicant | | |under Section 8 hereof. | | |(c) The application shall be | | |filed with the office of the | | |mayor of the city or | | |municipality in whose | | |jurisdiction the intended | | |activity is to be held, at least| | |five (5) working days before the| | |scheduled public assembly. | | |(d) Upon receipt of the | | |application, which must be duly | | |acknowledged in writing, the | | |office of the city or municipal | | |mayor shall cause the same to |

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|immediately be posted at a | |conspicuous place in the city or| |municipal building. | | | |Sec. 6. Action to be taken on | |the application. | |(a) It shall be the duty of the | |mayor or any official acting in | |his behalf to issue or grant a | |permit unless there is clear and| |convincing evidence that the | |public assembly will create a | |clear and present danger to | |public order, public safety, | |public convenience, public | |morals or public health. | |(b) The mayor or any official | |acting in his behalf shall act | |on the application within two | |(2) working days from the date | |the application was filed, | |failing which, the permit shall | |be deemed granted. Should for | |any reason the mayor or any | |official acting in his behalf | |refuse to accept the application| |for a permit, said application | |shall be posted by the applicant| |on the premises of the office | |of the mayor and shall be deemed| |to have been filed. | |(c) If the mayor is of the view | |that there is imminent and grave| |danger of a substantive evil | |warranting the denial or | |modification of the permit, he | |shall immediately inform the | |applicant who must be heard on | |the matter. | |(d) The action on the permit | |shall be in writing and served | |on the applica[nt] within | |twenty-four hours. | |(e) If the mayor or any official| |acting in his behalf denies the | |application or modifies the | |terms thereof in his permit, the| |applicant may contest the | |decision in an appropriate court| |of law. | |(f) In case suit is brought | |before the Metropolitan Trial | |Court, the Municipal Trial | |Court, the Municipal Circuit | |Trial Court, the Regional Trial | |Court, or the Intermediate | |Appellate Court, its decisions | |may be appealed to the | |appropriate court within | |forty-eight (48) hours after |

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|receipt of the same. No appeal |bond and record on appeal shall |be required. A decision |granting such permit or |modifying it in terms |satisfactory to the applicant |shall be immediately executory. |(g) All cases filed in court |under this section shall be |decided within twenty-four (24) |hours from date of filing. |Cases filed hereunder shall be |immediately endorsed to the |executive judge for disposition |or, in his absence, to the next |in rank. |(h) In all cases, any decision |may be appealed to the Supreme |Court. |(i) Telegraphic appeals to be |followed by formal appeals are |hereby allowed. |

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- It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. - In sum, the Supreme Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that "in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny." - For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard. - IBP v. Atienza, GR No. 175241, February 24, 2010- Atienza gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP which should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived

imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue under BP 880, the Public Assembly Act. It found that Atienza failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such modification. "Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which 'blank' denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereto," - Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC, May 5, 2001- Election surveys are covered by the protection to freedom of expression as they refer to the measurement of opinions and perception of voters as regards to a candidate's popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including the voter's preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period. - The prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) is invalid because: 1) it imposes prior restraint on the freedom of expression; 2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period; and 3) the government interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression. TESTS of Valid Government Interference: 1. Clear & Present Danger 2. Balancing of Interests 3. Dangerous Tendency Rule - Content based and content neutral regulations- Regulations of speech may either be content-based (the subject of the speech or utterance is sought to be regulated) and content-neutral (it regulates only the conduct associated with speech, such as the time, place and manner). To pass constitutional muster, any contentbased regulation must show that the government has a compeling or overiding interest in the subject regulation. A content neutral restriction, on the other hand, need only show an important government interest, as long as it leaves open alternative channels of communication. - Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February 15, 2008The acts of the Secretary of Justice and the NTC in warning television stations against playing the "Garci tapes" under pain of revocation of their licenses, were content-based restrictions and should be subjected to the "clear and present and danger test". - Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et al., GR No. 170270/GR No. 179411, April 2, 2009- The immediate implication of the application of the "strict scrutiny" test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of the government to prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners' constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression.

- ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000)- The prohibition of publication of exit poll or electoral survey would be unreasonably restrictive because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election day projections, but also for long term research. - MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, et al., January 17, 2005- P.D. No. 1986 gives petitioner "the power to screen, review and examine "all television programs," emphasizing the phrase "all television programs". Thus, when the law says "all television programs," the word "all" covers all television programs, whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. The principle assumes that the legislative body made no qualification in the use of general word or expression. It then follows that since "The Inside Story" is a television program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review. - Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 164785; Soriano v. MTRCB GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009-The Supreme Court said that Soriano's "statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child," and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Ang Dating Daan has earlier been given a "G" rating for general viewership. The Supreme Court said the MTRCB suspension was limited only to the show Ang Dating Daan, not Soriano, as the MTRCB "may not suspend television personalities, for such would be beyond its jurisdiction." - Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1, In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim is identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It must also be shown that a third party could identify him as the object of the libelous article. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following: 1. private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; 2. a fair and true report, made in good faith, without remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceeding which are not confidential in nature including any statement made therein or act performed by public officer. - A privileged communication may either be absolutely privileged (those which are not actionable or even if author acted in bad faith, e.g. speech by member of Congress therein or any committee thereof) or qualified privileged (those containing defamatory imputations which are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive, e.g., private communications and fair and true reports without any comments/remarks). - Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every

discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved. Section 5- Freedom of Religion- Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 - members of Jehovah's witnesses may validly refuse participating in flag ceremonies (singing the national anthem, saluting the flag, etc.) on account of their religious beliefs. - Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of religious freedom can be regulated when it will bring about clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State has a duty to prevent. However, criticism on certain catholic tenets and dogmas does not constitute clear and present danger. - Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 - Freedom of religion does not prohibit imposition of a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization. For the purpose of defraying cost of registration. - Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretary, 405 SCRA 497- Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the Office of the Muslim Affairs exclusive power to classify food products as halal, E. O. No. 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organization to interpret what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. The State has in effect forced Muslim to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. - Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March 10, 2005The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. Section 6- Liberty of abode & Right to travel- Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA; Silverio vs CARelate to suspension of deployment of OFWs to SARs infected countries. In relation to bail (Manotoc vs. CA; Santiago vs. Vasquez)- valid restriction on his right to travel. - Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 115132, August 9, 1995- The person's right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. Whether the accused should be permitted to leave the country for humanitarian reasons is a matter addressed to the court's discretion. (Yap vs. CA, GR No. 141529, June 6, 2001). - Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights- provides that

everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. - Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- provides that noone shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

Section 7- Right to Information - Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract is consummated. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions liked privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs. COMELEC - Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCTA 592- While access to official records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be regulated.

Section 8- Right to form Unions of public sector - United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15Congress, via Art. 125 of the Labor Code, validly prohibited supervisors from forming labor unions. the right to strike does form an integral part of the Right to Association.

Section 9- Expropriation

- Republic vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005- Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. - Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property "for national government infrastructure projects".

- Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., 551 SCRA 303There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedure under RA No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas Rule 67, the government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary, and Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purpose of taxation, unlike RA 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal value of the BIR, whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method. - ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous owners who were able to prove the commitment of the government to allow them to repurchase their land. - Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59- The State, through expropriation proceedings may take private property even if, admittedly, it will transfer this property again to another private party as long as there is public purpose to the taking. - Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking of a property subject to expropriation was by virtue of a law which was subsequently declared unconstitutional, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint, and not the earlier taking. - MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983, April 16, 2009 - For MCWD to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and second, the exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by the LWUA. - Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the individual's rights. Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property owner. - While the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that "the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment." To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against

their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. - Local government units possessed the delegated power of eminent domain, subject to judicial review (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community). - Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private capacity (patrimonial), in any expropriation proceeding, must be paid just compensation. If the property owned is public or otherwise held in trust then no compensation need be paid (City of Baguio vs. NAWASA). - To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs. Dulay). - The Court said that the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its implementing rules and regulations. It added that the State also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents' property without payment of just compensation. (GR No. 177056, Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land Incorporated, September 18, 2009)

- Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No. 148512, June 26, 2006, Cmsr. of IR vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., GR No. 148083, July 21, 2006 - The tax credit given to commercial establishments for the discount enjoyed by senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 is a form of just compensation for private property taken by the State for public use, since the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come directly from the State, but from private establishments concerned. - Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then power of eminent domain comes into play. It is inconsequential that private entities may benefit as long as in the end, public interest is served (Ardona vs. Reyes). - Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Taking of property for socialized housing is for public use. - Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired n the following order: 1) government lands; 2) alienable lands of the public domain; 3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; 4) lands within the declared areas for priority development, zonal improvement program sites, slum improvement and resettlement sites which have not yet been acquired; 5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and 6) privately-owned lands (City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar, 350SCRA 487 2001).

Section 10- Non-impairment clause - There is no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against real estate transactions entered or perfected even prior to its imposition. The contract clause is not a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. (Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance) - The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on judicial acts that impair contract. (Ganzon vs. Inserto, 123 SCRA 135) Sections 11 & 12 - Custodial Investigation Rights - Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs. Illinois. - Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399 SCRA 624 - PP vs. Vallejo, May 9, 2002- To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of counsel to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. Indeed counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. - PP vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1- RA 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning. - PP vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, A confession made to a private person is admission in evidence. - PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten inadmissible. confession is

- A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel (Ampong vs. CSC, 563 SCRA 293). - Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532- While investigations by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Section 13- Bail - Where the accused was originally charged with a capital offense but later convicted of non-capital and which he appeals, bail cannot be granted as a matter right (Obosa vs. CA, 266 SCRA 281).

- The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. The right is not available in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. In the absence of any provision in the constitution, the law or the treaty, adopting the practice of not granting bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors. - Notwithstanding the rule that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing: 1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and 2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling reasons (Gov't. of USA vs. Purganan, September 24, 2002). - Government of Hongkong Special Administrator Region vs. Judge Olalia, Jr., April 19, 2007 - Potential extraditee may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence" that the person is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. Section 14- Rights of accused 1. Presumption of innocence- as against presumption of law. 2. The right to be heard - The vagueness doctrine merely requires reasonable degree of certainty for the law to be upheld- not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude ( Estrada vs - . Desierto, November 19, 2001). - Despite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused appellant may not be sentenced to death under RA 7659 due to the failure of the information to allege relationship to the victim. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process (PP vs. Sandoval, 348 SCRA 476). - A person subject of an extradition request from another sovereign State is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not criminal proceeding which will call into operations all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The extraditee's right to notice and hearing is present only when the petition for extradition is filed in courtit is only then when he has the opportunity to meet the evidence against him (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377, 2000). 3. Right to public trial - A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only

implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe trial (Sec of Justice vs. Estrada, June 29, 2001). 4. Right to face to face confrontation - The absence of cross-examination by the defense due to the supervening death of plaintiff/witness does not necessarily render the deceased's testimony inadmissible. Where no fault can be attributed to plaintiff/witness, it would be a harsh measure to strike out all that has been obtained in the direct examination (PP vs. Narca, 275 SCRA 696). Section 16- Speedy disposition - Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was pending for preliminary investigation with the Office of the Tanodbayan for 3 years and it is indicated that the case is of simple nature and was prosecuted for political reasons, it is held that there was violation of the accused's right to speedy disposition of case. Right to speedy disposition extends to preliminary investigations. (Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70).

Section 17- Against Self-incrimination - The right against self-incrimination is available in administrative hearings when the nature of the penalty is penal in nature (like forfeiture of property or dismissal from employment) and the hearing partakes the nature of criminal proceeding (Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059). - Applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in the loss of the privilege to practice medical profession (Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners, ). - Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on 456- The right against self incrimination is administrative investigations that partake of the analogous to criminal proceedings. The privilege been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned cases in which punishment is sought to be visited whether a party of not. Banks, 541 SCRA extended in an nature of or are has consistently by law; and all upon a witness,

- The right against self-incrimination is defeated by the public nature of documents sought to be accessed (Almonte vs. Vasquez). - In the recent case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility and probative value of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Citing the first ever Supreme Court decision on the admissibility of DNA evidence, i.e., People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209, the Court, in Yatar, held that in assessing the probative value of DNA

evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: "how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests". - In Yatar, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contended "that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution". - The Court rejected the argument. It held that "the kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion", citing Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. 69401, 23 June 1987, 151 SCRA 279. It held that "the right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt" and that "it does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence". - Citing People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, 9 December 1999, 320 SCRA 383, the Court held that "although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress." - Hence, according to the Court, "a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved". It cited People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, 27 February 2000, 325 SCRA 835, where immediately after the incident, "the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel". In that case, the Court ruled that "there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination". It further stated that "the accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused". Section 18 - Involuntary servitude: (Article 272 of the Revised Penal Code) Exceptions:1. Punishment for a crime; 2.service in defense of the state 3.naval enlistment 4. posse comitatus 5.return to work order 6. patria potestas Section 19- Death penalty - The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There was no total abolition of the death penalty. The ConCom had deemed it proper for Congress to determine its reimposition because of compelling

reasons involving heinous crimes. (PP v, Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682). Section 20- Non-imprisonment for Debt - The civil liability from a crime is not "debt" within the purview of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for non payment of "debt". - Vergara vs. Gedorio, 402 SCRA 520- Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to a civil debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. Clearly, the non payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment. Section 21- Double Jeopardy - The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada was not concluded as a series of events prompted the Senate to declare the impeachment functus officio- thus, he was neither acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed without his express consent. Neither was there conviction/ It follows then that the claim of double jeopardy must fail. (Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001). - Under Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a provisional dismissal of a case becomes permanent after the lapse of one year for offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six years or a lapse of two years for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six years. - For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case against the accused, the following must be established: 1) the provisional dismissal had express consent of the accused; 2) the provisional dismissal was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; 3) the 1 yr. or 2-yr. period to revive had lapsed; 4) there is no justification to file a subsequent case beyond the period of one or two years. (PP vs. Lacson, May 28, 2002). - The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide was not a judgment of conviction. It merely approved the agreement between the parties on the plea to a lesser offense by the accused and the condition attached to it. (PP vs. Romero, 399 SCRA 386)

Section 22- Ex post facto law/bill of attainder - RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, is not penal law but a substantive law on jurisdiction whose retroactive application is constitutional (Lacson vs. Exec. Secretary, 301 SCRA 298). - Nasi-Villar vs. People, 571 SCRA 202- A law can never be considered ex-post facto law as long as it operates prospectively since its stricture would cover only offenses committed after and not before its enactment.

- The prohibition of ex post facto laws and bill of attainder applies to court doctrines pursuant to the maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet"- the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law ( PP vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 602). - The law making the use of an unlicensed firearm a qualifying circumstance in murder cannot apply retroactively. (PP vs. Patoc, 398 SCRA 62). - Re DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against accused being unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto was tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law- Describing the argument as specious, the Supreme Court held "no ex-post facto law was involved in the case at bar". It added that "the science of DNA typing involved the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court". Whereas, "an ex-post facto law referred primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented". (PP vs. Yatar, May 19, 2004)