TRIAL MEMORANDUM SKELETAL FRAMEWORK: TRIAL MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff, by counsel and unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully states:

STATEMENT OF FACTS In this action, the plaintiff seeks to _______________________ (Discuss briefly the nature of the cause/action). This case concerns the _________________________. (Present the salient and relevant facts in a narrative that supports your position without adding or distorting facts or making unreasonable inferences)

ISSUES This memorandum will discuss the following issues:

I. First, whether or not ___________________. (Spot and formulate the issue based on the conflicting legal claims of the parties. Issues are the disputed points of law as set out in the pro blem that are alleged by one party and denied by the other. Resolving these issues is necessary to decide the case) xxxx

ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION (Use the T-R-A-C formula for every issue: Thesis/Contention-Rule-Application-Conclusion)

I. The plaintiff is entitled to ________________ because _______________. (This is the contention/thesis. You must make it known at the very beginning of your discussion)

Article _______ of the __________, which states that _______________ clearly applies in this case. The case of ___________ likewise applies. As held in that case, ______________. (Determine and state what the applicable rule is. The applicable rule is the law, jurisprudence, legal principle or doctrine that is necessary to resolve the issue or to answer the question that the issue raises) In this instant case, ____________. (Here, interweave the elements of the applicable rule with the key facts. Show your reasoning and analysis based on the applicable rule and its application to the facts. Show which facts support or prevent the application of the rule step by step, element by element) Therefore, __________. (State your conclusion)

PRAYER WHEREFORE, plaintiff earnestly prays that ___________________. (State and enumerate the reliefs being sought) Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs and remedies that are just and equitable under the premises. xxxx

SAMPLE NO. 1

Republic of the Philippines COURT OF APPEALS SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION

JUANA DELA CRUZ Represented by her attorney-in-fact Atty. Jeffrey A. Archer Petitioner, -versusC.A. G.R. SP No.__ For: Ejectment JANE DOE Respondent,

X-------------------------------------------------------X MEMORANDUM

COMES NOW PETITIONER, through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court most respectfully submits this Memorandum in the above-entitled case and aver that: PREFATORY STATEMENT

This is a Petition for Review pursuant to Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court assailing the decision rendered by the Hon. Judge Lorenzo Menzon of the Regional Trial Court Branch 10 of Pasay City dated June 29,2009 where the dispositive portion of which reads and quotes: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City is hereby affirmed in toto So ordered. and an order made in August 6, 2009 denying the Motion for Reconsideration made by the petitioner where the dispositive portion reads of which reads and quotes:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit-defendant-appellants Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied The plaintiff, now the respondent, files against the defendant, now the petitioner, an action of Unlawful Detainer. The respondent wherein claims that she is the titled owner of the said parcel of land being leased by the petitioner and prays that the petitioner be ejected from the said property of the respondent. The petitioner, in answering the complaint, maintained that she cant be ejected invoking P.D.1517, P.D. 2016, APD 1-12 Pasay City and other related laws which grants statutory rights to bona fide tenants to acquire the said property through purchase of the said property in question. The petitioner is willing and able to buy the said property. The Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City has decided the case in favor of the ownership of the property which was evidently unprocedural considering that in an action of unlawful detainer, only issue of possession de facto can be raised and ignoring the said Presidential Decrees, Proclamations and Issuances which take part of the law of the land. This decision a quo made by the Metropolitan Trial Court and affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in toto which ought to be reversed or modified

THE PARTIES

1.

The Petitioner Juana Dela Cruz (herein referred to as the Petitioner), is of legal age, widow and with

residence and postal address at 123 Binibini St., Pasay City where she can be served with legal processes and notices issued by this Honorable Court; 2. The Respondent Jane Doe (herein referred to as the Respondent), is of legal age, single and with postal

address at 1010 Ginoo Blvd., Pasay City;

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

The petitioner entered into an oral contract of lease with the original owners of the said parcel of land, the

late spouses Marcela and Marcelo Del Pilar (herein referred to as the SPS. Del Pilar and/or spouses), the size of which is a 65 square meters and located at 123 Binibini St., Pasay City; 2. In line with the lease agreement, the petitioner constructed their house and continued to reside therein up

to the present; 3. From the day they started to lease the said land, the petitioner never defaulted in the payment of the

agreed monthly rentals;

4.

On February 18, 1995, unknown from the petitioner the respondent has bought to the said property from

the spouses and the respondent has titled it on her own name; 5. Thereafter, the respondent has taken her own steps to eject the petitioners from the said property until

finally, she filed an action of unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City;

STATEMENT OF THE CASES

1.

On February 12, 2008, the respondent filed a Complaint for Ejectment against the Appellee at the

Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City; 2. 3. On December 22, 2008, the petitioner filed a Position Paper; On February 2, 2009, the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City decided in favor of the

respondent; 4. On February 20, 2009 , the petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and elevated the case to the Regional Trial

Court Branch 10 of Pasay City 5. On June 29, 2009, the Hon. Judge Lorenzo Menzon of the Regional Trial Court Branch 10 of Pasay City

affirmed in toto the judgment rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court; 6. On July 5, 2009, a Motion for Reconsideration is filed by the petitioner thru his counsel praying that the

decision rendered on June 29,2009 be set aside and another rendered for the Appellee; 7. On August 6, 2009, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City has denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed

by the petitioner; thus, prompting the petitioner to file a petition for review; 8. 9. On September 4, 2009, the petitioner file a Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals; On May 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals order both parties to submit their memoranda within 15 days

Hence, the filing of this memorandum

ISSUES

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN DECIDING THIS UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP AFTER DEFENDANT HAD RAISED IN DEFENSE THE LESSEES RIGHT UNDER P.D.1517, P.D.2016 AND APD 1-12 PASAY CITY WHETHER OR NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION BARS THE BONAFIDE LESSEES RIGHT TO AVAIL OF THE PRIVILEGES AND BENEFITS PROVIDED BY SECTION 6 OF P.D. 1517 WHETHER OR NOT IN DETERMINING THE COVERAGE OF AREAS FOR PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT (APD), REFERENCE MUST BE HAD TO THE LIST OF STREETS SUBJECT TO ZONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NOT TO THE AREAS INCLUDED IN THE DELINEATION BY METES AND BOUNDS AS INDICATED IN THE PROCLAMATION ITSELF. WHETHER OR NOT SUCH ACT OF THE PETITIONER OF INSTITUTING A COMPLAINT TO THE HOUSE AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING

ARGUMENTS WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN DECIDING THIS UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP AFTER DEFENDANT HAD RAISED IN DEFENSE THE LESSEES RIGHT UNDER P.D.1517, P.D.2016 AND APD 1 -12 PASAY CITY Under the Rule 70 of Rules of Court, an action for Unlawful Detention resolves only the issue of possession de facto even if the evidence of ownership may be referred to or considered only to determine its possession. This is, if the defendant, now the petitioner, is unlawfully withholding possession of the said property or the refusal of the petitioner is unlawful as held by the Supreme Court in Huibonhoa v. Court of Appeals, GR. 95897, Dec. 14, 1997. In our present case, the possession of the petitioner is lawful and even her refusal to vacate the said property is also lawful. Since the petitioner has been lawfully leasing the said property to the original owners, the Sps. Del Pilar, it clearly presents us a situation wherein the petitioner is lawfully in possession of the said property and justifies her refusal to vacate the same property. Furthermore, although the contract between the original owners and the petitioners, the respondent were not able to overthrow the counterclaim of the petitioner which was overlooked by the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court when she resolved the case in favor of the respondents. In her disquisition, the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court said and quotes: After the thorough evaluation of the evidence on record, the court believes that the defendants can be lawfully ejected from the subject premises.

Clearly, the plaintiff is the registered owner of the property on question as evidenced by the Transfer Certificate of the Title Number 12345. Such being the case and as an exercise of ownership the plaintiff can lawfully take possession of the property (pars. 1 & 2 pp.2 Decision 2-3-09) the pronouncement made by the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court humbly submits that it is not in conformity with the rules governing ejectment cases which concerns itself solely with the issue of possession . In fact, ownership was never raised as an issue in this case. In refusing to vacate the property, petitioner invokes her statutory rights found under the Section 6 of P.D. 1517 which provides the property in question to be purchased by a qualified lessee. The petitioners lease period and in fact that her oral contract with the original owners of the land makes her the legal tenant thereof. Also, under P.D. 2016, prevents her eviction when the entire Barangay San Roque where Binibini Street is located an area of priority development. Furthermore, the issuance of the decree is used to prevent urban landowners from ejecting the tenants in violation of P.D. 1517 and other related laws which are intended to develop such slum areas in the Metro Manila Since such decree and issuances became part of the land, the petitioners claim and evidence relating to such decrees and issuances should have been appropriate and laudible for the trial judge to consider it and not hastily decide the case because the respondent is the titled owner of the said property.

WHETHER OR NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION BARS THE BONAFIDE LESSEES RIGHT TO AVAIL OF THE PRIVILEGES AND BENEFITS PROVIDED BY SECTION 6 OF P.D. 1517 When the Honorable Judge Lorenzo Menzon, affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, he invoked the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Five Star Marketing, Co., Inc. v. Booc (535 SCRA 28) which reads and quotes: The avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which have been made summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of the property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time, otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of long waiting and decide as a measureof self-protection to take the law into his hands and seize the same by force and violence. (par. 2 pp 2. Decision 6-29-09) In the present case, the evil sought to be prevented in the said Five Star case is not present. First of all, the petitioner is no illegally in possession of the said property as indicated in the previous agreement made by the petitioner for she was the lessee of the original owners of the said land, the Sps. Del Pilar. Furthermore, her

resistance to vacate the premises is that she availed her right granted under PD1517 on which the avowed policies are laid down under its preamble to wit: WHEREAS, it is declared objective of the New Society to effect social, economic and political reforms attuned to the establishment of a secure national community and to an improved quality of life for all citizens and for all others who may sojourn our shores; WHEREAS, the quality of human life in our times is inescapably determined by the relationship among population, resources, the environment, and intelligent policies; WHEREAS, human settlement is an integrative concept embracing the interdependence of man's environment, human shelters and structures, and the design and organization of human communities consistent with a national framework plan, all for the people's security and wellbeing. WHEREAS, land is the ultimate platform of all man's activities, and the crucial factor in determining the shape of human settlements; WHEREAS, the basic law of the land explicitly provides for the regulation of the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and for the equitable diffusion of property ownership and profits which includes land and land resources; WHEREAS, the traditional concept of landownership has aggravated the problem arising from urbanization such as the proliferation of blighted areas and the worsening of the plight of the urban poor and has spawned valid and legitimate grievances in urban centers giving rise to social tension and violent conflicts; WHEREAS, a social reform objective of the New Society is to renew blighted areas, improve the conditions of the urban poor and resolve and redress legitimate grievances arising therefrom, while at the same providing incentives to progressive landowners and developers who wish to develop their lands in accordance with government plans and programs responsive to community welfare; The then late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation 1967 as amended by Proclamation No. 2284 to ensure a meaningful realization of the said policies therein in PD 1517. Furthermore, PD 2016 was also issued to prevent the Circumvention of the Urban Reform Law by the heartless landowners. From the avowed principles of the said laws, courts should not render these laws nugatory but instead to decide to effectively implement these laws for the benefit of the slum dwellers. In PD 2016, the equitable diffusion of property ownership of land and land resources is the primary reason why in such Presidential Decree prohibits the ejectment of the qualified tenants residing in areas for priority development. Furthermore, such reason is one of the paramount objectives of the Urban Reform Law which in turn, cannot be rendered nugatory by the avowed objective of the action for Unlawful Detainer which had been made summary in character WHETHER OR NOT IN DETERMINING THE COVERAGE OF AREAS FOR PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT (APD), REFERENCE MUST BE HAD TO THE LIST OF STREETS SUBJECT TO ZONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NOT TO THE AREAS INCLUDED IN THE DELINEATION BY METES AND BOUNDS AS INDICATED IN THE PROCLAMATION ITSELF.

The property in question where the petitioner built her house more than 60 years ago is located at Binibini Street Barangay San Roque, Pasay City. APD 1-12 covers a large portion of Pasay City bounded on the North by the Manila-Pasay boundary; on the East, by Tripa de Gallena somewhere near M. dela Cruz; on the South by EDSA and on the West by Zamora-Burgos Streets. The following Barangays are included in the APD 1-12 are the following: San Isidiro, San Roque and Sta. Clara. Some streets are also listed within the whole area proclaimed as subject to zonal development. Binibini Street wherein the property is located is located at Barangay San Roque. Although the said street is not included in the list as an area for priority development but considering that the entire Barangay San Roque is covered by the proclamation as blighted area and subject to priority zonal development Binibini Street is necessarily included. It would be absurd that not to include a street and the whole Barangay is put as a part of the areas for priority development. PRAYER WHEREFORE, in consideration of all the foregoing, the petitioner respectfully prays that the Honorable Court of Appeals reverse or modify the decision of the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 1 of Pasay City dated June 29, 2009 and the order of the Honorable Regional Trial Court Branch 10 of Pasay City dated August 6, 2009.Furthermore, a new order be rendered declaring the areas in Binibini Street be subject to APD 1-12 Pasay City as areas of priority development and petitioner be entitled to the benefits and privileges provided under Sec 6 of P.D. 1517 It is further prayed that the alleged sale of the said parcel of land of the Spouses Marcela and Marcelo Del Pilar to the respondent, Jane Doe, on February 18, 1991 be declared null and void due to the violation of the Urban Reform Law Finally, other reliefs that are just and equitable under the present circumstances are likewise prayed for. Respectfully submitted Manila, Philippines, this 28th day of May 2010 DE GUZMAN TUGELIDA DE CASTRO AND ASSOCIATES Counsel for Petitioner Address: Unit 1200, Tall Building Condominium, Espana, Manila By: Atty. Jeffrey A. Archer IBP Lifetime No. 12345; 5/10/2005 PTR No. 777654; 1/10/2011 Roll of Attorney No. 2005-006341 MCLE Compliance No. III 000897

SAMPLE NO. 2

MEMORANDUM (On the Issue of Jurisdiction)

Private Respondent, through counsel, respectfully states:

1.

During the hearing last November 24, 2010, this Honorable Court noted that there is a threshold issue to

be resolved in this proceeding, i.e., if it has jurisdiction in light of the question of whether or not petitioner X is doing business in the Philippines without the requisite license. 2. Petitioner itself alleges in its Petition that it is a foreign corporation, thus:

13.

Petitioner X is an organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the British Virgin Islands, with

business address at 1301 Bank of America Tower, 12 Harcourt Road, Central, Hong Kong. x x x

3.

During the hearing last November 24, 2010, petitioner, through its counsel, reiterated its assertion in its (To further support such fact, attached to the original copy of this

Reply dated ___, 2010 that it is not doing business in the Philippines. Evidently, therefore, the petitioner has no license to do business in the Philippines. Memorandum is the original Certification issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission that petitioner X has no registration of any kind with its office [Annex 1].) 4. The law in this regard is clear a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without the

requisite license from the Securities and Exchange Commission, cannot sue. (cite statutory provisions here) 5. 6. Thus, the only question now is, whether the petitioner X is doing business in the Philippines? The fact that X is doing business in the Philippines is shown in the Petition itself and in its corresponding

annexed document. Thus, the Petition alleges: 21. The NN Axa has then an (sic) existing Bareboat Charter Agreements [COPY REST OF

SENTENCE/PARAGRAPH]. 7. In support of such allegation, petitioner has attached its Bareboat Charter with Y Corp. as Annex G to

the Petition filed with this Honorable Court. For easy reference, attached as Annex 2 hereof is a copy of such Bareboat Charter. Such Charter consists of eleven (1) pages. 8. The Bareboat Charter has the following features:

(a) (b)

on the first page, in box no. 2, the place of execution is Manila, Philippines; on the last page, i.e., the eleventh page, the notarization of the Charter and its acknowledgment

by the contracting parties were accomplished in Pasig City; (c) on the first page, in box no. 4, the bareboat charterer, i.e., Y Corp., is shown to be based Unit

3204B, East Tower, PSE Bldg., Exchange Road, Ortigas, Pasig City; (d) (e) (f) (g) 2013; (h) (i) on the first page, in box no. 22, the charter hire is US$3,800 per calendar day; on the second page, in box no. 35, dispute resolution is pursuant to Philippine law and the on the first page, in box no. 13, the port of delivery is at a safe port in the Philippines; on the first page, in box no. 20, the trading limits is within Philippine ports only; on the first page, in box no. 16, the port of redelivery is Bataan, Philippines; on the first page, in box no. 21. the charter period is from August 2, 2010 to February 1,

place of arbitration will be in Manila; (j) Philippines. on the second page, in box no. 44, the flag and country of the Bareboat Charter Registry is the

9.

Evidently, therefore, petitioner X came to the Philippines, through its representative, and executed the

Bareboat Charter with Y, a corporation based in the Philippines, over X's alleged vessel, the NN Axa, which is under Philippine registry for purposes of the charter. The said vessel was delivered by X to Y in the Philippines and said vessel is restricted to navigate only within the Philippines. When the Bareboat Charter is terminated, Y will then redeliver the vessel to X in Bataan, Philippines. The fee for the Charter is US$3,800 per day and the Charter period is two and a half (2 ) years [or at least nine hundred (900) days]. Any dispute will be resolved pursuant to Philippine law through arbitration in Manila. 10. With its vessel being chartered or in civil law terms, leased to Y upon the foregoing terms and

conditions, is X doing business in the Philippines? Without doubt, X is doing business in the Philippines.

11.

In any event, just to forestall any uncertainty on this issue, cited hereunder are pertinent rulings in

decided cases: A. [CITE EXCERPTS OF JURISPRUDENCE]

B. C. D. 12. To reiterate, it is submitted that the only finding that can be made is that X is doing business in the

Philippines. Since it is a foreign corporation and has no SEC license to do business, petitioner X cannot sue, and in particular, cannot file this Petition. Consequently, this petition must, as it should, be dismissed. Prayer

Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court consider the foregoing Memorandum in its resolution of the above-discussed threshold issue in this case and thereby DISMISS the petition. Other pertinent reliefs are likewise prayed for. November 7, 2010. Cebu City, Philippines.

XXX

SAMPLE NO. 3

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila City

JUANA DELA CRUZ, Defendant-Petitioner,

-versus-

CIVIL CASE NO. L-12345 For: Ejectment

JANE DOE, Plaintiff-Respondent. x-------------------------------------------------------------------------x

MEMORANDUM

COMES NOW PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Supreme Court most respectfully submits and presents this Memorandum in the above-titled case and avers that:

THE PARTIES

1.

Plaintiff-Respondent Jane Doe is of legal age, single, and residing on 1010 Ginoo Boulevard, Pasay City,

where she may be served with legal processes and notices issued by this Honorable Court; 2. Defendant-Petitioner Juana Dela Cruz is of legal age and residing on 123 Binibini Street, Quezon City, and

may be served with legal processes and other judicial notices thereto.

I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1.

On February 11, 2008, herein Plaintiff-Respondent filed a Complaint for Ejectment dated February 7, 2008

against Defendant-Petitioner; 2. 3. On December 22, 2008, an Answer dated December 15, 2008 was filed by the Defendant-Petitioner; On February 3, 2009, a Decision was rendered by Branch 1 of Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City in

favor of the Plaintiff-Respondent; 4. On August 6, 2009, a Motion for Reconsideration filed July 5, 2009 by Defendant-Petitioner through legal

counsel was denied by Judge Lorenzo Menzon of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court Pasay City; 5. On September 14, 2009, a Petition for Review dated September 9, 2009 was filed to the Court of Appeals

by Defendant-Petitioner; 6. 7. On April 23, 2010, Plaintiff-Respondent through legal counsel filed a Comment dated April 19, 2010; On May 13, 2010, as per Verification and Report from the Judicial Records Division (JRD) no Reply was

filed by the Defendant-Petitioner; 8. On May 21, 2010, a Resolution was rendered by the Court of Appeals denying Defendant-Petitioners

Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO); 9. Accordingly, the Honorable Court of Appeals ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda

fifteen (15) days from notice, otherwise regardless whether or not Memoranda were filed, the petition shall be submitted for decision; Hence, the filing of the instant Memorandum.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1.

Plaintiff-Respondent seeks that a parcel of land located at 123 Binibini Street, Pasay be returned to her

possession, but due to Defendant-Petitioners occupancy thereat, the former cannot claim possession which left her with the option of residing at 1010 Ginoo Boulevard, Pasay City. It is noteworthy to stress that Plaintiff-Respondent is the registered owner of the land subject under TCT No. 12345 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. The property was sold to them by the now deceased original owners, Spouses Marcelo and Marcela del Pilar; 2. Defendant-Petitioner, on the other hand, is an alleged lessee of the original owners of the land since

September 1955. They had repeatedly assailed the verbal contract of lease for more than 50 years; 3. Plaintiff-Respondent was not able to claim immediately the land for it was previously subject to a pending

legal proceeding and that there was still no urgent necessity of using and occupying it. When the event came that Plaintiff-Respondent was able to enforce her right over the land, Defendant-Petitioner, despite earnest and peaceful

efforts of the Plaintiff-Respondent still refused to vacate the land. This led her to seek help from the Barangay officials for mediation and/or conciliation in accordance with law. However, the Defendant-Petitioner still persistently occupied the land without heed to the serious and constant demand of the Plaintiff-Respondent which rendered it unattainable to reach an agreement; 4. Due to the foregoing failure to claim the parcel of land attributed to the obstinate refusal of the

Defendant-Petitioner, Plaintiff-Respondent was compelled to hire the services of a legal counsel to commence the enforcement of ejection under the wings of the courts of law.

I.

ISSUES OF THE CASE

A.)

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN DECIDING THIS

UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP AFTER DEFENDANT HAD RAISED IN DEFENSE THE LESSEES RIGHTS UNDER P.D. 1517, P.D. 2016, APD 1 -12 PASAY CITY; B.) WHETHER OR NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION BARS THE BONA FIDE LESSEES RIGHT TO

AVAIL THE PRIVILEGES AND BENEFITS PROVIDED BY SECTION 6 OF P.D. 1517; C.) WHETHER OR NOT IN DETERMINING THE COVERAGE OF AREAS FOR PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT

(APD), REFERENCE MUST BE HAD TO THE LIST OF THE STREETS SUBJECT TO THE ZONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NOT TO THE AREAS INCLUDED IN THE DELINEATION BY METES AND BOUNDS AS INDICATED IN THE PROCLAMATION ITSELF.

I.

ARGUMENTS

A.) 2016. B.)

The court committed no error in deciding that an unlawful detainer action be enforced upon

herein Defendant-Petitioner despite the assailed contention of the former under P.D. 1517 and P.D.

There is no bar in this instant case for an unlawful detainer to avail the benefits and privileges

provided by Section 6 P.D. 1517 provided it is applicable. C.) The determination of the scope and limitation of Areas for Priority Development shall be based

on the list of specific areas prescribed by the proclamation.

II.

DISCUSSION

A.)

It is necessary to emphasize that the Plaintiff-Respondent is the bona fide owner of the parcel of land

located at 123 Binibini Street, Pasay City under TCT No, 12345 of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City. In the Philippines, the presentation of a valid certificate of title of the real property is a conclusive evidence of ownership of the person whose name the certificate of title is entitled to. Under Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, or Act No. 496, it provides that the original certificates in the registration book, any copy thereof duly certified under the signature of the clerk, or of the register of deeds of the province or city where the land is situated, and the seal of the court, and also the owners duplicate certificate, shall be received as evidence in all the courts of the Philippine Islands and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein except so far as otherwise provided in this Act. Recognized jurisprudence also uphold the significance of a certificate of title in proving valid ownership of a land. In the decision of the case of Spouses Pascual v. Spouses Coronel, the ponente cited two cases which highlight the significance of a valid certificate of title in claiming ownership over a land. It was held that in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court declared that the trial court did not err in giving more probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent visvis the contested unregistered Deed of Sale. Later in Arambulo v. Gungab, the Court held that the registered owner is preferred to possess the property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. The ruling of Dizon v. Court of Appeals was also used as basis for this argument. It was stated that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of ownership and the questionability of the title is immaterial in an ejectment suit. Futhermore, Article 428 of the New Civil Code enumerates the rights of an owner. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations other than those established by law. The owner has right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it. It is indubitable that the certificate of title of 123 Binibini Street, Pasay City under TCT No. 12345 which is registered in the Register of Deeds of Pasay City entitles Petitioner-Respondent the right to exercise the aforementioned rights, specifically, in this instant case, the right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover the land. The contention of the Defendant-Petitioner that the verbal lease agreement they had made with the now deceased original owners Marcelo and Marcela Del Pilar for over 50 years shall entitle them to the privileges under P.D. 1517 and P.D. 2016 (Annex A and B, respectively) is untenable. It is expressly stated that Section 6 of P.D. 1517 grants lessees the right of first refusal before they may be ejected from a land, but this is only feasible under certain conditions. It is an indispensable qualification that the land is included in the list of Areas for Priority Development (APD) before an owner can be granted of the right of first refusal. The land subject of this case is clearly not included in the specific areas enumerated in the list of APD. To reiterate the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. No. CV 12345: Insofar as the property in litigation, appellant Jane Doe is, consequently, correct in objecting to appellees exercise of the right of first refusal granted under Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1517. The fact that it is not included in the areas for priority development specifically identified under Proclamation No. 1967 indicates that appellee have no cause of action for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and preliminary injunction against appellants.

B.)

The Plaintiff-Respondents argument in this issue is intimately connected with the preceding argument.

Defendant-Petitioner vigorously assails that there is no bar to the availability of the privileges and benefits conferred to bona fide lessee whenever there is an unlawful detainer action. It is however true. But this is subject to circumstances that may qualify a lessee to the privileges and benefits under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1516 such as the right of first refusal. Unfortunately, the land possessed by the Defendant-Petitioner does not fall under the ambit of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1517. Therefore, the Defendant-Petitioner has no cause of action in this issue. C.) The third issue questions the coverage of the APD prescribed by the proclamation, whether or not it refers

to the list of streets subject to the Zonal Development or to the areas included in the delineation of the metes and bounds indicated. Reiteration is therefore necessary to lay emphasis on the decision of the Court of Appeals that in the List of Areas for Priority Development (APDs), labeled as the South Sector of Pasay City, the area for priority development was defined as Tramo Lines along Barangays San Isidro, San Roque, and Santa Clara. It was thereafter specifically enumerated the list of covered sub-areas (please refer to Annex C for diagram) which are the following: 1) F. Victor, 2) Ventanilla Street, c) Juan Luna Street, d) D. Jorge Street, e) Viscarra Street, f) Conchita Street, g) Dolores Street, h) Leonardo Street, i) Alvarez Street, j) Basilio Street, k) Rodriguez Street, and i) Villa Barbara. There is consequently no gainsaying the fact that with its Binibini Street location, the property in litigation is not included among the sites identified as Areas for Priority Development in Pasay City.The mere fact that the list does not include Binibini Street necessarily implies that it is deemed excluded from it. Citing Solanada Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, it made a profound analysis of Section 6 of P.D. 1517 (as found in Annex A of this Memorandum) based on statutory construction: We agree. A close reading of Proclamation No. 1967 reveals that, before a preemptive right can be exercised, the disputed land should be situated in an area declared to be both an APD and a ULRZ. An urban tenant's right of first refusal is set forth in Section 6, PD 1517, as follows: Sec. 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. Within the Urban Zones[,] legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more [,] who have built their homes on the land[,] and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree. Proclamation No. 1967 further delimited the areas or zones wherein this preemptive right could be availed of viz.: WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 1893 was issued on 11 September 1979, pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1517, declaring the entire Metropolitan Manila area as Urban Land Reform Zone. WHEREAS, It is now necessary and appropriate to identify specific sites covered by urban land reform in Metropolitan Manila for purposes of making specific the applicability of P.D. Nos. 1517, 1640 and 1642 and of LOI No. 935. NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and existing laws, and in relation to Proclamation No. 1893 declaring the entire Metropolitan Manila area as an Urban Land Reform Zone, and LOI 935,

hereby amend Proclamation No. 1893 by declaring 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones as described in the attached annex. The provisions of P.D. Nos. 1517, 1640 and 1642 and of LOI No. 935 shall apply only to the above[-]mentioned Areas of Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones. xxx xxx xxx The aforesaid whereas clauses express a clear intent to limit the operation of PD 1517 to specific areas declared to be located in both an APD and a ULRZ. The conjunctive and in the last sentence of the quoted provision confirms this intention. And in statutory construction implies conjunction, joinder or union. As understood from the common and usual meaning of the conjunction and, the provisions of PD 1517 apply only to areas declared to be located within both an APD and a ULRZ. With the foregoing recognized jurisprudence said, the Defendant-Petitioners action would necessarily lead to futility for no cause of action. PRAYER WHEREFORE, premise considered, it respectfully prayed for that this Honorable Supreme Court that Defendant-Petitioners prayer for writ of injunction be DENIED for having no cause of action and the petition DISMISSED for being clearly unmeritorious. Other just and equitable relief under the foregoing are likewise being prayed for. Respectfully submitted. Makati City for Manila City, Philippines. April 8, 2011. AZURIN BUHAIN BONTUYAN AND ARICAYOS LAW OFFICES Counsel for Plaintiff-Respondent 10th Floor, New Building, Makati Avenue, Makati City By: ATTY. PAOLO COELHO IBP Lifetime No. 67891; 5/10/2005 PTR No. 44568; 1/10/2011 Roll of Attorney No. 2005-001023 MCLE Compliance No. III 000899

Copy Furnished: ATTY. JEFFREY A. ARCHER

Counsel for Petitioner Unit 1200, Tall Building Condominium, Espana, Manila

SAMPLE NO. 4

PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL MEMORANDUM Plaintiff, through counsel, most respectfully alleges: STATEMENT OF FACTS: In order that this honorable court may be enlightened and guided in the judicious disposition of the aboveentitled case, cited hereunder the material, relevant and pertinent facts of the case, to wit: 1. Plaintiff is Luz Diaz, sixty five (65) years old, widow and a resident of Mountain View Subdivision, Antipolo,

Rizal while defendant is Emma Crisostomo, forty two (42) years old, housewife married and also a resident of Mountain View Subdivision, Antipolo, Rizal; 2. Plaintiff and defendant have been neighbors for at least three (3) years. Plaintiff alleges that in the

afternoon of October 25, 2010, a truck owned by the defendant's carpenter, Gregorio Timbol, was parked in front of the defendant's on a street that was sloping. Mr. Timbol has been working on the renovation of defendant's house. He has been a carpenter for at least thirty five (35) years; 3. Just before the incident, plaintiff was taking a nap in her house when she noticed that her dog, Trix was

missing. She then looked around the house until she heard a crashing bang and a dog crying out; 4. When the plaintiff went outside her gate, she saw Trix pinned under the wheel of the truck. The truck was

backed up against a tree by the sidewalk and Trix was thrashing and squealing underneath the truck with blood coming out his mouth; 5. Plaintiff cried and screamed to Nilda, her helper, and shouted for the guards who roamed the subdivision,

but no one came. She could not save him even if she wanted to because there was no one in the truck's driver seat and she does not know how to drive. She could only cry and scream while Trix kept on howling until it stopped moving and making any sound. He died soon after; 6. 7. According to the plaintiff, Trix had been with her since her husband passed away eight years ago. Plaintiff observed that the truck had always been parked in front of the defendants house since the time

defendant's house was being renovated; 8. When the incident happened, defendant did not do anything except to call Mr. Timbol. Defendant insisted

that the truck was properly parked and what happened to Trix was an accident and Mr. Timbol could not be faulted. On the other hand, Mr. Timbol admitted that his truck was of an old model. He bought it second hand and had it overhauled and repainted. He also admitted that, when he parked it on the day the incident happened, he put two (2) large rocks against the back wheels to make sure the truck does not roll back down the street;

9.

Mr. Timbol finally admitted that when he looked at the scene after the incident happened, the rocks were

no longer there. He concluded that someone must have removed them; 10. Plaintiff demanded that the defendant should give her another dog, but the latter refused and insisted that

what happened to Trix was plaintiff's fault because Trix should have not been loose on the streets. 11. Defendant testified that Trix was a pesky dog and had complained about it many times. In fact, it was

because of Trix that the defendant met plaintiff for the first time three (3) years ago. Defendant went to plaintiff's house to complain that Trix pulled out the plants in the yard; 12. Defendant also mentioned that Trix would dig holes in her lawn. It would frequently deposit its wastes on

her driveway and also pee in front of her house, leaving a foul smell. One time, Trix even chased her little girl along the road; 13. Defendant went to the extent of complaining the activities of Trix before the Homeowner's Association, so

that the latter issued a Board Resolution stating that wandering dogs will be caught and brought to the municipal dog pound. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1. 2. 3. 4. dog ARGUMENTS 1. Plaintiff committed a nuisance when she allowed her dog to roam the streets of the subdivision because Whether or not the plaintiff committed a nuisance when she allowed her dog to roam the streets of the Whether or not the defendant validly abated the nuisance when she lodged a complaint before the Whether or not the carpenter was negligent when he parked his car in front of the house of the defendant Whether or not the defendant may be held liable when the truck of her carpenter ran over the plaintiff's

subdivision. Homeowner's Association

the dog endangered the safety of a resident of the subdivision. The dog also caused annoyance and offended the senses of a resident inside the subdivision. Our laws on property states that: "A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health and safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with free passage of any public highway or street or any body of water; (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property." (Article 694, New Civil Code of the Philippines). Here the plaintiff allowed her dog to roam the streets of the subdivision because it was ran over by a truck while on the street. Plaintiff's dog was not kept inside any cage or in a leash because it could sleep in plaintiff's room, lie on the floor or be found on defendant's yard. Plaintiff's dog was therefore free to move around freely. When plaintiff's dog was roaming the streets of the subdivision, it endangered the defendant's girl because it chased her on the street. Plaintiff's dog also caused annoyance and

offended the senses of defendant because it dug holes on defendant's lawn, pulled out the plants in her yard and deposited wastes on her driveway or peed in front of her house that left a very foul smell. Therefore plaintiff committed a nuisance when she allowed her dog to roam on the streets and yard of her neighbor because it endangered the defendant's girl . It also caused annoyance and offended the senses of the defendant. Our laws on Property further states that "[n]uisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects the community or neighborhood or any considerable amount of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition."(Article 695, New Civil Code) Here, the nuisance maybe regarded as a private nuisance because it only affects an identifiable number of persons. Specifically, the defendant, her family and her surroundings. 2. Defendant failed to abate the nuisance because he did not obtain the approval of the City Health Officer to authorize him to abate the nuisance. {Write your discussion here pointing out relevant laws and jurisprudence tying it up with the case at hand.} 3. The carpenter was negligent when he parked his car in front of the house of the defendant because he failed to use that care and diligence expected of sensible men under comparable circumstances. {Write your discussion here pointing out relevant laws and jurisprudence tying it up with the case at hand.} 4. The defendant may be held liable when the truck ran over the plaintiff's dog because he was the employer of the carpenter that committed negligent acts and which resulted to damages against the plaintiff. {Write your discussion here pointing out relevant laws and jurisprudence tying it up with the case at hand.} PRAYER WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant to pay the value for the plaintiff's dog. Plaintiff likewise prays for costs and for such other and further relief as this honorable court may deem just and equitable in the premises. Manila, Philippines, November 27, 2011.

SAMPLE NO. 5 Republic of the Philippines Regional Trial Court _____ Judicial Region Branch ____, _______

LUZ DIAZ, Plaintiff, Civil ___________ - versus For: Damages EMMA CRISOSTOMO, Defendant. X -------------------------------/ MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENDANT Defendant, through the undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court, respectfully submits this Memorandum, as follows: Case No.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Plaintiff filed the instant case for damages arising from quasi-delict against defendant pursuant to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines. After the presentation of evidence, this Honorable Court required the parties to submit their respective Memorandum. Hence, this Memorandum for the defendant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff is a 65-year old widow who has been a resident of Mountain View Subdivision, Antipolo, Rizal for thirty (30) years. She had a dog named Trix. On the other hand, defendant is a 42-year old housewife, and a neighbor of plaintiff in Mountain View Subdivision for the last three (3) years. In the afternoon of October 25, 2010, while plaintiff was taking her siesta in her living room, she noticed that her dog Trix was no longer by her feet. Thus, she got up to look for the dog in the kitchen and also in the garden but it was not there. Suddenly, she heard a loud crashing bang and also the cries of the dog from outside her house. So she ran towards the gate and when she opened it, she saw the dog thrashing and squealing under the wheel of a truck, with blood coming out of its mouth. The truck was owned by Gregorio Timbol, one of the

carpenters who were working on the renovation of defendants house at that time. Plaintiff cried and shouted for the guards who roamed the subdivision but no one came. She could not save the dog even if she wanted to because there was no one in the trucks driver seat, and she did not know how to drive. The dog kept on howling until it stopped moving and making any sound, and it died soon after. Since plaintiff knew that the truck belonged to one of defendants car penters, she complained to defendant after the incident. Plaintiff demanded that defendant should get her another dog because Trix was plaintiffs only companion in her house. However, defendant refused all of the plaintiffs demands, and insisted that the whole incident was the fault of plaintiff. Defendant contended that the owner of the truck should not be blamed because the dog was not supposed to be out on the streets in the first place. Hence, plaintiff filed the instant action for damages against the defendant as a result of the death of the formers dog. ISSUES The issues to be resolved in the instant case are as follows: 1. 2. 3. Whether or not Timbol, the owner of the truck, was negligent in parking his truck in front of defendants house; Whether or not plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the death of her dog; and Whether or not defendant should be liable for the death of plaintiffs dog.

DISCUSSION

First Issue: Whether or not the owner of the truck was negligent in parking his truck in front of defendants house It is defendants position that the owner of the truck was not negligent in parking his truck in front of defendants house. Plaintiff argued that Timbol did not properly park the truck, and that is the reason why it suddenly moved backwards, ran over the dog, and killed it. On the other hand, Timbol alleged that he followed subdivision rules when he parked his truck in front of defendants house, and he even put two large rocks against the back wheels of his truck to make sure that the truck would not roll back down the street. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury. All that the law requires is for a person to use that care and diligence expected of sensible men under comparable circumstances. (Philippine National Railways vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157658, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 147, 154)

By following the subdivision rules and by putting two large rocks against the back wheels of his truck when he parked it in the sloping part of the street, Timbol clearly observed that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Therefore, there was no negligence on his part when he parked his truck in front of defendants house. Plaintiffs argument that Timbol was negligent in parking his truck because it led to the death of her dog is untenable and very speculative. She failed to adduce evidence showing that Timbol did not follow the subdivision rules, nor did she present evidence to rebut Timbols contention that he observed the proper degree of care and precaution under the given circumstances. In other words, plaintiff failed to prove that Timbol was negligent in parking his truck in front of defendants house.

Second Issue: Whether or not plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the death of her dog It is defendants position that plaintiffs own negligence was the proximate cause of the death of her dog. Plaintiff alleged that her dog was killed when the truck of Timbol suddenly moved backwards and ran over the said dog. On the other hand, it is defendants position that plaintiff should be faulted that the dog was run over by the truck because the dog should not have been out there roaming the streets in the first place because of a prior warning from the homeowners association of the subdivision. In order to resolve the issue on whether or not plaintiffs negligence was the proximate cause of the de ath of her dog, it may be proper to know first the definition or meaning of the term probable cause. In the case of Ramos vs. C.O.L. Realty Corporation (G.R. No. 184905, August 28, 2009, 597 SCRA 526, 535-536), the Supreme Court defined proximate cause in the following manner: Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. The homeowners association of the subdivision previously warned plaintiff about her dog, and it even issued a board resolution banning wandering dogs in the subdivision. With the issuance of the said resolution, plaintiff should have done something to ensure that her dog would not be able to go out of the gate of her house. She could have put the dog inside a cage or tie it up to a certain area in her house while she is taking her siesta in her living room. Instead, she just allowed the dog to stay or sleep by her feet. In addition, it is worthwhile to note that plaintiff failed to properly close the gate of her house, and this is the reason why the dog was able to escape from her house and roam around the streets.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, plaintiff clearly failed to observe, for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Hence, plaintiff was negligent in complying with the resolution issued by the homeowners association of the subdivision banning wandering dogs. Such negligence eventually led to the death of her dog. Plaintiff has only herself to blame for letting her dog roam the streets freely because if the dog was not out on its own, it would not have been killed. In effect, the proximate cause of the dogs death was not because it was run over by th e truck, but it was because plaintiff failed to observe the proper degree of care and precaution required under the circumstances. The death of the dog would not have occurred if not for plaintiffs own negligence considering that the dog was not supposed to be out on the streets in the first place. Therefore, plaintiffs own negligence was the proximate cause of the death of her dog. Third Issue: Whether or not defendant should be held liable for the death of plaintiffs dog It is defendants position that she should not be held liable for the death of plaintiffs dog. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides as follows: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Moreover, Article 2179 of the Civil Code states as follows: When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. As previously discussed, plaintiffs own negligence was the proximate cause of the death of her dog. She failed to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. defendant. Therefore, defendant should not be held liable for the death of plaintiffs dog. Thus, pursuant to the aforementioned Article 2179 of the Civil Code, plaintiff cannot recover any damages from the

CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing considerations, it is defendants position that since plaintiffs own negligence is the proximate cause of the death of her dog, defendant should not be held liable for any damages arising from such death.

PRAYER WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, defendant respectfully prays as follows: 1. 2. That all reliefs set forth in the Answer be granted; and Such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises.

________________, Philippines, October 24, 2011.

(Sgd.) Name of Counsel Counsel for the Defendant (Address of Counsel) Roll No. _____________ IBP No. _________; Date/Place Issued PTR No. _________; Date/Place Issued MCLE Compliance No. ____________

SAMPLE NO. 6

Based on the Ponencia of Justice Roberto A. Abad in People of the Philippines vs. Romy Fallones (G.R. No. 190341, March 16, 2011)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PROSECUTION

The Prosecution, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully states:

STATEMENT OF FACTS This case involves the admissibility of the deceased rape victims spontaneous utterances during the time she was being sexually abused and immediately afterwards. The prosecution charged the accused Romy Fallones with rape in an information dated September 14, 2004 before a Regional Trial Court (RTC). The complainant in this case, Alice, was a retardate. She died while trial was ongoing, hence, was unable to testify. To prove its case, the prosecution presented Allan (Alices father), Amalia (her Aguilar (a police investigator), Eduardo Marcelo and Arturo Reyes (the medico- legal officer), and Eden Terol (a psychologist). Amalia testified that at about 9:45 a.m. on June 29, 2004, her mother told her older sister, Alice, to look for their brother Andoy. Since Andoy arrived without Alice, her mother asked Amalia to look for her. Amalia looked in places where Andoy often played and this led her near accuseds house. As she approached the house , Amalia heard someone crying out from within, Tama na, tama na! Recognizing Alices voice, Amalia repeatedly knocked on the door until the accused opened it. Amalia saw her sister standing behind him. As Amalia went in to take her sister out, Alice held out a sanitary napkin and, crying, said that the accused had given her the napkin. Alices shorts were wet and blood-stained. Frightened and troubled, the two girls went home. On their way home, Alice recounted to her sister that the accused brought her to his bathroom, pulled down her shorts, and ravished her. She said that the accused wet her shorts to make it appear that she tripped and had her monthly period. Along the way, they met an uncle and told him what happened. On their arrival, their father brought Alice to the barangay while Amalia returned to the accuseds house where she saw her uncle, some relatives, and neighbors accosting and beating the accused. Shortly intervened. after, some barangay officials arrived and sister), PO3 Lilibeth apprehending officers), Dr. Ortiz (a

ISSUES This memorandum will discuss the following issues: First, whether or not Amalias testimony was hearsay, and therefore doubtful, and unreliable; Second, whether or not the deceased rape victims utterances are res gestae and therefore admissible in evidence. Third, whether or not accuseds claim that the members of Alices family pressured her into

pointing to him as her abuser can be given credence.

ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION I. Although what Alice told Amalia may have been hearsay, the rest of the latters testimony, which established both concomitant (Alices voice from within the accuseds house, pleading that she was hurting) and subsequent circumstance (Alice coming from behind the accused as the latter opened the door, her shorts bloodied), are admissible in evidence having been given from personal knowledge. Although Alice died before she could testify, the evidence shows that she positively identified the accused as her abuser before the barangay officials and the police. Amalia, her sister, testified of her own personal knowledge that she had been out looking for Alice that midmorning; that she heard the latters voice from within the accuseds house imploring her attacker to stop what he was doing to her; and that upon repe atedly knocking at the accuseds door, he opened it, revealing the presence of her sister, her shorts bloodied. II. Amalias recital of what she heard Alice utter when she came and rescued her is part of the res gestae. In Marturillas vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006, res gestae was defined as referring to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. This is based on Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which states: Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal

act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. Alices statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the

occasion, without any opportunity for her to fabricate a false statement.

In Marturillas vs. People of the Philippines, supra, it was held that for spontaneous statements to be admitted in evidence, the following must concur: 1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. Here, the accuseds act of forcing himself into Alice is a startling event. And Amalia happened to be just outside his house when she heard Alice cry out tama na, tama na! When the accused opened the door up on Amalias incessant knocking, Alice came out from behind him, uttering Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o. The admissibility of Alices spontaneous statements rests on the valid assumption that they were spoken under circumstances where there had been no chance to contrive. In Capila vs. People, G.R. No. 146161, July 17, 2006, it was held that it is difficult to lie in an excited state and the impulsiveness of the expression is a guaranty of trustworthiness.

III. Accuseds claim that the members of Alices family pressured her into pointing to him as her abuser cannot be given credence. Accused has been unable to establish any possible ill-motive that could prompt Alices family into charging him falsely. In fact, the accused admitted in his testimony that there had been no animosity between Alices family and him. In conclusion, the evidence sufficiently establish that the accused Fallones raped Alice. The accused offered no evidence of his innocence other than his bare denial. In fine, the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

PRAYER WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution earnestly prays that the accused Romy Fallones be adjudged and declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for raping Alice. The prosecution prays for such other reliefs and remedies that are just and equitable under the premises. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR