The Limits of Protest and The Prospects For Political Reform in Malaysia - Nair

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Critical Asian Studies

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The Limits of Protest and Prospects for Political Reform in Malaysia

Sheila Nair Published online: 13 Dec 2007.
To cite this article: Sheila Nair (2007) The Limits of Protest and Prospects for Political Reform in Malaysia, Critical Asian Studies, 39:3, 339-368, DOI: 10.1080/14672710701527345 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14672710701527345
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Critical Asian Studies

Nair / Limits of Protest
39:3 (2007), 339368
Downloaded by [SOAS, University of London] at 04:22 17 November 2013
THE LIMITS OF PROTEST AND PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL REFORM IN MALAYSIA

Sheila Nair
ABSTRACT: The 1997 Asian currency crisis affected Malaysians in profound ways
and complicated dominant nation and modernity narratives centered on economic growth and development and the stability of ethnic relations. In the ensuing months, Malaysias political landscape dominated by one party and its leadership was also reconfigured. The ouster of Malaysias deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, heir apparent to Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad set the stage for the Reformasi movement, which was arguably the countrys first organized large-scale protest movement to embrace a range of social actors, including nongovernmental organizations, grassroots groups, and political parties. By 2001 Reformasi was in decline and meaningful political and social reform had failed to materialize. What happened to this once vibrant movement? How can we account for its decline? This article analyzes the challenges encountered by Reformasi in confronting these dominant narratives and in reframing political discourse. The article situates Reformasis decline in the context of its struggles with the dominant Barisan Nasional-led state as well as the complex relationship between different elements of the movement. It also explores how democratic deepening, the movements inability to provide an alternative discourse that takes into account ethnicized divisions in Malaysia, and the tensions between the party political and movement aspects of protest politics have contributed to Reformasis demise.
The dominant or official Malaysian narratives of nation and modernity have long emphasized rapid economic development and income parity among ethnic groups and a form of ethnic pluralism resting on the premise that each major group knows its place and respects the status quo. Official statements by political elites and bureaucrats have also downplayed political democracy and human rights, ostensibly in favor of the collective good and a community cenISSN 1467-2715 print/1472-6033 online / 03 / 00033930 2007 BCAS, Inc. DOI:10.1080/14672710701527345
tered on Asian values or a government knows best whats good for the nation philosophy. In 1997 when Malaysia became a casualty of the Asian financial crisis, these interrelated discourses were challenged by a new idiom, one marked by calls from the street for political reform, expressions of interethnic solidarity, and a resurgence of advocacy-oriented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and opposition political parties. A reform movement, or 1 Reformasi, uniting disparate groups in the political opposition and galvanizing civil society agents, including NGOs involved in human rights issues and Islamic causes, became the locus of opposition to the state. On the one hand, Reformasi challenged political authoritarianism and its compatibility with official articulations of Malaysia as a modern, industrializing state. On the other hand, Reformasi revealed the cracks and contradictions in the official narratives, the states demonstrable failure to suture ethno-social differences, and the cultural contradictions of Malaysias postcolonial condition. These contradictions have once 2 again risen to the forefront of Malaysians collective anxieties about race and ethnicity and their relationship to politics. The Malaysian political model has generally been viewed as an exemplary multiethnic one in the developing world in part due to the absence of overt and enduring political conflict. The diversity of religious life despite Islams dominance and the coexistence of different ethnic groups Malay, Chinese, Indian in peninsular Malaysia, where the distinction between indigene and immigrant underpins political, economic, and social arrangements, supports the view that the Malaysian model is worthy of emulation. Yet Malaysias postcolonial history was also shaped by race riots mostly involving attacks between Malay and Chinese especially in and around Malaysias capital city in May 1969. The riots, which were a turning point in Malaysian history, became the rationale for political dominance and control of the state by one coalition, the Barisan Nasional (National Front) or BN. Malaysias ethnic pluralism should not, however, be confused with the absence of ethnic divisions or an ethnicized or a racialized discourse and politics. On the contrary, these divisions have historically been used very effectively by ruling elites to shore up electoral support with the claim that only the BN, a coalition made up of predominantly ethnically based parties, can best serve the interests of all Malaysians and provide political stability. However, recent statements by political leaders and rank-and-file members of Malaysias United
1.
2.
Generally translated into English as reform or reformation. Reformasi in Malaysia is consistent with the push for democratization, human rights, transparency, accountability, and justice. The use of race in Malaysian political discourse has colonial roots. It was used in colonial censuses and official documents to distinguish among the numerous ethnic groups in Malaysia and as a cultural marker of difference (see Hirschman 1986, 1987; Syed Hussein 1977; Abraham 2004). Scholars generally prefer the term ethnicity over race in analyses of Malaysian politics and society (e.g., Husin Ali 1984). I use these terms interchangeably and often together throughout the text, seeing both as social constructs and as essentially referring to the same set of meanings, centered on cultural identity, in the Malaysian context.
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Supporters of Anwar Ibrahim, 53, hold Anwar posters and shout Reformasi, as police led the ousted deputy prime minister out from the courthouse after the first days of his trial, on 25 January 2000 in Kuala Lumpur. (Credit: AP Photo/Teh Eng Koon)
Malays National Organization (UMNO), which dominates the BN, attacks on Hindu temples, Muslim fears of Christian proselytization, the controversy over the rights of families of converts to Islam, and the blurring of the lines between church and mosque in political and civil society, reveal deep ethnic divisions in Malaysian politics and its potential instability. In this light, the dynamic Reformasi phase from 1998 to 2001 appears as an aberration given its early promise of a different counter-hegemonic vision, one that subsumed ethnic interest, of Malaysian society and politics. The very public keris-flashing4 rhetoric of some members of the ruling party, and the manner in which the debate over Malay dominance has played out in recent years, suggests that ethnic identity and its claims continue to shape the contours of politics in Malaysia.
3.
4.
The salience of ethnicity in Malaysian political life is evident in statements and speeches by various UMNO delegates at the November 2006 UMNO General Assembly in which warnings against questioning the status of Islam and Malay hegemony were issued. Further, the seriousness of racialized discourse in contemporary Malaysian politics is shown in the official admission that ethnic pluralism, which has long defined social relations in Malaysia, is in trouble. See Pak Lah says race relations fragile, Malaysiakini, 7 December 2007, and Malaysias ruling party congress ends; lingering concerns over race relations, International Herald Tribune, 17 November 2006. The keris or kris, commonly described as a sinewy ceremonial dagger, is often associated with the legendary Malay warrior of precolonial and colonial times, and invokes Malay manhood and cultural identity, despite its more complex origins and meanings (see Farish 2006). At the November 2006 UMNO General Assembly, a disgruntled delegate asked Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, the UMNO Youth leader and
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Unlike neighboring Indonesia, where an authoritarian regime in place since 1965 collapsed in 1998 in the wake of the currency crisis, the crisis produced no significant change in patterns of political rule however much it shook Malaysian society. While this was hardly a surprise given the hegemonic position of the ruling coalition in Malaysian politics and its coercive capabilities, the outcome was not the only plausible one particularly given developments in Indonesia. This difference in political outcomes in the two contexts provokes a number of interesting questions, but they are beyond the central question addressed in this essay, namely, How can we account for the decline of Malaysias once vibrant Reformasi movement? The core of the argument elaborated in these pages is that the demise of Malaysias Reformasi movement reveals not only the entrenchment of the discursive/structural aspects of state power, but also its articulation with civil society and movement politics. In other words, state power is informed by a productive tension in civil society among different competing elements, which limits the ability of protest movements to elicit a more radical restructuring of existing political and social institutions, in turn reinforcing state power and ideological hegemony. This tension is manifested in the often conflicting demands and issues that Reformasi espoused and in its limitations as a movement in mobilizing widespread resistance. Resistance to overt state power may thus be seen in the forms of protest that emerged through Reformasi, but consensus over the social and political logics underpinning the state, such as ethnically defined political arrangements and policies, has not been significantly undermined. I argue also that the limits of democratic deepening, in which democracy is understood not merely as a political regime but as a broader set of social relations,5 may help explain the decline of Reformasi despite its efforts to reach down to the grassroots, articulate a wide range of issues, and project itself as a viable multiethnic and more democratic alternative to the status quo. In elaborating these points I explore the impacts of the financial crisis and highlight elements of the official narratives to better situate Reformasi discourse. The emergence and characteristics of Reformasi, as well as tensions within the movement and its sympathizers, are discussed with a view to understanding some of the challenges the movement faced in reshaping political debate and discourse. Finally, I assess the broader implications of protest for state-society relations in Malaysia, looking more closely at NGOpolitical party relations and their impact on Reformasi. The analysis that follows is situated in reference to turning points in Malaysian politics during the period 19972002, the critical time frame for conditions enabling the growth and decline of Reformasi politics, although events before and after this period are also addressed where relevant.
5.
education minister, whether he would use his keris to defend Malay privilege. This reference, far from being benign, seems to signify a more aggressive stance in Malay political discourse around Malay rights. Roberts 1998, 29. I elaborate more fully on this concept below.
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The State, Ruling Relations, and Crisis

The dominant conception of the Malaysian state is that it is quintessentially an authoritarian structure with some democratic features. According to this view, general elections held every four to five years, the presence of a legitimate and autonomous political opposition, the growth of NGOs, and economic liberalization capture these countervailing but coexisting tendencies. William Case, for example, argues that it is this pseudo-democratic or semi-democratic character of the Malaysian state that has contributed to its longevity.6 The various restrictions on political mobilization and expression enacted through repressive laws, despite the provision of constitutional parliamentary democracy, and the chilling effect on Malaysian society of detention and prosecution of political and social activists appear to provide conclusive evidence of the Malaysian states so-called semi-democratic structure.7 The Malaysian states structuring of dissent through liberal openings and authoritarian closures, according to Case, offers an opportunity to analyze political change and transitions, and provides a window into the political stability of such systems and their possible demise. He maintains that Malaysian semi-democracy was strengthened under Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad through patronage networks, privatization of key sectors in the economy, and a populist approach (targeting ethnic Malays) to economic policy particularly in the implementation of the New Economic Policy (NEP).8 However, despite some discussion of social actors responsiveness to what is conceived as a top-down process, Case subscribes to a view of political change that can only be effectively measured against the experiences of institutionalized political democracies.9 An alternative perspective addresses the question of hegemony in state-society relations. Anne Munro-Kua, for example, suggests that a form of authoritarian populism prevailed in Malaysia during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. In this view, the Malaysian states domination is obtained in and through the states role as benefactor and protector of class and elite interests, although it simultaneously presents itself as acting in the interests of the citizenry as a whole.10 Related to the theme of state hegemony, I have challenged elsewhere the state-civil society split evident in conventional approaches to Malaysian politics, arguing that it would be more useful to view the civil society-state dynamic in Malaysia as mutually constitutive, with each providing the conditions of possibility for the 11 other. Utilizing a Gramscian perspective, I suggest that civil society far from being a realm autonomous of the state is implicated in the relations of rule that structure state power. Consequently, dissent is not merely contained, but muted in part through the production of a nationalist narrative or discourse in
6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
Case 2001, 4357. See also Crouch 1992, 2143. Case 2004. Other writings in a similar vein include Emmerson (1999) and Weiss (2005). Munro-Kua 1996. Nair 1999.
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In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Malaysias prime minister Mahathir Mohamad (pictured here on the cover of Bibliografi Dr. Mahathir [Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia, 2004]) constructed a nation under siege, a country about to be brought to its knees by currency speculators and foreign fund managers, but ready to hold its own against the marauding forces of global capital. Once a key advocate of privatization, the accumulation of private wealth, and of international opportunities presented by globalization, Mahathir saw the financial crisis as an outcome of neoimperialism, arguing that it constituted no less than an attack on Malaysias very sovereignty and yet another form of Western colonization.
civil society. John Hilley in a similar vein claims that with the ascendance of neoliberal ideology and practices around the globe, political control under Mahathir needed a more hegemonic form of authority to sustain it.13 He argues that the state pushed notions of economic development and modernity premised on the Vision 2020 ideas promoted by Mahathir in an effort to secure consent. These distinct but overlapping arguments on the nature and role of the Malaysian state and its relationship to civil society suggest that the question of political democracy and its associated meanings in Malaysia remain a source of contention and struggle. The state-society dynamic may thus be seen to rest on relations of rule.14 Such relations of rule evoke the everyday discourses of ruling elites: specifically, the construction and production of language, ideas, and technologies of control and servitude around nationalism, on the one hand, and a form of consensual control in which state and society are mutually implicated, on the other. This does not of course mean that direct repression is absent, but control of dissent may be enacted in a number of different ways as we see in Malaysia. According to Gramsci, the production of ideology as practical, everyday consciousness or common sense is what ultimately enables the he-
12
12. 13. 14.
Ibid. Hilley 2001, 7. I borrow this concept from Smith 1989. In its usage here relations of rule refer to hierarchical power relations that structure class, gender, and ethnic relations in any given social formation.
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gemonic power of the state. At the same time, hegemony is seldom complete and invites disruption, struggle, and resistance in the relationship between state and civil society. In a Gramscian view the disjunctures or contradictions in ideological production also allow for dissent. Stuart Hall illustrates this nicely when he argues that hegemony is a very particular, historically specific, and temporary moment in the life of a society.16 In the aftermath of the currency crisis in Malaysia we see a reassertion of dominant narratives as envisioned and disseminated by the state, as well as challenges to these from newly mobilized social agents.
15
Constructing Nation and Modernity: Responses to a Crisis and Its Aftermath

The official reaction in Malaysia during the early days of the financial crisis, represented best by the rhetoric of the prime minister (Mahathir) and several key cabinet members, was critical, at least initially, in preventing a social crisis over the precipitous decline of the Malaysian ringgit. Mahathir constructed a nation under siege, a country about to be brought to its knees by currency speculators and foreign fund managers, but ready to hold its own against the marauding forces of global capital. Once a key advocate of privatization, the accumulation of private wealth, and of international opportunities presented by globalization, Mahathir saw the financial crisis as an outcome of neoimperialism, arguing that it constituted no less than an attack on Malaysias very sovereignty and yet another form of Western colonization: There will be no occupation of the territories but already we are seeing how the choice of leaders of these countries can be influenced by pressures on the currency.17 Mahathirs attack on external forces may have been anticipated given his long-standing criticisms of Western hegemony and promotion of various initiatives that put a premium on South-South relations. One example of Mahathirs challenges to Western power was a short-lived Buy British Last initiative that resulted from a hostile takeover by Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) an investment arm of the Malaysian state of Guthrie Corporation, a once dominant corporate British presence in Malaysia. Another was his Look East policy, which meant looking toward Japan and other countries in East Asia as exemplars of a late capitalist modernity, a modernity Malaysia could emulate without losing sight of its own cultural values. As Khoo Boo Teik explains, Mahathirs criticism of Western economic and political power reflected a worldview in which there were two basic camps. One side comprised poor, developing countries, former colonies, and other nations of the East and the South. The other side consisted of rich, developed countries, former colonizers, and other nations of the West and the North. By Mahathirs scheme of things, such a
15. 16. 17.
Hall 1986, 20. Ibid.,15. In Murray Hiebert, Read it and weep. Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 May 1998, 28.
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division of the world, while it did not portend of mortal combat between the two sides, contained a leitmotif of ceaseless competition which determined the fates of nations.18 Mahathirs Third World nationalism constituted a reformulation of themes laid out by early leaders of the Malayan anticolonial movement, although his was a nationalist narrative articulated in response to newer, and seemingly less overt, forms of Western power and domination. It was a posture that brought him much acclaim and wide support among leaders and countries in the global South. Yet despite his criticisms of the West, Mahathir remained a staunch advocate of an economic system underwritten by the logic of global capitalism, albeit one attenuated by the development priorities of an industrializing, modernizing Third World state. Several key premises underpin the dominant Malaysian nation and modernity narratives: (1) the state is the only able arbiter of ethnic politics; (2) ethnic divisions are informed by class inequalities, which are best addressed through aggressive state intervention in the economy and a developmentalist agenda; (3) political conflict cannot be mediated through civil society but rather through access to the state; (4) political stability and order are central to national survival and political opposition generates instability; and (5) state power is exercised in a manner consistent with the interests of the nation as a whole. These premises, which I have explored elsewhere, situate Mahathirs rhetoric in the face of a disciplinary neoliberalism (epitomized by the financial crisis).19 The question Mahathir implicitly (ex)poses in his response to the crisis is whether national autonomy should be sacrificed at the altar of economic liberalization and its promises. His position reflects the broader contradictions of official narratives on nation and modernity, which Mahathir himself played an important part in constructing. As Partha Chatterjee has noted, the nationalist elite in India was able to forge a singular nationalism around the struggle against British rule and yet at the same time foundered in its efforts to quell resistance from subaltern groups in the postcolonial context.20 Similarly, while the nationalist prelude in colonial Malaya signaled to some degree a unity despite sharp differences among key political elements around the idea of a common destiny and a shared history, deep ambivalence around the terms and conditions of postcolonial statehood surfaced in the first decade after independence. By the late 1960s the Malays, Malaysias dominant indigenous ethnic group, were widely viewed as underprivileged relative to the Chinese, a minority in the country but viewed as an economically ascendant immigrant community at the time of independence from Britain in 1957. More than a decade later, in May 1969, street riots and clashes, conventionally held to be the result of ethnic conflict arising out of class divisions between Chinese and Malay, led to the tempo-
18. 19. 20.
Khoo 1995, 65. Nair 1995. Chatterjee 1986.

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rary suspension of parliamentary rule. An economic restructuring program, embodied in the NEP and directed toward the transformation of Malaysian society and politics, was also set in place after the violence of 1969. The NEP had as its core objectives the reduction of poverty and the elimination of the identification of race with economic function. Designed to redress the economic gap between Malays and the Chinese, the NEP was not only the cornerstone of eco21 nomic planning by the state, but also its ideological template. The post-NEP policies set out in its successor, the National Development Policy (NDP), reflected the urgency of the earlier plan, but placed greater emphasis on social accommodation to the imperatives of rapid industrialization.22 The modernization imperative accompanying nationalist objectives and inscribed by a belief in the virtues of privatization and the capitalist free market system, envisioned Malaysias transformation into an industrialized, globalized, and technologically driven economy by the year 2020. Mahathirs outline for Malaysias economic future was encapsulated in a set of policy statements known as Vision 2020 a program of rapid economic modernization that included objectives such as cultural 23 and moral development and the construction of a unified national identity. A hegemonic political compact among key ethnically based parties, partners in the ruling BN has shaped postcolonial politics in Malaysia. The BN, formerly named the Alliance, emphasizes that its ability to maintain social harmony and political stability in an ethnically divided polity derives from a delicate balancing act involving the countrys major ethnic groups.24 The main component parties of the BN include the UMNO, its de facto leader, the Malaysian Chinese Congress (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). Under Mahathir, who became prime minister in 1981, signs of an even greater erosion of civil and political liberties became obvious, even though until 1997 key civil society sectors and groups, particularly those associated with commerce, were generally seen as partners in the states modernization project. Driven by Mahathirs vision of a modern, economically resilient state, the middle class also appeared to ignore executive encroachment on various institutions of democratic governance.25 Further, seduced by the rise of Malay capitalists closely associated with the state and dependent on state patronage, the expanding Malay middle class appeared willing to trade off civil and political liberties for economic well-being.26 The states modernizing ambitions, however, glossed over deepening poverty and social inequality, problems that were mostly sidelined during the period of rapid economic growth that preceded the 1997 financial crisis in Malaysia. As privatization and deregulation of the economy were pursued with in-
21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.
Husin Ali 1984. Ishak 2000, 112124. See Gomez and Jomo 1999, 16876. For a lengthy discussion of this ethnic divide and its colonial roots see Abraham 2004. Khoo 1995; 2003. Saravanamuttu 2003; Abdul Rahman 2002.
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tensity, intra-ethnic inequality, especially the socioeconomic gulf within the Ma27 lay community, grew even sharper. In the aftermath of the currency crisis a subtle discursive shift could be discerned, one that calls into question the hegemony of official discourses around nation and modernity. John Hilley refers to this as a hegemonic crisis in response to Mahathirism an ideological program he ascribes to Mahathirs articulation of Vision 2020.28 With the financial crisis of 1997 an array of critics, including those within the ruling BN, challenged the states policy prescriptions and growth targets. Mahathir, calling opponents of his crisis-related policies agents and tools of foreign interests,29 now questioned the wisdom of Malaysias deepening integration into the global economy. He was also unhappy with Anwar Ibrahims advocacy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) position on the economic crisis and proposed solutions for Malaysia. In an interview, Anwar, then deputy prime minister and finance minister, told Time magazine: We will have to convince investors that we need them. I think we should be in the [sic] league with the international system and its commitment to further liberalize. Theres no question of a reversal of public policy.30 Mahathir took the opposite view. Allegations of nepotism and crony capitalism in the party and government soon began to surface among the UMNO rank and file in June 1998 and were directed at Mahathir.31 Joined by some opposition groups, the critics (and Anwar supporters) alleged that cronies and Mahathirs sons were being protected under various bailout schemes for their business ventures. Suspicious of those who were raising these matters and seeing Anwars political ambitions exposed by such allegations, Mahathir retaliated by disclosing lists of those who benefited from lucrative contracts resulting from privatization of huge national assets and other schemes.32 By taking on his critics unflinchingly Mahathir indicated his willingness to defend his policies, which privileged economic growth and modernization over democratic values, by force if necessary. He warned Malaysians that the national interest, translated as economic survival, was at stake and accused his political opponents of subverting the national interest.33
27. 28. 29. 30. 31.
32.
Ishak 2000. Hilley 2001. PM: Opposition parties mere agents to foreign prophets of doom, New Straits Times, 21 July 1998. What is success without freedom, Time, 6 October 1997, 2324. There were signs that all was not well between Mahathir and Anwar even before the currency crisis hit the country. At the 1998 UMNO General Assembly, the annual meeting of the party for rank and file members, a defamatory booklet 50 Dalil: Mengapa Anwar Tidak Boleh Jadi PM (Fifty reasons: Why Anwar cannot be prime minister) was circulated to members and appeared to have Mahathirs tacit, if not open endorsement. For analysis on events preceding and leading up to the assembly and its outcomes see, for example, Malaysia: The Feud, Businessweek, 9 November 1998; Tim Healy and Assif Shameen, Can Anyone Save Malaysia (available at http://www.asiaweek.com/asia week/98/0828/cs_1_malaysia.html; accessed 1 July 2006); and Hwang 2003, 276306. Cronies All, The Star, 17 June 1998.
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Notwithstanding these warnings, many Malaysians were still shocked when Anwar Ibrahim was dismissed from all cabinet posts on 8 September 1998 and subsequently expelled from UMNO.34 Despite their differences, the struggle between Anwar and Mahathir had less to do with framing an alternative political discourse in Malaysia than with intra-elite and factional politics in UMNO. In this regard, the struggle meant wresting control not only of UMNO but of economic policy as well.35 At stake was the huge UMNO patronage machine that dispensed favors in return for grassroots political support, in part through the availability of funds generated by a vast network of corporate interests that have been critical to UMNOs political dominance.36 However, the struggle was arguably also about the ways in which the states modernity project could accommodate conflicting class interests. The beneficiaries of UMNOs largesse were politically well-connected business people from all ethnic groups, but not the lower income or poor in the city or countryside. Under Mahathir and post-NEP , the state has unquestioningly favored wealth generation and has given less attention to the problems associated with capital accumulation in the hands of a few, 37 well-connected business elites. Although the UMNO-dominated state in a pre-1997 expanding economy was able to accommodate to some degree the needs of its rank-and-file supporters in part through rural development, education, health, housing, and investment incentives and opportunities, the distribution of the spoils of Malaysias economic growth during the NEP period was unbalanced. The 1997 crisis suggests, however, that intra-party struggles and crises are grounded in the material, social, and cultural terrain of postcolonial Malaysia. Widespread dissatisfaction among those who were not so privileged during the boom years resulted in unexpected alliances among social forces and political organizations and the emergence of more coordinated forms of resistance to the ruling party.
The Emergence and Contours of Reformasi

Studies on NGOs that address questions concerning the role and impact of non-state action in the Malaysian political process have been prolific since the mid 1990s.38 Scholarly literature at this time began to utilize the new social or societal movement concept to explain how human rights, Islamist, and environmental movements could resist state hegemony.39 Recently, the use of other
33. 34.
35. 36. 37. 38.
Malaysia: The Feud, Businessweek, 9 November 1998. No deputy prime minister had ever been summarily sacked from his position. When serious differences emerged between a prime minister and his deputy, the latter was either forced to resign or left voluntarily. The treatment of Mahathirs first deputy Musa Hitam and the political crisis that shook up the party and government in 1987 is a case in point. See Crouch 1992; Means 1991; Milne and Mauzy 1999. Gomez 2004. For a detailed study on the topic of money politics in Malaysia see Gomez 1991. Gomez and Jomo 1999. For a useful survey of the role of nongovernmental organizations in Malaysia see Tan and Singh 1994.
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terms such as civil society organizations (CSOs) seeks to capture the same phenomena. All of these works address similar questions. For example, how should we think about the role of the voluntary sector and cause-based NGOs in a political context such as Malaysias where the state assumes such a dominant position? My earlier work addressed this question in reference to the emergence and resilience of the NGO movement in Malaysia from the 1960s and to the 41 early 1990s. In that work, I noted: The growing anxiety of ordinary Malaysians over the currency crisis of 19971998 and its accompanying economic implications, may create less of an opportunity for NSMs (new social movements) to articulate and position themselves on what may seem like abstract concerns over human 42 rights, environmental and religious issues. Yet civil society remains a space where politics and identity continue to be ne43 gotiated along a number of different fronts. In the reform movement that negotiation may be witnessed in the conflicts and tensions around movement directions and politics. In his essay on the aftermath of 1997 and its implications for democratization and electoral politics in Malaysia, Sharaad Kuttan points to some of these tensions. Describing the ideological winds buffeting Reformasi, he suggests that NGOs were and remain conflicted about their relationship to opposition political parties as reflected in the desire expressed by some in the movement to maintain a critical distance from party politics.44 This ambivalence may be in part attributable to the dynamics of the specific sociopolitical context within which Reformasi evolved, a context that in turn shaped the future of the movement. The Reformasi movement in Malaysia may be characterized in the following way: (1) it was a response to a concrete political event, which was the ouster and detention of the Malaysian deputy prime minister by the prime minister and his allies thus it came to be constituted initially as a pro-Anwar and anti-Mahathir movement; (2) it was also a movement from the street made up of participants from different class backgrounds and ethnic groups, albeit led by a cadre of individual activists spurred on by political events; (3) it came to be dominated by both noninstitutionalized (NGOs) and institutionalized elements (opposition political parties) who worked together in opposition to the state but who were not always able to forge a unified strategy; (4) it was animated by a wide range of issues and causes, but centered on the arbitrary exercise of state power; and (5) it was hampered by access to organizational resources and by state coercion. I elaborate on the implications of some of these facets below.
40
39.
40. 41. 42. 43. 44.
The concept was drawn from scholarly literature on social movements in North America and Europe (Nair 1995; 1999). It has gained increasing currency in more recent writings on Malaysias NGO sector (see, for example, Weiss and Saliha 2003). For example, Weiss 2005. Nair 1995; 1999. Nair 1999, 100. Ibid. Kuttan 2005, 16667.
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The Reformasi movement emerged from the political turmoil and disaffection resulting from Anwar Ibrahims ouster, arrest, and detention. Anwars subsequent calls for reform stirred thousands who took to the streets of Kuala Lumpur in protest against state power. In a brief statement known as the 45 Permatang Pauh Declaration, issued on 8 September 1998, just days after his expulsion from the ruling party and government, Anwar outlined demands for a comprehensive reform of the Malaysian judicial, social, and political system. The estimated thirty thousand people who took to the streets of Kuala Lumpur on 20 September 1998, in the largest such protest in decades, supported this contention. In this sense, Anwar was a singularly important figure and a critical factor in the protest against state power and its excesses in post-crisis Malaysia.46 Paradoxically, Anwar himself was complicit in the propagation of the very system he now condemned and rallied his troops against. Yet despite his detractors, Anwars calls for Reformasi appealed to many Malays disillusioned with UMNO politics, which had assumed an increasingly authoritarian and elitedriven character under Mahathir. Further, Anwars arrest after the 20 September demonstration under the Internal Security Act (ISA), which gives the government powers of preventive detention without trial, also triggered public outrage. Importantly, Anwars imprisonment galvanized an important segment of Malay society long accustomed to UMNOs projection of itself as the protector of Malay interests.47 In the wake of Anwars arrest university students, NGOs, political parties, the unemployed, workers, civil servants, professionals, and cultural workers became involved in street protests and other forms of dissent. In his analysis of these events, Sabri Zain chronicles the resonance that Reformasi held for a wide group of people, reaching across Malaysian society, including elderly men, middle-aged men and women, young girlssenior managers in the private sectorexecutives or civil servants, teachers, businessmen, lawyers and Rockers in Leather jackets.48 Reformasis appeal cut across a fairly wide swathe of the Malaysian population, projecting a dissident discourse that initially held the promise of meaningful social progress and political change.49 In its early days Reformasi drew a number of diverse organizations such as the Kuala Lumpur Residents Civic Club and the Society for Christian Reflection, human rights organizations such as Suaram (Voice of the Malaysian People) and Aliran (National Consciousness Movement), and Islamist NGOs such as ABIM (Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia) and Jemaah Islah Malaysia (JIM). Islamist groups now found common ground with these non-Islamist organizations. Such an alliance
45. 46. 47. 48.
49.
Permatang Pauh was Anwars parliamentary constituency. Kuttan 2005, 156. Chandra 1979. In Khoo 2003, 104. Sabri Zains widely circulated Internet journal, Reformasi Diary, provided important documentation of the formation and momentum of the movement. For information on the diary see http://www.sabrizain.demon.co.uk/ index2.htm. Interviews with various activists and analyses of alternative media sources such as Aliran Monthly, Harakah (the PAS newspaper), The Rocket (newsletter of the DAP)
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was not without precedent since many of these organizations had cooperated on campaigns during the 1980s and early 1990s focusing on, among other issues, human rights in Bosnia, East Timor, and Burma, and political repression in Malaysia. Reformasi also reflected the tensions of identity politics, however, and the ambiguities and contradictions of political solidarity among secular and religious (principally Islamist) organizations, which were constantly under pressure from countervailing moves to solidify intra-group support. Despite the participation of non-Islamist entities, Reformasi would soon become a testament to the power and influence of groups such as ABIM and JIM that successfully mobilized their members and supporters in defense of Anwar and Reformasi.50 Having been a founding leader of ABIM and the Muslim youth movement of the 1970s, Anwar now found renewed support among these organizations and their members. Under the Reformasi banner, meetings and gatherings were organized and a new formal coalition, Gagasan Demokrasi Rakyat or simply Gagasan (Peoples Democratic Coalition), was formed in November 1998. In addition to the Gagasan a second broad coalition, the Gerakan Keadilan or Gerak (Malaysian Peoples Justice Movement), was also established in late 1998. Throwing their support behind the movement, opposition political parties such as the Democratic Action Party (DAP), the Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM), and the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) renewed their calls for reform.51 These parties had been articulating concerns about creeping and overt forms of authoritarianism for decades. While these coalitions reflected overlapping membership and objectives, Gerak was led by PAS and dominated by the Islamists including ABIM and JIM, while Gagasan reflected greater diversity in membership. Reformasi was further aided by the creation of another NGO, ADIL (Social Justice Movement), led by Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, Anwars wife, and made up of ex-UMNO members who followed Anwar out of the party.52 Reformasi thus mobilized several different social and political organizations and ethnic groups whose conflicting objectives and asymmetric organizational resources lent the movement a horizontal rather than a vertical structure.53 Anwars separate trials on charges of corruption (19981999) and sodomy (19992000) captivated the Malaysian public and fueled the reform movement. He was convicted and sentenced to six and nine years respectively on the charges. His trials, conviction, and sentencing were widely condemned by human rights groups and his supporters and seen as a sign of his political persecu-
50. 51. 52.
generally support this view. Author interviews: Sharaad Kuttan, writer, journalist, and long-time NGO activist (Kuala Lumpur, May 2004); Tian Chua, Parti KeADILan vice-president (Kuala Lumpur, December 2003); and Cynthia Gabriel, executive director of Suara Rakyat Malaysia or Suaram (Petaling Jaya, October 2003). For analyses of the origins of Malaysias Islamic movement, see among others Chandra 1987, Nagata 1984, and Zainah 1987. Three more NGOs join reformists, Star Online, 8 September 1998. ADIL would morph into a political party, Parti KeADILan Nasional (National Justice Party) also known as KeADILan.
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tion. During the Anwar trials Reformasi groups utilized alternative media such as the Internet to get the word out about Anwars persecution and to organize street protests. Numerous Reformasi websites such as Mahazalim, Laman Reformasi, Laman Rakyat, and freeMalaysia sprang up between 1998 and 2000. In addition, alternative Internet news portals such as Malaysiakini and Agenda Malaysia emerged on the scene while web periodicals such as Saksi55 approached issues in a more analytical style and provided good coverage of a range of topics including culture and civil society. These news sites, combined with those already maintained by other NGOs and parties and especially PASs Harakah newsletter, produced the sense of a widening (if not a deepening) public sphere and democratic possibilities.56 Peaceful protests at which people carried placards and made speeches, were the typical means of showing solidarity with fellow reformers and developing a politics of resistance. In November 2000 an estimated ten thousand people gathered on a major Kuala Lumpur expressway to protest the governments efforts to block yet another planned 100,000 gathering. Similar demonstrations were called several times after Anwars sentencing, but because of threats of police action, lack of skillful and coordinated organization, and the difficulty of sustaining interest in a long-running campaign to bring about justice for Anwar, the number of protestors dwindled over time. The Black 14 first anniversary commemoration of Anwar Ibrahims sentencing organized by Reformasi party activists in 2001, for example, drew only a mere 1,000 or so die-hard supporters, according to one Reformasi website.57 The following year and days before the second anniversary of Anwars sentencing Reformasi leaders Tian Chua, Mohamad Ezam Mohamad Nor, Saari Sungib, Badrul Amin Baharon, Lokman Adam, Abdul Ghani Harun, and N. Gobalakrishnan all from the opposition party, Parti KeADILan Nasional (National Justice Party), along with activist independent filmmaker and essayist Hishamuddin Rais, Free Anwar Campaign director Raja Petra Kamarudin, and Badaruddin Ismail of Suaram, were arrested under the ISA.58 The arrests also highlighted the flexible use of coercion by the state to silence or intimidate Reformasi activists and the political opposition.
54
53. 54. 55. 56.
57. 58.
Aside from interviews with activists, the analysis in this section draws from a variety of sources including Reformasi websites and news media. Anwar won an appeal against his conviction for sodomy in September 2004 and has since been released from prison. Saksi ceased publication in mid-2000. AgendaMalaysia announced in December 2000 that it would cease publication due to lack of revenue. See Anil Netto, Falling mainstream newspaper readership and the rise of the alternative media: Exploring new opportunities for promoting media freedom. Paper presented at Southeast Asian Fellows (SEAF) Seminar Series, 24 October 2000, Institute of Malaysia and International Studies (IKMAS), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. Author interview: Anil Netto, November 2003, Penang, Malaysia. Reformasi needs to reinvent itself, 23 October 2001. Available at http://www. freeanwar.net/articles/article241001.html; accessed 20 June 2006. See Protest against the 2001 ISA arrests: Memorandum to Suhakam submitted by Aliran, Hakam, and Suaram. Available at http://www.aliran.com/oldsite/monthly /2001/3a.html; accessed 20 June 2006.
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The commemoration revealed the shifting dynamics of Reformasi from what was originally a grassroots, nonpartisan movement into an opposition party driven one. Political parties such as PAS, DAP, PRM, and KeADILan, which Wan Azizah and Anwars supporters established in April 1999 shortly after Anwars conviction and sentencing on corruption charges, had initially worked together to give Reformasi a structure and organizational coherence that could be channeled into electoral politics. Another key development was the formation, also in 1999, of the Barisan Alternatif (Alterna- Anwar Ibrahim. Anwars separate trials tive Front) led by opposition parties PAS, on charges of corruption (19981999) and sodomy (19992000) captivated the DAP , PRM, and KeADILan, which demon- Malaysian public and fueled the reform strated the increased cooperation and movement. (Credit: Weatherhead East Asian Insolidarity among different Reformasi institute, Columbia University) terests and revealed conflict over resources, objectives, and strategies as well. For example, different groups competed for access to the OKT (orang kena tuduh, or the accused),59 who were seen as more willing than most to take to the streets and risk arrest. Organizations within Reformasi tried to identify key supporters to bolster their core membership and ensure loyalty to the cause. Access to these individuals became a contentious issue.60 Yet Reformasi groups did cooperate on the OKT. For example, Suarams arrangements for legal assistance to the hundreds arrested during protests helped solidify its alliance with the Islamist NGOs and the political opposition.61 In terms of priorities, Wan Azizah and Anwar allies had Anwars release at the top of their agenda although this was not the main priority for many others in the movement. PAS, the principal beneficiary of the fallout from Anwars trial and sentencing, held to a political platform not shared by others in the movement. This in turn posed problems for other reformists who shared a broad secular vision of a post-Mahathir order in marked contrast to PASs consistent advocacy with support from Islamist NGOs such as ABIM of an Islamic state. The creation of the Barisan Alternatif (BA), which became the vehicle for challenging the electoral dominance of the BN, was significant in terms of Reformasis political momentum (more below). Yet in the words of one human rights activist the movement faced a serious problem of leadership by late 2000 and it looked as 62 if people are more ready for change than the organizers of Reformasi.
59. 60. 61.
Individuals who were accused by the state of anti-lawful actions during the Reformasi protests and arrested. Sangwon Suh, Reformasis on-going fight Asiaweek, 17 November 2000. Author interview: Cynthia Gabriel, October 2003.
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The Malaysian reform movements difficulties thus reflect the challenges social and political movements typically encounter, especially when they have limited resources and are unable to effectively threaten or coerce opponents, or offer much in exchange for concessions from their opponents. As Medearis suggests, social movements are usually understood to be collective challenges mounted by relatively marginal groups against powerful elites and dominant ideologies. And acting, as they do, in societies characterized by significant inequalities of power, they face systematic barriers to democratic inclusion for themselves and their arguments. In addition to their weak social positions, they are almost always bearers of ideas that are unconge63 nial to prevalent institutions and practices. This view is generally consistent with the Malaysian reform movements experience. In the next section I explore why the reform movement was unable to formulate an alternative discourse that could displace or de-center the official narratives of nation and modernity.
Reformasi and Its Discontents

Academic analysts generally agree that Reformasi presented an alternative to BN hegemony by formulating an alternative set of propositions that expanded political participation, challenged the nexus between ethnic identity and political life, and democratized civil society.64 Like the reformists, several academic commentators have viewed Reformasi in somewhat lofty terms; the movement promised a new political awakening, the defanging of ethnic politics, and a more democratic framework of governance. Francis Loh, for example, suggests that ethnicism is no longer the overriding factor in determining national political outcomes.65 Yet despite such optimism it is debatable whether the movement disavowed the ethnic politics expressed by the BN. How effectively did Reformasi refute the ethnonationalism embedded in the dominant discourse of the ruling party/state? Ethnicity, identity, and nation are mutually constitutive categories in Malaysia. Reformasis seductive promises aside, why was it unable to significantly rework the underlying premises of the dominant nation and modernity narratives? The answers to these questions remain elusive. Significantly, the struggle to define precisely the kinds of alternative national ideals Reformasi stands for has frustrated those activists who subscribe to the broad goals of social and political change and democratic reform. I suggest here that the extent to which the Reformasi movement subverted dominant political meanings has been exaggerated in the literature. Contrary to claims made that Reformasi produced an alternative cultural politics or cultural imperative and facilitated the empow-
62. 63. 64. 65.
Author interview: S. Arutchelvan, then Suaram coordinator, November 2000, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia. Medearis 2005, 53. Khoo 2003; Loh and Saravanamuttu 2003; Funston 2000; Shamsul 2000. Loh 2003, 278. See also Santiago and Nadarajah 1999, 31.
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erment of civil society, I argue instead that the movement reinforced the underlying premises of the dominant narrative. Little has changed in the overall structure and pattern of state-society relations in post-crisis Malaysia despite Reformasis hopeful interventions. I make three related points to support this contention. First, Reforma si emerged in a c ontext w h ere th e institutionalization or deepening of participatory norms in civil society was severely constrained. The reasons for this lack of deepening can be traced to decades of tight state control over political expression and public debate on key issues such as repressive legislation and the hegemony of the UMNO/BN political formula. Several NGOs organized around human rights issues and pushed for an expansion of political and civil liberties in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, but their campaigns did not resonate widely in civil society, which remained largely indifferent to the issues raised by these groups. When Reformasi came along it breathed new life into NGOs and led to the creation of new groups, but these were mostly unable in the long run to articulate a deeper critique of politics and the state beyond justice for Anwar and electoral gain. Second, as a movement that initially manifested itself as a spontaneous outcry from the streets against official abuses of power, Reformasi struggled to present itself as a viable movement for political and social change in the long term. Its message was anchored in a general critique of the excesses of state power and the need for political change, but it stopped short of grounding its alternative discourse in most Malaysians experience of a divided and racialized polity. In other words, ideas about democracy and political change were presented in such abstract terms that it underestimated the preoccupations of many Malaysians with identity, primarily ethnic identity, and its relationship to politics.66 It was also a movement principally made up of disparate groups and organizations, many of which had operated independently since their formation. A third point, and closely related to the second, is that as Reformasi evolved tensions emerged among different component parties and complicated the movements message, seriously diluting Reformasis optimism and critique. I develop these arguments below.
Deepening Reform and Civil Society: Challenges for NGOs

Democratic deepening refers to the transformation of social and political structures so that these are inclusive and extend full rights of citizenship and participation to all regardless of caste, class, gender, ethnicity, or race.67 Emerging in part as a critique of the political democratization literature, which emphasizes regime attributes and a teleological understanding of social and political change as well as a preoccupation with democratic consolidation, democratic deepening has a descriptive and normative content and impact rather than providing a mere analytical tool.68 Utilized in the literature to capture pro69 cesses associated with institutionalizing participatory democracy and the rise
66.
I agree with Mandal that transethnic solidarities in Malaysia exist and have been obscured historically. However, as he also acknowledges, this does not mean that such constructions illustrate a false consciousness. Race and/or ethnicity become naturalized in ways that construct difference as primordial (Mandal 2002, 5255).
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of grassroots social movements particularly in Latin America, democratic 71 deepening also implies a deliberative discourse. In this view democratic deepening should involve the active participation of all members of civil society whether through intermediary institutions such as political parties, civic associations, and social movements or through more direct input from informal networks established at the local town, district, or village levels. According to Kenneth Roberts: The deepening logic conceives democracy as a property of the social order and not merely that of a political regime.This conception of democracy is inherently continuous rather than discrete; it revolves around the central analytical dimension of popular sovereignty or empowerment.This approach treats democracy as an elastic and dynamic phenomenon that contracts or expands over time in accordance with the extent of popular 72 control over collective decision-making. I use the notion of democratic deepening in the Malaysian context mainly to illustrate the discursive boundaries of Reformasi and its structural limitations in facilitating wider citizen participation. As noted earlier, modernity and nation narratives constructed around the imperatives of growth and development and inter-ethnic relations premised on the NEP and the NDP were dominant in the pre-Reformasi period and inhibited citizen participation. Democratic deepening in this period was truncated not only by the Malaysian states coercive response but also by its ability to deploy ideological rationales when challenged by counter-narratives from civic associations, NGOs, and opposition parties thus preempting more widespread opposition. For example, periodic uses of the ISA kept criticism of state policies and growing state power in check through the 1970s, 1980s, and into the early 1990s. Accompanied by the production of an official ideology around economic progress, ethnic harmony, and political stability that only the UMNO/BN state could secure, citizen involvement in the public sphere was severely constrained.73 Yet citizen bodies, principally public-interest NGOs, have historically constituted a distinct, politicized segment in Malaysian civil society and have long been the standard bearers of alternative visions of democracy, human rights, and political reform in Malaysia. Well before the emergence of Reformasi, Malaysian human rights, womens, and environmental NGOs were criticizing key state initiatives and seeking to shape public opinion and policy in key ar-
70
67. 68. 69. 70. 71.
72. 73.
Harbers 2007, 40. Ibid. See also Schedler (1998) for a discussion of democratic consolidation. Alvarez 1993. Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Roberts 1998. According to Harbers deliberative procedures involve a face-to-face setting in which citizens present reasoned arguments to persuade their fellow citizens on their positions and concerns. Citizens should participate as equals in these processes, rather than as clients, and should contribute to the shaping and development of democratic practices (Harbers 2007: 4243). Roberts 1998, 29. Nair 1999; Hilley 2001.
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eas. Some of the high-profile campaigns run by NGOs include the anti-ISA, anti-Official Secrets Act (OSA), and anti-logging protests of the 1980s. These NGOs, unlike Islamist groups like ABIM and JIM, generally disavowed party politics and advocated alternative modes of political organization and expression. They also challenged a dominant nationalist discourse, one that privileged ethnicity, and in the process drew attention to more fluid notions of identity. However, NGOs appeared to have a more difficult time taking on issues and challenging state policy by the mid-1990s in Malaysia. This failure may be due in part to the effects of an ISA crackdown in 1987 known as Operation Lallang when many key activists were detained and NGOs came under closer government scrutiny. The Mahathir government accused several NGOs of playing politics under the guise of being nonpartisan groups and targeted these organizations as enemies of the state and saboteurs.75 The 1987 crackdown undermined NGO efforts to raise public awareness of the expanding reach of state power and authoritarianism and limited more extensive citizen involvement in the political process. While the immediate genesis of the 1998 reform movement may be traced to popular disenchantment with state policies in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis, it is also informed as noted above by pre-1997 struggles to redefine state-society relations. Reformasis impetus thus lay also in the failure of non-Islamist NGOs and their allies in the political opposition to better articulate a post-1987 vision or movement for human rights and democratic values in Malaysia. Export-led growth had propelled Malaysia into the ranks of newly industrializing states and promoted the creation of a Malaysian middle class less attuned to the need for checks against the arbitrary exercise of state power by the mid 1990s.76 As NGOs mobilized against the backdrop of economic growth and expanding domestic consumption, they also found it more difficult to articulate an alternative set of ideals that, given their urban roots and base, was essential to success in national campaigns on human rights, womens rights, indigenous peoples rights, the environment, and so forth. The exception was the Islamist NGO movement, which has grown in its appeal, and in alliance with the opposition party PAS constitutes a formidable obstacle to the advancement of an alternative secular, democratic, multiethnic, and multireligious nationalist politics in Malaysia. While it has always been more difficult for human rights NGOs and other opposition political parties to match the organizational skills and grass-
74
74. 75. 76.
Tan and Singh 1994; Nair 1995, 1999; Weiss and Saliha 2003. Cited in Means 1991, 194. The Malaysian experience would no doubt contradict the conventional view that economic modernization actually brings about demands for greater political liberalization. Instead of a political modernity in which political debate can flourish, the Malaysian experience demonstrates all too well that economic modernization is typically accompanied as it has been elsewhere by the citizen consumer and the states corresponding move to segregate the personal, familial, and the private from the realm of the public (Kessler 1998: 5556). On the role and significance of middle classes in shaping social and political change see Rodan 1996 and Abdul Rahman 2002.
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Parti Keadilan Rakyats youngest supporters protesting the Malaysian governments delay in granting the party a publishing permit for its newspaper, Suara KeADILan. (Courtesy: Parti
Keadilan Rakyat)
roots support of the Islamist NGOs and PAS before the Reformasi era, the situation was no easier with the onset of Reformasi. The irony was not lost on many in the Malaysian human rights NGO community that it took an ousted deputy prime minister from the ruling party to make the call for democratic reform resonate with many Malaysians.77 After all, despite their demands for the abolition of repressive laws, enhancement of judicial oversight and independence, and civil and political liberties for many years prior to Reformasi, NGOs and some in the political opposition were often lone voices of dissent. Still, Reformasi signified a variety of possibilities for NGOs that actively mobilized behind it. On the electoral front, NGO leaders were now solidly behind opposition efforts to overcome the decisive two-thirds parliamentary majority of the ruling party. In effect, this meant that those NGO activists who joined the party opposition ranks were willing to dispense with the appearance of nonpartisanship. The involvement of NGO activists in the electoral process on the surface constituted a shift away from the noninstitutionalized politics espoused and practiced by NGOs in the 1970s and 1980s.78 In sum, this was a recognition that NGOs ability to effect change through civil society was somewhat limited given the lackluster public response to past campaigns. The reform movement thus signaled an important shift in the modes and scope of protest from the 1970s and 1980s when activists mobilized on a range of issues. Key figures in the human rights movement such as Chandra Muzaffar, president of the Just World Trust, Tian Chua of Suaram, activist lawyer Sivarasa Rasiah, and immigrant
77. 78.
Author interviews: Arutchelvan, November 2000; Kuttan 2004. Nair 1999; Loh 2003.
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rights advocate Irene Fernandez had become leaders in the political opposition by 1999. The appearance of KeADILan as an alternative multiethnic party was critical to the appeal that electoral politics now held for many of these individuals who mostly joined the new party. The formation of the BA was also a move that attracted support, formal and otherwise, from NGOs. It was, in short, the moment of politics. Some activists believed that staying out of electoral politics in light of events surrounding Anwars arrest would be to abdicate responsibility for bringing about change in the prevailing social and political order.79 NGO activists also saw the reform movement as an opportunity to transform the political and social order and to promote an alternative vision of the good society in Malaysia that would be popular with Malays. The wider NGO community believed that if Malays did not support calls for reform the movement was doomed to fail. Unlike earlier unsuccessful efforts by NGOs to mobilize large numbers of people around human rights violations and political repression, Reformasi had brought thousands to the streets of Kuala Lumpur in support of Anwar, human rights, social justice, and other Reformasi ideals. The broad scope of Reformasi, even if it meant allying with conservative forces such as PAS, thus enabled the secular human rights movement to anchor its critique of state practices in a concrete political agenda. Toward the end of 1999 a number of important new initiatives were being advanced by these NGOs and their allies. These initiatives included the Peoples Manifesto for Change, Womens Agenda for Change (WAC), and Womens Candidacy Initiative (WCI). (WCI fielded its first candidate in the 1999 general elections.) Key womens NGOs such as the All Womens Action Society (AWAM), Womens Aid Organization (WAO), and Womens Development Collective (WDC) rallied behind Reformasi and in support of new opportunities for political mobilization on womens rights, while maintaining a skeptical distance from the Reformasi movement. The skepticism in part stems from the awareness of paternalistic attitudes in society at large and a corresponding lack of consciousness in the larger NGO movement about womens specific issues and concerns.80 There was also much concern on the part of Muslim womens organizations such as Sisters In Islam (SIS) over the participation of PAS, ABIM, and even Anwar, for SIS and its allies saw them as undermining Muslim womens rights.81 The latter are often encompassed within the human rights debate, but seldom consistently highlighted in critiques or analysis of state power by key intellectuals within these movements. Some of the main issues for the Reformasi movement, including the ISA, state authoritarianism, judicial independence, had been core NGO concerns for over two decades. Yet when linked to Anwar, these issues had a more palpable and immediate impact among Malaysians, albeit at the expense of a deeper under-
79. 80. 81.
Author interview: Tian Chua, December 2003. Author interview: Ivy Josiah, director of Womens Aid Organization, December 2003. Author interview: Zainah Anwar, executive director, Sisters in Islam, July 2006, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia. See also Derichs 2002.
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standing of the problems. To some critics, NGOs were not above opportunism and used Reformasi for their own narrow political ends such as raising their profile among potential international funders.82 Significantly, a broader and deeper historical interrogation of the underlying structures of authority and rule and of the implications of long-standing policies aimed at curbing political, cultural, and social activism were seemingly obscured in the spirited protests against Anwars plight. I argue that this was due in part to how the issues were framed in the Reformasi campaign and to the failure to effectively link Anwars plight to persistent executive control over other branches of government and the states curtailment of political space and civil society. Anwars complicity in perpetuating authoritarianism while in power was not raised by many although it was of concern to some in the movement.83 Consequently, Reformasi did not engender a more profound debate over social justice, political democratization, and inclusion of all citizens, although it signified the promise of a radical shift in the terms of political discourse.
Ethnicity, Identity, and Political Reform

Initially, the gathering of different groups in the reform movement revealed a sensibility more attuned to commonalities rather than differences. As noted earlier, human rights and democracy campaigns coordinated by NGOs in the 1970s and 1980s had failed to garner broad support among Malays. In contrast, the calls for Reformasi in the late 1990s galvanized Malays across the socioeconomic spectrum. Similarly, Johan Saravanamuttu writes, it cannot be denied that for the first time significant numbers of the Malay middle classes were involved in the movement. Reflexively supportive of the BN government in times past, they now considered the BN government, or perhaps more pointedly the Mahathir government, zalim (re84 pressive), tidak adil (unjust), and involved in cronyism and nepotism. Yet to other observers Reformasi may have reshaped the tone and temper of Malay political discourse, but it did not have a similar resonance among other ethnic groups. Khoo Boo Teik suggests, for example, that Reformasi appealed mostly to Malays angry with UMNO while the Chinese electorate remained largely impervious to its message. He adds, Where Reformasi reached the level of Chinese voters, it renewed the 1980s discourses of democracy and civil society but it could not interject the reverberations of the Malay cultural revolt.85 If Khoo means by a cultural revolt, a politics that is shaped by alternative notions of self, nation, cultural identity, and citizenship, then it would appear that Reformasi failed to promote a more pluralist and inclusive project, one that held wide appeal for all Malaysians. Farish Noor also suggests that some key constituencies of the reform movement had injected the discourse of the
82. 83. 84.
Author interview: Former NGO activist who chooses to remain anonymous, Kuala Lumpur, May 2004. Author interview: Zainah Anwar, July 2006. Saravanamuttu 2003, 14.
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Reformasi movement with their ethnocentric Islamist concerns. Reformasi viewed in these terms was infused by an Islamist ideology that erased difference and privileged Malay religious identity above all others, even as it sought to frame a critique of the ethnicized BN framework. It is also the case, however, that even though the Islamists shared some responsibility for the underlying racialized logic of Reformasi, others could also be accused of fostering the same, including members of KeADILan, home to former UMNO members and supporters, and the DAP , which in public statements and private comments underscored the ethnic divide. In these seemingly more inclusive circles comments about defending ethnic rights and privilege were not unusual.87 Further, an Islamist agenda cannot be held largely responsible for the problems faced by the movement when the BN-controlled states hegemonic constructions of ethnic identity, and a nationalist politics driven by it, have been carefully maintained for several decades. The tensions in addressing equitably and democratically questions of faith, race, gender, social class, and cultural identity remained despite the joint manifesto, Towards a Just Malaysia, the BA issued in the run-up to the 1999 elections. This manifesto underlined the BAs commitment to democracy, the protection of human rights, and the socioeconomic well-being of all Malaysians, while decrying political repression and the Mahathir administrations control of the judiciary, media, police, and civil service. Yet the BA was unable to provide a clear program or ideological template for economic, social, and political transformation consistent with the objectives outlined in the manifesto. It also did not seriously grapple with the core cultural and ideological differences, such as disputes over an Islamic state, evident in the BAs internal politics or the ethnic chauvinism displayed among the rank and file. The general elections of 1999 saw a surge in support for PAS while other parties in the BA, including the DAP , PRM, and KeADILan, were left with little to show for their efforts but for a handful of new seats. The strength of the Islamist forces was underscored when the PAS held on to the state government in Kelantan and took control of Terengganu from the UMNO. The party also made significant gains in the northern, largely Malay-dominated states of Kedah, Pahang, and Perlis.88 Even though Reformasi highlighted solidarities that transcended ethnic and political differences and brought together a cross section of Malaysians, advocacy groups, and political parties focusing on human rights, political democracy, and social justice, the movement seemed embedded in a similar ethnicized logic. As one observer who was also a participant in the early Reformasi movement suggests, the talk of a new politics, in which presumably ethnic politics would no
86
85. 86. 87. 88.
Khoo 2003, 138. Farish Noor, Reformasis dead-end? Why hegemony matters. Available at pemantau.tripod.com/artikel//29March2000farish.html; accessed 25 April 2004.. Author interview: Sharaad Kuttan, May 2004. Useful academic analysis of the 1999 elections can be found in Khoo (2000), Hussin (2000), and Puthucheary and Norani (2005).
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longer hold true, was an act of self-mythologising; in part, wish fulfillment, a 89 projection of the observers desire for change. The difficulty in articulating reform in the context of a dominant political discourse overwritten by the logic of ethnic identity was also evident in the hotly contested November 2000 by-election for a seat in the legislative assembly of the northern state of Kedah.90 While the DAP insisted that its candidate of Indian descent should be fielded in the predominantly Malay constituency of Lunas, the BA chose KeADILans Saifuddin Nasution. The intra-coalition squabble led to the departure of several DAP members of Indian descent from the BA (preceding the DAPs eventual departure from the BA). The opposition coalition won the Lunas seat an upset for the BN and the BA was reassured that issues aired during the 1999 election campaign, including the imprisonment of 91 Anwar, remained important to voters. For the opposition, Lunas signified a major victory and added momentum to the issues raised by reformists, who had put forth a multiethnic alternative to the BNs formula.92 To some in the BA, the BNs racial politics was evident in the dominance of UMNO, whose main objective was to champion the Malay special position and ketuanan Melayu [Malay supremacy] while the BA could espouse slogans like Long Live the People! (Hidup Rakyat!) rather than Long Live the Malays (Hidup Melayu!).93 Yet the BA was itself dependent on the cobbling together of an alliance built on a racialized social structure and political history. How a party like PAS could be seen to represent the interests of non-Muslims, or how the DAP could erase its image of being a Chinese party was unclear. Unfortunately, for the BA and its allies many of the issues the opposition raised in 1999 were not as salient to voters in the 2004 general elections, which saw the opposition coalition now without the DAP suffer significant setbacks. PAS lost the state of Terengganu to the BN and barely held on to Kelantan, while suffering humiliating losses in the predominantly Malay northern states of Kedah and Perlis. While the defection of a significant percentage of voters to the opposition camp during the 1999 general election illustrates widespread dissatisfaction with the ruling party-state, Reformasi was clearly unable to translate those gains into lasting political reform and social change. The merger of Parti KeADILan Nasional and PRM to form the Parti KeADILan Rakyat (the Peoples Justice Party, or PKR) in 2003 consolidated party resources, but failed to generate a stronger, unified political voice. This became apparent in the opposition setbacks in the 2004 elections. Aside from allegations of mismanagement and outright fraud in the handling of the 2004
89. 90.
91. 92. 93.
Kuttan 2005, 161. This was a seat vacated due to the slaying of a BN state assemblyman, Joe Fernandez. It was a by-election that was hotly contested as the opposition front could deny the BN a two-thirds majority in the Kedah state assembly in the event it won the seat. For an analysis of intra-coalition politics, see Khoo 2003. Ang Hiok Gai, Lunas, Racial Politics and BA. Available at http://pemantau.tripod.com/artikel/13Dec_prm.html; accessed 20 June 2006. Ibid.
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general elections by the BA parties, the voter swing toward the BN in key constituencies previously dominated by the Islamist opposition signals a perceptible 94 shift in support back toward the ruling party after 1999. Another problem for Reformasi was the framing of a coherent message, which given the movements fragmented structure, made it even harder to convey. Even supporters were not sure whether the movement espoused an Islamist agenda, presumably hidden by Reformasi rhetoric, or whether it was committed to a secular, democratic politics.95 The contention that Reformasi was beholden to radical Islamists counters other criticisms that it was too fragmented and represented every conceivable opposition position or group.96 While a strength of the reform movement may well lie in the pluralism of 97 groups, ideas, and objectives, its alternative political and ideological message was seldom well defined. Further, as Reformasi shifted from being a movement that mobilized ordinary Malaysians to one led by the party political opposition, signs of disaffection and contention in its ranks became evident, particularly with the departure of the DAP and high-profile NGO activists such as Chandra Muzaffar from the opposition coalition. Finally, the end of the Mahathir era in Malaysian politics in 2003 and the transition to a different leadership style under the administration of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi may be another step toward Reformasis marginalization. After all, the new leadership presented itself as reformist in tone and seemed interested in a more consultative style. The BNled state under Abdullah, however, is not much different than its predecessor as seen in the longevity of key figures in government, a holdover from the Mahathir era, and little meaningful political reform directed at providing greater accountability, democracy, and justice, all core demands of Reformasi.
Conclusion
The Asian financial crisis triggered dramatic political developments such as the sacking of Malaysias deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, in 1998. The Reformasi movement that emerged in its wake initially won the support of many Malaysians, but by the end of 2001 that support was declining and Reformasi began to fade from the scene. I explore in this article how dominant narratives around nation and modernity have structured state-society relations, and con-
94.
95. 96.
97.
Factors cited for the BNs better performance, compared with 1999, and the opposition coalitions losses include Mahathirs resignation as prime minister in 2003 and the assumption of that post by his deputy Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, popularly seen as less confrontational than his predecessor and with better Islamist credentials. As Kessler (2000, 108) anticipates, the reform movement would become ever more dependent on the Islamists communications and organizational infrastructure. Countering his claim about the hijacking of the reform movement by Islamists, Farish (1999) offers yet another view of the reform movement in terms of its plurality, which he argues undermined Reformasis potential as a counter-hegemonic project. Shamsul 2000.
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sequently, state power and societal dissent. This became a backdrop for a discussion of Reformasis demise, including the constraints that it faced in organizing and mobilizing successfully around causes that dominant elites regarded as a direct threat to their interests and survival. I acknowledge that coercion remains an important factor in explaining the inability of the reform movement and its allies in Malaysia to successfully mobilize against the BN state. The threat of arrest and detention under internal security laws and other forms of intimidation constrain protest in Malaysia. Overt coercion or the threat of force, however, cannot wholly account for the difficulties the reform movement has faced. Despite the presence of such constraints, Reformasis decline may also relate to the problem of democratic deepening, the movements inability to provide an alternative discourse that meaningfully addresses ethnicized or racialized divisions and the tensions between the party political and movement aspects of protest politics. Further, the overlapping nature of elite and ethnic interests in Malaysia has made it even more difficult to frame creative alternatives that are inclusive of the equal participation of citizens regardless of ethnicity, class, gender, or other differences. The salience of ethnicity as a politically relevant marker is also reflected in party affiliations despite efforts to the contrary. For instance, KeADILan (now the PKR) and PAS have been widely viewed as a Malay alternative to UMNO despite presenting themselves as multiethnic. This perception is further underlined by statements from some of its members identifying the DAP as a Chinese party. Such messages emerging from the coalition of party political forces in Reformasi thus signal a political expediency rather than a well thought out, coherent ideological alternative to the BN state. Calls for political reform, which continue to be aired in Malaysia, intersect in critical yet contradictory ways with hegemonic discourses around modernity and nation. These intersections make it more difficult, but not impossible, to deconstruct the older hegemonic scripts and reconfigure a politics that reflects a momentum toward a more inclusive, participatory democracy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: I thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments and Tom Fenton, CAS editor, for his generous assistance and fine editing. I am very grateful to activists and friends in the NGO community in Malaysia who shared with me their many insights and experiences over the years and without whom this article would never have been written. I am also indebted to Mik Jordahl for the considerable emotional support that made the writing of this article possible. This article is dedicated to the memory of my late father, K. Bhaskaran Nair.
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Critical Asian Studies

The Limits of Protest and Prospects for Political Reform in Malaysia

Critical Asian Studies

39:3 (2007), 339368

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THE LIMITS OF PROTEST AND PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL REFORM IN MALAYSIA

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Nair / Limits of Protest

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The State, Ruling Relations, and Crisis

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Constructing Nation and Modernity: Responses to a Crisis and Its Aftermath

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Khoo 1995, 65. Nair 1995. Chatterjee 1986.

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The Emergence and Contours of Reformasi

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Reformasi and Its Discontents

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Deepening Reform and Civil Society: Challenges for NGOs

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Ethnicity, Identity, and Political Reform

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