Centre for Energy, Petroleum & Mineral Law & Policy

International Energy Law and Policy Researcb Paper Series

Working Researcb Paper Series No: 2010J0

"1he kussion neqotiotion sty/e: experience from the oi/ service industry"

6riqorij 5erscikov
lbu cooJlJote ot tbe ceotte fot oetqy, lettoleom ooJ Mloetol low ooJ lollcy

AbsLracL: AlLhough a mounLaln of scholarshlp has been wrlLLen abouL SovleL negoLlaLlon sLyles and
LacLlcs, few of Lhem have Lackled oll and gas lndusLry. AfLer Lhe collapse of Lhe SovleL unlon, many
WesLern oll fleld servlce and equlpmenL companles have enLered Lhe 8usslan markeL chooslng
varlous enLry mode sLraLegles. 1he ma[or parL of Lhls arLlcle ls based on lnLervlews (abouL 30)
conducLed by auLhor wlLh Lhe managers of Lhe lnLernaLlonal oll fleld servlce and equlpmenL
companles currenLly operaLlng ln 8ussla. AlLhough Lhe ma[or focus of Lhe lnLervlews was on enLry
mode sLraLegles, Lhe area of Lhe 8usslan negoLlaLlon sLyle and LacLlcs has been also dwelled on.
8ased on Lhls prlmary research, Lhe 8usslan negoLlaLlng behavlor ls analyzed and some pracLlcal
recommendaLlons are provlded ln Lhe lasL chapLer.

The Russian negotiation style: experience from the oil service
industry
February 2010
Grigorij Serscikov (PhD Candidate at the Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral
Law and Policy, The University of Dundee), gserscikov@dundee.ac.uk


Abstract: Although a mountain of scholarship has been written about Soviet
negotiation styles and tactics, few of them have tackled oil and gas industry. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Western oil field service and equipment
companies have entered the Russian market choosing various entry mode strategies.
The major part of this article is based on interviews (about 30) conducted by author
with the managers of the international oil field service and equipment companies
currently operating in Russia. Although the major focus of the interviews was on
entry mode strategies, the area of the Russian negotiation style and tactics has been
also dwelled on. Based on this primary research, the Russian negotiating behavior is
analyzed and some practical recommendations are provided in the last chapter.

Key Words: Soviet Union, Russia, negotiation-style, oil field service industry, oil
and gas, interviewing
Introduction
While much has been written about Soviet and Russian negotiation styles and tactics
(s. for overview Roemer et al. 1999), few of these studies have tackled oil and gas
industry. The literature which exists on this topic focuses primarily on the Soviet
(pre-1990s) negotiation experience during the East-West gas pipeline deal 1980-
1984 (OTA 1979; OTA 1981; Lebahn 1983; Gustafson 1985; Bonin 2003).
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Western oil and oil field service
companies have entered the Russian market choosing various entry mode strategies
ranging from joint ventures (TNK-BP) and consortia (Sakhalin I and II projects), to
partial (Weatherford owns 33% of Borets Company) and complete acquisition of
companies (Schlumbergers acquisition of PetroAlliance Services Company).
Understandably, the information on the companies negotiation practice and
experience is not available freely in the public domain. With exception of
periodically appearing articles and papers lamenting an awful situation in the
Russian oil and gas industry (s. for example Huang et al. 2003), the information on
negotiation process in the industry is based mostly on anecdotal evidence and
personal experiences.
In the framework of the ongoing PhD research, the author has conducted about 30
semi-structured interviews with the managers of the international oil field service and
equipment companies. The major topics of the interviews have been an entry mode
strategy where the area of negotiation style and tactics has been dwelled on,
operational experience in Russia, ethical issues, and some other industry-related
questions.
The remainder of the article is presented in three parts. First, literature regarding
Russian negotiation styles is reviewed. Next, the negotiation style and tactics
experienced by the respondents of the interviews are presented and analyzed. The
final section provides recommendations and directions for those contemplating about
negotiations in Russia.

Distributive bargaining strategies: pre-1990s and post-1990s literature overview
The ease of international travel, communication and transportation has widened the
circle of international actors businesspeople, engineers, scientists dealing with
Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union. This unprecedented level of
cooperation increases possibilities for misunderstanding caused by variations in
negotiating behaviors that are grounded in cultural differences which can complicate,
prolong, and frustrate negotiations (Cohen 1997).
Compare to the western partners, Russians have often followed a distributive rather
than a cooperative, approach to negotiations. This reflects the Russian belief that a
compromise is equal to unscrupulousness, lack of will, and that one persons profits
are always at the expense of anothers. Therefore all attempts to strive for a
compromise are considered as negative (Prokhorov & Sternin 2007). Win-win
solutions do not fit the Russian psyche well, it is rather a zero-sum game.
This was reflected in the existing literature which, due to the nature of world politics
in the last decades, was mostly based on the experience from the international
political negotiations rather than on the commercial trade negotiations between
nations. These sources have described Russian negotiators as hesitant,
contradictory, and improvising (Gustafson 1985); inflexible (Gorlin 1979); hard
(Carvounis & Carvounis 1989; Vlachoutsikos 1986); rigid (Gorlin 1979; Von
Czege 1983) tough (Carvounis & Carvounis 1989; Gorlin 1979);
uncompromising (Von Czege 1983), and secretive, risk-averse, and manipulative
(Rajan & Graham 1991).
Graham et al. (1992), while looking for explanations offered in the literature, come
up with mainly two reasons which can be seen as complementary:
1. Bureaucratic/organizational constraints lead to a more distributive approach
and contribute to the Russian economic system run as an integrated, single
complex on the basis of a system of commands. The secretiveness and
mistrusts inherited in the system were even exacerbated by the tensions
between East-West relations. Furthermore, as Lebedeva (2004:125) points
out, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of class struggle in the international arena
degraded negotiations to the status of temporary tactical maneuvers
insignificant in the larger historical perspective.
2. Differences in ethical systems which are reflected in the Lefebvres (1982)
theory of two types of ethical systems. According to this hypothesis, Western
cultures are dominated by the first ethical system under which individuals
seek compromises to resolve conflicts with both their partners and
adversaries, and this is considered positive behavior. Positive behavior for
Russians, who are governed by the second ethical system, is in sharp
contrast: Individuals try either to create new conflicts or to exacerbate existing
ones with adversaries (Lefebvre 1982 cited Graham et al. 1992). Weigand
(1977) observations also corroborate the Lefebvres theory that the rigidity of
the Soviet negotiators may be a product of the Soviet and Russian culture and
national trait.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russias opening for foreign investments,
the attitudes to negotiations among Russians have hardly changed. Today, one can
observe a peculiar mixture in peoples mentality and behavior of both old and new
cultural patterns, which perhaps conflicting with each other, coexist. Institutional and
cultural backgrounds translated into specific features of current Russian negotiating
behavior produce three crucial features: zero-sum and rigid approach, manipulative
behavior, and low contract loyalty.
Zero-sum, tough, obstinate, and forceful approach to negotiations is portrayed
vividly by Wilson and Donaldson (1995). According to Brett et al. (1998), Russian
negotiators identified hierarchy as a guiding cultural value, distributive tactics as
normative in negotiation, and negotiator role as a source of power.
Manipulative behavior is characterized by information greed, secretiveness and
mistrust. As Michailova (2003:62) points out, everybody in Russia is trained to keep
things confidential. As a result, there is no knowledge transfer but rather a
husbanding and hoarding of information at all hierarchical levels. During the
negotiations, Russian counterparts often withhold the useful information, which is
seen as a source of power (Fey & Bjorkman 2001), in the same time, asking for much
detailed information that foreign counterparts can provide (Gorlin 1979). Mistrust
towards outsiders makes Russians consider every negotiation process as a
manipulative and uncompromising play. For homo sovieticus, everyone outside a
very narrow circle of intimate friends was seen as basically evil, selfish, greedy, and
cruel, tend to take advantage of other exploit them for achieving personal gain,
safety, and leisure (Mikheyev, 1987:519). This attitude towards the outside world
was not specific to the times of Communist era only because in Russia, cultural
attitudes have proven more durable and resilient than in other countries (as it has
been only less than twenty years since centuries-closed Russian borders opened for
free travel and exchange).
Hingley (1978) was stunned by the ability of Russians to a sudden switch, a volte-
face in their moods. Twenty years later, Holden et al. (1998:161) wrote of Russian
businessmen we need to take account of the mercurial side of the Russian
character: that element in their makeup which inclines them literally and figuratively
to change agendas. This resulted in frequent changes in already-signed contracts and
overall low contract loyalty. Thus, Szymanskis (1998) in his analysis of the JVs in
Russia reports that agreements are frequently rewritten. Similarly, Kohlert (2006)
mentions decreasing contract loyalty as one of the major negative factors in modern
Russia.
The abbreviated account of literature given here can be summed up by the findings of
Ayois (2003:193) citing a Russian general director: Everything goes on not the way
it goes in the west. There is no doubt that Russians and Westerners differ not only in
terms of national culture, but also in the economic, political, ideological, religious,
and social systems from which they come, the approaches to negotiations is thus
completely different. In the next chapter the most striking differences, western
managers should be aware of, are described.


Negotiating with Russian counterparts: empirical evidence from international
oil field service and equipment companies
In 2008, the volume of oil and gas service market in Russia was quite considerable in
size - about USD 13 billion dollars. Starting with 2003 the market doubled in size,
whereas during 2005-2006 the highest growth rates were achieved, forming +33%
and +22% respectively. The growth spike throughout the industry was provoked by
the fact that the companies operating in the field finally exhausted their low cost
expansion possibilities at already existing and developed deposits, facing a need to
compensate for fall of extraction by increasing the effectiveness of operations. It is
expected that in the next years the market would be growing at +10% per annum and
reach a whole USD 20 billion by the year 2010. Given the sheer size and
perspectives of the market, all major international oil field service companies
(Schlumberger, Baker Hughes, Halliburton, Weatherford, BJ Services) have been
active in Russia since early 1990s, providing services in high-end segment and
holding about 15% (whereby Schlumberger - 11%) of the total market (Veles Capital
Research 2008; Pak 2007).
Since 1990s, all mentioned companies have acquired smaller Russian oil field service
providers and accumulated valuable experience in dealing with Russians inside (as
acquired firms and employees) and outside (as customers) the company. In order to
tap into this invaluable reservoir of knowledge, the author conducted about 30 semi-
structured interviews with the managers of international oil field service and
equipment companies in Moscow in the period of August-December 2008. The main
purpose of interviews was to determine how alliances (e.g., JV, partnerships, and
acquisitions) between foreign and Russian partners develop over time and what the
causes behind the short-terminism of major joint ventures in the industry.
The interviews corroborated with the literature review described in the previous
chapter and revealed some additional interesting insights into negotiating tactics of
Russian managers. The majority of respondents have mentioned substantial
differences between western and Russian/Soviet cultures. As a Managing Director of
the US leading oil equipment manufacturing company put it:
The whole culture is different. It is not to say one is wrong and the other is right.
Historically, the western culture was based on the mercantile philosophy, it was
based on trade, there was always this movement towards compromise trade me
something and I give you something, and it was in the nature to negotiate to the
point, when you have this, when you have mutually agreeable, mutually acceptable
fundamental decision and everybody was happy. You win I win that means a win-
win situation. And then you have a Russian culture which was highly land-locked
the nearest largest metropolis 300 years ago was Paris or Berlin. It was very tribal,
very clan-oriented, harsh climate it was win-lose situation. We have to conquer to
survive. So compromise historically in the culture was not there. It is victory or
death.
Another respondent mentioning lack of success of the venture in one of the countries
of former Soviet Union, there is a big culture clash. Sometimes, I thing they look at
us as if we were invaders.
Culture has a direct influence on the Russian negotiating style, which, in words of
one respondent is rigid. Another, describing his negotiation experience, says:
When I go to the negotiations I have to have a mentality that everything that comes
out of their mouth is going to be a NO, because they have to take the high ground.
And morally speaking, they actually feel like they fell and must take the high ground.
Even if they wrong or right it does not matter they have to stand their position to
show a compromise will be considered a weakness. So is that wrong? Not it is not
wrong, it just a different way of approaching business. There is no wrong way or
right way.
On the matter of unethical behavior of Russian counterparts, the majority of
respondents have stated that they experience it very often. Russians are driven by
egoistic motifs, playing tricky games. A Key Account Manager of the leading
supplier of drilling fluid systems says that here is always an attempt from Russian
site to buy something cheap and probably with lower quality and to sell it with profit.
Here is the root of the conflict. Another respondent, reporting on numerous failed
attempts to set up an alliance with Russian partners, consider an unethical behavior
as specificity of Russia.
More important, the manipulative behavior of Russians observed throughout
negotiations goes beyond this process and influences the entire cooperation lifespan.
So, having their roots in rather fluid ethical standards in Russia, attitude to power
control and intellectual property rights are two major reasons why the partnerships
and alliances in the oil field sector are almost inexistent today. Thus, a country
manager of the US drilling rig producer, reporting on his experience in alliance with
the Russian rig manufacturer, says about visit to the production site in Russia: These
guys walking around with machine guns you cannot go there, you go over there.
We did a pilot project when we had subcontracted some of the work to Russians and
our quality control guys could not even get access to see the parts to control quality
on certain stages of production. So, how can I have a partner like that? Strive for
control is also mentioned by others: There are attempts to take as much control as
possible and to control manufacturing processes and distribution of profits, even
when the Russian counterparts lack experience and knowledge. As one respondent
put it: You cannot be in a driving seat if you do not know how to drive.
Fear to lose know-how is another reason preventing companies from establishing
alliances with Russians. The major reason why we do not go for JV is because we
do not trust our Russian partners. Our competitive advantages are subtle because
everybody can buy a set of equipment, disassemble it and try to repeat. So, subtle
advantages of our equipment are in packing materials, some proprietary fields that
allow the equipment to function much longer and be more corrosively resistant. By
doing everything in Russia we would expose the proprietary knowledge which we do
not like to do obviously, - says a business development manager of the US
manufacturing company. He later portrays his visit to the possible partners site in
Russia: They invited us, they have a lot of vacant areas that we can use bringing in
our machinery. But we noticed that they were looking more for our technology.
Whatever we see here, there is something behind it. They try to get our technology
and then probably just kick us out. Another respondent says: Often we would
either not bring some type of technology in, if we think that it might be easily copied,
or it is not a key property than we just do not worry about it that much.
To avoid problems inherited in joint ventures and alliances, as JV in Russia we are
not really happy to do it, almost all oil field service and equipment companies have
preferred acquisitions and green field investments as the most appropriate choice for
Russia.
The findings above corroborate with the authors own experience in Russia as
business development manager of the German drilling rig manufacturer and later
strategic consultant in Russian oil industry that many Russians still consider
negotiations as a zero-sum game, where at the end the only winner will stay glorious.
Forced to make compromises, Russians will feel a subtle sense of defeat. The
willingness to make compromises from the start without getting anything in return
will be viewed as weakness and not as gestures of goodwill or flexibility, therefore,
inviting them to squeeze harder. The achieved agreements are often completely
reversed due to purely laughable pretexts, so that the negotiations can start from the
scratch. During the negotiations, the Russian team will sometimes leaves the room
for some urgent need, in this case, if the negotiations take place at the Russian site
(e.g., factory, plant, office, etc.), the room is likely bugged, so they can listen to what
opposite side is talking about usually it is negotiation tactics.
Summarizing the findings, this chapter highlights the fact that the specifics,
underlying societal and cultural values in Russia, need to be explored as predictors
and determinants of established norms which might appear during the negotiation
process. Often missing in traditional due diligence studies, these salient issues
might be crucial for overall success of negotiations. The question then becomes how
to prevent Western managers underestimating the importance of specific features of
the Russian mentality by projecting its own way of doing business on this country. In
what follows, some practical recommendations are given.


Some practical recommendations
Negotiating team composition and structure can place a decisive role in every
negotiation. In Russia, which is often seen as unpredictable, the team composition
and management can be used to diminish unpredictability and make negotiation
process more manageable. Depending on effort and expected outcome (e.g., M&A,
JV, product sale, etc.), the negotiating team can vary in size and composition. Below
is an example of the negotiating team, set-up by a western multinational during
acquisition process of the Russian oil field company.

Figure 1: Negotiating team structure
In a large acquisition, a structure of this size (or larger) would be appropriate. For a
smaller alliance, it would be sufficient to have a steering committee and a core deal
team consisting of people with skills in each area. In authors view, the most
important element here is the role of people running the steering committee who
must be key decision makers able to apply a veto and meet at least once per month.
Moreover, the composition of the committee should remain constant throughout the
time of negotiations (a high turnover of members can hamper the negotiating
process). Therefore:
Carefully select the delegation. Women and young managers may have a much
harder time gaining the trust or respect of Russian managers.
Try to clarify the authority of your counterpart. Because the decisions can be
made only by chief executives or director, that could delay negotiations.
The first barrier that has important implications for international communication
could be seen in the subtleties of language and the crucial problem of grasping
meaning, not only words (Kopper, 1996). As language reflects the diverging values
of societies, appropriate translation and usage of a correct word seems to be a
problem. Especially in Russia, much of business language is still new to Russian
managers who often interpret the business terminology in their own way (Snavely et
al. 1998). Consequently, the underlying psychological meaning and emotional impact
is either changed, blurred, or lost. Therefore:
Check that the Russian counterpart indeed understands the presented proposals
correctly.
Establishing personal relations and experience in the country are very important.
Business Development Manager of British oil field service firm describes it as
follows: Personal relationships are really critical in Russia. In UK, US corporation
is corporation and thats it they have systems and processes. Here they have
systems and processes but still a personal touch is worthwhile. This is also reflected
in the statement of Country Head of the German rig manufacturer: The business
culture in Russia requires long-term relationship. Therefore:
Build personal ties and cultivate trust even prior to transacting any business
because Russians tend to trust more in relationships than in contracts.
Furthermore, Russians prefer exclusive relationships; emphasize the exclusive
nature of your order and the significance of your company.
Since the Soviet times, the price was a decisive factor in negotiations. It still is. The
Soviets managed to squeeze a good price for sometimes wrong product (Gorlin 1979)
or for the product of low quality Why should I buy a western-made product when
I can by three Chinese products for similar price? is what western producers often
hear. Russians expect that foreign negotiators will make concessions on price from
the very beginning and feel sometimes offended when the other side is not ready to
so. Therefore:
Do not let yourself to be squeezed. Invest time and endurance into negotiations.
On the same time, avoid the we know best syndrome that would push
Russians to stick more strongly to their positions and create antagonism. Write
down all the interim results of the negotiation, including verbal consensus.
In order to get the Russia right, western managers have to understand that there are
sometimes different layers behind decisions and actions of people. In words of the
Business Development Manager of the leading international oil service company, I
have seen many foreign managers who were very experienced in what there were
doing, but sometimes they made decisions based on their previous experience and
not on the existing realities on the ground. The Russian fur hat (shapka) or wood doll
(matrshka) is for tourists. In business life here there are certain laws of the game
which differ from the western mentality. To explain or teach it is impossible.
Conclusions
In the analysis presented in this paper, an abbreviated account of literature regarding
Russian negotiation styles is reviewed, showing that there are still sticking
similarities between the Soviet and post-1990s negotiation styles. By providing
examples from praxis, the author does not try to dissuade investors to enter Russia,
which still contain vast economic resources and large untapped oil service and
equipment market. The aim here is to direct attention to issues which are presently in
state of flux, given the major transformations occurring in Russian society. Many of
issues, however, have the kind of robustness that will endure, retaining their
significance for those attempting to understand and deal with the Russian people.
Although the communist legacy continues to exert a powerful conditioning effect on
management thinking, the possibility now exists that a new order of constructive
collaboration is emerging between eastern and western business representatives in an
international business context that necessitates mutuality and dependency. The
results from the interviews show that overall, attitudes among foreign managers are
wary but increasingly positive; there is a strong sense that you need to know and
what you are doing and be prepared to operate successfully in Russia.

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