Tihana Dauenhauer shared a link.

10 December 2012

Moj mu!ek Nenad Jari" Dauenhauer napravio super interview o super temi. :) http://www.tportal.hr/scitech/znanost/230988/Je-li-filozofija-mrtva-kao-sto-tvrdiHawking.html#.UMW5q5G9KSM
Je li filozofija mrtva kao !to tvrdi Hawking? www.tportal.hr Ugledni ameri#ki filozof znanosti Tim Maudlin, profesor na Sveu#ili$tu u New Yorku, koji je pro$li tjedan sudjelovao na simpoziju 'Filozofija u dijalogu sa znanostima' u Zagrebu, poku$ao je u intervjuu za tportal pojasniti koje je mjesto filozofije u suvremenom svijetu kojim dominira znanost te koja... 1070 Like % % Share &Tamara Cacev and 9 others like this.&

&Boris Lenhard Pitat "u i ovdje: "Uloga filozofa je da upozore fizi#are da ne bismo trebali biti zadovoljni samo prediktivnom to#no$"u, ve" da trebamo tragati za razumijevanjem onoga $to stvarno jest. " A question for professor Maudlin: How do you know when you have gotten there? How do you know when you have accomplished the kind of understanding that you are seeking? This is a question central to whether what you are trying to accomplish is meaningful or not. So far I have asked that question on several occasions, and I haven't heard or read any answers to it that are even remotely satisfactory.&11 December 2012 at 00:14 % Like&

&Tihana Dauenhauer Vishnya Maudlin? - jer ja ne znam odgovor. Pa ako "e ona imati vremena.&11 December 2012 at 07:25 via mobile % Like&

&Boris Lenhard Pitanje izri#ito nije za Vi$nju. Nego za Tima. Vi$nju sam ve" poku$ao pitati.&11 December 2012 at 10:37 % Like&

&Tihana Dauenhauer Ok. I will tag his name. Maybe he will find some time to answer your question. He is very busy at the moment. But, who knows. Tim Maudlin?&11 December 2012 at 10:40 via mobile % Like&

&Tim Maudlin In response: there is a positive and a negative aspect to this. In a positive sense, one will never be able to certain that any precise theory is, in fact, the true account. There may be alternative theories that are known and provably empirically equivalent, and so cannot be decided by data. There can be theories than make different empirical predictions in principle but cannot be checked in practice. And there can be theories than no one has thought up, or even, given human capacities, can think up. So certainty in the positive sense is not going to be had.&11 December 2012 at 11:21 % Like % 1&

&Tim Maudlin But, in a negative sense, one can see that some approaches are internally inconsistent, or not precisely defined. The most common approaches to understanding quantum theory fall in this category. If the basic axioms of the theory invoke measurement, for example, but no precise account of what counts as a measurement is given, then theory is, as Bell would say, unprofessionally vague. Given vague rules of thumb the theory can be used to make predictions, but it is not even a candidate for a precise physical account. Some precisely defined, mathematically exact approaches to understanding quantum phenomena do exist, but the majority of practicing physicists are not aware of them and do not appreciate the problems they solve. This is due to an odd history that goes back to Bohr. What we want to do is develop as many exact theories as possible, and see how far data can go to decide between them. No one expects complete certainty to come at the end.&11 December 2012 at 11:27 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard (EDIT: this is only a response to the first part of the answer) Professor Maudlin, thank you for your response. However, I feel none the cleverer for it. I still do not understand what understanding means in this context (no pun intended). If theories are empirically equivalent, what is the criterion for choosing one over another? Is it, what Roger Penrose suggests, that one would feel more right than the other? Isn't there a danger of confounding the truth (or reality) with the simple preference for a model that is more within our intellectual/cognitive comfort zone - which is basically an aesthetic criterion, and a rather anthropocentric

attitude to begin with? (Sorry if I use some terms in a crude ir imprecise way - I am still only a biologist. )&11 December 2012 at 11:27 % Like % 1&

&Tim Maudlin You are confusing two separate issues. Understanding the phenomenon is getting the true account of it. What you are after is easy to state. The hard question is how one can have good grounds for believing that an account is, in fact, true. Empirical data go some way to addressing this, but there are other grounds for making judgments. For example, some people have believed that the universe was created 6,000 years ago, with apparent evidence for a longer age (dinosaur bones, etc.) intact. Clearly, there can be no empirical basis to reject the theory, in the sense that it can be made consistent with all data. Equally clearly, no scientist would take it seriously. So there are other grounds on which such judgments can be made. These are most usefully discussed on a case-by-case basis. I would not call the grounds for rejecting the theory just mentioned either aesthetic or anthropomorphic. I would call them rational.&11 December 2012 at 11:45 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard "Understanding the phenomenon is getting the true account of it. " This only means, if there is no objective criterion for getting a true account of phenomenon (and from what you are saying, I don't see one), there is no way of claiming one has understood it. What you (and many other people) mean by understanding, as I see it, still refers to a model and consists of 1) knowledge of the assumptions of the model, 2) knowledge of the predictive consequences of the model, and 3) BELIEF that the model is a true physical description of the phenomenon. There is no way to make beliefs objective or to decide that they do correspond to reality. "For example, some people have believed that the universe was created 6,000 years ago, with apparent evidence for a longer age (dinosaur bones, etc.) intact. Clearly, there can be no empirical basis to reject the theory, in the sense that it can be made consistent with all data. Equally clearly, no scientist would take it seriously. " No scienctist would take it seriously because the empirical basis to reject the theory that the world is 6000 years old is that it has no predictive power - it is a model overfitted to one ancient set of (made-up) data (Genesis) and each new observation of the real world clashes with it and only very convoluted retrofitting could be attempted to reconcile it. Of course, one could argue that the world was really made 6000 years ago, but that God made it to look precisely as it was 4.6 billion years old. (Or, as by Bertrand Russell, 5 minutes old). That idea we cannot dismiss out right - but for practical purposes there is no difference and no way to know. That is where Occam's razor comes in handy, to slash all the unnecessary variables and actors - to me, that is where one acts rationally or not, not elsewhere (as you seem to imply). If some interpretations of QM introduce new variables to make the QM more BELIEVABLE as an account of physical world, we are back to chasing the comfort zone, aren't we?&11 December 2012 at 11:58 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin The theory I mentionedthat the universe came into existence 6,000 years ago in the state that orthodox science says it had 6,000 years agoobviously has exactly the same predictive power as the orthodox theory. It makes precisely the same predictions for all future experiments. So your claim that it is rejected for lack of predictive power is obviously false. If you want to state that you yourself think it is no more reasonable to believe that the universe began about 13 billion years ago than that it began 5 minute ago, then your opinion is not scientific. If you think that "Occam's razor" settles the issue, please state just what you think the principle is and how it settles the case. As for quantum theory, I take it that a decent account should have as a consequence that experiments have determinate outcomes and should be mathematically well defined. If denying either of those criteria is inside your "comfort zone", then I have no idea what you are comfortable with.&11 December 2012 at 12:08 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard " The theory I mentionedthat the universe came into existence 6,000 years ago in the state that orthodox science says it had 6,000 years agoobviously has exactly the same predictive power as the orthodox theory. It makes precisely the same predictions for all future experiments. So your claim that it is rejected for lack of predictive power is obviously false. " No, please read what I wrote again. I said for the theory overfitted to the Genesis account that it has no predictive power. For the scenario you mentioned (6000 years or 5 minutes), I said precisely what you are saying: "Of course, one could argue that the world was really made 6000 years ago, but that God made it to look precisely as it was 4.6 billion years old. (Or, as by Bertrand Russell, 5 minutes old). That idea we cannot dismiss out right - but for practical purposes there is no difference and no way to know. That is where Occam's razor comes in handy, " First, most people who believe the Earth is 6000 years old, believe it in the former sense (the one with no predictive power), so your sense is purely academic. Second, the latter sense differs from the account that the Earth is 4.6 billion years old (or universe 13 billiion years) in that it has more parameters and/or actors. 6000 years-timepoint is an extra parameter, which is completely arbitrary (could indeed be any timepoint). No predictive power is lost by ditching it. "As for quantum theory, I take it that a decent account should have as a consequence that experiments have determinate outcomes and should be mathematically well defined. If denying either of those criteria is inside

your "comfort zone", then I have no idea what you are comfortable with." I am a biologist, not a physicist, but no, I do not necessarily crave determinate outcomes in your sense. Perhaps it really is the limitation of our cognitive apparatus and the macroscopic scale that we inhabit that we expect that.&11 December 2012 at 12:22 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin As a biologist, I would expect that you want cats to end up either alive or dead, even after Schrdinger's experiment. That is what I mean by a determinate outcome. If you are happy to forgo that, I have no idea what you think is acceptable. If you are not really conversant with the issues surrounding the interpretation of quantum theory, then a lot of background has to be provided.&11 December 2012 at 12:27 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard "As a biologist, I would expect that you want cats to end up either alive or dead, even after Schrdinger's experiment. That is what I mean by a determinate outcome." Not really. I wouldn't be surprised if no interpretation of quantum mechanics would ever tell you what happened to the cat before you actually look. "If you are not really conversant with the issues surrounding the interpretation of quantum theory, then a lot of background has to be provided." I did not intend to discuss the interpretation of quantum theory, just the criteria for "understanding what really is". I am still not convinced that "what really is" is not simply an overambitious code for "what we are comfortable with". The difference between the two is that the former at least im my view is supposed to be objective, while the latter can never be. That is why most practicing physicists probably do not appreciate it. They need an objective measure of progress.&11 December 2012 at 12:34 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin Again, you just are not understanding the issue. The issue about the cat I mentioned is not about what happens before you look but what happens after, and if there is a physical account of the process of looking. That is a straightforward demand of an adequate physics. As for "what we are comfortable with", that is your own notion and has nothing at all to do with anything I said. Please directly answer: do you think you have a defensible, rational ground for thinking that the world existed 10 minutes ago or is it just "what you are comfortable with"? If the former, then you think there are rational grounds for preferring one theory over another that is not just a matter of prediction. If the latter, then you are outside of scientific opinion.&11 December 2012 at 12:42 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin SInce I asked a straightforward question half an hour ago and there is no answer, I infer that you have no adequate answer. I reach 2 conclusions and a comment. 1) You have not though clearly about grounds for belief in theories that go beyond predictive adequacy. 2) You do not understand the interpretive problems that confront the quantum formalism. The comment is this: my wife understands both of these things perfectly well, and would have been able to say enlightening and useful things about them, but by all accounts you have been unspeakably and indefensibly obnoxious to her. You owe her, and everyone else on the blog, an apology.&11 December 2012 at 13:13 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard Wrong inference sir, I had a meeting in the meantime. I have an academic job, too The answer is coming in a few minutes.&11 December 2012 at 13:29 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard "Again, you just are not understanding the issue. " Quite possibly. It doubles the problem, since I still do not know what you mean by "understanding". "Please directly answer: do you think you have a defensible, rational ground for thinking that the world existed 10 minutes ago or is it just "what you are comfortable with"? If the former, then you think there are rational grounds for preferring one theory over another that is not just a matter of prediction. " I think that, while we have no means of distinguishing between the two scenarios, in _this_case_ there are rational, defensible reasons for preferring one over another. In the model that claims that the world as we know it was made into existence 10 minutes (or 6000 years) ago, 10 minutes (or 6000 years) is not a replacement for 13 billion or 4.6 billion - by studying the properties of the world as it is, even if it is 10 minutes or 6000 years old, the numbers 13 or 4.6 billion will come out of the model - as extrapolations. On the other hand, if you work out the details under the assumptions that the Universe is 13 billion years old (or Earth 4.6 billion), 6000 years or 10 minutes will not come out of anywhere. Rather than being alternative explanations, these are just arbitrary values of an additional, arbitrary parameter that come out of nowhere, could be replaced by any other value, and are unnecessary for the model. Getting rid of such parameters is, at least to me, a textbook application of Occam's razor. On the other hand, while I do not understand anywhere nearly enough about quantum mechanics or its

interpretations, I am quite confident that what you are trying to achieve there is unrelated to what I have just described above. If it was, I am pretty sure that practicing physicists would have done it themselves by now. The bottom line, making predictive models more complicated and adding additional parameters that will not improve their predictive ability, but serve to cater to one's (religious or cognitive) preconceptions is just not science, and in many cases is anti-science. That might be the reason why there are top practicing physicists whom you cannot convince to take your path.&11 December 2012 at 13:43 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard "The comment is this: my wife understands both of these things perfectly well, and would have been able to say enlightening and useful things about them, but by all accounts you have been unspeakably and indefensibly obnoxious to her." I apologise for being obnoxious to your wife (in which I admit that I went way overboard even for my relaxed standards), but it started when she accused me of not understanding and not being able to understand what I am doing as a scientist rather that trying to explain the issues and to defend her opinions. I tried to have a reasoned discussion, but some attitudes just bring out the worst in me...&11 December 2012 at 13:48 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard Incidentally, I agree that Hawking's remark on the death of philosophy was wrong and uncalled for. He really might not be up to date with developments in philosophy of physics, which you suggest has been seamlessly integrated with cutting-edge physics. But, if one (or several) leading cosmologists can become leading cosmologists without being aware of what you and your colleagues have accomplished, isn't it at least obvious that the knowledge of what you have accomplished is not necessary to be a world leading cosmologist, at present date? Could Hawking's hyperbole have meant just that - that it simply provides no useful input to working physicists (such as him), which does not prevent them from leading the way in science? The question then becomes - should scientists pay attention to what you are doing? I think it is your job to convince the scientist that they should, while avoiding the temptation to suggest that those who decline the invitation are bad scientists - because many are clearly not bad at all.&11 December 2012 at 14:53 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin The problem is that you keep thinking that the sort of thing that philosophers want is different in kind from what physicists want. This is not the case. The strongest proponents of the sort of clarity in the foundations of physics that I am advocating were Einstein and Bell, and Schrodinger was very dissatisfied with the sorts of thing Bohr was saying. Or you could go back all the way to the Copernican Revolution, when and instrumentalist approach (all we want are hypothesis from which one can calculate planetary positions) was rejected in favor a a demand for a clear physical account of what is going on, of the sort the Newton offered. You also might reflect on the difference between, say, Poincare who took the atomic hypothesis purely instrumentally, and Boltzmann and again Einstein who took atoms seriously as a physical posit and then were able to work out the consequences of the posit for phenomena that had not been considered (e.g. Brownian motion). The idea that physics ought to offer proposals with a clear account of what exists and the precise, mathematically formulated dynamical laws that govern it is not something that only philosophers want. Nor is it a demand for something familiar or comforting, as you repeatedly suggest. Everyone in foundations I know is happy to consider theories, for example, according to which Schrdinger's cat is neither definitely alive nor dead until a certain sort of physical interaction takes place. They just want a clear physical account of the interaction, expressed in precise mathematical terms.&11 December 2012 at 18:53 % Like % 1&

&Tim Maudlin One then proceeds in two steps. First, formulate as many precise theories consistent with the data as possible. Only once this is done can one ask whether there are some rational grounds other than simple empirical accuracy for thinking some of the theories to be more plausible than others. There have been many such criteria proposed and used in the history of science, which can go be somewhat vague names like "simplicity" or "obeying Occam's razor" to much more exact accounts in terms of various confirmation theories. But as I said at the beginning, I don't think that very much of a general nature can be said here: one has to look at the particular case. I could give you the sorts of considerations that, I think, make the GRW collapse theory less plausible theory than a Bohmian theory, but there is no reason to think that those will generalize to other cases. The issues that I focus on have to with the the foundations of physics, and I can provide any amount or detail you like about why the textbook versions of quantum theory are not up to proper profession standards of clarity and rigor. Of course, the textbook version is, as John Bell said, fine FAPP, i.e. For All Practical Purposes. But there are other purposes than practical purposes. Indeed, one might well say that cosmology has no practical aspect at all. As for whether actual scientific practice would be improved in cosmology if there was more rigorous and clear thinking, I will defend that it would be, but we again have to get into technical detail (e.g. about so-called "black hole complimentarily") that is probably of no professional interest to you. If you really want to understand the situation, I suggest you at least start with John Bell's essay "Against 'Measurement'". These are the complaints of a leading physicist about the lack of clarity and rigor in physics. I think Bell is perfectly correct. One can, no doubt, become a "leading cosmologist" while having confused or incoherent views on foundational issues. But one could not have accomplished what Bell did without having a high regard for rigor and clarity. Nor what Einstein did. Philosophers of physics are not Einstein...but neither are almost all physicists. What we can do is advocate for some of the same intellectual virtues that Einstein demanded. If you personally have no interest in this sort of clarity, there is probably nothing to be said. But to think that these questions, the questions of Einstein, Bell and Schrdinger, are somehow merely philosophical and not scientific is to denigrate the greatest scientists in history.&11 December 2012 at 19:14 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard "The problem is that you keep thinking that the sort of thing that philosophers want is different in kind from what physicists want." The reason I keep thinking this is that your criteria for the plausibility of Bohm vs GRW vs Everitt interpretation of quantum theory (of which I know nowhere nearly enough to have my own opinion) are against the majority opinion of practicing physicists. Your ranking of importance of physicists is quite different from the consensus of practicing physicists (with Bell and Bohm - especially Bell - much higher up the list than most physicists would put them, and with objections to Bohr, Heisenberg or Dirac most practising physicists would not find relevant or at least not scientifically relevant). (It is similar with the ranking of living biologists by importance, where a list that practicing biologists would come up with would be very very different from that assembled by either philosophers of biology or by non-biologists in general.) "The strongest proponents of the sort of clarity in the foundations of physics that I am advocating were Einstein and Bell, and Schrodinger was very dissatisfied with the sorts of thing Bohr was saying." Well if you trust me to speak as a scientist who works with other scientists (and, even though I am no physicist and definitely no Einstein or Bell, or Bohr, I am the scientist of a kind you or your equivalent in philosophy of biology would have to deal with), "dissatisfaction" with what somebody is saying is not a relevant criterion for finding problems with one's science. One either has demonstrably unjustified assumptions, conclusions that do not follow from assumptions+observations. It can phenotypically manifest itself as general dissatisfaction, but it has to be accompanied by a clear case against either assumptions, conclusions which do not follow, or predictive power that is lacking. "One can, no doubt, become a "leading cosmologist" while having confused or incoherent views on foundational issues.[...]" The problem is that most often, one will never become a leading cosmologist (or biologist) by trying to come up with a clear, coherent view of [what to you look like] foundational issues instead of focusing on problems in which he/she can make real and - wait for it - _measurable_ progress in one's lifetime. That is a problem that somebody who tries to do what you are doing cannot afford to either ignore or treat with what may even remotely look like contempt (and some attitudes do appear like that). The problem - and I think this is where you and many practicing scientists, including world-leading ones, part ways - is that what you consider foundational issues (in science) are simply not foundational issues in their view. I had a long and occasionally unpleasant discussion first with Vi$nja then with Pavel about the (un)importance of defining the concept of "gene" in biology, where I tried to convince them that no working biologist would spend any effort on trying to come up with an exact an universally true definition of the concept, even though to a philosopher looking from the outside it looks like an inexcusably irresponsible attitude to leave such "foundational issue" "confused" or "incoherent". Well, I can tell you that science (and by all criteria by which both scientist and society measure it, very successful science) simply does not work like that. Francis Crick (a physicist by training) said that if in the 1960s their goal was to define a gene exactly, this would likely would have halted the progress of molecular biology by several decades. Even now, attempting to define a gene exactly (which I could discuss in much more detail) is a progress-halting effort, both from the viewpoint of biology and from the viewpoint of a biologist's career. Again, expressing contempt toward such state of affairs is likely to antagonise you to many world-leading scientists. "Einstein, Bell and Schrdinger, are somehow merely philosophical and not scientific is to denigrate the greatest scientists in history." I would never call philosophical questions "merely philosophical" but I would also not call philosophical questions scientific merely because they were asked about scientific theories by people who also did some groundbreaking science. From what I can see, you and your colleagues in philosophy of science have no problem denigrating many other of the greatest scientists in history, precisely because they did not ask the questions that _you_ find interesting or they explicitly found those questions uninteresting. In doing that, you imply (or at least that is what often appears) that your criteria for estimating the greatness of scientists are somehow superior to those of practising scientists themselves. Since practising scientists are still the ones doing science and deciding which of the existing scientific results are fundamentally worthy of building upon, this is bound to create conflict. Any good scientist whom you cannot convince about your view of what is important in science will tell you - anybody who thinks that he/she has a better way of doing science, or more important problems to solve, or a superior way of solving them, is welcome to do the science him/herself. Telling scientists how they should go about their business from the sidelines is simply not going to fly. Most good scientists are neither muddle-headed nor confused about what they are trying to do, but they job is to clearly identify questions they can meaningfully and unambiguously _answer_, and not merely _explore_. Philosophers might help, but they cannot prescribe what is important.&12 December 2012 at 09:09 % Like % 1&

&Tihana Dauenhauer Although last comment by B. Lenhard sounds somewhat intentionaly provocative, I must admit that it got my attention. (sorry, for spelling and grammatical errors. I don't have spell check on my mobile phone)&12 December 2012 at 09:22 via mobile % Like&

&Boris Lenhard I did not mean to be provocative - I can assure you that I wrote it with the best intention to clarify my view, and that Professor Maudlin would be interested in what scientists think and how to have a more productive dialogue with them. Without it, the sample of scientists that he will get to talk to is unlikely to be representative. I apologise if anything in the comment sounds disrespectful - it is not meant to be.&12 December 2012 at 09:24 % Like % 1&

&Tim Maudlin I really think you ought to have at least some actual data or examples to back up the claims you

make. First, to say that an issue is foundational is not to make some sort of subjective claim. It is to say something about the precision with which the foundational postulates of a theory have been articulated. To say that there are foundational problems in the standard formulations of quantum theory isand I'm getting a little tired of repeating thisto point out that those presentations are not mathematically precise. This is what Bell's complaint is about. If you haven't read his work read it. If you have, read it again because you haven't understood it. As for the relative rankings of "practicing physicists" about the importance of Bell...I am not doing sociological surveys. Bell stands head-and-shoulders above the rest on foundational questions, and in addition his work arguably is the source of the interest in entanglement on which quantum computation and quantum cryptography rest. In any case, if you want to argue that Bohr, for example, is better on foundational issues than Bell I am happy to have that argument. Just cite and defend what Bohr actually said, don't give me a list of the offhand opinions of physicists who mostly have not read either one. If you yourself don't have first-hand, defensible opinions about these things, then you shouldn't have opinions at all. Blind reverence for anyone, including the "famous physicist", is not intelligent. Here is a concrete example. Feynman was a first-class scientist. No doubt you would rank him above Bell. And the Twins Paradox is one of the central puzzles that occurs in discussions of Relativity. But in his famous lectures, Feynman gives a completely incorrect account of how that paradox is resolved. Bell's paper, "How to Teach Relativity" in contrast is perfect. Bell does not treat the Twins Paradox, but if you want a correct account of it you can read it in my book. I am sure, of course, that Feynman would have acknowledged his error if pointed outhe was not dogmatic. But he did make the mistake, in a prominent place, and in a way that makes the actual content of the theory hard to understand. Is pointing out that fact about what Feynman wroteand it is a fact"denigrating" him? I really don't care what you say, because it is a fact that he made a mistake, and it improves matters to point it out and correct it. Bohr's account of quantum theory is simply atrocious, as is his attempt to respond to the EPR paradox. If you want to dispute this assessment, then do so on factual groundsread and exposit Bohrnot on some offhand "survey" of who physicists like. To do anything else is just lazy and irresponsible.And yes, I do think that my own estimate of which physicists were clearer thinkers and had better things to say about foundational issues is superior than opinions of most practicing physicists, who have neither the interest nor ability to think clearly about foundational issues. If you want to dispute these judgments by actual argument, make the argument. If you want to just say that "practicing scientists" have a high opinion of themselves, so what? So: do you want to defend Feynman on the Twins Paradox against a mere philosopher like me? Let's have the conversation. Do you want to defend Bohr over Bell? Any time. But there is not a single concrete example or fact that you cite. If you don't like philosophers claiming that physicists make mistake, then show that they aren't mistakes. The rest of this is just empty rhetoric.&12 December 2012 at 14:56 % Like % 2&

&Boris Lenhard Professor Maudlin, I have said this and I will say it again - I am neither a physicist nor a philosopher of physics. I can not argue with you about the details of Bell's vs Feynman's account of anything. Likewise, you would probably not be able to figure out where a philosopher of biology like Philip Kitcher in his writings gets the concept of "regulatory gene" dead wrong - repeatedly. In short, I cannot give you examples from your own field because it is quite remote from my own field. Feynman might get a thing wrong here and there but, sociological surveys or not, there are very few physicists that will doubt that his overal contributions to physics (and scientific thinking) vastly exceed those of Bell. I think that I have right to notice that, and that it is relevant - just like you have the right to point out one thing in which he was apparently wrong and Bell was right.&12 December 2012 at 15:09 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin Foundational issues are foundational issues. Some overall judgment about Bell and Feynman, again by physicists who have probably never read Bell, is just worthless as a way to decide which had more profound things to say on these issues. I do make strong judgments about this, and will defend them in detail if asked. If you are not actually interested in these issueswhich are the ones I have been discussingI have no idea why you feel you have to take sides or issue any judgement at all. As you say, I have not been making any claims at all about philosophy of biology. It is not my field, so I have no basis to judge. If you are in the same situation with respect to physics, then take the same attitude.&12 December 2012 at 15:15 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard I am worried about this: "And yes, I do think that my own estimate of which physicists were clearer thinkers and had better things to say about foundational issues is superior than opinions of most practicing physicists, who have neither the interest nor ability to think clearly about foundational issues. " That is the same attitude that Vi$nja had before and that is bound to instantly antagonise you to many working scientists, including, I suspect, many who are equally or more accomplished that you in their respective fields. In a nutshell, if you think that some (excellent) physicists do not have ability to think clearly, then your notion of "thinking clearly" is simply unneccesary for doing relevant physics (or other scientists). And it still sounds offensive. So it is better not to express that attitude - at least if honest dialogue with scientists is desired. Because cherrypicking those scientists who agree with you (or say they do) will not result in a sample of scientists doing the most relevant science.&12 December 2012 at 15:17 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin Again, I will argue particular cases. I will go through what Bohr says or Feynman says and point out the errors. The fact that they make errors shows that clear thinking on these issues is not so trivial as you seem to think it is. If the actual facts antagonize working scientists, so what? If I'm wrong, make the argument.

If I'm right, then they shouldn't be antagonized by that. Maybe they have overestimated themselves. But the issue is who is right and who is wrong. Which example would you like to discuss? By the by, I wonder if you ever censor yourself out of fear of antagonizing anyone.&12 December 2012 at 15:23 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard The problem with foundational issues is that, if you look at the history of science, no vigorous scientific advances ever started by defining foundational questions or ny trying to sort out foundational issues. Foundational issues have come out of scientific activity and might represent _conclusion_ (as in closing down) of a scientific research program, and not the beginning of something new and scientifically (not philosophically) exciting. Since foundational issues are defined by _existing_ scientific knowledge, any new scientific knowledge could in principle derail them (as it happened with any attempts to define the "gene"). And foundational issues that you have to keep modifying as new data comes in are not foundational after all. Looking at the case of Einstein, it is no accident that he started with annuus mirabilis and not by demanding clarity on foundational questions - without the papers from 1905, nobody would pay attention to his demands for clarity. His early work gave him a megaphone for his demands for clarity, but the more philosophical his interests became, the more his scientific output dwindled. The same happened to many other scientists with philosophical interests.&12 December 2012 at 15:33 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard "The fact that they make errors shows that clear thinking on these issues is not so trivial as you seem to think it is." Is your definition of a clear thinker "the one that does not make errors"? Do _you_ _never_ make errors? I would be very sceptical about such claims coming from _anybody_. Again, some of the most important scientists made some very serious errors in their days. Einstein made errors. Linus Pauling was a walking disaster much of the time. And it is not philosophers who typically caught their errors - but other scientists who made their own errors on other occasions. If your goal is to rid science (in this case physics) of errors, even regarding foundational questions, I must say that I am sceptical about that ambition.&12 December 2012 at 15:38 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin Do you really want to argue cases in the history of science? (I take it we are now leaving the issues about the foundations of contemporary physics.) You might as well note, in case you are unaware of it, that in Einstein's 1905 paper there is not any mention of experimental results (and specifically no mention of Michelson and Morley), but a long and completely conceptual discussion of the different accounts of electromagnetic induction given by Maxwell's theory for a moving magnet and a moving coil. Maxwell's theory was perfectly empirically adequate about these phenomena, but, for Einstein, conceptually inadequate. So the very case you cite argues against your claim. Shall we discuss Newton's foundational interest in the nature of space and time? All of this is, in any case, misdirection. My present work is largely on the foundational situation in contemporary physics. If you personally don't care about that, fine. That's not my concern. If you think these aren't interesting questions, fine again. Then just stop having opinions about which work in this area is well done and which poorly done. My interest is getting clear about these things, and if doing so antagonizes anyone I can't think of a reason why I should care. If the claims I make are false, then I very much need to have the mistakes pointed out. The rest is just a side show. But again: it was Einstein's interest in foundations that led to the EPR paper, and Schrdinger's reading of EPR that led to the cat paper and the first explicit discussion of entanglement. It was worries about non-locality that arise from EPR (and specifically Bohm's theory) that led Bell to his theorem, and then to the renewed interest in entanglement, and then to quantum computation and quantum cryptography. The historical claim that foundational issues are somehow sterile is demonstrably false.&12 December 2012 at 15:47 % Like % 1&

&Tim Maudlin Why in the world would you attribute to me such a definition of a "clear thinker"? I never said, nor implied, any such thing. In fact, categorizing people in this regard is pointless: Feynman was, on average, splendidly clear. But the fact that he made such a basic mistake shows that it is hard work keeping everything straight. The issue is always a particular argument in hand, not who made it. Contributions to keeping things straight ought to be valued, even if they come from philosophers.&12 December 2012 at 15:54 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard "Contributions to keeping things straight ought to be valued, even if they come from philosophers." I, for once, never doubted this. I only doubted some of the philosophers' opinions of what is important in science - because in the cases they disagree with practising scientists, they imply that they know better what are important problems in science than the scientists themselves.&12 December 2012 at 15:58 % Like&

&Tihana Dauenhauer I just need to say few things (I will be very short). 1. This is for me very, very interesting discussion. 2. I'm sorry that for now very few are reading this conversation. Lenhard is, as I see it, openly asking questions about philosophy of science that are usually hidden inside minds of most Croatian scientists? 3. Boris Lenhard, didn't Tim Maudlin already elaborately answered your last question?&12 December 2012 at 16:01 via mobile % Like&

&Tim Maudlin There is just no point in debating this. There are foundational issues. Some scientists think they are important and some don't. If you don't, then don't bother about them. If you think there just are no such issues, then you are wrong, and we can talk about what they are. If you think that work on foundational issues never leads to other sorts of progress then you are also wrong and we can go through cases. If you are upset that philosophers are much more attracted to foundational issues than to non-foundataional issues, then get over it. My own assessment is that you are much more concerned to denigrate philosophers than philosophers are interested in denigrating practicing scientists. What is annoying are scientists who take themselves to be experts on topics about which they have not thought hard or clearly. And this happens with some frequency in foundational topics. But this is a claim to made only on a specific, case-by-case basis.&12 December 2012 at 16:05 % Like % 2&

&Boris Lenhard I do not understand the details of the EPR paper, but the paper is from 1935, and I understand the issues raised there are still not settled. Bell theorem is more than 50 years old, and so are most of the interpretations of quantum mechanics. For the standards of a molecular biologist, as a scientific field this is beyond stagnant - even if it ensued (long time ago) from interest in foundational questions. If I understand your goals correctly, your goal is to get it moving again (at least above the glacial speeds of past half a century). And my initial question in this discussion is - how do you know that you are succeeding at it? If the criteria are not something scientists wold recognise as scientific, they will not recognise the progress as such, either.&12 December 2012 at 16:06 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin Why in the world should the "standards of a molecular biologist" be of any relevance here? I have no reason to think that the situation in the two fields have anything at all to do with each other. A foundational problem, now, in physics is the reconciliation of quantum theory and the General Theory of Relativity. By your standard, that problem is "stagnant" since it could have been raised in the 1930s, or whenever you think quantum theory became established. One of the problems for a quantum theory is the so-called problem of time. And some non-standard approaches to interpreting quantum theory (in particular Bohm's) have no such problem. So that's reason to think that interpretational issues can be fruitful. If you want to discuss what the problem of time is, and how this approach avoids it, that's fine. If you want me to explain the sociology of physicists about this, I don't have much useful to say. It is only by first understanding the issue that you can be in a position to judge whether the physicists are making good judgements. Again, you seem happy to just endorse whatever most scientists do, without understanding what the issues are. So anyone who says they are making mistakes must somehow be wrong. This is just lazy. If you want to have well-reasoned opinions on these matters then you have to learn about them. If you don't want toand it is hard workthen just stop having opinions.&12 December 2012 at 16:17 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard "There are foundational issues. Some scientists think they are important and some don't." If scientists are free to disregard foundational issues and still be (good) scientists, then the foundational issues are either not scientific or net necessary for scientific progress. "If you don't, then don't bother about them. " I am interested in what you think. I have already learned a lot from this discussion. "If you think there just are no such issues, then you are wrong, and we can talk about what they are." I don't think that. But I do think that they are philosophical, not scientific issues. " If you think that work on foundational issues never leads to other sorts of progress then you are also wrong and we can go through cases." I have no trouble believing that they can inspire other sort of progress. I am not necessarily convinced that they are necessary for it. But I might be wrong there, too. "If you are upset that philosophers are much more attracted to foundational issues than to non-foundataional issues, then get over it. " No I am not. I am only occassionaly upset when philosophers assert that I am unable to think or understand things when I have an opinion of an allegedly fundamental issue that differs from theirs (such as the concept of the gene). "My own assessment is that you are much more concerned to denigrate philosophers than philosophers are interested in denigrating practicing scientists." I am sorry if I came across as such, that was not my intention. My experience with some philosophers are that they get too hostile too soon when I start asking questions - like that they are not used to the sort of

questions I ask, or tha they are somehow beyond them. " What is annoying are scientists who take themselves to be experts on topics about which they have not thought hard or clearly." I hope that I have stated clearly what my expertise is and what isn't - whenever I referred to something I knew little or nothing about, I said so. This is an open-ended conversation - I couldn't have possibly thought hard or clearly about everything we have covered here - and neither could you.&12 December 2012 at 16:20 % Like % 1&

&Tim Maudlin So let's try to think clearly about one of your claims:&12 December 2012 at 16:23 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard I am not suggesting that my standards should be relevant here - I was just comparing time scales. Fifty years is an entire career, and I would hate to spend it with little measurable progress. But I am not claiming that this should be the standard.&12 December 2012 at 16:25 % Like % 1&

&Tim Maudlin "If scentists are free to disregard foundational issues and still be (good) scientists, then the foundational issues are either not scientific or net necessary for scientific progress." by analogy If scentists are free to disregard biological issues and still be (good) scientists, then the biological issues are either not scientific or net necessary for scientific progress. Now by your argument, since there are good scientists who have never given a thought to biological issues, biology must not be scientific or necessary for scientific progress. Someone well trained in philosophy would not make such a mistake. This is the sort of thing I mean.&12 December 2012 at 16:26 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard "Now by your argument, since there are good scientists who have never given a thought to biological issues, biology must not be scientific or necessary for scientific progress." Well, that IS true, isn't it? Biological problems do not underpin all of science. My impression was that you claimed that every field of science has its foundational issues that underpin it (which is why they are called foundational) and that no understanding is possible without working them out. If they are optional...&12 December 2012 at 16:31 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin What I was pointing out, by example, is that you argument is not valid. Your argument is that if good science can be done without X then X is not scientific. By that standard, nothing is scientific. It is a ridiculous standard. I made no claims at all about foundational issues in biology. None. It was you who offered an argument to the conclusion that the study of foundational issues is not scientific, by means of an argument that is obviously invalid. This is really not getting us anywhere.&12 December 2012 at 16:35 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard "Your argument is that if good science can be done without X then X is not scientific" I said: "If scientists are free to disregard foundational issues and still be (good) scientists, then the foundational issues are either not scientific or not necessary for scientific progress." Note the form of the statement - even I know enough logic to know that it cannot be cast in the form you have stated above. "I made no claims at all about foundational issues in biology. " Neither did I. Are you suggesting that physics is somehow different than biology with respect to the existence or importance of foundational questions? I would be very interested to know. "This is really not getting us anywhere." I beg to differ - I am trying to understand the issues here, and I think I am making progress. I can see that you are annoyed, but it was not my intention to annoy you. I am a scientist, working in a field that is not your specialty. If you are interested in dialog with scientists on things you do, this is how it is going to look without cherrypicking &12 December 2012 at 16:42 % Like&

&Tihana Dauenhauer Franjo Sokolic, Oudeis Oudenos - I named my two friends because I know that they have interest in this subject.&12 December 2012 at 16:47 via mobile % Like % 1&

&Tim Maudlin So let's at least get clear on this point. I cannot possibly have misrepresented your argument, because all I initially did was cut-and-paste your sentence, then replace the word "foundational" with the word "biological". That change cannot change the argument form. And in the new form, the argument purports to prove that if there are good scientists who disregard biological issues (and there obviously are), then biological issues either are not scientific or not necessary for scientific progress. One any usual reading that conclusion is false. If you mean only that it is *possible* to do good scientific work without regard to foundations...well of course. No one ever denied that. It was rather you who seem to argue that foundational work must be somehow sterile or pointless. And against that claim there are clear counter-examples. As for the practice of biology, again I make no claims at all. It is not an area of my expertise.&12 December 2012 at 16:51 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard "If you mean only that it is *possible* to do good scientific work without regard to foundations...well of course. " That is exactly what I meant - in fact I do not see how my original statement could be interpreted otherwise. "It was rather you who seem to argue that foundational work must be somehow sterile or pointless." No, but the examples you have given are not shining examples of a start of a new and vibrant scientific field, either. Please correct me if I am wrong, but I (as a complete non-expert) see them as inconclusive attempts to tie the loose ends of (basically philosophical) implications of quantum theory. Meanwhile, the predictive power of quantum theory has been exploited much more productively elsewhere. I am not trying to disparage the former effort, just like I think nobody should disparage the scientific value of the latter. But the fact that they have been inconclusive is what made me ask in the first place - are you trying to conclude them? Or persuade practicing physicists to work on trying to conclude them?&12 December 2012 at 17:00 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard Mate, thanks - just a couple of points: "Since the beginning of quantum mechanics, we have continuous discussion " Discussions do not necessarily mean progress, let alone vigorous progress. Maybe, as a molecular biologist, I am more of a progress junkie than people in this field are. I remember that Feynman in his lectures (1962) in one of the first lectures in book one stated several big questions of (molecular) biology - look them up. 35 years later, ALL OF THEM were solved. "For example, in the Perimeter Institute there are two research groups working on foundation of QM and quantum gravity." Any testable hypotheses yet? "But last month Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph published paper about that problem in the Nature (Nature Phys. 8, 476 (2012)). " <nitpicking>Nature Physics is not Nature </nitpicking>. Other than that I am glad that things are happening.&12 December 2012 at 17:07 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin If all you mean is that good scientific work can proceed without worrying about foundations, why even assert that? No one has ever denied it. As for the claim that the interpretational issues are philosophical, that is not true. They are physical. Once again, Bell was interested in physics as physics, in clarity and precision of physical postulates. The aim for precision and clarity in the postulates of a theory is an end in itself, not a means to some other end. As for how much progress is being made...well it is obvious that exactly zero progress will be made if no one works on it. Why does it annoy you so much that people do? On a more concrete note, one could argue that the last three decades of work on string theory has not yet led to any clear empirical success. If you want to go argue with the string theorists to stop work, be my guest. I would rather look in detail about the problems they have and the progress they have made before making a judgement.&12 December 2012 at 17:09 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard "On a more concrete note, one could argue that the last three decades of work on string theory has not yet led to any clear empirical success. If you want to go argue with the string theorists to stop work, be my guest." Well, there are a number of physicists who see many problems with the lack of empirical success of string theory. As far as I understand it is not science YET. It may be one day. On the other hand, it may never become one (if it never produces any practically testable hypothesis), it may be proven wrong, and it may simply fizzle out as people lose interest in something that is supposed to become science but never does... "I would rather look in detail about the problems they have and the progress they have made before making a judgement." I cannot judge the progress they made, obviously. But there is no consensus about it in the community, either. In the absence of testable hypothesis or any predictive power beyond what already exists, any progress is purely mathematical I guess. But I might be wrong there, too. "The aim for precision and clarity in the postulates of a theory is an end in itself, not a means to some other end. As for how much progress is being made...well it is obvious that exactly zero progress will be made if no one works on it. Why does it annoy you so much that people do?" It does not annoy me. I understand that "exactly zero progress will be made if no one works on it". What worries me is the possibility that exactly zero measurable progress will be made even if people do work on it. It should worry those people even more. Much more.&12 December 2012 at 17:12 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin Now we are just having a semantic debate about the word "science". The string theory community has gotten enough funding from the National Science Foundation to conclude that most people think it is science. I don't care much about how you use the word "science". Foundational issuesissues of clarity and precisionhave intrinsic value. One can use a theory and not understand it. To recur to my example, most physicists cannot explain the Twins Paradox because, although they can calculate with the theory they do not understand it. Getting people to understand it would be progress even if it leads to no new predictions.And to be clearby "understand" here, I mean something simple. You do not understand Relativity if you cannot give the correct account, according to that very theory, of the effect.&12 December 2012 at 17:17 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard "Foundational issuesissues of clarity and precisionhave intrinsic value. " That is where I might have be confused. I was convinced that you choose work on the issues of clarity and precision because you are convinced that lack of them hinders progress - for everybody, not just for those specifically interested in those issues. Now we have concluded that it is not necessarily the case - or have we?&12 December 2012 at 17:21 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin "It should worry those people even more. Much more." Why? You won't know what can be done until you try. If you try to do something valuable and fail, that is no great tragedy. Deciding to do something rather unimportant because you know you will succeed might be said to be worse.&12 December 2012 at 17:22 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard "You won't know what can be done until you try. If you try to do something valuable and fail, that is no great tragedy." Tell it to a tenure review committee...&12 December 2012 at 17:23 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin If tenure review committees are to be the standard of value, God help us. Maybe it's easier to get tenure doing deconstruction. Why bring it up?&12 December 2012 at 17:25 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin I work on issues of clarity and precision because they are intrinsically important, so progress on them is progress full stop. And progress can be made. Actually, pointing out Feynman's error is, in a small way, progress: more people will understand Relativity. Why should progress require satisfying people with no interest in the issues? That is just plain bizarre. Your fundamental principle seems to be: if I don't care about it, then it is worthless. Good luck with that.&12 December 2012 at 17:29 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard It was meant as a joke. Maybe I should have ended it with a smiley. (And unfortunately tenure IS important - if you are over 40 and don't have it, you will be working on these problems as a hobby only...)&12

December 2012 at 17:29 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard "Your fundamental principle seems to be: if I don't care about it, then it is worthless." You are being unfair, sir. My principle in this discussion is the question "why should anybody (you, I, somebody else) care about it?" And it is not put in the way that you should get defensive about it - no, it is open-ended. The answer that I would not be happy about is "If you don't see it, well just dont do it". I want to find out what you see. That is why I am asking all this. Starting from the simple "if you claim that your aim is to understand something, how do you know when you have accomplished that?"&12 December 2012 at 17:34 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard Just a note: if I was as defensive about my research as you seem to be here, I would never get any funding for it. And trust me, I get asked much dumber and more contemptuous questions by people who are deciding on it &12 December 2012 at 17:43 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin So we have two concrete examples. 1) There is, at present, a lack of fundamental precision in the foundations of quantum theory, which makes itself manifest in the Measurement Problem. One can use the theory without resolving that problem (obviously), but this basic problem means that you can't really understand anything in terms of the theory, because of a flaw in the theory itself. 2) Relativity is, in contrast, an intrinsically clear theory, but still widely misunderstood. Conceptual progress can be made by explaining the theory clearly, and pointing out the errors in popular presentations. I think both of these sorts of issues are intrinsically important. If you don't, you don't and I can't quite see why I should try to convince you. I can point out that some great scientists thought they were important, or that thinking about them did lead to other sorts of progress, but those are side issues. I take them to be intrinsically important. If you are willing to say that you neither care that the foundational principles of a theory be precisely articulated, or that the precisely articulated principles of a theory be properly understood, so long as some other sort of "progress" can go on unimpeded, fine. Then there is no further discussion. Since I take these sorts of thing to be intrinsically important, I feel no obligation to show that trying to solve them might have some other consequences. As for progress, Mate mentioned the PBR theorem, and your response was, I think it is fair to say, dismissive because of the venue of publication. I guess I find that rather shallow. Maybe you should read the paper, or try to understand the issues.&12 December 2012 at 17:44 % Like % 1&

&Tihana Dauenhauer Thank you Tim M., you explained this very nicely and in a simple way: "So we have two concrete examples. 1) There is, at present, a lack of fundamental precision in the foundations of quantum theory, which makes itself manifest in the Measurement Problem. One can use the theory without resolving that problem (obviously), but this basic problem means that you can't really understand anything in terms of the theory, because of a flaw in the theory itself. 2) Relativity is, in contrast, an intrinsically clear theory, but still widely misunderstood. Conceptual progress can be made by explaining the theory clearly, and pointing out the errors in popular presentations."&12 December 2012 at 17:51 via mobile % Like&

&Boris Lenhard ") There is, at present, a lack of fundamental precision in the foundations of quantum theory, which makes itself manifest in the Measurement Problem. One can use the theory without resolving that problem (obviously), but this basic problem means that you can't really understand anything in terms of the theory, because of a flaw in the theory itself." Two questions: 1) Are you actually working on resolving the flaw in the theory? 2) By what criterion will you know that you or somebody else have resolved it? "2) Relativity is, in contrast, an intrinsically clear theory, but still widely misunderstood. Conceptual progress can be made by explaining the theory clearly, and pointing out the errors in popular presentations." Put this way, this seems like a pedagogical aim. Am I wrong? "I think both of these sorts of issues are intrinsically important. If you don't, you don't and I can't quite see why I should try to convince you. " Again, as a practising scientist, I can NEVER afford to assume this attitude about my research. Not even in a casual conversation. Defending it before doubting people - especially educated people who can be argued with - is simply part of being a scientist. I thought it was the same for philosophers. Maybe I was wrong. "As for progress, Mate mentioned the PBR theorem, and your response was, I think it is fair to say, dismissive because of the venue of publication. I guess I find that rather shallow. Maybe you should read the paper, or try to understand the issues." My response was not dismissive at all. Nature Physics is an excellent journal - it is just that Mate's statement

that the paper was published in Nature is, as you say, demonstrably false. (And trust me, I published in Nature and Nature Genetics, and to a scientist it is _not_ the same. I understand that philosophers do not worry about such distinctions, but for us it _is_ part of the job. Again, if I did it your style, I would ask "why I should care that you don't care about the difference between journals?"...)&12 December 2012 at 18:00 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin This has just become hilarious. First you ask why foundational issues are important, and when I answer you say " if I was as defensive about my research as you seem to be here, I would never get any funding for it." Then when I say I have no need to try to defend the claim that precision is intrinsically important you say "Defending it before doubting people - especially educated people who can be argued with - is simply part of being a scientist. I thought it was the same for philosophers. Maybe I was wrong." DO you stay up mights working on silly rhetorical traps like that? Answer the questions and you are defensive, don't answer it and you aren't doing what you are supposed to! Nifty!&12 December 2012 at 18:20 % Like % 1&

&Boris Lenhard I am trying to add some casual notes to a casual discussion. Sorry if my sense of humour falls flat with you...&12 December 2012 at 18:22 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard And to me, to defend one's research is not the same as being defensive about it. Being defensive includes a hostile response. Merely defending something does not...&12 December 2012 at 18:24 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard (It is my hope that I have managed not to be obnoxious in this discussion. I sincerely regret being obnoxious to other people whom I debated about related topics before, and I still feel the consequences of this in Tim's attitude in this discussion. That makes me sad because the discussion could have been even better without it. But I accept responsibility for it.)&12 December 2012 at 18:27 % Like&

&Tim Maudlin It is easy to say that you have some sincere interest in understanding things. It is harder to actually do it. I have made what seems to me a perfectly clear claim: that the sort of precision and clarity I am trying to achieve is intrinsically valuable. If you want to reject it, then reject it. Anyone else can make their own decision. I think I have shown that I will spend time to try to explain things. But you simply give no indication of caring to have them explained. You claim not to understand why anyone should pursue foundational questions. I have explained. Now are we really supposed to get into a discussion of the status of the measurement problem, and my own contribution to it (why would that be relevant to the general question?). What is the point of that? Are we supposed to argue over the use of the word "pedagogical"? Why? I have just pointed out a silly rhetorical trick you tried to play (which I refrained from pointing out until you started up again) and now its just a joke. This is, in Lakatos's phrase, a "degenerating research programme". You seem to believe that having the last word on a comment thread is somehow winning. By that standard, you win. Let anyone else following the thread make their own judgment.&12 December 2012 at 18:36 % Like % 2&

&Boris Lenhard "that the sort of precision and clarity I am trying to achieve is intrinsically valuable. If you want to reject it, then reject it." I do not want to reject it. But to state that something is "intrinsically valuable" without defending it amounts to a revelatory statement about objective reality, not an academic argument. I want to know why (you think) something is intrinsically valuable. The response "if you do not see it/accept it, just b***r off" is not really a response I can take seriously. "But you simply give no indication of caring to have them explained." How does one give indication of caring to have them explained? (I thought I gave ample indication for it, but you obviously find something in my response grating. Please tell me what it is.) "Now are we really supposed to get into a discussion of the status of the measurement problem, and my own contribution to it (why would that be relevant to the general question?). What is the point of that?" The point is to find out if you are working towards solving a problem that you claim you want to see solved. Isn't that a legitimate point? The reason i am asking is that I am not sure if you expect that the solution should come from a physicist or a philosopher of physics. "Are we supposed to argue over the use of the word "pedagogical"?" No. I am pretty clear what "pedagogical" means - but the aim the way you have phrased it could as well be a general aim of any physics teacher or textbook author. I asked if that was it or is there something more to it. "I have just pointed out a silly rhetorical trick you tried to play (which I refrained from pointing out until you started up again) and now its just a joke. " It was a joke to begin with. It was never my intention to play any tricks in this discussion.

" You seem to believe that having the last word on a comment thread is somehow winning. By that standard, you win. Let anyone else following the thread make their own judgment." Again, I do not understand why this level of hostility is necessary. I do not want to win here. I just wanted you to clarify a statement whose meaning was not obvious to me. That is all. I am grateful that you have responded. Even if it ended on a hostile note.&12 December 2012 at 18:50 % Like&

&Boris Lenhard Since the discussion is over, let me just summarise what I got from it: Based on professor Maudlin's statement of goals in the interview, and a couple of previous discussions with philosophers on what it means to "understand an issue" (especially since some of them accused me of not understanding, not caring to understand and/or not being able to understand an issue from my own scientific field, even though they knew next to nothing about it) I really wanted to find out what it means to "understand an issue" in the sense that goes beyond what I consider scientific understanding. By scientific understanding I mean 1. there is a reasonably well-performing predictive model of a phenomenon 2. one is aware of the assumptions of the model 3. one knows the basic statements the model makes (mathematical as an equations or a series equations, or physical, such as e.g. details of a molecular structure of DNA) 4. one is able to assess the predictive ability of the model and further testable (or testable in principle) predictions/implications. To distinguish between two models whose testable predictions are exactly the same, the only criterion that always works in scientific reasoning is to choose one with fewer parameters - which, in the case of models with identical predictive power almost always means that one contains parameters that are not needed. This is what is normally meant by Occam's razor. I think that the previous example about the 6000-years or 5/10 minutes universe nicely demonstrates that point. Based on previous discussions, I had an uneasy feeling that any further "understanding" beyond the above points is basically a subjective preference for one formulation of a model over another, or an insistence that one should have a clear idea/definition of a notion that was arbitrary or never corresponded to any physical object to begin with (such as "gene"). Since Professor Maudlin is a philosopher of physics, I could not hope to understand the details of concrete issues he deals with in his professional work. (But please note that people with whom I had a heated discussion of the gene concepts had very little knowledge of molecular biology or genetics, but still had very strong opinions about it, and I was perfectly willing to discuss it with them.) Let me rephrase the main things from Professor Maudlin's response that I think are relevant, and whose important details I do not understand: * Professor Maudlin states that current formulations of quantum theory are inexact and mathematically imprecise. From what I know, quantum theory makes impressively accurate measurable predictions, so I do not understand what it means to be "imprecise" in this context. * To choose among different formulations of quantum theory which do not differ by measurable or otherwise testable predictions they make, Professor Maudlin suggests a program that would proliferate many alternative formulations, and then by some criteria that I cannot grasp - but which obviously do not include measurement - decide which is the most acceptable. In it, he is apparently willing to forego the basic Occam's razor principle - because he already prefers formulations that do not have the lowest number of parameters, such as Bohm's. He claims that there are more sophisticated, "exact" criteria to justify such choices that include neither measurement nor Occam's razor. As a scientist, I am completely in the dark about what these criteria should be and how they are supposed to inform our decision-making - not only in quantum theory, but in any branch of science. Professor Maudlin claims that those principles cannot be stated generally but only concretely for specific cases. ### Foundational issues and intrinsic importance On the question of foundational issues, here is what I have learned: 1. There are foundational issues in physics. Professor Maudlin would consider those who doubt this simply and flatly wrong. 2. Professor Maudlin implies that, or at least acts like, the issue he considers foundational in physics are THE foundational issues in physics. It is unclear to me if there is disagreement of what the foundational issues are, and if there is, if professor Maudlin also considers those who disagree with him wrong and why. 3. Professor Maudlin claims that he works on those issues because they are intrinsically important. I do not see how something in science can be intrinsically important without being extrinsically important at the same time (i.e. having practical consequences as well), but I am aware that this does not contradict his claim. I have no reason not to accept that there are foundational issues (although I would have trouble defining them meaningfully in e.g. biology) and that they are important. However I asked professor Maudlin about the details of his work because working on an important issue by no means guarantees that what one does about it is important, meaningful or that it will lead to anything important. Perhaps I am too much into the mindset of science grant proposals, but in grant proposals in science we have to justify things such as "impact" ("intrinsically important" would not be a convincing argument, even in most basic science, as remote from applications as science can be), and "feasibility" (anything along the lines "so what if it fails, it is important to try" would guarantee that you will not get funded; or attract any good PhD students or postdocs, for that matter).

### Field consensus ### Professor Maudlin is also oddly dismissive about the majority opinion in physics, calling it a sociological question. I try very much not to draw parallels with climate science community because the criteria in this case are basically not scientific in my ("narrow") view of what scientific is, but dismissing majority attitude or priorities as "worthless" with respect to ranking the importance of John Bell because the majority hasn't read his work strikes me as problematic and lacking objectivity on ones own position in the field. It is as if Professor Maudlin is implying that everybody who has read what he read will either see the light or, failing to see it, prove to be an irredeemable nincompoop that just cannot grasp the foundational issues in his own field. Many of the great scientists were actually familiar with Bell's work (Feynman was, apparently) and yet did not found it of equal importance. Not to mention that they probably read many other things that Professor Maudlin never did, so it would be appropriate to at least consider the possibility that some of his opinions and rankings could be seen as "worthless" in their eyes, too. It is not a matter of specialisation - it is a mere question of objective worth of something vs mere personal preferences. ### Conclusion ### The concept of "understanding" as used by philosophers in discussions with me, is inherently vague (should I say "unprofessionally vague"), subjective and occasionally circular. Nobody, not even professor Maudlin, managed to explain to me how they distinguish the state of not understanding something from the state of understanding it, when this understanding is not based on "simple-minded" principles of practicing science that I have outlined above. It is at best a fuzzy feeling of intellectual achievement after having explored some issues and ranking some alternatives by criteria that cannot be ever universally agreed upon. For that reason, I am still in the dark about the basic questions concerning the feasibility of his project - about what is there in his approach that will resolve long-standing issues that many great mind couldn't resolve for many decades, if resolving of these issues is even his goal, and if is, what are the criteria for deciding that this goal has been achieved, or at least that he has come closer to it.&13 December 2012 at 10:09 % Like&

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