Noscitur a sociis Words must be construed in conjunction with the other words and phrases used in the text.

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. Where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true meaning may be clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated. Aisporna v CA Facts: Mapalad Aisporna, the wife of one Rodolfo Aisporna, an insurance agent, solicited the application of Eugenio Isidro in behalf of Perla Compana de Seguros without the certificate of authority to act from the insurance commissioner. Isidro passed away while his wife was issued Php 5000 from the insurance policy. After the death, the fiscal instigated criminal action against Mapalad for violating sec 189 of the Insurance code for feloniously acting as agent when she solicited the application form. In the trial court, she claimed that she helped Rodolfo as clerk and that she solicited a renewal, not a new policy from Isidro through the phone. She did this because her husband was absent when he called. She only left a note on top of her husbands desk to inform him of what transpired. (She did not accept compensation from Isidro for her services) Aisporna was sentenced to pay Php 500 with subsidiary costs in case of insolvency in 1971 in the Cabanatuan city court. In the appellate court, she was found guilty of having violating par 1 of sec 189 of the insurance code. The OSG kept on repeating that she didnt violate sec 189 of the insurance code. In seeking reversal of the judgment, Aisporna assigned errors of the appellate court: 1. the receipt of compensation was not a necessary element of the crime in par 1 of sec 189 of the insurance code 2. CA erred in giving due weight to exhibits F, F1, F17 inclusive sufficient to establish petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 3. The CA erred in not acquitting the petitioner Issues: (1)Won a person can be convicted of having violated the 1st par of the sec 189 of the IC without reference to the 2nd paragraph of the said section. Or (2) Is it necessary to determine WON the agent mentioned in the 1st paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an insurance agent found on its second paragraph Decision: Aisporna acquitted Ruling: Sect 189 of the I.C., par 1 states that No insurance company doing business with the Philippine Islands nor l any agent thereof shall pay any commission or other compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance unless such person shall have first procured from the Insurance Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such company as herein after provided. No person shall act as agent, sub-agent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications for insurance without obtaining a certificate from the Insurance Commissioner. Par2 Any person who for COMPENSATION solicits or obtains insurance for any for any insurance compna or offers or

assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance shall be an insurance agent in the intent of this section and shall thereby become liable to all liabilities to which an insurance agent is subject. Par 3 500 pseo fine for person or company violating the provisions of the section. The court held that the 1st par prohibited a person to act as agent without certificate of authority from the commissioner In the 2nd par, the definition of an insurance agent is stipulated The third paragraph provided the penalty for violating the 1st 2 rules. The appellate court said that the petitioner was penalized under the1st paragraph and not the 1nd. The fact that she didnt receive compensation wasnt an excuse for her acquittal because she was actually punished separately under sec 1 because she did not have a certificate of authority as under par 1. The SC held that the definition of an insurance agent was made by CA to be limited to paragraph 2 and not applicable to the 1st paragraph. The appellate court said that a person was an insurance agent under par 2 if she solicits insurance for compensation, but in the 1st paragraph, there was no necessity that a person solicits an insurance compensation in order to be called an agent. The SC said that this was a reversible error. The CA said that Aisporna didnt receive compensation. The SC said that the definition of an insurance agent was found in the 2nd par of Sec 189 (check the law) The definition in the 2nd paragraph qualified the definition of an agent used in the 1st and third paragraphs. xxx Aisporna vs. CA: wife of insurance agent prosecuted for having sold an insurance without registering as an agent. Using this doctrine, the Court ruled that an insurance agent is one who sells insurance in return for compensation, and it was not proved that Aisporna received compensation for the insurance she was alleged to have sold. (Her defense was that as her husbands clerk, she only renewed the insurance because her husband was out at the time). Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing Corp. v. Villarama: Dai-Chi filed a complaint against Villarama for violating an agreement that he would not join the companys competitor within two years after leaving Dai-Chi. Dai-Chi filed a complaint against Villarama at the RTC, which dismissed it on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, for it should have been filed before a labor arbiter. Using the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the court ruled that while the Labor Code says that all money claims of workers were under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, it did not mean to encompass the entire universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers. Paragraph 3 should not be read in isolation, but rather in conjunction with paragraphs 1 to 5, which all refer to money claims of workers arising from violations of or in connection with an employee-employer relationship. Dai-Chis complaint was anchored on a violation of contract, since Villarama was no longer an employee. The court ruled that the RTC was the proper venue for filing of the case. MAYOR MAGTAJAS & CITY OF CAGAYAN v. PRYCE PROPERTIES & PAGCOR Facts: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the

women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition for review. Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid Held: No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows: ***Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. EJUSDEM GENERIS Where a statute describes things of particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a kindred nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statute to repel such influence. Ejusdem generis could be expansive, however, because the list is not exclusive; it may be expanded if a juridical tie could be found with another item. PBA v CA: Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general

words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. xxx FACTS: On July 21, 1989, the petitioner received an assessment from the CIR for the payment of deficiency amusement tax in the amount of P5, 864, 260.84 (including 75%surcharge and 25% interest for 2 years). The petitioner contested the assessment but it was denied by the CIR. The Court of Tax Appeals also dismissed the subsequent petition of PBA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the CTA so the petitioner filed this petition for certiorari. Petitioners arguments: Jurisdiction to collect amusement taxes of PBA is vested with the local government and not the national government. It argues that they should be included in the enumeration provided by Section 13 of the Local Tax Code of 1973. Commissioners issuance of BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 8-88 -- both upholding the authority of the local government to collect amusement taxes -should bind the government or that, if there is any revocation or modification of said rule, the same should operate prospectively. Income from the cession of streamer and advertising spaces to VEI should not be subject to amusement taxes In case they are made liable to pay the deficiency amusement tax, they should not be charged with the 75% surcharge ISSUE: 1. WON the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA games a local tax NO 2. WON BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR RMC No. 8-88 binds the government NO 3. WON income from the cession of streamer and advertising spaces to VEI is subject to amusement taxes YES 4. WON the petitioner should be charged with amusement tax YES HELD: 1. NO - Sec 13 of the Local Tax Code indicates that the province can only impose a taxon admission from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement. The authority to tax professional basketball games is not therein included, as the same is expressly embraced in PD 1959, which amended PD 1456, wherein it is clear that the "proprietor, lessee or operator of . . . professional basketball games" is required to pay an amusement tax equivalent to fifteen per centum (15%) of their gross receipts to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which payment is a national tax. While Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions "other places of amusement", professional basketball games are definitely not within its scope. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, in determining the meaning of the phrase "other places of amusement", one must refer to the prior enumeration of theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses with artistic expression as their common characteristic. Professional basketball games do not fall under the same category as theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the latter basically belong to artistic forms of entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming. Also, a historical analysis of pertinent laws does reveal the legislative intent to place professional basketball

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3.

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games within the ambit of a national tax. Previous laws (PD 871 by PD 1456 and PD 1959) shows are cognition that the amusement tax on professional basketball games is a national, and not a local, tax. NO - Commissioners issuance of BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR Memorandum Circular No. 8-88, both upholding the authority of the local government to collect amusement taxes cannot bind the government. The government cannot be never be in estoppels, particularly in matters involving tax. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not preclude subsequent correct application of the statute, and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents. YES - PD 1456 provides that for the purpose of the amusement tax, the term gross receipts embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. That definition of gross receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of advertising and streamer spaces as the same embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. YES - The issue on the payment of surcharge was never posed as an issue before the respondent court so it must necessarily fail.

mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Santua anchored his argument on Section 3 (f) of RA 26. However, applying the principle of ejusdem generis, Section 3 (f) of RA 26 should be pertinent to the items preceding it. Meaning, these should be documents issued by or are on file with the Register of Deeds. Moreover, they are documents from which the particulars of the certificate of title or the circumstances which brought about its issuance could readily be ascertained. At most, the tax declaration can only be prima facie evidence of possession or a claim of ownership. As for the survey plan and technical descriptions, these are not the documents referred to in Section 3(f) but merely additional documents that should accompany the petition for reconstitution. Moreover, a survey plan or technical description prepared at the instance of a party cannot be considered in his favor, the same being self-serving. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS The express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Variation: Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. Canon of restrictive interpretation. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos: A group of old men charged with violating the solicitation permit law was acquitted because the term religious purpose was not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, and what the law does not include, it excludes. The law referred only to charitable purposes, which phrase cannot be construed so as to include a religious purpose. xxx Facts: Sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. An information was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos. Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for contributions intended for religious purposes with the submission, inter alia, that the term religious purpose is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes.

Republic vs Santua FACTS: Santua was claiming that he is the owner of a parcel of land in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. He could not produce the original copy of the certificate as it was lost during an earthquake in 1994. The records of the Registry of Deeds were destroyed due to a fire in 1977. There are no encumbrances on the land. Santua then filed for reconstitution. He presented a tax declaration, a survey plan and technical description of the land as evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not tax declarations, technical description and lot plans are sufficient bases for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of titles. HELD: No. Section 3 of RA No. 26 provides: SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order: (a) The owners duplicate of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate of the certificate of title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued; (e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property the description of which is given in said documents, is

Issue: Whether the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. Held: No. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words charitable and religious separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word charitable is only one of three descriptive words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that charitable institutions, churches and personages . . ., and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out charitable and religious in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated charitable or public welfare purposes, only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly. Malinias v Comelec: An attempt to use an administrative charge for a criminal complaint against police officers accused of violating the election code. The court ruled that not all violations of the election code provided for criminal penalties and in this case, the violated provisions only warrant the imposition of administrative, not criminal, penalties. xxx The Case Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC for brevity) en banc dated June 10, 1999 and October 26, 2000. The assailed Resolutions dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner Sario Malinias (Malinias for brevity) and Roy S. Pilando (Pilando for brevity) for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. The Facts Petitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor whereas Pilando was a candidate for congressional representative of Mountain Province in the May 11, 1998 elections. The Provincial Board of Canvassers held the canvassing of election returns at the second floor of the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, Mountain Province from May 11, 1998 to May 15, 1998. On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint with the COMELECs Law Department for violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881, against Victor Dominguez, Teofilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose Bagwan who was then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Victor Dominguez (Dominguez for brevity) was then the incumbent

Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Teofilo Corpuz (Corpuz for brevity) was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Anacleto Tangilag (Tangilag for brevity) was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province. Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc, and prevented them from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Building. Malinias and Pilando further alleged that policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their supporters, who nevertheless eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from entering the capitol grounds. In their complaint, Malinias and Pilando requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to investigate and prosecute private respondents for the following alleged unlawful acts. 3. That on May 15, 1998 at the site of the canvassing of election returns for congressional and provincial returns located at the second floor of the Provincial Capitol Building the public and particularly the designated representatives/watchers of both affiants were prevented from attending the canvassing. xxx 4. That the aforementioned Mass-affidavits support our allegations in this affidavit-complaint that we and our supporters were prevented from attending the provincial canvassing because of the illegal checkpoint/blockade setup by policemen in Nakagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mt. Province and as an evidence to these allegations, Certification of the Police Station is hereto attached as Annex D and affidavits of supporters hereto attached as Annex E, both made an integral part of this affidavitcomplaint; and that said mass-affidavits show that the Provincial canvassing were not made public or (sic) candidates and their representatives/watchers prevented because of barricade, closure of canvassing rooms, blockade by armed policemen that coerce or threaten the people, the candidates or their representatives from attending the canvassing In support of the complaint, several supporters of Malinias and Pilando executed so-called mass affidavits uniformly asserting that private respondents, among others, (1) prevented them from attending the provincial canvassing, (2) padlocked the canvassing area, and (3) threatened the people who wanted to enter the canvassing room. They likewise alleged that the Provincial Board of Canvassers never allowed the canvassing to be made public and consented to the exclusion of the public or representatives of other candidates except those of Dominguez. Consequently, the COMELECs Law Department conducted a preliminary investigation during which only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint Counter-Affidavit. In their Counter-Affidavit, Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of a checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province and securing the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building, to wit: 3. We admit having ordered the setting up of check points in Nakagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province; as in fact, this is not the only checkpoint set up in the province. There are other checkpoints established in other parts of the province, to enforce the COMELEC gun ban

and other pertinent rules issued by the Commission on Election during the election period. 4. Policemen were posted within the vicinity of the capitol grounds in response to earlier information that some groups were out to disrupt the canvass proceedings which were being conducted in the second floor of the Provincial Capitol Building. This is not remote considering that this had happened in the past elections. In fact, during the canvass proceeding on May 15, 1998 a large group of individuals identified with no less than affiantscomplainants Roy S. Pilando and Sario Malinias was conducting a rally just in front of the capitol, shouting invectives at certain candidates and their leaders. This group likewise were holding placards and posted some in front of the capitol building. After the investigation, in a study dated May 26, 1999, the COMELECs Law Department recommended to the COMELEC en banc the dismissal of the complaint for lack of probable cause. In a Resolution dated June 10, 1999, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint of Malinias and Pilando for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause against private respondents. On October 26, 2000, the COMELEC dismissed Malinias Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, Malinias filed the instant petition. The Comelecs Ruling In dismissing the complaint against private respondents, the COMELEC ruled as follows: As appearing in the Minutes of Provincial Canvass, complainant Roy Pilando was present during the May 15, 1998 Provincial Canvass. He even participated actively in a discussion with the members of the Board and the counsel of Congressman Dominguez. The minutes also disclosed that the lawyers of LAMMP, the watchers, supporters of other candidates and representatives of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines were present at one time or another during the canvass proceedings. The minutes does not indicate any charges of irregularities inside and within the vicinity of the canvassing room. Pursuant to Comelec Res. No. 2968 promulgated on January 7, 1998, checkpoints were established in the entire country to effectively implement the firearms ban during the election period from January 11, 1998 to June 10, 1998. In Mountain Province, there were fourteen (14) checkpoints established by the Philippine National Police way before the start of the campaign period for the May 11, 1998 elections including the subject checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Thus, the checkpoint at Sabangan, Mountain Province was not established as alleged only upon request of Congressman Dominguez on May 15, 1998 but way before the commencement of the campaign period. Granting arguendo that the Congressman did make a request for a checkpoint at Sitio Nacagang, it would be a mere surplusage as the same was already existing. Furthermore, an alleged text of a radio message requesting advice from the PNP Provincial Director at Bontoc, Mt. Province was attached to complainants affidavit-complaint.

However, said person by the name of Mr. Palicos was never presented to affirm the truth of the contents and the signature appearing therein. Finding that Malinias failed to adduce new evidence, the COMELEC dismissed Malinias Motion for Reconsideration. The Courts Ruling The sole issue for resolution is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Malinias and Pilandos complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for alleged violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. 881. We rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. For this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious and despotic manner. There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law. Such is not the situation in the instant case. The COMELEC dismissed properly the complaint of Malinias and Pilando for insufficient evidence, and committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. First, Malinias charged private respondents with alleged violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646, quoted, as follows: Sec. 25. Right to be Present and to Counsel During the Canvass. Any registered political party, coalition of parties, through their representatives, and any candidate has the right to be present and to counsel during the canvass of the election returns; Provided, That only one counsel may argue for each political party or candidate. They shall have the right to examine the returns being canvassed without touching them, make their observations thereon, and file their challenge in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Commission. No dilatory action shall be allowed by the board of canvassers. In the present case, Malinias miserably failed to substantiate his claim that private respondents denied him his right to be present during the canvassing. There was even no showing that Malinias was within the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building or that private respondents prevented him from entering the canvassing room. As found by the COMELEC and admitted by Malinias, Pilando was present and even participated actively in the canvassing. Malinias failed to show that his rights as a gubernatorial candidate were prejudiced by the alleged failure of his supporters to attend the canvassing. Malinias claimed that even though Pilando was present during the canvassing, the latter was only able to enter the room after eluding the policemen and passing through the rear entrance of the Provincial Capitol Building. This allegation, however, is not supported by any clear and convincing evidence. Pilando

himself, who was purportedly prevented by policemen from entering the canvassing room, failed to attest to the veracity of this statement rendering the same self-serving and baseless. In an analogous case where a political candidates watcher failed to attend the canvass proceedings, this Court held: Another matter which militates against the cause of petitioner is that he has not shown that he suffered prejudice because of the failure of his watcher to attend the canvassing. Had the watcher been present, what substantive issues would he have raised? Petitioner does not disclose. Could it be that even if the watcher was present, the result of the canvassing would have been the same? There is therefore no merit in petitioners claim that respondent Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in issuing its questioned decision. And, as emphatically stated in Sidro v. Comelec, 102 SCRA 853, this Court has invariably followed the principle that in the absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of the utmost gravity, the conclusion reached by the respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its competence is entitled to the utmost respect, xxx. There is justification in this case to reiterate this principle. Assuming that Pilando in fact entered the canvassing room only after successfully evading the policemen surrounding the Provincial Capitol grounds, Pilando could have easily complained of this alleged unlawful act during the canvass proceedings. He could have immediately reported the matter to the Provincial Board of Canvassers as a violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646. However, Pilando opted simply to raise questions on alleged irregularities in the municipal canvassing. While he had the opportunity to protest the alleged intimidation committed by policemen against his person, it is quite surprising that he never mentioned anything about it to the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Surprisingly, the COMELEC and private respondents apparently overlooked that R.A. No. 6646 does not punish a violation of Section 25 of the law as a criminal election offense. Section 25 merely highlights one of the recognized rights of a political party or candidate during elections, aimed at providing an effective safeguard against fraud or irregularities in the canvassing of election returns. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6646, which specifies the election offenses punishable under this law, does not include Section 25. Malinias further claims that, in violation of this right, his supporters were blocked by a checkpoint set-up at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province. This allegation is devoid of any basis to merit a reversal of the COMELECs ruling. Malinias supporters who were purportedly blocked by the checkpoint did not confirm or corroborate this allegation of Malinias. Moreover, the police established checkpoints in the entire country to implement the firearms ban during the election period. Clearly, this is in consonance with the constitutionally ordained power of the COMELEC to deputize government agencies and instrumentalities of the Government for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Second, Malinias maintains that Corpuz and Tangilag entered the canvassing room in blatant violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881. His sole basis for this allegation is the affidavit of his supporters who expressly stated that they saw Dominguez and Corpuz (only) enter the canvassing room. Malinias likewise contends that Corpuz and Tangilag impliedly admitted that they were inside or

at least within the fifty (50) meter radius of the canvassing room as they were able to mention the names of the persons who were inside the canvassing room in their Counter-Affidavit. The provision of law which Corpuz and Tangilag allegedly violated is quoted as follows: Sec. 232. Persons not allowed inside the canvassing room. It shall be unlawful for any officer or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including the Philippine Constabulary, or the Integrated National Police or any peace officer or any armed or unarmed persons belonging to an extra-legal police agency, special forces, reaction forces, strike forces, home defense forces, barangay selfdefense units, barangay tanod, or of any member of the security or police organizations or government ministries, commissions, councils, bureaus, offices, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries or of any member of a privately owned or operated security, investigative, protective or intelligence agency performing identical or similar functions to enter the room where the canvassing of the election returns are held by the board of canvassers and within a radius of fifty meters from such room: Provided, however, That the board of canvassers by a majority vote, if it deems necessary, may make a call in writing for the detail of policemen or any peace officers for their protection or for the protection of the election documents and paraphernalia in the possession of the board, or for the maintenance of peace and order, in which case said policemen or peace officers, who shall be in proper uniform, shall stay outside the room within a radius of thirty meters near enough to be easily called by the board of canvassers at any time. Again, the COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. While Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal election offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the penalty for an election offense under Sections 261 and 262 is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years. Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. xxx The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are

based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. They are predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Also, since private respondents are being charged with a criminal offense, a strict interpretation in favor of private respondents is required in determining whether the acts mentioned in Section 232 are criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Since Sections 261 and 262, which lists the election offenses punishable as crimes, do not include Section 232, a strict interpretation means that private respondents cannot be held criminally liable for violation of Section 232. This is not to say that a violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is without any sanction. Though not a criminal election offense, a violation of Section 232 certainly warrants, after proper hearing, the imposition of administrative penalties. Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC may recommend to the President the imposition of disciplinary action on any officer or employee the COMELEC has deputized for violation of its directive, order or decision. Also, under the Revised Administrative Code,the COMELEC may recommend to the proper authority the suspension or removal of any government official or employee found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with COMELEC orders or rulings. In addition, a careful examination of the evidence presented by Malinias shows that the same are insufficient to justify a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. Obviously, the evidence relied upon by Malinias to support his charges consisted mainly of affidavits prepared by his own supporters. The affidavits of Malinias own supporters, being selfserving, cannot be accepted at face value under the circumstances. As this Court has often stated, reliance should not be placed on mere affidavits. Besides, if Corpuz really entered the canvassing room, then why did Pilando and the representatives of other candidates, who were inside the room, fail to question this alleged wrongful act during the canvassing? Malinias contention that Corpuz and Tangilag impliedly admitted they were inside the canvassing room because they mentioned the names of the persons present during the canvassing deserves scant consideration as the same is not supported by any evidence. Finally, Malinias asserts that private respondents should be held liable for allegedly violating Section 261 (i) of B. P. Blg. 881 because the latter engaged in partisan political activity. This provision states: Sec. 261 (i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay selfdefense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer. Section 79, Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 defines the term partisan political activity as an act designed to promote the election

or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. Malinias asserts that, in setting up a checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province and in closing the canvassing room, Corpuz and Tangilag unduly interfered with his right to be present and to counsel during the canvassing. This interference allegedly favored the other candidate. While Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of the checkpoint, they did so to enforce the COMELECs firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968, among others. There was no clear indication that these police officers, in ordering the setting up of checkpoint, intended to favor the other candidates. Neither was there proof to show that Corpuz and Tangilag unreasonably exceeded their authority in implementing the COMELEC rules. Further, there is no basis to rule that private respondents arbitrarily deprived Malinias of his right to be present and to counsel during the canvassing. The act of Corpuz and Tangilag in setting up the checkpoint was plainly in accordance with their avowed duty to maintain effectively peace and order within the vicinity of the canvassing site. Thus, the act is untainted with any color of political activity. There was also no showing that the alleged closure of the provincial capitol grounds favored the election of the other candidates. In summary, we find that there is no proof that the COMELEC issued the assailed resolutions with grave abuse of discretion. We add that this Court has limited power to review findings of fact made by the COMELEC pursuant to its constitutional authority to investigate and prosecute actions for election offenses. Thus, where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law, this Court may not review the factual findings of the COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of public respondent COMELEC are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs. CIR FACTS: San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue millers tax and manufacturers sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable year 1987 particularly on SPMCs sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products. SPMC opposed the assessments. The Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC appealed the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by way of a petition for review. docketed as CTA Case No. 5423. It insists on the liberal application of the rules because, on the merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3% millers tax. It maintains that the crude oil which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to millers tax pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMCs milled products, subsequently exported said products, SPMC should be exempted from the millers tax. ISSUE: Whether or not SPMC is liable for the deficiency millers tax. HELD: Yes. The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to the

exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and desiccated coconuts, whether in their original state or or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the miller itself. The language of the exemption proviso did not warrant the interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it provide that the exportation made by the purchaser of the materials enumerated in the exempting clause or the manufacturer of products utilizing the said materials was covered by the exemption. Since SPMCs situation was not within the ambit of the exemption, it was subject to the 3% millers tax imposed under Sec168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Sec. 168. Percentage tax upon proprietors or operators of rope factories, sugar central mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut factories. Proprietors or operators of rope factories, sugar central and mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut factories, shall pay a tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of the gross value in money of all the rope, sugar, coconut oil, palm oil, cassava flour or starch, desiccated coconut, manufactured, processed or milled by them, including the by-product of the raw materials from which said articles are produced, processed or manufactured, such tax to be based on the actual selling price or market value of these articles at the time they leave the factory or mill warehouse: Provided, however, That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and the by-product of copra from which it is produced or manufactured and desiccated coconut, if such rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and desiccated coconuts, shall be removed for exportation by the proprietor or operator of the factory or the miller himself, and are actually exported without returning to the Philippines, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products: Provided further, That where the planter or the owner of the raw materials is the exporter of the aforementioned milled or manufactured products, he shall be entitled to a tax credit of the miller's taxes withheld by the proprietor or operator of the factory or mill, corresponding to the quantity exported, which may be used against any internal revenue tax directly due from him: and Provided, finally, That credit for any sales, miller's or excise taxes paid on raw materials or supplies used in the milling process shall not be allowed against the miller's tax due, except in the case of a proprietor or operator of a refined sugar factory as provided hereunder SPMCs proposed interpretation unduly enlarged the scope of the exemption clause. The rule is that the exemption must not be so enlarged by construction since the reasonable presumption is that the State has granted in express terms all it intended to grant and that, unless the privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute, the favor would be intended beyond what was meant. Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention

not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation. Its application in this case is consistent with the construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMCs claim for tax exemption will violate these established principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority. DISSIMILUM DISSIMILIS EST RATIO The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification. Garvida v. Sales: Sales sought to have Garvida disqualified from the SK post because of age. The court ruled that while the Local Govt Code provided that SK members should be 21 years old, it added a qualification that should officials should be 21 years old on the date of election. Garvida was disqualified because she was more than 21 years old, although she was less than 22 years old. xxx Facts: In 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her candidacy to the position of Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of a barangay in Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her candidacy was opposed by her rival Florencio Sales, Jr. on the ground that she is over 21 years old (21 years old, 9 months at the time of the filing). Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that she be admitted as a candidate and the SK elections went on. Sales, in the meantiume, filed a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Garvida. When the elections results came in, Garvida won with a vote of 78, while Sales got 76. Garvida was eventually proclaimed as winner but had to face the petition filed by Sales. Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section 424 of the Local Government Code (LGC) provides that candidates for the SK must be at least 15 years of age and a maximum age of 21 years. Garvida states that the LGC does not specify that the maximum age requirement is exactly 21 years hence said provision must be construed as 21 years and a fraction of a year but still less than 22 years so long as she does not exceed 22 she is still eligible because she is still, technically, 21 years of age (although she exceeds it by 9 months). ISSUE: Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement. HELD: No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that candidates for SK must be: 1. Filipino citizen; 2. an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; 3. 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and 4. duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. The provision is clear. Must not be more than 21 years of age. The said phrase is not equivalent to less than 22 years old. The law does not state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day. If such was the intention of Congress in framing the LGC, then they should have expressly provided such. Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence he should be declared as the SK Chairman, is this a valid contention? No. Applying the ruling in Labo vs COMELEC, a defeated candidate, though obtaining the second highest number of vote, is not deemed to have been elected by reason of the winners eventual

disqualification/ineligibility. He cannot be declared as successor simply because he did not get the majority or the plurality of votes the electorate did not choose him. It would have been different if Sales was able to prove that the voters still voted for Garvida despite knowing her ineligibility, this would have rendered her votes stray. Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by the SK member who obtained the highest number of votes, should the SK member obtaining such vote succeed Garvida?** (**Not to be confused with Sales situation Sales was a candidate for SK chairmanship not SK membership.) The above argument cant be considered in this case because Section 435 only applies when the SK Chairman refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3) consecutive months. Garvidas case is not what Section 435 contemplates. Her removal from office by reason of her age is a question of eligibility. Being eligible means being legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen. Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for succession of the SK Chairman. CASUS OMISSUS Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally. This needs two laws. In expressio unius, its just the enumeration you are looking at, not another law. COA of the Province of Cebu v Province of Cebu: This case is about the effects of a new law on an old law. The Special Education Fund (SEF) allowed the use of part of the realty and cigarette taxes for extension programs and scholarships. When the Cebu provincial office used it to pay for salaries of teachers and scholars, COA said those were not chargeable to the SEF since RA 5447, which created the SEF, was deemed repealed by the Local Govt Code. Because the two retained sections in the LGC omitted the scholarship grants, the court ruled that what was omitted must have been omitted intentionally, and so may not be included. xxx May the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers appointed by local chief executives in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes; as well as the expenses for college scholarship grants, be charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned? The instant petition for review, which raises a pure question of law, seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, in a petition for declaratory relief, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-24422. The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local school board, under Section 98 of the Local Government Code, appointed classroom teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes that would accommodate students in the public schools. In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, for the period January to June 1998, it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the province for the extension classes were charged against the provincial SEF. Likewise charged to the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province.

Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF. Faced with the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA, the province of Cebu, represented by its governor, filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court. On December 13, 1999, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring the questioned expenses as authorized expenditures of the SEF. The dispositive portion thereof reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered giving due course to this instant petition for declaratory relief declaring and confirming that petitioner is vested with the authority to disburse the proceeds from the Special Educational Fund [SEF] for the payment of salaries, allowances or honoraria for teachers and non-teaching personnel in the public schools in the Province of Cebu and its component cities, and, municipalities, as well as the expenses for scholarship grants of petitioners specially to poor but deserving students therein. Declaring, further, respondent's audit findings on pages 36 and 37 in the Annual Audit Report on the Province of Cebu for the year ending December 31, 1999 as null and void. Hence, the instant petition by the Commission on Audit. The Special Education Fund was created by virtue of R. A. No. 5447, which is An act creating a special education fund to be constituted from the proceeds of an additional real property tax and a certain portion of the taxes on Virginia-type cigarettes and duties on imported leaf tobacco, defining the activities to be financed, creating school boards for the purpose, and appropriating funds therefrom, which took effect on January 1, 1969. Pursuant thereto, P.D. No. 464, also known as the Real Property Tax Code of the Philippines, imposed an annual tax of 1% on real property which shall accrue to the SEF. Under R. A. No. 5447, the SEF may be expended exclusively for the following activities of the DECS (a) the organization and operation of such number of extension classes as may be needed to accommodate all children of school age desiring to enter Grade I, including the creation of positions of classroom teachers, head teachers and principals for such extension classes x x x; (b) the programming of the construction and repair of elementary school buildings, acquisition of sites, and the construction and repair of workshops and similar buildings and accessories thereof to house laboratory, technical and similar equipment and apparatus needed by public schools offering practical arts, home economics and vocational courses, giving priority to elementary schools on the basis of the actual needs and total requirements of the country x x x; (c) the payment and adjustment of salaries of public school teachers under and by virtue of Republic Act Numbered Five Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Eight and all the benefits in favor of public school teachers provided under Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Six Hundred Seventy; (d) preparation, printing and/or purchase of textbooks, teacher's guides, forms and pamphlets x x x; (e) the purchase and/or improvement, repair and refurbishing of machinery, laboratory, technical and similar equipment and apparatus, including spare parts needed by the Bureau of

Vocational Education and secondary schools offering vocational courses; (f) the establishment of printing plant to be used exclusively for the printing needs of the Department of Education and the improvement of regional printing plants in the vocational schools; (g) the purchase of teaching materials such as work books, atlases, flip charts, science and mathematics teaching aids, and simple laboratory devices for elementary and secondary classes; (h) the implementation of the existing program for citizenship development in barrio high schools, folk schools and adult education classes; (i) the undertaking of education research, including that of the Board of National Education; (j) the granting of government scholarships to poor but deserving students under Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Ninety; and (k) the promotion of physical education, such as athletic meets. With the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, petitioner contends that R.A. No. 5447 was repealed, leaving Sections 235, 272 and 100 (c) of the Code to govern the disposition of the SEF, to wit: SEC. 235. Additional Levy on Real Property for the Special Education Fund (SEF). A province or city or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, may levy and collect an annual tax of one percent (1%) on the assessed value of real property which shall be in addition to the basic real property tax. The proceeds thereof shall exclusively accrue to the Special Education Fund (SEF). SEC. 272. Application of Proceeds of the Additional One Percent SEF Tax. The proceeds from the additional one percent (1%) tax on real property accruing to the SEF shall be automatically released to the local school boards: Provided, That, in case of provinces, the proceeds shall be divided equally between the provincial and municipal school boards: Provided, however, That the proceeds shall be allocated for the operation and maintenance of public schools, construction and repair of school buildings, facilities and equipment, educational research, purchase of books and periodicals, and sports development as determined and approved by the local school board. (Emphasis supplied) SEC. 100. Meeting and Quorum; Budget xxx (c) The annual school board budget shall give priority to the following: (1) Construction, repair, and maintenance of school buildings and other facilities of public elementary and secondary schools; (2) Establishment and maintenance of extension classes where necessary; and (3) Sports activities at the division, district, municipal, and barangay levels. Invoking the legal maxim expressio unius es exclusio alterius, petitioner alleges that since salaries, personnel-related benefits and scholarship grants are not among those authorized as lawful expenditures of the SEF under the Local Government Code, they should be deemed excluded therefrom.

Moreover, petitioner claims that since what is allowed for local school boards to determine under Section 99[5] of the Local Government Code is only the annual supplementary budgetary needs for the operation and maintenance of public schools, as well as the supplementary local cost to meet such needs, the budget of the local school boards for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes should be construed to refer only to the upkeep and maintenance of public school buildings, facilities and similar expenses other than personnel-related benefits. This is because, petitioner argued, the maintenance and operation of public schools pertain principally to the DECS. The contentions are without merit. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.[6] In this connection, the following portions of the deliberations of the Senate on the second reading of the Local Government Code on July 30, 1990 are significant: Senator Guingona. Mr. President. The President. Senator Guingona is recognized. Senator Guingona. Just for clarification, Mr. President. In this transfer, will it include everything eventually -- lock, stock and barrel, including curriculum? Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, our stand in the Committee is to respect the decision of the National Government in terms of curriculum. Senator Guingona. But, supposing the Local Education Board wishes to adopt a certain curriculum for that particular region? Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, pursuant to the wording of the proposed transfer of this elementary school system to local government units, what are specifically covered here are merely the construction, repair, and maintenance of elementary school buildings and other structures connected with public elementary school education, payment of salaries, emoluments, allowances et cetera, procurement of books, other teaching materials and equipment needed for the proper implementation of the program. There is nothing here that will indicate that the local government will have any right to alter the curriculum. Senator Guingona. Thank you, Mr. President. Similarly instructive are the foregoing deliberations in the House of Representatives on August 16, 1990: INTERPELLATION OF MS. RAYMUNDO (Continuation) Continuing her interpellation, Ms. Raymundo then adverted to subsection 4 of Section 101 [now Section 100, paragraph (c)] and asked if the budget is limited only to the three priority areas mentioned. She also asked what is meant by the phrase maintenance of extension classes. In response, Mr. De Pedro clarified that the provision is not limited to the three activities, to which may be added other sets of priorities at the proper time. As to extension classes, he pointed out that the school boards may

provide out of its own funds, for additional teachers or other requirements if the national government cannot provide funding therefor. Upon Ms. Raymundos query, Mr. de Pedro further explained that support for teacher tools could fall under the priorities cited and is covered by certain circulars. Undoubtedly, the aforecited exchange of views clearly demonstrates that the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the compensation of teachers handling extension classes. Furthermore, the pertinent portion of the repealing clause of the Local Government Code, provides: SEC. 534. Repealing Clause. - x x x (c) The provisions of . . . Sections 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act No. 5447, regarding the Special Education Fund are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect. Evidently, what was expressly repealed by the Local Government Code was only Section 3, of R.A. No. 5447, which deals with the Allocation of taxes on Virginia type cigarettes and duties on imported leaf tobacco. The legislature is presumed to know the existing laws, such that whenever it intends to repeal a particular or specific provision of law, it does so expressly. The failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and the old laws. Hence, the provisions allocating funds for the salaries of teachers under Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447, which are not inconsistent with Sections 272 and 100 (c) of the Local Government Code, remain in force and effect. Even under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their services. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of extension classes. Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is lodged principally with the DECS. This is the reason why only salaries of public school teachers appointed in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes, inter alia, pertain to the supplementary budget of the local school boards. Thus, it should be made clear that not every kind of personnelrelated benefits of public school teachers may be charged to the SEF. The SEF may be expended only for the salaries and personnel-related benefits of teachers appointed by the local school boards in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes. Extension classes as referred to mean additional classes needed to accommodate all children of school age desiring to enter in public schools to acquire basic education. With respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a reading of the pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that said grants are not among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated. It should be noted that Sections 100 (c) and 272 of the Local Government Code substantially reproduced Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447. But, unlike payment of salaries of

teachers which falls within the ambit of establishment and maintenance of extension classes and operation and maintenance of public schools, the granting of government scholarship to poor but deserving students was omitted in Sections 100 (c) and 272 of the Local Government Code. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held to have been omitted intentionally. It is not for this Court to supply such grant of scholarship where the legislature has omitted it. In the same vein, however noble the intention of the province in extending said scholarship to deserving students, we cannot apply the doctrine of necessary implication inasmuch as the grant of scholarship is neither necessary nor indispensable to the operation and maintenance of public schools. Instead, such scholarship grants may be charged to the General Funds of the province. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for declaratory relief may be filed before there is a breach or violation. The Solicitor General claims that the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA to the respondent province amounted to a breach or violation, and therefore, the petition for declaratory relief should have been denied by the trial court. We are not convinced. As held in Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. v. Municipality of Sipocot, any breach of the statute subject of the controversy will not affect the case; the action for declaratory relief will prosper because the applicability of the statute in question to future transactions still remains to be resolved. Absent a definite ruling in the instant case for declaratory relief, doubts as to the disposition of the SEF will persist. Hence, the trial court did not err in giving due course to the petition for declaratory relief filed by the province of Cebu. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-24422, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the provincial school board of Cebu in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes, are declared chargeable against the Special Education Fund of the province. However, the expenses incurred by the provincial government for the college scholarship grants should not be charged against the Special Education Fund, but against the General Funds of the province of Cebu. Sps. Delfino vs St. James Hospital Before Us for Resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration of private respondent St. James Hospital, Inc., seeking the reversal of Our Decision dated 5 September 2006. Respondent assails the Decision on the ground that the Court had erroneously interpreted the 1991 Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP) or the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna, in ruling that the St. James Hospital is a non-conforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance and that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision is prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. Moreover, respondent now contends that the case must now be decided in accordance with the latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa Rosa Zoning Ordinance which was only submitted as evidence in the instant Motion for Reconsideration. Respondent now claims that the legislative history of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance shows that commercial and institutional uses were expressly allowed in Sec. 2, par. 1 of said Ordinance as it

retained uses that are commercial and institutional as well as recreational in character and those for the maintenance of ecological balance. Thus, respondent postulates that even if parks, playgrounds and recreation centers which were expressly provided for in the 1981 Zoning Ordinance under letters (h) and (k) were excluded in the enumeration in the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, the same cannot, by any stretch of logic, be interpreted to mean that they are no longer allowed. On the contrary, respondent explains that what appears is the fact that parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers are deemed to have been covered by Sec. 2, par. 1 of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance which speaks of x x x other spaces designed for recreational pursuit and maintenance of ecological balance x x x. Hence, respondent concludes that the same reading applies in the non-inclusion of the words hospitals, clinics, school, churches and other places of worship, and drugstores which cannot be interpreted to mean that the aforesaid uses are to be deemed non-conforming under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance as these uses are allegedly covered by the clause allowing for institutional and commercial uses. Arising from this interpretation, respondent maintains that the Court erred in applying Sec. 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance which pertains only to existing non-conforming uses and buildings, since, according to respondent, the St. James Hospital and its expansion are consistent with the uses allowed under the zoning ordinance. To address this matter, we deem it necessary to reiterate our discussion in our Decision dated 5 September 2006, wherein we have thoroughly examined the pertinent provisions of the 1981 and 1991 Zoning Ordinances, to wit: Likewise, it must be stressed at this juncture that a comprehensive scrutiny of both Ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed within a residential zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance such as schools, religious facilities and places of worship, and clinics and hospitals have now been transferred to the institutional zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. This clearly demonstrates the intention of the Sangguniang Bayan to delimit the allowable uses in the residential zone only to those expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, which no longer includes hospitals. It is lamentable that both the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals gave undue emphasis to the word institutional as mentioned in Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance and even went through great lengths to define said term in order to include hospitals under the ambit of said provision. However, they neglected the fact that under Section 4, Article VI of said Ordinance, there is now another zone, separate and distinct from a residential zone, which is classified as institutional, wherein health facilities, such as hospitals, are expressly enumerated among those structures allowed within said zone. Moreover, both the Office of the President and the appellate court failed to consider that any meaning or interpretation to be given to the term institutional as used in Section 2, Article VI must be correspondingly limited by the explicit enumeration of allowable uses contained in the same section. Whatever meaning the legislative body had intended in employing the word institutional must be discerned in light of the restrictive enumeration in the said article. Under the legal

maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius, the express mention of one thing in a law, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. Thus, in interpreting the whole of Section 2, Article VI, it must be understood that in expressly enumerating the allowable uses within a residential zone, those not included in the enumeration are deemed excluded. Hence, since hospitals, among other things, are not among those enumerated as allowable uses within the residential zone, the only inference to be deduced from said exclusion is that said hospitals have been deliberately eliminated from those structures permitted to be constructed within a residential area in Santa Rosa, Laguna. Furthermore, according to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of the phrase hospital with not more than ten capacity in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone classification, the only logical conclusion is that the legislative body had intended that said use be removed from those allowed within a residential zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such asSt. James Hospital, within a residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. xxxx Having concluded that the St. James Hospital is now considered a non-conforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, we now come to the issue of the legality of the proposed expansion of said hospital into a fourstorey, forty-bed medical institution. We shall decide this said issue in accordance with the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance relating to non-conforming buildings, the applicable law at the time of the proposal. As stated in Section 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance: Section 1. EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES AND BUILDINGS. The lawful uses of any building, structure or land at the point of adoption or amendment of this Ordinance may be continued, although such does not conform with the provisions of this Ordinance. 1. That no non-conforming use shall be enlarged or increased or extended to occupy a greater area or land that has already been occupied by such use at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance, or moved in whole or in part to any other portion of the lot parcel of land where such non-conforming use exist at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance. It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance that the expansion of a non-conforming building is prohibited. Hence, we accordingly resolve that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision as prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. From our discussion above, it is clear that the position of respondent is erroneous. As stated in our Decision, a comprehensive scrutiny of both zoning ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed within a residential zone under the 1981

Zoning Ordinance such as schools, religious facilities and places of worship, and clinics and hospitals have been transferred to the institutional zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. This clearly indicates that the allowable uses in the residential zone have been delimited only to those expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, which no longer includes hospitals. With respect to respondents claim that the controversy must now be decided in light of latest Zoning Ordinance passed in 1999 or the Santa Rosa Zoning Ordinance, it must be stressed at this point that the present case arose in 1994 when respondent St. James Hospital, Inc., applied for a permit with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to expand its hospital into a fourstorey, forty-bed capacity medical institution, at which time, the zoning ordinance in effect was the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. It is a well-settled rule that the law in force at the time of the occurrence of the cause of action is the applicable law notwithstanding its subsequent amendment or repeal. Hence, in resolving the instant case, the zoning ordinance to be used in interpreting the legality or illegality of said expansion is that which was in full force and effect at the time of the application for expansion which is the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, regardless of its subsequent amendment or repeal by the passage of the 1999 Zoning Ordinance. Moreover, pleadings, arguments and evidence were submitted by both parties as regards the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance only. Apparently, the 1999 Zoning Ordinance was already enacted and in effect by the time the petitioners appealed their case to this Court on 7 February 2005. Petitioners, however, in their appeal, consistently maintained their argument that the expansion undertaken by the respondent in 1994 violated the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, and respondent likewise limited itself to the defense that it had complied therewith. It bears to emphasize that respondent called the attention of this Court to the enactment of the 1999 Zoning Ordinance and asserted its compliance with this latest zoning ordinance only in its Motion for Reconsideration before this Court. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. This rule holds even more true when the points of law, theories, issues and arguments are belatedly raised for the first time in the motion for reconsideration of this Courts decision. Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent St. James Hospital, Inc., is hereby DENIED. However, this is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to respondent St. James Hospital, Inc.s reapplication for expansion in accordance with the requirements under zoning ordinances now in effect. UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMOS Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ramirez v CA: The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. xxx FACTS: Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.. Private respondent filed a

criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial courts order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner. ISSUE: WON the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. HELD: NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity. Cebu Institute of Medicine v Cebu Institute of Medicine Employees Union-National Federation of Labor: Other benefits may refer to SSS, Medicare, Pagibig and may be taken from the 70% tuition increase since the law only says that money from this may be given to employees in the form of salaries and other benefits. Since the law did not distinguish between other benefits and SSS, etc, these may be deducted from the 70% increase in tuition charged by the school. xxx May the mandatory share of an educational institution in the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums be charged against the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase authorized under Sec. 5, par. (2), of RA 6728? Cebu Institute of Medicine (CIM), petitioner, is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with Dr. Josefina L. Poblete as its incumbent dean at the time the instant petition was filed. Respondent Cebu Institute of Medicine Employees Union - National Federation of Labor (UNION) is the duly certified bargaining representative of the employees of CIM. On 2 September 1997 the UNION asked CIM to stop its practice of charging the employers mandatory share in the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums against the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase under Sec. 5, par. (2), of RA 6728. CIM refused. Eventually, the dispute was submitted to voluntary arbitration. On 6 January 1999 Voluntary Arbitrator Julius Z. Neri rendered a decision in favor of the UNION holding that charging the employers share in the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig contributions against the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase contravened Sec. 19, of RA 1161 thereof which provides Sec. 19. Employers Contributions. - (a) Beginning as of the last day of the month when an employees compulsory coverage takes effect and every month thereafter during his employment his employer shall pay, with respect to

such covered employee, the employers contribution in accordance with the schedule indicated in section eighteen of this Act. Notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, an employer shall not deduct, directly or indirectly, from the compensation of his employees covered by the SSS or otherwise recover from them the employers contributions with respect to such employees. In short, the Voluntary Arbitrator ordered CIM to refund the UNION of the employers share in the SSS and Pag -Ibig premiums and to refrain from charging the employers share against the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase. Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, CIM appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that the Voluntary Arbitrator gravely erred in disregarding the clear tenor of Sec. 5, par. (2), of RA 6728, and in disallowing petitioners from deducting the employers premiums for SSS and Pag-Ibig benefits from the seventy percent (70%) portion of the incremental tuition fee increase, and also in ordering a refund of the employers premiums taken from the seventy percent (70%) portion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrator that to pay the employers share out of funds allotted for the employees would make the employees contribute the entire amount of the said premiums, aside from the fact that it will reduce the portion of the tuition fee increases intended for their benefit. Petitioners disagree and this Court sustains them. Section 5, par. (2), of RA 6728 provides x x x Assistance under paragraph (1), subparagraphs (a) and (b), shall be granted and tuition fees under subparagraph (c) may be increased on the condition that seventy percent (70%) of the amount subsidized allotted for tuition fee or of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel x x x x Provided, That government subsidies are not used directly for salaries of teachers of non-secular subjects. At least twenty percent (20%) shall go to the improvement or modernization of buildings, equipment, libraries, laboratories, gymnasia and similar facilities and to the payment of other costs of operation. As may be culled from the foregoing, salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel are to be charged against the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase. SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig fall under the category of "other benefits," hence, may very well be charged against the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase which after all is for the benefit of petitioners' teaching and non-teaching personnel. The law speaks of payment of "salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits." There is no specific prohibition against charging the employer's share to the incremental tuition fee increase. Hence, it cannot properly be said that the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums could be charged against the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase but the employers share of the contribution should be deducted from the remaining thirty percent (30%) or elsewhere. This would seem absurd. As we can see it, the employers share in the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums is deemed integrated in the amount to be allocated for these benefits from the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase. Ubi

lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish.[6] For sure, the seventy percent (70%) is not to be delivered whole to the employees but packaged in the form of salaries, wages, allowances, and other benefits which may be in the form of SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums, all intended for the benefit of the employees. In other words, the private educational institution concerned has the discretion on the disposition of the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase. It enjoys the privilege of determining how much increase in salaries to grant and the kind and amount of allowances and other benefits to give. The only precondition is that seventy percent (70%) of the incremental tuition fee increase goes to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel. On the other hand, the remaining thirty percent (30%) is intended, quite obviously, for the use of the educational institution itself, otherwise, it will be a diminution of the aliquot share of the employer which is specifically intended under Sec. 5, par. (2), of RA 6728, "for the improvement or modernization of buildings, equipment, libraries, laboratories, gymnasia and similar facilities and to the payment of other costs of operation." Plainly, SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums cannot be lumped in this category. The seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase for salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits under RA 6728 may be compared to the sixty percent (60%) allocation contained in PD 451[7] and BP Blg. 232. Under PD 451, the disposition of the sixty percent (60%) incremental tuition fee increase was limited to salaries and wages. No provision was made for allowances and other benefits unlike in RA 6728. Thus the provision was increased from sixty percent (60%) under PD 451 to seventy percent (70%) under RA 6728 obviously because of the inclusion of allowances and other benefits provided in the latter law. Under BP Blg. 232, which repealed PD 451, private school institutions were granted the authority to determine tuition fee increases on the condition that the application and use thereof be subject to the rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS). In University of Pangasinan v. Confesor, decided under BP Blg. 232, this Court held x x x x salaries or wages, allowances and fringe benefits of Faculty and other staff, including accruals to cost of living allowance, 13th month pay, social security, medicare and retirement contribution and increases as may be provided in mandated wage orders, collective bargaining agreements or voluntary employer practices should be charged against the 60% tuition fee increase Corollarily, under PD 451, the forty percent (40%) balance of the incremental tuition fee increase was to be devoted for institutional development, student assistance and extension services, and return on investments, the latter not to exceed twelve percent (12%) of the incremental proceeds, while under RA 6728 the balance is to be disposed of in the following manner: at least twenty percent (20%) of the incremental tuition fee increase shall go to the improvement or modernization of buildings, equipment, libraries, laboratories, gymnasia and other similar facilities, and to the payment of other costs of operation. It may be noted in RA 6728 that there is no provision for return on investments similar to that in PD 451. Also, RA 6728 does not set a maximum limit as to the amount to be used in the improvement or modernization of buildings, equipment, libraries, laboratories, gymnasia and other similar facilities, and to the payment

of other costs of operation. What it provides instead is a minimum which is twenty percent (20%). Therefore, not only twenty percent (20%) of the incremental tuition fee increase but the entire thirty percent (30%) balance from the incremental tuition fee increase is allocated for the improvement or modernization of buildings, equipment, libraries, laboratories, gymnasia and other similar facilities and to the payment of other costs of operation thus leaving nothing for return on investments, which would not be attractive to educational institutions; more so, if they would still be required to charge their share in the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums from sources other than the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 August 1999 and its Resolution of 13 December 1999 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered allowing petitioner Cebu Institute of Medicine (CIM) to charge its share in the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums against the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase under Sec. 5, par. (2), RA 6728. No costs. MTRCB v. ABS-CBN Facts: Respondent abs-cbn aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of the TV program The Inside Story produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and the faade of the PWU building served as the background of the episode. This caused up soar in the PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint to the MTRCB. MTRCB alleged that respondents: 1) Did not submit the inside story to petitioner for review 2) Exhibited the same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986 and some sections of MTRCB rules and regulations ABS-CBN averred: 1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial, its airing is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press 2) Petitioners has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents. After hearing and submission of the parties memoranda, MTRCB investigating committee ordered the respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the program MTRCB affirmed the ruling. Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents, annulling and setting aside the decision and resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and decreeing that certain sections of PD 1986 & MTRCB do not cover the TV program Inside Story, they being a public affairs programs which can be equated to a newspaper. Hence, this petition Issue: Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the Inside Story prior its exhibition or broadcast by TV. Held: Sec 3 of PD 1986 enumerates the powers, functions and duties of the board: b) to screen, review and examine all motion pictures herein defined, TV programs, including publicity materials

The court in INC v. CA rules that PD 1986 gives MTRCB the power to screen, review and examine ALL TV PROGRAMS *LESSON* where the law does not make any exceptions, courts may not exempt something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it. Thus, when the law says all TV programs, the word all covers all tv programs whether religious, public affairs, news docu, etc. It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV Program, MTRCB has the power to review it. The only exemptions from the MTRCBs power to review are those mentioned in Sec 7 of PD 1986: 1) TV programs imprinted or exhibited by Phil govt and/or departments and agencies 2) Newsreels In a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents content that Inside Story falls under the category of newsreels. MTRCB rules and reg defines newsreels as straight news reporting, as distinguished from analyses, commentaries, and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered newsreels. Clearly, Inside Story is not a newsreel but more of a public affairs program and within petitioners power of review. GINA M. TIANGCO and SALVACION JENNY MANEGO vs UNIWIDE SALESWAREHOUSE CLUB, INC. and JIMMY GOW FACTS: Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club Inc. (UNIWIDE) was a domestic corporation under the presidency of Jimmy Gow. Gina Tiangco was employed as concession manager and was later designated as group merchandising manager for the fashion and personal care department (P45k salary). On the other hand, Salvacion Jenny Maego was initially employed as buyer and was later promoted as senior category head (P25k salary).Sometime in 2001, Tiangco and Maego filed separate complaints against UNIWIDE for illegal dismissal with money claims. Labor Arbiter then consolidated said cases and submitted the same for decision. UNIWIDE and Gow filed a motion for the suspension of the proceedings on said cases on the ground that UNIWIDE was placed under suspension of payments by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a receivership has in fact been appointed. In 2002, LA then suspended the proceedings. Two years thereafter, Tiangco and Maego move to reopen the case for SEC already approved the second amendment to UNIWIDEs rehabilitation plan. UNIWIDE and Gow opposed said reopening. LA issued an order directing the parties to file their respective memoranda. UNIWIDE and Gow filed a petition for certiorari on ground that LA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing said order. CA granted the petition ad denied the motion for reconsideration of Tiangco and Maego. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the consolidated illegal dismissal cases can be reopened at this point of the SEC proceedings for respondent USWCIs rehabilitation. HOLDING: NO. The relevant law dealing with the suspension of payments for money claims against corporations under rehabilitation is Presidential Decree No. (PD) 902-A, as amended. Section 6 (c) thereof states: Sec. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the [SEC] shall possess the following powers xxx

c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and personal, which is the subject of the action pending before the [SEC] in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order to preserve the rights of the parties-litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing public and creditors: xxx Provided, finally, that upon appointment of a management committee rehabilitation receiver board or body, pursuant to this Decree all actions for claims against corporations, partnership or associations, under management or receivership pending before any court xxx The term claim, as contemplated in Section 6 (c), refers to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature. It is the assertion of rights for the payment of money. Here, petitioners have pecuniary claims the payment of separation pay and moral and exemplary damages. In Rubberworld, we held that a labor claim is a claim within the contemplation of PD 902-A, as amended. This is consistent with the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation which came out in 2000. Section 1, Rule 2 of the Interim Rules definesclaims as follows: Sec. 1. Definition of Terms - For purposes of these Rules Claim shall include all claims or demands of whatever nature or character against a debtor or its property, whether for money or otherwise. Thus, labor claims are included among the actions suspended upon the placing under rehabilitation of employercorporations. REDEENDO SINGULAR SINGULIS Referring each to each; let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively. People vs Tamani: Promulgation should refer to judgment and notice should refer to order. The computation of the filing of the petition was wrong. (This was an obiter because the filing was late either way it is computed, and the court decided on the case anyway). xxx Facts: After the appellant had filed his brief, the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was 47 days late. Appellant's counsel de oficio did not oppose the motion. Action thereon was "deferred until this case is considered on the merits".(Resolution of March 7, 1967). The motion to dismiss is reiterated in appellee's brief. The lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was promulgated on February 14,1963. A copy thereof was served on his counsel on February 25, 1963. On March 1, 1963 he filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied. A copy of the order of denial was served by registered mail on July 13, 1963 on defendant's counsel through his wife. He had eleven days or up to July 24, 1963 within which to appeal (if the reglementary 15 day period for appeal should be computed from the date of notification and not from the date of promulgation of the decision). He filed his notice of appeal only on September10, 1963 or forty eight days from July 24th. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. - An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from. This period

for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney. Held: 1) The word "must" in section 6 is synonymous with "ought". It connotes compulsion or mandatoriness. The clear terms of section 6 leave no room for doubt that the appeal should be effected within fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment. The counsel for appellant Tamani must have so understood that import of section 6 (which is confirmed by the practice in trial courts) as evinced by the fact that his MFR was filed on March 1st, which was the 15th or the last day of the reglementary period. The assumption that the 15-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly served on appellant's counsel by registered mail, is not well-taken. 2) The word "promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as referring to "judgment" while the word "notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis: "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object", or "let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should betaken distributively". Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion for reconsideration was served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had only one (1) day within which to file his notice of appeal and not eleven days. That construction is an application by analogy or in a suppletory character of the rule governing appeals in civil cases which is embodied in section 3,Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was fifty-eight days late. Arigoristic application of section 6 justifies the dismissal of his appeal, as prayed for by the prosecution. However, considering that appellants right to seek a review of his case was lost by reason of his counsel's inadvertence and considering further that the briefs have been submitted, the Court has resolved to review the record to obviate any possible miscarriage of justice. Amadora v CA: Teachers should apply to pupils and students; and heads of establishment of arts and trades to apprentices. The teacher in charge must answer for a students tort, but in this case none of those charged were either the teacher in charge or the dean of boys. xxx FACTS: Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon resulting to the formers death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The victims parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebus decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on oath other hand claimed their

son was under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports). CONTENTIONS ON CUSTODY PETITIONERS: AMADORA UNDER SCHOOLS CUSTODY. He was in school to show his physics experiment as a graduation prerequisite. RESPONDENTS: AMADORA NOT UNDER SCHOOLS CUSTODY. Semester already ended. THE GUN ISSUE Days before the incident, the dean of the boys confiscated from Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the principal or taking any further action. PETITIONERS contend that this was the same pistol, as Gumban was one of Daffons companions when the latter fired the gun that killed Amadora, and that Amadora would not have been killed if the gun was not returned by the dean of the boys. RULING OF COURTS CFI held the remaining defendants liable. CA, however, reversed CFI and all defendants were absolved. CA found that NCC 2180 was not applicable since the school was not a school of arts and trades. It also held that the students were not in the schools custody at the time of the incident since the semester already ended. In addition, there was no clear identification of the gun, and that the defendant exercised the necessary diligence in preventing injury. ISSUES: 1. Does NCC 2180 also cover establishments that are NOT schools of arts and trades? YES 2. When is the offending student supposed to be in the schools custody? As long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. Alfredo still under custody 3. Who is liable for the injury? None of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito on Alfredo Held: 1. The school CANNOT be held directly liable under NCC 2180. Three cases were cited: Exconde, Mercado, and Palisoc. What you need to know in Exconde: Student boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting to the death of two of its passengers. This decision, penned by Justice Angelo exculpated the school on the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades. Justice Reyes said that the school authorities should be held liable. Liability was imposed on teachers in general, and heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The clause of establishments of arts and trades should apply only to heads. What you need to know in Mercado: A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during recess time in school. Exconde was reiterated in this case (the school was exculpated on the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades).

The custody requirement was not proved as it contemplates a situation where the student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those of the parent. What you need to know in Palisoc: A student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the school. The head of the school and the teacher-in-charge were held liable together with the wrongdoer, even though the latter was not boarding in the school. The ponencia, Justice Teehankee, said, There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live an board in the school, as erroneously held in Exconde and Mercado. The case at hand Amadora: The school has been directly impleaded unlike in Exconde and Mercado. The school is an academic institution of learning, unlike in Palisoc wherein the school was an arts and trade school. Does NCC 2180 also cover establishments that are NOT schools of arts and trades? YES GENERAL RULE. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of the student, following the first part of NCC 2180. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head that should be answerable as an exception to the general rule. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, teachers should apply to the words pupils and students and heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word apprentices. On the differences between academic and non-academic schools There is no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The teacher should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic. HOWEVER, why is it that for academic schools, the teacher is the one held liable, while for non-academic / arts and trade schools, the head is the one held liable? The answer can be traced to the fact that historically, the head exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of an academic school because of the apprenticeship system they employed. This distinction no longer holds at present but until NCC 2180 is changed, it should be interpreted according to its clear and original mandate. 2. At the time the incident occurred, Alfredo was still in the custody of the school authorities. When is the offending student supposed to be in the schools custody? As long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.

On the teacher-in-charge and custody The teacher-in-charge, who is the one designated by a superior to exercise supervision over pupils for a particular subject or section, is the one who must be held liable, in the same way that parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher is physically present to be in a position to prevent it. Custody refers to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him because of such influence. For the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him. The rector, high school principal and the dean of boys CANNOT be held liable because none of them was the teacher-incharge as defined, and they were only exercising general authority over the student body. Evidence did not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of Pablito was. The mere fact that Alfredo went to school to finish / submit his physics project DID NOT necessarily make the physics teacher the teacher-in-charge. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable, since there was evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and returned it to the latter without reporting to authorities. HOWEVER, it has not been showed that said gun was the same that Pablito used to shoot Alfredo; hence, said fact does not necessarily link the dean to the shooting. On the defense of exercising due diligence of a good father of a family The school, teacher-in-charge, or the head may exculpate themselves by proving that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family or bonus paterfamilias. The school can show this in selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to the rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them. Such defense is also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180. The teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the student's age. The Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. The parent can expect more obedience from the child because the latter's dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. However, assuming that the physics teacher was the teacher-in-charge, there is NO SHOWING that he was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Pablito or that he waived observance or condoned the non-observance of school rules and regulations. Respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.