The Concept of Imitation in Greek and Indian Aesthetics by Ananta Charana Sulka Review by: V. K.

Chari The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Spring, 1979), pp. 357-358 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/430791 . Accessed: 13/11/2013 18:38
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Reviews into, go hand in hand with the very diversity of his approaches and the ambition of his enterprise.

357

creating a likeness of the forms of feeling, for the two belong to different orders of existence. Hence he suggests that abhinaya-Bharata's term for theatrical representation, meaning litMORRIS GROSSMAN erally "leading towards"-should be taken to Fairfield University mean that gestures and movements are the indicative signs, rather than mimetic reproductions, of the emotions being portrayed. The Concept of SULKA, ANANTA CHARANA. Abhinavagupta argues further that, between Imitation in Greek and Indian Aesthetics. the characters and actions of a drama and their Calcutta: Rupa 8c Co., 1977, 299 pp., Rs. 60-. types in the real world there can be no similarThis book purports to be an essay in comity relation, as between a visual design and its parative aesthetics and is devoted largely to subject, because they are of the same kind expositions of Greek and Indian theories of imi- (sajdtiya). If, again, poetry were to be called tation, in two separate parts. The comparisons imitation because it might be said to "reprethemselves appear in a brief concluding section. sent" things in the medium of words, then imiThe author provides a faithful rendering of tation would have to be extended to every both Greek and Indian ideas. But the general mode of expressing our thoughts by words. The infelicity of his prose style is a constant em- Indian philosophers, and, implicitly, Abhinabarrassment. However, his main argument is vagupta too, reject the "Picture Theory" of intelligible enough, and I shall concentrate on language. Therefore Abhinavagupta prefers to it. understand Bharata's term anukarana, not as Sukla's thesis is that imitation has been a "imitating," but as "narrating," "relating," or seminal principle in the Indian as much as in "exhibiting" of emotive meanings-bhdvdnukirthe Greek aesthetic tradition and that, notwith- tanam, a term Bharata himself used synonystanding Abhinavagupta's criticism of the con- mously. Sukla discusses at least some of these cept, the ancient Indian theorists accepted the arguments, but he doesn't make out a case essentially mimetic nature of the arts; and, what against them. is more, that Abhinavagupta's own aesthetics is, Sukla's contention is that the Indian theorists despite apparent differences, substantially the like Sankuka understood imitation in a larger, same as Aristotle's concept of imitation. But the more Aristotelian, sense than that of formal trouble with this thesis is that, although Sukla likeness. He argues that since aesthetic objects distinguishes several senses of the term "imi- are constructed in obedience to the laws of natation," he makes no attempt to fix the focus ture they must be an imitation of nature. And on its core-meaning, viz., "likeness-making" this idea he equates with the Indian concept (sadrakaranam, in Sanskrit), with its implica- of propriety (p. 293). But he does not answer tion of a formal, not substantial, likeness, or Abhinavagupta's objection that if doing somesimilarity-in-difference. Failure to apply this thing "following the ways and actions of the definition rigorously results in some confusion. world" is imitation, then every act in life should Let me explain. Sukla criticizes Abhinavagupta be regarded as imitation. As he is himself aware for taking imitation in its literal sense as "a (p. 92), even for Aristotle, this condition alone partial or imperfect copy of the original, lack- will not define the imitative arts, for the proing its essential elements" (pp. 258, 275). But ductive arts too are created in this way. The how else is imitation to be understood? True, imitative artist must also be a maker of likeAbhinavagupta says that all that the picture nesses. The notion of imitating the universal of a cow might be expected to do is produce a is, again, equated with Abhinavagupta's docformal likeness of a'cow; it cannot pretend to trine of "generalization" (pp. 293, 297), but its be the real animal-a Platonic conclusion-but sense is not examined. Abhinavagupta precise this implies no condemnation of art. Abhinaexplains that general notions of love and sorrow vagupta is only defining the nature of visual cannot be imitated; they can only be instanrepresentation. And, arguing from this position, tiated in particular cases. Poetry is necessarily he concludes that emotions and mental objects all about "what Alcibiades did or had done to cannot be imitated because not even formal him." However, its meanings are generalized, likenesses can be made of them either in the to the nature of the emotive discourse verbal or in the non-verbal presentational me- owing itself. dium. By reproducing their external The question whether the invisible can be signs (physical manifestations) alone you are not imitated in a visible medium is brought up

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358 again and again in the book. But the author does not stop to consider the critical consequences of the view he expounds. For instance, he asserts rather glibly that the Indians "sought to render [he means imitate] the spirit itself directly" (p. 285), whereas the Greeks imitated the invisible through its visible aspects. Thus the Hindu icons and temple architecture are stated to be direct imitations of the invisible spirit, or, alternatively, "symbolic imitations" or "concretization[s] of an abstract principle" (p. 171). What Sukla is talking about here is a species of mystical symbolization, distinguished earlier from the Greek conception (pp. 50-51), in which the object of imitation is a mental form and the likeness between it and its representation a spiritual resemblance. Now the question is, when the model is the unknown or unknowable (to most of us, at any rate) spirit how can we judge whether the object ("firealtar") is a symbolic or other likeness of its referent (Agni-Prajapati)? It seems that the mimetic test cannot be applied in such cases. In fact, according to Coomaraswamy, in the Indian theory an aesthetic object is to be judged, not by its correspondence to an actual or ideal model, but by its successful realization of the canonical prescriptions in accordance with which it was constructed. A Hindu icon is a "geometrical representation" of a deity (Sukla on pp. 169, 205). But, then, can working out a formula for representing an abstract conception be called imitation in any normal sense? Nor can I agree with Sukla that the Indian theory of music is mimetic. There is no implication in the classical tradition that rhythm and melody are, as for Aristotle, express images of inner movements, or that the rdgas and svaras by themselves express or signify definite emotions as their subject matter, as Sukla maintains on p. 291. All that Bharata says is that they suggest certain emotive qualities when adapted for evocative purposes. Abhinavagupta definitely rejects the view that tunes, dance movements, and musical tempi are imitations of anything in real life (except in the sense of natural imitation of sounds and motions). Abhinavagupta's point that the arts are not all of the same nature, and therefore that the concept of imitation cannot apply to them equally, is noted by the author (p. 293), but its lesson is evidently lost upon him. I find it curious that he should state, in conclusion, that Abhinavagupta's refutation of the imitation theory stemmed from "an idealist's misunderstanding" (p. 277). On the whole, I find this a disappointing book, in spite of its erudition.

REVIEWS It leaves many questions unanswered. The comparisons tend to slur over important distinctions. However, the work is valuable for its expositions, especially of the Indian theories of art.
V. K. CHARI

Carleton University, Ottawa

ed. Aesthetics in Science.

WECHSLER, JUDITH,

MIT Press, 1978, 180 pp., $12.50. For almost a century the elusive relationship between aesthetics and science has been the subject of countless informal discussions and debates among scientists, artists, and philosophers. Yet the published literature dealing specifically with this topic has been rather scant. It is quite natural that an art historian associated with a predominantly scientific institution should become vitally interested in this subject. Judith Wechsler designed and taught for several years a course on Aesthetics in Science and Technology. The preparation of this course and her interaction with students and colleagues at MIT and elsewhere led her to edit this collection of seven essays written by a crystallographer-metallurgist (C. S. Smith), two physicists (P. Morrisson and A. I. Miller), a mathematician (S. A. Papert), a psychologist (H. E. Gruber), a social theorist and generalist (Sir. G. Vickers), and an art historian (J. Wechsler, introductory essay). Henri Poincare, an outstanding mathematician and mathematical physicist, was the first to formulate the problem with some clarity (ca. 1900) and to lay the ground for debate through his penetrating analyses. He and the quantum physicists (Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Dirac, Schroedinger), as well as Darwin, were keenly aware of the role of the aesthetic in scientific creativity. They often use terms like "intuition," "sensibility," "elegance," "beauty"; and while they are not direct contributors to this volume, their original remarks and their controversies pervade and give substance to this collection of essays. In the introductory chapter, Wechsler reviews briefly the contributions of these "founders," before defining the scope of the material covered by the six modern contributors. After recalling Kant's definition (aesthetics is the science which treats the conditions of sensuous perception), she notes that: "In Art, in life we acknowledge the place of Aesthetics and intuition but we don't really associate these more tacit dimensions with the logical processes of Sciences." To counter this attitude, Poincare

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