http://books.google.es/books?

id=VkpR25ji4-wC&pg=PA141&lpg=PA141&dq=Analytic+Lite rary+Theory&source=bl&ots=RTvYA3lSfj&sig=bxvhpmWeQo1-Px_M7ZUTjSE8d5s&hl=es&sa=X& ei=5-qHUoS8Iajb0QXd4YD4CA&ved=0CHgQ6AEwCA#v=onepage&q=Analytic%20Literary%20Theo ry&f=false

davidson, goodman austin-derrida, davidson, deman, rorty, wittgen, cavell, -Literary Theorists Encounter Analytic Philosophy (Poetics today 11.3 fall 1990) -Redrawing the Lines: Analytic Philosophy, Deconstruction, and Literary Theory -Terry Eagleton s The Event of Literature -21st Century Theories of Literature: Essence, Fiction, and Value grupo: Analytic Literary Theory The general objective of analytic literary theory is the combination of insights from traditional literary theory, analytic philosophy, psychology and linguisti cs in order to shed light on structural and functional features of literary text s. The research group is devoted to the analysis of higher-order properties of n arrative texts with a special focus on the phenomenon of narrative perspective/f ocalization. http://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/publications/353908.html Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic Tradition: An Anthology [Pape rback] Peter Lamarque (Editor), Stein Haugom Olsen (Editor) Donald Davidson, Pragmatism, and Literary Theory Bryan Vescio From: Philosophy and Literature Volume 22, Number 1, April 1998 pp. 200-211 | 10.1353/phl.1998.0027 In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Philosophy and Literature 22.1 (1998) 200-211 Notes and Fragments As perhaps the most influential living philosopher of language, Donald Davidson would appear to have much to contribute to the field of literary theory. But Dav idson himself has had surprisingly little to say about the implications of his t heory of "radical interpretation" for literary interpretation. Lately, literary theorists have begun to pay more attention to his work, as indicated by the appe arance of a collection of essays called Literary Theory After Davidson, and perh aps in response to this heightened interest, Davidson has written several essays in recent years that are more explicitly concerned with literary language and w ith art in general. Although views on how his work applies to literature vary wi dely, sometimes even within his own writings on the subject, he and most of his expositors tend to agree that his theory of communication places certain constra ints on the interpretation of literary texts. In this essay, I will argue that t he constraints Davidson proposes -- as well as talk of interpretive constraint i n general -- run counter to the main thrust of his philosophy of language, which I believe moves roughly in the direction of Richard Rorty's pragmatism. I

Although they differ on whether or not to embrace the consequences of Davidson's philosophy of language, all the contributors to Literary Theory After Davidson agree that theoretical descriptions have significant consequences for the practi ce of literary criticism. A recurring theme in the book is the problem of "relat ivism," which in literary theory becomes the problem of unlimited interpretation . For several contributors, the possibility of "unconstrained" interpretation is just as dangerous as other kinds of relativism, and just as Davidson's theory o f communication solves the problem of relativism, so it also guarantees that int erpretation is constrained. In the book's first essay, Reed Way Dasenbrock antic ipates many of the other contributors when he marshals Davidson's theory against the "conceptual relativism" of Stanley Fish and others: "By extending this Davi dsonian account to the issue of interpreting texts -- which is not something Dav idson has done -- we reveal the incoherence of the notion advanced by Herrnstein Smith and Fish that different readers read different texts" (LT, p. 24). Althou gh the rest of the essays present a variety of attitudes toward both Davidson an d the relativity of interpretation, each remains concerned, in one way or anothe r, with the same basic question: how does the extension of Davidson's account of ordinary communication to literary texts either constrain or fail to constrain interpretive activity? Davidson addresses this same question in his own writing on literature. In "Loca ting Literary Language," his contribution to Literary Theory After Davidson, he inveighs against the same kind of relativism that troubles Dasenbrock. Since com munication, on his theory, always involves the correct interpretation of a speak er's intentions, Davidson suggests that adapting this view to literary theory em phasizes the need to focus on the writer's intentions in the interpretation of a literary text: "Indeed, it is clear to me now that any gesture in the direction of such adaptation will also reveal the need for a sharper focus on the role of intention in writing, and hence on the relation between writer and reader" (LT, p. 295). It is this focus, Davidson thinks, that will allay fears of the relati vity of interpretation. This claim that literary interpretation is always a matt er of determining authorial intent is the most consistent note struck in all his writings on literature. In an essay called "James Joyce and Humpty Dumpty," Davidson discusses the "tens ion between the thought that what a speaker intends by what he says determines w hat he means and the thought that what a speaker means depends on the history of the uses to which the language has been put in the past," aligning himself squa rely with the former view. He goes on to show how an emphasis on the role of int ention in communication allows us to understand Joyce's innovative language. In "The Third Man," an essay that discusses both the literary and the visual arts, Davidson again stresses the importance of the writer's intentions in the product ion of textual meaning: "The text, unlike most objects, has... Preview of first page

Peter Lamarque and Derek Attridge