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TOPIC: EFFECT OF NON-FILING OF FEE SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD. (SIOL), E. B. PHILLIPS AND D. J. WARBY vs. HON.

MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, P !s"#"$% J&#%!, '$# MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG( G.R. NO. )**+)-+,, FEB. -+, -*,* NATURE OF THE CASE: The petition was prompted by the CAs allegedly incorrect assessment of the damages sought by respondent Tiong in his complaint, which was to be the basis of the docket fee to be paid. The SC is then asked to resolve again the issue of whether or not a court acquires urisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid. FACTS: Sun !nsurance filed a complaint for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the udicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent "anuel #y $o Tiong with the %TC of "akati. $rivate respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. &ater, Tiong also filed a case against Sun !nsurance for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, seeking the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, e'emplary and liquidated damages, attorneys fees, e'penses of litigation, and costs of suit with the %TC of (ue)on City. *owever, the amount of damages sought by Tiong was not specified, though it can be inferred from the body of the complaint that it+s around $,- million. Tiong only paid $./- as docket fee for his complaint which prompted Sun !nsurance to raise an ob ection, which was disregarded by the then presiding udge of the case 0udge 0ose Castro. #pon the order of the SC, the records of the complaint filed by Tiong along with .. other cases assigned to the branches of the %TC of (ue)on City were under investigation for under1assessment of docket fees. &ater, the SC returned the records to the %TC and were re1raffled to the other udges of the said court with the e'clusion of 0udge Castro. The SC also ordered the udges, through a %esolution, to reassess the docket fees of the re1raffled cases and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The clerks of court were also required to issue certificates of re1 assessment of docket fees. *owever, the clerk of court who was assigned to reassess the docket fee of the complaint filed by Tiong had a difficulty complying with the %esolution because the e'act amount sought to be recovered was not indicated in the complaint. Thus, the now presiding 0udge "a'imiano Asuncion required the parties to comment on the clerk of court+s report. Tiong filed a 2Compliance2 and a 2%e1Amended Complaint2 and indicated $/- million as actual compensatory damages in his prayer. 3ut, in the second amended complaint Tiong filed, he alleged $44, 5-/, 5.6.7- as actual and compensatory damages and attorney+s fees. 0udge Asuncion admitted the second amended complaint and the clerk of court reassessed the docket fee to be $68, 795, which was subsequently paid by Tiong. Sun !nsurance questioned the order of 0udge Asuncion admitting the second amended complaint with the CA. *owever, while the case filed by Sun !nsurance was still pending in the CA, Tiong filed another supplemental complaint claiming an additional $.- million as damages, making his total claim for damages to be $54, 5-/, 5.6.7-. Seven months after filing said supplemental complaint, Tiong paid the additional docket fee of $9-, 685. Subsequently, the CA ruled on the petition filed by Sun !nsurance. The CA ordered the %TC to reassess the docket fee to be paid by Tiong on the basis of the amount of $.,, 4-/, 7-7. The case was then elevated to the SC. 3ut during the pendency of this petition in the SC and after the promulgation of the decision in "anchester, Tiong complied with the CA+s decision and paid an additional docket fee of $5., /6..8. based on the amount stipulated by the CA. Thus, Tiong paid a total of $/9., 9.4. 8- as docket fee. Sun !nsurance :$et;< The docket fee paid by Tiong is not sufficient. Tiong should pay a total of $.,7, 9/-.48 because the total damages Tiong actually sought was $54, 5-/, 5.-.7-. $ursuant to the ruling in "anchester, Tiong+s complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled for Tiong+s failure to pay the proper docket fee. Tiong :%es;< The ruling in "anchester cannot be applied retroactively. At the time the complaint was instituted, the "anchester ruling was not yet made. The correct urisprudence to apply in the case, then, is the "agaspi v. %amolete doctrine wherein the SC held that the trial court acquired urisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient. ISSUES: /; =>? the "anchester ruling can be applied retroactively. :"A!? !SS#@; .; =>? Tiong could be considered to have filed the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient and that the trial court could be considered to have acquired urisdiction over the case. HELD: /; Aes, The contention that "anchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. $rocedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that e'tent. .; Aes, although there was an obvious intent on the part of T!ong to defraud the government of the docket fee due through his amendments in his complaints, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in the "anchester case, Tiong demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. Thus, even if the "anchester ruling was applied, the SC, through this case provided the following guidelines regarding docket fees< /. !t is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with urisdiction over the sub ect matter or nature of the action. =here the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. .. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

6. =here the trial court acquires urisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the udgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the udgment. !t shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authori)ed deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. This petition was then dismissed. The Clerk of Court was also instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee to be paid by Tiong considering the total amount of the claim sought in his original complaint and supplemental complaintB and to require Tiong to pay the deficiency.

Tacay vs RTC of Tagum GR Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989 Facts: These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (acciones publiciana against ! defendants" namely: #ntonia $oel" Ponciano Panes" and %a&imo Tacay' Pineda was the owner of ()* s+m land evidenced by TCT $o' T,-./.*' The previous owner of such land has allowed the ! defendants to use or occupy the same by mere tolerance' Pineda" having himself the need to used the property" has demanded the defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefore" but such were refused' The complaint was challenged in the %otions to 0ismiss filed by each defendant alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual" nominal" and e&emplary damages" nor the assessed value of the property" that being bars the determination of the RTC1s 2urisdiction in deciding the case' The %otions to 0ismiss were denied but the claims for damages in the complaint were e&punged for failure to specify the amounts' Thus" the defendants filed a 3oint Petition for certiorari" mandamus" prohibition" and temporary restraining order against the RTC' 4ssue: 5hether or not the amount of damages claimed and the assessed value of the property are relevant in the determination of the court1s 2urisdiction in a case for recovery of possession of property6 0ecision: 0eterminative of the court1s 2urisdiction in a recovery of possession of property is the nature of the action (one of accion publicaina and not the value of the property" it may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual" nominal or e&emplary damages and such action would fall within the e&clusive original 2urisdiction of the RTC' The court ac+uired 2urisdiction upon the filing of the complaint and payment of the prescribed doc7et fees'
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PI.AS /ENTURES, INC., AND FILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., 0!1"1"2$! s, vs. THE HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH -34 '$# THE SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA. MARLENE SABIO, respondents. /88- 0anuary 6-/st CivisionD.%. ?o. 994./ NATURE OF THE CASE: >nce more the issue relating to the payment of filing fees in an action for specific performance with damages is presented by this petition for prohibition. FACTS: RTC(M'5'1"): MADAYAG: filed against petitioners an action for specific performance with damages AYALA< filed a motion to dismissB lower court has not acquired urisdiction over the case as "adayag failed to pay the prescribed docket fee and to specify the amount of e'emplary damages both in the body and prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint 66 RTC: denied the motion MADAYAG: motion for reconsideration 66 RTC: denied. *ence, this petition The main thrust of the petition is that "adayag paid only the total amount of $/,5/5.-- as docket fees instead of the amount of $/6,-5/.6, based on the assessed value of the real properties involved as evidenced by its ta' declaration. CONTENTIONS OF AYALA: /.; "adayag failed to specify the amount of e'emplary damages sought both in the body and the prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint. ..; because of the failure of the "adayag to state the amount of e'emplary damages being sought, the complaint must nevertheless be dismissed

66RTC: denied. The determination of the e'emplary damages is within the sound discretion of the court and that it would be unwarrantedly presumptuous on the part of the private respondents to fi' the amount of e'emplary damages being prayed for ISSUE: =hether or not the %TC acquired urisdiction for not specifying the amount of docket fees RULING: RTC #"# $21 '78&" ! 9& "s#"71"2$. The trial court may either order said claim to be e'punged from the record as it did not acquire urisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount of the e'emplary damages sought and require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive period. The trial court is directed either to e'punge from the record the claim for e'emplary damages in the amended and supplemental complaint, the amount of which is not specified, or it may otherwise, upon motion, give reasonable time to private respondents to amend their pleading by specifying its amount and paying the corresponding docketing fees within the appropriate reglementary or prescriptive period. ?o costs. LUIS JOSEPH, 0!1"1"2$! , vs. HON. CRISPIN /. BAUTISTA !1 ':. , respondents. N'1& !: Appeal by certiorari for the annulment and setting aside of the order, dismissing petitioner+s complaint, as well as the order, denying his motion for reconsideration of said dismissal, both issued by respondent 0udge Crispin E. 3autista of the CF! of 3ulacan. &uis 0oseph is the plaintiff in a Civil Case filed before the CF! of 3ulacan, , and presided over by respondent 0udge Crispin E. 3autistaB while private respondents $atrocinio $ere), Antonio Sioson, 0acinto $agarigan and &a)aro Eillanueva are four of the defendants. Cefendant Comingo Eilla de 0esus did not answer either the original or the amended complaint, while defendant %osario Eargas could not be served with summonsB and respondent Alberto Cardeno is included herein as he was impleaded by defendant $atrocinio $ere), one of respondents herein, in her cross1claim. T;! F'71s: %espondent $atrocinio $ere) :girl; is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying cargoes and passengers. 0oseph, :passenger; with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck from Cagupan to Ealen)uela, 3ulacan. =hile said cargo truck was proceeding towards "anila, defendant Comingo Eilla :driver /; tried to overtake a tricycle. At the same time, a pick1up truck, supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and 0acinto $agarigan, then driven by respondent &a)aro Eillanueva :driver .;, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. 0oseph sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. CFI 1 Complaint for damages J2s!0;: *e filed a complaint for damages against respondent $atrocinio $ere), as owner of the cargo truck, based on a :/; breach of contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and &a)aro Eillanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick1up truck, based on :.; quasi1 delict. S"2s2$< *e is not and never was an owner of the pick1up truck and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future. J2s!0;: :=ith prior leave of court; filed his amended complaint impleading respondents 0acinto $a)arigan and a certain %osario Eargas as additional alternative defendants. $etitioner apparently could not ascertain who the real owner of said cargo truck was, whether respondents $atrocinio $ere) or %osario Eargas, and who was the real owner of said pick1up truck, whether respondents Antonio Sioson or 0acinto $agarigan. P! !<< She filed her amended answer with 7 2ss7:'"= against her co1defendants for indemnity and subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay petitioner+s claim, and therein impleaded cross1defendant Alberto Cardeno as additional alternative defendant. %espondents &a)aro Eillanueva :driver of pick1up track;, Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and 0acinto $agarigan, thru their insurer, !nsurance Corporation of the $hilippines, paid 0oseph+s claim for in uries sustained. 0oseph e'ecuted a !:!'s! 2> 7:'"= releasing from liability the respondents who paid. &a)aro Eillanueva, Alberto Cardeno and their insurer, the !nsurance Corporation of the $hilippines, paid respondent $ere)+ claim for damages to her cargo truck. S"2s2$, P'%' "%'$, C' #!$2 '$# /"::'$&!v': They filed a 2"otion to @'onerate and @'clude Cefs.G them in the case2, because Cardeno and Eillanueva already paid $7,4.-.5/ to respondent $ere), and alleging further that Cardeno, Eillanueva, Sioson and $agarigan paid $/,6--.-- to petitioner 0oseph by way of amicable settlement. P! !<: She filed her 2>pposition to Crossdefs.+ and Counter "otion2 to dismiss. The release of claim e'ecuted by 0oseph in favor of the other respondents inured to the benefit of respondent $ere), considering that all the respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner. CFI (J&#%! B'&1"s1'): *e issued the questioned order dismissing the case, and a motion for the reconsideration thereof was denied.

T;! Iss&!s: :/; =hether or not there are more than one causes of action involved. :.;=hether or not the release of claim inured to the benefit of $ere). SC H Appeal by certiorari J2s!0;: 0udge 3autista erred in declaring that the release of claim e'ecuted by petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson, Eillanueva and $agarigan inured to the benefit of respondent $ere). :Dusto pa kasi ni 0oseph na may ma1claim siya kay $ere).; SC: :!ssue /; 0oseph sustained a single in ury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law. The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner+s complaint, hence the udgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of action based on 8&'s"-#!:"71 is not a bar to the cause of action for ? !'7; 2> 72$1 '71 2> 7' "'%!, is untenable. A 7'&s! 2> '71"2$ is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. !t is true that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes uridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. H2@!v! , @;! ! 1;! ! "s 2$:A 2$! #!:"71 2 @ 2$%, 1;! ! "s ?&1 ' s"$%:! 7'&s! 2> '71"2$ !%' #:!ss 2> 1;! $&=?! 2> "%;1s 1;'1 ='A ;'v! ?!!$ v"2:'1!# ?!:2$%"$% 12 2$! 0! s2$. T;! s"$%:!$!ss 2> ' 7'&s! 2> '71"2$ :"!s "$ 1;! s"$%:!$!ss 2> 1;! #!:"71 2 @ 2$% v"2:'1"$% 1;! "%;1s 2> 2$! 0! s2$. N!v! 1;!:!ss, "> 2$:A 2$! "$9& A !s&:1!# > 2= s!v! ': @ 2$%>&: '71s 2$:A 2$! 7'&s! 2> '71"2$ ' "s!s. The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. *owever, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against un ust enrichment. There is no question that the respondents herein are solidarily liable to petitioner. >n the evidence presented in the court below, the trial court found them to be so liable. :!ssue .; $ere) is no longer liable. The respondents having been found to be solidarily liable, the full payment made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the e'tinguishment and release from liability of the other solidary debtors, including $atrocinio $ere). The claim that there was an agreement between the parties during the pre1trial conference that, after such payment made by the other respondents, the case shall proceed as against $ere) is both incredible and unsubstantiated. The challenged orders of the respondent udge are hereby affirmed. BACHBACH MOTOR CO., INC., plaintiff1appellant, vs. @ST@3A? ICARA.GAL and >%!@?TA& C>""@%C!A& C>., !?C., defendants1 appellees. N'1& !< Appeal to SC from CF! "anila decision T;! F'71s: Es1!?'$ I7' 'B%': (@"1; 0acinto Figueroa;< For value received, e'ecuted in favor of the plaintiff, 3achrach "otor Co., !nc., a promissory note for $/,5/4.--, and in security for its payment, e'ecuted a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land in $aIgil, &aguna. CFI M'$":': 3AC*3AC* ">T>% C>., !?C. instituted an action for the collection of the amount due on the note. 0udgment was rendered for 3AC*3AC* ">T>% C>., !?C :3"C!;. A writ of e'ecution was subsequently issued and, in pursuance thereof, the provincial sheriff of &aguna, at the indication of the 3"C!, levied on the properties of !caraIgal et al., including that which has been mortgaged by !caraIgal in favor of the motor company. O "!$1': C2==! 7"': C2., I$7. (1;! 21;! #!>!$#'$1) < !nterposed a third1party claim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of e'ecution of the municipal court of the City of "anila, the property which was the sub ect of the mortgage and which has been levied upon by the sheriff, had already been acquired by it at the public auction on "ay /., /866. S;! ">>: Cesisted from the sale of the property by reason of the third1party claim, and, in consequence thereof, the udgment rendered in favor of 3"C! remained unsatisfied. BACHBACH MOTOR CO., INC .< !nstituted an action to foreclose the mortgage. CFI #!7"s"2$< Cismissed the complaint. From that udgment dismissing the action to foreclose the mortgage, I7' 'B%': took the present appeal. T;! Iss&!s: =>? BMCI is barred from foreclosing the real estate mortgage after it has elected to sue and obtain a personal udgment against ICARA.GAL on the promissory note for the payment of which the mortgage was constituted as a security. T;! R&:"$%:

!n *i os de !. de la %ama vs. Saio :4, $hil., 7-6;, the mortgage creditor, instead of instituting proceedings for the foreclosure of his mortgage, filed a personal action for the recovery of the debt. The mortgage debtor ob ected to the action, alleging that, if it be allowed, he would be sub ected to two suits, one personal and another for the foreclosure of the mortgage. =e answered this ob ection, laying down the rule that 2in the absence of statutory provisions, the mortgagee may waive the right to foreclose his mortgage and maintain a personal action for the recovery of the indebtedness.2 And we emphasi)ed the doctrine in the later part of our decision by saying that 2 1;! &:! "s @!:: !s1'?:"s;!# 1;'1 1;! 7 !#"12 ='A @'"v! @;'1!v! s!7& "1A ;! ;'s '$# ='"$1'"$ ' 0! s2$': '71"2$, "$ 1;! '?s!$7! 2> s1'1&12 A 0 2v"s"2$s 12 1;! 72$1 ' A .2 !t is true that in "atien)o vs. San 0ose :D% ?o. 68,/-, 0une /5, /864;, a decision of three ustices of this court ruled that 2apart from special proceedings regulated by statute, an unsatisfied personal udgment for a debt is no bar to an action to enforce a mortgage or other lien given as security for such debt.2 3ut this decision cannot be made to prevail over a decision given by this court in banc. 3esides, the rule laid down in the Ce la %ama case is more in harmony with the principles underlying our procedural system. "ost of the provisions of our Code of Civil $rocedure are taken from that of California, and in that urisdiction the rule has always been, and still is, that a party who sues and obtains a personal udgment against a defendant upon a note, waives thereby his right to foreclose the mortgage securing it. :Ould vs. StoddardB Felton vs. WestB Craiglow vs. WilliamsB 188 Pac., 76, following doctrine in Biddel vs. Bri olara, 6! B "# Pac., 6#$B Brown vs. WillisB 7 Pac., 68%B Bar&ieri vs. 'amelliB %" Pac., 1#86B (o&) vs. OregonB "" Pac., **#B +c,ean vs. -erman./merican Sav. Ban0B Woodward vs. BrownB 6" /m. St. 'e1., 1#8B *1 Pac., %, *!%B +e)er vs. We&erB 6* Pac., 111#B Crisman vs. 2antermanB 117 /m. St. 'e1., 167B 87 Pac., 8$B -narin vs. Swiss /merican Ban0B 1%1 Pac., 7%6.; The same rule obtains in the States of !daho, "ontana, ?evada and #tah. :See . 0ohns on "ortgages, 895, /-/a, /-/8, /-45.; !t is true that this rule is founded on e'press statutory provisions to that effect. =e have here, however, section 7-9 of our Code of Civil $rocedure which provides that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, has to elect between enforcing such security or abandoning it by presenting his claim before the committee and share in the general assets of the estate. #nder this provision, it has been uniformly held by this court that, if the plaintiff elects one of the two remedies thus provided, he waives the other, and if he fails, he fails utterly. : 3eloso vs. 4eredia, "" P5il., "#66 Cf. Osorio vs. San /gustin, %* P5il., !#!.7 The same rule applies under the !nsolvency &aw. :Sec. ,8, Act ?o. /8,5B 8nson and 2acson vs. Central Ca1i , !7 P5il., !% B C5artered Ban0 of 9ndia, /ustralia and C5ina vs. 9m1erial, 49 $hil., 86/B O:Brien vs. ;el 'osario and Ban0 of t5e P5ili11ine 9slands , 48 $hil., 5,7.; There is indeed no valid reason for not following the same principle of procedure in ordinary civil actions. =ith the substitution of the administrator or e'ecutor in place of the deceased, or of the assignee or receiver in place of the insolvent debtor, the position of the parties plaintiff and defendant in the litigation is e'actly the same in special or insolvency proceedings as in ordinary civil actions. 3ut, even if we have no such section 7-9 of our Code of Civil $rocedure, or section ,8 of the !nsolvency &aw, we have still the rule against splitting a single cause of action. This rule, though not contained in any statutory provision, has been applied by this court in all appropriate cases. Thus, in Santos vs. +oir :65 $hil., 6,-, 6,8;, we said< CI1 "s @!:: !72%$"<!# 1;'1 ' 0' 1A 7'$$21 s0:"1 ' s"$%:! 7'&s! 2> '71"2$ "$12 0' 1s '$# s&! 2$ !'7; 0' 1 s!0' '1!:A. A 72=0:'"$1 >2 1;! !72v! A 2> 0! s2$': 0 20! 1A @"1; #'='%!s >2 #!1!$1"2$ s1'1!s ' s"$%:! 7'&s! 2> '71"2$ @;"7; 7'$$21 ?! #"v"#!# "$12 '$ '71"2$ >2 02ss!ss"2$ '$# 2$! >2 #'='%!s( '$# "> s&"1 "s ? 2&%;1 >2 02ss!ss"2$ 2$:A ' s&?s!8&!$1 '71"2$ 7'$$21 ?! ='"$1'"$!# 12 !72v! 1;! #'='%!s !s&:1"$% > 2= 1;! &$:'@>&: #!1!$1"2$.C !n 'u&io de 2arena vs. 3illanueva :,6 $hil., 8.6, 8.7;, we reiterated the rule by stating that2 . . . a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it the basis for several suits2 and that when a lease provides for the payment of the rent in separate installments, each installment constitutes an independent cause of action, but when, at the time the complaint is filed, there are several installments due, all of them constitute a single cause of action and should be included in a single complaint, and if some of them are not so included, they are barred. The same doctrine is stated in &avarro vs. &abitoria :,4 $hil., 799;, wherein we said that 2a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits2 and that a claim for partition of real property as well as for improvements constitutes a single cause of action, and a complaint for partition alone bars a subsequent complaint for the improvements. And in Blossom < Co. vs. +anila -as Cor1oration :,, $hil., ..5, .4-;, we held that 2as a general rule a contract to do several things at several times is divisible in its nature, so as to authori)e successive actionsB and a udgment recovered for a single breach of a continuing contract or covenant is no bar to a suit for a subsequent breach thereof. 3ut where the covenant or contract is entire, and the breach total, there can be only one action, and plaintiff must therein recover all his damages.2 The rule against splitting a single cause of action is intended 2 12 0 !v!$1 !0!'1!# :"1"%'1"2$ ?!1@!!$ 1;! s'=! 0' 1"!s "$ !%' # 12 1;! s'=! s&?9!71 2> 72$1 2v! sA( 12 0 21!71 #!>!$#'$1 > 2= &$$!7!ss' A v!D'1"2$( '$# 12 'v2"# 1;! 72s1s '$# !D0!$s!s "$7"#!$1 12 $&=! 2&s s&"1s.C !t comes from that old ma'im nemo bedet bis ve'are pro una et eadem, cause : $2 ='$ s;':: ?! 1@"7! v!D!# >2 2$! '$# 1;! s'=! 7'&s!;. :@' parte &ange, /9 =all., /56, /59B ./ &aw. ed., 97.B also #. S. vs. Throckmorton, 89 #. S., 5/B ., &aw. ed., 86.; And it developed, certainly not as an original legal right of the defendant, but as are interposition of courts upon principles of public policy to prevent inconvenience and hardship incident to repeated and unnecessary litigations. For non1payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit which e'ecution of the security. !n other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. 3ut both demands arise from the same cause, the non1payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to order and the same obligation. Consequently, there e'ists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. $laintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. !f he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. 3y allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authori)ing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much ve'ation and oppression to the debtor. =e hold, therefore, that, in the absence of e'press statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor !"1;! ' 0! s2$': '71"2$ >2 #!?1 2 ' !': '71"2$ 12 >2 !7:2s! 1;! =2 1%'%! . I$ 21;! @2 #s ;! ='A 0& s&! !"1;! 2> 1;! 1@2 !=!#"!s, ?&1 $21 ?21;. 3y such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and e'ecution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied udgment thereon would still

give him the right to sue for a deficiency udgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. !n either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attend1 ant to the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. >n the other hand, a rule that would authori)e the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to ustice : Soriano vs. =nri>ues, .4 $hil., ,94; and obno'ious to law and equity :Osorio vs. San /gustin, ., $hil., 4-4;, but also in sub ecting the defendant to the ve'ation of being sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies. !n arriving at the foregoing conclusion, we are not unaware of the rule prevailing in certain States American #nion, to the enact that, in cases like the one at bar, the creditor can pursue his remedies against the note and against the security concurrently or successively. The reason given for the rule seems to be that the causes of auctioning the two instances are not the same, one being personal and the other, real. 3ut, as we have heretofore stated, the creditor+s cause of action is not only single but indivisible, although the agreements of the parties, evidenced by the note and the deed of mortgage, may give rise to different remedies. :Frost vs. =itter, Cal., 4./.; The cause of action should not be confused with the remedy created for its enforcement. And considering, as we have shown, that one of the two remedies available to the creditor is as complete as the other, he cannot be allowed to pursue both in violation of those principles of procedure intended to secure simple, speedy and ine'pensive administration of ustice. J&#%=!$1 (#"s="ss"$% 1;! '71"2$ 12 >2 !7:2s! 1;! =2 1%'%!) "s '>>" =!# '%'"$s1 BMCI. TOPIC: PROMISSORY NOTES SECURED BY ONE MORTGAGE BPI FAMILY SA/INGS BANE, INC., $etitioner, vs. MARGARITA /DA. DE COSCOLLUELA, %espondent. NATURE: Assailed before this Court is a $etition for %eview under %ule 4, of the %ules of Court of the Cecision of the Court of Appeals :CA; in CA1D.%. S$ ?o. 5876. granting respondents petition for certiorari, and its resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. FACTS: Coscolleula spouses:"argarita and >scar; obtained an agricultural sugar crop loan from the Far @ast 3ank J Trust Co. :F@3TC; 3acolod City 3ranch :later merged with petitioner 3ank of the $hilippine !slands; for crop years /887 and /889. *owever, in the book of F@3TC, the loan account of the spouses was treated as a single account, which amounted to $/6,,8.,48..-- as evidenced by 57 $romissory ?otes e'ecuted on various dates. The promissory notes listed under ?os. / to 66 bear the maturity date of February 8, /889, with a 6-1day e'tension of up to "arch //, /889, while those listed under ?os. 64 to 57 bear Cecember .9, /889 as maturity date. Spouses e'ecuted a real estate mortgage in favor of F@3TC over their parcel of land located in 3acolod City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title :TCT; as security of loans on credit accommodation obtained by the spouses from F@3TC and those that may be obtained by the mortgagees which was fi'ed at $7,---,---.--, as well as those that may be e'tended by the mortgagor to the mortgagees. #nder the terms and conditions of the real estate mortgage, in the event of failure to pay the mortgage obligation or any portion thereof when due, the entire principal, interest, penalties and other charges then outstanding, shall become immediately dueB upon such breach or violation of the terms and conditions thereof, F@3TC may, at its absolute discretion foreclose the same e'tra udicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Act ?o. 6/6,, as amended, and for the purpose appointed F@3TC as its attorney1in1fact with full power and authority to enter the premises where the mortgaged property is located and to take actual possession and control thereof without need of any order of any court, nor written permission from the spouses, and with special power to sell the mortgaged property at a public or private sale at the option of the mortgageeB and that the spouses e'pressly waived the term of 6- days or any other terms granted by law as the period which must elapse before the mortgage agreement may be foreclosed and, in any case, such period has already lapsed. The mortgage was registered with the %egistry of Ceeds of 3acolod and was annotated in the title of the land on 0une .-, /887. "eantime, >scar died intestate and was survived by his widow, "argarita. For failure to settle the outstanding obligation on the maturity dates, F@3TC sent a final demand letter to respondent on "arch /-, /888 demanding payment, within five days from notice, of the principal of the loan amounting to $/6,49/,489.59, with past due interests and penalties or in the total amount of $/8,49.,/59.6/ as of "arch 8, /888. %espondent failed to settle her obligation. >n 0une /-, /888, F@3TC filed a petition for the e'tra udicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property, significantly only for the total amount of $4,597,--5.59 e'clusive of balance, interest and penalty, covered by promissory notes from / to 66, e'cept nos. . and /-. =hile the e'tra udicial foreclosure proceeding was pending, petitioner F@3TC filed a complaint with the %egional Trial Court :%TC; of "akati City, 3ranch 54, against respondent for the collection of the principal amount of $9,784,48..-- plus interest and penalty, or the total amount of $/.,57.,---.6/, representing the amounts indicated in the rest of the promissory notes, specifically $romissory ?ote ?os. 64 to 57. !n her answer, respondent alleged, by way of special and affirmative defense, that the complaint was barred by litis pendentia, specifically, the pending petition for the e'tra udicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage< thus, ; That 3$! is guilty of forum shoppingB 3$! has not only charged but over charged the defendant1spouses with e'cessive and e'orbitant interest over and above those authori)ed by lawB That the act of 3$! in seeking to collect twice on the same promissory notes is not only unfair and un ust but also condemnable as plaintiff seek to un ustly enrich itself at the e'pense of the coscolluelaB That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same causeB That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs complaint has either been waived, abandoned or otherwise e'tinguished. 3$! presented @mmanuel Danuelas, its loan officer in its 3acolod City 3ranch, as sole witness. *e testified that the spouses Coscolluela were granted an agricultural sugar loan which is designed to finance the cultivation and plantation of sugar farms of the borrowers. 3orrowers were allowed to make successive drawdowns or availments against the loan as their need arose. @ach drawdown is covered by a promissory note with uniform maturity dates. The witness also testified that the loan account of the spouses was a 2single loan account.2 Coscolluela filed a demurrer to evidence contending, among others, that, with Danuelas admission, there is only one loan account secured by the real estate mortgage, that the promissory notes were e'ecuted as evidence of the loans. $laintiff was thus barred from instituting a personal action for collection of the drawdowns evidenced by $romissory ?ote ?os. ., /-, and 64 to 57 after instituting a petition for e'tra udicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage for the amount covered by $romissory ?ote ?os. /, 6 to 8, and // to 66. %espondent insisted that by filing a

complaint for a sum of money, petitioner thereby split its cause of action against herB hence, the complaint must perforce be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. $etitioner opposed the demurrer arguing that while the loans were considered as a single account, each promissory note e'ecuted by respondent constituted a separate contract. !t reiterated that its petition for the e'tra udicial and foreclosure of the real estate mortgage before the @'1>ficio $rovincial Sheriff involves obligations different and separate from those in its action for a sum of money before the court. Thus, petitioner could avail of the personal action for the collection of the amount evidenced by the 65 promissory notes not sub ect of its petition for the e'tra udicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. $etitioner insists that the promissory notes sub ect of its collection suit should be treated separately from the other set of obligations, that is, the 6/ promissory notes sub ect of its e'tra udicial foreclosure petition. O$ J'$&' A -F, GFFG, T "': C2& 1 denied the demurrer on the ground that the promissory notes e'ecuted by respondent and her deceased husband contained different amounts, and each note covered a loan distinct from the others. 3$! had the option to file a petition for the e'tra udicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage covering 6/ of the promissory notes, and, as to the rest, to file an ordinary action for collection. 3$!, thus, merely opted to institute an action for collection of the debt on the 65 promissory notes, and waived its action for the foreclosure of the security given on these notes. Coscolluela filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied, prompting her to file a certiorari petition under %ule 5, with the CA, orders of the trial court alleging that 3$! D%AE@&A A3#S@C *@% C!SC%@T!>? TA?TA">#?T T> &ACK A?CG>% @LC@SS >F 0#%!SC!CT!>? !? *>&C!?D T*AT T*@ %@S$>?C@?T 3A?K CA? F!&@ S!"#&TA?@>#S ACT!>?S F>% F>%@C&>S#%@ A?C F>% C>&&@CT!>?. The CA cited the ruling of this Court in 3achrach "otor Co., !nc. v. @steban !caraIgal and >riental Commercial Co., !nc. Aggrieved, 3$! filed a motion for reconsideration on >ctober /., .--4. Coscolluela filed her opposition to the motion on >ctober .5, .--4. The CA thereafter denied the motion in a resolution promulgated on April 5, .--,. 3$! filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that the court of appeals erred in granting the petition for certiorari of Coscolluela on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The Trial Court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or e'cess of urisdiction in denying the Cemurrer to @vidence filed by the respondents. P!1"1"2$! , "$ "$s1"1&1"$% ' 0!1"1"2$ >2 1;! ED1 ' J&#"7"': F2 !7:2s& ! 2> 1;! M2 1%'%! 2> !s02$#!$1s ?'s!# 2$ +0 2="ss2 A $21!s !D!7&1!# ?A !s02$#!$1s '$# '$21;! '71"2$ 12 72::!71 2$ ' s!0' '1! s!1 2> +H 0 2="ss2 A $21!s, #"# $21 s0:"1 1;!" 7'&s! 2> '71"2$. I$ 1;"s @"s!, 1;! P!1"1"2$ >2 C! 1"2 ' " >":!# ?A !s02$#!$1s s;2&:# $21 ;'v! ?!!$ % '$1!#. Curing the pendency of this appeal, petitioner filed with this Court on Cecember ., .--, a manifestation and oint motion for substitution, informing the court that petitioner bank has assigned to the $hilippine Asset !nvestment, !nc. all its rights, title and interest over its non1performing loan accounts pursuant to %epublic Act ?o. 8/9. entitled 2The Special $urpose Eehicle Act of .--..2 ISSUES< :/; whether the petition for certiorari under %ule 5, of the %ules of Court filed by respondent in the CA was the proper remedy to assail the 0anuary /-, .--. >rder of the trial courtB :.; whether the appellate court issued its 0anuary /-, .--. >rder with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to e'cess or lack of urisdiction. BPIIS CONTENTION: !t insists that, although respondent and her husband had a oint account with it, they had separate loan obligations as evidenced by the promissory notesB hence, it had separate causes of action for each and every drawdown evidenced by a promissory note. COSCOLLUELAIS CONTENTION: admits having e'ecuted the promissory notes. *owever, as testified to by Danuelas, the witness for petitioner, she and her husband only have one loan account with petitioner, hence, the latter had only one cause of action against her either for the collection of the entire loan account or for the e'tra udicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, also for the entire amount of the loan. $etitioner cannot split her single loan account by filing a simple collection suit and a petition for e'tra udicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage without violating the rule against splitting a single cause of action. %#&!?D< /.; we '% !! @"1; 0!1"1"2$! Is 72$1!$1"2$ 1;'1 1;! %!$! ': &:! "s 1;'1 '$ 2 #! #!$A"$% ' =21"2$ 12 #"s="ss 2 #!=& ! 12 !v"#!$7! "s "$1! :27&12 A '$# "s $21 '00!':'?:!. Consequently, defendant must go to trial and adduce its evidence, and appeal, in due course, from an adverse decision of the trial court. *owever, the rule admits of e'ceptions. =here the denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss or demurrer to evidence is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to e'cess or lack of urisdiction, the aggrieved party may assail the order of dismissal on a petition for certiorari under %ule 5, of the %ules of Court. As the Court held in $referred *ome Specialties, !nc. v. Court of Appeals< !t bears stressing that a writ of certiorari is of the highest utility and importance for curbing e'cessive urisdiction and correcting errors and most essential to the safety of the people and the public welfare. !ts scope has been broadened and e'tended, and is now one of the recogni)ed modes for the correction of errors by this Court. The cases in which it will lie cannot be defined. To do so would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and limit its usefulness. The appropriate function of a certiorari writ is to relieve aggrieved parties from the in ustice arising from errors of law committed in proceedings affecting usticiable rights when no other means for an adequate and speedy relief is open. !t is founded upon a sense of ustice, to release against wrongs otherwise irreconcilable, wrongs which go unredressed because of want of adequate remedy which would be a grave reproach to any system of urisprudence. The aggrieved party is entitled to a writ of certiorari where the trial court commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to e'cess or lack of urisdiction in denying a motion to dismiss a complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. An appeal while available eventually is cumbersome and inadequate for it requires the parties to undergo a useless and time1consuming and e'pensive trial. The second case constitutes a rude if not debilitating imposition on the trial and the docket of the udiciary. ..; I$ 1;! 0 !s!$1 7's!, @! '% !! @"1; 1;! &:"$% 2> 1;! CA 1;'1 1;! RTC '71!# @"1; % 'v! '?&s! 2> #"s7 !1"2$ '=2&$1"$% 12 !D7!ss 2 :'75 2> 9& "s#"71"2$ when it denied the Cemurrer to @vidence of respondent and, in the process, ignored applicable rulings of this Court. Although respondent had the right to appeal the decision of the trial court against her after trial, however, she, as defendant, need not use up funds and undergo the tribulations of a trial and thereafter appeal from an adverse decision.

The rule against splitting causes of action is not altogether one of original legal right but is one of interposition based upon principles of public policy and of equity to prevent the inconvenience and hardship incident to repeated and unnecessary litigation. !t is not always easy to determine whether in a particular case under consideration, the cause of action is single and entire or separate. The question must often be determined, not by the general rules but by reference to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The true rule which determines whether a party has only a single and entire cause of action for all that is due him, and which must be sued for in one action, or has a severable demand for which he may maintain separate suits, is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same act or contract or the several parts arise from distinct and different acts or contracts. W;! ! 1;! ! ' ! !$1" !:A #"s1"$71 '$# s!0' '1! 72$1 '71s, 1;!A %"v! "s! 12 s!0' '1! 7'&s!s 2> '71"2$ >2 @;"7; s!0' '1! '71"2$s ='A ?! "$s1"1&1!# '$# 0 !s!$1!#. O$ 1;! 21;! ;'$#, @;! ! s!v! ': 7:'"=s 0'A'?:! '1 #">>! !$1 1"=!s ' "s! 2&1 2> 1;! s'=! 1 '$s'71"2$s, s!0' '1! '71"2$s ='A ?! ? 2&%;1 's !'7; :"'?":"1A '772&$1s. B&1 @;! ! $2 '71"2$ "s ? 2&%;1 &$1": =2 ! 1;'$ 2$! "s #&!, ':: 1;'1 ' ! #&! =&s1 ?! "$7:&#!# "$ 2$! '71"2$( '$# 1;'1 "> '$ '71"2$ "s ? 2&%;1 12 !72v! &02$ 2$! 2 =2 ! 1;'1 ' ! #&! ?&1 $21 &02$ ':: 1;'1 ' ! #&!, ' !72v! A "$ s&7; '71"2$ @":: ?! ' ?' 12 ' s!v! ': 2 21;! '71"2$s ? 2&%;1 12 !72v! 2$! 2 =2 ! 7:'"=s 2> 1;! 21;! 7:'"=s 1;'1 @! ! #&! '1 1;! 1"=! 1;! >" s1 '71"2$ @'s ? 2&%;1. The action of the creditor is anchored on one and the same cause< the nonpayment by the debtor of the debt to the creditor1mortgagee. Though the debt may be covered by a promissory note or several promissory notes and is covered by a real estate mortgage, the latter is subsidiary to the former and both refer to one and the same obligation. A mortgage creditor may institute two alternative remedies against the mortgage debtor, either a personal action for the collection of debt, or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both. REMEDIOS JUIOGUE, ET AL., plaintiffs1appellees, vs. JACINTO BAUTISTA, ET AL., defendants1appellants. N'1& !: Appeal against the decision of %TC T;! F'71s: $rior to the filing of this appeal, plaintiffs had instituted before the Court of First !nstance of "anila an action to foreclose a first mortgage on the same properties and that on the date said action was filed the two loans covered by the second and third mortgages which are herein foreclosed had already matured (C"v": C's! N2. --*H*). !t likewise appears that udgment was duly entered in the first case and when a writ of e'ecution was issued to enforce it, it was fully satisfied by defendants on August /9, /8,. by paying to the sheriff the sum of $8,---.--. J&"2%&!: She filed an action to foreclose two deeds of mortgage e'ecuted to secure the payment of two loans, one for $.,---.-- and another for $5,---.-- covering two parcels of land in "anila. The first deed was e'ecuted on "ay 8, /844 and the second on >ctober //, /844 and it was stipulated therein as a common provision that the two loans cannot be repaid within one year from the date of the termination of the last world war. B'&1"s1' (#!>!$#'$1s): The present action is already barred by Civil Case ?o. //858 filed in the same court between the same parties, and that if there is any amount recoverable from them the same shall be computed in accordance with the 3allantyne schedule. They also set up a counterclaim for moral damages. CFI 2> M'$":': in favor of plaintiffs !t ordered the 3autista et al. to pay the sum of $/.,9.8.9/, with interest at the rates of 5M and 6M per annum on the amounts of $9,---.-- and $4,9.8.9/, respectively, from 0uly ./, /8,7, plus costs, and in default of payment, it was ordered that the properties mortgaged be sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof applied to the payment of the udgment. SC :>n Appeal; J&"2%&!: This case is barred by the decision rendered in Civil Case ?o. //858. T;! R&:"$%: The contention that his action is already barred by the filing of Civil Case ?o. //858 for the simple reason that the two loans herein involved could have been included in said action because at the time it was filed they had already matured, is likewise &$1!$'?:!, considering that the first case refers to a transaction different from those covered in the present case. S!71"2$ +, R&:! G, 2> 2& R&:!s 2> C2& 1 , invoked by appellants, which provides that a single cause of action cannot be split up into two or more parts so as to be made the sub ect of different complaints, does not apply, for here there is $21 ' s"$%:! 7'&s! 2> '71"2$ 1;'1 @'s s0:"1 &0, ?&1 s!v! ': 7'&s!s 1;'1 !>! 12 #">>! !$1 1 '$s'71"2$s. And it was held that a contract embraces only one cause of action because it may be violated only once even if it contains several stipulations. Thus, $2$-0'A=!$1 2> ' :2'$ s!7& !# ?A =2 1%'%! 72$s1"1&1!s ' s"$%:! 7'&s! 2> '71"2$. The creditor cannot split up this single cause of action into two separate complaints, one for payment of the debt and another for the foreclosure of the mortgage. !f he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the second complaint. !n other words, the complaint filed for the payment of certain debt shall be considered as a waiver of the right to foreclose the mortgage e'ecuted thereon. The lower court, therefore, did not err in denying the motion to dismiss on this ground. =*@%@F>%@, the decision appealed from is affirmed. TOPIC: LOANKS SECURED BY A MORTGAGE IN RELATION TO SINGLENESS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION RODRIGO ENRIJUEL, ET AL. /S. SOCORRO RAMOS, ET. AL.( GR -H)*), GKG)KH+ NATURE OF THE CASE: This is a direct appeal made by Socorro upon the decision of the CF! against her averment that the @nrique) and the spouses Ci)on are guilty of splitting a single cause of action. FACTS: %odrigo @nrique) and the spouses #rbano Ci)on and Aurea Ci)on sold to Socorro %amos // parcels of land located in (ue)on City which are covered by their corresponding certificates of title. The lands were sold to %amos for the price of $/-/, --- through a notarial deed. %amos paid

$,,--- down, $.,,-- cash, and $.,,-- by check drawn against the $?3. %amos agreed to pay the remaining $85,--- balance within 8- days. For security, %amos mortgaged the eleven parcels of land in favor of the vendors in the same deed of sale. Additionally, %amos, as attorney1in1fact of her children and as udicial guardian of her minor child, e'ecuted another morgage on a lot situated in "alinta. %amos failed to comply with some conditions of the mortgage so @nrique) and the spouses Ci)on filed an action for foreclosure of the mortgage. !n response, %amos moved to dismiss the case on the ground that @nrique) and the spouses Ci)on had previously filed an action against her in the CF! of "anila for the recovery of $.,,-- paid by check as part of the down payment accrued and demandable. @nrique) and the spouses Ci)on, then, are guilty of splitting a single cause of action under sec. 4 of %ule . of the %ules of Court. The filing of the first action for $.,,-- was a defense that could be pleaded in abatement of the second suit. @nrique) and the spouses Ci)on opposed %amos+ motion to dismiss, which was granted by the CF! of (ue)on City. 3ut, %amos repleaded her aforementioned averments as a special defense in her answer. CF!< !ts decision was against %amos and she was ordered to pay $85,--- with /.M interest from Feb. .4, /8,8 ntil payment, /-M of the amount due as attorney+s fees, and the costs of the suitB and further decreed the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case of non1payment within ninety :8-; days. %A">S< She insists that the action should be dismissed on account of the alleged splitting of appellee+s cause of action, and that the obligation not having fi'ed a period, although one was intended, the court below should have set first a date of maturity before ordering payment or foreclosure. @?%!(#@N, @T.A&. < They did not split a single cause of action. They are correct in filing two cases against %amos. The first case they filed was for collection of the unsecured portion of the consideration of the sale or collection of the check drawn by %amos, while the second was to foreclose the mortgage used as security on the balance. ISSUE: =>? the case filed by @nrique), et. al. should be dismissed on the ground of splitting their cause of action. HELD: ?o, the Court finds no merit on this appeal. An e'amination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the Court of First !nstance of "anila shows that it was based on appellants+ having unlawfully stopped payment of the check for $.,,--.-- she had issued in favor of appelleesB while the complaint in the present action was for non1payment of the balance of $85,---.-- guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for $.,,--.-- was, therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the securityB and since the mortgage was constituted on lands situated in (ue)on City, the appellees could not ask for its foreclosure in the "anila courts. The two causes of action being different, section 4 of %ule . does not apply. >SCA% $. MALLION, petitioner, vs.@C!T*A ALCANTARA, respondent. Topic< ?ullity of marriage based on several grounds :$sychological incapacity and lack of license; constitutes only one cause of action N'1& !< $etition for Certiorari under %ule 4,. T;! F'71s: RTC, S'$ P'?:2 C"1A: *usband "allion filed a petition seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to wife Alcantara under Article 65 of @'ecutive >rder ?o. .-8, as amended, :aka the Family Code;, citing Alcantaras alleged psychological incapacity. RTC #!$"!# 1;! 0!1"1"2$ since "allion 2failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking. CA: Cismissed "allions appeal for his failure to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. RTC S'$ P'?:2 C"1A< After the decision attained finality, "allion fled another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, this time alleging that his marriage was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. The wife filed an answer with a motion to dismiss praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res ?udicata and forum shopping. %TC granted her motion to dismiss, on ground of Forum Shopping and "ultiplicity of Suits. "allion motion for reconsideration was also denied, hence this petition. T;! Iss&!: =>? the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a partys psychological incapacity under Article 65 of the Family CodeO T;! R&:"$%: M'::"2$Is ' %&=!$1: That while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage, the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different. 3ecause there is no identity as to the cause of action, "allion claims that res ?udicata does not lie to bar the second petition . !n this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action. "allion insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle of res ?udicata.

A:7'$1' 'Is 72==!$1: That while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in the first case, that is, the validity of their marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their marriage. She contends that "allion violated the rule on forum shopping. "oreover, she asserts that "allion violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in the second petition could have been raised during the trial of the first case. SC s'As M'::"2$Is 0!1"1"2$ :'75s =! "1. 'es ?udicata is defined as 2a matter ad udgedB a thing udicially acted upon or decidedB a thing or matter settled by udgment. !t also refers to the rule that a final udgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent urisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit.2 This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well1regulated system of urisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law, namely< :/; public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and :.; the hardship on the individual that he should be ve'ed twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine would sub ect the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. !n this urisdiction, the concept of res ?udicata is embodied in Section 47 :b; and :c; of %ule 68 of the %ules of Court, thus< S@C. 47. @ffect of udgments or final orders. P The effect of a udgment or final order rendered by a court of the $hilippines, having urisdiction to pronounce the udgment or final order, may be as follows< :a; !n case of a udgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the udgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the personB however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be 1rima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestateB (?) I$ 21;! 7's!s, 1;! 9&#%=!$1 2 >"$': 2 #! "s, @"1; !s0!71 12 1;! ='11! #" !71:A '#9&#%!# 2 's 12 '$A 21;! ='11! 1;'1 72&:# ;'v! ?!!$ '"s!# "$ !:'1"2$ 1;! !12, 72$7:&s"v! ?!1@!!$ 1;! 0' 1"!s '$# 1;!" s&77!ss2 s "$ "$1! !s1 ?A 1"1:! s&?s!8&!$1 12 1;! 72==!$7!=!$1 2> 1;! '71"2$ 2 s0!7"': 0 27!!#"$%, :"1"%'1"$% >2 1;! s'=! 1;"$% '$# &$#! 1;! s'=! 1"1:! '$# "$ 1;! s'=! 7'0'7"1A( '$#, (7) I$ '$A 21;! :"1"%'1"2$ ?!1@!!$ 1;! s'=! 0' 1"!s 2 1;!" s&77!ss2 s "$ "$1! !s1, 1;'1 2$:A "s #!!=!# 12 ;'v! ?!!$ '#9&#%!# "$ ' >2 =! 9&#%=!$1 2 >"$': 2 #! @;"7; '00!' s &02$ "1s >'7! 12 ;'v! ?!!$ s2 '#9&#%!#, 2 @;"7; @'s '71&'::A '$# $!7!ss' ":A "$7:&#!# 1;! !"$ 2 $!7!ss' A 1;! !12. The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res ?udicata. Section 47 :b; pertains to it in its concept as 2bar by prior udgment2 or 2estoppel by verdict,2 which is the effect of a udgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action &02$ 1;! s'=! claim, demand or 7'&s! 2> '71"2$. >n the other hand, Section 47 :c; pertains to res ?udicata in its concept as 2conclusiveness of udgment2 or otherwise known as the rule of auter action 1endant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a #">>! !$1 7'&s! 2> '71"2$. 'es ?udicata in its concept as a bar by prior udgment obtains in the present case. 'es ?udicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites< :/; the former udgment is finalB :.; it is rendered by a court having ?urisdiction over the sub ect matter and the partiesB :6; it is a udgment or an order on t5e meritsB and :4; there is 11 between the first and the second actions 11 identit) of parties, of sub ect matter, and of causes of action. "allion does not dispute the e'istence of the first three requisites. =hat is in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. !n this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. !f the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a udgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. 3ased on this test, "allion would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license. "allion, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. 3y definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. !n both petitions, petitioner has the same cause 1 the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Alcantara. =hat differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondents marriage. Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. !n the first case, , however, "allion impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemni)ed and celebrated in accordance with law. *e is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which he raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been ad udged in that case. !t must be emphasi)ed that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res ?udicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. As this Court stated in Pere v. Court of /11eals@ ' ' ' the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.

!t bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A 0:'"$1">> "s ='$#'1!# 12 0:'7! "$ "ss&! "$ ;"s 0:!'#"$%, ':: 1;! "ss&!s !D"s1"$% @;!$ 1;! s&"1 ?!%'$. A :'@s&"1 7'$$21 ?! 1 "!# 0"!7!=!':. T;! 0:'"$1">> "s ?2&$# 12 s!1 >2 1; "$ ;"s >" s1 '71"2$ !v! A % 2&$# >2 !:"!> @;"7; ;! 7:'"=s 12 !D"s1 '$# &02$ @;"7; ;! !:"!#, '$# 7'$$21 ?! 0! ="11!# 12 !:A &02$ 1;!= ?A 0"!7!=!': "$ s&77!ss"v! '71"2$ 12 !72v! >2 1;! s'=! @ 2$% 2 "$9& A. A 0' 1A s!!5"$% 12 !$>2 7! ' 7:'"=, :!%': 2 !8&"1'?:!, =&s1 0 !s!$1 12 1;! 72& 1, !"1;! ?A 1;! 0:!'#"$%s 2 0 22>s, 2 ?21;, 2$ 1;! % 2&$#s &02$ @;"7; 12 !D0!71 ' 9&#%=!$1 "$ ;"s >'v2 . H! "s $21 '1 :"?! 1A 12 s0:"1 &0 ;"s #!='$#s, '$# 0 2s!7&1! "1 ?A 0"!7!=!': 2 0 !s!$1 2$:A ' 02 1"2$ 2> 1;! % 2&$#s &02$ @;"7; ' s0!7"': !:"!> "s s2&%;1 '$# :!'v! 1;! !s1 12 1;! 0 !s!$1=!$1 "$ ' s!72$# s&"1 "> 1;! >" s1 >'":s. T;! ! @2&:# ?! $2 !$# 12 :"1"%'1"2$ "> s&7; 0"!7!=!': 0 !s!$1'1"2$ "s '::2@!#. :Citations omitted.; !n sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain udicial relief. >nce an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again. Therefore, having e'pressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage due to lack of marriage license is barred by the decision on "allions petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. TOPIC: OBLIGATIONS IN INSTALLMENTS JOSEFINA RUBIO DE LARENA, 0:'"$1">>-'00!::'$1, vs. HERMENEGILDO /ILLANUE/A , defendant1appellee./8.9 ?ovember -,/st CivisionD.%. ?o. .8/,,C @ C ! S ! > ? NATURE: The case at bar is a sequel to case D. %. ?o. ./7-5, 0osefina %ubio de &arena vs. *ermenegildo Eillanueva, decided on "arch .5, /8.4. / !n that case we affirmed a decision of the Court of First !nstance ordering the rescission of a lease of the Tacga an Sugar $lantation and the payment by the defendant1lessee of the unpaid balance of the rent for the agricultural year /8.-1/8.. in the sum of $,,848..9 with interest from August .5, /8.., and for $9,--- in rent for the agricultural year /8./1/8.6. The decision also provided that the possession of the leased land be delivered to the plaintiff. Shortly after the record was returned to the court below, a writ of e'ecution was issued, but before levy was made the parties came to an agreement, under which the money udgment was to be satisfied by the payment of $/-,,-- in cash and the transfer to the plaintiff of a dwelling house situated in the municipality of 3ais. FACTS: !n the meantime, Eillanueva harvested the sugarcane crop produced in the agricultural year /8..1/8.4, and after having satisfied the aforesaid money udgment, he also continued in possession of the plantation long enough to appropriate to himself the following ratoon cane crop. The present action was brought on April /6, /8.,, but the last amended complaint, setting forth three causes of action, was not filed until 0une /7, /8.7. As her first cause of action, &arena, after a preliminary statement of the origin of the controversy, alleges that while case D. %. ?o. ./7-5 was on appeal to the Supreme Court, Eillanueva knew positively that the aforesaid lease was declared rescinded by the Court of First !nstance on September 9, /8.6, and that Eillanueva also knew that he thereafter was not entitled to the possession of the aforesaid haciendaB that he, nevertheless, in bad faith continued in such possession during the agricultural year /8..1/8.4 and appropriated to himself the cane harvest for that year, which after deducting the share of the sugar centralB that &arena has demanded payment to her of the total value of said /,578.-. piculs, amounting to $./,9.7..5, but Eillanueva refuses to pay. &arena, therefore, asks udgment for the sum of $./,9.7..5 upon the first cause of action. For a second cause of action, &arena alleges that under the contract of lease of the Tacga an *acienda, one of the obligations assumed by the defendant was that he would use the care of a good father of the family in conserving the tools, agricultural implements, draft animals, and other effects enumerated in an inventory made at the time Eillanueva entered in possession under the leaseB that he was further obligated to return said property to &arena, but that he returned only a part thereof and failed to return 4 carabaos, 4 vacunos, / corn mill, 4 wagons, /-5 steel rails, /4 plows, / table, / scale, and / telephone, the total value of the property enumerated being $6,,85 for which amount, plus $,-- in damages, &arena asks udgment under her second cause of action. As a third cause of action the &arena alleges that the harvest of sugar cane illegally made by Eillanueva in /8.4 left ratoon sugar cane in the fields of the hacienda, which sugar cane was the property of &arena, and that during the year /8.,, Eillanueva illegally harvested said ratoon cane together with some recently planted cane, which harvest after deducting the share of the sugar central, produced /,5/6.., piculs of sugar, which Eillanueva sold for his own benefit at the price of $/6 per picul, the total amount received by him being $.-,85..., for which &arena demands udgment. !n his answer to the first and third causes of action, the defendant alleges that according to the pleadings in case D. %. ?o. ./7-5, the two causes of action were included in that case and, therefore, must be considered res ad udicata. !n regard to the second cause of action the defendant pleads the general issue and sets up as a special defense that assuming that the property referred to in said cause of action was missing, its loss was due to its total e'tinction by ordinary use, for which the defendant could not be held responsible. The Court of First !nstance sustained the defendant+s special defense and absolved him from the complaint with the costs against the plaintiff, whereupon the latter appealed to this court. ISSUE: =hether or not the court erred in absolving Eillanueva of his liability upon the second cause of action. RULING: W! #2 $21 1;"$5 1;'1 1;! 72& 1 ?!:2@ ! !# "$ '?s2:v"$% /"::'$&!v' > 2= :"'?":"1A As to the first cause of action Eillanueva argues that it was included in the prayer of an amended complaint filed in case D. %. ?o. ./7-5 and that, although no e'press determination thereof was made in the decision of the case, it must, nevertheless, be regarded as res ad udicata. That such is not the case is very clear. The Code of Civil $rocedure says< 2That only is deemed to have been ad udged in a former udgment which appears upon its face to have been so ad udged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.2 :Sec. 6-7, Code of Civ. $roc.;

3ut Eillanueva maintains that &arena, having had an opportunity to ventilate the matter in the former case, she cannot now enforce the same cause of action in the present case. $roperly speaking, this argument does not involve the doctrine of res ad udicata but rests on the well1 known and, in American law, firmly established principle that a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it the basis for several suits. 3ut that is not this case. T;! &:! "s @!:: !s1'?:"s;!# 1;'1 @;!$ ' :!'s! 0 2v"#!s >2 1;! 0'A=!$1 2> 1;! !$1 "$ s!0' '1! "$s1'::=!$1s, !'7; "$s1'::=!$1 "s '$ "$#!0!$#!$1 7'&s! 2> '71"2$, 1;2&%; "1 ;'s ?!!$ ;!:#, '$# "s %22# :'@, 1;'1 "$ '$ '71"2$ &02$ s&7; ' :!'s! >2 1;! !72v! A 2> !$1, 1;! "$s1'::=!$1s #&! '1 1;! 1"=! 1;! '71"2$ "s ? 2&%;1 =&s1 ?! "$7:&#!# "$ 1;! 72=0:'"$1 '$# 1;'1 >'":& ! 12 #2 s2 @":: 72$s1"1&1! ' ?' 12 ' s&?s!8&!$1 '71"2$ >2 1;! 0'A=!$1 2> 1;'1 !$1. The motion was granted, and the case came up for trial, the trial court rendered its decision giving udgment for rent up to and including the rent for the agricultural year ending in /8.6. The lease did not provide for payment of rent in advance or at any definite time, and it appears plainly from the record that the rent for an agricultural year was not considered due until the end of the corresponding year. The only question remaining in regard to the first cause of action relates to the amount of the damages. The plaintiff contends that the defendant was a possessor in bad faith, and therefore, must pay the value of the fruits of the land in accordance with article 4,, of the Civil Code. #nder the circumstances of the case, we cannot so hold. The defendant held possession under the contract of lease until said contract was rescinded. The contract contained no special provision for the procedure in effecting the rescission, and it follows that it could only be accomplished by a final udgment of the court. The action for terminating the lease was brought under article //.4 of the Civil Code, and it may, perhaps, be said that property speaking, the sub ect matter of the action was a resolution of the contract and not a rescission. That may be true, but it is a distinction without a differenceB in either case a udicial declaration would be necessary for the cancellation of the contract in the absence of a special agreement. Eery little need be said in regard to the third cause of action. !t relates to a period subsequent to the complete termination of the lease by final udicial order. The defendant had then no right whatever to the possession of the land or to the fruits thereof, and in removing the fruits, he acted in bad faith. This being the case, he must pay for the fruits received by him, less the necessary e'penses of production. As his bad faith commenced long before the fruits in question were produced, he is not entitled to any part of the net proceeds of the crop. BLOSSOM M COMPANY, INC., 0:'"$1">>-'00!::'$1, vs. MANILA GAS CORPORATION , defendant1appellee. N'1& !: 3lossom seeks to recover damages from "anila Das which it claims to have sustained after September, /8.6, arising from, and growing out of, its original contract of September /-, /8/9, as modified on 0anuary /, /8/8, to continue for a period of ten years from that date. T;! F'71s: B:2ss2=: "anila Das 2willfully and deliberately breached its said contract,2 and that it 2flatly refused to make any deliveries under said contract, and finally on ?ovember .6, /8.6,2 it was force to commence '71"2$ in the Court of First !nstance against the defendant, to recover the damages. 0udgment was rendered in favor of the 3lossom for $.5,//8.-9, as damages . *owever, CF! refused to order the defendant to resume the delivery of the coal and water gas tar to the plaintiff, in accord with said contract, but left it with its remedy for damages against the defendant for any subsequent breaches of the contract. P!1"1"2$! : The udgment was never intended that it should be or become a bar to another action by the plaintiff to recover any damages it may have sustained after September, /8.6, during the remainder of the ten1year period of that contract. 3e that as it may, it must be conceded that the question as to what would be the legal force and effect of that udgment in that case was never presented to, or decided by, the lower court or this court. !n the very nature of things, neither court in that case would have the power to pass upon or decide the legal force and effect of its own udgment, for the simple reason that it would be premature and outside of the issues of any pleading, and could not be raised or presented until after the udgment became final, and then only by an appropriate plea, as in this case. !n the final analysis, plaintiff in this action seeks to recover damages growing out of, and arising from, other and different breaches of that same contract after ?ovember, /8.6, for the remainder of the ten1year period, and the question is thus squarely presented as to whether the rendition of the former udgment is a bar to the right of the plaintiff to recover damages from the after September, /8.6, arising from, and growing out of, breaches of the original contract of September /-, /8/9, as modified on 0anuary /, /8/8. Iss&!: That is to say, whether the plaintiff, in a former action, having recovered udgment for the damages which it sustained by reason of a breach of its contract by the defendant up to September, /8.6, can now in this action recover damages it may have sustained in this action recover damages it may have sustained after September, /8.6, arising from, and growing out of, a breach of the same contract, upon and for which it recovered its udgment in the former action. D"s7&ss"2$: !n the former action in which the udgment was rendered, it is alleged in the complaint< "anila Das Corporation, the defendant herein, without any cause ceased delivering coal and water gas tar to the plaintiff hereinB and that from that time up to the present date, the plaintiff corporation, 3lossom J Company, has frequently and urgently demanded of the defendant, the "anila Das Corporation, that it comply with its aforesaid contract @'hibit A by continuing to deliver coal and water gas tar to this plaintiff 1 but that the

said defendant has refused, and still refused, to deliver to the plaintiff any coal and water gas tar whatsoever under the said contract @'hibit A, since the said month of 0uly, /8.-. ''' ''' ''' That owing to the bad faith of the said "anila Das Corporation, it has caused to this plaintiff great and irreparable damages amounting to the sum total of one hundred twenty1four thousand eight hundred forty1eight pesos and seventy centavos :$/.4,949.7-;B and that the said defendant corporation has refused, and still refuses, to pay to this plaintiff the whole or any part of the aforesaid sum.

That the said contract was to be in force until 0anuary /, /8.8, that it to say, for ten :/-; years counted from 0anuary /, /8/8B and that, unless the defendant again commence to furnish and supply this plaintiff with coal and water gas tar, as provided for in the said contract @'hibit A, the damages already suffered by this plaintiff will continually increase and become larger and larger in the course of years preceding the termination of the said contract on 0anuary /, /8.8.+2 !n the final analysis, 3lossom must stand or fall on its own pleadings, and tested by that rule, it must be admitted that the plaintiff+s original cause of action, in which it recovered udgment for damages, was founded on the ten1year contract, and that the damages which it then recovered were recovered for a breach of that contract. 3oth actions are founded on one and the same contract. 3y the terms of the original contract of September /-, /8/9, the defendant was to sell and the plaintiff was to purchase three tons of water gas tar per month from September to 0anuary /, /8/8, and twenty tons of water gas tar per after from 0anuary /, /8/8, one1half ton of coal gas tar per month from September to 0anuary /, /8/8, and si' tons of coal gas tar per month after 0anuary /, /8/8. That from and after 0anuary /, /8/8, plaintiff would take at least the quantities specified in the contract of September /-, /8/9, and that at its option, it would have the right to take the total output of water gas tar of defendant+s plant and ,- per cent of the gross output of its coal gas tar, and upon giving ninety days+ notice, it would have the right to the entire output of coal gas tar, e'cept such as the defendant might need for its own use. That is to say, the contract provided for the delivery to the plaintiff from month to month of the specified amounts of the different tars as ordered and requested by the plaintiff. !n other words, under plaintiff+s own theory, the defendant was to make deliveries from month to month of the tars during the period of ten years, and it is alleged in both complaints that the defendant broke its contract, and in bad faith refused to make any more deliveries. A$1"7"0'12 A B !'7; (J& "s0 &#!$7!) CAs ' %!$! ': &:! ' 72$1 '71 12 #2 s!v! ': 1;"$%s '1 s!v! ': 1"=!s "s #"v"s"?:! "$ "1s $'1& !, s2 's 12 '&1;2 "<! s&77!ss"v! '71"2$s( '$# ' 9&#%=!$1 !72v! !# >2 ' s"$%:! ? !'7; 2> ' 72$1"$&"$% 72$1 '71 2 72v!$'$1 "s $2 ?' 12 ' s&"1 >2 ' s&?s!8&!$1 ? !'7; 1;! !2>. B&1 @;! ! 1;! 72v!$'$1 2 72$1 '71 "s !$1" !, '$# 1;! ? !'7; 121':, 1;! ! 7'$ ?! 2$:A '71"2$, '$# 1;! 0:'"$1">> =&s1 1;! !"$ !72v! ':: ;"s #'='%!s.C !n the case of %oehm vs. *orst, /79 #.S., /B 44 &aw. ed., 8,6, that court said< 2An unqualified and positive refusal to perform a contract, though the performance thereof is not yet due, may, if the renunciation goes to the whole contract, be treated as a complete breach which will entitled the in ured party to bring his action at once.2 /, %uling Case &aw, 855, 857, sec. 44/, says< 2Similarly if there is a breach by the vendor of a contract for the sale of goods to be delivered and paid for in installments, and the vendee maintains an action therefor and recovers damages, he cannot maintain a subsequent action to recover for the failure to deliver later installments.2 !n $akas vs. *ollingshead, /94 ?. A., .//B 77 ?. @., 4-B 6 &. %. A. :?.S.;, /-4., the syllabus says< 2#pon refusal, by the seller, after partial performance, longer to comply with his contract to sell and deliver a quantity of articles in installments, the buyer cannot keep the contract in force and maintain actions for breaches as they occur, but must recover all his damages in one suit.2 And on page /-44 of its opinion, the court says< 2The learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that the former udgment did not constitute a bar to the present action, but that the plaintiff had the right to elect to waive or disregard the breach, keep the contract in force, and maintain successive actions for damages from time to time as the installments of goods were to be delivered, however numerous these actions for damages from time to time as the installments of goods were to be delivered, however numerous these actions might be. !t is said that this contention is supported in reason and ustice, and has the sanction of authority at least in other urisdictions. =e do not think that the contention can be maintained. There is not, as it seems to us, any udicial authority in

this state that gives it any substantial support. >n the contrary, we think that the cases, so far as we have been able to e'amine them, are all the other way, and are to the effect that, inasmuch as there was a total breach of the contract by the defendant+s refusal to deliver, the plaintiff cannot split up his demand and maintain successive actions, but must either recover all his damages in the first suit or wait until the contract matured or the time for the delivery of all the goods had arrived. !n other words, there can be but one action for damages for a total breach of an entire contract to deliver goods, and the fact that they were to be delivered in installment from time to time does not change the general rule.2 And on page /,- of the opinion, the court says< 2!t is enough to show the lack of merit in the present contention to point out as an ine'orable rule of law that, when Knevals+ contract was discharged by his total repudiation thereof, =atts+ claims for breaches and damages therefor Qconstituted an indivisible demand, and when the same, or any part of the same, was pleaded, litigation had and final udgment rendered, such suit and udgment constitute a bar to subsequent demands which were or might have been litigated.+ :3ucki, etc., Co. vs. Atlantic, etc., Co., /-8 Fed. at page 4/,B 49 C. C. A., 4,8B Cf. &andon vs. 3ulkley, 8, Fed., 644B 67 C. C. A., 85.; 2The rule is usually applied in cases of alleged or supposed successive breaches, and consequently severable demands for damagesB but if the contract has been discharged by breach, if suit for damages is all that is left, the rule is applicable, and every demand arising from that contract and possessed by any given plaintiff must be presented :at least as against any given defendant; in one actionB what the plaintiff does not advance he foregoes by conclusive presumption.2 C2$7:&s"2$: !n such a case it is no warrant for a second action that the party may not be able to actually prove in the first action all the items of the demand, or that all the damage may not then have been actually suffered. H! "s ?2&$# 12 0 2v! "$ 1;! >" s1 '71"2$ $21 2$:A s&7; #'='%! 's ;'s ?!!$ '71&'::A s&>>! !#, ?&1 ':s2 s&7; 0 2s0!71"v! #'='%! ?A !'s2$ 2> 1;! ? !'7; 's ;! ='A ?! :!%'::A !$1"1:!# 12, >2 1;! 9&#%=!$1 ;! !72v! s "$ s&7; '71"2$ @":: ?! ' 72$7:&s"v! '#9&#"7'1"2$ 's 12 1;! 121': #'='%! 2$ '772&$1 2> 1;! ? !'7; . !t will thus be seen that, where there is a complete and total breach of a continuous contract for a term of years, the recovery of a udgment for damages by reason of the breach is a bar to another action on the same contract for and on account of the continuous breach. !n the final analysis, there is no real dispute about any material fact, and the important and decisive question is the legal construction of the pleadings in the former case and in this case, and of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant of 0anuary /, /8.-. :! dont think this is connected with the issue, but this is the last word of the Court in this case;. After careful study of the many important questions presented on this appeal in the e'haustive brief of the appellant, we are clearly of the opinion that, as found by the lower court, the plea of res udicata must be sustained. The udgment of the lower court is affirmed. !t is so ordered, with costs against the appellant. TOPIC: UNDER CAUSE OF ACTION (PAGE 3), IN CONTRAST WITH THE BLOSSOM CASE, THIS IS A CASE WHERE THE PRINCIPLE OF ANTICIPATORY BREACH CANNOT BE APPLIED DANFOSS, INC. /. CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORP., G.R. NO. -3+),,, *K*KF4 NATURE OF THE CASE: The CA affirmed the decision of the %TC that the CCCs :herein respondent; complaint for damages against Canfoss. So, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on appeal of the said ruling of the CA and the CAs denial for Canfoss motion for reconsideration. FACTS: "echatronics !nstruments and Controls, !nc. :"!?C!; is an agent of Canfoss, !nc.s products here in the $hilippines. >n September /887, CCC ordered two unit /6. K= Canfoss 3rand Frequency ConverterG!nverter from "!?C! to be used in the Finish "ill of its Cement $lant in 3ulacan. !n the terms of conditions of the original purchase order, the two unit Frequency Converter shall be delivered by Canfoss within 9 to /- weeks from the opening of the letter of credit. The letter of credit opened by CCC in favour of Canfoss on September 8, /887. >n September /7, /887, "!?C! informed CCC that its order are already ready for shipment and "!?C! requested to amend the letter of credit changing the port of originGloading from Singapore to Cenmark :Singapore is the Asian %egional >ffice of Canfoss, the *ead >ffice of the company is Cenmark;. CCC complied and the port of origin in the letter of credit was changed. >n ?ovember 5, /887, "!?C! relayed to CCC that Canfoss !nc. was still checking the status of their order. CCC replied that every delay in the delivery of the order will cause loss to their company, so CCC requested for early work out and immediate shipment to avoid further loss. 3ut, on ?ovember 8, /887, Canfoss !nc. informed "!?C! through fa', that the reason for the delivery problems was that some of the supplied components for the new E&T ,--- series :this may be a part of the converter which is the sub ect thing in this case or a machine to create the converter; did not meet the agreed quality standard. So, Canfoss was canvassing for another supplier for the said E&T ,--- series. !n the fa', there was no clear message as to when normal production will resume.

#pon receiving the relayed information, CCC surmised that Canfoss would not be able to deliver their order. There was also no definite commitment of the delivery from Canfoss and "!?C!, so CCC informed "!?C! that they intend to cancel its order. The order was cancelled on ?ovember /6, /887. *ence the complaint for damages filed by CCC with the %TC of (ue)on City against Canfoss and "!?C! on ?ovember ,, /889. !n reply, Canfoss filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. CCC< Cue to the RimpendingS delay in the delivery of its order, it suffered more than $9 million and was compelled to look for another supplier. Canfoss< The case should be dismissed on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. /; The letter of credit was opened on September 8, /887, so, since the agreed delivery period is 9 to /- weeks from the opening of the letter of credit, the due date is until ?ovember /8, /887. .; Although Canfoss was having a problem with its supplier prior to CCCs cancellation of its order, CCC only surmised that Canfoss could not deliver within the due date agreed upon. 6; ?either Canfoss nor CCC agreed to change the date of delivery. >nly the port of origin was changed in the letter of credit. Canfoss has until ?ovember /8, /887 to deliver the order, CCC cancelled the order on ?ovember /6, /887. 4; CCC never made an e'tra udicial demand for the delivery of its order on its due date as it cancelled the order before the due date. ,; Camages sought for by CCC could not have accrued yet since the order was cancelled before the delivery was actually delayed. %TC< 0udgment in favor of CCC. According to the %TC< R...the issue of whether or not the defendants incur delay in the delivery of the equipment in question within the period stipulated is a debatable question which necessitates actual trial on the merits where the parties have to adduce evidence in support of their respective stance. =hile the defendants contend that the stipulated period of delivery had not lapsed yet when the plaintiff cancelled its order of the two equipments in question as the cancellation took place seven :7; days before the e'piry date of the defendants obligation to deliver, the plaintiffs position is that the acts of the defendants had made compliance with their obligation to deliver within the period stipulated, impossible, hence, there was no need for a demand as the law provides that Rwhen demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.S The plaintiffs contention if properly and strongly supported by evidence during the hearing of the merits of the case may well negates :sic; the defendants contrary stand.S CA< Affirmed the decision of the %TC and denied the "otion for %econsideration of Canfoss. ISSUE: =>? there was a cause of action in the complaint filed by CCC against Canfoss and =>? the principle of anticipatory breach can be applied in the case. HELD: ?o, there was no cause of action in the complaint for damages filed by CCC. R!n order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action, the insufficiency must appear on the face of the complaint. And the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid udgment thereon in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.S The %TC erred in ruling that Rthe issue of whether or not the defendants incurred delay in the delivery of the equipment within the period stipulated was a debatable question.S *ow could Canfoss be liable for damages when Canfoss had not yet breached his obligation to deliver the order of CCC, aside from the fact that the obligation was already negated when CCC cancelled the order before the prestation became due and demandableO Thus, there was no breach and there was no damage caused by Canfoss. The principle of anticipatory breach cannot be applied here because the obligation was single and indivisible H to deliver two units of frequency converter by ?ovember /8, /887. There was no showing that Canfoss refused to deliver, and on the contrary, Canfoss made an effort to make good in its obligation by looking for other suppliers who could provide the parts needed to make the timely delivery of the order. Thus, the case was prematurely filed. CCCs fear that Canfoss might not be able to deliver its order on time was not the cause of action referred to by the %ules and urisprudence. $@T!T!>? D%A?T@C. T*@ CAS C@C!S!>?S A%@ %@E@%S@C A?C S@T AS!C@. %@"@C!> E. FLORES, petitioner, vs. *>?. 0#CD@ *@!&!A S. MALLARE-$*!&&!$$S, !D?AC!> 3!?>?DCA& J F@%?A?C> CA&!>?, respondents. Topic< 0oinder of causes of action H permissive :Section ,; %equisites< a. Comply with the rule on 0oinder of $arties The Court rules that the application of the totality rule under Section 66:/; of 3atas $ambansa 3lg. /.8 and Section // of the !nterim %ules is sub ect to the requirements for the permissive oinder of parties under Section 5 of %ule 6 which provides as follows<

2$ermissive oinder of parties, All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to e'ist, whether ointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, e'cept as otherwise provided in these rules, oin as plaintiffs or be oined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the actionB but the court may make such orders as may be ust to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to e'pense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest.2 N'1& !< Appeal by certiorari T;! F'71s: RTC, B'%&"2 C"1A '$# B!$%&!1 P 2v"$7!: 0udge *eilia S. "allare1$hillipps #"s="ss!# 0!1"1"2$! Flores complaint for lack of urisdiction. *e did not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in the erroneous belief that the entire original record of the case shall be transmitted to this Court pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 68 of 3$ /.8. This provision applies only to ordinary appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals :Section .- of the !nterim %ules;. Appeals to this Court by petition for review on certiorari are governed by %ule 4, of the %ules of Court :Section ., of the !nterim %ules;. *owever, the >rder appealed from states that the first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against respondent !gnacio 3inongcal for refusing to pay the amount of $//,546.-- representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from Flores on various occasionsB and the second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of $/-,./..-- representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions. Counsel for 3inongcal filed a "otion to Cismiss for lack of urisdiction since the amount of the demand against said respondent was only $//,546.--, and under Section /8:9; of 3$ /.8 the regional trial court shall e'ercise e'clusive original urisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos :$.-,---.--;. !t was further averred in said motion that although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in the amount of $/-,./..--, his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent. At the hearing of said "otion to Cismiss, counsel for respondent Calion oined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of urisdiction. Counsel for petitioner Flores opposed the "otion to Cismiss. T;! Iss&!s: =>? the %TC has urisdiction over the case following the 2novel2 totality rule introduced in Section 66:/; of 3$ /.8 and Section // of the !nterim %ules. T;! R&:"$%: F:2 !sI A %&=!$1: *e maintains that the lower court has urisdiction over the case following the 2novel2 totality rule introduced in Section 66:/; of 3$ /.8 and Section // of the !nterim %ules. The pertinent portion of Section 66:/; of 3$ /.8 reads as follows< 2. . . $rovided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions . . .2 Section // of the !nterim %ules provides thus< 2Application of the totality rule. !n actions where the urisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of urisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, e'clusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. !f any demand is for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.2 Flores compares the above1quoted provisions with the pertinent portion of the former rule under Section 99 of the 0udiciary Act of /849 as amended which reads as follows<

2. . . =here there are several claims or causes of action between the same parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactionsB but where the claims or causes of action oined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the urisdictional test . . .2 *e argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the former rule, the totality rule was reduced to clarity and brevity and the urisdictional test is the totality of the claims in all, not in each, of the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. SC: Flores argument is partly correct. There is no difference between the former and present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate causes of action. !n such cases, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions. !f the total demand e'ceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the regional trial court has urisdiction. ?eedless to state, if the causes of action are separate and independent, their oinder in one complaint is permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action where the amount of the demand is twenty thousand pesos or less may be the sub ect of a separate complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal trial court. >n the other hand, there is a difference between the former and present rules in cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant oin in a single complaint. #nder the former rule, 2where the claims or causes of action oined in a single complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate claim shall furnish the urisdictional test2 :Section 99 of the 0udiciary Act of /849 as amended, supra;. This was based on the ruling in the case of Eda. de %osario vs. 0ustice of the $eace, 88 $hil. 586. As worded, the former rule applied only to cases of permissive oinder of parties plaintiff. *owever, it was also applicable to cases of permissive oinder of parties defendant, as may be deduced from the ruling in the case of 3rillo vs. 3uklatan, thus< 2Furthermore, the first cause of action is composed of separate claims against several defendants of different amounts each of which is not more than $.,--- and falls under the urisdiction of the ustice of the peace court under section 99 of %epublic Act ?o. .85. The several claims do not seem to arise from the same transaction or series of transactions and there seem to be no questions of law or of fact common to all the defendants as may warrant their oinder under %ule 6, section 5. Therefore, if new complaints are to be filed in the name of the real party in interest they should be filed in the ustice of the peace court.2 :97 $hil. ,/8, ,.-, reiterated in Dacula vs. "artine), 99 $hil. /4., /45;. #nder the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant oin in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against two or more defendants oined in a single complaint. *owever, the causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 5 of %ule 6. The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive oinder of parties may be illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the case of Eda. de %osario vs. 0ustice of the $eace :supra; as e'ceptions to the totality rule. !n the case of Soriano y Cia vs. 0ose :95 $hil. ,.6;, where twenty1nine dismissed employees oined in a complaint against the defendant to collect their respective claims, each of which was within the urisdiction of the municipal court although the total e'ceeded the urisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law then the municipal court had urisdiction. !n said case, although the plaintiffs+ demands were separate, distinct and independent of one another, their oint suit was authori)ed under Section 5 of %ule 6 and each separate claim furnished the urisdictional test. !n the case of !nternational Colleges, !nc. vs. Argon)a :8- $hil. 47-;, where twenty1five dismissed teachers ointly sued the defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court also held that the municipal court had urisdiction because the amount of each claim was within, although the total e'ceeded, its urisdiction and it was a case of permissive oinder of parties plaintiff under Section 5 of %ule 6. #nder the present law, the two cases above cited :assuming they do not fall under the &abor Code; would be under the urisdiction of the %TC. Similarly, in the abovecited cases of 3rillo vs. 3uklatan and Dacula vs. "artine) :supra;, if the separate claims against the several defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is a common question of law or fact, they would now be under the urisdiction of the regional trial court. !n other words, in cases of permissive oinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 5 of %ule 6, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the urisdictional test. ?eedless to state also, if instead of oining or being oined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the urisdictional test. I$ 1;! 7's! '1 ?' , 1;! :2@! 72& 1 72 !71:A ;!:# 1;'1 1;! 9& "s#"71"2$': 1!s1 "s s&?9!71 12 1;! &:!s 2$ 92"$#! 2> 0' 1"!s 0& s&'$1 12 S!71"2$ 4 2> R&:! G '$# S!71"2$ H 2> R&:! + 2> 1;! R&:!s 2> C2& 1 '$# 1;'1, '>1! ' 7' !>&: s7 &1"$A 2> 1;! 72=0:'"$1, "1 '00!' s 1;'1 1;! ! "s ' ="s92"$#! 2> 0' 1"!s >2 1;! !'s2$ 1;'1 1;! 7:'"=s '%'"$s1 !s02$#!$1s B"$2$%7': '$# C':"2$ ' ! s!0' '1! '$# #"s1"$71 '$# $!"1;! 2> @;"7; >'::s @"1;"$ "1s 9& "s#"71"2$. =*@%@F>%@, the >rder appealed from is AFF!%"@C. TOPIC: JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION G.R. N2. -3)3-) J&:A ,, GFF4 SPS. /ICTOR M MILAGROS PEREL '$# CRISTINA AGRA/IADOR A/ISO, $etitioners, vs. ANTONIO HERMANO, %espondent.

NATURE OF THE CASE: This petition was filed after the CA dismissed the petitioners original action for certiorari for being filed out of time. The original action filed with the CA questions the decision of the %TC ruling that there was a mis oinder in the causes of action in the civil case filed by the petitioners, and consequently dropping respondent *ermano from the said case. FACTS: $etioner spouses and Aviso filed three causes of action based on the following allegations. Sometime in ?ovember /887, the spouses $ere) and Aviso entered into a Contract to Sell with Necson &and !nc. as the buyer through its president Nenie Sales1Contreras. The sub ect properties were five parcels of land valued at $/8, /-4, ---. !n the agreement entered into by the parties, Necson &and !nc. shall pay a down payment to the spouses and Aviso, another portion of the purchase price will be given as cash advance upon the e'ecution of the contract, while the rest shall be used by Necson as payment for loans earlier contracted by the three from the company. This is the first cause of action. !n the second cause of action, the spouses $ere) and Aviso contend that they were tricked to sign other documents simultaneous with the e'ecution of the Contract to Sell. Two of the said documents were mortgage deeds over the same , properties in favour of respondent *ermano, whom they have never met. Sales1Contreras allegedly e'plained to them that Rthe mortgage contracts would merely serve to facilitate the payment of the price agreed upon in their Contract to Sell.S *owever, the spouses and Aviso assert that it was never their intention to mortgage their properties to *ermano and that they have never received a single centavo from mortgaging their properties to him. They now then seek a T%> against *ermano who informed them that he would be foreclosing the sub ect properties. !n their third cause of action, the spouses and Aviso pray for damages against Necson &and, !nc. andGor Nenie Sales1Contreras, Atty. $erlita Eitan1@le and Antonio *ermano. They claim that they are entitled to damages from the aforementioned defendants for Necson and Contreras failure to comply with their obligations under their Contract to Sell and in misleading and misrepresenting them into mortgaging their properties to *ermano, who in turn, had not paid them the proceeds thereof. Thus, the first cause of action was for enforcement of contract to sell entered into between the spouses and Aviso and Necson, the second was for annulment or rescission of two contracts of mortgage entered into between the spouses and Aviso and *ermano, while the last one was for damages against all the mentioned defendants. A oinder was made on these causes of action and a civil case for @nforcement of Contract and Camages with $rayer for the !ssuance of a Temporary %estraining >rder :T%>; andGor $reliminary !n unction against Nescon &and, !nc. andGor its $resident Nenie Sales1Contreras, Atty. $erlita Eitan1@le and against respondent herein Antonio *ermano was filed before the %TC. *ermano denied the spouses and Avisos allegations through his Answer with Counterclaim. *ermano also filed a R"otion with &eave to Cismiss the Complaint or >rdered Severed for Separate Trial2 which was granted by the trial court on the ground that there was a mis oinder in the causes of action. As a consequence, *ermano was dropped from the civil case. The spouses $ere) and Aviso moved for reconsideration but was also denied by the trial court. So, they filed an original action for certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition 2for having been filed beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 4, %ule 5, of the /887 %ules on Civil $rocedure, as amended.2 The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was also denied. *ence this petition. ISSUE RELATED TO THE TOPIC: =>? the trial court erred in dropping *ermano in the civil action and ruling that there was a mis oinder in the causes of action. HELD: Aes. The statutory intent behind the provisions on oinder of causes of action is to encourage oinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to permit oinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them. =hile the rule allows a plaintiff to oin as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, sub ect always to the restriction thereon regarding urisdiction, venue and oinder of parties. #nlimited oinder is not authori)ed. =hat the SC gathered from the trial courts >rders was that the trial court ruled that there was a mis oinder in the civil case filed because it did not comply with the conditions on oinder of parties. !t is well to remember that the oinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties. !f the oinder involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties oined, arising out of the same transaction or series of transaction. !t can be deduced from the averments made in the complaint that there are questions of fact and law common to both Necson &and, !nc. and *ermano arising from a series of transaction over the same properties. There is the question of fact, for e'ample, of whether or not Nescon &and, !nc., indeed misled petitioners to sign the mortgage deeds in favor of respondent *ermano. There is also the question of which of the four contracts were validly entered into by the parties. ?ote that under Article .-9, of the Civil Code, for a mortgage to be valid, it is imperative that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. Thus, respondent *ermano will definitely be affected if it is subsequently declared that what was entered into by petitioners and Nescon &and, !nc., was a Contract of Sale :as evidenced by the Ceed of Absolute Sale signed by them; because this would mean that the contracts of mortgage were void as petitioners were no longer the absolute owners of the properties mortgaged. Finally, there is also the question of whether or not Nescon &and, !nc., as represented by Sales1Contreras, and respondent *ermano committed fraud against petitioners as to make them liable for damages. Thus, the petition was granted, the >rders of the %TC were annulled and set aside, and the %TC was ordered to respondent Antonio *ermano as one of the defendants in Civil Case filed by spouses $ere) and Aviso. PANTRANCO N2 1; ED0 !ss, I$7., '$# A:!D'$#! B&$7'$, v! s&s S1'$#' # I$s& '$7! C2=0'$A, I$7., '$# M' 1"$' G"7':! , D.%. ?o. /4-745, "arch /5, .--,. NATURE OF THE CASE: The case was elevated to the SC by $antranco and 3uncan by reason of the ruling of the CA against them and the denial of the appellate court of their motion for reconsideration. The CA ruled that there was no mis oinder of parties in the complaint filed by Standard and Dicale against them, and that they are to be held accountable to the money claims of the respondents. FACTS: Crispin Dicale was driving the passenger eepney owned by his mother "artina Dicale. Ale'ander 3uncan, on the other hand, was driving a bus owned by $antranco ?orth @'press !nc. 3oth drivers were travelling along the ?ational *ighway of Talavera, ?ueva @ci a in a rainy afternoon.

3uncan was driving the bus northbound while Cripin was trailing behind. =hen the two vehicles were negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger bus overtook the eepney. !n so doing, thhe passenger bus hit the left rear side of the eepney and sped away. Crispin reported the incident to the police and to the insurer of their eepney, Standard !nsurance Co. The total cost of the repair amounted to $./, 4/,. Standard only paid $9,--- while "artina Dicale shouldered the remaining $/6,4/,. Thereafter, Standard and "artina demanded reimbursements from $antranco and 3uncan, but the bus company and the driver refused. Thus, Standard and "artina were prompted to file a complaint for sum of money with the %TC of "anila. $antranco and 3uncan denied the allegations of the complaint and asserted that it is the "eTC which has urisdiction over the case. %TC< The trial court ruled in favor of Standard and "artina, and ordered $antranco and 3uncan to pay the former reimbursements with interests due thereon plus attorney+s fees, and litigation e'penses. $antranco and 3uncan< The %TC has no urisdiction over the complaint. /; "artina Dicale was claiming $/6,4/,, while Standard was claiming $9,---. Their individual claims are below $.-,---. Thus, the case falls under the e'clusive urisdiction of the "TC. .; There was a mis oinder of parties. CA< The appellate court affirmed the decision of the %TC. /; #nder the (otalit) 'ule provided for under Sec. /8 of 3$ /.8, it is the sum of the two claims that determines the urisdictional amount. At the time this case was heard, cases involving money claims that amounts to more than $.-,--- falls under the e'clusive urisdiction of the %TC. .; @ven assuming that there was a mis oinder of parties, it does not affect the urisdiction of the court nor is it a ground to dismiss the complaint. The claims of Dicale and Standard arose from the same vehicular accident involving $antranco+s bus and Dicale+s eepney. Thus, there was a question of fact common to all parties. $antranco and 3uncan+s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. Dicale and Standard< There was no mis oinder of parties. Their individual claims arose from the same vehicular accident and involve a common question of fact and law. Thus, the %TC has urisdiction over the case. ISSUE: =>? there was a mis oinder of parties in the case. HELD: ?o. Sec. 5, %ule 6 of the %evised %ules of Court provides the following requirements for a permissive oinder of parties< :a; the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactionsB :b; there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendantsB and :c; such oinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the %ules on urisdiction and venue. !n this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, $antrancos bus hitting the rear side of the eepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action against petitioners. To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authori)e a recovery in the first. *ere, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would have been presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in order. Such oinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of ustice. There is ?> "!S0>!?C@% >F $A%T!@S if the money sought to be claimed is in favor of the same plaintiffGs and against the same defendantGs. >n the issue of lumping together the claims of Dicale and Standard, Section ,:d;, %ule . of the same %ules provides< RSec. ,. 0oinder of causes of action. H A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, sub ect to the following conditions< ''' :d; =here the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of urisdiction.S Further, the Court reiterates the (otalit) rule e'emplified by Sec. 66 :/; of 3$ /.8< Rwhere there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.S *ence, $@T!T!>? !S C@?!@C.