Survey on Modern Fault Detection and Diagnosis Technologies

Authors: Elena M. Cimpoeu* * Department of Software Development and Technical Research, Societatea de Inginerie Sisteme SIS SA, 22nd, oseaua Electronicii, Sect 2, !2"2#", $ucharest, Romania %&hone' ()!2* 2#2#)+#, e,mail' ema cimpoesu-sis ro.
A stract: During the past years, the increasing control demands of safety-critical applications have led to the development of innovative control strategies and algorithms that are able to ensure that the desired system performance as well as the closed-loop stability are guaranteed, both under nominal operating conditions and in the presence of one or more component faults. These modern control systems, known as Fault-Tolerant Control Systems FTCS!, differ from the classic approaches mainly due to the integration of Fault Detection and Diagnosis FDD! modules and Controller "econfiguration #echanisms. This paper focuses on FDD and investigates some of the most promising techni$ues used in modern applications, with emphasis on model-based approaches. !ey"ords:

#.

$ntroduction

"ecent developments in the field of safety-critical applications such as chemical and petrochemical plants, nuclear power plants, aircraft and spacecraft show that conventional control systems are no longer able to meet all the control re$uirements of such comple% applications. Therefore, a new type of control system is needed, that is capable of guaranteeing the desired system closed-loop performances as well as the stability and operational safety of the plant, both under nominal operating conditions and in the presence of system faults. Such systems are usually referred to in the literature as /ault,Tolerant 0ontrol S1stems FTCS!. From the point of view of the fault accommodation strategy, there are two ma&or approaches to FTCS' &assive FTCS (FTCS! and Active FTCS )FTCS! *+,-../0. 1n (FTCS, controllers are fi%ed and are designed to be robust against a class of presumed faults. This approach has the advantage of being computationally simple, since it makes no use of a /ault Detection and Diagnosis FDD! module, but it only offers tolerance to a limited class of system faults. )s opposed to the passive approach, )FTCS respond to system component faults through reconfiguration actions that are meant to change the controller parameters and2or structure in order to automatically accommodate the faults or, in other words, to maintain the stability and acceptable performance of the entire system, although a slight decrease in performance can be tolerated in certain cases. )ctive FTCS are sometimes referred to as self-repairing, reconfigurable, restructurable or self-designing control systems. They also rely heavily on real-time FDD modules that should provide accurate up-to-date information about the system status3 this contributes significantly to the increase of computational comple%ity. )s shown in *,-..40 and again in *+,-../0, a typical )FTCS configuration consists of the following subsystems' 5! an FDD scheme, -! a reconfigurable controller and 6! a reconfiguration mechanism see Fig. 5!. The FDD module has to provide information about the faults time, type and magnitude! and the post-fault system model. The reconfiguration mechanism is in charge of establishing the changes in structure and control parameters needed in order to achieve the system performance and stability ob&ectives, while the controller ensures these ob&ectives are met, both for the nominal and for the impaired systems. #oreover, all the components should work together under the real-time constraints.

Fig. 5 7 Typical configuration of an active FTCS

This paper focuses on FDD schemes and offers a survey of the most recent breakthroughs in the fields of early fault detection and fault isolation and identification methods. The paper is organi8ed as follows' in Section -, the notion of system faults is e%plained and several classification criteria are presented. Section 6 contains a brief description of the various fault detection and diagnosis techni$ues currently available, while Section 9 focuses on some of the most promising model-based techni$ues from the point of view of the demands of modern control systems for safety-critical applications. %. System Faults

1n *10, a s1stem fault is defined as the unpermitted deviation of at least one characteristic property of a technological variable from its normally accepted behavior. The occurrence of a system fault affects the overall behavior of the plant to different e%tents, from a simple performance degradation to system instability, depending on the type and magnitude of the fault and on the nature of the plant. 1n worst case scenarios, the system becomes uncontrollable and needs to be shut down in order to prevent from catastrophic conse$uences. 1t is generally accepted that any other type of malfunction like erroneous software code, damaged electrical cables, faulty transmission networks etc. are transparent or reflected in the classical components of a control system, namely the sensors, the actuators or the actual controlled process. :enerally speaking, faults can be classified according to several criteria, such as their time evolution, their location within the system or their way of affecting the model that describes the system behaviour. From the point of view of their time characteristics, faults can be classified as' a2rupt, incipient or intermittent, as shown in Fig. -.

Fig. - 7 Faults evolution in time a 7 abrupt faults3 b 7 incipient faults3 c 7 intermittent faults

Fig 6 7 Typical fault models a 7 additive faults3 b 7 multiplicative faults

)s far as the fault location is concerned, system faults can affect sensors, actuators or even the various components of the physical plant. Sensor faults represent incorrect readings from the sensors in the system. Sensor faults can be further classified in total and partial faults. Total sensor faults produce information that is not related to the measured physical parameter, while partial faults produce readings that are not accurate, but are still related to the measured signal so that useful information still is retrievable. The small si8e of the sensors generally allow for

them to be duplicated within the system. Therefore, fault tolerance relies heavily on hardware redundancy and the so-called ;ma&ority voting< can be used to determine the faulty sensor. Actuator faults represent partial or total loss of control action. 1n the case of partial actuator faults, only a part of the normal actuation is produced by the faulty actuator, while completely failed actuators produce no controllable actuation, regardless of the applied input. =nfortunately, hardware redundancy is often not an option in this case, since the actuators have a larger si8e and mass compared to the sensors and are also significantly pricier. Finally, component faults are faults in the components of the plant itself, often due to structural damage and difficult to anticipate. There is a wide class of situations that can be caused by component faults, which makes it rather difficult to deal with them. )nother classification is based on the way a system fault manifests with regards to the changes in the impaired system model. >asically, a fault can be modeled as either additive or multiplicative, see Fig. 6. 1n *?erh-.5.0, the authors consider that multiplicative modeling is best suited to represent sensors and actuators faults, while additive modeling is more general and can therefore be used to represent a wider class of system faults. >ased on the laws of physics, most engineering systems can be modeled using the following set of differential e$uations
t ! = g 3 t !, u t !, d t !, f t !!, 3 1 t ! = h 3 t !, u t !, d t !, f t !!,

-.5!

where g and h are nonlinear functions of the state vector 3%t., the command inputs u%t., the measured system output 1%t., the unmeasured disturbances vector d%t. and the faults f%t. respectively.
Fig. 6 7 >asic fault models a 7 additive fault3 b 7 multiplicative fault

Since it is often very difficult to manipulate the system in -.5! in its general, nonlinear form, when the system operates under nominal conditions that are characteri8ed by an e$uilibrium state, its linear correspondent can be obtained by representing functions g and h as Taylor series at the e$uilibrium point, from which only the first order terms are considered. 1n this conte%t, additive faults can be characteri8ed using the corresponding linear time invariant model given by t ! = An 3 t ! + $ n u t ! + E d d t ! + E f f t !, 3 1 t ! = 0 n 3 t ! + 4 d d t ! + 4 f f t !. -.-!

)s it is shown in -.-!, this type of fault is modeled as an additional entry to the linear model. 1t is obvious that, in this absence of any fault, f t ! = ., t + . @owever, not all the events that alter the system behavior can be modeled as additive. Since the linear model is nothing but the representation of the e$uilibrium in the vicinity of a functioning point of the general nonlinear system, one should take into consideration &.