MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE, petitioner, vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, respondent.

Facts: The Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation[7] against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a combined area of about 10,000 square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila, and covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700 The complaint was filed for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept RTC gave it a due course and authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property (Feb. 4, 1994 order) Private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim, alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata Petitioner filed its opposition, stressing that the trial courts Order dated February 4, 1994 was in accord with Section 19 of RA 7160, and that the principle of res judicata was not applicable Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 Resolution nullifying its February 4, 1994 Order and dismissing the case Issues: a. WON the local government of Paranaque can validly exercise the power of eminent domain in the absence of an ordinance b. WON principle of res judicata is applicable to the present case Ruling: a. The following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4. valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance because a resolution is different from an ordinance, as what the petitioner contends. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. b. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it. Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and can reach e very form of property which the State might need for public use The power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.

Masikip v. City of Pasig FACTS: Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. Respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the sports development and recreational activities of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community. On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community. The taking is done for the benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid. Power of eminent domain - the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation therefor. It has also been described as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. [Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160)] A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:

Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) The adequacy of the compensation, (b) The necessity of the taking, and (c) The public use character of the purpose of the taking Ruling: There is no genuine necessity to justify the expropriation. The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from the necessity and the taking must be limited to such necessity. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow the taking of the land. Necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with such benefit. Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification [14] issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioners lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown to exist.

Bardillon v. Brgy. Masili of Calamba Who has jurisdiction of expropriation proceedings? RTC The expropriation of Lot 4381-D was being pursued in view of providing Barangay Masili a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of its constituents. Facts: Two complaints for eminent domain were filed by herein respondent for the purpose of expropriating the land owned by petitioner. 1st complaint [Civil Case No. 3648] was filed before the MTC on Feb. 23, 1998, following the failure of Barangay Masili to reach an agreement with herein petitioner on the purchase offer of P200,000.00. The expropriation of Lot 4381-D was being pursued in view of providing Barangay Masili a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of its constituents. MTC dismissed the case for lack of interest for failure of the [respondent] and its counsel to appear at the pre-trial. 2nd complaint [Civil Case No. 2845-99-C] was filed before RTC on October 18, 1999. This complaint also sought the expropriation of the said Lot 4381-D. Petitioner, by way of a Motion to Dismiss, opposed this complaint by alleging in the main respondents cause of action is barred by prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. Judge denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss, holding that the MTC which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3648 has no jurisdiction over the said expropriation proceeding. 2nd complaint was ordered in favor of Barangay Masili. Court of Appeals CA held that RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders. It ruled that the second Complaint for eminent domain was not barred by res judicata. The reason is that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the action. Issues: 1. Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the expropriation case; 2. Whether the dismissal of that case before the MTC constituted res judicata Other issues: forum-shopping Ruling: No merit. 1.) Jurisdiction over Expropriation Petitioners claim: value of the land is only P11,448, the MTC had jurisdiction over the case.

CA: held that the assessed value of the property was P28,960. Thus, MTC did not have jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings, because the amount involved was beyond the P20,000 jurisdictional amount cognizable by MTCs. An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take property for public use. As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the land. Condemnation proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance, the forerunners of the regional trial courts. The Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance had original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation. While it is true that the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it, this, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation. 2.) Res Judicata Petitioners contention: MTCs dismissal of the first Complaint for eminent domain was with prejudice, since there was no indication to the contrary in the Order of dismissal. She contends that the filing of the second Complaint before the RTC should therefore be dismissed on account of res judicata. Res judicata [a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled by judgment] It provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. Requisites of res judicata: 1. Former judgment must be final; 2. The court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; 3. It is a judgment on the merits; and 4. There is -- between the first and the second actions -- an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application even if the Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits.

[G.R. No. L-18841. January 27, 1969.] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendant-appellant. FACTS: The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That office was created on 1 July 1947, under Executive Order No. 94 The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise, Act 3426, as amended by Commonwealth Act 407, to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the business of electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other countries. The RCA Communications, Inc., (which is not a party to the present case, but has contractual relations with the parties) is an American corporation authorized to transact business in the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a legislative franchise to operate a domestic station for the reception and transmission of long distance wireless messages (Act 2178) and to operate broadcasting and radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic communications services (Act 3180). Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from the United States and received by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United States. Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. 6 Its application for the use of these trunk lines was in the usual form of applications for telephone service, containing a statement, above the signature of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules and regulations of the PLDT which are on file with the Public Service Commission. One of the many rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private use. The Bureau has extended its services to the general public since 1948, 9 using the same trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own schedule of rates.

On 7 April 1958, the defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is interconnected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections. 13 When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services, from the rest of the world, except the United States. At that time, the Bureau was maintaining 5,000 telephones and had 5,000 pending applications for telephone connection. 16 The PLDT was also maintaining 60,000 telephones and had also 20,000 pending applications. 17 Through the years, neither of them has been able to fill up the demand for telephone service. The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the Government Telephone System to the PLDT. 18 The PLDT replied that it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the Bureau would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission and in consideration of 37 1/2% of the gross revenues. 19 In its memorandum in lieu of oral argument in this Court dated 9 February 1964, on page 8, the defendant reduced its offer to 33 1/3% (1/3) as its share in the overseas telephone service. The proposals were not accepted by either party. On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by the

Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaims. Issue: Whether interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation, i.e. the exercise of eminent domain. Held: Although parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the contract -- the freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions being of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation or undue influence -- and thus the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If under Section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now under appeal, is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company to continue servicing the Government telephone system upon such terms, and for a compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just, including the period elapsed from the filing of the original complaint or petition. And for this purpose, the records are ordered returned to the court of origin for further hearings and other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs.

CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS and PEDRO P. ROXAS, plaintiffs, vs. THE CITY OF MANILA and ROBERT G. DIECK, as city engineer, defendants. FACTS: 1. That on the 15th of January, 1906, the plaintiff, as owner of the property situated on the Escolta, district of Binondo, city of Manila, the eastern boundary of which adjoins the canal of San Jacinto or Sibacon to the extent of 23.50 meters, the total area of the ground being 658.19 square meters, applied to the city engineer, Robert G. Dieck (defendant), for a license to construct a terrace over "the strip of land 3 meters in width between the main wall of her house and the edge of the said canal of Sibacon or San Jacinto, which strip of land belongs exclusively to her"; but the defendant refused to grant the license or authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace. 2. That a similar petition was addressed to the Municipal Board of the city of Manila on the 30th of said month and year, and it also was denied. Denial was due to the intent to reserve the said strip for the establishment of a public easement, although the opposing witnesses did not agree as to the special easement intended to be established. 3. That it was agreed between both parties that the strip above referred to had not been expropriated in whole or in part by the municipality of Manila, and that neither had the latter offered any compensation for the same to the owner thereof. 4. That according to Engineer Dieck, a defendant, the purpose of the city was to use the said strip of 3 meters as a place for discharging and landing goods, and as a place of shelter for shipwrecked persons and for fishermen, and to devote it also, together with other strips along the canal, by the gradual acquisition of land, to a towpath for craft passing through the canal; that a building line has been established by the Municipal Board along the Sibacon Creek leaving a strip of 3 meters within which, according to ordinances, no constructions would be permitted; that such is the purpose and the intent on which the existing ordinances are based. 5. What the defendants have therefore done is to prevent the plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy, use, and freely dispose of such strip of their ground, as they had been doing up to the time when they applied for a license to construct a terrace over said strip, and the defendants prevented it with the intention of establishing a public easement provided for in an ordinance of their own which they consider is pursuant to the provisions of the Law of Waters and of the Civil Code in force. "The powers of the administration do not extend to the establishment of new easements upon private property but simply to preserve old ones, whenever a recent and easily proven usurpation exists." (Decision of January 23, 1866.)

"Ayuntamientos are not authorized to impose an easement upon private property; therefore, any order thus given cannot be held to have been issued in the exercise of their lawful powers." (Decision of July 28, 1866.) According to article 349 of the Civil Code, no one shall be deprived of his property, except by competent authority and with sufficient cause of public utility, always after proper indemnity; if this requisite has not been fulfilled the courts must protect, and eventually restore possession to the injured party. Under section 5 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, no legislation shall be enacted in the Philippine Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and the due process of law in order to deprive a person of his property is, according to the Code of Civil Procedure, reserved to the judicial authority. The refusal to grant a license or the enactment of an ordinance whereby a person may be deprived of property or rights, or an attempt thereat is made, without previously indemnifying him therefor, is not, nor can it be, due process of law. And, considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by expropriating it for a public use which, be it what it may, cannot be accomplished unless the owner of the property condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases HELD: Therefore, we hereby command the defendants, the city of Manila, and Robert G. Dieck, as city engineer to immediately issue a license in favor of the plaintiff, Doa Carmen Ayala de Roxas, to construct the terrace as aforesaid in accordance with the plan and specification ========== This denial to grant permit is a mere act of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond the powers of the city of Manila, because it is not simply a measure in connection with building regulations, but is an attempt to suppress, without due process of law, real rights which are attached to the right of ownership. Facts: 1. Petitioner owns a land which belongs, without any doubt, to her. Part of the land includes a strip to which she wants to build a terrace over "the strip of land 3 meters in width between the main wall of her house and the edge of the said canal of Sibacon or San Jacinto, which strip of land belongs exclusively to her"; but the city engineer refused to grant the license or authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace.

2. That a similar petition was addressed to the Municipal Board of the city of Manila on the 30th of said month and year, and it also was denied. 3. Sole reason wherefore the license was denied is because "the said defendants pretend to compel the plaintiff to leave vacant and without any construction whatever thereon the said strip of 3 meters in width which is a portion of the ground belonging to her, in order to use the same as the wharf or public way so that the plaintiff will only be able to use the said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as the public in general, thus losing the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of the said strip of the property which the plaintiff and the former owners thereof have enjoyed quietly and peacefully during more than seventy years." 4. The strip above referred to had not been expropriated in whole or in part by the municipality of Manila, and that neither had the latter offered any compensation for the same to the owner thereof. 5. According to Engineer Dieck, a defendant, the purpose of the city was to use the said strip of 3 meters as a place for discharging and landing goods, and as a place of shelter for shipwrecked persons and for fishermen, and to devote it also, together with other strips along the canal, by the gradual acquisition of land, to a towpath for craft passing through the canal; that a building line has been established by the Municipal Board along the Sibacon Creek leaving a strip of 3 meters within which, according to ordinances, no constructions would be permitted; that such is the purpose and the intent on which the existing ordinances are based. 6. But John Tuther, the secretary of the Municipal Board, declares that, when Ordinance No. 78 was under discussion, he does not recall having heard any of the members of the board make reference to a towpath nor did he ever hear anything said with reference to the purpose to which the strip of 3 meters mentioned in Ordinance No. 78 was to be devoted, though he believes that, by thus leaving a strip of 3 meters, it would be easier to prevent collisions; that it would facilitate navigation, and that it had never been the intention of the Board to indemnify the owners of such strips of 3 meters by reason of the use which parties landing thereon may make of the same. Issues: 1. Whether or not such denial of permit is valid? Ruling: Considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending

to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by expropriating it for a public use which, be it what it may, cannot be accomplished unless the owner of the property condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is the only adequate remedy when no other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent which is nothing short of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power with which the same is invested. The question involved here is not the actual establishment of an easement which might be objected to by an action in court, but a mere act of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond the powers of the city of Manila, because it is not simply a measure in connection with building regulations, but is an attempt to suppress, without due process of law, real rights which are attached to the right of ownership. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------People vs. Fajardo [104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958] Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents.

As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SPS. MISERICORDIA GUTIERREZ and RICARDO MALIT and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,respondents. Pedro S. Dabu for private respondents. Facts Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and controlled entity, in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 120, is invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction, operation, and maintenance of electric transmission lines for distribution throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, plaintiff's lines have to pass the lands belonging to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit covered by tax declarations Nos. 907, 4281 and 7582, respectively. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. Trial courts ordered that the defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00 deposited by the plaintiff to cover the provisional value of the land to proceed their construction and for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants, the court appointed three commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one for the defendants and the other from the court, who then were empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to be paid to the owners of the lots. The lower court rendered judgement ordered Napocor to pay defendant spouses the sum of P10.00 per square meter as the fair andreaso

nable compensation for the right-of-way easement of the affected area andP800.00 as attorney's fees'. Dissatisfied with the decision, the plaintiff corporation filed a motion for reconsideration which was favorably acted upon by the lower court, and in an order dated June 10, 1973, it amended its previous decision in the following tenor: On the basis of an ocular inspection made personally by the undersigned, this court finally classified the land of the spouses Ricardo Malit and Misericordia to be partly commercial and partly agricultural, for which reason the amount of P10.00 per sq. meter awarded in the decision of December 4,1972 is hereby reduced to P5.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable market value of the 760 square meters belonging to the said spouses. There being no claim and evidence for attorney's fees, the amount of P800.00 awarded as attorney's fees, in the decision of December 4, 1972 is hereby reconsidered and set aside. (Annex S) Still not satisfied, an appeal was filed by petitioner (NPC) with the Court of Appeals but respondent Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: WHETHER PETITIONER SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY SIMPLE EASEMENT FEE OR FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND TRAVERSED BY ITS TRANSMISSION LINES. Ruling: The petition is devoid of merit. The resolution of this case hinges on the determination of whether the acquisition of a mere right-of-way is an exercise of the power of eminent domain contemplated by law. The trial court's observation shared by the appellate court show that ". . . While it is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property." In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete

equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. It appearing that the trial court did not act capriciously and arbitrarily in setting the price of P5.00 per square meter of the affected property, the said award is proper and not unreasonable. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI [58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974] Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the "just compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, the judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi, from 1 July 1947, by virtue of a contract of lease, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year). Before the expiration of the contract of lease on 30 June 1956, the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff of the AFP on 11 July 1956, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the general public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned in substantially the same condition as before occupancy. The Chief of Staff refused, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to the President.

Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pampanga (Civil Case 1458), to eject the Philippine Air Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent domain against Castellvi, and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun over 3 parcels of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga. In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of the abovementioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259,669.10, that the court authorizes the Republic to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints 3 commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation. The Republic was placed in possession of the lands on 10 August 1959. Meanwhile, on 21 November 1959, the CFI of Pampanga, dismissed Civil Case 1458, upon petition of the parties. After the parties filed their respective memoranda, the trial court, on 26 May 1961, rendered its decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just; and required the Republic to pay interests. On 21 June 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, against which motion Castellvi and Toledo- Gozun filed their respective oppositions, and which the trial court denied on 12 July 1961. The Republic's record on appeal was finally submitted on 6 December 1961, after filing various ex-parte motions for extension of time within which to file its record on appeal. On 27 December 1961 the trial court dismissed both appeals for having been filed out of time, thereby . On 11 January 1962 the Republic filed a "motion to strike out the order of 27 December 1961 and for reconsideration", and subsequently an amended record on appeal, against which motion Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their opposition. On 26 July 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating that "in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court," and at the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal containing copies of orders and pleadings specified therein. In an order dated 19 November 1962, the trial court approved the Republic's record on appeal as amended. Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Toledo-Gozun did not appeal.

Issue: Whether the taking of Castellvis property occurred in 1947 or in 1959. What is the reckoning point?

Held: A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain. 1. First, the expropriator must enter a private property. 2. Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. 3. Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. 4. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. 5. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. The "taking" of Castellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. Two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947. The "taking' of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the "just compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on 10 August 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid

must, therefore, be reckoned as of 26 June 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. ============== Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question. Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of contract.

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983 CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII; HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents. contract. FACTS: -Quezon City created Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" -Sec. 9 of such ordinance states that: At least six 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers -7 yrs after, QC council passed a Resolution: Resolved that the council hereby request the City Engineer to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City because the owners have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial -Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition for declaratory relief before CFI (grounds: resolution contrary to Constitution) RTC: Ordinance 6118, Sec 9 NULL and VOID ISSUE: WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of the police power? QCs Arguments taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties and to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and Himlayangs Arguments the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare.

convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein DECISION: CFIs decision AFFIRMED. Sec 9 Ordinance 6118 NULL & VOID. Grounds: power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution) 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law' Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. the questioned ordinance was passed only after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. Important points: Police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 which reads as follows: To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote, the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.

3 inherent powers of government (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. Police power -the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property' -to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof -the most essential of government powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government -does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. Being coextensive with selfpreservation and survival itself, it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes -scope of police power have become almost boundless -Courts cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------REYES VS. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY [395 SCRA 494; GR NO. 147511; 20 JAN 2003] Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which showed that most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise question the public nature of the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its

rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned to herein petitioners. Issue: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose. Held: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience." Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use." In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social justice. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED Versus Court of Appeals, et al G.R. 125218, G.R. 127008 (January 23, 1998) Facts: Filstream's properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Section 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Very clear from Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) are the limitations with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be

deemed mandatory because these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use. There is nothing in the records that would indicate that City of Manila complied with Section 9 and Section 10 of RA 7279. Filstream International, Inc., is the registered owner of the properties. Filstream filed an ejectment suit against the occupants of the parcels of land (Orlando Malit et al) on the grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered by the MTC on September 14, 1993 ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to Filstream. Appealed. Denied. Twice. Thereafter, no further action was taken by Malit, et.al., as a result of which the decision in the ejectment suit became final and executory. However, during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings Malit, et. al. filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream. It was at this stage that City of Manila came into the picture when the city government approved Ordinance 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means certain parcels of land which formed part of Filstream's properties then occupied by Malit, et. al. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved Ordinance 7855 declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land situated along Antonio Rivera and Fernando Ma. Guerrero streets in Tondo, Manila which were owned by Mr. Enrique Quijano Gutierrez, Filstream's predecessor-in-interest. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. On 23 May 1994, the City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain before the RTC seeking to expropriate the parcels of land owned by Filstream which are situated at Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila. Pursuant to the complaint filed by the City of Manila, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the former which ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed premises to the City of Manila. Appeals from parties. Denied. Appeals. Again and again. Consolidation of cases. At the conclusion of the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeals, in its resolution dated 18 February 1997, found merit in Malit, et. al.'s allegations in support of their application of the issuance of the writ and granted the same. Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

Issue: Whether there is violation of due process against Filstream in the manner its properties were expropriated and condemned in favor of the City of Manila.

Held: Evidently, there was a violation of Filstream's right to due process which must accordingly be rectified. That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them. Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates . It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be expropriated in this case is less than half a hectare only. Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions. Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and housing. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount task in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious dilemma, local government units are not given an unbridled authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in pursuit of solutions to these problems. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows : "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation". Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not without limitations. Even Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code is very explicit that it must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. Very clear from Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) are the limitations with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use. There is nothing in the records that would indicate that City of Manila complied with Section 9 and Section 10 of RA 7279. Filstream's properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the

acquisition of other lands listed under Section 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of Filstream's right to due process which must accordingly be rectified. ==================== FACTS: Filstream is the registered owner of or parcels of land situated in A. Rivera St. in Tondo Manila. On Jan 7, 1993, Filstream filed an ejectment suit before MTC Manila against the occupants of the said property on the ground of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered for Filstream on Sept 14, 1993 ordering private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to petitioner. The respondents appealed before the RTC and then CA, which both affirmed the MTC decision. Meanwhile, on May 25, 1993, while the case is still pending before the MTC, the private respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream before RTC Manila. Subsequently on November 5, 1993, the City of Manila approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, purchase, or other legal means the properties of Filstream, among others. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. On May 23, 1994, respondent City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain to expropriate the aforecited parcels of land owned by petitioner Filstream before RTC Manila. Pursuant to this, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession which ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed premises to the City of Manila. Filstream filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for eminent domain and a motion to Quash the Writ of Possession, which were denied by the RTC, along with the 2 MR's subsequently filed. Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which was denied for procedural flaws. Meanwhile, the decision of the MTC on the ejectment case became final and upon motion of Filstream, the MTC issued a Writ of Execution and Notice to vacate the premises. Private respondents filed a Motion to Recall/Quash the Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate alleging the existence of a supervening event in that the properties subject of the dispute have already been ordered condemned in an expropriation proceeding in favor of the City of Manila for the benefit of the qualified occupants thereof, thus execution shall be stayed. MTC denied the motion and upheld the Writ and the Notice. On April 22, 1996, the trial court issued an order commanding the demolition of the structure erected on the disputed premises, that prompted the private respondents to file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which was granted. A Petition for Certiorari was subsequently filed by City of Manila in another RTC branch to reverse the MTC decision denying the motion to quash the writ of execution. Thereafter, the cases filed by the respondent and the City of Manila were consolidated and an injunction was issued against the writ of execution. These cases were however dismissed by RTC upon motion of Filstream for violation of the SC

Circular against forum shopping. Thereafter, Filstream filed an Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ of Demolition and Ejectment, which as granted. As a consequence of the dismissal of the consolidated cases, private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the same and directed the MTC of Manila to desist from implementing the order of demolition dated January 23, 1997, unless otherwise directed. Thus, Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme COurt seeking to nullify the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals which granted herein private respondents' prayer for a TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the same being null and void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: Whether or not the injunction issued is valid vis-a-vis whether or not the expropriation is valid. HELD: No. The City of Manila has the power of eminent domain as expressly granted by the Local Government Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. However, this power is not unlimited. The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution); private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution)". The governing law that deals with the subject of expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 of which specifically provide the order of lands to be acquired for socialized housing which shows that private property is the last one that should be expropriated. Moreover, Section 10 the same law provides for the modes of acquisition an states that the modes include "community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation. Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted." Upon examination of the records, the court found that the City of Manila has not complied with Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279. Filstream's properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream's right to due process which must accordingly be rectified. Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot

override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due process requirements is in order. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Manosca vs. CA The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has long been discarded. Facts: Alejandro, Asuncion and Leonica Manosca inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about 492 square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the National Historical Institute (NHI) to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 6 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS). Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his opinion 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative. Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by the Manoscas. After a hearing, the trial court issued, on 3 August 1989, an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. The Manoscas moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss. The Manoscas moved for reconsideration thereafter but were denied. The Manoscas then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On 15 January 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition/A motion for the reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court on 23 July 1992. The Manoscas filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the setting up of the marker in commemoration of Felix Manalo, the founder of the religious sect Iglesia ni Cristo, constitutes public use. Ruling: The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines , rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES IGMEDIO and LIWAYWAY CHIONG and the HEIRS OF AGRIFINA ANGELES, represented by FRANCISCO MERCURIO, respondents. 1. National Power Corportation: (RA No. 6395) government owned and controlled corporation, created and existing for the purpose of undertaking the development of hydroelectric power, the production of electrical power from any source, particularly by constructing, operating, and maintaining power plantstransmission lines, power stations, and similar works to tap the power generated from any river, creek, lake, spring, or waterfall in the country and supplying such power to the inhabitants thereof. In order to carry out said purposes, NPC is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain. 2. On February 19, 1998, NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain with the RTC of Iba, Zambales. a. It sought the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way and certain portions of agricultural lands owned by Igmedio and Liwayway Chiong and the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles, as represented by Francisco Mercurio, to be used in its Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line Project. 3. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings.

4. Trial courts ordered that the defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00 deposited by the plaintiff to cover the provisional value of the land to proceed their construction and for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due the defendants, the court appointed three commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one for the defendants and the other from the court, who then were empowered to receive evidence, conduct ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just compensation to be paid to the owners of the lots.

5. The lower court rendered judgement ordered Napocor to pay defendant spouses the sum of P10.00 per square meter as the fair andreasonable compensation for the right-of-way easement of the affected area andP800.00 as attorney's fees'. 6. Dissatisfied with the decision, the plaintiff corporation filed a motion for reconsideration which was favorably acted upon by the lower court, and in an order dated June 10, 1973, it amended its previous decision in the following tenor: On the basis of an ocular inspection made personally by the undersigned, this court finally classified the land of the spouses Ricardo Malit and Misericordia to be partly commercial and partly agricultural, for which reason the amount of P10.00 per sq. meter awarded in the decision of December 4,1972 is hereby reduced to P5.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable market value of the 760 square meters belonging to the s aid spouses. There being no claim and evidence for attorney's fees, the amount of P800.00 awarded as attorney's fees, in the decision of December 4, 1972 is hereby reconsidered and set aside. (Annex S) 7. Still not satisfied, an appeal was filed by petitioner (NPC) with the Court of Appeals but respondent Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY SIMPLE EASEMENT FEE OR FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND TRAVERSED BY ITS TRANSMISSION LINES. RULING: Respondent: mere easement (right of way) The petition is devoid of merit. The resolution of this case hinges on the determination of whether the acquisition of a mere right-of-way is an exercise of the power of eminent domain contemplated by law. The trial court's observation shared by the appellate court show that ". . . While it is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a right-of-way easement, it

nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their property." In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. It appearing that the trial court did not act capriciously and arbitrarily in setting the price of P5.00 per square meter of the affected property, the said award is proper and not unreasonable. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the just compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. FACTS:

1. On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). 2. Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation included, among others, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the private respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the property. 3. The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the private respondent, to expropriate the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66, as amended, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of export processing zones, in relation to Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. 4. At the pre-trial conference on February 13, 1981, the respondent judge issued an order stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved is the just compensation for the properties and that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and the hearing on the merits is set on April 2, 1981. 5. On February 17, 1981, the respondent judge issued the order of condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint. The respondent judge also issued a second order, subject of this petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. 6. On June 19, 1981, the three commissioners submitted their consolidated report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for the properties. 7. On July 29, 1981, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of February 19, 1981 and Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533. BEFORE: Garcia v. Court of Appeals (102 SCRA 597, 608), ". . . Hence, in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and all the uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered and not merely the condition it is in the time and the use to which it is then applied

by the owner. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities may be shown and considered in estimating its value." Republic v. Santos (141 SCRA 30, 35-36), "According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissioners' report. It may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property expropriated. This Court may substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the record (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286). AFTER: P.D. No. 76: "For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower." P.D. No. 464: "Section 92.Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. In determining just compensation which private property is acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." P.D. No. 794: "Section 92.Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation proceedings. In determining just compensation when private property is acquired by the government for public use, the same shall not exceed the market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower." P.D. No. 1533: "Section 1.In determining just compensation for private property acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the

assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property." ISSUE: In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose. RULING: YES. We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier well-established doctrine, to our mind, is more in keeping with the principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights." The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final determination. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis for just compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal, later city assessor long before martial law, when land was not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the owner of the properties at the time. It purchased the lots for development purposes. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.

It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated. HELD: We return to older and more sound precedents. This Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. (See Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra). The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation. We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on February 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[G.R. No. 76182. March 11, 1991.] BELEN v. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: A small portion of land measuring a hundred (100) square meters, more or less, belonging to the Manotoc Services, Inc. was leased to Pedro M. Belen. That piece of land is known as Lot No. 10, Block 18 and is situated at Sunog Apog, Tondo, Manila. On it stood a house built by Belen. Part of the land came to be occupied by Alfredo Juliano and his family in the early part of 1978; Juliano bought a house standing thereon, not belonging to Belen, and moved in without the latter's knowledge. On learning of this, Belen had a talk with Juliano, and they came to an agreement that Juliano could continue staying on the land temporarily and would pay one-half of

the rental to Manotok Realty, Inc. Later a fire razed both Belen's and Juliano's houses to the ground. Belen told Juliano not to build anything on the land any more. However, on Juliano's pleas, Belen acceded to Juliano's continued stay on the land on the explicit condition that his occupancy should not be longer than two and a half (2 1/2) years. When Juliano failed to leave the premises after the stipulated term despite demand, Belenbrought suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court sometime in September, 1982. Juliano appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila. That Court reversed the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court. On Appeal - The decision rendered on June 26, 1985, 6 was made to rest on the expropriation of the Manotok Estate effected by Presidential Decree No. 1670, and declared that "PD No. 1670 . . . has expropriated real property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog, Tondo, Manila . . . formerly owned by the Manotok Realty, INC. . . . The decree was signed on January 28, 1980. The government has started to implement the expropriation (See Exhibit '2,' p. 7; 2, rec.) . . . Alfredo Juliano is a prospective beneficiary of the Bliss Project being undertaken by the National Housing Authority at the site in question (See Exhibits '2-B' and '3'). Therefore, when the complaint in this case was filed on September 13, 1982, . . . Manotok Realty Services, Inc. was no longer the owner of the premises in question and as correctly contended by defendants-appellants, the relation between plaintiff-appellee and defendants-appellants were also deemed terminated." The decision declared that by virtue of the decree, Manotok Realty, Inc. ceased to be the owner of the land, including the lot leased to Belen, and could not interfere with the possession, administration, control and disposition of the National Housing Authority (NHA); its only right being to claim the just compensation thereof; that as a result, Manotok's lease contract with Belen over the lot in question also ipso facto ended ISSUE: RULING: Appeal GRANTED. Appealed decision REVERSED. The Court found that both the decrees, being "violative of the petitioners' (owners') right to due process of law," failed "the test of constitutionality," and that, additionally, they were tainted by another infirmity as regards "the determination of just compensation." "The decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the just compensation. Having failed to provide for a hearing, the Government should have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so. Obviously, it did not deem it necessary because the enactment of the

questioned decrees which rendered, by their very passage, any questions with regard to the expropriation of the properties, moot and academic. In effect, the properties under the decrees were 'automatically expropriated.' This becomes more evident when the NHA wrote the Register of Deeds and requested her to cancel the certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said Register of Deeds only with copies of the decrees to support its request. This is hardly the due process of law which the state is expected to observe when it exercises the power of eminent domain. PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance therewith must also be deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of the property by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries thereof. The invalidation of P.D. 1670 removes the basis for the decisions of the Regional Trial C ourt and the Court of Appeals, which are both contrary to the verdict of the Metropolitan Trial Court. Right of possession: Pedro Belens superior right of possession over the Lot 10, block 18 of the "Sunog-Apog Estate" of the Manotok Services, Inc ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------MERALCO VS PINEDA (1992) FACTS: 1. Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. || While private respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista are owners in fee simple of the expropriated property situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal. 2. On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner MERALCO against forty-two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila. 3. The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite petitioner's offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed to reach an agreement. 4. Respondents always demanded for expropriation compensation and respondent judge always ruled in favor despite the fact that commissioners are still to be assigned in the contemplation of the right amount of compensation. 5. Pursuant to a government policy, the petitioners on October 30, 1979 sold to the National Power Corporation (Napocor) the power plants and transmission lines, including the transmission lines traversing private respondents' property.

6. On February 11, 1980, respondent court issued an Order appointing the members of the Board of Commissioners to make an appraisal of the properties. 7. On June 5, 1980, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has lost all its interests over the transmission lines and properties under expropriation because of their sale to the Napocor. In view of this motion, the work of the Commissioners was suspended. 8. The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation to private respondents without formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the reasonable value of the property constitutes a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process. It stressed that respondent court ignored the procedure laid down by the law in determining just compensation because it formulated an opinion of its own as to the value of the land in question without allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the reception of evidence. ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation. RULING: The applicable laws in the case at bar are Sections 5 and 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 5.Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their report is to be filed with the court. "Section 8.Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken."

Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by A.B.A. Homes and private respondents on June 1, 1972. This agreement was merely attached to the motion to withdraw from petitioner's deposit. Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation on its own, without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners. While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons. Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine just compensation. Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a smaller amount by the court, the property owners are subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a larger sum, they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by the court. Thus, when the respondent court granted in the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 the motions of private respondents for withdrawal of certain sums from the deposit of petitioner, without prejudice to the just compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of the case, it committed no error. Thus, Meralco had already ceded and in fact lost all its rights and interests over the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of Napocor. In addition, the same contract reveals that the Napocor was previously advised and actually has knowledge of the pending litigation and proceedings against Meralco. This Court is convinced that the respondent judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws of the Philippines For the purpose of constructing a transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Pililia, Rizal, petitioner needed portions of land of the private respondents with an aggregate area of 237, 321 sqm; parties failed to reach an agreement despite negotiations and offers to pay compensation Petitioner then filed a complaint for eminent domain with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Court authorized petitioner to take and enter property sought to be expropriated Respondents filed for Motion for Withdrawal of deposit claiming they are entitled but were subsequently denied Petitioner then sold to NAPOCOR its power plants and transmission lines including the one in questions pursuant to a government policy The court then appointed commissioners for the appraisal of the land Commissioners work was suspended when petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss because of their said sale to NAPOCOR Respondents filed another motion for payment and courts granted and another sum thereafter Petitioner then filed for a Motion for Reconsideration and alleged that at this stage the respondents are not yet entitled to payment of just compensation as there is no appraisal yet and that court, upon awarding a fraction of sum, based it only on a witness of a credible real estate broker instead of employing the assistance of three commissioners to determine just compensation ISSUE Whether the court can dispense the employment of three commissioners in the ascertainment of just compensation HELD No Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: the court shall appoint 3 commissioners to ascertain just compensation and render judgment based on their reports 2 stages of expropriation: 1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise power of eminent domain 2. Determination of the court of just compensation for the property sought done with the assistance of 3 commissioners A trial before commissioners in a mandatory and substantive right, indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation

Reasons for court to disregard findings of commissioners: 1. Where the commissioners applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them 2. Where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence 3. Where the amount is either grossly inadequate and excessive

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Republic vs Santos FACTS: -expropriation of a 66,096 square meters of land claimed by 44 persons, located in Paranaque and Muntinlupa, Rizal -expropriation was necessary for the widening of, and construction of interchanges in, the Manila South Diversion Road. -Appraisal Committee of Rizal fixed amount at P40/sq.m. or an aggregate amount of P2,641,190 in its Resolution No. 10, series of 1968. -Some respondents, including Maura Santos, withdrew the amounts corresponding to them subject to the outcome of the case -CFI granted the fiscal's motion fixing the provisional value at P2,641,190. A writ of possession was issued to the Republic of the Philippines -14 claimants did not object to the valuation of P40 a square meter. -As to those who did not settle at the price of P40 a square meter, the trial court, pursuant to section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, appointed three commissioners to determine the just compensation -Commissioners recommended that the just compensation for the lands should be P100 a square meter except the land of Maura Santos with an area of 25,909 square meters which should be evaluated at P60 a square meter -The Court of Appeals adopted the commissioners' report. It added 6% legal rate of interest. -Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON the Commissioners Report on expropriation is binding upon courts?

Republics Arguments 14 out of the 44 claimants already sold their lots to the Republic at P40 a square meter. commissioners' report was not substantiated by trustworthy evidence. Presidential Decree No. 1533 provides that just compensation should be the value of the land "prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property."

Respondents Arguments (santos, etc) prices per square meter ranged from P150 to P200 and that subdivision lots in the vicinity were being sold at P85 to P120 a square meter

DECISION: RTC and CA reversed and set aside. The just compensation for the lands is forty pesos (P40) per square meter Grounds: Santos was already paid P1,036,360 for her expropriated land. 14 claimants out of 44 had willingly sold their lands to the Government at P40 a square meter Section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissioners' report. It may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property expropriated. This Court may substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the record ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Landbank vs CA 249 SCRA 196 It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side . 1 As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz: ". . . social justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich

simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law." 2 FACTS: Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 6 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, 7 and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked," "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. Judgment was ruled in their favor in lower court and on appeal. Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation. RULING: PETITIONER: "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657. UNTENABLE. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows: "SECTION 16.Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. . . . (e)Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the

compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit. PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATIO : BEFORE OR AFTER THE TAKING?? ISSUE NUMBER 2: issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the negative. CASE: "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform." ". . . despite the 'revolutionary' character of the expropriation envisioned under RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that 'payments of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money' even as the Supreme Court admits in the same case 'that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other' the Supreme Court in said case did not abandon the 'recognized rule . . . that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation." To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that: ". . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation

cannot be considered 'just' for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss." It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. HELD: Appealed decision is AFFIRM in TOTO. =========== Facts: In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its resolution. Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the following the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals. Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, they sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. DAR and Land Bank filed for petitions but it was dismissed and they filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Issues: Whether or not the opening of "trust accounts" is within the coverage of term "deposit. Ruling: The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit. Accordingly, we must adhere to the well -settled rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. The validity of constituting trust accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding immediate payment to them is further premised on the latter's refusal to accept the offered compensation there by making it necessary that the amount remains in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to the landowners. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property under the CARP puts the landowner, and not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against his favor. He has no recourse but to allow it. His only consolation is that he

can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for the expropriated property. Unduly burdening the property owners from the resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARP, which was supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation, is plainly unfair and unacceptable. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF DAR [175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. L-78742; 14 JUL 1989] Facts: Several petitions are the root of the case: a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislatures power. b. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victorias Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion. c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares. Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional. Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent domain. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police Power and Eminent Domain. RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and the method.

Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the method employed to achieve it.

CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO Facts: On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the land for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower courts decision in toto. ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. HELD: NO In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA FACTS: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings on 19 September 1969 before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Bulacan, covering a total of 544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the "Voice of the Philippines" project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency ("PIA"), took over the premises after the previous lessee, the "Voice of America," had ceased its operations thereat. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than nine years after the institution of the expropriation proceedings condemning the properties of the defendants and that plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants the just compensation for said property which is the fair market value of the land condemned, computed at the rate of six pesos (P6.00) per square meter, with legal rate of interest from September 19, 1969, until fully paid The bone of contention in the instant controversy is the 76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Santos which forms part of the expropriated area. It would appear that the national government failed to pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, On 09 May 1984, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. On 07 June 1984, the Bulacan RTC, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ of execution served on the plaintiff, through the Office of the Solicitor General, for the implementation thereof. When the order was not complied with, respondents again filed a motion urging the trial court to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amount of P72,683.55, a portion of the sum deposited by petitioner at the inception of the expropriation proceedings in 1969, corresponding to their share of the deposit. The trial court, in its order of 10 July 1984, granted the motion. In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, 2 transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the PIA.

 This fact notwithstanding, and despite the 1984 court order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until 16 September 1999 when petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation as might be approved by the court. This time, the Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. On 01 March 2000, the Bulacan RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the assailed order, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 and declaring it to be unenforceable on the ground of prescription Petitioner brought the matter up to the Court of Appeals but the petition was outrightly denied. It would appear that the denial was based on Section 4, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provided that the filing of a motion for reconsideration in due time after filing of the judgment, order or resolution interrupted the running of the sixty-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari; and that if a motion for reconsideration was denied, the aggrieved party could file the petition only within the remaining period, but which should not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from the notice of such denial. Thus this instant petition. ISSUE/S: WON defendants can expropriate unpaid lands from the government? RULING: The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya 14where the unpaid landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question. It might be borne in mind that the

case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited application. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No. 7160 15 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and allencompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking. Limitation of Right to eminent Domain: 1. first, the taking must be for public use; and a. In determining "public use," two approaches are utilized i. the first is public employment the actual use by the public, and ii. the second is public advantage or benefit. 2. second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose.

The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is. The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides not only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes, exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the judgment. The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum 28 should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. 29 Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations. 30In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account to alter the value of the currency. 31 All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 31 July 2000, of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari, as well as its resolution of 04 January 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, dated 01 March 2000, are SET ASIDE. Let the case be forthwith remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for the proper execution of its decision promulgated on 26 February 1979 which is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. ITaESD

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGINIA CHIONGBIAN, respondents. Facts: On April 16, 1952, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation proceeding, Civil Case No. R-1881 (Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch), on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which included Lot 941, for the expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport In June 1953, appellee Virginia Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, Antonina Faborada, the original defendant in the expropriation case, for P8,000.00. Subsequently, TCT No. 9919 was issued in her name December 29, 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Republic of the Philippines which was made to pay Virginia Chiongbian the amount of P34,415.00 for Lot 941, with legal interest computed from November 16, 1947, the date when the government begun using it. Virginia Chiongbian did not appeal therefrom. 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the MactanCebu International Airport Authority to which the assets of the Lahug Airport was transferred. Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under TCT No. 120366 on May 8, 1992 July 24, 1995, Virginia Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 9, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-17650 June 3, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Virginia Chiongbian MCIAA contends that the Republic of the Philippines appropriated Lot No. 941 through expropriation proceedings in Civil Case No. R-1881. The judgment rendered therein was unconditional and did not contain a stipulation that ownership thereof would revert to CHIONGBIAN nor did it give CHIONGBIAN the right to repurchase the same in the event the lot was no longer used for the purpose it was expropriated.

ISSUE: DOES CHONGBIAN HAD A RIGHT TO REPURCHASE THE EXPROPRAITED LOT 941.

RULING: The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a corporation which has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If, for example, land is expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug airport. CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. Court of Appeals[14] wherein the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the existence of a written agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation proceedings but a contract of sale. This Court consequently allowed the presentation of parol evidence to prove the existence of an agreement allowing the right of repurchase based on the following ratiocination: Under the parol evidence rule, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties thereto.