Aviation Security 1950-2000

Threat and Response

The threat to civil aviation over the last 25 years has not diminished.
It remains a dangerous world. The number of incidents worldwide of
unlawful interference with civil aviation, primarily hijacking and
sabotage, have decreased over the last 25 years, while the number of
flights, enplanements and passenger-miles flown by scheduled air
carriers have increased. As graphically demonstrated by the two most
recent hijackings, however, this decrease in the number of events does
not minimize the tragedy of these crimes. Governments, airlines and
airports must work together cooperatively to achieve our common goal:
safe and secure air transportation worldwide.

When hijacking was an all too frequent occurrence in the late 1960's
and 1970-71, air carriers voluntarily cooperated with the Federal
Government on measures to counter the threat, but not without some
concern. One history describes the situation at the time as follows:

"The airlines as a group had consistently argued that

combating hijacking and airport security were largely
Federal responsibilities. They had therefore fought for
Federal operation and payment for anti-hijacking programs.
The airlines were especially unhappy about the prospect of
their employees physically searching passengers or engaging
in any other activities normally assigned to law
enforcement officials. Most were, therefore, pleased with
the infusion of Federal agents under the sky marshal
program. When it became clear that security systems would
have to be extended to virtually all of their boarding
areas, the airlines began an intensive lobbying campaign
for an expansion of the existing Federal security force to
handle the operation."1

Criminal acts against civil aviation are not committed exclusively by

terrorists. Most crimes against civil aviation have been committed by
mentally deranged persons, or fugitives and would-be refugees who
resorted to hijacking only as a means of transportation with no clear
intention of harming the aircraft or its occupants. Others are more
deadly. In 1955, a United Airlines aircraft disintegrated in flight 11
minutes after takeoff near Longmont, Colorado. A dynamite bomb
detonated in a baggage compartment, killing 39 passengers and five
crew. One J. Graham was arrested, tried, and executed for the crime,
for which the motive was insurance fraud.2 Another incident of sabotage
over Bolivia, North Carolina, in early 1960 killed 34 passengers and
crew and was also related to insurance fraud. A ceiling on the amount
of airline trip insurance passengers can purchase was imposed, and

1 Kent, Richard J., Jr., "Safe, Separated and Soaring: A History of Federal Civil Aviation Policy 1961-1972," U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 1980, pp. 349-50.

2 President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, "Report to the President," Washington, DC, May 15,1990, p.160.
baggage screening was improved. Domestic airline sabotage declined
until there were no fatal incidents in the 1970 's.3

In 1969, Eastern Air Lines voluntarily agreed to an FAA test of an

"operational screening system for boarding airline passengers" with
"weapon-detection devices" used in conjunction with "FAA's evolving
psychological profile to identify and isolate suspicious individuals
for further surveillance or search."4 Eastern was joined later in that
year by TWA, Pan Am, and Continental in "using the screening system."5
The sharing of the costs of passenger screening was then and has
continued to be a topic of debate and divided opinions. A solution
found in 1972 was to require air carriers to provide screening
personnel and the airport operators to provide law enforcement support.

On March 18, 1972, Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)

part 107 was issued requiring each airport operator to implement
prescribed security measures by developing and observing an
airport-specific security program. Part 107 has been amended on
several occasions. On January 15, 1981, Title 14 CFR part 108
was issued to separate air carrier security requirements from
part 121, which contains general safety requirements for large
transport category aircraft. Historically, the threat of
hijacking has been directed toward large passenger-carrying
aircraft. The security requirements needed to protect those
aircraft were placed in this new part 108 with applicability to
scheduled and public charter passenger operations.

While there were 134 domestic hijackings between 1961 and 1972, and
seven explosions aboard commercial aircraft between 1955 and 1976 in
, | these domestic security incidents did not contain
clearly "terrorist" elements until a hijacking at LaGuardia Airport in
September 1976. A group called "Fighters for Free Croatia" hijacked a
TWA flight bound for Chicago. After stops in Montreal, Quebec; Gander,
Newfoundland; and Iceland for refueling, they dropped leaflets over
London and Paris landed in Paris and surrendered.6 Ironically, the
perpetrators believed that security screening was tight at LaGuardia
and decided to use simulated explosives made from material smuggled on
board rather than traditional weapons, which probably would have been
discovered. The group met the profile and triggered more than usual
rigorous searching. The ruse was bolstered by a genuine bomb that had
been planted in a New York subway locker; the hijackers notified
police, and the bomb exploded during examination.7

3 Rochester, Stuart I., "Takeoff at Mid-century: Federal Civil Aviation Policy in the Eisenhower Years 1953-1961,"
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington DC, 1976, pp. 262-3 & 275.

4 Kent, Richard J., Jr., "Safe, Separated and Soaring: A History of Federal Civil Aviation Policy 1961 - 1972," U.S. Department of
Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC, 1980, p. 338. The recommendations and the test were devised by
the FAA Task Force on Deterrence of Air Piracy, created by Acting Administrator Dave Thomas on February 17, 1969.

5 Id., p. 340.

6 St. John, Peter, "Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism," Quorum Books, New York, Westport, Connecticut, and
London, 1991, p. 31.

7 Preston, Edmund, "Troubled Passage: The Federal Aviation Administration During the Nixon-Ford Term 1973-1977,"
U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 1987, pp. 215-17. This incident should not be confused with
the self-service baggage locker bombing at LaGuardia Airport in New York on December 29, 1975. See also: Moore, Kenneth C.,
In the 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Senator Cannon, Chairman of the
Aviation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, introduced
the "Air Transportation Security Act of 1973" as S.39, "A Bill to amend
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to provide a more effective program to
prevent aircraft piracy and for other purposes."8 For most of the last
25 years, the executive branch of the Federal Government has maintained
that providing security is a cost of doing business, which should be
borne by the air carriers and airports just as they bear the cost of
ensuring safe operations. The most authoritative statement of this
position was recorded during the hearings in February and March 1973,
which led to amendments to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, now
codified in title 49, United States Code. These amendments were
contained in two related titles of Public Law 93-366: title I--the
Antihijacking Act of 1974, and title II--the Air Transportation
Security Act of 1974. In those hearings, the views of a high-ranking
Transportation Department official clearly indicated that the users of
civil aviation should bear its costs, and those costs explicitly
included those derived from the application of security measures.9

Through the 1970's and into the 1980's, concerted action by the world
aviation community reduced the number of hijacking attempts. A number
of approaches to the problems caused by the threat of terrorism and
other criminal acts against civil aviation were taken in those two
decades. They include:

• more effective passenger and baggage screening;

• imposition of contingency or extraordinary security measures in
special circumstances;
• worldwide use of x-ray and metal detection equipment;
• increased use of other, more advanced screening and detection
devices;
• in-depth assessments of U.S. and foreign airport and air carrier
security;
• the U.S. Federal Air Marshal Program;
• tightened control of access to aircraft and security sensitive
areas;
• increased research and development of explosives detection and other
security technologies;
• improved analyses of intelligence on terrorist activities; and,
• better technical assistance and training.

The 1980's saw a change in the nature of violent acts against aviation.
Hijacking, seemingly the preferred form of criminal and terrorist

"Airport, Aircraft, and Airline Security," Second Edition, Butterworth-Heinemann, a division of Reed Publishing (USA), Inc., Boston,
London, Oxford, Singapore, Sydney, Toronto, and Wellington, 1991, pp. 28, 165, and 389.

8 S.39 was introduced on January 4, 1973. Senator Cannon then noted that there were more than 1,700 Federal security officers on
duty at U.S. airports.

9 "Anti-Hijacking Act of 1973": Hearings on H.R. 3858, H.R. 670, H.R. 3953, and H.R. 4287 (and all identical or similar bills) before
the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93rd Cong. 222 (1973)
(statement of Hon. Egil Krogh, Jr., Under Secretary, Department of Transportation), February 27, 1973. See also Kent, Richard J.,
Jr., "Safe, Separated and Soaring: A History of Federal Civil Aviation Policy 1961 - 1972," U.S. Department of Transportation,
Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC, 1980.
activity, was joined once again by the placement of explosive devices
aimed at the total destruction of aircraft, passengers, and crew. The
vast majority of criminal and terrorist acts against civil aviation J -
during this decade occurred overseas rather than in the United States. M \f(W*
Some believe the decline in hijacking may have been due to more , ,«-c '
effective security at airports.10 In any case, the threat has broadened H J
to include the introduction of bombs aboard aircraft and murderous J^
attacks within airports. The following terrorist incidents are ^
illustrative examples of what FAA seeks to prevent through effective
security measures efficiently applied:

June 13, 1985: Trans World Airlines (TWA) Flight 847 from Athens,
Greece was hijacked. The hijacking lasted 17 days before the
terrorists released the aircraft and its remaining hostages in Beirut,
Lebanon. U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem was killed by the hijackers.
The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985
(P.L. 99-83, Title V, Pt. B) was enacted soon thereafter. It
established security standards and procedures concerning foreign air
transportation; required the Secretary of Transportation to conduct
assessments of security measures at foreign airports; and, designated
Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention), standards and appropriate recommended practices, as the
guidelines that must be used by the Secretary of Transportation.11

June 23, 1985: Air India Flight 182 from Toronto and Montreal to s
India crashed at sea after an explosion in the front cargo hold, K
probably caused by a bomb. All 329 passengers were killed,
including 22 U.S. citizens. The same day at Tokyo's Narita
Airport, a checked bag being transferred from a Canadian Pacific
to an Air India flight exploded, killed two baggage handlers and
injured others.

November 23, 1985: An EgyptAir flight was hijacked enroute from

Athens to Cairo and diverted to Malta. An Egyptian commando unit
stormed the plane after several passengers were shot, including
three Americans, in reprisal for failing to meet hijacker
demands. A total of 59 of 96 passengers died in the gun battle
and fire.

December 27, 1985: Simultaneous attacks occurred at two European

airports against passengers and the general public in open
terminal areas. Sixteen people were killed and 74 wounded at
Rome's Leonardo da Vinci International Airport including five
Americans; three persons were killed and 45 wounded at Vienna's
Schwechat International Airport.

April 2, 1986: A bomb placed onboard TWA Flight 840 detonated (I,
enroute from Rome, Italy. Four passengers were killed but the
aircraft made a safe landing in Athens, Greece.

May 30, 1986: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and

Canadian authorities uncovered a terrorist conspiracy to bomb an

10 Simon, Jeffrey D., "The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience with Terrorism," Indiana University Press, Bloomington and
Indianapolis, 1994, pp. 349-50 and 396-99.

" FAA Security Specialists conduct these assessments and provide their findings to the Secretary through appropriate channels.
Air India jet departing from JFK International Airport. Five
individuals were charged with sabotage, but only two were
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.

September 5, 1986: Terrorists assaulted Pan American (Pan Am)

Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan as the aircraft waited to depart.
The four terrorists were dressed similar to airport security
personnel and drove a van resembling an airport security vehicle
alongside the aircraft. The flight crew was able to escape while
the terrorists stormed the aircraft. After 17 hours of
negotiations, the aircraft's auxiliary power unit failed.
Anticipating an attack by security forces, the terrorists opened
fire on the massed passengers killing 22 persons and injuring 125
others before security forces could intercede.

November 29, 1987: A bomb on Korean Airlines Flight 858 detonated T5 ^~

over the Indian Ocean. All 115 persons onboard were killed.

pril 5, 1988: Kuwait Airways Flight 422 was hijacked enroute

from Bangkok, Thailand. The hijackers left the aircraft 15 days \-\r in Algiers, Alg

release prisoners in exchange for hostages. The hijackers had

killed two Kuwaiti passengers to emphasize their demands.

December 21, 1988: Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed in flight by a p

omb placed in checked baggage. All 243 passengers and 16 crew I? '—
n board, plus 11 persons on the ground at Lockerbie, Scotland
were killed. Subsequent inspection of the reconstructed aircraft
determined that a device consisting of plastic explosives inside
a tape cassette player was concealed in checked luggage.
Individuals working for the Government of Libya are responsible
for the bombing. One conspirator was the former manager of the
JLibyan Arab Airlines (LAA) office in Valletta, Malta and retained
vfull access to the airport. Using this access privilege and
Dther knowledge gained as representatives of LAA, the
conspirators bypassed security checks at Valletta's Luqu airport
md inserted the suitcase containing the bomb into baggage of an
Air Malta flight to Frankfurt, Germany.

September 19, 1989: Union de Transport Aeriens (UTA) Flight 772 *

was destroyed by a bomb over Chad, nine months after the Pan Am P
103 explosion over Lockerbie. All 171 persons on board were
killed, including seven Americans.

November 11, 1989: A bomb placed onboard Avianca Flight 203 (5>
petonated over Columbia in the cabin area destroying the aircraft
lin-flight. One hundred and seven passengers and crew were
killed.

July 19, 1994: An Alas Chiricanas Airline plane exploded in flight over (? ,/
Banama, killing all 21 people on board, including three U.S. citizens.

December 11, 1994: On Philippine Flight 434, a bomb detonated

enroute to Tokyo from Cebu. One passenger was killed. \? ^
Investigation of this act revealed an increased threat in early
1995 to U.S. carriers operating in the Asia-Pacific region.
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef has been indicted for bombing Philippine
Airline Flight 433, for conspiracy to bomb U.S. flag aircraft,
and for bombing New York's World Trade Center in February 1993.

December 24, 1994: In one of the most provocative terrorist acts

in history, a hijacking may have included the intent to destroy
Air France Flight 8969 in-flight over Paris. While on the ground
at Houari Boumedienne International Airport, Algeria, Air France
Flight 8969 was commandeered by four terrorists armed with
automatic weapons, hand grenades, and explosives. The four
gunmen wore what appeared to be Air Algerie uniforms and
displayed airport identification. The hijackers killed three
passengers. French counterterrorism forces stormed the aircraft
at Marseille Marignane Airport; all four hijackers were killed.
Improvised explosive devices were found on the aircraft, leading
to speculation that the hijackers intended to blow up the
aircraft over Paris.

In addition, individual acts of revenge or criminality must also

be prevented since the consequences of such acts can be just as
deadly as those spawned by terrorism.

For example, on December 7, 1987, Pacific Southwest Airlines

(PSA) Flight 1771 crashed after a recently terminated airline
employee boarded the Los Angeles-San Francisco flight with a
handgun, shot one passenger (his former supervisor), the flight
crew, flight attendant, and presumably himself. As a result, all
38 passengers and five crew on board were killed. The fired
employee retained his airline ID after his dismissal and used it
to bypass the passenger screening checkpoint.

On August 14, 1990, a man armed with a .38 caliber revolver

entered the Ogden Allied Services garage at Washington, D.C.'s
National Airport, and held several employees at gun point. He
was a former employee at Ogden and had voluntarily left his job.
He commandeered a fuel truck, forced an Ogden employee to drive
onto the air operations area and fired several shots at a second
Ogden fuel truck, wounding two persons. He was in possession of
30 to 40 rounds of ammunition when he was arrested. A Molotov
cocktail was recovered from the commandeered fuel truck, and
several others were found in the gunman's vehicle.

On May 7, 1995, at Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport, a

man armed with a 7.62mm Norinco SKS rifle attempted to enter a
secure area through a door in the baggage claim area. Unable to
gain access, the gunman fired several rounds, shattering several
panes of plate glass, and then proceeded through the terminal
firing his weapon. The gunman then exited the terminal to a
public driveway, exchanged fire with responding police officers
and was shot three times before being apprehended. Three persons
were injured by flying debris, but none seriously. The weapon
used appeared to have been altered to fire automatically and the
gunman was in possession of 90 rounds of ammunition. The gunman
I never gained access to sterile or secure areas of the airport.
The Bombing of Pan Am 103

It was the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland during
a flight from Frankfurt on December 21, 1988, that stimulated the most
significant changes in aviation security since the early 1970's.

"Libyan agents struck again, according to U.S. intelligence, on Dec. 23, 1988, when Pan Am Flight 103
was destroyed by a bomb over Lockerbie, Scotland. Two hundred and seventy people died in the terrorist
incident." (Washington Post: "Terror Strikes: Palestinian Terror and the Rise of Libya" © Copyright 1999
The Washington Post Company)

In February 1989, Secretary of Transportation Skinner attended a

Special Session of the ICAO Council called as the result of a joint
U.S./U.K. initiative to specifically address the sabotage of Pan Am
Flight 103. Nine other ministers responsible for civil aviation
attended, as well as representatives from 23 other Member States.
During the session, the 33-member ICAO Council unanimously adopted a
resolution describing a high priority plan of action to review and
improve all existing international standards applicable to all
operations. It also considered developing a set of extraordinary
measures for use when increased threat levels exist. ICAO agreed to
encourage States to expedite research and development on the detection
of explosives and explore the possibility of establishing an
international regime for the marking or "tagging" of explosives to
facilitate detection, which resulted in a treaty signed and ratified by
the United States.

On April 3, 1989, Secretary of Transportation Skinner announced several

aviation security initiatives after an intensive internal review of the
U.S. aviation security system and after meeting with the families of
the Pan Am 103 victims, the Congress and the President. These
included: deployment of explosives detection systems (EDS);
improvements in the FAA security bulletin process; deployment of
additional FAA security specialists overseas; elevating standards for
x-ray and metal detection equipment; creation of an Aviation Security
Advisory Committee; a comprehensive review of carrier compliance with
the extraordinary security measures required on December 29, 1988; and
discussions with foreign governments.

On August 4, 1989, the President's Commission on Aviation Security and

Terrorism was created by Executive Order 12686, its Charter completed
and submitted to the President by DOT. Its objective was to conduct a
comprehensive study and appraisal of practices and policy options to
prevent terrorist acts against civil aviation with particular reference
to the destruction of Pan Am 103. Many hearings were held. The
Commission's report was issued on May 15, 1990, and has been reviewed
in detail by the Departments of State and Transportation, other
government agencies and the industry. Its recommendations formed the
basis of many of the provisions of the Aviation Security Improvement
Act Of 1990 (P.L. 101-604) .

The crash of Flight 103, which had been full of Americans heading home for Christmas, left a crater in the
ground at Lockerbie. Investigators combed the countryside for clues. (CORBIS/Bryn Colton)

iAviation Security Improvement Act of 1990

On November 16, 1990, the President signed Public Law 101-604, the
Aviation Security Improvement Act, which strengthened the role of the
Federal government in civil aviation security including a number of
actions recommended by the President's Commission on Aviation Security
and Terrorism. The Act mandated regulatory responses, security program
guidelines, establishment of new positions, Congressional reports, and
other research and development, and administrative initiatives. All
actions assigned to FAA have been completed in a good faith attempt to
meet both the letter and the spirit of the Act. The results were
structured to ensure that all views were taken into account while still
carrying out the law. Listed below are five themes that cover elements
of the 1990 Act.

ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL: Since the Act, both the Office of the
Secretary and the FAA have specialized organizations that handle
aviation security. Both are headed by senior executives who report
lirectly to the Secretary or the Administrator. Concerns about
security are not filtered. There are 18 Civil Aviation Security
Liaison Officers (CASLO) overseas to cover foreign airports and 19
Federal Security Managers here at home stationed at our largest and
busiest U.S. airports (Category X). All report to the Associate
Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. FAA published rules that
improve air carrier and airport security personnel education, training
and performance, establish employment standards, and provide for
employment investigations and criminal history record checks for those
requiring unescorted access to sensitive areas of an airport.

RESEARCH, ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT (R,E&D): FAA increased the

intensity of explosives and weapons detection and aircraft hardening
research programs, and expanded the scope of work, particularly by
developing a comprehensive human factors program. An R,E&D Scientific
Advisory Panel of independent experts was established to critically
examine the program and provide advice to the FAA. Threat assessments
are taken into account when making decisions about program priorities.

INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ASSESSMENT: Guidelines were developed and

published for airline employees on reporting threats, for public
notification of threats and for threat notification of flight and cabin
crews. At the same time, procedures to minimize the number of
individuals having access to security threat information were
developed. Intelligence community cooperation and coordination has
been enhanced. Intelligence reports are routinely received and
analysis of information is shared efficiently. Effective liaison with
the intelligence community is in place. FAA has full time liaison
officers at the FBI, the CIA and the State Department.

EXPLOSIVES DETECTION SYSTEMS (EDS): The final performance criteria for

bulk explosives detection systems and the certification test plan with
independently developed test protocols were published in 1993, after
the assigned deadline but meeting the requirements for testing mandated
by the law. The first EDS, the InVision CTX-5000, was certified in
December 1994 and was operationally tested in three airports in
accordance with the Act.

TECHNICAL AIRPORT AND AIR CARRIER SECURITY ISSUES: A review and

revalidation of foreign air carrier security programs to determine
whether or not they provide a similar level of protection was
completed. Joint FAA/FBI threat and vulnerability assessments of major
U.S. airports were completed and comprehensive security plans were
prepared for each major airport. Improvements in cargo and mail
security were made. Guidelines were published on incorporating good
security practices in airport construction and renovation.

The key to any effective aviation security system is the vigilance and
abilities of the people staffing the screening checkpoints. To aid
screening personnel, FAA is not only conducting aviation security human
factors research, but evaluating better equipment, improving training,
and modifying procedures to make air carrier personnel more effective
and efficient.

The Domestic Aviation Security Baseline

The aviation system within the United States has been on alert since
1995, and security measures overseas have been adjusted a number of
 10

times since then. Increased security measures contained in previously

agreed contingency plans have been in effect within the United States
since the spring of 1995. The decision to increase security was based
upon information provided by federal law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, combined with an analysis of the state of affairs at the
time. It was reasonable and prudent to ensure that proper measures
were in place to deter or prevent all foreseeable terrorist or criminal
acts against transportation.

On August 9, 1995, Secretary of Transportation Pena asked the FAA to

direct airports and air carriers within the United States to begin
implementation of increased security measures, and on October 1, 1995,
called for even more stringent measures. Many adjustments to these
measures have been made. Stringent security measures have been in
place for flights departing the United States for overseas locations
for many years.

In part because of disruptions in airline and airport operations caused

by contingency plan-based security measure adjustments, the FAA and the
Office of the Secretary of Transportation in 1995 and 1996 worked
through the National Security Council to focus U.S. Government
attention on the need to revise the domestic aviation security
baseline. This effort culminated in the creation by the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) of the Baseline Working Group (BWG)
on July 17, 1996. Deputy Secretary of Transportation Downey and
Congressman Oberstar both addressed the plenary ASAC meeting and
strongly endorsed improving aviation security in this manner. The
destruction of TWA Flight 800, which followed by only a few hours the
BWG's creation, accelerated a process already underway.

The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security

President Clinton established the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security chaired by Vice President Gore on July 25, 1996,
and directed that preflight security inspections be conducted on all
overseas international flights: "every plane, every cabin, every cargo
hold, every time."12 A preliminary report by the Baseline Working Group
was completed and provided to the Commission on August 30 in support of
the President's call for an initial White House Commission report by
September 9, 1996. The BWG was able to provide important data and
analyses on aviation security to the "Gore Commission" from its
inception to its final report. The final report of the ASAC Baseline
Working Group was published on December 12, 1996." The White House
Commission published its final report on February 12, 1997.

The primary FAA focus in the late 1990' s has been to implement the
White House Commission recommendations and the provisions of the

12 White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President at Hangar 12, JFK International Airport,"
July 25, 1996.

13 BWG, "Domestic Security Baseline Final Report," Washington, DC, December 12, 1996, pp. 78-79. This report contains
sensitive information and is not available to the public. It is subject to the provisions of 14 CFRpart 191. No part of it may be
released without the express written permission of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security (ACS-1), Federal Aviation
Administration, Washington, DC 20591.
 11

Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 and the Omnibus

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, which funded many of the
Commission's initial recommendations dealing with aviation security.
The Two-Year Agenda for DOT'S National Security Goal states that the
goal is to "advance the nation's vital security interests in support of
national objectives such as the National Security Strategy, National
Drug Control Strategy, and economic growth by ensuring that the
transportation system is secure and available for defense mobility and
that our borders are safe from illegal intrusion."14 First among the
outcomes to be achieved is to "reduce the vulnerability and
consequences of intentional harm to the transportation system and its

Implementation of the recommendations of the White House Commission on

Aviation Safety and Security16 is the DOT Flagship Initiative designed
to achieve this important goal. Among the most important
recommendations are: improve checked baggage and checkpoint screening
by deploying advanced security technologies; develop federal standards
and procedures for certification of security screening companies and
training of security screening personnel; strengthen security through
consortia and partnerships with airport, airline and law enforcement
personnel; conduct unannounced, realistic operational tests of security
systems; and, enhance controls on access and movement in secure areas
of airports.

The Current Aviation Security System

The mission for the FAA in civil aviation security is to protect the
traveling public in air transportation throughout the world and provide
for the integrity of the civil aviation system. FAA oversees a complex
system composed of trained Government and private sector personnel,
properly maintained and calibrated equipment, and appropriate
procedures to provide multiple layers of security from the airport
perimeter to the aircraft.

The Office of the FAA Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation

Security develops and implements regulatory policies, programs, and
procedures to prevent criminal, terrorist, and other disruptive acts
against civil aviation; protect FAA employees, facilities, and
equipment; ensure FAA employees' suitability to serve in positions of
trust; ensure the safe transportation of hazardous materials by air;
assist in interdicting unlawful drugs and narcotics coming into the
United States; and support national security.

The FAA is responsible for establishing and enforcing regulations,

policies, and procedures; identifying potential threats and appropriate
countermeasures; deploying Federal Air Marshals on selected U.S. air
carrier flights; and providing overall guidance to ensure the security
of passengers, crew, baggage, cargo, and aircraft. FAA personnel

14 Department of Transportation Website, lnip://www.dot.gov/onedot/fla jjsec.htm. August 26, 1999.

15 Id.

16 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, "Final Report to President Clinton," Washington, DC,
February 12, 1997, available on: http://www.aviatkmcommission.dot.gov.
 12

monitor and inspect air carrier and airport security, taking compliance
and enforcement measures, such as finding violations and assessing
civil penalties when necessary to maintain discipline in the system.

The FAA also has a responsibility to protect its own assets, thereby
contributing to the maintenance of the safety and security of the
commercial aviation system. FAA facility and National Airspace System
security issues support the ability of the FAA to accomplish its
mission. These latter security responsibilities are among those
addressed by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection, which was established in July 1996,17 and published its
final report in October 1997.18

In addition, the FAA must ensure that designated personnel at air route
traffic control centers, terminal radar approach control facilities,
and other staffed facilities are properly trained and equipped in
matters related to security and that they meet the standards of
integrity necessary for them to perform their security duties in
support of the National Airspace System. Security is taken into
account during the design and refurbishment of FAA facilities. The FAA
strives to provide for effective air traffic control voice and data
communications security, and ensure effective navigation system
security, including that of the Global Positioning System.

The Office of the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security

maintains close ties to its customers: private sector air carriers;
State and local governments and airport authorities; facility and air
traffic control elements of FAA; and the traveling public. The current
organizational structure is the result of exhaustive review and
analysis by many entities since 1989. Many functions are codified in
law. In addition to policy, intelligence, and operations functions,
the organization's work includes aviation security training at the
FAA's Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center, Oklahoma City, and the
responsibility for guiding the aviation security research and
development program conducted at the FAA's William J. Hughes Technical
Center, Atlantic City.

The Office of Intelligence and Security in the Office of

the Secretary of Transportation coordinates security and intelligence
within the Department of Transportation.19 Consultation and
coordination between the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation
Security and the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Security is
close and continuous.20 Cooperation among modal security elements
has been encouraged and improved by the formation of a Department of
Transportation Security Working Group under the leadership of the
Director of the Office of Intelligence and Security.

" Executive Order 13010 of July 15, 1996, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 61 Fed. Reg. 37347 (1996).

18 The Report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, "Critical Foundations: Protecting America's
Infrastructures," Washington, DC, October 13, 1997.

19 Section 101 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Public Law 101-604, November 16, 1990.

20 Id., section 103.

 13

The FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence provides

intelligence analysis of the threat to civil aviation as the basis for
determining the application of aviation security measures. This is
accomplished by synthesizing intelligence and threat information into
products such as security directives, information circulars, and threat
assessments. These products are needed by the operations and planning
offices for ruling on carrier amendments to approved security programs,
determinations of foreign airport security effectiveness, and support
in changing regulations. The highest level of security is applied in
specific situations when there is credible and specific threat
information. The FAA, in consultation with the aviation industry, has
developed contingency plans that make it possible to implement only
those security measures applicable to specific threat situations.
- ,
The Office of Civil Aviation Security Intelligence .receives
- , and,
analyzes all information regarding potential or direct threats to civil
aviation. The information can be original or from other centers of
analysis, classified and open source. It comes from agencies of the
U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities, foreign government
authorities, and private sector elements. To keep abreast of rapidly
changing threat situations worldwide and to determine their relevance
to civil aviation, FAA intelligence analysts stay in contact with their
counterparts in other agencies and with FAA special agents in field
-offices. Decisions to impose additional security measures result from
coordinated effort among operations, policy, and intelligence
specialists, U.S. and foreign air carriers, and airport operators.

Aviation security threat information and additional security

requirements are disseminated to U.S. airlines and airports by official
FAA communications called "information circulars" and "security
directives," respectively, under section 108.18 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR §108.18), as well as other written and oral
communications. The Department of State, pertinent U.S. Embassies,
foreign government security officials, and others may also receive
these communications. FAA information is passed to airline crews by
their companies. If a specific and credible threat cannot be thwarted
and security measures cannot counter it, either the specific f light (s)
will be canceled or public notification will be made by both the
Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Department of State for
international flights, or by DOT for domestic flights.

Finally, to review FAA' s responsibilities in customer service terms,

the services listed on the next page are those provided by the FAA to
industry in the field of aviation security.
 15

These services enhance the overall security posture of U.S. air

carriers through deterrence and many other ancillary benefits not
directly related to terrorism prevention or Federal regulations.

Air carriers bear the primary responsibility for applying security

measures to passengers, service and flight crews, baggage, and cargo.
Airports, run by State or local government authorities, are responsible
for maintaining a secure ground environment and for providing law
enforcement support for implementation of airline and airport security
measures.

There are about 100 entities conducting screening at airports in the

United States. These include units conducting screening at small
airports, air carriers that conduct their own screening, and the large
screening companies.21 Five of the largest screening companies employ
approximately 64 percent of the estimated 18,000 screeners nationwide.
At least 16 different companies, including two air carriers, conduct
screening at the 19 Category X22 airports.

The baseline security required of air carriers and U.S. airport

operators represents an effort to match the level of security with
FAA's best estimate of the level of threat. The goal is to allocate
industry and government resources efficiently to protect commercial air
carrier operations. The Aviation Security Contingency Plan mentioned
earlier allows the FAA and the aviation industry to respond promptly to
security emergencies, focusing on those measures that effectively
counter threats while taking into account local conditions. Any change
in the prevailing threat must be addressed by an adjustment to the
baseline.

Air carriers also must counter other crimes unrelated to air piracy or
terrorism, such as theft and fraud.23 Air carriers' security interests
are inherently broader than the prevention of terrorism, and their
security programs deal with more than is required by Federal Aviation
Regulations.

Aviation Security, Terrorism and National Security

In the 1986 report of his task force on terrorism, then Vice President
George Bush asserted that the United States views terrorism as a threat
to the national security.24 A logical evolution of this view could lead

21 An Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on Certification of Screening Companies was published in the "Federal
Register" at 62 Fed. Reg. 12724 (1997) on March 17, 1997; the comment period closed on May 1,1997. Comments were received
and analyzed, a draft NPRM prepared, and concurrence scheduled for February 20, 1998. Having a reliable and consistent way to
measure actual screening performance was critical. It was decided to add more specific screening improvements to the rule based on
data gathered by threat image projection (TIP) systems. On March 4, the FAA decided to withdraw the ANPRM, and a notice to that
effect was published on May 13, 1998. Special evaluations by field agents were conducted to validate data gathered by TIP, which
was found to be a reliable means of measuring performance. The NPRM was published on January 5, 2000.

22 Category X airports are generally among the busiest and most complex of all U.S. airports. Category I airports are also among the
busiest airports, followed by progressively smaller airports in Categories II, III, and IV. The precise definitions of each category and
the identification and location of airports within each category are sensitive information subject to the provisions of 14 CFR §191.1
et seq.

23 President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, May 15, 1990, p. 46.

24 Bush, George, "Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism," Washington, DC, February 1986,
p. 7.
 16

to the conclusion that the Federal Government should be responsible for

the costs of combating terrorism, just as it pays for the cost of
providing for the common defense of the Nation. In the late 1980's, a
former Administration official extended this view further, including
"freedom of the air," meaning the maintenance of civil aviation
security, as a vital national interest.25

Several years later, Senator Lautenberg, who had been a member of the
post-Pan Am Flight 103 President's Commission on Aviation Security and
Terrorism, expressed similar views in his opening statement at a
hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee
on August 1, 1996:

"Congress, our Nation's airlines, and our airports have

been unwilling to make the investments necessary to protect
the public. Terrorism is an act of war against an entire
nation, with civilians on the tragic front lines, and we
have got to confront it with the same commitment and fervor
that we must reserve for other threats to our national
security. "26

Ambassador Morris Busby, former U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism

at the Department of State, agreed during testimony at the same
hearing, saying:

"...the idea that aviation security is a national security

issue has received a lot of support around this room today,
and I am absolutely 100 percent in support of that."27

President Clinton and members of his Administration have made

statements of policy indicating that the security of civil aviation
should be treated as a matter of national security. In a speech at
George Washington University on August 5, 1996, President Clinton
stated:

"We cannot reduce the threats to our people without

reducing threats to the world beyond our borders . That's
why the fight against terrorism must be both a national
priority and a national security priority. We have pursued
a concerted national and international strategy against
terrorism on three fronts: first, beyond our borders, by
working more closely than ever with our friends and allies;
second, here at home, by giving law enforcement the most
powerful counterterrorism tools available; and, third, in
our airports and airplanes by increasing aviation
security."2B

25"The Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103: A Critical Look at American Aviation Security": Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Government Activities and Transportation of the House Committee on Government Operations, 101st Cong. 34 (1989) (statement of
Mr. Noel Koch, President, International Security Management, Inc.).

26 "Aviation Security": Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong. 13 (1996)
(statement of Senator Lautenberg).

27 Id., p.86 (statement of Morris D. Busby, President, BGI Inc.).

28White House Press Release, "Remarks by the President on American Security in a Changing World," at
George Washington University, Washington, DC, August 5, 1996.
 17

On September 9, 1996, when receiving the initial report of the White

House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security from Vice President
Gore, the President reiterated this theme by saying:

"We know we can't make the world risk-free, but

we can reduce the risks we face and we have to take the
fight to the terrorists. If we have the will, we can find
the means. We have to continue to fight terrorism on every
front by pursuing our three-part strategy: First, by
rallying a world coalition with zero tolerance for
terrorism; second, by giving law enforcement the strong
counterterrorism tools they need; and, third,
by improving security in our airports and on
our airplanes."29

The White House Commission, in recommendation 3.1 of its final report,

stated:

"The federal government should consider aviation security

as a national security issue, and provide substantial
funding for capital improvements. The Commission believes
that terrorist attacks on civil aviation are directed at
the United States, and that there should be an ongoing
federal commitment to reducing the threats that they
pose. "30

In section 314 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996

(Public Law 104-264), the Senate appears to endorse these views,
stating the "Sense of the Senate Regarding Acts of International
Terrorism." After finding that "...there has been an increase in
attempts by criminal terrorists to murder airline passengers through
the destruction of civilian airliners and the deliberate fear and death
inflicted through bombings of buildings and the kidnapping of tourists
and Americans residing abroad," section 314 states:

"It is the sense of the Senate that if evidence establishes

beyond a clear and reasonable doubt that any act of
hostility towards any United States citizen was an act of
international terrorism sponsored, organized, condoned, or
directed by any nation, a state of war should be considered
to exist or to have existed between the United States and
that nation, beginning as of the moment that the act of
aggression occurs."31

29 White House Press Release, "Remarks by the President during White House Commission on Aviation Safety
Announcement," the Oval Office at the White House, September 9, 1996.

30White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, "Final Report to President Clinton," Washington, DC, February 12,
1997, p. 27.

31 Section 314 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Public Law 104-264, October 9, 1996.
 18

Again, the President's words are reflected in the White House

publication, A National Security Strategy for a New Century:

"We further seek to uncover, reduce or eliminate foreign

terrorist capabilities in our country; eliminate terrorist
sanctuaries; counter state-supported terrorism and
subversion of moderate regimes through comprehensive
program of diplomatic, economic and intelligence
activities; improve aviation security worldwide and at
U.S. airports; ensure better security for all U.S.
transportation systems; and improve protection for our
personnel assigned overseas."32

As a result, the Federal Government recognizes aviation security as an

element of national security strategy and U.S. counterterrorism
policy.33 An FAA integrated product team of acquisition and security
experts, including representatives from airport authorities and
carriers, was formed by FAA in 1996 to plan, purchase and install
explosives detection systems (EDS) and other advanced security
equipment at many of the busiest U.S. airports. The Federal Government
is subsidizing air carriers' capital expenses related to security
improvements. Under law, all major air carriers assume operations
costs for installed EDS and other technologies and pay maintenance
costs upon expiration of warranties and initial maintenance periods.

Aviation Security Research, Engineering, and Development

For many years, the Federal Government and the FAA have been fulfilling
a major responsibility by fostering and funding security research,
engineering and development (R,E&D), which was accelerated by the
Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990. From 1991 to 1996, the FAA
spent over $209 million on R,E&D on explosives and weapons detection
technology development, airport security technology, security systems
integration, aircraft and container hardening, and human factors. This
effort will continue.

The FAA must continue research and development in the aviation security
field to provide the technologies and other tools to support the
strategic goals, cope with new threats and improve existing
countermeasures. The result must be usable products to meet FAA
requirements for future deployment, which will, in turn, require the
commitment and expenditure of significant human and financial
resources. Particular attention must be paid to the development of
hardening standards for new aircraft and completion of the transition
to hardened containers to prevent catastrophic damage. Human factors
work must continue to be emphasized to aid in the solution of a variety
of problems including the identification of threats, interaction with
advanced technology, hiring qualifications and specialized training.

32 The White House, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," May 1997, p.10.

33 The White House, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," May 1997, p. 10; reaffirmed in publications with the same
title dated October 1998 and December 1999.
 19

We want to improve the detection of explosive devices concealed in

carry-on bags without introducing significant operational delays and
without requiring the use of extraordinarily expensive detection
systems. Historically, threat items concealed on individuals have
accounted for an appreciable percentage of all civil aviation security
incidents. These include explosives and other improvised explosive
device (IED) components, as well as weapons. Consequently, means must
be developed to reliably detect IED components and weapons carried by
people.

In terms of weapons detection, conventional metal detectors are

generally considered to be effective, although clearly there are non-
traditional weapons for which other detection means may be required.
The Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-649) made it illegal
for any person to manufacture, import, sell, ship, deliver, possess,
transfer, or receive any firearm that is not detectable by walk-through
metal detectors calibrated to a specified level. The Act also
instructed the FAA to conduct a research and development effort
necessary to improve the effectiveness of airport security metal
detectors and airport security x-ray systems in detecting firearms,
which has been an integral part of FAA's research program ever since.

The primary mission of the R,E&D program is the development of

equipment and methods for the detection of improvised explosive
devices. In accordance with the 1990 Act, the FAA, based on
intelligence data provided by U.S. and non-U.S. government agencies,
established the explosive types and amounts and detonator types that
pose a threat to civil aviation. The detection rate for these threats,
combined with false alarm rates and throughput requirements, comprise
the FAA's certification criteria for explosives detection systems (EDS)
published in September 1993 and amended in April 1998. These
certification criteria were extensively coordinated with the scientific
and intelligence communities, the aviation industry and properly
cleared members of the public (e.g., manufacturers and vendors).
Modifications to the certification criteria require going through the
rule making process, but to remain effective, the certification
criteria must address the terrorist threat, which may reasonably be
expected to change over time.

A major thrust for the R&D program will be the systematic assessment of
the many devices and techniques which are applicable to checkpoint
security. Based on these assessments a security screening checkpoint
model will be developed and a trade off analysis performed. The result
will be an architecture for the checkpoint of the future. This
architecture will address the mandates of both security and operations,
and will form the basis for prototype configurations to be tried in
airport testbeds.

In 1996, a consortium of organizations proposed a public/private

partnership to assist FAA in the development and testing of aviation
security and safety technologies. The organizations included Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, the Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Authority, the
Metropolitan Airports Commission, the University of Tennessee, the
Tennessee Air National Guard, the Honeywell Corporation, and a number
of private companies, each with its own expertise in related
technologies. On October 4, 1997, the FAA Administrator signed a
memorandum of understanding between FAA and the National Safe Skies
 20

Alliance (NSSA), which lead to the establishment of a national test bed

at McGhee Tyson Airport for operational evaluation and testing of newly
developed technologies for checkpoint screening.

Following the recommendations of the White House Commission, the

Federal Government returned to an area not visited since the height of
the hijacking threat in the mid-1970's: the capital purchase of
security equipment for use by private sector air carriers to enhance
their ability to screen passengers and baggage effectively and
efficiently prior to boarding.

On October 30, 1996, the FAA established the Security Equipment

Integrated Product Team (SEIPT) to acquire and deploy advanced security
equipment through "non-competitive contracts or cooperative agreements
with air carriers and airport authorities, which provide for the FAA to
purchase and assist in installation of advanced security equipment for
the use of such entities."34 The equipment acquisition has been funded
in the FAA Facilities and Equipment account derived from the Airport
and Airway Trust Fund. The team includes working representatives of
air carriers and airport authorities.

The following table depicts planned expenditures for various types of

equipment selected by the integrated product team for purchase and
deployment during FY's 1997-99:

TABLE II

FAA Expenditures in FY 1997-98 for Acquisition

of Security Technologies

Explosives Detection Systems $ 68,313,400

Other Automated Technologies $ 15,550,000

Explosives Trace Detectors $ 45,036,600

Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) $ 10,000,000

Screener Proficiency Evaluation & Reporting System $ 5,300,000

(SPEARS)

Total $144,200,000

An agreement to create a National Academy of Sciences Panel on

Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security was

34 This was authorized and funded by Title V of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law 104-208.
 21

signed by FAA and the Academy on May 19, 1997. The panel was asked to
assess the results of the advanced security equipment deployments,
hardened cargo container tests and planned deployments, and formulate
recommendations on how to more effectively deploy explosives detection
systems and hardened containers to improve security. The consensus
report was published in November 1999. The panel will continue as the
National Research Council (NRC) Committee on the Assessment of
Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security for an additional
three years.

Continuing Efforts, Future Trends and Challenges

Terrorism, for the most part, affects U.S. interests overseas, and the
threat to U.S. civil aviation is assessed to be higher abroad than it
is within the United States. However, members of foreign terrorist
groups and representatives from state sponsors of terrorism are present
in the United States. There is evidence that a few foreign terrorist
groups have well-established capability and infrastructures here.

The terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania

remind us of the global nature of terrorism and the need for everyone
to work together to oppose it anywhere in the world. The relationship
between Osama bin Laden, who was behind these terrorist attacks, and
Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted of bombing the World Trade Center in
New York and attempting to place bombs on a dozen U.S. air carrier
flights in the Asia-Pacific region in 1995, reaffirms the continuing
tangible threat to civil aviation.

The destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 and the French airline UTA
Flight 772 in 1989, coupled with the events in Asia and the Pacific in
1995 and the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814 in 1999, remind us
that aviation security is an international concern. Even though the
threat of terrorism within the United States has increased, the threat
still remains greater overseas.

Terrorism is a crime, but the threat to civil aviation is not

restricted solely to those motivated by political concerns. In
addition to terrorism, we must also prevent other criminal acts
regardless of motivation to ensure safe and secure air transportation.

As noted earlier, the Federal Government recognizes aviation security

as an important element in national security strategy and overall U.S.
counterterrorism policy. As a result, federal funding for aviation
security has been increased substantially. FAA plans to continue to
purchase explosives detection systems and other advanced security
technologies for expedited deployment as part of the overall effort to
improve security and implement provisions of laws35 enacted to require
and fund many Commission aviation security recommendations.

The FAA has purchased and deployed advanced security technologies

including over 90 explosives detection systems for checked baggage
screening and over 550 explosives trace detection devices for use at

35 Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264) and Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997
(P. L. 104-208)
 22

screening checkpoints at over 80 U.S. airports. Voluntary security

consortia have been established at 170 airports where government
agencies and airline industry representatives assess and discuss
security and work together to eliminate vulnerabilities. Interagency
efforts to assess and mitigate potential threats posed by chemical and
biological weapons and surface-to-air missiles actively continue.

The U.S. Government has worked with the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) to strengthen international security standards.
U.S. Customs Service and FBI resources devoted to counterterrorism have
increased. We have issued final rules requiring enhanced passenger
manifests and background checks for security screeners. FAA and the
airlines have worked together to implement domestic passenger-bag match
voluntarily, based on systemwide use of the Computer-Assisted Passenger
Pre-screening System (CAPPS), which will be required by regulation.
All of this work will continue.

In the coming years, we will continue to increase the number of EDS and
explosives trace detection devices deployed at a steady rate to be
joined by purchases of several hundred advanced checkpoint x-ray
devices. We expect 20 more than the current 170 voluntary airport
consortia to be formed. The number of explosives detection canine
teams subsidized and certified by FAA rose from 87 teams at 26 airports
in 1996 to 174 teams at 39 airports in 1999. Growth in this program
will continue but slowly; we have teams at all major airports now for
the first time in the 27 year history of the program.

Rules on certification of screening companies to improve screener

performance and domestic automated passenger prescreening systems with
bag matching or EDS should be in effect within the next few years.
Access to aircraft and air operations areas must be tightened and that
will come about through increased labor intensive, but realistic
operational testing and special assessments in combination with
surveillance and scheduled inspections. Literally thousands of such
inspections have been conducted since 1997 as well as screener
evaluations and tests of many types of security measures including, but
not limited to, cargo, checked baggage, carryon bags and persons.

Ensuring effective screening of ever-increasing numbers of passengers,

baggage and cargo on more flights without restricting movement remains
our greatest challenge now and in the future. Effective and efficient
civil aviation security is based on a system of shared responsibilities
in place for the last thirty years. All partners must do their fair
share to make the system secure. The U.S. airline industry must
embrace improved aviation security as part of its mission to provide
better service to its customers. All airline personnel must be trained
to understand and support the effective accomplishment of the security
responsibilities of the commercial aviation industry. The industry
must work together to develop a new set of best practices all will use
effectively. We in government stand ready as good partners to assist
them and guide them, as well as to monitor, test and challenge them.

Together, we must also improve the quality of security through better

equipment for screening passengers, bags and cargo that is used by
carefully selected, better trained and tested screening personnel. We
must continue research and development to improve explosives and
weapons detection, technology integration, aircraft hardening and
 23

aviation security human factors. Hopefully, technology will not become

a barrier to progress so that we are able to produce what we want and
need to help make the air transportation system more secure.

Future Trend; Aviation Security Training

Changes in the current system, which have been debated for years, have
occurred only incrementally, often in response to a crisis or loss of
an aircraft. One of the common threads weaving throughout all reports,
books, hearings, articles, and recommendations over the years has been
the need for better and more standardized aviation security training
and an increased role for the Federal Government in both.

Many new, more complicated but more effective types of equipment are
being deployed at U.S. airports. The operators of advanced security
equipment need far more detailed training, management attention, and
motivation to ensure that devices are properly and effectively
operated. Much more in the way of following operational procedures and
making decisions needs to be done by the screeners, placing additional
burdens on the selection, training, and maintenance of at least this
part of the screener work force.

As long ago as the September 1989 hearings of the House Government

Activities and Transportation Subcommittee on the bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103, Mr. Noel Koch, formerly Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, in his
prepared statement said:

".... we have to pay much closer attention to the personnel

side of the security equation. At the present time, the
economics of security appear to militate in favor of hiring
entry-level minimum wage people. They often get little or
no training, they have frequently the most limited 'people
skills,' and the turnover rates among them are wholly
inconsistent with the requirements of an effective security
system. Put minimum wage people on a million dollar
machine, give them little or no training, manage them like
entry level people, and you will get minimum wage
performance out of your million dollar machine.... Coupled
to a more imaginative hiring philosophy, we will benefit
from a systematic approach to training security personnel.
This is an area in which the FAA may need additional
authority, to standardize training requirements for
security personnel, and to assist in bringing training
regimes up to those standards."36

Mr. Koch's comments are still pertinent today. The "Certification of

Screening Companies" rulemaking offers an opportunity for FAA to
present to the public for comment both selection criteria and training
standards and seek ideas for improving aviation security training.

36"The Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103: A Critical Look at American Aviation Security": Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Government Activities and Transportation of the House Committee on Government Operations, 101st Cong. 34 (1989) (statement of
Mr. Noel Koch, President, International Security Management, Inc.).
 24

In his 1993 book Combatting Air Terrorism, Rodney Wallis, former

director of security for the International Air Transport Association,
also suggested an increased role for the FAA in the area of training:

"Training is a truly vital part of air transportation's

fight against terrorism, yet too many governments, airport
administrations, and airline managements fail to ensure
their staff are adequately prepared for their roles...A
role the FAA might well enlarge is the physical monitoring
of U.S. based airlines' training and security
implementation at home and abroad."37

Senator Rollings in his prepared statement for the aviation security

hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee
on August 1, 1996, stated:

"...the public deserves the best technology operated by the

best trained individuals, to reduce the risks of a
terrorist attack. Another thing is clear-security is going
to be costly. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
has estimated that it will cost as much as $2.2 billion to
install up to 1,800 machines at 75 airports. The FAA
should be authorized to collect a fee to pay for the
machines. Today, there are approximately 14,000-18,000
screeners, paid an average of $10,000 to $15,000 per year.
These screeners are one line of defense, but a critical one
in the fight against terrorism. They need training, and
they need to be paid in accordance with their
responsibilities. The present turnover rate among these
employees is extremely high. Unless we change the way we
provide security, we cannot upgrade it...I am considering
whether the FAA should provide the screeners, thereby
relieving the air carriers of this responsibility; this
also will cost money."38

There is broad, although not universal, agreement that the regime of

shared responsibilities should stay the same. However, it could be
argued that the Federal Government should increase its involvement by
setting training standards, thereby adding to its other
responsibilities for capital equipment purchases, R,E&D, intelligence
assessments, testing countermeasures, standard setting, and compliance
and enforcement of regulations. Air carriers would still be
responsible for screening, but their employees, the screeners and their
supervisors, would be trained to standards set by the FAA in accordance
with White House Commission recommendations 3.2 and 3.10.

Commissioner Victoria Cummock introduced and supported recommendation

3.2 at the final meeting of the White House Commission on February 12,
1997. Later, she went further in her discussion of training under
recommendation 3.10 in her dissent, contained in appendix I of the
final report:

37 Wallis, Rodney, "Combatting Air Terrorism," Brassey's (US), Washington, New York, London, 1993, p. 117.

38 "Aviation Security": Hearings before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 104th Cong. 93 (1996)
(statement of Senator Hollings).
 25

"This recommendation contains a number of admirable

objectives but it, like its predecessor recommendation in
President Bush's Commission on Aviation Security and
Terrorism lacks teeth. Following President Bush's
Commission of Aviation Security and Terrorism and the
follow-on Aviation Security Improvement Act in 1990, the
FAA established standards for the selection and training of
aviation security personnel. Those standards were, and
still are, totally inadequate. There is nothing to prevent
the same inadequate actions by the FAA to this
recommendation. The Commission should specifically
recommend that the FAA mandate 80 hours of intensive
classroom/laboratory and 40 hours of on-the-job training
before performance certification for all airline security
screening personnel."39

An identical recommendation for 80 hours of classroom and 40 hours of

on-the-job training had been made by Patricia Friend, international
president of the Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO, at the
White House Commission meeting on September 5, 1996. These
discussions, contained in the final report and its dissent, and in
testimony, all support the need for improved, more comprehensive
training. Again, the certification of screening companies rulemaking
offers an opportunity to improve training and thereby improve screener
performance. Investment in training and requirements for improved
performance will offer an economic incentive for airlines to retain the
most productive, efficient, and effective screeners which will, in
turn, lead to higher wages and better benefits.

The FAA takes human factors into account (as required by the provisions
of Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990)40 by providing appropriate
training and developing utilization standards, clear guidance, and
operational procedures in partnership with the airlines to ensure the
effective use of security equipment by trained and properly motivated
air carrier and contractor personnel. FAA is already taking steps to
improve initial and recurrent training curricula for checkpoint
screeners and their supervisors. Such FAA involvement will increase.

All of us must be concerned with how to help people do the difficult

job of screening baggage for explosive devices better by improving the
human factors engineering of their work environment. Lessons learned
from the operational deployment of explosives detection systems
(EDS) substantiate the need for screeners who use the machines to be
properly trained and highly motivated. Personnel selection criteria
and training standards are important considerations receiving
particular attention by all concerned.

The FAA developed and is currently deploying a computer-based training

(CBT) system for screeners. CBT modules for training security
screening checkpoint x-ray machine operators are now operational at 37
major airports, including Seattle, Miami, Los Angeles, St. Louis,

39White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, "Final Report to President Clinton," Appendix I, dated February 19,
1997, unnumbered p.8.

40Sections 105 and 107 of Public Law 101-604, November 16, 1990, adding sections 316 (d) and (g) to the former Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, now 49 U.S.C. 44912 (a) and 44935 (b), respectively.
 26

Baltimore, Detroit, Houston, Dallas, New York, Denver, Orlando, San

Juan, Atlanta, and San Francisco, with additional airport installations
continuing to about 77 of the busiest U.S. airports. Specialized
modules for training operators of explosives detection systems are
installed on all deployed systems.

The Threat Image Projection (TIP) system electronically inserts images

of possible threats (e.g., a gun, knife, explosive device) on x-ray and
explosives detection system monitors as if they were within a bag being
screened. Its purpose is to provide training, keep screeners alert,
and measure screener performance. High scores in detecting TIP images
equate to a high probability of detecting actual bombs. Not only can
TIP data be potentially used to assess screener performance over time,
the results can also be used to analyze any correlation between
performance, experience, and compensation.

The FAA provides formal training through airport security seminars for
law enforcement officers and airport personnel with aviation security
responsibilities. Aviation security special agents are also asked by
individual airlines to provide 1- or 2-hour blocks of instruction in
airline training courses. Similar participation occurs in industry
association-sponsored schools and conferences as part of FAA's
partnership efforts. Specialized courses of instruction on specific
topics have been prepared by the FAA and are presented on request.

While air carriers should not have to bear all the costs of
security, they should bear a substantial portion of the personnel
costs to provide security screening and the operational costs of
using the advanced security equipment that the Federal Government
provides. At the same time, the Federal Government should continue
to control the quality of aviation security and security screening
by setting higher, but realistically achievable, standards for
screener selection, training, and performance.
 27

ACS STAFFING HISTORY

FY 86-00
Staffing •Actual Staffing
151)0

1300
\c J f t S«2 1168.
'I « A KUO. i *)r, >—--*"! 1 82
1100
noi6
900

700

500

300
FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY FY
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00

NOTE: FY 99 represents Conference agreement, FY 00 represents OMB request File: NCSSTF

11/6/98
 28

CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

FUNDING PROFILE
Dollars in Millions Ops. -»~R,E&D -*-F&E

I 1 1—« I 1 1 «—I 1 1 1 I
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
Fiscal Years Est. Est.

NOTK: FY 99 represents cotiierence agreement, FY 00 represents OMB request File: FNDHSTYB

11/6/98
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