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Ethics, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Nov., 2007), pp. 395-416 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25124003 . Accessed: 27/09/2013 15:17
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Springer
2007
Douglas
ABSTRACT. aUocations propose institutional nizational sociaUy investments sociaUy and to two
This the
article sociaUy
investor class. We
ature
elements investment
in private and
see also Miles et al., 2004; Spence review; no prior study has et al., 2003; Wempe, 2005), an empirical analysis of the direct inter considered investment section between and sociaUy responsible
institutional
and funds, compare equity across different asset classes investors funds). The (banks, data equity to with a imple single
there has been related private equity (although for work issue is nevertheless ). This important institutional investor capital aUocation, as weU as for private equity funds and companies for undertaking sociaUy responsible
activities.
seeking
capital
entrepreneurial
in private decision
such
is centralised
investment officer. investment SociaUy responsible common in private is also more institu among equity a greater investors international tional with investment and less common fund-of-fund focus, among private equity investments.
sociaUy in private equity structure and (1) institutional (2) organizational In the spirit of research on internationalization. investment
governance and institutional investors
elements
influence
corporate
2001; MaUin (e.g., MaUin, duce in this article a new Dutch institutional The survey 2005.
et al., 2005), intro dataset from a survey of investors that was carried out in
we
KEYWORDS: international
sociaUy institutional
responsible investment,
data comprise information from 24 of which institutions, currently have a investment program (of these, sociaUy responsible include 14 equity sociaUy responsible private 100 Dutch investment 19 which investment plan on program 5 include
Introduction This the factors that study empiricaUy investigates influence investors to allocate capital to institutional investments. sociaUy responsible private equity
(of these, pro responsible private equity investment grams). The data comprise extremely specific details on the institutions' portfolio management practices, as weU as their perceptions of the importance of socially various economic, legal and institutional factors that Insti influence their portfolio allocation decisions. investors'
their
act as financial inter equity fund managers mediaries between investors and entre institutional firms. Private is a viable and preneurial equity Private and investors, important asset class for institutional there has been a growing trend towards sociaUy investment While responsible practices. prior work has examined the role of business 2003 ethics in entrepreneurship (see Hannafey, for a liter
tutional
tives in
positions
asset
regarding
aUocation
their objec
were sought.
strategic
More
views the perceived significantly, regarding risks and hurdles faced by such investors were sought concerns to determine in adopting main sociaUy responsible investment. The data enable an empirical
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396 Douglas
assessment of institutional investor aUocations
Gumming
to
and Sofia Johan statistics and multivariate summary asset aUo empirical analyses of sociaUy responsible cations by Dutch institutional investors. Limitations alongside are discussed outlined and suggestions after the multivariate for future research are analyses. Concluding in the last section.
to investment with consideration sociaUy responsible controls for a variety of factors potentiaUy pertinent
to asset aUocation.
The and
perhaps
remarks foUow
ismore sociaUy responsible private equity investment common to implement when the decision such an investment a is in the hands of chief plan placed or the head of capital investment officer ("CIO", as a broader to investment investments), opposed a team. When CIO is in charge, a sociaUy responsible private equity 40?50% more is approximately program to be is likely adopted. This finding of but related work supportive independent organizational structure influences investment
Testable Institutional
to aUocate strategies when deciding to and alternative derivatives, bonds, capital equities, are such as private equity. Portfolios investments, to trade-off risk and specificaUy designed optimaUy their investment return by aUocation of the portfolio to appropriately of assets, with consideration diversified combinations to institutional and regulatory factors, and possibly behavioral biasses and decision-making processes. FoUowing
biasses and
social responsibihty corporate (Guyatt, 2005, 2006), as discussed in detail in the first part of this article. invest Second, sociaUy responsible private equity
ments tend to be more common among institutional
upon
the
potential
processes
effect
may
behavioral
have on
that
invest
decision-making
an
levels
institution
of asset
determining
aUocation, this
current
study
and
seeks to
projected
ascertain
indicate
pri
more
equity
programs
a potential in a more trend towards investing spec ialised form of private equity, sociaUy responsible
private equity, also sometimes referred to as sus
common
those
among
larger
greater
institutional
economic
investors
returns from
and
so
expecting
find no statisticaUy ciaUy responsible to carry out in differences the significant propensity on the investments sociaUy responsible depending investor of insurance type company or (pension fund, bank/financial that institution). We do find evidence investments. We
sociaUy among responsible institutional investment investors that is less invest common a greater
equity. two
central
elements investment
influence in private
sociaUy responsible internal organizational (1) the institutions' equity: structure and (2) the institutions' external environ ment in terms of internationalization. our two main hypotheses underlying to sociaUy responsible
asset
institutional
The
intuition
investment
classes. However,
proportion
expected as
in private
equity
fund-of-funds,
remove the
which
decision
is
but
also
other
fund-of-funds
sociaUy
because
responsible
it is a new
investment
"alternative"
in private
asset class that
equity
is now
investors to the fund making from the institutional The data further suggest sociaUy of-funds managers. common investment is more among responsible institutional new investors that are more Financial although
econometric
sensitive
to the is
also
scrutinized being closely internaUy by institutions' decision makers asweU as externaUy by the media for its diversification annual and consistent properties returns. ever, Some of the factors discussed directly pertinent in investment private equity. responsible First, in regards to internal organizational are more below, how only to sociaUy struc
International (2005),
to the
("IFRS")
sensitive
Standards relation
We
proffer
are quite
evidence
similar
sociaUy equity
investment
ture, institutions (or rather their human resource) wiU to balance have the conflicting needs of their stakeholders.
investment
as foUows. The next is organized the theoretical and propositions are The data then introduced hypotheses. article outlines
The
does not
practice
mean
of
that
sociaUy
returns
responsible
need to be
sacrificed
(Geczy
et al., 2003),
even
though
some
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Socially Responsible may hold this perception (for recent survey evidence, see Guyatt, 2005). An effective socially responsible investment program should incorporate the objective to gain the maximum possible return for stakeholders in the institution, at an acceptable risk, with the idea
of combining concerns. social, Any decision moral, made legal, and environmental or the by management,
Institutional social
Investment 397
when their they recognize responsibility such stakeholders prefer policies (thereby increasing more to wfll firm value); be hkely corporations
recognize and implement the corporate social
responsibility implement
sociaUy
of
their when
are
stakeholders decisions
made
and about
responsible
investment
centraUy
board
of directors, wiU affect each stakeholder dif on important policies ferently. As such, decisions regarding investment affect and asset aUocation, which wiU are not the returns of the institution, In an institution where there is the
decision-making, where a
Hypothesis 1: SociaUy responsible investment pro grams aremore likely to be adopted by institutions
that centralize investment decision-making.
investment
general
compete
investment
with one
team
another,
comprising
each employee
employees
is more
Our
ments.
to which
the
relates to the extent second primary hypothesis an institution its invest internationalizes
On the one hand we to may be expect more investment sociaUy common
expected
returns as this is
indicator to
performance
responsible
and less likely to risk adopting poten management investment. tiaUy less profitable sociaUy responsible
In an organization where investment decisions are
a CIO, who a is not only through of management but also the board of it is more
are primarily based within the in which for The country they reside, particularly investments are not Netherlands. SociaUy responsible only on awareness of increasing social a as but result of by institutions, primarily the increasing public interest in social (beneficiary) is that the Thus, responsibility. pubhc perception
institutions need to 'return to society,' a sense of
of
the fact
that
institutional
the rise
as a result
that innovative (thus probable and risky) sociaUy responsible investment policies be formulated, approved, and implemented. in the exercise The board of directors, of their their reUance on the CIO's deem discretion, to meet advice their duty of care to sufficient will of the outcome of the regardless of the program. This suggests that implementation the presence of a CIO who will take "ownership" can facUitate a and responsibility for the program stakeholders, sociaUy responsible Guyatt
non-standard
social responsibility that has been given to them by their stakeholders. And as 'charity begins at home,' to enjoy domestic stakeholders the likely want benefits that increased corporate social responsibility such brings, environmental On
that may
as increased
adherence
to
labor
and
investment
(2005, 2006)
investment
laws by local companies. the other hand, there are two primary
lead to a greater focus on sociaUy
factors
respon
to
to
justify
zational
decisions
hierarchy,
to those
using
above
one
in the organi
arguments.
'conventional'
Thus
if socially responsible investment does not to invest that way lose money, there is a disincentive because you have to 'stick your neck out' and do recourse when to conventional This investment
are
even
among institutions with an international focus (DoweU et al., 2000; and those First, 2003). Dunning, larger corporations an international or multinational with presence sible investment policies investment scrutiny with regard to their investment socially responsible policies (Dunning, term returns to sociaUy Second, 2003). long investments, particularly for international responsible investments over the long run, are reported as being typicaUy face public viewed number as being very of institutional see Guyatt, institutions investment in view favorable investors by a significant in a recent survey itmay viable be easier
without investment or
decisions.
reduced
is
of corporate social respon compliance are more institutions that sibUity Ukely to comply are made with when decisions It has also centrally. been argued that corporations will adopt corporate
with
norms
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398 Douglas
Gumming
and Sofia Johan Other factors relevant to socially responsible private equity
investments
caveat
able local sociaUy responsible investments (with the that they may prefer to invest locaUy because of local conditions). they have greater knowledge regions around the world have different legal standards and social norms in regards to sociaUy responsible investment policies. Most notably, inAsia Different
The off
of institutional investors' objective is to achieve the most optimal trade and return. The of this achievement wfll differ in accordance For with characteristics. a example, different funding
Punning,
2003; Hanna, 2004) countries with high levels of corruption developed (Doh et al., 2003), there is comparatively weaker spirit
towards sociaUy responsible investments as weU as
and
less weU
objective specific
however institutional
weaker
America
legal standards compared to Europe and North 2003; Hanna, (Dunning, 2004). Corporate standards tend to be more lax in some accountabiUty countries (particularly less developed countries) as away to encourage foreign direct investment. WhUe there is some evidence (e.g., Angel and Rock, 2004) that global often operate at higher standards than corporations those required by local regulation, this has traditionaUy
pension fund and a bank wfll have assets and liabilities, and and solvency requirements, extent of regulatory oversight. Different institutions may exhibit differences in corporate objectives, contributor/stakeholder/beneficiary to and sensitivity regulatory
accounting rules. Hence, our
control
for
sion funds,
investor type of institutional (pen insurance companies and banks/financial are financial investors inter
the
not
been
observed
in Asia.
international
institutional
responsible in Asia. In sum, there may be different reasons for investing a difference outside The Netherlands and finding between The North (outside Europe Netherlands)
America, and Asia. First, sustainable private equity
investors preneurial firms. Institutional the time and specialized skfll sets to carry out due in screening diligence entrepre private potential neurial
monitor
to invest; institutional firms in which inves tors also do not have the time and skiUs to efficiently
and add value to the investee entrepre
will be Umited in any one country, opportunities a one smaU such as The Nether especiaUy relatively lands. This wiU tend to make sustainable investments
more international than conventional investments,
neurial
firms.
The
pronounced
of
lo
cated
and agency in smaU, flliquid, and high-tech is a primary firms explanation of private investment funds with
information
cultural,
is critical.
Linguistic,
transparency
factors are Ukely to be more favorable to the discovery and take-up of opportunities in Europe (outside The and North America versus Asia and less Netherlands) countries. Both these developed with respect to empirical evidence Hypothesis 2: issues are discussed in Cowton (2004).
skfll sets to mitigate that institutional jecture bases are more inchned
special con such problems. We investors with larger asset to invest in private equity
and in sociaUy responsible investments which require more extensive due diligence. in private equity can be carried out Investments as direct fund direct investments, company
investments, or fund-of-fund investments. Private
opportunities Netherlands,
investments
wiU ceteris
tend
to make
than
international
fund-of-funds allocate their institutional equity assets in what to be the investors' they perceive fund-of-funds funds; therefore, top private equity remove to invest in a sociaUy the decision the institutional from investor. responsible manner are less likely As such, fund-of-funds investments to be sociaUy responsible to because they need the needs of many balance institutional investors a strict profit-maximizing and do so by foUowing
tional
paribus. Institutional likely to invest in sociaUy in Europe investment (outside The than in Asia
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Institutional
We
our
control
empirical
for
tests.
fund-of-fund
invest
equity
equity
some
annual
venture
financial
capital/private
reports, but
associations
investment private SociaUy equity responsible decisions may further be influenced by the extent to are concerned about reporting which institutions
standards. We may expect increased transparency of
other
asset
information
aUocation,
such
investment
as
projected
or
and
future
current
objectives
investment decisions (adopted in 2005, invest and relevant for reports of private equity to and increased ments) vulnerabiUty public per via the IFRS to lead to a greater tendency ception investments towards socially responsible (consistent with HUlman and Kleim, 2004; Kolk, 2005; Kolk et al., and Tulder, 2001; Kolk et al., 1999; MaUin and pressure 2005; Shaffer, 1995). 2005; Mclnemey, We consider other control variables in the empir ical analyses. For instance, we control for the expected
return on socially responsible investments relative to
investment activity and projected socially responsible are not available in the public domain, and in our be could obtained opinion, only by survey. Our us to determine the survey instrument also enabled effect the IFRS had on sociaUy responsible perceived investment and enhance data activity. To verify obtained by the survey, foUow up interviews were
carried out and where possible, reference was made
web
investment
is a qual that of other investments. This expectation itative ranking of sociaUy responsible investment
returns relative to other returns (returns are based on
provided with general guidelines are not as yet bound by any leg and stakeholders, or and instead create their islation, rules regulations, we own Alternative internal policies. definitions provided
(e.g.,
in our
survey
included
in
"negative
areas or
screens"
industries
the institutions' self-formed reported ranking of the on a return risk-adjusted simple 1 (low) to 5 (high) return for The the relative scale). higher expected
sociaUy cation responsible to sociaUy investments, responsible the greater As the a aUo qual investments.
excluding
investments
where volved
screens"
moral
and/or
standards
legal rights
are not
are violated,
met, or firms
or
in
environmental
in the production
(e.g., including
of weapons),
investments in
"positive
alternative
itative matter,
fuel in
industries), positive
investments leadership
examples exhaustive,
demonstrate specific
listed meant
Guyatt, do not
consistent
survey
dients"
are described
discussion of
variate empirical
Thereafter
multi by a
and followed
of a sociaUy responsible investment program to guide the survey respondents. The institutions were to in left this study decide if their surveyed
future
investment policies and practices, sociaUy responsible if any, fell within the scope of an integrated sociaUy investment that is consistent program responsible with industry definitions instrument we (Social used Investment Forum, 2003).9 The data dataset from 100
Data Methods We Dutch Dutch and survey instrument in this article a new
to obtain and
introduce
this article
investors. The data assembled for institutional are derived primarily from a survey of institutional investors carried out between
required investment sociaUy responsible activity by Dutch is a 13-page questionnaire, institutions comprising 32 questions. Robustness is achieved chiefly by in a way that calls for numeric framing questions
responses, or a simple "yes" or "no" response. In
about
domestic
2005. This use of surveys February 2005 and May was necessary for the research questions considered in this article. Data on past and current institutional asset aUocation and investment levels in private
view
of the fact that the potential respondents, while are from different branches of financial institutions, a glossary of terms was provided in the finance,
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Gumming
and Sofia Johan & Verzekeringskamer (1) Pensioen (Pensions and insurance of The supervisory authority Netherlands, PVK); Bank (DNB); (2) De Nederlandsche Financiele Markten (3) Autoriteit (The Nether lands authority for the financial markets,
to ensure uniformity
necessarily An be overview used sectors.
in defining
in ofthe the
terms which
same manner col
information
in Table
I, which
defines
the
are moving
we have to
sociaUy
AFM);
(4) The Dutch private equity and venture capi tal association and the European (NVP)
venture capital association; and
majority currently have sociaUy responsible sur programs. Of the 100 institutions
that
the
of
institutional
veyed, only 24 currently have a sociaUy responsible investment program for any asset class (of these, 14 include invest sociaUy responsible private equity ment programs). However, investment program adopting a sociaUy responsible over the period 2006?2010 (of these, 5 include so investment pro ciaUy responsible private equity on Reasons for the hesitance the part of grams). 19 institutions plan on
(5)Web Pursuant
persons,
sites of Dutch to
financial the
institutions. contact
to approx
identifying
survey instrument
appropriate
was sent
the
imately
(a) 797
to enter the sociaUy responsible institutions invest arena may ment include the perception that with social responsibility, corporate optimal returns may be forfeited. the main holder at the end of the day, have Institutions, and maintaining of stake goal creating some stakeholders deem social
pension funds; occupational pension and (b) 205 Insurance companies; Universal (c) 112 Banks, including Securities Mortgage
providers.
pension
credit banks,
Savings financial
value. While
to be an important factor, others may responsibility see it as separate from their main aim of obtaining ability needs may easily achieved by some institutions and board (or rather the managers of directors of these institutions) than by others. resource The human in formulating factor and stakeholder implementing grams is also institutions investment pro responsible in this Also, many analyzed study. are able to hide behind the cloak of sociaUy to caUs by their stakeholders can responsibility. They easily justify about cloak policies
who
the best
financial
returns.
The be more
to balance
was chiefly solicited with Participation that the aggregated survey results would
inated to respondents. Only one
questionnaire
in hard
equity
contact
investments
institution
One
limitation
to evade
to obtaining data through a survey we of sample selection bias. While we believe that this is a possibility, the responses the responses,
exercise. First,
secrecy
same
by
seek
the need
increased
to protect
transpar
stakeholders
provided
Potential The
funds, and other financial respondent 25 insurance Limitations weU the finance
company comprising pension industrial pension funds, occupational pension insurance companies, banks hfe and non-life institutions in our service providers. Our sample of includes 56 pension funds, and 19 banks (see Table II). companies,
gathered investors
for a final
sample
of
100
insti
the population of insti respondents, potential were identi tutional investors in The Netherlands, various sources including, but not limited to the foUowing:
fied from
sample size from each sector of industry from which we derived data, as as the limited information about comparable
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deviation observations
TABLE I
sociaUy responsible investment 5. sociaUy responsible investment 2005, plan program at as or on 2006-2010 in adopting one Social A investment responsible dummy 1 for 0 100 0.43 to 0.50 0.00 1.00 equal variable Social 0.00 0.39 0 100 1.00 private A responsible 0.19 dummy 1 equity for variable to equal j^ Social A investment responsible dummy 1 for 0 to 0.24 variable 100 equal 0.46 0.00 1.00 at as program ^ 2005 2005 institutions that program have currently a^ program institutions 2005-2010 that currently have a
planon adopting 2006-2010 in one investment 2005, Si program at as or sociaUy responsible private g equity
Fund-of-fund The investment 100 institutions'total ofthe 0 0.62 percentage 8.00 0.00 1.49 assets ^ | Netherlands 2006-2010 for expected investments expected for 2006-2010 > invested in the private equity assets Europe The Netherlands sociaUy responsible private equity a U.S. investment equity private 100 institutions'total 0 the of 0.41 0.00 percentage The 1.00 5.63 Asia investment private equity institutions'total the 0 0.05 100 of percentage 0.25 0.00 2.06invested in private in assets equity excludingThe 2006-2010 invested in fund-of-fund private equity _p_. ? Netherlands The private domestic 100 institutions'total the of 0 0.25 percentage 9.00 0.00 1.27 investment program at as 2005 ^ The 2006-2010 U.S. for expected Asia 2006-2010 for expected (outside The European Netherlands) 100 11.25 ofthe 0 institutions' 0.69 0.00 total 1.58 percentage 2006-2010 for expected ? 0 Social 0.00 0.35 1.00 100 private A responsible 0.14 dummy 1 equity for variable to equal investment equity invested in private the assets & equity
investment 2005 institutions S that program have currently a investment 2005-2010 institutions that program ? have currently a>
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deviation observations
I ?
Continued
TABLE
descriptive table in 100 Dutch selected and variables This statistics presents dataset the institutional of data investors, based coUected 2005. in on Dummy
variables have 0 of minimum and values the take that 1, percentage maximum reflects observations of value mean 1.
insurance institutional investor company responsible investment program relative o^ International Financial Reporting new (millions 300 Assets The Euros) of 800 4,753.00 9,060.41 100 50,000 by total the ,? managed assets bank/financial institutional investor responsibUity sociaUy a ? 0 0.50 1 100 fund A 0.56 Pension dummy 1 for variable equal to a fund 3* pension investor (relative the of attractiveness returns to the risk)sociaUy of a to adopting program a'-> O such single not Officer (in 5L responsible investment program to a a Chief institutional investor miUions s>; adopting Standards (2005) (IFRS) for the adopting 5 high) and of standards the importance = of 0 100 1 Insurance dummy A for 0.44 variable 0.25 to equal company an to P Chief 0.00 0.27 0 1.00 100 0.08 Officer A Investment dummy 1 for variable equal to institutional Rank of (1 The 100 institutional attractiveness low 3 investor's 2.49 1.16 5.00 1.00 rank returns = Investment Bank/financial institution 100 A 0 dummy 1 0.39 variable for 0.19 to equal one a financial The International institutional (1 reporting investor's low 2 100 2.23 0.92 rank 1.00 5.00 =
2005 g^ Euros) of
decision invest to |institutions responsibUity that the aUocate high) 5 sustainable investment the to of and comparative =
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Institutional
Investment 403
makes statistical reliable equity, however, of our sample relative to the population comparisons of other types of investors in private equity intrac
table.
and 19 which private equity investment programs), a on investment plan sociaUy responsible adopting over the period 2006-2010 program (of these, 5 include ment sociaUy programs). investment programs by type of sociaUy responsible investor institutional insurance fund, (pension and bank). The picture in Figure 2 does company, suggest there to invest is a material difference in in socially responsible invest of Dutch institutions. types comparison
These
Second,
the survey.
a broad
For
array of respondents
the data show
replied
the median
to
example,
and the average respondent asset size of 800,000,000 4,665,000,000, being indicating respondents were of a variety of asset sizes. The possibUity of sample selection bias is further reduced by the presence of institutions that do not currently aUocate any of their
assets to private equity, and do not plan to aUocate
not
the
tests and a
univariate
institutions
tests indicate
relations between
that plan to reduce aUocations by 2010. We a statisticaUy did not find significant
between non-respondents. that we cannot average However, absolutely assets we rule of respondents unfortunately out the possi
for other factors. The simultaneously controUing statistics univariate and tests in Tables III summary and IV indicate sociaUy responsible private equity investment is observed more often for European investments ments (outside The Netherlands), in the United States from Dutch and invest institutional
bility
the
of a response
data.
bias due
to the unique
nature
of
investors. SociaUy responsible is observed investment more often when institutional rank the investors importance of the IFRS as being more important. investment is also observed more
Summary The
data indicate
pension
investors
companies,
comprising
SociaUy responsible often among larger institutions, and among institu tions that centralize decision-making responsibility as well via a CIO. Note that sociaUy responsible is observed more often for private equity investment
fund-of-funds investments, but fund-of-fund
financial institutions invested on assets in 1.09% of their average private equity as at on and of their assets in 1.44% 2005, plan investing over the 2006-2010 private equity (Table II period on Panel B). Of these 100 institutions, 19 plan (over banks, and other the period 2006-2010) investing on average more than 2.5% of their assets in private equity, 10 plan on than 5% of their assets in private investing more and 6 than 7.5% of equity, plan on investing more their assets investment as at 2005. equity institutional funds in private equity. Total private equity accounted for approximately 10.5 biUion to private The proportional aUocations Netherlands aUocations States are consistent to private with investor equity and (see, e.g., Gompers
size (and hence the effect is shown to be different in the multivariate tests below). In the next section we provide multi variate of the determinants of sociaUy analyses responsible
asset classes)
investments
investment
that
in private
equity
control
(and other
for a wide
simultaneously
range of variables. Tables III and IV provide useful preliminary in into the relations between the variables. These sights
summary statistics also enable assessment of potential
problems
regards to,
with
for
the multivariate
example, coUinearity
empirical
across
tests
explana
in
in The
in the United
Lerner, 1999) and Australia (see, e.g., Cumming et al., 2005). cur Figure 1 indicates 24 (of 100) institutions a have investment rently pro sociaUy responsible 14 include gram (of these, sociaUy responsible
tory variables or some other type of misspecification error. For be example, due to the high correlation tween the regional variables, such variables are not in included the multivariate regres simultaneously sions presented in multivariate models
below in the next
the are
next
section.
Alternative discussed
presented
and
section.
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404 Douglas
Gumming TABLE
Summary
Panel
A.
Characteristics financial
of
the
institutional of in
investors
in assets of
the
dataset Number tions with of a institusociaUy investNumber sociaUy program adopt one of institutions with investment or planning to a
of Type institution
responsible in 2005
in 2006-2010
Pension
fund
56 25 19 Bank
23 14 13 7 10 5 29 43
Insurance company
AU
tional
types of instituinvestors
100
Panel
B.
Asset
aUocations
(percentage
of
assets
invested
in different
asset
classes)
Cash/ Index
funds
Private
equity investments
Other types
of alternative
Other
Pension fund
Insurance company
31.51
24.71
2.86
2.52
1.97
2.16
1.67
0.62
0.73 9.53
2.60 8.37
All Types
tional This
47.59 52.77
2.68 2.74
1.05 1.85
1.86 1.44
table
the
data
by
the
characteristics investment
of program
the
in
terms
of and estate.
assets future
and asset
number aUocations
of
types
investments
primarily
encompass
hedge
empirical
analyses
empirical tests in this section focus on logit regression analyses of the probability that an investor has a sociaUy responsible private institutional In Table V Panel A, we equity investment program. aU 100 institutional investors in the dataset, or not of whether regardless they invest in private In V Table Panel B we consider of any type. equity the subset of 35 institu of logit regression analyses consider
to be (2005) or expect in V Table (2006?2010) private equity. inModel Panel B also considers (11) bivariate logit two the that steps: (1) analyses involving probability tional investors that invested an institutional investor (2) the probability in sociaUy invested Model invests in private that an institutional equity, and investor is
are
private equity. The responsible is a useful robustness check (11) specification to ascertain whether in there are statistical differences that invest in private equity versus
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Socially Responsible
Institutional
Investment 405
SRI
(2005)
investment
(SRI) programs for private equity and other asset classes among
100 Dutch
any concern with potential relations studied, as indicated nitions across robustness variables, in Table the 17 I. The regression checks for potential
alternative models
and other are available upon request from the authors. ported in respect Table V provides interesting evidence of the three primary regards to Hypothesis indicates hypotheses 1, note outlined above. evidence
In
Company
Ban3^;^3C,al
regression invest private equity sociaUy responsible common to ment when the decision is more more an in investment is such plan implement placed the hands of investment a CIO, team. When as opposed to a broader a CIO is in charge, a so equity investment program
Figure 2. SociaUy responsible investment (SRI) programs by type of institution (Current as at 2005 or Planned for 2006-2010).
correct for that do not, and to econometricaUy in Heckman differences the those potential spirit of thereafter considers 1979). Table VI (1976, logit an the that insti of regression analyses probability those responsibility any asset class, not only private equity. Each ofthe to show (17 in total) are provided regression models to alternative in the sample, robustness subsets alternative definitions ofthe dependent variable, and alternative explanatory variables. The variables are as (see also Table data in terms of the questions defined investors in the survey was above I). The structure ofthe put to the institutional also designed to mitigate tutional investor invests in social for
hkely to be adopted. 4 and text), (note accompanying to investments may be perceived sociaUy responsible a some returns in expected involve sacrifice by an investment personnel within investors, and when above
compete with each other on the basis of organization to their returns performance, they are less hkely in sociaUy investments. invest By responsible a CIO takes contrast, when to be investments of type investment responsible to be adopted. likely In regards to Hypothesis cate
ments
for the responsibihty carried out, sociaUy are much more programs 2, the regressions private
among
indi invest
that sociaUy
are more
responsible
common
equity
institutional
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ON
proportions test
III ?
TABLE
European (outside The19 Chief Investment 2.39 0.30 81 1.88 0.00 3.55*** p < 0.000*** Officer 19 Pension 19 fund 0.47 81 1.00 0.58 1.00 -0.82 -0.84 81 0.02 0.32 0.00 0.00 2.62** 4.21***
?"*
lands
domestic International
19 0.00 81 0.34
Financial
0.2353Fund-of-funds private equity 81 0.88 1.35 19 0.45 0.00 2.35** < 0.000*** p | 81 3.00 19 0.00 Rank of attractiveness of 81 3.00 2.89 19 2.40 p 3.00 1.76* < on 0.52 0.171 81 1.92* 0.00 0.16 0.213 19 0.03 < investment Asia private O equity p 2.63
2.14 p
1.89*
<
0.677
??
observations observations
Reporting js Standards
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (8) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(15) -0.65 0.09 0.10 -0.07 0.11 -0.06 0.03 0.07 0.14 -0.16 -0.09 -0.14 Insurance company
(14) Pensionfund -0.04 -0.10 -0.08 -0.05 0.02 (13) Log (assets) 0.17 0.18 0.46 0.40 -0.02 0.26 0.36 0.12 0.31 0.37 -0.17 0.27 1.00 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.18 -0.26 0.18 -0.11 -0.33
matrix TABLE IV Correlation This table defined Table highlighted 5% in coefficients bold correlation variables the selected Correlations level presents I. and as significant at are across
Investment
Officer
responsibUity
0.42 0.06 0.05 0.22 0.26 (10) 0.29 International 0.22 0.07 -0.10 0.23 0.19 0.25 0.21 1.00 Reporting Financial -T Standards (9) Fund-of-funds private equity investment (outside ^ (6) The 0.03 0.44 0.52 0.19 0.20 1.00 European Netherlands) private (5) The Netherlands domestic private equity -0.07 0.03 -0.01 1.00 o |* (7) 0.28 0.00 0.50 0.61 U.S. 0.25 1.00 private investment equity (4) Social ^ responsible private 0.46 investment 0.63 0.83 equity 1.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.24 0.16 0.34 0.45 0.19 0.02 0.09 0.17 0.53
0.20
0.00
of
attractiveness
of
0.00 0.07
0.32
1.00
0.05
-0.14
0.32
0.41
1.00
(3) Social 0.48 0.56 1.00 responsible private o5 equity (1) Social responsible investment program 1.00 (2) Social investment responsible 2005 2005-2010 program ? program 2005 equity investment g ?1 2005-2010 investment program responsible investment *|
0.74
1.00
'g: investment
font. underline
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ii te*
Marginal /"-Statistic
Marginal /-Statistic Marginal /-Statistic Marginal /-Statistic /-Statistic Constant -0.966 -4.144*** -0.824 -2.821*** -0.741 -0.969 -4.083*** -0.794 -2.421** -0.661 -2.868*** (6) (5) (4) (3) Model (1) (2) Model -2.626*** Log (assets) Pension 0.085 fund 3.454*** 0.069 2.591*** 1.167 0.137 1.376 0.130
Marginal
3.356*** 1.361
0.056 0.097
0.044 1.348
2.464** ?
?V TABLE responsible
-0.069
equity
investment -1.303 -0.095 Insurance company 0.110 0.798 0.201 1.041 0.173 0.992 0.793 0.107 0.154 0.887 0.818 0.088 s -0.025 -0.788
stainable/sociaUy
Chief European
Officer -0.006
2.044**
2.190** 0.021
0.459
1.893* 0.475
0.512
1.414
0.096
0.03
31.801*** 57.978*** 31.434*** 51.570*** 52.608*** 30.549*** Chi-square statistic Loglikehood function -33.348 Adjusted R2 (pseudo 0.530 0.314 0.541 -22.837 -32.906 -19.633 -24.596 -22.318 0.323 0.596
0.393
A.
Full
sample The
dutch 100 of
institutions U.S. Asia private equity investment 0.145 0.998 0? 0.262 private 1.549 f 0.015 0.632 investment private equity equity domestic Netherlands) private investment equity Reporting 5 Standards equity /-\ ^ investment responsible returns to socially '-^ investment investment responsibility variable 100 100 Number of observations Number observations of 19 19 14
Netherlands
1) Model R2 for
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4^O
private equity private equity private equity private equity SteP 1: Probability of Step 2: Probability of
Marginal ('-Statistic
Marginal (-Statistic
Marginal
Marginal (-Statistic (-Statistic Constant -0.716 -1.155 -2.477 -2.207** -1.349 -1.376 -2.103** -2.173 -3.490 -3.315*** -4.451 -2.786*** 2.018**
Marginal (-Statistic
Marginal (-Statistic
0.211
0.060
0.567
0.188
1.944*
ubsample
(9) subsample
Model
(10)
subsample Chief Investment Officer 0.470 2.506** 0.404 2.125** 0.450 1.983** 0.700 1.448 S
Model
(11)
V TABLE
Continued Model
investment Reporting
European -0.113 -0.088 (7)-(10)) (Models Subsample B. Panel bivatiate of investments private (Model and (11)) equity logit estimates selection with sample
Pension fund 0.151 0.528 0.324 0.962 0.037 0.110 0.279 0.920S Insurance 0.256 0.083 0.862 0.289 0.194 1.064 0.579 0.159 company
-0.271
0.002
-1.983**
0.016
? " 1.955* 1.837* Rank 0.237 0.245 1.621 0.207 1.851* of 0.375 attractiveness returns
Attractiveness returns private of to 0.013 3.506*** ? to socially responsible investment SJ. public equity """* versus -0 339 ? responsibility ? Standards
The
-0.025
domestic
investment Netherlands
?y Netherlands) investment investment U.S. 574 0 227** 2 investment J? ? Asia 0.680 ? 0.217
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s3 3
I'
Go
cts
significance
in the spirit of Heckman (1976, 1979) whereby in the first step the probability that the institution private invests in equity is estimated, while in the second step the probability that the institution makes firms of included The and Dutch excluded variables. 100 institutional with collinearity total population of comprises presented described investors Tables in The the II. and I not logit standard values are . the is shown statistical institutional in investors (l)-(5), of regardless sample the whether they investing Models plan private in In not policy equity. adoption of investment responsible socially or are on includes a means 2005, either adoption has place taken institution plans (6) at the 2006-2010. as adopt or within policy period to the Model In such sometime practice the to adoption 2005. refers only a at current as independent The responsible is investments Table in equity private I. socially estimated. variables defined potential problems independent the coefficients to robust as on variables are associated alongside logit estimates investment regression table the This probability of presents adoption responsible policy socially private in by Dutch equity institutional investor. 100 a Panel all considers A institutional Panel the 2006-2010 B will (7)?(10). of considers period be subsample (11) investors private invested in Models that the Model in equity B Panel bivariate involves 2-step a regression
significance.
*,
**,
***
Significant
difference
for
the
sample
of
all
other
Chi-square 9.331 21.223*** 19.618** 14.282* function Loglikehood -19.466 -13.520 -14.323 -16.990 -46.219
statistic
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a*
4^ i??
Marginal Marginal ^-Statistic ^-Statistic Marginal (15) (16) (17) (14) (13) (12) Model -0.622 -1.451 effect effect effect effect effect Pension fund 0.227 1.481 0.269 1.631 1.195 0.210 0.233 1.516 0.203 1.143 0.189 1.313 ? 1 Insurance 1.341 1.726* 0.219 0.286 1.353 0.220 1.555 0.257 0.275 1.480 0.262 1.566 company 9.783 16.930** institutional Tables in I described investors The II. and logit values standard presented the they that coefficients; rather, not effects marginal significance are economic so within the period 2006-2010. In Model (17) adoption only refers to the current practice at as The 2005. independent variables are as defined in Table I. The coefficients on the 10.424*** 22.805*** This table presents logit regression estimates of the probability adoption of socially a responsible investment policy in any asset class by a Dutch institutional investor. In Models (12)?(16), of adoption responsible sociaUy policy investment includes a 2005, place taken has adoption either the policy institution plans to at such adopt as sometime means or a 19.545*** independent variables included robust potential problems are with associated collinearity population to of total excluded and The variables. firms 100 of comprises Dutch **, *** Significant difference sample for the -0.871 -2.361** Log (assets) 0.071 1.740* 0.066 1.531 0.038 0.776 0.073 1.793* 0.077 1.707* 0.048 1.409 |' -1.185 -2.755*** -1.029
International Financial 0.033 0.504 0.014 0.201 0.021 0.294 0.048 0.688 0.018 0.247 0.113 1.915* ft statistic ^ Chief Officer Investment 2.327** 0.406 3.219*** 0.476 2.957*** 2.252** 2.415** 0.459 0.400 0.441 0.233 0.047 Fund-of-funds investment -0.073 -1.363 -0.173 -2.191** -0.229 -1.809* -0.102 -1.575 -0.157 -1.962** -0.088 -1.631 ^ Chi-square
is
shown (outside The European 1.975** 0.156 1.698* 0.071 0.144 1.598
alongside
the
statistical
significance.
*,
of
Rank of attractiveness of returns 0.121 2.344** 0.027 0.648 ? & Number 100 of observations ? 43 Number 29 of observations socially ^ resopnsible to investment where The Netherlands -0.373 -0.021 U.S. 0.412 investment 1.717* ^ ?. Asia investment 0.229 0.867 Netherlands) investment Reporting Standards ^ domestic investment ?responsibility Model js diagnostics variable dependent 1) Model = 1
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Gumming
and Sofia Johan to invest in sociaUy responsible propensity ments. Model 17 indicates that an increase invest in the
In particular,
with
6, 8, and 11 in Table V Panels economic of a 10% change is as low as significance 0.4% inModel 6 and as high as 2.7% inModel 11. are AU of these estimates statisticaUy significant at at least control
institutional
2, 5, The
of the IFRS by 1 (on a ranking of the importance scale of 1-5, where 5 is the most important) increases the likelihood that an institutional investor will a investment program by adopt sociaUy responsible 1.1%. The
standards investments again, these are as
data
more
therefore
closely to
suggest
connected private
that
reporting
to pubUc but very
opposed statistical
the
of
for
and that
robust influence
to
differences
pronounced Many of
investment
allocations.
variables significant
more
in
the and
Table
V Model
3 indicates
private equity investment for private equity investments Dutch institutional institutional regardless
equity.
that sociaUy responsible not is statistically different in the United when considered they
consider
SociaUy
programs
responsible
private
common
invest
the
investors and those insti larger institutional in the data expecting risk greater economic returns from invest sociaUy responsible adjusted among tutions
ments. An increase in the rank ofthe relative returns
However,
of Dutch equity
investors data
in private
among investors with a 10% greater international investment focus in the United States. By contrast, there is no evidence from that any specification sociaUy is statisticaUy private equity investment responsible related to cross-border in Asia investment decisions and/or for domestic
of the
equity common
investment
to sociaUy responsible investments by 1 (on a scale of 1 is the lowest) increases the probability 1-5, where of a sociaUy investment 1?3% responsible by on the specification of the model (see depending no Models 5 and 7-10). We find statisticaUy signifi cant differences to carry out sociaUy in the propensity on the type of investments responsible depending financial fund, insurance company or bank/ in any specification in Tables V institution) that sociaUy responsible and VI. We do find evidence is approximately investment 1?3% less common investor (pension institutional investors in fund-of-funds that invest (seeModels of a 10% 8?9 this
In regards
description
among
variate
investment investors
correlation
is more that are
evidence
common more
greater proportion and 13?16, but the statistical significance is not robust in some of the other evidence is expected cations), which the decision-making from
to the fund-of-funds managers.
it appears However, affect the association IFRS to an institution sociaUy relation in Table
tions
to invest in and the propensity investments: the private equity is not robust in a controls for other factors
multivariate
to of Table VI by comparison FinaUy, note that the factors that give Table V that the evidence for investment decisions rise to sociaUy responsible private
asset
V, Panels A and B. As such, the data offer that institu evidence suggestive but not conclusive
are sensitive to reporting standards and pubUc
equity
This
similar viewed
to those
unexpected
for other
result, as
classes.
is a somewhat
perception
investment
private
equity
private classes.
noteworthy
that Model
(17)
in Table VI
investment, including public that the just private equity) related (at the 10% level of
ofthe fact that the IFRS to related appears to be somewhat more closely but these investments than private other equity, in the differences were not statisticaUy pronounced not It is that factors data. captured possible regulatory the data could better explain differences across
as a distinctive
asset
note
by
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Socially Responsible asset classes, but that issue is beyond the scope of this article and the new dataset used herein. This issue, along with other related issues is discussed further in
the next section.
Institutional such
sensitive
it is natural
to the
the market
asset
to be more
class. There
responsible
is ample why
such
scope for further research to consider when, and how private fund managers implement
programs.
Extensions
and
future
research
Conclusions This article introduced the first international dataset The for the first time the factors study investigated that influence investors to allocate cap institutional to ital sustainable sociaUy responsible private equity a new detaUed dataset investments. We introduced from a survey of Dutch institutional investors. Per
most importantly, there was very strong evi
on sociaUy responsible private equity investments. As the data obtained in this article are new and unique to obtain from institutional and extremely difficult investors,
number of
there
are of
course
We
limitations
in
gathered
the
observations.
nevertheless
sufficient factors
cations
affect
asset
institutional
classes
haps
dence
responsible
in the data
investments
introduced
are
herein
more
that
likely
sociaUy
among
investments. And aswe have discussed in responsible the article, we do not have any reason to believe there are biasses with in regard to sample selection
the data we were able to obtain.
that centralize
of a CIO.
on Dutch institutional analysis focussed to sociaUy responsible investor aUocations private investment in The Netherlands, equity Europe (outside The Netherlands) (our data cannot distin in Europe due to guish between specific countries Our the confidential United between
evidence,
model among investment competitive are 40?50% less likely to consider in their decisions. responsibility data indicated investors institutional sociaUy strong evidence are more likely
nature
in responsible private equity in The and the United (outside Netherlands) in contrast to domestic Dutch investments investments. is more That socially responsible likely in Europe (outside The and the United States relative to within likely reflects investment has shown less widely sociaUy
among
investments
regions). We
conclusive,
suggestive
regulations
might in regards
have
different to social
responsibility. could consider expanding the data in terms of more different asset classes, as well as closely investigating for time periods different and different possibly countries
Further
FinaUy,
investment
the
data
indicated
common
and Ralston, (in the spirit of Manignan a see et also for discussion of 2002; al., 2005, Mayer in institutional differences in the investor decisions versus the United United Kingdom States). Given propensity the increase in institutional investor to adopt socially responsible investment in asset other programs classes), private equity (and further research could also investigate the factors that give rise
selves
is more
larger
tional
investors
expecting
for
greater
There the view
investments. support
that sociaUy responsible investment was more institutions that consider adherence among IFRS to be more OveraU, we across factors
investing in
likely to the
to private
such
equity
investment
fund managers
alternatives
to them
to their
differences responsible
asset classes.
offer
private
institutional article
investors.
The is an
data
introduced
in this
Further or
research on other
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dimming
private GUson
equity (1998),
venture
Cumming
and Johan (2006), Gompers and Lerner (1999), Manigart et al. (2000), Mayer et al. (2005), Sapienza et al., (1996), Wright and Lockett (2003).
For bUity and recent hterature on corporate investment, social responsi see, e.g., sociaUy responsible
communities, employees, to deliver is designed sustainable as as at to weU shareholders." society large, as social ethical described investing, investing, or aware SRI based investing, investing, socially respect ronment. It investing concerns individuals, pension other approach into investment businesses, funds, that integrates decisions. universities, social Social and
environmental include
investors
hospitals, religious
foundations, and
Cowton (2002, 2004), DUlenburg et al. (2003), Sparkes and Cowton and Lewer (2004), Guay (2004), Waring et al. (2004), MiU (2006), and Lockett et al. (2005).
Most sis of notably, social capital see Maula and et al. (2003) for an acquisition knowledge context venture of corporate capital. In our data in the next section), (described the institutional returns asset (see, investors quite classes, e.g., Ali ranked highly consistent and Gold, sociaUy to be and with 2002; recent analy in the
corporations,
institutions,
Social investors organizations. consciously nonprofit to work to achieve in ways their money spe put designed a better, more cific financial just and goals whUe buUding investment sustainable Social economy. investing requires managers to overlay and a quaUtative onto analysis the of corporate poU
of
cies,
practices, of profit
impacts
traditional
quantitative
analysis
potential."
All types
gate response and
of pension
bias. As of
funds were
2004,
included
funds
to miti
in the
aU pension
evidence
DerwaU
Netherlands
company
had
pensions
assets at
having
442 biUion,
assets of over
with
141
Dutch
biUion.
1miUion have how Pension funds with assets below ever been excluded (954 in total) primarily because the possibiUty of sample selection bias is mitigated by the
breadth survey surveyed, of asset size of the Of assets questionnaires. 524 have pension the between funds 797 that were pension 10 million sent funds and
associated funds).
with 5
sociaUy argument go
responsible tralized
to work
sociaUy cen with corporations and Ramus, 2003). (Montgomery more to rank, risk was difficult for
1 biUion. A majority
100 miUion. 34 Pension
of
those
Funds
have
control
assets
assets
less than
between
1 biUion
5 biUion Those scribed or with as
and
within
5 biUion, whUe
their control. within with an
12 have more
this but
than
de
against which
differ at different we were
category in
implementation, for
services
ranking e.g.,
returns for
European
their
increase are of we
result in institutional eventuaUy to what extent to declare social and are factors (e.g., in their investment some insti
deemed study.
for
the
this
of of
pension of the
investors
to make
survey selection
mitigates number
The Social Investment Forum (2003, page 9) defines SRI as foUows: "SociaUy responsible investing (SRI) is an
investment mental process consequences that of considers investments, of rigorous the social both and environ and positive
between 100 miUion and 1 biUion, 27 have more than 1 biUion and 29 have less than 100 miUion. 1 and EU bank branches have not been Non-EU
included.
13
within the context negative, It is a process of identifying certain that meet standards
financial
analysis.
The
size) the
10%
merely of the
change
to illustrate effect.
is
The
simply
the effect
hypothetical,
is modeled
and
selected (the in
economic
internationaUy.
Forum open explains: and trans
econometric
specification.
Diagnostic
as UkeUhood
a non-Unear
for
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Socially Responsible
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