Parapsychology and Philosophy: A Whiteheadian Postmodern Perspective1

David Ray Griffin2

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The Marginality of Parapsychology in the Modern World (odern science in general has had a tremendo*s impact *pon philosophical tho*ght in recent cent*ries# and this fact has remained tr*e in the 2+th cent*ry, Altho*gh some philosophical circles in an earlier portion of this cent*ry -ere dominated .y movements that so*ght to ins*late themselves from the sciences# s*ch as phenomenology# e/istential0ism# and analytic philosophy# philosophical tho*ght overall has .een greatly transformed .y the effects of scientific discoveries and theories, &his is tr*e not only of the so0called nat*ral sciences1the effects of the second la- of thermodynamics# 2*ant*m physics# evol*tionary theory# molec*lar .iology# and ecology spring to mind1 .*t also of the so0called social sciences1here one thin3s immediately of the impact of (ar/ism# 4re*dian0ism# and the theory of paradigm0shifts# -hich arose in the sociohistorical st*dy of science, o-ever# altho*gh the science of parapsycho0logy# at least *nder the older name 5psychical research6 7$ *se the t-o terms synonymo*sly# e/cept -hen indicating other-ise8# has e/isted for over a cent*ry# it has yet to have m*ch impact *pon philosophical tho*ght, $ndeed# altho*gh the Parapsychological Association has .een an affiliate of the American Association for the Advancement of Science since 19:9# most scientists and philosophers still do not thin3 of it as a science# -hether thro*gh e/plicit re;ection or simply .y not thin3ing a.o*t it at all, &he reasons mat have .een given most often for this contin*ed marginality of parapsychology .y its detractors are these: 718 &he alleged interactions of parapsychology violate certain f*ndamental ass*mp0tions 7often called# follo-ing C, D, <road=s >19:9? analysis# 5.asic limiting principles68 of the -orldvie- that is pres*pposed thro*gho*t the philosophical and scientific comm*nities1a -orldvie- that -or3s perfectly -ell for almost everything e/cept the alleged data of parapsychology 7Camp.ell# 19@A# pp, BB# 9109:C 4eigl# 19:+# pp, 2@0298, 728 Parapsycho0logy is s*spect .eca*se of association -ith the 5occ*lt6 7Allison# 19D@# p, 2@18, 7B8 Parapsychology has .een *na.le to prod*ce e/periments that are repeata.le in the strong sense, 'ven if some replica.ility has .een achieved# it is not s*fficient given the fact that the implications of the alleged res*lts do not cohere -ith many .asic principles accepted thro*gho*t the rest of the scientific comm*nity: e/traordinary claims re2*ire e/traordi0 nary evidence 7E*rtF# 19@1# pp, 1B01A8, 7A8 &he parapsychology comm*nity has not prod*ced a -idely accepted# testa.le theory of ho- and -hy the effects appear -hen they occasionally do# if they do,

Parapsychology as a Revolutionary Science &his marginality of parapsychology has evo3ed contrasting proposals from the parapsychological comm*nity, Altho*gh mere is a large spectr*m of attit*des# $ -ill spea3 in terms of t-o main tendencies# the conservative and the revol*tionary, &he conservative stance involves# in the first place# minimiFing the appearance of

contradiction .et-een the -orldvie- of the scientific comm*nity in general and that of the parapsychological comm*0nity, 4ello- parapsychologists are *rged not to spea3 of their science as revol*tionary, &he seemingly paranormal types of ca*sal interaction st*died .y parapsychologists are called 5anomalies#6 -hich implies that they may event*ally .e e/plained in terms of conventional ca*sal theories 7some have s*ggested that they may already .e th*s e/plaina.le# -ith 2*ant*m physics .eing the favorite 5conventional6 theory8, $t has even .een *rged that ca*sal hypotheses .e given *p# at least temporarily, Some parapsychologists advocate the *se of terms that imply no hypotheses a.o*t the types of ca*sality involved in the vario*s phenomena st*diedC rather# they say these terms sho*ld .e defined negatively or phenomenalistically, &he term 5psi6 has .een proposed as s*ch a term to refer to all the phenomena 7$ -ill *se the term# .*t not -ith the phenomenalist meaning8, A second conservative tendency has .een to disting*ish 5parapsychology#6 *nderstood as a la.oratory science# from 5psychical research#6 -hich investigates spontaneo*s cases as -ell# and to e/cl*de from parapsychology the st*dy of evidence for life after death and the more .iFarre0 seeming physical phenomena# s*ch as materialiFa0tions# there.y .rea3ing the association .et-een parapsychology and the occ*lt, A third conservative tendency# closely related to the second# is to try to find an e/periment that -ill .e s*fficiently repeata.le to convince other scientists of the reality of the phenomenon st*died, A fo*rth conservative tendency# closely related to the third# is to do process0oriented st*dies to try to *nderstand the dynamics .ehind the prod*ction of psi effects, At the opposite end of the spectr*m is a revol*tionary stance, &his stance says that if the types of interaction st*died .y parapsychologists are gen*ine# so that telepathy# psycho3inesis# and precognition really occ*r# this sho-s that the conventional -orldvie- of modern science and philosophy is completely inade2*ate, Precognition# -ith its implication that the f*t*re e/erts .ac3-ard ca*sation *pon the present1-hich -o*ld mean that an effect can e/ist .efore its ca*se1is often offered as the clearest case in point, Conventional ideas of ca*sality and time 7as -ell as space8# it is said# m*st .e given *p, Regarding the second and third points in the general criti2*e of parapsychology# those -ith a more revol*tionary approach# .eing less concerned -ith acceptance .y conventional science and less -orried a.o*t charges of association -ith 5the occ*lt#6 tend to .e impatient -ith the methods and generally meager res*lts of the strictly e/perimental approach# and -ant to devote more attention to large0scale spontaneo*s phenomena and to consider serio*sly the 2*estion of s*rvival, Regarding the fo*rth point# altho*gh these thin3ers are not necessarily *ninterested in discovering the *nderlying dynamics# they s*spect that the dynamics operating -hen normal s*.;ects intentionally prod*ce 7small0scale8 manifestations of psi are 2*ite different from those operating in e/traordinary individ*als -ho have spontaneo*sly manifested large0scale effects 7&aylor# 19@D# p, B2D8, &he la.oratory# e/perimental approach# they .elieve# is therefore not going to help *s *nderstand the nat*ral phenomenena# -hich *nderstanding -as the motive for esta.lishing the science in the first place, 4*rthermore# there may .e something a.o*t psi that -ill al-ays prevent s*ccessf*l e/periments that are repeata.le in a very strong sense 7'isen.*d# 19@B# pp, 1A901:@8, (y o-n reading in the area# -ith eyes conditioned .y the philosophy of Alfred %orth Whitehead 71@:1019AD8#B has led me to a position some-here in the middle of the spectr*m .et-een the conservative and revol*tionary stances, &he foc*s of my disc*ssion -ill .e on the 2*estion of -orldvie-# especially on -hat C, D, <road 719:98 called the 5.asic limiting principles,6 $ agree -ith those -ho see this iss*e as primary and the rest# s*ch as the iss*e of repeata.ility# as secondary, 4or e/ample# sociologist of science (arcello &r*FFi 719@+8# one of the fairest of parapsychology=s critics# ma3es these t-o points a.o*t repeata.ility and parapsychology: 7a8 a.sence of replica.ility is present for significant claims in many other accepted sciences 7especially in psychology and sociology .*t also in s*ch fields as astronomy8C and 7.8 replica.ility is also a matter of degree# and many e/periments in

parapsychology have .een replicated -ith some consistency .y different e/perimenters 7to say nothing a.o*t replications -ith the same e/perimental set or replications -ith a single s*.;ect8# 7p, AB8 !n this .asis he endorses the follo-ing statement .y Pa*l Allison 719D@8: While the discovery of an easily repeata.le e/periment might *ltimately save parapsy0 chology# the lac3 thereof s*rely does little to e/plain the intensity of those -ho oppose the field, $t certainly hasn=t stopped other fields 7e,g,# psychology8 from .eing accepted as scientifically legitimate, %o# the opposition seems to stem most from t-o closely related feat*res of parapsychology: its threat to .asic scientific ass*mptions and its origins hi and contin*ed association -ith the occ*lt# 7p, 2@18 $ -o*ld say that these t-o reasons1threat to .asic ass*mptions and association -ith the occ*lt1are so 5closely related6 that they# in fact# are t-o sides of the same coin: &he principles of the 5modern scientific -orldvie-6 that the evidence from para0 psychology challenges -ere originally adopted precisely# in large part# to r*le o*t 5occ*lt6 pheno0mena, Challenging these principles therefore inevi0ta.ly loo3s to defenders of the modern -orldvie- li3e s*pport for 5the occ*lt,6 At the center of the ne- philosophy of nat*re that emerged victorio*s in the 1Dth cent*ry -as a mechanistic doctrine of nat*re, &his position -as# in fact# often referred to as the 5ne- mechanical philosophy,6 &his vie- of nat*re had t-o f*ndamental dimensions# .oth of -hich e/emplified the demand that all 5occ*lt6 2*alities and po-ers .e .anished from nat*re, !ne dimension -as the elimination of all sponta0neity# self0motion# or self0 determination1especially any self0determination in terms of an ideal end 7final ca*sation81from nat*re# -hich res*lted in determinism, &he second meaning of mechanism -as that there can .e no action at a distance: All ca*sal infl*ence m*st .e .y contact, A statement .y Richard Westfall 719@+a8 nicely s*mmariFes these t-o points: All >mechanical philosophers? agreed on some form of d*alism -hich e/cl*ded from nat*re the possi.ility of -hat they called pe;oratively 5occ*lt agents6 and -hich presented nat*ral phenomena as the necessary prod*cts of ine/ora.le physical processes, , , , All agreed that the program of nat*ral philosophy lay in demonstrating that the phenomena of nat*re are prod*ced .y the m*t*al interplay of material particles -hich act on each other .y direct contact alone, 7pp, 1G01:8 !ne of the factors ma3ing action at a distance s*ch an important iss*e at the time -as the 5-itch0craFe6 of the 1:th and 1Dth cent*ries# -hich some historians consider the ma;or social pro.lem of the time 7Eors H Peters# 19D28, &he acc*sations of -itchcraft pres*pposed the idea that the h*man mind co*ld directly ca*se harm to other people and their possessions, &he mechanistic philosophy of Descartes and (ersenne# .y denying that any action at a distance can occ*r and# more partic*larly# .y denying that the mind can e/ercise infl*ence *pon remote o.;ects 7Descartes= philosophy made it diffic*lt to *nderstand ho- the mind co*ld even infl*ence its o-n .ody8# *ndermined the -orld of tho*ght in -hich the -itch0craFe flo*rished and helped .ring a.o*t its demise 7'aslea# 19@+C "eno.le# 19AB# pp, 1@# @909:C &revor0Roper# 19:98, A second theological0social pro.lem# pro.a.ly e2*ally important# involved the interpretation of 5miracles,6 Competing -ith .oth Aristotelianism and the mechanistic philosophy -as a -ild assortment of %eoplatonic# ermetic# Ca.alistic# and nat*ralistic philosophies that had spread north-ard from the Platonic Renaissance that .egan in $taly in the 1Gth cent*ry, Some of these -ere 5magical6 philosophies# -hich allo-ed action at a distance, &hey specifically allo-ed the h*man mind to e/ert and receive infl*ence at a distance1for e/ample# thro*gh 5sympathy,6 &hese philosophies implied# and some of their proponents e/plicitly arg*ed# that the miracles of the %e- &estament

7and# for Catholics# the ongoing Christian tradition8 -ere p*rely nat*ral effects# not different in 3ind from e/traordinary events that have occ*rred in other traditions and not re2*iring any s*pernat*ral intervention, Defenders of Christianity sa- these philosophies as posing a profo*nd threat# .eca*se the appeal to miracles as the sign of God=s esta.lishment of Christianity as the one tr*e religion -as the central element in Christian apologetics, (any .elieved# f*rthermore# given the close relation .et-een the Christian Ch*rch and the state# that the sta.ility of the -hole social fa.ric rested on this point 7'aslea# 19@+# pp, 9A09G# 1+@011G# 1B2# 1BG# 1B@# 1G@# 21+C Iaco.# 19D@# pp, 1:20 1D:8, &he mechanistic philosophy -as seen .y many as the .est defense of this traditional Christian position against the nat*ralistic interpretation of miracles, 4or e/ample# 4ather (arin (ersenne# -ho -as1along -ith Descartes# and in -ays more important than Descartes1the central fig*re in the esta.lishment of the mechanistic philosophy in scientific# philoso0phical# and theological circles in 4rance# advocated the mechanistic philosophy on these gro*nds, <eca*se it sho-ed that no infl*ence at a distance co*ld occ*r nat*rally# the miracles that occ*rred in the %e- &estament and later Christian history -ere really miracles1that is# they re2*ired the s*pernat*ral intervention of God 7"eno.le# 19AB# pp, 1BB# 1GD01G@# 21+# BDG# B@18, 7&hose similar events that occ*rred in other traditions -ere said to .e prod*ced .y Satan, Altho*gh Satan=s po-ers -ere said to .e not tr*ly s*pernat*ral# .*t only preternat*ral# they incl*ded the po-er to sim*late mirac*lo*s effects,8 Part and parcel of this denial of infl*ence at a distance -as the sensationist doctrine of perception# according to -hich -e can perceive act*alities .eyond o*rselves only .y means of the .odily senses, S*ch perception involves a chain of contig*o*s infl*ences# -hereas nonsensory percep0tion -o*ld involve a direct contact .et-een the mind and a remote o.;ect or mind, &his sensationism helped *ndermine the -orld of tho*ght that allo-ed .oth for -itchcraft and for nat*ralistic interpretations of certain miracles 7s*ch as Ies*s= 3no-ledge of -hat -as in other people=s minds8, Some of the theological0sociological reasons for preferring the mechanistic doctrine of nat*re# ho-ever# involved the other meaning of this doctrine1the denial to matter of the capacity for self0motion, !ne of theseA had to do -ith .elief in life after death, Some of the Renaissance philosophies# referred to a.ove# regarded matter as self0moving and perhaps self0organiFing, Some of the proponents of the idea that matter is self0moving e/plicitly propo*nded the heresy of 5mortalism#6 -hich says that -hen the .ody dies# so does the so*l, &hey arg*ed for this on the gro*nds that the .ody is composed of self0 moving things and yet it clearly decays at deathC there is no reason# accordingly# to ass*me that the fate of the so*l -ill .e any different, &his heresy -as also profo*ndly threatening in the eyes of the defenders of the ch*rch=s a*thority and there.y of social sta.ility, (ost people# friends and opponents ali3e# agreed that the ch*rch=s a*thority lay primarily in its having 5the 3eys to the 3ingdom#6 meaning the po-er to determine -hether people at death -o*ld go to heaven or hell, $f .elief in life after death cr*m.led# so -o*ld the a*thority of the ch*rch, Again# the mechanistic vie- of nat*re -as seen as a godsend, $t portrayed matter as having no self0moving po-er, &his vie- of nat*re made it o.vio*s that .eca*se -e are o.vio*sly self0moving .eings# there m*st .e something in *s that is different in 3ind from matter1an immaterial# self0moving so*l, Accordingly# it -as arg*ed1.y (ersenne# Gassendi# Descartes# <oyle# and the Royal Society1the fact that the .ody decays at death is no reason to s*ppose that the so*l decays# too 7'aslea# 19@+# pp, 1+@011G# 1B@# 1G@# 21+C Iaco.# 19D@# pp, 1:101D:C "eno.le# 19AB# pp, 1BB# 1GD01G@# 21+# BDG# B@18, $ mention this third e/ample# a.o*t ho- the mechanistic philosophy of nat*re -as *sed to s*pport .elief in life after death# for t-o reasons, 4irst# it sho-s that in its first phase the 5modern -orldvie-6 -as not intended to r*le o*t .elief in life after death# .*t to

s*pport it, &he so*l -as different from the .rain and separa.le from it, $ -ill ma3e *se of this point .elo- in delimiting psi and the paranormal, Second# this e/ample ill*strates the fact that the idea that nat*re=s .asic *nits are devoid of the po-er of self0motion -as as central to the modern -orldvie- as the denial of action at a distance, (y proposal in this essay -ill .e that -e need a postmodern philosophy in -hich .oth of these feat*res of the modern -orldvie- are re;ected, &hat is# .esides allo-ing for action at a distance# the Whiteheadian philosophy $ commend is a nond*alis0tic# neoanimistic# pane/perientialist philosophy# in -hich e/perience and spontaneity are f*lly nat*ral feat*res of the -orld# characteristic of nat*re at every level, 4or no-# ho-ever# the iss*e is the relation .et-een the modern -orld0vie-# action at a dis0tance# and the controversial and therefore potentially revol*tionary nat*re of parapsychology, (y proposal is that# if -e say that parapsychology st*dies ostensi.le psi relations# then ho-ever 5psi relations6 are e/actly to .e defined to differentiate them from other phenomena# the feat*re of action at a distance sho*ld .e central, &hat this is the most distinctive feat*re of the 3inds of events st*died .y para0psychologists is s*ggested .y many of the terms *sed: telepathy# tele3inesis 7a variant of psycho0 3inesis8# teleportation# remote vie-ing# retrocog0nition# and precognition, 7Sometimes the distance is temporal# sometimes spatial# and sometimes .oth,8 &he idea of infl*ence at a distance is# f*rthermore# at least arg*a.ly implicit in the other phenomena considered to .e appropriate for parapsychologists or psychical researchers, G <y proposing that psi relations .e defined in terms of ca*sal infl*ence at a distance# $ am re;ecting the conservative tendency to define psi and there.y the s*.;ect of parapsychology in a merely negative or phenomenalistic -ay, 4or e/ample# some people propose that parapsychology is the st*dy of all paranormal phenomena# ta3ing 5paranormal6 .roadly to mean anything that does not fit into the c*rrent -orldvie-# that is# the late modern -orldvie- of materialism, 4reedom# ho-ever# does not fit -ithin this -orldvie-# and yet no one -o*ld thin3 ostensi.le instances of free action .elong to the s*.;ect matter of parapsychologyC and many other e/amples co*ld .e listed 7see the disc*ssion of the inade2*acies of materialism in the section .eginning on p, 2BB8, Another negative definition states that parapsycho0logy=s s*.;ect matter consists of types of effects for -hich there is no- no 3no-n ca*se, We do not# ho-ever# *nderstand the ca*sal .asis for many phenomena# s*ch as ho- a spider 3no-s ho- to spin a -e.# or ho- the *niverse came into e/istence 7if one says# 5thro*gh a .ig .ang#6 -e can as3 -here the -here-ithal for the .ig .ang came from8C and many people say -e have no idea of ho- the mind affects the .rain and vice versa, S*ch a negative# temporally0.ased definition# f*rthermore# -o*ld have the res*lt that if -e came to *nderstand ho- psi relations are ca*sed# they -o*ld no longer .e psi relationsJ &he phenomenalistic definition of psi relations as 5anomalo*s correlations6 also# li3e the negative definitions# shies a-ay from that -hich ma3es parapsychology a potentially revol*tionary science1the fact that it may confirm ;*st the 3ind of ca*sal infl*ence that the modern -orldvie- not only r*les o*t# .*t -as intentionally designed to r*le o*t: ca*sal infl*ence at a distance, (any philosophers# s*ch as Iames Wheatley 719DD8# have e/pressed the hope that -e can e/press o*r 5int*itive notion of -hat psi occ*rrences are6 in a 5positive characteriFation6 7p, 1:28, (y s*ggestion is that this positive characteriFation of the nat*re of psi m*st involve the notion of infl*ence at a distance, &his type of positive characteriFation of psi has .een resisted .y many parapsychologists, !ne of the most important reasons for this resistance is that if psi is th*s characteriFed# and parapsychology is defined as the st*dy of psi events# then it is easy for critics to claim that parapsychology is not a legitimate science .eca*se its very s*.;ect matter is in do*.t, &he proper -ay to solve this pro.lem# ho-0ever# is not to define psi negatively or phenomena0listically# .*t simply to define parapsychology# as

Iohn Palmer 719@:8 has s*ggested# as the st*dy of ostensi.le psi events, 7Palmer himself said 5ostensi.le psychic events#6 .*t $ prefer psi,8 Parapsychology then clearly has a s*.;ect matter, Palmer=s s*ggestion# f*rthermore# provides a definition that is accepta.le for .oth those -ho do and those -ho do not .elieve that psi really occ*rs# there.y removing the s*ggestion that a parapsycho0logist is necessarily a 5.eliever6 in psi, Parapsycho0logy# then# is the scientific st*dy of ostensi.le psi events# meaning events that# ho-ever more precisely they .e specified# seem to involve a form of ca*sal infl*ence at a distance, (y claim that parapsychology is inevita.ly potentially revol*tionary ma3es my analysis close to that of <rian and "ynne (ac3enFie 719@+8, &hey rightly say that the 5paranormal6 events st*died .y parapsychology are not simply 5anomalo*s6 in the sense of .eing a 5specifia.le class of events -hich ;*st happen to conflict -ith the scientific conception of the -orld,6 Rather# 5they -ere esta.lished as paranormal .y the genesis of that scientific conception# and are not defina.le separately from it, , , , &he Kparanormal= -as esta.lished as s*ch .y .eing r*led o*t of nat*re altogether6 7pp, 1AB# 1GB8, Accordingly# they say# the incompati.ility of parapsychology -ith modern science is neither accidental nor recent# .*t is .*ilt into the ass*mptive .ase of modern science itself, $t is .eca*se the aims and claims of parapsychology clash so strongly -ith this ass*mptive .ase that the field attracts s*ch hostility, $t is for the same reason that# if accepted# parapsychology -o*ld have the revol*tionary implications on -hich Rhine and some other parapsychologists fre2*ently insist# 7p, 1BG8 Aside from the fact that the (ac3enFies define parapsychology as the st*dy not of ostensi.le paranormal relations# .*t simply of paranormal relations 7-hich p*ts parapsychology itself rather than its possi.le res*lts in tension -ith the -orldvie- of modern science8# their analysis seems correct, &hey are correct# f*rthermore# in their identification of the nat*re of this tension, &hey introd*ce this topic .y 2*oting the famo*s statement of George Price 719D@8# made prior to his change of mind: 5&he essence of science is mechanism, &he essence of magic is animism6 7p, 1GB8, According to the modern -orldvie-# in other -ords# 5scientific6 e/planations are mechanistic e/planations# -hereas parapsycho0logy points to phenomena for -hich mechanistic e/planations do not seem possi.le, <eyond this point# ho-ever# the analysis of the (ac3enFies needs revision, $n their acco*nt of the esta.lishment of modern science in the 1Dth cent*ry# the (ac3enFies 719@+8 foc*s on the 5reification of mathematics6 and the res*lting schema of primary and secondary 2*alities# according to -hich only physical entities -holly descri.a.le in mathematical terms -ere said to .e ca*sally efficacio*s in nat*re, &his move -as clearly central# and they rightly see that this vie- of nat*re implied a d*alism .et-een mind and nat*re, (ind .ecame the repository of all feat*res of the -orld not descri.a.le mathematically, 5(ental and other nonmathematico0physical entities and forces -ere tolera.le in the scientific scheme , , , only if they -ere confined -ithin the nonphysical minds of individ*al organisms# -here they co*ld not interfere -ith the orderly co*rse of nat*re6 7p, 1A28, While this is all tr*e# at least as a tendency# the (ac3enFies -rongly ta3e this feat*re of the 5mechanistic6 -orldvie- to .e the primary feat*re violated .y 5paranormal6 phenomena, 4or the (ac3enFies# the defining characteristic of all movements .elonging to -hat they .roadly call 5the parapsychological tradition6 is that 5they all involve attempts to demonstrate more or less p*.licly the e/istence and ca*sal efficacy of some 3ind of irred*ci.le nonmathematico0physical elements in the -orld6 7p, 1A@8, Parapsychology insists on 5the irred*ci.le efficacy of some 3ind of , , , agency availa.le to persons .*t not to physical systems6 7p, 1BB8, $f this -ere all that -ere involved# ho-ever# then Descartes# the arch0mechanist# -o*ld .elong to the 5parapsychological tradition6 insofar as he .elieved that the mind infl*ences the .rain# -hich in t*rn

infl*ences the arm# -hich in t*rn prod*ces effects in the -orld .eyond the person=s .ody, !*r e/perience of deciding to move a spoon -ith o*r hand and then doing so -o*ld evo3e as m*ch -onder in *s as -itnessing someone .end a spoon .y simply thin3ing a.o*t it, What is missing from their analysis of the mecha0nism of the modern -orldvie- is the centrality of the denial of action at a distance, !ne of the primary meanings of 5mechanical#6 as $ arg*ed a.ove# -as that all ca*sal action is .y contact, As Richard Westfall 719@+a8 says# 5the f*ndamental tenet of Descartes= mechanical philosophy of nat*re >-as? that one .ody can act on another only .y direct contact6 7p, B@18, &his claim might seem to .e *ndermined .y the fact that one of the central pillars of the modern -orldvie-# %e-ton=s theory of *niversal gravitation# seems to involve action at a distance, A 2*alification is indeed needed, &here -ere several versions of the mechanical philosophy# and %e-ton=s version diverged more radically from Descartes= than did any of the others# at least on this point, $n contrast -ith Descartes= kinetic mechanical philosophy# %e-ton had a dynamic mechanical philosophy# in -hich the *ltimate agent of nat*re -as# in Westfall=s -ords# 5a force acting .et-een particles rather than a moving particle itself6 7p, B9+8, &his meant that %e-ton=s philosophy of nat*re -as at least open to the idea of action at a distance# and his lang*age of 5attractions6 seemed to imply it, &his is precisely -hy his philosophy -as so controversial -hen it -as first artic*lated# especially on the Continent# -here the Cartesian philosophy reigned, Christiaan *ygens# the leading Cartesian scientist after Descartes= death# -rote the follo-ing a.o*t %e-ton to a friend: 5$ don=t care that he=s not a Cartesian as long as he doesn=t serve *s *p con;ect*res s*ch as attractions6 7Westfall# 19@+a# p, A:A8,: $t -as precisely in this conte/t that %e-ton -ent positivistic saying that he -as only giving mathematical form*lae of the effects of the force involved# and that his -ord 5attraction6 did not entail any claims a.o*t the nat*re of the force 7p, A:A8, 4*rthermore# altho*gh scientists and philoso0phers contin*ed to spea3 of the 5%e-tonian -orld0vie-#6 d*ring the 1@th and 19th cent*ries %e-ton=s ideas -ere assimilated as m*ch as possi.le to the Cartesian mechanistic philosophy# so that it is more acc*rate to descri.e the res*lting -orldvie- as %e-tonian0Cartesian 7Schofield# 19D+# pp, 11G012A8, &his process .egan -ith %e-ton himself, <esides leaving open the possi.ility# -ith his positivistic disclaimers# that mechanical ca*ses might .e fo*nd for gravity and other forms of apparent attraction and rep*lsion#6 in his final years# a gro-ing philosophic ca*tion led %e-ton to retreat some-hat to-ard more conventional mechanistic vie-s6 7Westfall# 19@+a# p, :AA8, &he claim can remain# accordingly# that for the most part the first version of the modern -orldvie-# -hich -as d*alistic and s*pernat*ralistic# said that events involving apparent action at a distance do occ*r# .*t that they occ*r only thro*gh s*pernat*ral po-er 7or at least the preternat*ral# virt*ally s*pernat*ral# po-er of Satan8, !f co*rse# the d*alism .et-een mind and nat*re# -hile insisting that there can .e no action at a distance -ithin nat*re 7that is# .et-een t-o material .odies8# might have allo-ed the mind# -hich -as effectively placed o*tside of nat*re# to have received and e/ercised infl*ences at a distance, Some thin3ers# in fact# did arg*e for this position 7Prior# 19B2C &homas# 19D1# pp, GDD0GD@C &revor0Roper# 19:9# pp, 1B201BB8, &he act*al nat*re of the d*alism adopted .y most d*alists# ho-ever# did not allo- for this, &he infl*ence of mind on matter at a distance -as r*led o*t# and mind -as said to .e a.le to perceive only thro*gh the material senses, &he second version of the modern -orld# -hich dropped the s*pernat*ralism as -ell as the d*alism of the first version# did not allo- at all for events ine/plica.le mechanistically, &he mechanistic vie- of nat*re -as retainedC the re;ection of d*alism meant that this vie- of 5nat*re6 no- applied to the -orld as a -hole# incl*ding h*man e/perienceC and the re;ection of God meant that there is no po-er to prod*ce effects

that cannot .e e/plained .y contig*o*s ca*ses, $t -as this transition to the late modern -orldvie- that .ro*ght the complete a priori denial that events ine/plica.le thro*gh mechanical principles# *nderstood as r*ling o*t action at a distance# co*ld occ*r, A slight 2*alification of this statement might .e needed -ith regard to gravitation, &here has# to .e s*re# .een a contin*ation of the early hostility to the action0at0a0 distance interpretation of gravity# and there have .een attempts to find alternative interpretations# s*ch as 5c*rved space6 and 5gravitons,6 (any intellect*als in the modern -orld# ho-ever# have accepted gravitational attraction as a form of action at a distance# -hile re;ecting all alleged instances of psi# evidently .eca*se of several differences, 718 Gravity -as associated -ith 5the great %e-ton6 and the esta.lishment of the 5scientific -orldvie-6 7%e-ton=s involvement in 5occ*lt6 phenomena -as not -idely 3no-n *ntil recently8, 728 Gravity is very reg*lar and is directly e/perienced as s*ch all the time, 7B8 Gravity can .e given a mathematical description, 7A8 Gravity involves inanimate nat*re# not the mind, &he latter t-o points accord -ith the (ac3enFies= analysis of -hat modernity declared to .e accepta.le# and the fo*rth point in partic*lar fits -ith the concern to r*le o*t all 5-itchcraft6 and 5.lac3 magic6 as -ell as the concern 7among s*pernat*ralists8 to precl*de nat*ralistic interpretations of the .i.lical 5miracles,6 !*t of this disc*ssion# -e can say that psi events# ho-ever they sho*ld .e more precisely defined# are events in -hich minds either receive causal influence from a distance or exert causal influence at a distance, &his characteriFation# of co*rse# conforms to -hat are *s*ally considered the t-o ma;or forms of psi: e/trasensory perception and psycho3inesis, $ prefer# ho-ever# the terms 5receptive psi6 and 5e/pressive psi#6 for reasons that $ -ill e/plain later, Receptive psi -o*ld occ*r if a mind receives infl*ence at a distance# meaning infl*ence that has not arrived thro*gh a chain of contig*o*s events 7-ith the last lin3s in the chain .eing constit*ted .y the .ody=s sensory system8, &his category incl*des everything that is *s*ally classified *nder e/trasensory perception 7e/cept tr*e precognition# for reasons to .e clarified .elo-8, Expressive psi -o*ld occ*r if a mind e/erted ca*sal infl*ence at a distance, &his category incl*des not only psycho3inesis as narro-ly defined1that is# as the direct infl*ence of the mind on inanimate matter other than that in the .rain1.*t also s*ch ostensi.le phenomena as tho*ght0transference# psychic healing# and psychic stim*lation of plant gro-th, An o.vio*s o.;ection to my proposal that infl*ence at a distance .e made part of the defining essence of psi relations is that it leaves o*t -hat is *s*ally listed as the third ma;or s*.;ect matter of parapsychology# life after death, $ndeed# the fo*nders of psychical research -ere first and foremost interested in this iss*e, &his s*.;ect matter of parapsychology or psychical research# in fact# no- has its o-n name# 5theta psi,6 A definition of parapsychology that leaves it o*t# one co*ld claim# cannot .e ade2*ate, "ife after death# ho-ever# does not o.vio*sly involve action at a distanceC and the same co*ld .e said for o*t0of0.ody e/periences, What is paranormal in these cases# one co*ld say# is not receiving or e/erting action at a distance .*t simply existing apart from the physical .ody, &his ;*dgment# ho-ever# reflects the change from the first to the second version of the modern -orldvie-, $nsofar as the materialistic e2*ation of the mind# self# or so*l and the .rain has .ecome the 5normal6 vie- in intellect*al circles# the e/istence of the mind apart from the .rain has come to seem 5paranormal,6 $n the early modern -orldvie-# ho-ever# the so*l=s e/istence apart from the .ody did not go against the paradigm, &he early modern -orldvie- -as intended# in fact# not to threaten this .elief .*t to s*pport it, What -as r*led o*t -as onlycommunication .et-een incarnate and discarnate so*ls# .eca*se s*ch comm*nication -o*ld have .een e/trasensory, 4rom this perspective#

then# onlyevidence for life after death# not life after death as s*ch# -o*ld .e considered paranormal, &a3ing this approach -o*ld p*t the self0definition of parapsychology in harmony -ith most traditions of the -orld, $n virt*ally all of these# life after death has .een accepted# -hereas the capacities to e/ert infl*ence at a distance# clearly to perceive events at a distance# and to comm*nicate reg*larly -ith departed spirits have .een considered e/traordinary capacities# possessed .y only a fe-, 'ven in the Lnited States today# most people .elieve in life after death 7*s*ally on the .asis of a premodern or early modern -orldvie-8# considering it a 5normal6 thing# -hereas for most of them telepathy# psycho3inesis# and direct evidence for life after death 7aside from that provided .y the <i.le8# .elieved to come thro*gh tho*ght0transference or other forms of e/pressive psi from departed so*ls# are considered very *n*s*al# perhaps impossi.le, (y proposal is not that -e give *p the term 5theta psi6 and no longer regard evidence for life after death as a distinct area of parapsychology# .*t only that -e state clearly that -hat is ostensi.ly paranormal in this area is the evidence for life after death# not life after death as s*ch, &hat is# the 5psi relation6 in theta psi sho*ld not refer to the e/istence of the so*l apart from the .ody# .*t to the relations that ostensi.ly give evidence of the capacity of the so*l to e/ist apart from the .ody, &his is ho- many already *nderstand theta psiC .*t others 7s*ch as C, D, <road# as -ill .e seen .elo-8 have tho*ght that the very e/istence of the so*l apart from the .rain -o*ld .e paranormal# and some a*thors oscillate .et-een the t-o meanings, $n any case# .esides .ringing parapsychology into line -ith -hat most c*lt*res have considered *n*s*al# my proposal -o*ld have another advantage: $t -o*ld allo- all the ma;or types of phenomena st*died .y parapsychologists to .e defined in terms of ca*sal infl*ence at a distance involving minds1and it is al-ays nice if the vario*s phenomena placed *nder a field of st*dy have something positive in common, aving said this# let me add that $ co*ld go the other -ay, $ said a.ove that life after death and o*t0of0.ody e/periences do not 5o.vio*sly involve action at a distance,6 <*t# it co*ld .e replied# altho*gh the action at a distance might not .e as o.vio*s as in other cases# it -o*ld still o.tain, &hat is# a mind e/isting apart from a .rain -o*ld# to e/ist# have to .e perceiving something .eyond itself# and pro.a.ly infl*encing something .eyond itself as -ell, &his perception and action -o*ld# .eca*se not mediated .y a .rain# pro.a.ly have to involve the reception and e/ertion of infl*ence at a spatial distance 7ass*ming that spatial distance -o*ld .e a meaningf*l concept in that conte/t8, Accordingly# the very e/istence of the mind apart from the .rain -o*ld involve infl*ence at a distance, &his arg*ment ma3es sense to me# given my Whiteheadian perspective# according to -hich to e/ist 7as act*al8 is to perceive and to .e perceived# and according to -hich all 5minds6 as -ell as other act*alities have spatial0temporal location, &a3ing this position# f*rthermore# -o*ld fit -ith those -hose sense of 5normality6 has .een decisively shaped .y the late modern -orldvie-, $ do not feel strongly a.o*t this iss*e# and co*ld accept cither option# as long as# if o*t0of0.ody e/periences 7incl*ding e/periences after death8 .e considered paranormal# they .e considered s*ch .eca*se infl*ence at a distance is involved, $n any case# parapsychology sho*ld he *nderstood as a potentially revol*tionary science# $ have arg*ed# in that it st*dies ostensi.le psi events# events that seem to occ*r and that# it a*thentic# seem to imply that at least some minds# especially some h*man minds# are capa.le# at least at times# of e/erting andMor receiving ca*sal infl*ences at a distance, $nsofar as psi th*s *nderstood is a*thenticated# the modern -orldvie-# to the e/tent that it implies that this 3ind of ca*sal infl*ence is impossi.le# -o*ld need to .e modified, (y o-n .elief is that psi has .een s*fficiently demonstrated# .oth e/perimentally and

.y doc*mentation of spontaneo*s cases, $ hold# therefore# that parapsychology act*ally does have revol*tionary implications# that the modern -orldvie- does need to .e modified in order# among other reasons# to incl*de the e/istence of ca*sal infl*ence at a distance to and from minds,

Parapsychology as not Ultra-Revolutionary aving s*pported the revol*tionary nat*re of parapsychology in this respect# $ -ant immediately to distance myself from the *ltra0revol*tionaries, !f all the ostensi.le psi effects# tr*e precognition# if accepted# -o*ld .e the most revol*tionary, Trueprecognition# most commentators agree# -o*ld imply .ac3-ard ca*sation that the precogniFed event ca*sed the precognition of it# -hich -o*ld mean that the 5effect6 e/isted .efore its 5ca*se6 7<rier# 19DA# p, 1DAC Pratt# 19:A# p, 1:D8, &his is parado/ical at .est# .*t 5nonsensical6 -o*ld .e a .etter term, D We are here spea3ing# of co*rse# a.o*t efficientca*sation# meaning the ca*sal infl*ence of one event *pon another 7-hich is to .e disting*ished from final ca*sation in the sense of self0ca*sation# in -hich the ca*se and effect are one and the same8C and it .elongs to the very meaning of an efficient ca*se that it does not come after its effect, Altho*gh $ -o*ld say# in fact# that an efficient ca*se necessarily comes efore its effects# some people might hold that at least some efficient ca*ses occ*r sim*ltaneo*sly -ith their effects, $n any case# -e cannot intelligi.ly say that an efficient ca*se comesafter its effects, What philosophy teacher# *pon confronting a st*dent -ith evidence sho-ing that she had plagiariFed Aristotle in her term paper# -o*ld accept her alternative e/planation that Aristotle m*st have plagiariFed herN $f the st*dent claimed# instead# that she m*st have pic3ed *p Aristotle=s ideas .y clairvoyance or retrocognition# the teacher# -hile perhaps not .elieving the st*dent# co*ld at least find the claim intelligi.le, 'ven if the idea that an efficient ca*se cannot come after its effects -ere not considered analytic and the idea of .ac3-ard ca*sation -ere not re;ected as *nintelligi.le on other gro*nds 7$ give some more later# and see also <ra*de# 19@:# pp, 2:102DD8# it remains tr*e that the idea -o*ld have far more drastic conse2*ences for o*r -orldvie- than -o*ld any of the other forms of psi, 7As 'isen.*d# 19@B# says: 5&he radical ass*mptions a.o*t time that have .een s*ggested to acco*nt for Kprecognitive= phenomena are irreconcila.le on all fronts -ith all other correspondences 3no-n to science6 >p, A:?,8 &hese drastic implications might have to .e pondered# of co*rse# if alternative e/planations for ostensi.le precognition -ere not possi.le, $ .elieve# ho-ever# that they are possi.le# and $ -ill offer 1B of them later, 'liminating tr*e precognition and therefore .ac3-ard ca*sation from the revol*tionary threat posed .y parapsychology -o*ld go a long -ay to-ard allo-ing people to e/amine the evidence for psi rationally, Another conservative move that sho*ld also help in this regard -o*ld .e to sho- that the acceptance of e/pressive and receptive psi -o*ld not destroy the val*e of all the scientific -or3 that has .een cond*cted on the ass*mption that they do not occ*r, As (arcello &r*FFi 719@+8 has p*t it: 5>Proof of psi? -o*ld merely limit the domain of the accepted principles to their previo*s area of generaliFation: they -o*ld not .e falsified for that limited domain6 7p, AA8, &his mention of 5accepted principles6 .rings *s to C, D, <road=s 719:98 list of 5.asic limiting principles6 mentioned earlier, According to <road# these principles# 5apart from the 7alleged? findings of psychical research# are commonly accepted either as self0 evident or as esta.lished .y over-helming and *niformly favora.le empirical evidence6 7p, 98, $ -ill *se this list to s*mmariFe the -ays in -hich parapsychology sho*ld .e seen as a revol*tionary# .*t not *ltra0revol*tionary# science,

Rather than repeating <road=s list of nine s*ch principles# $ -ill s*mmariFe the most important of them in terms of fo*r .asic principles# pointing o*t the types of things that are there.y r*led o*t, 1, &here can .e no ca*sation and 7therefore8 no perception at a distance1either at a temporal distance# -hich r*les o*t precognition and retrocognition# or at a spatial distance# -hich r*les o*t telepathy and clairvoyance, 7<road=s Principles 1,2 and 1,B8 2, &here can .e no 7a8 infl*ence of a mind on the -orld# or 7.8 infl*ence of the -orld on a mind# that is not mediated .y the .rain, &his principle is already implicit in the first# .eca*se .oth r*led0o*t types of infl*ence -o*ld .e instances of ca*sation at a distance, <*t stating it as a distinct principle r*les o*t even more e/plicitly .oth receptive psi 7e/trasensory perception of every type8 and e/pressive psi 7psycho3inesis of every type8, 7<road=s Principles 2 and B8 B, (inds cannot e/perience apart from .rains# -hich r*les o*t s*rvival of death apart from a s*pernat*ral act, 7<road=s Principle B8 A, An efficient ca*se cannot come after its effect7s8# -hich means that there can .e no retroca*sation and 7therefore8 no precognition, 7<road=s Principle 1,18 Altho*gh <road=s limiting principles are often cited .y those -ho re;ect psi interactions as virt*ally s*fficient reason for re;ecting claims for their e/istence# <road=s o-n vie-as that the evidence for some 3inds of psi is s*fficiently strong to 5call for very radical changes in a n*m.er of o*r .asic limiting principles6 7p, 228, e -as more convinced of receptive psi and precognition than of e/pressive psi and life after death, !f the fo*r principles in my list# that is# he -as *ncertain a.o*t 2a and B .*t tho*ght -e sho*ld definitely re;ect 1# 2.# and A, With regard to A# he said that 5the esta.lishment of paranormal precognition re2*ires a radical change in o*r conception of time# and pro.a.ly a correlated change in o*r conception of ca*sation6 7p, 2+8, With regard to paranormal 3no-ledge in general# he s*ggested that -e sho*ld not 5tin3er -ith the orthodo/ notion of events in the .rain and nervo*s system generating sense data6 7p, 2B8# .*t that -e sho*ld e/tend or modify the 3ind of theory <ergson had s*ggested# according to -hich the main f*nction of the .rain# nervo*s system# and sensory organs is to filter o*t information# not to generate it, $ agree -ith <road that# rather than tin3ering -ith the orthodo/ theory of reality# -e need a f*ndamentally different theory, <y contrast# ho-ever# $ .elieve# on the one hand# that this theory needs to allo- for e/pressive psi no less than for receptive psi# -hich means that 2a m*st .e re;ected, $ also .elieve there is eno*gh evidence for s*rvival that the theory sho*ld allo- for its possi.ility# -hich means that principle B sho*ld .e# if not re;ected as definitely as 1 and 2# at least considered do*.tf*l, 7'ven if life after death as s*ch sho*ld not .e classified as paranormal and hence as a type of psi# a disc*ssion of the possi ility of life after death .elongs in a philosophical .asis for parapsychology insofar as parapsychology e/amines data s*ggestive of life after death# .eca*se# for one thing# ho- -e regard the possi.ility for s*rvival -ill affect ho- -e interpret these data,8 $ do not .elieve# on the other hand 7as $ indicated earlier8# that -e need to re;ect Principle A, $ accept the contention that it is self0evident, We do not# therefore# need to revise the normal conception of ca*sality -ith respect to time 7altho*gh it needs revision in other respects8, <esides not re;ecting Principle A# a second step to-ard overcoming the -idespread ass*mption that one m*st choose .et-een psi and science as -e have 3no-n it is to sho-# as $ s*ggested a.ove# that the acceptance of psi# incl*ding gen*ine evidence for life after death# implies not the complete re;ection of the remaining three principles .*t merely the relativisation of them, $n partic*lar# one co*ld form*late these principles in the follo-ing alternative terms 7the 5A6 is for 5alternative68: 1A, (ost# if not all# forms of ca*sation that are .oth strong and reg*lar occ*r .et-een

contig*o*s events# and# in partic*lar# most and perhaps all ca*sation .y the h*man mind that is strong and reg*lar 7i,e,# it is repeata.le at -ill .y a given individ*al# and it can .e e/ercised .y most if not all normal ad*lt h*man .eings8 employs the .rain and the motor system of the h*man .ody, And all conscio*s perception of e/trasomatic things that occ*rs in a reg*lar# relia.le manner for most h*man .eings most of the time involves chains of contig*o*s events and therefore the .odily sensory organs and the .rain, 2A, All infl*ence of the -orld on the mind and of the mind on the -orld that is .oth strong and reg*lar 7in the relevant senses specified in 1A8 is mediated .y the .rain, 75Strong6 -ith regard to the infl*ence of the -orld on the mind means strong eno*gh to .ecome conscio*s on a reg*lar .asisC 5strong6 -ith regard to the infl*ence of the mind on the -orld means strong eno*gh to .e readily noticea.le,8 BA, Animal minds cannot originally come into e/istence apart from .rains# and most s*ch minds cannot e/ist apart from .rains, &his revision of the principles -o*ld# -hile saying that Principles 1 and 2 and perhaps B are false in their *n2*alified form# sho- -hy most of the facts of ordinary e/perience and science are generally ta3en to confirm them, &his is the 3ind of 5reconciliation6 that is needed# $ .elieve# .et-een evidence for psi# on the one hand# and the principles that are pres*pposed in most scientific -or3 and most daily e/perience# on the other hand, &hat is the 3ind of postmodern reconciliation that Whitehead=s philosophy can provide, $t is postmodern# rather than modern# in that it re;ects most of modernity=s 5.asic limiting principles6 that -ere accepted in order to r*le o*t psi interactions, $t is postmodern# rather than premodern# in that it accepts the fact that these principles e/press important tr*ths a.o*t reality# and therefore accepts the he*ristic val*e of these principles for many p*rposes# especially for a 5democratic6 civiliFation -ith a scientific0technological mentality# -hich is interested primarily in that range of h*man po-ers that can .e e/ercised .y most people# most of the time# on a reg*lar# relia.le .asis, &his position has implications for the other t-o feat*res of the tension .et-een the conservative and the revol*tionary stances in parapsychology: the val*e of contin*ing to search for a strongly repeata.le e/periment# and the val*e of process0oriented st*dies to try to *nderstand the dynamics involved in the manifestation of conscio*s receptive psi and deli.erate e/pressive psi, $n the section .eginning on page 2GG $ give s*pport for .oth efforts,

The !lleged !de"uacy of the Modern Worldvie# for Everything Except Psi <efore moving to Whitehead=s postmodern philosophy# one more feat*re of the accepted -isdom a.o*t parapsychology needs to .e challenged, &his is the -idespread ass*mption# accepted even .y many .elievers in psi#@ that the modern -orldvie-# -ith its .asic limiting principles# 5-or3s perfectly -ell for almost everything e/cept the alleged data of parapsychology6 72*oting paragraph B# a.ove8, &his idea is not even close to tr*e, $f .y 5the modern -orldvie-6 -e mean the late modern# materialistic -orldvie- -ith its sensationist doctrine of perception# -hich is dominant in scientific circles today# it cannot acco*nt for a -ide range of ideas that are pres*pposed in practice1.oth ordinary and scientific practice1.y scientists as -ell as everyone else, <eca*se of its materialism# -hich leads to the vie- that the 5mind6 is really somehoidentical -ith the .rain# -hich is held to .e composed of insentient matterMenergy# this -orldvie- cannot acco*nt for o*r o-n conscio*s e/perience, Altho*gh materialists hold that this e/perience 5emerged6 in the co*rse of evol*tion# they cannot e/plain hoinsentient st*ff gave rise to e/perience, &hey cannot e/plain ho- this e/perience

e/ercises freedom# altho*gh everyone in practice ass*mes that he or she and other people are partly free, &hey cannot e/plain ho- the partly free decisions of their e/perience affect their .ody and there.y the -orld .eyond themselves# as -hen they manip*late a microscope1ho- can e/perience affect none/periencing matterN So# altho*gh materialists often re;ect psycho3inesis for a priori reasons# .eca*se the infl*ence of the mind on e/trasomatic o.;ects is *nintelligi.le# the infl*ence of the mind on its o-n .ody is no less *nintelligi.le on their premises, 75(ind6 is *sed here to refer to the person=s stream of e/perience# -hich clearly e/ists even if it is tho*ght 5really6 to .e someho- 5identical6 -ith the .rain,8 &he sensationist doctrine of perception that is inherent in this materialistic ontology ca*ses no fe-er pro.lems, 4or e/ample# scientists see3 tr*th# and those -ho re;ect .elief in the e/istence of psi do so .eca*se it seems to .e *ntr*eC .*t if all of o*r perception of things .eyond o*rselves is sensory perception 7-hich is -hat the sensationist doctrine of perception claims8# -e have no percept*al .asis for 3no-ing that 5tr*th6 is important, &he same is tr*e for all other val*es# -hich as ideal rather than material or physical things cannot .e contacted thro*gh o*r physical senses, &here is said to .e no .asis# accordingly# for the *niversal ass*mption that some things are 5.etter than6 others# s*ch as the .elief that science is .etter than occ*ltism, Sensory perception also gives *s no e/periential .asis# as *me pointed o*t# for spea3ing of ca*sation as the real infl*ence of one thing or event on another, Sensationist scientists and philosophers -ho re;ect psi .eca*se they cannot *nderstand ho- ca*sality can act at a distance are therefore in the *ncomforta.le position of not .eing a.le to say ho- -e 3no- anything a.o*t ca*sation at all, 7!f co*rse# they# -ith *me# may redefine ca*sation phenomenalistically to mean nothing .*t 5constant con;*nction6 .et-een t-o types of events# pl*s the convention that the event that comes first -ill .e called the 5ca*se,6 <esides the fact that this convention leads to several *nconventional conse2*ences# s*ch as that the rooster=s cro-ing ca*ses the s*nrise# this phenomenalistic definition of ca*sation does not fit at all -ith the materialist=s *s*al complaint that psi ca*sation is *nintelligi.le .eca*se there is no 5mechanism6 for it,8 4*rthermore# as *me also sho-ed# .esides not .eing a.le to say that no part of the -orld e/erts ca*sal efficacy *pon another# a sensationist cannot even spea3 of a real -orld# .*t only of the ideas and impressions in one=s mind: sensationism implies solipsism 7the doctrine that# for all $ 3no-# $ may .e the only act*al e/istent8, 'ven more# as Santayana 719GG8 sho-ed# it implies 5solipsism of the present moment#6 .eca*se sensory perception as s*ch gives *s no 3no-ledge of the past or the f*t*re 7pp, 1A11G8, 4inally# .eca*se of this# it also gives *s no 3no-ledge of time, (aterialism -ith its sensationist doctrine of perception# in s*m# can provide no .asis in its theory for all sorts of ideas that -e all pres*ppose in practice, $ call these ideas 5hard0core commonsense ideas,6 &hey are 5common6 .eca*se they are *niversal# .elonging to the sense of the entire h*man comm*nity, $ add the ad;ective 5hard0core6 to stress their difference from ideas that may .e called commonsense .*t that are not# in fact# pres*pposed in practice .y all people# and that can .e denied -itho*t contradiction, '/amples of s*ch 5soft0core commonsense ideas6 are the ideas that the earth is flat# that it -as created only a fe- tho*sand years ago# that all perception is sensory perception# and that molec*les have no feelings, $n any case# it can .e arg*ed that the hard0core commonsense ideas sho*ld .e ta3en .y thin3ers 7philosophers and scientists ali3e8 as the *ltimate criteria for ;*dging any theory, &he reason for this claim is that if -e pres*ppose these ideas in the very act of stating a theory that denies them# -e there.y contradict o*rselves# and the principle of noncontradiction is the first principle of rational tho*ght, &hese ideas are the really 5.asic limiting principles6 to -hich all theory m*st .o-# as Whitehead 719D@8 s*ggests 7pp, 1B# 1G18,9

&he moral of this disc*ssion is that .elievers in psi sho*ld not accept the .asic premise of most a priori dismissals of claims for psi# -hich is the claim that the materialistic -orldvie- of late modernity -or3s perfectly -ell for almost everything -e 3no- a.o*t reality as long as psi is not .ro*ght into the pict*re, &he tr*th is that this -orldviedoes not -or3 at all -ell for all sorts of things# incl*ding most of the ideas -e all pres*ppose in practice# incl*ding scientific practice, Would it not e interesting$ and in fact significant$ if the modifications that are needed to account for these hard-core commonsense ideas are the same modifications that are needed to account for psi% &his is# $ -ill s*ggest in e/plicating Whitehead=s philosophy# e/actly the case, <efore moving to this philosophy# $ need .riefly to consider another alternative# more common in parapsychological circles# -hich is to ret*rn to the early modern -orldvie-# -ith its ontological d*alism .et-een mind and nat*re, &his d*alistic -orldvie- says that# .esides the insentient matter0energy of the physical -orld# -hich operates according to mechanistic principles# the -orld contains minds# -hich are different in 3ind from material things, !n this .asis# -e can acco*nt for freedom and# if -e add the s*pposition that minds can have nonsensory perceptions# -e can acco*nt for o*r 3no-ledge of val*es 7s*ch as tr*th8# for a real -orld# for ca*sation as real infl*ence# and for the distinction .et-een the perceiver=s past and the anticipated f*t*re and therefore for time, Contra Descartes# f*rthermore 7a contemporary d*alist co*ld hold8# minds need not .e limited to h*man .eings# .*t can .e posited to e/ist to varying degrees thro*gho*t the animal 3ingdom, $n spite of its o.vio*s strengths# ho-ever# this d*alistic sol*tion has severe pro.lems, $t can provide no nonar.itrary point to dra- the line .et-een insentient and sentient thingsC for e/ample# some d*alists say that the cells in o*r .odies are insentient# .*t that amoe.ae# -hich are single0cell organisms# are sentient, Also# having dra-n the line# d*alism cannot e/plain ho- ca*sal infl*ence transverses it1ho- mind 5emerged6 from matter in the evol*tionary process and contin*es to .e infl*enced .y it 7-hether this matter .e contig*o*s or at a distance# as in clairvoyance8# and ho- mind in t*rn infl*ences matter 7-hether this matter .e contig*o*s or at a distance# as in psycho3inesis8, &his pro.lem of interaction has .een# in fact# the main reason for the -idespread re;ection of ontological d*alism,1+ &he only possi.le sol*tion to this pro.lem 7other than fran3 admission that it cannot .e ans-ered8 seems to .e to ret*rn to the other element of the early modern -orldvie-# its s*pernat*ralism# and say that God# .eing omnipotent# can ca*se *nli3es to interact# or at least to appear to interact,11 <esides the other pro.lems that this move -o*ld create# s*ch as an insol*.le pro.lem of evil 7Griffin# 19D:# 19918# it -o*ld .e a strange move for an advocate of psi to ma3e# .eca*se .elief in psi# *ndermining the .elief that 5miracles6 are s*pernat*ral acts of God# removes one of the t-o main reasons13no-ledge of the evol*tionary origin of the -orld removes the other1for .elief in an omnipotent deity *ndeterred .y mere metaphysical impossi.ilities, <eca*se .oth forms of the modern -orldvie- are so pro.lematic# it -o*ld seem -orth-hile to e/plore a postmodern philosophy that is neither materialistic nor d*alistic, &his is -hat Whitehead provides,

$&' 'AD=S

P!S&(!D'R% P

$"!S!P Y

&reative Experience as the Universal Stuff At the root of Whitehead=s postmodern philosophy is a conception of the .asic 5st*ff6 of reality that re;ects the modern conception of it, <y the .asic st*ff# $ mean -hat Aristotle meant formally .y the notion of the material ca*se of the *niverse: that f*ndamental st*ff of -hich all things in the -orld are instances, &he different species of things differ

in that they in0form this st*ff -ith different forms, 4or Aristotle this st*ff -as 5prime matter,6 4or early modern tho*ght there -ere t-o radically different st*ffs: for the physical -orld it -as inert# insentient matter# -hereas for the h*man mind it -as self0 determining conscio*sness, o- these t-o 3inds of st*ff co*ld interact# or at least appear to# -as# as mentioned earlier# a mystery resolva.le only .y appeal to s*pernat*ral ca*sation, &his d*alism -ith its s*pernat*ralism is re;ected in the late modern -orldvie-# so that inert matter is said to .e the st*ff of -hich all things are composed# even h*man e/perience, A completely red*ctionistic# deterministic -orldvie- follo-s, &o .e s*re# this matter is no longer said to .e inert# .eca*se it and energy have .een discovered to .e converti.le, (atter0energy# or energetic matter# is therefore said to .e the material ca*se of all things, $n spite of this re;ection of inertness# ho-ever# matter is still said not to .e self0determining, 'ach thing or event is said to .e f*lly determined .y previo*s events, &his determinism is said perhaps not to hold at the 2*ant*m level, 'ven -hen the idea of ontological indeterminacy in s*.atomic particles is entertained# ho-ever# this indeterminacy is not interpreted asself-determinacy# and -hatever indeterminacy o.tains at the micro0level is said to .e canceled o*t at the macro0level .y the 5la- of large n*m.ers#6 so that ca*sal determinism holds for all o.;ects of sensory e/perience# incl*ding h*man .eings, &his notion reflects the ontological red*ctionism of the late modern -orldvie-# according to -hich all apparent -holes are in principle red*ci.le to 7e/plaina.le in terms of8 their least parts, &he .ehavior of a cat or a h*man .eing is# therefore# as f*lly determined as that of a roc3 or a comp*ter, Altho*gh mind# e/perience# or conscio*sness is said someho- to 5emerge6 in the evol*tionary process# it is not a self0determining reality that mitigates determinism# and therefore the -orld=s predicta.ility# in principle, Whether -hat -e call the mind is said to .e 5epiphenomenal#6 5identical6 -ith the .rain# or something else# it has no a*tonomo*s po-er# and certainly no a*tonomo*s po-er to e/ert ca*sal infl*ence .ac3 *pon the .rain# .*t is simply a strange cog in the deterministic system of nat*re, What -e call conscio*s e/perience o.vio*sly e/ists# in some sense# .*t it does not play a self0 determining ca*sal role in the -orld, 4rom this late modern conception of the .asic st*ff of the -orld follo-s a threefold doctrine of ca*sation, 7a8 All ca*sation is physical and hence efficient and deterministic 1there is no mental or final ca*sation# in the sense of self0determination in terms of an ideal, 7.8 All ca*sation is either *p-ard or horiFontal1there is no do-n-ard ca*sation from -holes to their parts# or in general from higher to lo-er things, 7c8 All ca*sation is local# .et-een things or events that are spatially and temporally contig*o*s1there is no ca*sal infl*ence at a distance# -hether over a temporal or a spatial distance, 12 Whitehead=s postmodern starting point is to conceive of the .asic st*ff of the -orld# its 5material6 ca*se# not as 5material6 at all# .*t as creative experience,1B 'ach act*al thing# from s*.atomic particles to h*man minds# is an em.odiment of creative e/perience, &his means that .oth e/perience and creativity# -hich incl*des the po-er of self0determination# are f*lly nat*ral# rather than ill*sions# epiphenomena# or emergent properties, &his idea p*ts Whitehead=s philosophy in the class often called 5panpsychist#6 .*t the term 5pane/perientialist6 is .etter, 75Panpsychism6 s*ggests that the *ltimate *nits are end*ring psyches# -hereas they are >.y hypothesis? momentary e/periencesC also the term 5psyche6 s*ggests a higher level of e/perience than is appropriate for# say# electrons or even cells,8

!ctual Entities as 'ccasions of Experience '/cept for anticipations of this point .y William Iames and enri <ergson# Whitehead=s philosophy is *ni2*e among s*ch philosophies 7at least in the West1some forms of <*ddhism come close to Whitehead=s vie- here8 in saying that the f*lly act*al entities

are momentary events that occ*r# not things that endure thro*gh time, is term for these events is 5act*al occasions,6 <eca*se they are drops of e/perience# they are also called 5occasions of e/perience,6 Act*al occasions can ta3e1or# really# constit*te1 varia.le amo*nts of time# -ith s*.atomic events at one end of the spectr*m constit*ting perhaps a.o*t a .illionth of a second and occasions of h*man e/perience at the other end constit*ting perhaps a.o*t a tenth of a second, 1A 'nd*ring individ*als# s*ch as photons# protons# atoms# molec*les# macromolec*les# living cells# and animal psyches# therefore# are not n*merically self0identical s*.stances that simply end*re thro*gh time# .*t are each constit*ted .y a more0or0less rapidly repeating series of occasions of e/perience, 'ach occasion receives infl*ences from the previo*s occasions# repeating to a large degree the forms em.odied in them# and then passes these forms on to f*t*re occasions, 'nd*rance# therefore# is not simply *ndifferentiated .*t is the res*lt of repetition, An end*ring individ*al# then# is a 7p*rely temporal8 5society#6 -ith each momentary mem.er having social# ca*sal relations -ith previo*s and later mem.ers, 'ach occasion e/ists in t-o modes, $t e/ists first as a su (ect of e/perience# d*ring -hich it en;oys e/perience, $n its mode as a s*.;ect it is dipolar, $t .egins .y receiving infl*ences from past occasions# -hich means that it receives e/periences from them# and it concl*des .y e/ercising self0determination, &he reception and repetition of prior e/periences is the occasion=s 5physical pole#6 -hereas its self0determination is its 5mental pole,6 &his mentality# or self0determination# can .e e/tremely insignificant# as it m*st .e in lo-0grade individ*als s*ch as photons# protons# and atoms, All that is insisted *pon is that it is never entirely a.sent# .eca*se this a.sence -o*ld imply an essential d*alism .et-een dipolar and p*rely physical 7and therefore f*lly determined8 occasions, After an occasion has en;oyed its e/perience# -hich is more or less self0determined or self0created# it then e/ists in a second mode# as an o (ect of e/perience, $t is no longer a s*.;ect en;oying e/perienceC it is an o.;ect for the e/periences of s*.se2*ent s*.;ects, As an o.;ect# it no longer e/ercises receptivity and self0determinationC instead it e/ercises efficient ca*sation *pon other 7s*.se2*ent8 occasions, $n losing s*.;ectivity and final ca*sation# an event ac2*ires o.;ectivity and efficient ca*sation 7Whitehead# 1929M19D@# p, 29C 19B@# 19:@# p, 2BD8, !ne of the most important implications of this move from a materialistic to a pane/perientialist notion of nat*re is for the image of -hat is going on in efficient ca*sation, &he materialistic vie- implies that efficient ca*sation is some-hat analogo*s to the impact of one .illiard .all on another, &he pane/perientialist vie- s*ggests that efficient ca*sation involves a transfer of e/periences, Whitehead=s proposal is that the physical pole# or initial phase# of an occasion of e/perience is a 5conformal phase#6 in -hich the e/periences of the effect are conformed to those of its ca*ses, Ca*sation therefore involves a relation of 5sympathy#6 .eca*se the later event .egins .y feeling the e/periences of the previo*s event -ith it,

Efficient &ausation as Exclusively )or#ard &ausation 'fficient ca*sation# defined as the ca*sal efficacy of one act*al occasion *pon another# occ*rs only from past to present occasions, 4*t*re occasions do not yet e/ist and# therefore# cannot e/ert ca*sation 7Whitehead# 19BBM19:D# p, 19G8, An occasion can e/ert efficient ca*sation only after its self0 ca*sation 7final ca*sation8 has .een completed# and the self0ca*sation of a f*t*re occasion has not only not .een completed# it has not even .eg*n, We can# to .e s*re# spea3 of 5f*t*re occasions#6 in that some occasions or other are .o*nd to occ*r, $t is even tr*e that the nature of those occasions is already more or less determined .y the

past and the present# so that in this sense the f*t*re is implicit in the present, <eca*se every occasion# ho-ever# has at least some iota of mentality# and therefore e/ercises at least some iota of self0creativity# f*t*re occasions are not yet f*lly determinate, &heir details are fleshed o*t only .y them# in their moment of self0determination, What are to *s still f*t*re occasions do not someho- e/ist 5tenselessly6 and hence do not e/ist as o.;ects for an omniscient mind, 'ven God does not 3no- the details of the f*t*re, As <ergson 719118 said# 5&ime is invention or it is nothing at all6 7p, BA+8, And it is not nothing, We m*st not 5spatialiFe6 time# as <ergson 719:G8 said# .y thin3ing of it as a fo*rth dimension analogo*s to space 7pp, 1BD# 1A:n8, <eca*se f*t*re occasions are not yet act*al# they cannot act .ac3 *pon the past, 4*rthermore# the past is not the sort of thing that co*ld .e acted .ac3 *pon, &he past is f*lly determinate, &he .ecoming of an occasion of e/perience is its .ecoming f*lly determinate, $t is partially determined .y the occasions in its past, $n its moment of reception and self0creation it passes from partial to complete determination, !nce it has .ecome f*lly determinate# and there.y an o.;ect for s*.se2*ent e/periences# it can s*ffer no additions, $ts meaning# of co*rse# can change, &he meaning of %e-ton is different for *s than it -as for people of the 1@th cent*ry, <y reeval*ating the import of %e-ton# ho-ever# -e do not change -hat he tho*ght and ho- he felt a.o*t things, &he f*t*re can affect the meaning .*t not the .eing of the past, &his position provides clear distinctions .et-een the meanings of 5past#6 5present#6 and 5f*t*re,6 &he past is that -hich is f*lly determinateC the f*t*re is that -hich is still partially indeterminateC and the present is that -hich is .ecoming determinate 7 artshorne# 19D+# pp, 1BB01BA8, &hese definitions imply that .esides there .eing no efficient ca*sation from the f*t*re to the present# there is also no efficient ca*sation .et-een contemporaries, &his does not mean that t-o contemporary enduring individuals do not interactC contemporary people o.vio*sly interact# as do contemporary s*.atomic particles# m*t*ally e/erting efficient ca*sation *pon each other, What is meant is only that t-o contemporary occasions of experiencedo not interact, &he reason for this has nothing to do -ith the finite speed of radiation 7so that some form of instantaneo*s transmission or perception -o*ld allo- contemporary e/periences to interact8, &he reason is that an occasion can e/ert efficient ca*sation only after it has .ecome f*lly determinate# and contemporary occasions are .y definition only ecoming determinate, &his limitation does not place severe restrictions *pon the interconnectedness of the *niverse: $f a.o*t a .illion photonic occasions occ*r in a second of a photon=s e/istence# then t-o photons co*ld have a.o*t a half0.illion interactions d*ring that secondC if a.o*t a doFen h*man occasions occ*r in a second# h*man .eings co*ld have a.o*t a half0doFen interchanges in a second, All that is e/cl*ded is the self0contradictory notion that something co*ld .e an o.;ect for others .efore it has decided for itself precisely -hat it is to .e, &his point# -hich e/cl*des ca*sation from .oth f*t*re and contemporary e/periences# entails that all efficient ca*sation r*ns from the past to the present# and from the present to the f*t*re, $n this sense of the term 5linear ca*sation#6 all ca*sation is linear, &here are# ho-ever# at least three meanings of the phrase 5linear ca*sation6 in -hich all ca*sation is not linear in Whitehead=s philosophy, '/plaining this point re2*ires a disc*ssion of the notion of a 5compo*nd individ*al#6 -hich is important in its o-n right,

&ompound *ndividuals &here are t-o f*ndamental -ays in -hich end*ring individ*als1-hich are p*rely temporal societies of occasions of e/perience .eca*se only one mem.er e/ists at a time

1can come together to form spatiotemporal societies# in -hich there are many contemporary mem.ers 7ta3ing the 5mem.ers6 here to .e the end*ring individ*als# s*ch as electrons# atoms# and cells8, !ne -ay is to form anonindividuali+ed society# in -hich there is no dominant mem.er to give the society as a -hole a *nity of response and action in relation to its environment, A roc3 is an inorganic e/ample of s*ch a society# as is a comp*ter, $t -o*ld seem that plants are organic e/amples# in that there seems to .e no need to posit a so*l of the plant as a higher level of e/perience and self0 e/pression over and a.ove that of its cells, &he .ehavior of the plant seems e/plaina.le in terms of cooperation among the vario*s cells and the societies# s*ch as roots and leaves# that they form, Whitehead 719B@M19:@8# accordingly# says that a plant is a 5democracy6 or a 5rep*.lic6 7pp, 2A# 1GD8# .eca*se it has no monarch to coordinate its vario*s parts, &he other -ay for end*ring individ*als to form spatiotemporal societies res*lts in compound individuals, A higher end*ring individ*al arises from the -ay in -hich the lo-er individ*als are interrelated, $n the atom# for instance# o*t of the interrelation of the electrons# ne*trons# and protons there emerges a series of atomic occasions of e/perience, &his higher0level individ*al# having s*pervening po-er to infl*ence 7altho*gh not totally to control8 its s*.atomic parts# co*ld acco*nt for the -holistic properties of the atom# s*ch as the Pa*li e/cl*sion principle, $n a molec*le comprised of a n*m.er of atoms# -e can li3e-ise thin3 of a series ofmolecular occasions, &hin3ing analogo*sly of macromolec*les can provide a .asis for *nderstanding the po-er of the D%A molec*le actively to transpose its parts, Procaryotic cells -o*ld have# a.ove and .eyond their macromolec*les# a series of living occasions of e/perience, '*caryotic cells -o*ld .e even more comple/ individ*als# .eing compo*nded o*t of a n*m.er of organelles 7-hich are perhaps incorporated procaryotic cells8, (*lticelled animals# and especially those -ith central nervo*s systems# are# in this -ay of thin3ing# still more comple/ compo*nd individ*als: !*t of the more0or0less comple/ organiFation of the cells arises the animal so*l# -hich is a temporal society of higher occasions of e/perience,1G &hese occasions of e/perience constit*ting the animal so*l are not different in 3ind from those constit*ting the cells of the animal .ody# .*t they are# especially in the higher animals# greatly different in degree, &hose occasions of e/perience comprising the mind# psyche# or so*l1these terms are here *sed interchangea.ly1are called dominant occasions .y Whitehead 71929M19D@# p, 1198, $n this he follo-s "ei.niF# -ho referred to the mind as the 5dominant monad,6 &he similarity to "ei.niF# ho-ever# stops there, "ei.niF=s monads -ere end*ring s*.stances# .eing n*merically self0identical thro*gh time# and -ere accordingly 5-indo-0less#6 not .eing open to ca*sal infl*ence from each other, Whitehead=s end*ring individ*als# .y contrast# are temporal societies of momentary events# each of -hich .egins as an open -indo-# as it -ere# to the -hole past *niverse, $n any case# the term 5dominant6 does not mean 5omnipotent,6 &he so*l does have disproportionate po-er in the total psychophysical organism# ma3ing it a 5monarch6 of sorts, &he .odily cells# ho-ever# do not# in .eing parts of a larger -hole# lose their o-n po-er, &hey are also centers of creative e/perience# each -ith some a*tonomo*s capacity to e/ercise self0determination and then to e/ert creative infl*ence on the rest of the .ody and .ac3 *pon the mind, &hese cells# f*rthermore# are organiFed into giant colonies of partly a*tonomo*s organs# tiss*es# and fl*ids, Whitehead 719B@M19:@8 s*ggests# accordingly# that the image of a fe*dal society might .e more apt 7p, 2G8, Whatever image is *sed# the main point is that a compo*nd individ*al has a higher0level series of e/periences that gives the total individ*al a *nity of e/perience and action not possessed .y nonindivid*ated societies# s*ch as roc3s# comp*ters# and pro.a.ly plants, <y virt*e of its dominant occasions of e/perience# -hich *nify into themselves the vario*s e/periences of its .odily parts and then e/ert a s*pervening po-er thro*gho*t the ne/t moment of the .odily life# the compo*nd individ*al can respond as a -hole to

its environment, !n this .asis# -e can see -hy -e# *nli3e roc3s# have freedom# and -hy this freedom is not red*ci.le to 2*ant*m indeterminacy, $t is commonly tho*ght that 2*ant*m indeterminacy# even if it .eto3en some ontic 7not merely epistemic8 indeterminacy at the microlevel# and even if this .e interpreted as self0determinacy# -o*ld not *ndermine determinism at the macrolevel of o.;ects of ordinary e/perience# incl*ding h*man .eings, &he arg*ment is .ased on the la- of large n*m.ers: Altho*gh individ*al electrons and n*cleons might not .e totally determined .y their environments# in things s*ch as roc3s# in -hich there are .illions of them# their respective indeterminacies get canceled o*t# so that the .ehavior of the roc3 as s*ch is completely predicta.le 7or at least virt*ally so for all practical p*rposes8, Cats and h*man .eings are li3e-ise composed of .illions and .illions of s*.atomic particles1the arg*ment r*ns1so they m*st li3e-ise .e f*lly determined and th*s in principle f*lly predicta.le 7or at least virt*ally so8# even if they are too comple/ for their .ehavior to .e predicta.le in fact, &hat arg*ment pres*pposes that all spatiotemporal societies of end*ring individ*als are of the same type# so that a cat or a h*man .eing is analogo*s to a roc3 or a comp*terC this analogy is precisely -hat the doctrine of compo*nd individ*als denies, A h*man .eing is not simply a very comple/ aggregate of s*.atomic particles# so that its .ehavior -o*ld .e *nderstanda.le in principle in terms of the interactions of the fo*r forces of physics, A.ove and .eyond those centers of creative infl*ence that -e call s*.atomic particles# there are higher centers of creative infl*ence1s*ch as atoms# molec*les# macromolec*les# organelles# and living cells1-hich are e"ually act*al# and -hich in fact have more po-er, At the top of the pyramid is the dominant series of e/periences# the so*l# -hich has far more mentality# and therefore far more capacity for self0determination# than even those relatively high0level creat*res -e call .rain cells, <eca*se of the hierarchical organiFation of the h*man .ody# the freedom that is present in s*.atomic particles# far from .eing canceled o*t# is greatly increased thro*gho*t a -hole series of steps, &he freedom of the h*man so*l# and th*s of the h*man .eing as a -hole# is not limited to the min*sc*le degree of freedom that -o*ld res*lt solely from 2*ant*m indeterminacies in the ne*rons in the .rain, &he h*man so*l is ;*st as act*al as an electron# and has far more po-er1the threefold po-er of receptivity# self0 determination# and other0determination 7or efficient ca*sation8, &his great difference in degree of po-er is the res*lt of several .illions of years of evol*tion# -hich has .een characteriFed 7not e/cl*sively# to .e s*re# .*t importantly8 .y the gro-th of increasingly higher centers of creative e/perience,

,onlinear &ausation- Self-&ausation$ .o#n#ard &ausation$ and &ausation at a .istance &he .asis has no- .een laid for stating the -ays in -hich ca*sation is not linear, $ had stated earlier that it is linear in the sense that efficient ca*sation goes e/cl*sively from the past to the present and from the present to the f*t*re, Ca*sation is not linear# ho-ever# in three other respects, 4irst# efficient ca*sation# defined as the infl*ence of one act*ality *pon another# is not the only form of ca*sation e/erted .y act*al occasions, Rather# as already e/plained# each occasion of e/perience also e/erts self0determination, &his is self0ca*sation# -hich means ca*sation .y the occasion of e/perience upon itself, Lnless -e affirm that -e e/ercise self0ca*sation in this sense# -e imply that o*r o-n e/periences# and there.y all of o*r actions# are totally determined .y the past, $t is diffic*lt to *nderstand ho- -e h*mans can have this po-er of self0determination *nless some degree of this po-er is posited all the -ay do-n, o-# -itho*t positing a s*pernat*ral intervention# co*ld -e e/plain the rise of self0determining organisms in the evol*tionary process o*t of p*rely mechanical entitiesN o-# again -itho*t positing

adeus ex machina# co*ld -e *nderstand the interaction of the self0determining aspect of o*r selves -ith the p*rely determined dimensions 7-hich is one -ay of stating the pro.lem of Cartesian d*alism8N Accordingly# this postmodern philosophy s*ggests that p*rely linear# in the sense of p*rely mechanistic# ca*sation does not occ*r .et-een individ*als at any level of nat*re, &his 3ind of .illiard0.all ca*sation does occ*r# of co*rse# .et-een non0individ*aliFed societies of individ*als1s*ch as .illiard .allsJ <eca*se s*ch societies have no *nity of e/perience# these societies as s*ch have no mentality# -hich means that they can e/ercise no self0determination, &heir interactions -ith each other# accordingly# appro/imate the p*rely mechanical interactions pict*red .y mechanistic philosophers, $t is no mista3e to .elieve that s*ch ca*sation occ*rs, &he mista3e is to ass*me that it is the .asic 3ind of efficient ca*sation# so that it applies to individ*als# .oth simple and compo*nd# as -ell as to nonindivid*aliFed societies, A second sense in -hich ca*sation is not linear involves the direction of vertical ca*sal infl*ence, &o say that all ca*sation is linear can mean that in a h*man .eing# all vertical ca*sation r*ns *p-ard from the s*.atomic particles to the person as a -hole, &his is the doctrine .ehind ontological red*ctionism# according to -hich the .ehavior of every -hole# incl*ding any e/perience it may have# is red*ci.le to the .ehavior of its most elementary parts, !f co*rse# a p*rely linear model co*ld say instead that all ca*sation r*ns from the top do-n1the doctrine C, I, D*casse 719:18 called hypophenomenalism1 as -hen Christian Science holds that the health of the .ody depends entirely *pon the state of the mind# or -hen traditional theism holds that all events in the -orld res*lt from the -ill of God, With regard to this iss*e# Whitehead=s philosophy is radically nonlinear, 'ach individ*al event is a center of partially a*tonomo*s creative po-er and infl*ences every event in its f*t*re# at -hatever level, Accordingly# efficient ca*sation does# as modern tho*ght says# flo- *p-ard# from s*.atomic particles and molec*les to macromolec*les# cells# and the so*l# as -ell as horiFontally# from 7say8 cell to cell and from molec*le to molec*le, <*t it also flo-s do-n-ard# from the cells to the molec*les and from the so*l to the cells and the lo-er organisms, <eca*se do-n-ard as -ell as *p-ard ca*sation occ*rs# the flo- of ca*sal infl*ence is reciprocal and circ*lar as -ell as m*lti0leveled, 4or e/ample# $ am infl*enced in the present moment .y .rain cells that -ere infl*enced .y my e/perience in a previo*s moment# -hich had in t*rn .een infl*enced .y events in the .rain cells in a still earlier moment# and so on, &he notion that all ca*sation is linear can mean# in the third place# that# all ca*sation is transmitted thro*gh chains of contig*o*s events# so that there is no action at a distance, Whitehead=s vie- is# to the contrary# that each event is directly infl*enced# to at least some slight e/tent# .y all past events, &he standard vie-# reflected in <road=s limiting principles# is that my present e/perience directly infl*enced only .y events that are spatially and temporally contig*o*s1: -ith this e/perience# -hich means only .y immediately past .rain events, &he rest of the past -orld does infl*ence me 7in 'instein=s relativity theory# the past for an event is defined as all those events that affect the event in 2*estion8# .*t it is said to infl*ence me only indirectly# via its infl*ence *pon contig*o*s events, $n Whitehead=s philosophy# .y contrast# each noncontig*o*s event in the past e/erts a direct as -ell as an indirect infl*ence *pon the present event, 7&he 5past#6 therefore# is not limited to those events considered past in an 'insteinian light cone# .*t incl*des many events that -o*ld .e considered 5contemporaries6 -ithin 'insteinian relativity theory d*e to the finite speed of light,8 &his point depends# at least largely# *pon the distinction# introd*ced earlier# .et-een the physical and the mental poles of an event, An event=s physical pole# it -ill .e recalled# is that event=s incorporation of infl*ences from previo*s events, &he event is physical insofar as it simply repeats past forms of creative e/perience, An event=s mental pole is its self0determination, Any novelty in an event -ill originate in its

mental pole, An event can e/ert infl*ence *pon s*.se2*ent events in terms of .oth its physical pole and its mental pole, 'ither 3ind of infl*ence can .e said to .e physical ca*sation# .eca*se efficient ca*sation is al-ays e/erted .y an act*al occasion as a -hole# not simply .y one of its poles 7.eca*se a pole is an a.straction and as s*ch cannot act8# and every occasion has a physical pole, &here is no p*rely mental efficient ca*sation# in the Cartesian sense of a p*rely mental s*.stance e/erting ca*sality in the physical -orld, We can disting*ish# ho-ever# .et-een pure physical ca*sation and hy rid physical ca*sation,1D $t is pure physical ca*sation insofar as the in0formed creativity transmitted from the ca*se to the effect7s8 arose in the physical pole of the ca*se, $t is hy rid physical ca*sation insofar as this creativity first arose in the mental pole of the ca*se, &his distinction is relevant to the 2*estion at hand# .eca*se Whitehead 71929M19D@8 s*ggested that -hereas p*re physical ca*sation seems to occ*r mainly .et-een contig*o*s events# hy.rid physical ca*sation might not .e th*s .o*nd 7p, B+@8, &his 3ind of ca*sation# he s*ggested# sho*ld .e e/erted on more0or0less remote as -ell as *pon contig*o*s events# and he pointed to telepathic infl*ence as one reason to .elieve that this form of action at a distance occ*rs, &he reason he gave for the difference is that the physical poles of occasions are -hat give rise to the space0time contin**m# -hereas the mental poles involve the ingression of eternal forms# -hich are not related more to any one part of space0time than to all others, is statement is cryptic# leaving his reasoning opa2*e# .*t# especially given his geni*s and the amo*nt of time he devoted to *nderstanding the mysteries of space0 time# his s*ggestion seems -orthy of e/ploration .y those -ho are familiar -ith contemporary disc*ssions in physics, $n any case# the change from a materialistic to a pane/perientialist doctrine of nat*re ma3es the idea of infl*ence at a distance thin3a.le as a general characteristic of the -orld, So long as the act*al entities of nat*re are tho*ght to .e even remotely analogo*s to .illiard .alls# efficient ca*sation .et-een them m*st .e tho*ght to .e .y contact, $t is not as int*itively self0evident# ho-ever# that the infl*ence of one e/perience on another cannot occ*r at a distance, (any premodern philosophies# incl*ding some of the %eoplatonic and ermetic philosophies that flo*rished .et-een the 1Gth and the 1Dth cent*ries# said that 5sympathetic6 relations can occ*r .et-een noncontig*o*s things# and for Whitehead efficient ca*sation involves the transfer of feeling# and th*s involves sympathy 71929M 19D@# p, 1:2C 19B@# 19:@# p, 1@B8, &o s*mmariFe this disc*ssion of ca*sation and linearity: Ca*sation is linear in the sense that efficient ca*sation# meaning the ca*sal infl*ence .et-een act*al occasions# r*ns e/cl*sively from the past to the presentC .*t ca*sation is not linear in the sense that -o*ld e/cl*de self0determination -ithin an act*al occasion# do-n-ard ca*sation from higher to lo-er occasions of e/perience# and ca*sal infl*ence at a distance,

&reativity and Energy At the heart of Whitehead=s postmodern position on these iss*es is an e/pansion of the notion of 5energy6 into 5creativity,6 4rom his perspective# the 5energy6 of c*rrent physics is simply an a.straction from# a limited aspect of# the f*ll0.lo-n creativity that is the tr*e material ca*se em.odied in all act*alities 7Whitehead# 19BBM19:D# p, 1@:8, &he energy of c*rrent physics involves only the 2*antitative aspect of the creativity of events# and then only the e/ternal side of this 2*antitative aspect1that is# the energy transfers .et-een events, 'nergy th*s treated leaves o*t the 2*alitative side of the creativity and -hat this creativity is for the events themselves# -hich incl*des an e/periential realiFation of val*e and an element of self0determination, 7$t is to .ring o*t

this richer meaning that $ sometimes translate Whitehead=s term 5creativity6 as 5creative e/perience,68 4*rthermore# the energy of c*rrent physics is limited to forms of creativity that are e/emplified in the most elementary act*alities of the -orld1atoms and s*.atomic particles, &his limitation lies .ehind the a.s*rd notion that everything that happens in the -orld# incl*ding the compassion of a <odhisattva# m*st .e completely red*ci.le to# and th*s e/plaina.le in terms of# the fo*r forces of physics, Whitehead holds# .y contrast# that partly a*tonomo*s po-ers of self0determination and efficient ca*sation e/ist at higher levels# s*ch as cells and psyches# and that some psyches# s*ch as those of h*mans# have m*ch more of these po-ers than others# s*ch as those of rats, 7Some h*mans# f*rthermore# may have more than others,8 &his enlargement of 5energy6 into 5creativity6 is also important to the iss*e of action at a distance, What is a.ove called pure physical ca*sation is meant to descri.e -hat is occ*rring in those interactions that physicists consider transfers of physical energy, As mentioned previo*sly# this 3ind of transfer generally seems to occ*r only .et-een contig*o*s events, $f gravitation is not ta3en to .e an e/ception to this general r*le# and if psycho3inesis is re;ected# it -o*ld .e nat*ral to ass*me that the transfer of physical energy can occ*r only .et-een contig*o*s occasions, So if the creativity of events -ere e/ha*sted .y their physical energy# th*s *nderstood# then the only form of efficient ca*sation they co*ld e/ert -o*ld .e p*re physical ca*sation# and infl*ence at a distance -o*ld .e impossi.le, $f an event em.odies mental as -ell as physical energy# ho-ever# so that hy.rid as -ell as p*re physical ca*sation can occ*r# then one co*ld allo- for infl*ence at a distance -itho*t challenging the idea that the transfer of 5physical energy6 occ*rs only .et-een contig*o*s occasions, 4*rthermore# once one form of action at a distance is allo-ed# then it .ecomes easier to co*ntenance the s*ggestion that even pure physical ca*sation might at least occasionally occ*r at a distance# if the evidence for psycho3inesis seems to demand it, $n these -ays acceptance of a -orldvie- in -hich the 5energy6 of the contemporary physics comm*nity is enlarged to Whiteheadian 5creativity6 -o*ld ma3e people more open to loo3ing at evidence that seems interpreta.le only in terms of some 3ind of infl*ence at a distance, &he reference to 5mental energy6 s*ggests another -ay of reading Whitehead=s proposal in relation to energy and creativity, &he distinction .et-een the t-o terms co*ld .e *nderstood as a temporary e/pedient# -ith the long0term goal .eing another e/pansion of the concept of energy, &his concept has had to .e e/panded several times previo*sly to save the la- of the conservation of energy, %o-adays the notion of the infl*ence of the mind on the .rain is angrily deno*nced on the gro*nds that s*ch infl*ence -o*ld violate this la-, 'ven if this 5la-6 sho*ld .e ta3en as sacrosanct# ho-ever# no violation -o*ld .e involved if -e enlarged the notion of energy to incl*de the notion of psychic energy 7as -ell as intermediate forms# s*ch as cell*lar energy and macromolec*lar energy8, <*t -hether -e adopt the term creativity for that po-er -hich is em.odied in all events or enlarge the concept of energy so that it no- refers to -hat Whitehead meant .y creativity# the effect -ill .e the same: Ca*sation -ill no longer .e *nderstood as linear in -ays that r*le o*t self0determination# do-n-ard ca*sation# and action at a distance, &he nat*re of Whitehead=s s*ggestion as to ho- to overcome the materialistic# red*ctionistic philosophy of late modernity can .e .etter *nderstood if his doctrine of eternal forms# -hich -as mentioned earlier in passing# is e/plored,

Eternal )orms Whitehead=s position on this topic is one of the -ays in -hich his philosophy is clearly postmodern, !ne aspect of modern tho*ght has .een a tendency to deny the reality of eternal# ideal forms that transcend the realm of act*ality, $f disposed to accept their

reality at all# the modern mind red*ces them# -ith Eepler# to mathematical forms, Whitehead 71929M19D@8 not only e/plicitly affirms the e/istence of eternal forms *nder the name 5eternal o.;ects#6 .*t he also disting*ishes .et-een the 5o.;ective species6 of eternal o.;ects# .y -hich he means the mathematical forms# and the 5s*.;ective species#6 -hich incl*des forms s*ch as red# desire# anger# and conscio*sness 7pp, 2910 29B8, &he o.;ective species can characteriFe only an o.;ect of perceptionC the s*.;ective species can also characteriFe ho# an o.;ect is perceived, &ogether these t-o types of forms in0form the creative e/perience of each act*al entity# determining the species to -hich it .elongs and largely characteriFing its *ni2*eness -ithin its species, &he 2*alifier largely is essential# .eca*se each occasion of e/perience also incl*des -ithin itself the past act*al -orld o*t of -hich it aroseC an act*ality cannot .e ade2*ately descri.ed in terms of a com.ination of creativity and a.stract forms, !nce this caveat 7-hich is one of the main feat*res of Whitehead=s philosophy8 is made# ho-ever# it remains tr*e that act*al occasions of vario*s types differ largely .eca*se of the different eternal forms they em.ody, With regard to the o.;ects st*died .y physics# for e/ample# -e differentiate .et-een the vario*s s*.atomic particles .y indicating their mass# charge# spin# ang*lar moment*m# and so on, 'ach of these feat*res is an eternal form, Different forms are em.odied in the vario*s atoms# molec*les# organelles# cells# and psyches, &he forms em.odied in the higher act*alities are no less real in the nat*re of things than those in the lo-er, Contra most materialists# something does not have to em.ody the forms appropriate to the lo-est level of act*ality# s*ch as mass and charge# to .e act*al, 7"i3e-ise# contra most idealists# something need not em.ody forms appropriate to the highest types of act*alities# s*ch as conscio*sness# to .e act*al,8 (odern materialistic tho*ght has re;ected this democratic attit*de to-ard the forms .eca*se of its e/ternalism or o.;ectivism# meaning the tendency to limit scientific tho*ght to categories characteriFing the e/ternal# o.;ective side of things# and to ta3e the internal# s*.;ective side as less real# as epiphenomenal, $n Whitehead=s tho*ght# .y contrast# the internal side of things and the e/ternal# the s*.;ective and the o.;ective# are e2*ally act*al# e2*ally primordial# and therefore the s*.;ective species of eternal o.;ects is as real as the o.;ective, 'motion is as real as mass# intensity of e/perience as real as charge, &his democracy in the ho*se of forms# along -ith the pane/perientialism it pres*pposes# reinforces the Whiteheadian antired*ctionistic conviction that animal psyches are as act*al as protons, A pair of 2*estions that m*st .e faced .y those -ho affirm the reality of forms is -here they e/ist and ho- they .ecome effective in the -orld, $n and of themselves# they do not have act*al# .*t merely ideal# e/istenceC that is# they are not themselves act*alities .*t merely possi.ilities to .e act*aliFed .y act*al things, $t is a -idespread int*ition that merely ideal# possi.le e/istents cannot e/ist on their o-n# .*t can only 5s*.sist6 in something act*alC e2*ally -idespread is the int*ition that they cannot .e efficacio*s on their o-n .*t only thro*gh the agency of something act*al, Whitehead 71929M19D@8 reaffirms .oth of these int*itions *nder the r*.ric of the 5ontological principle#6 defining it .oth as the principle that everything m*st .e some-here# -ith 5some-here6 ta3en to mean in something act*al# and as the principle that only act*alities can act 7pp, A+# A:8, &his train of tho*ght led him to spea3 of the 5primordial nat*re of God6 as that aspect of an everlasting nonlocaliFed act*ality in -hich eternal forms not yet act*aliFed in the -orld co*ld s*.sist 7pp, A:# 2GD8, &his aspect of God he tho*ght of as a primordial appetite to have these forms act*aliFed in the -orld, &he infl*ence of this appetitive envisagement of the forms e/plains ho- previo*sly *nact*aliFed forms# altho*gh nonact*al in themselves# can e/ert press*re on the act*alities of the -orld to get themselves act*aliFed, &he divine appetite -hets the appetites of the creat*res for novel possi.ilities,

&his idea is f*ndamental to Whitehead=s s*ggestion as to ho- o*r -orld -as created thro*gh an evol*tionary process, !*r -orld -as created not o*t of a.sol*te nothingness# as if once *pon a time only God e/isted -ith no finite act*alities# .*t o*t of relative nothingness# or a chaos of act*alities 7Whitehead# 1929M19D@# p, 9G8, 4or Whitehead# the *niverse is a plen*m of act*al occasions, What -e call 5empty space6 is empty not of act*al occasions .*t of stationary end*ring o.;ects# s*ch as electrons and protons, &his is relative chaos 7pp, 92# 9G8, At one time# chaos may have prevailed every-here# perhaps as an interl*de .et-een a previo*s cosmic epoch and o*r o-n, Getting o*r -orld started# -ith its photons# ne*trons# electrons# protons# ne*trinos# mesons# and so on# and -ith its .asic la-s# s*ch as Planc3=s constant and the gravitational constant# -o*ld have re2*ired getting the appropriate sets of eternal o.;ects em.odied in sets of act*alities, Creation# in other -ords# involved not calling finite act*alities as s*ch into e/istence# .*t l*ring the realm of finit*de to em.ody ne- forms of order 7p, 9:8, &his creative process has contin*ed thro*gho*t the evol*tionary process for several .illion years# -ith ever ne- forms of order .eing elicited into act*al e/istence, $n lang*age familiar to parapsychologists# creation involves materialiFation, I*st ho- the divine l*re gets ne- forms em.odied in the -orld# and ho- this provides an analogy for materialiFation in the more c*stomary sense# -ill .e more easily e/plaina.le after a disc*ssion of Whitehead=s vie- of perception# to -hich $ no- t*rn,

Perception and Prehension <eca*se Whitehead has a pane/perientialist ontology# his doctrine of perception is in some respects simply the reverse side of his ontology, !ne can# therefore# introd*ce a disc*ssion of his doctrine of perception .y simply e/plicating some points implicit in his ontology, $f all act*al entities are occasions of e/perience that perceive previo*s occasions of e/perience# t-o points are already implied, 4irst# not all e/perience is conscio*s e/perience# -hich seems over-helmingly li3ely# at least if -e# -ith Whitehead# thin3 of conscio*s e/perience as that -hich contrasts -hat isthe case -ith -hat might have een 71929M19D@# p, 2:D8, $f amoe.ae# vir*ses# D%A molec*les# and even atoms and electrons have e/perience# there is no good reason to s*ppose that it is conscio*s e/perience# th*s *nderstood, &he second point is that not all perception is sensory perception# -hich is o.vio*s if things s*ch as cells# molec*les# and protons# -hich have no sensory organs# nevertheless en;oy a form of perception, &hese t-o points# as -e -ill see# are closely related# .eca*se sensory perception is m*ch more li3ely than nonsensory perception to .ecome conscio*s, RecogniFing that the term 5perception6 tends to connote conscio*s sensory perception# Whitehead s*ggested the term 5prehension6 as a more ne*tral term for perceptions that may or may not .e conscio*s or sensory 719BBM19:D# p, 2BA8, $ -ill# in fact# *se 5prehension6 to refer to nonsensory perception, $ -ill also# *nless $ indicate other-ise# *se 5prehension6 to mean a physical prehension# -hich means a prehension the o.;ect of -hich is another act*al occasion or a set of occasions, 7A 5concept*al prehension#6 .y contrast# has for its o.;ect an eternal o.;ect and th*s a possi.ility# not an act*ality,8 Whitehead=s vie- is that an act*al entity# .eing an occasion of e/perience# involves a creative synthesis of a m*ltiplicity of prehensions, 'ach occasion of e/perience# then# -hether or not it .ecomes conscio*s# and -hether or not it incl*des sensory perceptions# .egins -ith a m*ltit*de of nonsensory perceptions of past occasions, &hese prehensions# in some sense and to some degree# respond to the entire past -orld# .oth the contig*o*s past and the more remote past, &his statement# *n2*alified# -o*ld# .esides .eing incredi.le# seem to imply that all occasions of e/perience# from

American Christian to Asian <*ddhist# and from h*man to electronic# -o*ld .e virt*ally identical, <*t 2*alifications are given, 4irst# one=s spatiotemporal standpoint is important# .eca*se -e are in general directly affected more strongly .y contig*o*s than .y more remote events, Second# a distinction is made .et-een positive and negative prehensions, A positive prehension# also called a 5feeling#6 incl*des some aspect of the prehended o.;ect into the present e/perience, A negative prehension e/cl*des the entire o.;ect from incorporationC it eliminates the o.;ect from the prehending s*.;ect=s feeling 7Whitehead# 1929M19D@# p, 2B8, &he different grades or species of act*al occasions differ mainly in this respect: the lo-er the grade# the less comple/ the e/perience can .e# and conse2*ently the more of the past that m*st simply .e e/cl*ded, &hird# occasions of e/perience are partially self0created, &hey decide ;*st hoto synthesiFe the given dataC for e/ample# in occasions of e/perience that rise to conscio*sness# one thing to .e decided is ;*st -hich feat*res of the e/perience are foc*sed on conscio*sly, &hro*gh these three 2*alifications of the principle that each occasion prehends the entire past# the specific and historical differences .et-een occasions of e/perience can .e acco*nted for, Conscio*sness# ft sho*ld .e clear .y no-# is a very optional element in e/perience, <y far most of the occasions of e/perience in the *niverse have no conscio*s e/perienceC and# even in those that do have conscio*s e/perience# of the elements incl*ded -ithin the e/perience are not lit *p .y conscio*sness, What needs f*rther disc*ssion is -hat conscio*sness is and ho- it arises, Conscio*sness is defined .y Whitehead 71929M19D@8 as the s*.;ective form of an intellect*al prehension 7pp, 2DD# BAA8, &his is a prehension -hose o.;ect is the contrast .et-een a fact and a proposition1-hich is another -ay of saying -hat -as said earlier# mat conscio*sness arises only if one contrasts -hat is -ith -hat might have .een, &his 3ind of contrast can arise only in a very comple/# sophisticated occasion of e/perience# -hich can synthesiFe vario*s types of prehensions, &he first phase of an occasion of e/perience is constit*ted .y physical prehensions# thro*gh -hich past act*alities are prehended, !*t of each physical prehension arises a conceptual prehension# thro*gh -hich the eternal o.;ects incarnate in the prehended act*alities# or other possi.ilities closely related to them# are prehended, &his prehension is not ne*tral# .*t involves a s*.;ective form# the most elementary of -hich is a positive or negative val*ation of that possi.ility, &his is an elementary stage of mentality# .eca*se it introd*ces an element of self0determination into the e/perience, "o-0grade occasions of e/perience close o*t their s*.;ective e/istence -ith a simple final phase constit*ted .yphysical purposes# in -hich the possi.ilities received from the past -orld are .lindly reaffirmed or atten*ated in intensity 7Whitehead# 1929M19D@# pp, 2A@02A9# 2::8, $t ta3es a more comple/ level of e/perience# pro.a.ly that of an animal psyche or at least a living organism# to t*rn the contrasts in that third stage into propositions# in -hich the note of possi.ility is really entertained, $t ta3es a still more comple/ e/perience to contrast that proposition# -hich involves a possi.le fact a.o*t the -orld# -ith the act*al -orld# so as to get an intellectual prehension, !nly -hen this is done does conscio*sness arise as the s*.;ective form of the prehension, !f the vast n*m.er of o.;ects prehended in a moment of h*man e/perience# and of the smaller n*m.er of propositions entertained# only a min*sc*le n*m.er .ecome clothed in conscio*sness, Conscio*sness is a very poor g*ide to -hat is in fact e/perienced,

&omplexity$ /ierarchy$ /a its$ and Regularity !ne set of implications of this philosophy concerns the related topics of the 5la-s of nat*re6 and the 5hierarchy of the sciences,6 &he early modern -orldvie- tho*ght of the la-s of nat*re as a.sol*te# prescriptive

la-s imposed .y a s*pernat*ral deityC e/ponents of the late modern -orldvie- have generally 3ept this vie- of la-s even after having given *p the imposing la-giver, &he red*ctionism of this -orldvie- has implied# f*rthermore# that the most comple/ .eings sho*ld .ehave in as la-0li3e a manner as the simplest things: *man .eings sho*ld .e as la-0a.iding as rats# -hich sho*ld in t*rn .e as la-0a.iding as atoms and .illiard .alls, $t is only the comple/ity of the more comple/ things that prevents their .ehavior from .eing in fact as predicta.le as that of the simpler things# and therefore prevents scientific e/periments involving them from .eing as repeata.le, Whitehead=s postmodern philosophy has radically different implications, All la-s descriptive of the .ehavior of electrons# atoms# and molec*les are sociological la-s no less than are the la-s descriptive of the .ehavior of h*man .eings .elonging to a partic*lar society, Whitehead agreed -ith William Iames and Charles Peirce that these so0called la-s of nat*re are really the most -idespread ha its of nat*re 7Whitehead# 19B@M 19:@# pp, 1GA01GGC 19BBM19:D# p, A18 and are# accordingly# statistical la-s, A mem.er of a society acting in an a.normal -ay is not violating some imposed la- .*t simply failing to conform to some more0or0less pervasive ha.it of its species, &he ha.its of t-o 3inds of .eings -ill .e reg*lar eno*gh to allo- high degrees of prediction and control, !n the other hand# the .ehavior of lo-0level end*ring o.;ects -ill .e highly predicta.le# at least statistically# .eca*se the occasions of e/perience ma3ing *p these end*ring individ*als are almost entirely physical: &heir mental poles have little po-er to e/ercise self0determination, 'ach occasion largely repeats its predecessor# so that a proton or atom may last .illions of years# acting in the same -ay all the -hile, 'ven more predicta.le -ill .e the .ehavior of nonindivid*ated aggregates made *p of .illions of these lo-0grade end*ring individ*als# .eca*se they have no dominant individ*al to give the society as a -hole any spontaneity of response, Whatever min*sc*le spontaneities the end*ring individ*als# s*ch as electrons# manifest -ill .e m*t*ally canceling# so that the .ehavior of the -hole -ill reflect the mass average .ehavior of the .illions of components, &he .ehavior of these aggregates# s*ch as .illiard .alls# -ill .e almost perfectly predicta.le in principle# *nless some *nforeseen e/traordinary po-er intervenes, &he sciences st*dying these lo-0level individ*als and nonindivid*aliFed aggregates -ill .e capa.le of highly replica.le e/periments, As one deals -ith increasingly comple/ compo*nd individ*als# ho-ever# the ha.it0 .o*nd .ehavior -ill recede, &he occasions of e/perience of the dominant mem.er -ill have an increasingly significant mental poleC therefore they -ill have increasingly more po-er to deviate in the moment from the .ehavior of former e/periences .y responding to novel possi.ilities, Also# the physical poles -ill have more feelings or positive prehensions in comparison -ith negative prehensions# so that not so m*ch of the environment is simply e/cl*ded from feeling, (ore varia.les -ill therefore .e involved in determining the e/act character of the occasions of e/perience# .oth in their o-n s*.;ective response and then in their o.;ective effects on others, When one comes to h*man .eings# the n*m.er of varia.les involved in their e/perience is virt*ally infinite# and their capacity to respond in vario*s -ays to any partic*lar type of stim*l*s is enormo*s, Altho*gh there is some faint analogy .et-een a h*man psyche and a proton# any scientific approach to h*man psychology or sociology predicated on the ass*mption that h*man conscio*s e/perience# or even h*man o*ter .ehavior# -ill approach that of protons 7let alone .illiard .alls8 in la-li3eness -ill .e doomed to perpet*al fr*stration, Some fo*r .illion years of evol*tion on o*r planet have come in .et-een# d*ring -hich *niform ha.its have .ecome increasingly less determinative in comparison -ith spontaneity and *ni2*eness,

/ard-&ore &ommonsense ,otions

<efore t*rning to the -ay in -hich Whitehead=s postmodern philosophy allo-s psi interactions to occ*r# $ -ill .riefly point o*t the -ay in -hich it allo-s for the hard0core commonsense notions mentioned earlier# for -hich any philosophy claiming to .e ade2*ate to the facts of e/perience m*st .e a.le to acco*nt, &he doctrines of pane/perientialism and compo*nd individ*als sho- ho- o*r o-n e/periences# some of -hich have conscio*sness# can .e considered f*ll0fledged act*alities and ho- their seeming freedom can .e ta3en at face val*e, And o*r o-n creative e/perience can .e regarded not as a great e/ception in the -orld .*t as a high0 level e/emplification of a principle pervasive thro*gho*t nat*re, &he distinction .et-een the psyche and the .rain does not create an insol*.le pro.lem of ho- they interact# than3s to the doctrine of pane/perientialism, &his position is not d*alism .*t nond*alistic interactionism: &he psyche# -hilenumerically distinct from the .rain 7so that there are t-o things to interact8# is not ontologically different in kind from the .rain cells# .*t only greatly different in degree# so that the ca*sal interaction is not .et-een *nli3es .*t .et-een inferior and s*perior instances of the same 3ind of individ*als, 'fficient ca*sation involves sympathy# or the sharing of feelings, &he idea that o*r .asic -ay of apprehending the act*al -orld .eyond o*r o-n e/perience is nonsensory prehension# so that sensory perception is a secondary# derivative form of perception# sho-s ho- -e can 3no- many things that -e pres*ppose .*t that cannot .e 3no-n thro*gh sensory perception, 'fficient ca*sation# as the real infl*ence of one thing on another# is 3no-n in this -ay, $n fact# physical prehension is also called 5perception in the mode of ca*sal efficacy6 7Whitehead# 1929M19D@# pp, 121# 1:9# 1DB01DG8# .eca*se -hat the percipient prehends is precisely the ca*sal efficacy of previo*s e/periences *pon itself, $ncl*ded in this mode of perception is the act*ality of these prior e/periences# -hich e/plains -hy none of *s are solipsists in practice, &he fact that this 3no-ledge# that there is a -orld .eyond o*rselves that is ;*st as act*al as -e are# comes thro*gh a pre0intellect*al prehension rather than an intellect*al ;*dgment e/plains also -hy o*r dogs and# in fact# all organisms manifest nonsolipsistic responses to their environments, <eca*se this mode of perception involves a prehension of past act*alities# and .eca*se an occasion of e/perience al-ays anticipates the fact that it -ill infl*ence f*t*re events# o*r 3no-ledge of the past and the f*t*re 7not the act*al f*t*re# .*t that there #ill e a f*t*re >Whitehead# 19BBM19:D# p, 19B?8# and therefore of time# is also gro*nded, <y virt*e of the fact that this philosophy# -ith its pane/perientialism# says that a lo-0 grade end*ring individ*al# s*ch as an atom# is analogo*s to a h*man psyche1.eing li3e-ise a society of occasions of e/perience# each of -hich prehends its past and anticipates its f*t*re# ho-ever minimally1e/plains -hy time is real for all of nat*re# so that -e have no mystery of ho- temporal and nontemporal individ*als can interact# or of ho- time someho- emerged,1@ 4inally# the doctrine that -e have a mode of perception more .asic than that -hich is mediated thro*gh o*r physical sense organs e/plains ho- -e can apprehend those nonphysical realities -e call val*es# s*ch as tr*th# .ea*ty# and goodness, aving given a .rief 7or# to the -eary reader# $ sho*ld say: as .rief as possi.le8 e/position of some of the feat*res of Whitehead=s philosophy and ho- these feat*res help *s ma3e sense of o*r most .asic pres*ppositions# $ t*rn no- to some -ays in -hich this philosophy can help *s ma3e sense of psi interactions, $ offer no evidence for the reality of the phenomena# .*t simply ass*me for the sa3e of this disc*ssion that they do occ*r 7e/cept# of co*rse# for tr*e precognition8# and as3# if they do# ho- this is possi.le -ithin the conte/t of the philosophy offered .y Whitehead,

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Receptive Psi Receptive psi involves the mind=s prehensive reception of infl*ences at a distance, &his reception need not .ecome conscio*s, &he distinction .et-een experience as such andconscious e/perience is of vital importance to parapsychology# as is the 2*estion of -hy some forms of e/perience .ecome conscio*s on a reg*lar .asis# -hereas other forms of e/perience .ecome conscio*s only rarely# if at all, $n partic*lar# sensory e/perience reg*larly .ecomes conscio*s#19 -hile e/trasensory perception 7'SP81as generally *nderstood# to mean nonsensory perception of remote entities1rarely does, Whitehead=s philosophy provides a possi.le e/planation for this t-ofold fact# an e/planation that modifies <ergson=s theory 7to-ard -hich <road -as favora.ly disposed8 that the .rain and central nervo*s system f*nction to filter o*t e/trasensory perceptions, &here is a reason -hy the sensory perception of remote o.;ects is m*ch more li3ely to rise to conscio*sness than nonsensory prehensions of remote 7noncontig*o*s8 o.;ects, &his reason is .ased on the general point that the more intensely a dat*m is received# the more li3ely it is to rise to conscio*sness in the creative synthesis of prehensions constit*ting the dominant occasions of e/perience, &his reason is t-ofold: 4irst# in sensory perception# the data are .eing received .y the dominant occasions of e/perience from contig*o*s occasions of e/perience# namely# cell*lar occasions in the .rain, Second# the data from contig*o*s occasions are *s*ally transmitted -ith considera.le strength .eca*se they are not dil*ted .y data deriving from intervening occasions 7Whitehead# 1929M19D@# p, B+D8 and .eca*se they can res*lt from p*re physical ca*sation 7as -ell as hy.rid8, &he data received directly from noncontig*o*s occasions# .y contrast# -ill generally .e .ased on hy.rid physical ca*sation# and -ill# therefore# arrive -ith m*ch less strength, &hey# accordingly# -ill seldom force their -ay *p to the conscio*s s*rface of e/perience# generally remaining in the *nconscio*s depths, !n this .asis# -e can see -hy sensory perception of a remote o.;ect# s*ch as a tree 1++ yards a-ay# sho*ld .e so m*ch more relia.le# in terms of .ecoming a 5clear and distinct6 o.;ect of consciousa-areness# than e/trasensory perception of that same o.;ect, Sensory perception res*lts from a chain of contig*o*s ca*sal transmissions: Series of photonic events .ring the data from the tree to the eye# then series of ne*ronic events 75firings68 .ring the data# pro.a.ly in some-hat transm*ted form# from the s*rface of the eye to the .rain, &hen the dominant occasion receives the data 7pro.a.ly transm*ted still f*rther8 from occasions of e/perience constit*ting the .rain, 'ach lin3 in the chain is constit*ted .y nonsensory prehensions, &his is tr*e not only in the final event# in -hich the dominant occasion prehends the .rain cellsC .*t also each ne*ron in the optic nerve received its data from neigh.oring ne*rons thro*gh prehensionC the cells in the eye received data from the photons .y prehending themC and the data -ere conveyed from tree to eye thro*gh long chains of photonic events# each of -hich prehended a prior photonic event, &he difference .et-een sensory perception and e/trasensory perception of a remote o.;ect is# therefore# not that the latter involves nonsensory perceptionC sensory perception also involves nonsensory perception, &he difference is that sensory perception is .ased *pon chains of contig*o*s events# so that at every step there is p*re physical ca*sation# -hich is stronger than hy.rid physical ca*sation and -hich generally e/ha*sts itself on contig*o*s events, &he .ody=s sensory system 7li3e the systems of nat*re to -hich it is att*ned# s*ch as light and so*nd -aves8 is a very relia.le system for transmitting information of a certain type -ith s*fficient intensity to ma3e it thro*gh to the final phases of the dominant occasions of e/perience# -here conscio*sness may arise, &his relia.ility means repeata.ility# .oth .et-een different

occasions of e/perience in the history of one person and .et-een different persons# d*e to the similarity of o*r sensory systems, '/trasensory perception of a remote o.;ect# -hether it .e a roc3# a tree# or another person# cannot# .y definition 7ass*ming that it is perception at a distance8# rely *pon a chain of contig*o*s ca*sal transfers, $t# therefore# -ill not generally .e strong eno*gh# relative to the data from the rain# to rise to conscio*sness on a reg*lar .asis, &he data from the .rain and central nervo*s system -ill# therefore# *s*ally .loc3 o*t the e/trasensory information from remote o.;ects, &he data are not .loc3ed o*t from the dominant occasion of e/perience altogether# .*t only from the conscio*s part of this e/perience, &he .rain# -ith the rest of the central nervo*s system# does this .loc3ing o*t not .eca*se that is directly its f*nction# .*t simply as a side effect of one of its main positive f*nctions# -hich is to .ring precise information of certain types -ith s*fficient intensity to rise to conscio*sness in a reg*lar# relia.le fashion, When e/trasensory prehensions of remote o.;ects do occasionally rise to conscio*sness# accordingly# this is neither a violation of some la- of nat*re# nor a fail*re of one of the f*nctions of the .rain, $t is simply an e/ception to the -ay things# in fact# normally happen for intelligi.le reasons, Why it is that data from these prehensions do rise to conscio*sness in a fe- cases pro.a.ly differs from case to case, 'ven if -e can fig*re o*t the most common factors# it is *nli3ely that -e -o*ld learn ho- to prod*ce them at -ill 7apart# at least# from long0term spirit*al discipline -ith other ends in vie-8, $n any case# the most li3ely approach to finding fairly repeata.le e/periments involving 'SP# if the a.ove analysis has merit# -o*ld .e to concentrate *pon evidence for unconsciouse/trasensory perception, A fe- s*ch e/periments have .een cond*cted, <y far the ma;ority of e/periments# ho-ever# have tested for evidence ofconscious 'SP, &he reason for this# $ s*spect# lies in the desire of many parapsychologists to find -ays to ma3e 'SP *sef*l in daily life, $n any case# this concern sho*ld .e clearly disting*ished from the concern to find repeata.le e/periments, &rying to do .oth things at once -ill most li3ely res*lt in nothing .*t contin*ed fr*stration, $n a paper a decade ago# 'rlend*r araldsson 719@+8 stated that st*dies of the physiological correlates of psi had recently decreased in n*m.er# evidently .eca*se of the concl*sion of many researchers# e/pressed in a s*rvey of the literat*re .y <rian (illar 719D98# that 5res*lts so far do not , , , indicate s*ch e/periments yield any easier access to 'SP performance than proced*res *sing conscio*s 'SP responses6 7p, 1+:8, o-ever# given .oth the philosophical and empirical reasons for .elieving that psi reception occ*rs primarily at the *nconscio*s level and the relative pa*city of e/periments designed to test for s*ch reception# it -o*ld .e premat*re to concl*de that this approach -ill not yield more repeata.le res*lts than that involving conscio*s 'SP,

Panexperientialism and Some )orms of Receptive Psi $n this disc*ssion# $ have dealt -ith receptive psi in general# not differentiating .et-een 7conscio*s8 telepathy and clairvoyance 7ta3ing this latter term .roadly to incl*de claira*dience and all other forms of e/perience in -hich information a.o*t e/ternal feat*res of remote o.;ects is received -itho*t *se of the senses8, &his similar treatment of telepathy and clairvoyance is possi.le -ithin the frame-or3 of Whitehead=s philosophy# than3s to its pane/perientialism, <eca*se all act*alities are occasions of e/perience or gro*ps of s*ch# the direct# e/trasensory ca*sal relation .et-een a roc3 and a h*man psyche is not different in 3ind from that .et-een t-o h*man psyches, $n each case# feelings originally e/perienced .y the o.;ect -hen it -as still a s*.;ect 7or# in the case of the roc3# a cl*ster of s*.;ects8 are then felt .y the prehending psyche, $t is telepathy# or feeling at a distance# in .oth cases, &he difference

is that# in the case of clairvoyance# one receives information a.o*t the o*ter 7generally called the physical8 characteristics of things 7*s*ally aggregates8# information that may res*lt in the constr*ction of sensory0li3e images, $n telepathy# .y contrast# one receives information a.o*t the inner e/perience of an individ*al, Clairvoyance is th*s analogo*s to o*r direct prehensions of o*r .rain insofar as sensory images may arise from themC ho# these sensory images arise from the data is no more and no less mysterio*s in the one case than in the other, Ro.ert &ho*less 719D28 -as th*s right to say that the relation .et-een a remote o.;ect and the mind is the same as the relation .et-een the .rain and the mind# e/cept that the former percept*al relation occ*rs over a distance, Contrary to his position# ho-ever# the relation .et-een the .rain and the mind sho*ldnot .e called a psi relation precisely .eca*se the element of infl*ence at a distance is not involved, Psychometry# or o.;ect reading# is another form of receptive psi, $n one sense# it may not involve perception at a distance# .eca*se the person may handle the o.;ect in 2*estion, $n another sense# it does# insofar as the o.;ect elicits perceptions of events remote temporally and perhaps also spatially, &he pane/perientialist philosophy also ma3es this 3ind of phenomenon more intelligi.le, $f# for e/ample# the molec*les in a roc3 have e/periences# then it is possi.le that they co*ld incorporate memories of events that occ*rred in their pro/imity, &his idea sho*ld not seem o*trageo*s to materialist philosophers# incidentally# in that their vie- that the mind is really identical -ith the .rain implies that conscio*s memories are present in the molec*les of the .rain1in fact in the s*.atomic particles# if they are rigoro*s -ith their red*ctionism, $n any case# the molec*les -o*ld not need to have memories of the events in 2*estion in their f*ll concreteness .*t only eno*gh memories to elicit the perception of the events in the psychometrist=s mind, Yet another form of receptive psi is retrocognition 7-hich# .esides .eing an independent form of psi# is also involved in psychometry# at least as $ have interpreted it8, $t involves the perception of an event in the remote past that is not .ased *pon a chain of contig*o*s events connecting the event in 2*estion and the percipient occasion, Retroprehension -o*ld .e a .etter term# .eca*se in many# in fact in most# instances# no conscio*s 3no-ledge -o*ld .e involved, $n any case# if prehension is al-ays the reverse side of ca*sal infl*ence# as -ith Whitehead $ maintain# then retroprehension -o*ld mean that the remote past is still e/erting some form of ca*sal infl*ence *pon the present, Whitehead=s philosophy again helps *s *nderstand ho- this can .e so, According to Whitehead=s description of creativity# 5the many .ecome one# and are increased .y one6 71929M19D@# p, 218, &his is -hat occ*rs in each occasion of e/perience, &he 5many#6 as clarified earlier# are solely in the pastC contemporary and f*t*re occasions cannot apply for entrance, &he 5past6 incl*des the entire past# ho-ever# not simply the contig*o*s past, !nce an occasion of e/perience .ecomes an o.;ect# it is an o.;ect forever, $t does not ;*st e/ist as an o.;ect for a split second and then pass into complete none/istence, &he past is still act*al1-hich is nice# .eca*se it gives historians something to tal3 a.o*t, 7$n other -ords# the fact that the past still e/ists in some sense is one of those notions that -e all pres*ppose in practice# insofar as -e .elieve that propositions a.o*t the past are either tr*e or false1-hich -o*ld not .e the case if there -ere no o.;ects to -hich the propositions co*ld either correspond or fail to correspond,8 &he remote past does not e/ist in the same -ay# of co*rse# .eca*se it does not e/ert the same 3ind of ca*sal infl*ence as the immediate 7contig*o*s8 past, &hat immediate past e/erts a 3ind of comp*lsive infl*ence *pon *s that the more remote past does not, ere again the distinction .et-een p*re and hy.rid physical ca*sation is relevant, Pure physical ca*sation e/ha*sts itself immediately in its effects *pon the 7*s*ally contig*o*s8 f*t*re eventsC the event does e/ist as an o.;ect of this sort for

merely a split second, A form of hy rid physical ca*sation# ho-ever# can contin*e to e/ert infl*ence# al.eit of an e/tremely -ea3 form# forever, &his analysis can e/plain -hy retrocognition can occ*r 7retroprehension is occ*rring all the time8# and also -hy it is s*ch a rare phenomenon 7retro0prehension is the reception of ca*sal infl*ences that are too -ea3# apart from e/traordinary circ*mstances# to elicit the 3ind of conscio*s response re2*ired to have retrocognition8, !ne more alleged phenomenon that is *s*ally classed as a distinct form of receptive psi is precognition, As $ indicated earlier# ho-ever# there is no possi.ility of tr*e precognition from a Whiteheadian perspective: &here is no possi.ility of retroca*sation and therefore preprehensionC nor is time *ltimately *nreal# so that all events1 conventionally disting*ished as past# present# and f*t*re1-o*ld e/ist eternally, &he types of e/periences often classified as precognition m*st# accordingly# .e at most called apparent precognition and m*st .e e/plained in other -ays, $ s*spect that these other -ays involve a com.ination of prehensive and e/pressive psi, <efore dealing -ith apparent precognition# then# $ m*st treat e/pressive psi,

Expressive Psi

Psycho3inesis6 7PE8 is very *nsatisfactory as a synonym for the vario*s forms of

e/pressive psi, $t most immediately s*ggests ca*sing locomotion in some remote o.;ect# as in moving a matchstic3 on a ta.le# .y the po-er of tho*ght, $n most forms of e/pressive psi# s*ch as materialiFation# psychic photography# and psychic healing# ho-ever# locomotion is not the central res*lt, $n some forms of e/pressive psi# s*ch as tho*ght0transference 7-hich is distinct from telepathy insofar as the reason for the *n*s*al nat*re of the event lies more in the agent than in the recipient8# locomotion may not .e a direct effect at all, %evertheless# $ -ill sometimes *se 5psycho3inesis6 as a synonym for e/pressive psi# mainly .eca*se the ad;ectival and adver.ial forms of the -ord are *sef*l, 4or most p*rposes# e/pressive psi can .e *nderstood as efficient ca*sation e/erted .y a psyche on entities .eyond its o-n .ody that is not mediated thro*gh that .ody, o-ever# the psyche co*ld also e/ert e/pressive psi on its o-n .ody, Phenomena s*ch as stigmata and ectoplasm might .e e/amples, &hey -o*ld .e e/pressive psi if they -ere cases of action at a distance# -hich means that the psyche=s effects -o*ld not .e mediated thro*gh a chain of contig*o*s ca*sation# .eginning -ith the .rain, Also# for a person to ca*se his or her o-n .ody to levitate -o*ld apparently involve direct action of the mind on the vario*s components of the .ody, Part of the -ay in -hich Whitehead=s philosophy allo-s for the reality of e/pressive psi has already .een e/plained, $f every occasion of e/perience prod*ces# to at least some slight degree# direct effects *pon every remote as -ell as every contig*o*s event in its f*t*re 7-hich is simply the reverse side of every event=s directly prehending every occasion of e/perience in its remote as -ell as its contig*o*s past8# then the psyche in an animal -ith a central nervo*s system is at all times prod*cing direct effects *pon its e/trasomatic environment as -ell as indirect effects via the .rain, !f co*rse# insofar as this direct infl*ence is pervasive# steady# and e/tremely -ea3# it -o*ld pro.a.ly not .e h*manly detecta.le .y even the most s*.tle proced*res# especially if its intensity is not increased .y spatial pro/imity, Detecta.le e/pressive psi evidently res*lts from intentional acts on the part of a psyche# -hether those acts .e conscio*sly intended# as in psychic healing 7or in;*ry8# intentional tho*ght0transference# and la.oratory PE e/periments# or more *nconscio*sly intended# as in the 5side0effects6 of PE e/periments and in the effects prod*ced .y 5poltergeist children,6 &he 2*estion is ho- to *nderstand ho- intentions# -hether conscio*s or *nconscio*s# can res*lt in the more intense degrees of ca*sal infl*ence at a distance, o- is it that the capacity to prod*ce e/trasomatic effects that

go .eyond the 3ind of pervasive infl*ence e/erted 7.y hypothesis8 on all events is possessed .y the psycheN A related 2*estion is -hy the h*man psyche# evidently# can have so m*ch more of this psycho3inetic po-er than can the psyches of other animals, &here is e/perimental evidence# to .e s*re# that other animals do have psycho3inetic po-ers, $ndeed# a nond*alistic# evol*tionary philosophy -o*ld lead one to e/pect that the h*man psyche -o*ld not in any of its po-ers .e a.sol*tely discontin*o*s -ith the rest of nat*re, &he po-er to e/ert e/pressive psi seems# nevertheless# to .e far greater in h*man psyches than in the psyches of any other animals, &he a.ility to materialiFe or teleport things# to move heavy o.;ects# and to .ring a.o*t the vario*s .iFarre phenomena often associated -ith 5poltergeist6 cases seems to .e limited to h*man psyches, Why sho*ld the h*man psyche .e so distinctive in this respectN &he first step in *nderstanding the *ni2*e capacity of the h*man psyche in this respect has .een provided .y the previo*s disc*ssion of compo*nd individ*als, &he relevant points -ere that the evol*tionary process has prod*ced increasingly higher forms of occasions of e/perience# and that the higher forms have more po-er than the lo-er ones 7rather than less or no po-er# as late modern tho*ght has ass*med8, &o give an estimation of ho- m*ch more po-er# let *s ass*me that the ca*sal interaction .et-een the .rain and the psyche is a fair e/change# -ith each side e/erting a.o*t the same amo*nt of po-er on the other 7-hich -o*ld seem to .e tr*e if there is a 5la- of the conservation of creativity68, %o-# the psyche in each moment consists of a single occasion of e/perience 7this might .e tr*e even in cases of m*ltiple personality8# -hereas the .rain consists of at least ten .illion cells, $t -o*ld seem to follo-# then# that the dominant occasion of e/perience -o*ld .e at least ten .illion times as po-erf*l as a single .rain cell, &he .rain cell is in t*rn comprised of .illions of molec*les# -hich -o*ld seem to imply that the living occasions of e/perience in the cell are .illions of times more po-erf*l than a molec*lar occasion 7ass*ming the interaction .et-een the living and the molec*lar occasions to .e a fair e/change8, &he molec*les are in t*rn comprised of many s*.atomic particles, &he h*man psyche -o*ld therefore .e .illions of .illions times stronger than any s*.atomic particle, We can see here the radical distinction .et-een this vie- and that of the red*ctionism of modern materialism, S*.atomic particles do indeed possess impressive forms of po-er# as made o.vio*s .y n*clear e/plosions, $t m*st .e remem.ered# ho-ever# that the po-er e/erted in these e/plosions is not the po-er of a single s*.atomic particle# .*t of .illions of .illions of them, Also# their effects are so noticea.le .eca*se o*r atmosphere# .*ildings# and .odies are comprised of the same 3inds of entities and are there.y radically affected .y a n*clear chain reaction, We sho*ld not .e misled# therefore# .y the impressive nat*re of s*ch effects into s*pposing that s*.atomic particles have more po-er than the h*man psyche, !ther-ise -e -ill .e *na.le to acco*nt for the dominance -ithin the .ody that is indeed e/ercised .y the dominant occasions# and for other facts a.o*t the -orld# s*ch as that the face of the earth has .een changed more radically .y h*man .eings in an e/tremely .rief period of time than it has .y any other species over aeons, &he other salient point of the previo*s disc*ssion to apply to the present iss*e is the distinction .et-een energy as *nderstood .y contemporary physics and the more general notion of creativity, Creativity can .e informed .y many different sets of eternal o.;ects, &he feat*res descri.ed .y physicists as mass# charge# spin# and so on constit*te only a fe- of many possi.le sets of eternal o.;ects that can inform creativity, &he fact that the living occasions of a cell and the dominant occasions of an animal do not have their creativity informed .y those eternal o.;ects does not mean that they have no or even less creative po-er# meaning the po-ers of receptivity# self0determination# and efficient ca*sation, All the evidence# red*ctionistic .linders aside# s*ggests that the living cells have more po-er than their constit*ents and that the dominant occasions in

the animal have still more, &his is the hypothesis implied .y Whitehead=s philosophy, &he prior t-o paragraphs have provided e/planations as to -hy the psyche of animals sho*ld have more po-er to e/ert on other things# .oth contig*o*s and at a distance# than do lo-er act*alities, &he reason -hy the psyches of the higher animals sho*ld have more of this po-er than the lo-er is not hard to *nderstand, <*t -hy sho*ld there .e s*ch a difference .et-een the h*man psyche and that of other primates -hen genetically -e are so similarN &o give a possi.le ans-er to this 2*estion# -e sho*ld as3 -hat constit*tes the main difference .et-een h*mans and other primates, Iohn Co.. 719:D8# a Whiteheadian thin3er# has s*ggested that the threshold dividing h*mans from other animals -as crossed -hen 5the s*rpl*s psychic energy .ecame s*fficient in 2*antity to ena.le the psychic life to .ecome its o-n end rather than primarily a means to the s*rvival and health of the .ody6 7p, B98, <y 5s*rpl*s psychic energy6 is meant energy .eyond that needed for the -ell0.eing of the .ody, &his s*rpl*s energy can .e *sed for the psyche=s a*tonomo*s development# in -hich it p*rs*es ends that are intrinsically re-arding# independently of conse2*ences for the .ody, &his point a.o*t a*tonomo*s development -ill .e relevant later# -hen disc*ssing the possi.ility of the psyche=s s*rvival of .odily death, 4or no- the relevant point is that this great increase in s*rpl*s psychic energy co*ld .e *sed also for e/erting e/pressive psi, Given the fact that .oth empirical evidence and Whiteheadian theory s*ggest that the h*man psyche is in general more po-erf*l than other end*ring individ*als# the ne/t 2*estion is ho- to *nderstand the nat*re of the po-er that is occasionally manifested in e/pressive psi, Why is this po-er so seldom *nder the conscio*s control of the person# at least in great 2*antitiesN (ost people seem incapa.le of intentionally prod*cing any noticea.le psycho3inetic effects# at least apart from e/tensive spirit*al disciplines 7see .elo-8, (ost of the people -ho do seem capa.le of prod*cing PE effects deli.erately generally prod*ce s*ch -ea3 effects that they are discerni.le only thro*gh very s*.tle meas*rements andMor statistical analyses, $n most cases of more conspic*o*s effects# often called macro0PE# the effects seem to .e prod*ced more *nconscio*sly than conscio*sly 7as -ith so0called poltergeist children8, $t is a rare person -ho can prod*ce macro0effects# s*ch as psychic photography# spoon0.ending# or even moving a matchstic3 across a ta.letop# thro*gh conscio*s effortC and even -ith s*ch persons the po-er generally comes and goes, !nly in a fe- rare so*ls does it seem to .e a po-er that is *nder conscio*s control reg*larly over a long period of time, &hese facts s*ggest the d*al hypothesis that the po-er to e/ert e/pressive psi is a varia.le po-er# so that some people have more of it than others# and also that it is a po-er that# at least for the most part# resides in a portion of the psyche on -hich the conscio*s portion of the psyche cannot directly dra-, &his latter point is some-hat intelligi.le in terms of the earlier disc*ssion of conscio*sness, Conscio*sness arises# if at all# only in a late integrative phase of an occasion of e/perience, (ost of the creative po-er of the occasion of e/perience -o*ld there.y occ*r .elo- the threshold of conscio*sness, &he direct effects that conscio*s intentions can have *pon the -orld are therefore 2*ite -ea3# e/cept for those effects that are mediated thro*gh those channels that have .een fine0t*ned over .illions of years of evol*tion to respond to the s*.tlest changes in conscio*sness, $ mean# of co*rse# the .ody=s motor system, Also# -e are no- learning that other systems# s*ch as the imm*ne system# are more responsive to conscio*sness than -e had previo*sly tho*ght# .*t even here the most decisive effects seem to .e# analogo*s to psi effects# prod*ced .y *nconscio*s feelings, &here seems to .e more po-er in the depths of the psyche than at its s*rface, &his fact fits -ith a f*rther aspect of Co..=s s*ggestion: &he m*ch greater s*pply of 5s*rpl*s psychic energy#6 -hich disting*ishes h*mans from the rest of the animals#

e/ists primarily in -hat -e call the *nconscio*s portion of the psyche, Co..=s s*ggestion# infl*enced .y the I*ngian historian of conscio*sness 'rich %e*mann# differs in this respect from most evol*tionary acco*nts of the rise of h*man e/istence, <oth acco*nts ma3e the rise of sym.olism central, &he standard acco*nts# ho-ever# foc*s on the practical advantages for s*rvival given .y the development of sym.olic lang*age, Co.. 719:D8 says# .y contrast# that it -as not practical advantages that constit*ted h*manity=s tr*e distinctiveness# 5.*t rather the greatly increased *nconscio*s psychic activity organiFing the -hole of e/perience for its o-n sa3e6 7p, B98, &his *nconscio*s psychic activity of sym.oliFation did# to .e s*re# res*lt in 5a ne- and incompara.ly richer mode of conscio*sness6 7p, A18, &he great increase in s*rpl*s psychic po-er occ*rred# ho-ever# primarily in the *nconscio*s# and has contin*ed to reside there even after giving rise to the ne- mode of conscio*sness, (ost of the s*rpl*s energy of the psyche to this day is *nconscio*s energy# employed for sym.oliFing activity that is largely a*tonomo*s from the sym.oliFing activity of the conscio*s portion of the psyche, &his hypothesis -o*ld e/plain -hy the po-er to e/ert e/pressive psi# and especially to e/ercise strong amo*nts of it# -o*ld .e .eyond the conscio*s control of most people, $f this is so# ho- is it possi.le that occasionally1either no- and then in a partic*lar person or on a some-hat reg*lar .asis in an occasional person1conscio*s effort is a.le to prod*ce rather large0scale e/pressive psi effectsN A possi.le e/planation is that the conscio*s mentality of one occasion of e/perience# altho*gh 2*ite -ea3 in itself# can sometimes activate the *nconscio*s portion of the s*cceeding occasion of e/perience# ind*cing it to e/ert its generally *nmanifest po-er to .ring a.o*t e/traordinary e/trasomatic effects, o- e/actly this occ*rs# if it does# is a mystery# and perhaps -ill al-ays remain s*chC .*t then ho- e/actly the psyche ind*ces the appropriate part of the .rain to move into action to raise an arm is also a mystery# and perhaps -ill al-ays remain s*ch, $n any case# in this -ay -e can e/plain ho- conscio*s -illing# -hile normally 2*ite -ea3# can occasionally prod*ce conspic*o*s PE effects, &hese e/ceptional events -o*ld depend *pon a special att*nement .et-een the conscio*s and *nconscio*s portions of the psyche, &his s*ggestion fits -ell -ith the fact that people -ith some capacity to prod*ce e/pressive psi effects thro*gh conscio*s intention generally have a correlative capacity for .ecoming conscio*s of receptive psi infl*ences, 'ach side of this d*al capacity -o*ld depend *pon a greater0than0average att*nement .et-een the conscio*s and *nconscio*s levels of e/perience, &his idea coheres -ith the fact that .oth types of psi effects# called in $ndian tho*ght the 5siddhis#6 are often side0effects of spirit*al disciplines that serve 7-hether or not their p*rpose is th*s descri.ed8 to .ring one=s conscio*s e/perience into harmony -ith one=s *nconscio*s e/perience, ere the effects are not intentionally prod*ced in one sense# of co*rse# insofar as the person does not conscio*sly intend to prod*ce those effectsC .*t they are the prod*cts of conscio*s intention in another sense# insofar as it is the spirit*al discipline# conscio*sly e/erted# that res*lts in the greater att*nement -ith the *nconscio*s and there.y in the *nintended effects, 7At a still higher stage of spirit*al development# these psi effects# at least as conscio*sly *nintended# *ncontrolla.le side0effects# generally disappear,8 Another 2*estion a.o*t e/pressive psi involves -hat is tho*ght to .e going on in the thing on -hich it is e/erted, (any treatments have ass*med that the ca*sal relation is not *nli3e that of p*shing a roc3 -ith one=s hand, &his analogy can lead to the e/pectation that PE e/periments sho*ld .e 2*ite repeata.le, &his ass*med analogy has also created a 2*estion of -hether certain types of psi effects sho*ld .e classified as PE or not, 4or e/ample# Iohn <eloff 719DG8 has responded negatively to the idea that plants co*ld have telepathic feelings .eca*se# as a d*alist# he does not .elieve that plants or their cells are sentient 7pp, B:A0B:G8, $f plants sho- signs of responding at a distance to infl*ences from h*mans or other animals# then the psi effects m*st .e classified as PE on the part of the animal psyches# he insists# not as 'SP on the part of

the plants, 4rom the nond*alistic perspective of pane/perientialism# ho-ever# no s*ch antithesis e/ists, All act*al things are either s*.;ects or cl*sters of s*.;ects, A plant is a society of cells# each of -hich prehends its contig*o*s and more remote environments directlyC a roc3 is a society of molec*les# each of -hich is a prehender, &he psi infl*ence of a h*man psyche *pon a plant or a roc3 can# therefore# .e called either an instance of e/pressive psi# if considered from the standpoint of the h*man .eing# or an instance of receptive psi# if considered from the standpoint of the individ*als constit*ting the roc3 or the plant, $n some cases# to .e s*re# it is more meaningf*l to spea3 of the ca*sal0prehensive relation in one -ay than in the other# if -e have reason to .elieve that either the agent or the recipient is more responsi.le for the e/traordinary effects, $n some cases of psi relations .et-een t-o h*man .eings# for e/ample# the first may deli.erately see3 to transmit a tho*ght to the second at a time -hen the second has no conscio*s 3no-ledge of the attempt, $f the attempt is s*ccessf*l# -e -o*ld spea3 more of tho*ght0transference than of telepathic reception, $f the second# ho-ever# see3s to 5read the mind6 of the first at a time -hen the first is ma3ing no attempt to transmit tho*ghts to the second# then -e -o*ld spea3 more of telepathic reception than of tho*ght0transference, "i3e-ise# if a roc3 is moved thro*gh a psi relation# -e -o*ld spea3 of e/pressive psi 7-hether conscio*s or *nconscio*s8 rather than telepathy# insofar as -e do not s*ppose that the roc3 molec*les did anything *n*s*al to initiate the special psi relation, We -o*ld# li3e-ise# assign most of the responsi.ility in a h*man0plant psi relation to the h*man .eing, %evertheless# it -o*ld not .e a.s*rd to spea3 of a telepathic response of the plants to the moods of their careta3er, (*ch more important than the 2*estion of ho- to classify vario*s am.ig*o*s instances of psi# ho-ever# is the implication of thin3ing of all psi relations as relational# rather than *nilateral# prod*cts, A psi occ*rrence is relational .et-een t-o individ*als or cl*sters of individ*als# in -hich each of the individ*als e/ercises some modic*m of self0 determination, '/traordinary psi occ*rrences# s*ch as conscio*s 'SP or conspic*o*s PE# depend *pon .oth the 5agent6 and the 5percipient,6 &he sit*ation is even m*ch more comple/# insofar as .oth the 5agent6 and the 5percipient6 are not self0enclosed s*.stances .*t are constit*ted o*t of their total environments, $ -ill come to this complication laterC for no- it is eno*gh to consider the implications of the fact that the psi relation depends *pon partially self0determining entities on .oth sides of the relation, Parapsychologists have .een a-are of this m*t*ality -ith regard to telepathy# and some-hat so -ith regard to clairvoyance1having learned# for e/ample# that cards -ith images that are emotionally laden for the s*.;ect are more li3ely to elicit a correct response, &hey have seemingly .een less a-are of this m*t*ality -ith regard to PE# pro.a.ly .eca*se of the d*alistic ass*mption that act*alities .elo- a certain level are lac3ing all capacity for e/perience and self0determination, $f this d*alism is replaced .y a pane/perientialist philosophy# efforts to prod*ce PE effects in plants# .acteria# or even in matchstic3s -ill .e *nderstood as attempts less at coercion than at pers*asion, 7$ am here *sing 5pers*asion6 for any efficient ca*sation in -hich the entity *pon -hich the ca*sation is e/erted can and m*st ma3e a partially self0determining response, 5Coercion#6 in the metaphysical sense *sed here# refers to ca*sation -here this is not the case, &he a.sol*te difference .et-een coercion and pers*asion -hen the terms are *sed in this metaphysical sense is different from the mere difference in degree .et-een the terms -hen they are *sed in the more common# psychological sense, 4or ela.oration# see Griffin# 1991,8 &he effort to move a matchstic3 on a ta.le -itho*t physical means -o*ld .e less li3e moving it -ith one=s hand than li3e trying to raise the temperat*re in one=s hand or to heal one=s *lcers .y psychological processes, &his vie- -o*ld e/plain -hy it often ta3es some time to prod*ce PE effects: A

5sympathetic6 relation m*st .e esta.lished .et-een the agent and the recipient, What is .eing transmitted from the agent is less a physical force than a s*ggestion# to -hich the prehending s*.;ects constit*ting the o.;ect in 2*estion may or may not respond in a detecta.le manner, &hey may or may not .e pers*aded, '/pressive psi# th*s interpreted# -o*ld .e the res*lt of hy.rid physical ca*sation on the part of the agent# and of hy.rid physical prehensions on the part of the recipients 7for e/ample# the molec*les in a matchstic38, (any varia.les -o*ld .e involved in determining s*ccess, &he first 2*estion is -hether the hy.rid physical prehensions are positive or negative1that is# -hether the ca*sal infl*ences coming from the agent are positively felt and therefore incorporated# or -hether they are e/cl*ded from feeling, $t might ta3e some time to overcome this o.stacle, $f it is overcome# the ne/t 2*estion is -hether the s*.;ects respond favora.ly to the s*ggestion1-hether their appetites are -hetted for this ne- possi.ility, &hat might ta3e more time, $f that occ*rs# the ne/t 2*estion is -hether this appetition or mentality# -hich occ*rs in a series of molec*lar occasions of e/perience# .ecomes incorporated into the physical pole of some s*.se2*ent occasion -ithin that same molec*le, Yet another 2*estion is -hether a ma;ority of the molec*les in the matchstic3 respond in these -ays, !nly if all of this occ*rs -ill the matchstic3 move, $f 5s*ccess6 in this sense depends on this type of process# in -hich self0determination .ased *pon sympathy and appetition are involved# it is *nderstanda.le -hy one person might .e s*ccessf*l and a tho*sand others not, $t is even *nderstanda.le that the same person might .e s*ccessf*l only sometimes, Altho*gh -e spea3 of the 5same person6 thro*gh time# the end*ring person is some-hat a.stract: &he concrete ca*sal agents are the momentary occasions of e/perience# and each of them differs at least slightly# and they may differ radically1in intensity of e/perience# in emotional tone# in p*rpose# and in the content of tho*ghts and feelings# .oth conscio*s and *nconscio*s# ma3ing *p the e/perience, Any of inn*mera.le varia.les co*ld ma3e a decisive difference, &his type of e/planation# ho-ever# seems to fit only some of the reported instances of e/pressive psi, !ther instances seem to re2*ire another e/planation, $n these# the effects are dramatic and virt*ally instantaneo*s, &hings .end or .rea3# -eighing scales drop as if a D+0po*nd -eight had .een p*t on them# o.;ects fly thro*gh the air# telephones ring# lights go off and on# and so on, $n s*ch instances# the lang*age of 5pers*asion6 seems less appropriate, &he effects seem to indicate the e/ertion of -hat -e ordinarily call 5physical force,6 $n Whiteheadian terms# -e seem to have p*re# not simply hy.rid# physical ca*sation, &his .rings *s .ac3 to the 2*estion of -hether p*re physical ca*sation at a distance is possi.le, Whitehead himself did not r*le o*t the possi.ility, e said: provided that physical science maintains its denial of 5action at a distance#6 the safer g*ess is that >p*re physical prehension? is practically negligi.le e/cept for contig*o*s occasionsC .*t that this practical negligi.ility is a characteristic of the present cosmic epoch# -itho*t any metaphysical generality, 71929M19D@# p, B+@8 Accordingly# he did not assert that# if p*re physical prehension and hence p*re physical ca*sation occ*rs only .et-een contig*o*s occasions# this feat*re of o*r -orld -o*ld .e a metaphysical feat*re of reality# .*t s*ggested that it -o*ld .e a contingent characteristic of o*r cosmic epoch 7-hich -e no- .elieve to have .eg*n 1202+ .illion years ago8, Also# if it is s*ch a characteristic# this -o*ld not mean that p*re physical ca*sation at a distance -o*ld .e strictly impossi.le# .*t that it -o*ld .e 5practically negligi.le,6 4inally# he did not even assert -ith any confidence that it is a general characteristic of o*r cosmic epoch# .*t only that this is 5the safer g*ess6 if physical science finds no e/amples of action at a distance, Whitehead did not comment here on -hether in his o-n vie- gravitation constit*ted s*ch an e/ample 7he 3ne- f*ll -ell 'instein=s alternative interpretation in terms of

c*rved space# having -ritten a contrary interpretationC see Whitehead# 19228, Also# altho*gh he did mention telepathy as an e/ample of hy rid physical action at a distance# he did not mention psycho3inesis# and th*s did not reflect *pon -hether it -o*ld imply pure physical action at a distance, 7Whitehead pro.a.ly learned -hat he 3ne- a.o*t psychical research in t*rn0of0the0cent*ry Cam.ridge# 'ngland# and 2*ite li3ely shared the then dominant vie- there that altho*gh telepathy is credi.le# psycho3inesis is not,8 $n any case# even tho*gh Whitehead intended his theory to .e ade2*ate to 'SP .*t not necessarily to PE# his theory does allo- for it# even if PE .e tho*ght to re2*ire p*re physical ca*sation# hence the transmission of -hat in the h*man psyche is analogo*s to physical energy in a s*.atomic particle# at a distance, &o assert that this does occ*r -o*ld not .e to affirm a metaphysical impossi.ility# or even an e/ception to a cosmological la-# .*t only an e/ception to a very -idespread ha.it, $f this ca*sal infl*ence is e/erted# at least .y an e/ceptionally po-erf*l psyche# then the res*lting PE event -o*ld .e .ro*ght a.o*t almost *nilaterally .y the agent# -ith very little cooperation re2*ired on the part of the recipient of the ca*sal infl*ence, $ no- loo3 .riefly at a fe- types of e/pressive psi .eyond the simple forms of PE already disc*ssed,

Some Types of Expressive Psi 0evitation is a form of psycho3inesis that tends to evo3e either a-e or incred*lity, <eca*se o*r e/perience of gravitation is so f*ndamental# lev0itation seems mirac*lo*s, $f -e accept the idea of compo*nd individ*als# ho-ever# the possi.ility of levitation need not seem so remote, $f the atom as a -hole is a compo*nd individ*al# then it has po-er to infl*ence its s*.atomic parts 7in -hich all the gravitational mass is em.odied8, &he force of gravitational attraction is e/tremely -ea3# .eing 1+ AB times -ea3er than the electromagnetic force, 'ach atom in a .ody -o*ld# accordingly# have to e/ert only a minisc*le co*nter0force *pon its s*.atomic parts in order to ne*traliFe the force of gravity and allo- the .ody to levitate, &he levitation of# say# a .all co*ld accordingly .e ca*sed psycho3inetically if a h*man psyche co*ld ind*ce the appropriate effect in the atoms ma3ing *p the .all, !ne form of action at a distance -o*ld there.y overcome another 7if gravitation is to .e th*s interpreted8, Another type of reported psi phenomenon that seems a priori impossi.le to most modern minds ismateriali+ation and demateriali+ation# in -hich a psyche ca*ses a material o.;ect# s*ch as a lamp# to spring either into or o*t of e/istence, Teleportation# in -hich an o.;ect disappears from one place and appears at another place# can .e regarded as an e/ample of .oth dematerialiFation and materialiFation, &his phenomenon of dematerialiFation and materialiFation has .een regarded as very *nli3ely .eca*se it has seemed to .ear no analogy to any other processes, &ho*less and Wiesner 719AD8 even gave it its o-n name# psi epsilon# .eca*se it seemed s*fficiently different from ordinary psycho3inesis# -hich they called psi kappa, Whitehead=s philosophy can decrease the anomalo*s nat*re of this phenomenon some-hat, According to this philosophy# an end*ring o.;ect# s*ch as an atom# is really a series of occasions of e/perience, !ne occasion 5perishes#6 in the sense that it loses its s*.;ectivity and hence its character of presentness#2+ and is replaced .y a neoccasion# -hich repeats the same set of forms, &he atom is# accordingly# popping in and o*t of e/istence all the time, $t .ecomes less thin3a.le# therefore# that it might pop o*t of e/istence at one place and pop .ac3 in at another place, &his is -hat in fact occ*rs 7.y hypothesis8 on a smaller scale in ordinary locomotion, An occasion of e/perience does not move from one spatiotemporal standpoint to another#

.*t simply occ*rs -hen and -here it .egins, &he concept of locomotion does not apply to an act*al occasion .*t only to an end*ring individ*al, &he locomotion of the atom involves the differences among the spatiotemporal standpoints of its s*ccessive occasions relative to the standpoints of the s*ccessive occasions of other end*ring individ*als 7Whitehead# 1929M19D@# pp, DB# @+8, Accordingly# an atom does sometimes pop o*t of e/istence at one place and pop .ac3 in at another, What happens is that the pattern of forms em.odied in the one occasion is transmitted to the ne/t occasion# -hich occ*rs at a more0or0less different location, &he difference .et-een this commonplace occ*rrence and -hat is *s*ally meant .y teleportation# or dematerialiFation and re0materialiFation# is only a difference in degree, !nce it is granted that the h*man psyche e/ercises action at a distance on atoms# and that the -ay it does this is .y getting one atomic occasion to e/ert a type of efficient ca*sation *pon a s*ccessive occasion that it -o*ld not have other-ise e/erted# -e cannot e/cl*de the possi.ility that it can ind*ce a set of atomic occasions 7constit*ting# say# the lamp0at0the0moment8 to get their s*ccessors to occ*r at a different place than they other-ise -o*ld have, &he notion of materialiFation not .ased *pon a prior dematerialiFation is more diffic*lt .eca*se it seems to involve the creation of something o*t of nothing# .*t even here Whitehead=s scheme can .e helpf*l, 4or Whitehead# as e/plained earlier# the -orld is a plen*m of act*al occasions, &he difference .et-een -hat -e call 5empty6 and 5filled6 space is that in the latter the act*al occasions incarnate partic*lar sorts of eternal o.;ects# s*ch as those -e call mass and charge# -hich they pass along from occasion to occasion so as to form end*ring individ*als, &he origin of o*r *niverse -o*ld have involved not the creation of finite things# s*ch as electrons# o*t of a total a.sence of finite act*alities# .*t getting certain eternal forms incarnated in series of act*al occasions, Whitehead=s s*ggestion is that God# -ho -or3s solely .y pers*asion# did this .y envisaging the desired sets of forms -ith appetition1-ith the appetite that they .ecome incarnate in finite act*al occasions, A set of finite occasions# feeling the divine aim -ith conformity# incarnates these forms# first in their mental poles# as appetitions# and then# .y means of hy.rid physical prehensions# in the physical poles of later occasions, $n this fashion photons# electrons# protons# ne*trons# ne*trinos# mesons# and so on co*ld have .een formed as a first step in cosmic evol*tion, $n later stages of the evol*tionary process# more comple/ forms -ere incarnated# so that molec*les# macromolec*les# procaryotic cells# e*caryotic cells# and then still more comple/ individ*als -ere formed, 'ach stage involved a ne- level of materialiFation# in -hich forms not previo*sly realiFed in the -orld .ecame incarnate# creating a ne- species of act*al e/istence, 'ach ne- incarnation involves a response to the psyche of the *niverse# -hich# as the 5eros of the *niverse#6 l*res creat*res to em.ody novel forms, &he psyches of h*man .eings and other animals are analogo*s to the divine psyche in .eing em.odiments of creative po-er, *man .eings em.ody more creative po-er than other animals# and are especially analogo*s to the divine psyche in having the capacity to imagine novel possi.ilities and to prehend them -ith strong appetition, <eca*se they have this trait# and also .eca*se they 7*nli3e the divine psyche8 are locali+ed centers of creative po-er# an especially po-erf*l h*man psyche might# .y evo3ing a sympathetic response to its appetition# .e a.le to ind*ce the incarnation of desired forms in a partic*lar spatiotemporal region 2*ite a.r*ptly, Something -o*ld not .e created o*t of nothingC rather# forms that -ere not previo*sly incarnate in a region -o*ld s*ddenly .egin characteriFing a set of occasions there, &his might -ell involve a prior dematerialiFation from another region# filled perhaps -ith molec*les of o/ygen# car.on dio/ide# and other atmospheric gases# so that energy -as only transferred# not created, Psychic photography# -hich has received considera.le attention in recent years# than3s

primarily to I*le 'isen.*d 719:D8# is some-hat of a .ridge .et-een simple forms of PE# in -hich locomotion is ca*sed# and f*ll0.lo-n materialiFations, <*t it is a form of materialiFation# insofar as a psyche ind*ces a piece of film to incarnate a comple/ set of forms, (aterialiFation# incidentally# is more interesting than the simpler forms of e/pressive psi that the term 5psycho3inesis6 s*ggests# .eca*se it more clearly sho-s the po-er of the psyche to ind*ce apattern# not simply locomotion,

!pparent Precognition aving disc*ssed .oth receptive and e/pressive psi# $ t*rn no- to one form of p*tative psi interaction that cannot .e incorporated -ithin a Whiteheadian conte/t# namely# tr*e precognition, $t cannot .e incorporated for a variety of overlapping reasons, 4irst# an occasion of e/perience cannot perceive an event in its f*t*re .eca*se that event does not yet e/ist and therefore cannot e/ert ca*sal infl*ence *pon the present percipient, Second# the impossi.ility of .ac3-ard ca*sation aside# the present e/perience cannot infalli.ly 53no-6 e/actly -hat is going to happen in a fe- years# -ee3s# days# ho*rs# or even min*tes: What is going to happen is not yet f*lly determined# .eca*se of the self0 determination that -ill .e involved in the event and in a -hole series of intervening events, Propositions a.o*t f*t*re contingencies are not yet either tr*e or false 7e/cept insofar as certain a.stract feat*res of the f*t*re events may already .e settled8C their tr*th0stat*s is still indeterminate, &hird# Whitehead removes the .asis for saying that time is *nreal for the o.;ects st*died .y physics and# therefore# *ltimately *nreal, A s*.atomic particle s*ch as an electron is a series of act*al occasions# each of -hich incorporates its predecessors into itself, An electron# accordingly# cannot 5go .ac3-ard in time#6 .eca*se the temporal process is cumulative, &ime=s arro- is not a contingent feat*re of o*r -orld# d*e perhaps to the direction of entropy, $t is as real for an individ*al electron as it is for *s -ith o*r asymmetrical relation to the past and the f*t*re, We remem er the past# .*t only anticipate the f*t*re# and therefore -e prehend the past in a -ay that -e do not prehend the f*t*re, &he same is tr*e# at a m*ch more elementary level of co*rse# for an electron 7Griffin# 19@:8, 4o*rth# there is# f*rthermore# no perspective from -hich all of history is laid o*t to .e vie-ed in one glance, God may .e said to .e omniscient# .*t omniscience does not incl*de 3no-ledge of the f*t*re: omniscience is the capacity to 3no- everything that is 3no-a.le# and the f*t*re does not yet e/ist to .e 3no-n, A mystical prehension of the divine mind .y a h*man mind -o*ld not# accordingly# provide a .asis for prophecy in the sense of precognition ta3en literally, o-# then# if gen*ine precognition cannot 7.y hypothesis8 occ*r# can instances of apparent precognition .e e/plainedN &here are at least thirteen -ays# any one of -hich might .e the correct e/planation for a given event, Sometimes it seems to .e s*pposed that all instances of apparent precognition have to .e e/plained 7a-ay8 .y some one alternate e/planation# so that if this e/planation -ill handle only some of the cases# then gen*ine precognition m*st .e pres*med in the remaining cases, 21 The "uestion$ ho#ever$ is not #hether some one alternative$ such as expressive psi$ can explain all the instances$ ut only #hether explanations employing exclusively for#ard causation$ and therefore exclusively ack#ard prehension$ can handle all the cases1 $f several s*ch possi.le e/planations e/ist# then one of them may seem the most pro.a.le in one case# another in a second case# and still another in a third case, $nsofar as one or the other of the e/planations seems pla*si.le for each of the -ell0attested cases of apparent precognition# the resort to tr*e precognition# -ith its e/tremely pro.lematic

implications# is o.viated, $n the list of alternate e/planations to .e given# some of them1the first fo*r1are not paranormal, <*t $ do not .elieve that all -ell0attested instances of apparent precognition can .e handled thro*gh 5normal6 e/planations, Also# some of the alternate paranormal e/planations do not seem very pla*si.le to me# .*t $ mention them .eca*se they seem at least possi.le# -hereas .ac3-ard ca*sation does not, $f it came do-n to this -ith regard to some case# $ -o*ld choose one of these 7to me8 -ildly impla*si.le e/planations rather than agree that .ac3-ard ca*sation might have occ*rred, 22 ere# then# is a list of at least some of the possi.le e/planations for apparent precognition: 1, &oincidence, Altho*gh it -o*ld strain statistics# and therefore cred*lity# to s*ggest that all instances co*ld .e e/plained a-ay as mere coincidences# meaning that there -as no ca*sal e/planation to .e so*ght# it is pro.a.le that some instances sho*ld .e so categoriFed, 2, Unconscious kno#ledge of one2s o#n state or unconscious intentions leading to unconscious inference plus dramati+ation, 4or e/ample# one might have a dream of one=s o-n death# a dream that 5comes tr*e6 in three years, &he dream co*ld have .een created .y the *nconscio*s 7*sed here as shorthand for the *nconscio*s portion of e/perience8 on the .asis of *nconscio*s 3no-ledge of# say# the precancero*s state of one=s .ody or of an *nconscio*s death0-ish that effects its goal, B, Su liminal sensory perception leading to unconscious inference plus dramati+ation , 4or e/ample# a -elder has a dream in -hich a ship on -hich he had -or3ed many months ago sin3s# and then it does, &he e/planation co*ld .e that he s*.liminally noticed a fla- in the h*ll -hile he -as -or3ing on it# then made the *nconscio*s inference that the ship -o*ld develop a lea3 in a fe- months that -o*ld ca*se it to sin3# and finally prod*ced a dream that .ro*ght this *nconscio*s inference to the attention of his conscio*s e/perience, A, /allucinated fulfillment, 4or e/ample# a -oman has a dream in -hich a man -earing a topcoat and a der.y is feeding a stra-.erry icecream cone to a St, <ernard in a department storeC -hen she goes to the department store in a fe- days# she 5sees6 this same scene# than3s to a hall*cination, S*ch an event -o*ld not# of co*rse# .e on any list of -ell0attested events# .eca*se even if she had previo*sly told someone a.o*t her dream# no one else -o*ld 7.y hypothesis8 have 5seen6 its f*lfillment, &he event# ho-ever# -o*ld pro.a.ly .e 2*ite convincing to the -oman herself, G, )ulfillment #ith multiple hallucination, As a first e/ample of e/planations -ith a verified paranormal element# -e can simply ass*me that the -oman in the previo*s case had told some of her friends a.o*t the dream# that these friends accompanied her to the department store# and then that she ind*ced the hall*cinated vision in her friends thro*gh tho*ght0transference, :, &lairvoyance of virtually present conditions plus unconscious inference and dramati+ation, &his e/planation is the same as %*m.er B# e/cept here the *nconscio*s 3no-ledge is ac2*ired paranormally, A person co*ld ac2*ire thro*gh clairvoyance the 3no-ledge that the ship has a str*ct*ral defect that -ill event*ally ca*se the ship to sin3 if it is not repaired, &he res*lting vision of the ship sin3ing might occ*r several days# -ee3s# or even months .efore the ship act*ally sin3s, &he ca*sal infl*ence r*ns not from the f*t*re to the present# .*t from immediately past 7-hich $ have called the virt*ally present8 conditions to the present, D, Unconscious telepathic kno#ledge of other human souls$ plus unconscious inference and dramati+ation, At least three variations on this possi.ility co*ld occ*r# 7a8 &elepathy co*ld prod*ce *nconscio*s kno#ledge of another=s 3no-ledge, 4or e/ample# a person on shore co*ld pic3 *p telepathically the 3no-ledge# conscio*s or *nconscio*s# of a cre- mem.er on a ship that the ship has a str*ct*ral pro.lem# and o*t of this

prod*ce a dream of the ship=s sin3ing, !r one co*ld learn telepathically of another person=s *nconscio*s 3no-ledge of his or her precancero*s condition# 7.8 &elepathy co*ld prod*ce 3no-ledge of the intentionsof other h*man .eings# conscio*s or *nconscio*s, A -oman co*ld learn telepathically# for e/ample# that her .rother# -ho -as in a remote# isolated place# had a death -ish sometime .efore he .ecame conscio*sly a-are of this fact and committed s*icide, Accordingly# she might have a dream of his death and record it in her diary long .efore his death# even .efore the date at -hich tho*ghts of s*icide .egan to appear in his o-n diary# 7c8 &he telepathy co*ld prod*ce *nconscio*s 3no-ledge of another person=sfeelings, 4or e/ample# s*ch 3no-ledge of a man=s strong hatred for another person co*ld lead to an apparently precognitive dream in -hich the man m*rdered someone, @, Unconscious telepathic kno#ledge from a discarnate spirit leading to unconscious inference plus dramati+ation, Again# the 3no-ledge co*ld .e a.o*t facts# or# ass*ming that discarnate spirits can act psycho3inetically# a.o*t things the spirit intends to do, &his e/planation -ill seem more fancif*l to those -ho do not .elieve in discarnate spirits or -ho are at least do*.tf*l of their capacity to comm*nicate -ith *s and other-ise to act in o*r -orld, <e that as it may# this e/planation is not# *nli3e that employing the notion of .ac3-ard ca*sation# strictly nonsensical, 9, Unconscious prehensive kno#ledge of the kno#ledge or intentions of a soul of the planet 3a sentient 4aia5 leading to unconscious inference plus dramati+ation , A caveat similar to that added to the previo*s point -o*ld .e in order, 1+, Unconscious prehensive kno#ledge of 4od2s kno#ledge and6or intention plus the same dynamics, Regarding divine kno#ledge: As already indicated# God does not 7.y hypothesis8 literally 3no- the f*t*re in its concrete details# .eca*se it does not e/ist to .e 3no-n, <*t certain more0or0less a.stract feat*res of the f*t*re are already determined 7the more remote the f*t*re in 2*estion# the more a.stract the details that are already determined8# and God# .eing omniscient# -o*ld 3no- these, 'ven -ith regard to a.stract feat*res of the f*t*re that are not yet completely settled# pro.a.ilities e/ist# and God -o*ld 3no- these, &he idea of prophecy a.o*t the f*t*re that has a high degree of pro.a.ility and that is .ased *pon a direct e/perience of God is# accordingly# not r*led o*t, With regard to divine intentions: <eca*se the individ*als ma3ing *p the -orld have their o-n t-ofold po-er of self0determination and efficient ca*sation# -hich cannot .e overridden .y God# the fact that God intended something in a certain sit*ation -o*ld not necessarily mean that it -as going to occ*r, %evertheless# insight into divine intentions might increase the li3elihood that a 5prophetic vision6 of the f*t*re -o*ld .e f*lfilled, 11, .irect unconscious kno#ledge of o (ective pro a ilities a out the future plus the same dynamics, According to Whitehead# o.;ective pro.a.ilities a.o*t the f*t*re do e/ist 71929M19D@# p, 2+D8# and they can in principle .e directly int*ited, Accordingly# the idea that apparent precognition might in fact .e .ased *pon 3no-ledge a.o*t presentpro.a.ilities can .e *sed -itho*t .ringing telepathic 3no-ledge of God or discarnate so*ls into the disc*ssion, $n any case# the e/planation of so0called precognitive int*itions in terms of pro.a.ilities seems to fit the e/perience of at least many people -ho reg*larly have s*ch int*itions# .eca*se they have the sense that the anno*nced event -ill happenunless action is ta3en to prevent it, (any 5prophecies6 are iss*ed as #arnings# -hich -o*ld ma3e no sense if the predicted event had 5already happened6 in a timeless no*menal realm# or -ere going to occ*r no matter -hat I, R, Smythies 719:D8 is one of many -ho have said that the f*t*re precogniFed might .e only the most pro.a.le f*t*re1-hich -o*ld mean that one is not perceiving f*t*re events at all# .*t only the tendencies and pro.a.ilities inherent in the present 7or# strictly spea3ing# the immediate past8, 12, ! discarnate spirit learns the content of a person2s dream telepathically and then rings a out an event corresponding to it, &he discarnate might .e a misg*ided spirit

-ho .elieves in the reality of tr*e precognition and -ants others to .elieve accordinglyC or he or she might simply .e a f*n0loving spirit doing this for 3ic3s, $ mention this possi.le e/planation .eca*se# fancif*l as it is# to accept it -o*ld re2*ire less of an ad;*stment in the notions -e ordinarily pres*ppose than -o*ld the idea of .ac3-ard ca*sation, 1B, The experience of having a vision of an event$ #hether in a dream or a #aking state$ itself rings a out an event corresponding to the vision1 4or e/ample# the -oman=s dream mentioned in '/ample A ca*ses a man -ho often -ears a topcoat and a der.y -hile -al3ing his St, <ernard in the neigh.orhood of a department store# and -hom the -oman has often seen in this area 7altho*gh she does not conscio*sly recall this fact8# to enter the store# .*y a stra-.erry ice cream cone# and feed it to his St, <ernard, &his e/planation is# of co*rse# the 5active6 or PE theory of apparent precognition# perhaps first s*ggested .y A, &anagras 719A9# 19:D8 as the theory of 5psycho.olie#6 then revived .y I*le 'isen.*d 719@2C 19@B# pp, AA0A:# @D09@# 1BD01AG8 and others 7<ra*de# 19@:# pp, 2G:02DDC Roll# 19:1# pp, 11G012@8, &his e/planation seems less impla*si.le to the degree that one 3no-s a.o*t# and synthesiFes# the follo-ing facts: the po-er of *nconscio*s images and intentions to .ring a.o*t e/traordinary PE effects# s*ch as in so0called poltergeist casesC the po-er of s*ggestion *nder hypnosis and in posthypnotic sit*ations to ca*se people to act o*t .iFarre se2*ences of .ehaviorC and the capacity to ind*ce hypnotic states telepathically, !ne needs to remem.er# f*rthermore# that to invo3e this e/planation for some cases of apparent precognition does not mean that it m*st .e invo3ed for# and seem pla*si.le in relation to# all s*ch cases,2B (y s*ggestion is that most cases of apparent precognition can .e handled in terms of '/planations 2# B# A# :# D# 11# and 1B, &he fe- remaining cases# if any# can .e handled .y one of the other possi.le e/planations# among -hich is that of mere coincidence, $n this -ay# -e can accept the evidence for apparent precognition -itho*t .eing forced to allo- for the possi.ility that ca*sation can r*n .ac3-ards# that the f*t*re is -holly determined .y the past# or 7-hich is finally the same thing8 that time is *ltimately *nreal, All my e/amples# incidentally# have .een of spontaneo*s cases, With regard to la.oratory st*dies# $ am happy to appeal to the a*thority of Ro.ert (orris# -ho in a s*rvey 5Assessing '/perimental S*pport for &r*e Precognition6 has said that 5alternative# on0line interpretations do e/ist for all st*dies that offer evidence for retroactive infl*ence6 7(orris# 19@2# p, BBA8,

'ut-of-7ody Experiences and 0ife after .eath &he 2*estion of the reality of life after death -as central to psychical research from the o*tset and# after a period d*ring -hich 5parapsychology6 largely ignored the iss*e# it has# sometimes *nder the heading of theta psi# .ecome important for at least a portion of the parapsychological comm*nity, &he 2*estion of ho- to interpret o*t0of0.ody 7incl*ding near0death8 e/periences is closely related, $n each case# the .asic ontological 2*estion is -hether the h*man so*l is capa.le of e/isting apart from its physical0 .iological .ody, $f this 2*estion is ans-ered in the affirmative# then the .asic epistemological 2*estion is -hether any of the ostensi.le instances of theta psi or !<'s provide strong evidence for at least temporary discarnate e/istence, Whiteheadian postmodern philosophy c*ts .oth -ays on this topic, !n the one hand# its ontology allo-s discarnate e/istence to .e thin3a.le, !n the other hand# .y s*pporting the vario*s other forms of psi# even strong manifestations of them# it allo-s for alternative conceiva.le e/planations 7so0called s*per0psi e/planations8 for at least most instances of ostensi.le theta psi and !<'s, 4or e/ample# .y portraying past e/periences as still e/isting# and as therefore capa.le of .eing directly prehended# it

allo-s in principle for alternative e/planations of ostensi.le cases of reincarnation and possession, <y allo-ing for virt*ally *nlimited po-ers of telepathy and clairvoyance# and .y recogniFing the po-er of the *nconscio*s to create or impersonate other fig*res 7as in dreams and hypnotic states8# ostensi.le manifestations of discarnates thro*gh medi*ms can in principle .e e/plained a-ay, <y allo-ing for strong e/pressive psi# incl*ding materialiFation and levitation# the e/traordinary physical phenomena that prima facie s*ggest the intervention of discarnate spirits can .e alternatively e/plained, And so on, &he 2*estion# of co*rse# remains as to -hether these alternative e/planations sometimes strain cred*lity more than do e/planations involving discarnate so*ls, Central to this 2*estion is -hether discarnate e/istence is tho*ght possi.le, $ t*rn# accordingly# to a .rief consideration of the -ays in -hich Whiteheadian postmodern philosophy allo-s for the possi.ility of the e/istence of a h*man psyche apart from its physical0.iological .ody, 4irst# pane/perientialism allo-s for nond*alistic interactionism 7see the s*.section on hard0core commonsense notions a.ove8 and# there.y# for an intelligi.le assertion that the psyche is distinct from the .rain and therefore co*ld conceiva.ly e/ist apart from it, (aterialistic identism# of co*rse# does not allo- for any o*t0of0.ody e/istence 7and therefore for any life after death apart from a s*pernat*ral res*rrection or re0creation of the physical .ody8, D*alistic interactionism# .y .eing *na.le to e/plain ho- psyche and .rain can interact# cannot provide a defensi.le doctrine of the psyche=s distinctness from the .rainC it therefore tends to collapse into identism, Pane/perientialism can 3eep the distinctness -itho*t the *nintelligi.ility, $t there.y can provide one of the necessary conditions for holding that the psyche co*ld conceiva.ly e/ist apart from its .ody, A second necessary condition for !<'s and life after death -o*ld .e for the psyche to .e a.le to perceive apart from the .ody=s sensory apparat*s, Within the conte/t of some philosophies# according to -hich to .e act*al does not necessarily involve .eing related to things .eyond oneself# it -o*ld ma3e sense to as3: 'ven if a psyche co*ld e/ist apart from its .iological .ody# co*ld it perceive apart from itN <*t from a Whiteheadian point of vie-# a psyche is a temporally0ordered society of occasions of e/perience# and each occasion m*st .egin .y prehending other things# ta3ing aspects of them into itself as the .asis for its o-n e/istence, &his .asis constit*tes its 5physical pole,6 ence# if -e ta3e the notion of perception .roadly to incl*de 7nonsensory8 prehension# it -o*ld ma3e no sense to s*ggest that the psyche might e/ist .*t .e incapa.le of .eing related to others percept*ally, &o e/ist 7as an act*ality8 is to prehend, $t is also to .e self0determining and to .e prehendedC .*t it is# first of all# to prehend,2A Whitehead=s postmodern philosophy allo-s for perception# in the sense of prehension# apart from the .ody# .y sho-ing that nonsensory prehension is more f*ndamental than 7and is in fact pres*pposed in8 sensory perception 7see the s*.section on receptive psi a.ove8, <eing apart from the .ody=s sensory apparat*s -o*ld not# accordingly# remove the psyche=s capacity to prehend, At this point $ need to refer to a -idespread misconception a.o*t the implications of Whitehead=s philosophy for the 2*estion of s*rvival# a misconception ens*ing from differing *ses of the term 5physical,6 Whitehead says that every act*al occasion m*st have a physical poleC from this fact some interpreters have dra-n the concl*sion that the psyche -o*ld not .e a.le to s*rvive apart from the physical .ody .eca*se it -o*ld then not have a physical pole, &his concl*sion# ho-ever# involves accepting the ordinary# d*alistic meaning of 5physical#6 according to -hich the .ody is physical and the mind or psyche is mental# and applying it to the Whiteheadian philosophy# -hich re;ects this d*alistic *sage, 4or Whitehead# the psyche is comprised of a series of dominant occasions of e/perience# each of -hich has a physical as -ell as a mental

pole, "i3e-ise# the cells comprising the .ody are societies of occasions of e/perience# each of -hich has a mental as -ell as a physical pole, &o .e s*re# one can say that the .ody is more physical than the psyche# in that the cells have m*ch less mentality and are# therefore# more completely constit*ted .y their physical poles, Also# the psyche is an individ*al# -hereas the .ody is an aggregate of .illions of individ*als# there.y having those characteristics# s*ch as mass and apparent solidity# that -e normally associate -ith the 5physical,6 &he -ord 5physical#6 nevertheless# does not apply e/cl*sively to the .ody and the -ord 5mental6 e/cl*sively to the psyche, &he psyche=s physical pole is# of co*rse# constit*ted to a great degree .y the psyche=s prehensions of its .odyC .*t1and this -as the point of the a.ove disc*ssion1it is not e/cl*sively constit*ted .y these prehensions, $t also prehends other psyches and# in fact# the -hole past -orld# as -ell as God, &hese prehensions also constit*te its physical pole, $f a psyche is a.le to s*rvive apart from its .ody# it -o*ld still have a physical pole# insofar as it is a.le to prehend other act*alities, &he 2*estion of the possi.ility of s*rvival is -hether these other prehensions can .e s*fficiently intense and harmonio*s to contin*e to provide s*fficient no*rishment to the so*l -hen it no longer has the physical .asis previo*sly provided .y the .iological .ody, Ass*ming a positive ans-er to this 2*estion 7to -hich $ -ill ret*rn later8# a second 2*estion might .e: Wo*ld the psyche in a discarnate state .e a.le to have conscious perceptions on a reg*lar .asis# or -o*ld the data coming in from one=s prehensions of the environment *s*ally remain *nconscio*s# rising to conscio*sness only sporadically# as telepathic and clairvoyant perception no- doN &his 2*estion arises .eca*se of the point made earlier# that conscio*sness primarily lights *p sensory# rather than nonsensory# data, Act*ally# the point made there -as that nonsensory perceptions ofremote o.;ects are m*ch less li3ely to rise to conscio*sness than sensory perceptions of s*ch o.;ects, &here is a form of nonsensory perception# ho-ever# of -hich -e are reg*larly conscio*s, &his is that form of nonsensory perception that -e call 5memory,6 $n it# the mind=s present occasion of e/perience directly prehends some of its prior occasions of e/perience, People have not *s*ally tho*ght of memory as a form of 7nonsensory8 perception# .eca*se they have *s*ally tho*ght of the mind as an end*ring# self0identical s*.stance# n*merically one thro*gh timeC memory -as regarded# therefore# not as a relation .et-een one act*ality and another .*t a relation of one act*ality to itself, 2G $f# ho-ever# the f*lly act*al entities are occasions of e/perience# then memory is a form of perception# .eca*se the present act*al entity is prehending previo*s act*al entities, (emory# therefore# can .e regarded as a form of nonsensory perception -hose contents reg*larly .ecome conscio*s, &his is not to say# of co*rse# that most or even a ma;ority of o*r memories are conscio*s# .*t only that the contents of o*r memories .ecome conscio*s m*ch more reg*larly than do the contents of e/trasensory perceptions in the *s*al sense, 7A possi.le e/planation for this difference is that -e are connected -ith all of o*r past occasions of e/perience thro*gh a chain of contig*o*s occasions of e/perience,8 &here is# f*rthermore# a second form of nonsensory perception of -hich -e are reg*larly conscio*s, &his is o*r prehension of the vario*s parts of o*r .odies, We reg*larly .ecome conscio*s of .odily pains and pleas*resC .*t -e also# in sensory perception# are a-are of o*r nonsensory perception of o*r organs of sensation, <esides .eing conscio*s of the sensory data provided .y the eye# for e/ample# -e are conscio*s# even if less vividly# of the fact that -e see y means of the eye# that -e to*ch y means of the hand# and so on, Accordingly# thro*gh memory and prehensions of o*r .odies# -e are already conscio*s on a reg*lar .asis of data of nonsensory perceptions, 4*rthermore# the reason that sensory data are no- generally the ones ill*mined most clearly and reg*larly .y conscio*sness# in contrast -ith nonsensory perceptions of

things .eyond one=s o-n psyche and .ody# it -as s*ggested earlier# is that these data are generally presented to the psyche -ith the greatest intensity, 5Greatest intensity6 is o.vio*sly a relative matter, $f the psyche finds itself apart from its .odily sensory system# then m*ch more of the 7nonsens*o*sly8 prehended data may reg*larly rise to conscio*sness# no longer .eing .loc3ed o*t .y sensory data, &elepathic and clairvoyant perceptions may# accordingly# .e conscio*s -ith the 3ind of clarity and reg*larity that is no- associated -ith memories and .odily and sensory perceptions, A third 2*estion might .e: Granted that a psyche may .e a.le to e/ist apart from its .iological .ody# and that this e/istence -o*ld incl*de prehensions of other things# and even that these nonsensory prehensions can res*lt in reg*lar conscio*s perceptions# -o*ld a discarnate psyche .e a.le to actN Wo*ld it .e a.le to comm*nicate -ith others# to e/press its tho*ghts and emotions# or -o*ld it .e condemned to an e/istence of perpet*al fr*strationN I*st as 2*estions a.o*t the possi.ility of perception often pres*ppose sensationism1the doctrine that -e can perceive only thro*gh o*r physical sensory organs1the present 2*estion often pres*pposes -hat can .e called motorism1 the doctrine that the psyche can act on the -orld only .y means of its motor system 7the nerve system connecting the .rain to the .ody=s m*scles8, &he first element in the ans-er to this 2*estion is provided .y the fact that altho*gh an occasion of e/perience is first of all a s*.;ect of e/perience# it is secondly an o.;ect or s*per;ect for the e/perience of others, $t is first a s*.;ect# in -hich the e/periences of others are implanted in if# it is ne/t a s*per;ect# -hich implants itself in others, $n its mode of e/istence as a s*.;ect# to .e is to prehendC in its mode of e/istence as a s*per;ect# to .e is to .e prehended, &o .e prehended is to .e an efficient ca*se, Accordingly# ;*st as it -o*ld ma3e no sense -ithin this philosophy to say that the psyche might e/ist .*t .e incapa.le of perceiving# it -o*ld ma3e no sense to say that it might e/ist .*t .e incapa.le of acting, With regard to -hat it might act *pon# the fact that the psyche is not noconstit*tionally capa.le of acting only *pon its motor0m*sc*lar system is sho-n empirically .y vario*s effects la.eled psychosomatic or psychogenic# from *lcers# place.o effects# and effects *pon the imm*ne system# to stigmata, &he psyche seems capa.le of affecting any part of its .ody, 4*rthermore# the evidence for the vario*s types of e/pressive psi s*ggests that the psyche can act directly *pon other e/periences at a distance1other h*man e/periences and also lo-er0level types of e/periences# incl*ding those cl*sters of e/periences that -e normally spea3 of as physical o.;ects, &hese empirical data are consistent -ith the Whiteheadian theory that action and perception are simply t-o sides of a ca*sal relation: *f * am prehended y all others$ including others at a distance$ then * y definition can act upon all others$ including others at a distance, Disc*ssing ca*sation in terms of 5.eing prehended#6 ho-ever# ma3es it so*nd as if the 5agency6 is passive and nonselective1that a psyche simply acts -illy0nilly# .y .eing there to .e prehended# and that the nat*re of the ca*sation e/erted is *p to the percipients more than to the agent, &his is# ho-ever# not Whitehead=s meaning, &he present occasion of e/perience actively infl*ences the f*t*re, Whitehead refers to 5the thro..ing emotion of the past h*rling itself into a ne- transcendent fact6 719BBM 19:D# p, 1DD8, &his self0h*rling# f*rthermore# is selective: the 5anticipation6 that characteriFes all occasions of e/perience 7pp, 192019B8 rises to conscio*s intention in h*man e/perience, 'mpirically# -e clearly do have the capacity for selective agency: We can move one hand -hile 3eeping the other stillC -e can -arm *p one hand psychosomatically and not the otherC some people can move a matchstic3 psycho3inetically -itho*t moving another near.y oneC and people -ho e/ercise tho*ght0transference can direct it to a partic*lar person# rather than sending o*t a

general .roadcast that is pic3ed *p indifferently .y many, So# .esides the general# pervasive infl*ence -e have *pon everything in o*r f*t*re -orld simply .y e/isting# -e have more foc*sed effects *pon those parts of the -orld to -hich -e direct# conscio*sly or *nconscio*sly# partic*lar forms of energy, We can imagine that -e -o*ld# in a discarnate state# .e a.le to e/ercise this type of selective agency in -hatever neenvironment -e fo*nd o*rselves, $f it is conceiva.le that h*man psyches have the capacity to e/ist apart from their physical0.iological .odies# and that this e/istence -o*ld involve the capacity to have conscio*s perceptions on a reg*lar .asis and to act selectively# a final 2*estion -o*ld .e: Ass*ming that this capacity for s*rvival is not possessed .y the dominant mem.er of all compo*nd individ*als# -hy do h*man psyches have itN &his 2*estion arises .eca*se of t-o feat*res of the Whiteheadian position, 4irst# in this nond*alistic# evol*tionary philosophy# h*man psyches are not different in 3ind from animal psyches# incl*ding the psyches of the most primitive animals# s*ch as amoe.aeC and the psyche of an amoe.a# in fact# is not ontologically different from that -hich acco*nts for the *nity of vir*ses# macromolec*les# ordinary molec*les# and atoms, &hey are all temporal societies of occasions of e/perience, Second# this philosophy is nat*ralistic rather than s*pernat*ralistic, Altho*gh it incl*des a form of theism# it is a nat*ralistic theism 7or pan0en0theism8# according to -hich God cannot occasionally interr*pt the normal ca*sal processes# and cannot# therefore# *nilaterally ca*se something to happen that -o*ld other-ise .e impossi.le, &his re;ection of s*pernat*ralism is one reason that Cartesian d*alism m*st .e avoided: God cannot# contra Descartes# (ale.ranche# Reid# and other s*pernat*ralistic d*alists# simply ca*se *nli3es to interact# or to r*n along parallel to each other, $n the same -ay# God cannot simply ca*se the h*man so*l to s*rvive its separation from the .ody if it does not have the capacity to do so, &he generally accepted dict*m that the po-er of God does not incl*de the po-er to do the logically impossi.le 7s*ch as to ma3e ro*nd s2*ares8 is e/tended to the metaphysically impossi.le, &hese t-o points# and the preceding disc*ssion# can .e ta3en as a commentary *pon Whitehead=s statement that his philosophy is 5ne*tral6 on the 2*estion of the s*rvival of the h*man so*l 7192:M19:+# p, 1+D8, &his ne*trality means# on the one hand# that his description of the h*man so*l does not# *nli3e materialistic0identist descriptions# ma3e s*rvival impossi.le# and# on the other hand# that his description does not ma3e s*rvival necessary, &he 2*estion# Whitehead s*ggested1-ith an o.vio*s all*sion to psychical research1sho*ld 5.e decided on more special evidence# religio*s or other-ise# provided that it is tr*st-orthy6 7p, 1+D8, 2: &his 2*estion of the tr*st-orthiness of the evidence lies .eyond the scope of this paperC .*t a s*ggestion as to -hy the h*man so*l may *ni2*ely .e capa.le of s*rvival is in order, &his s*ggestion is that the capacity to s*rvive apart from its .ody may .e a capacity that emerged in the evol*tionary process# in the same -ay that other capacities# s*ch as the capacity for sym.olic lang*age# emerged, A difference in degree co*ld .ecome# in effect# a difference in 3ind 7as Whitehead s*ggested -as the case -ith the rise of the h*man capacity for sym.olic lang*age >19B@M19:@# pp, 2D# A1?8, !ne aspect of this difference is s*ggested .y Whitehead=s statement# made in another conte/t in -hich the 2*estion of s*rvival -as in vie-# that 5the personality of an animal organism may .e more or less, $t is not a mere 2*estion of having a so*l or of not having a so*l, &he 2*estion is# o- m*ch# if anyN6 719BBM19:D# p, 2+@8, &his is the idea that has .een developed .y Iohn Co.. 719:D8 in the s*ggestion introd*ced in the s*.section on e/pressive psi# a.ove, $n the lo-er animals# the energy of the psyche is devoted to the care of the .odily organism, 'ven in the higher animals# there is pro.a.ly little s*rpl*s psychic energy to .e *sed for a*tonomo*s activities of the psyche, $n h*man .eings# ho-ever# the great increase in s*rpl*s psychic energy allo-s for -hat Co.. calls 5a*tonomo*s development of the psyche#6 -hich involves

t-o elements, 4irst# the aim at intensity or richness of e/perience on the part of individ*al moments of the so*l=s life leads the so*l to act*aliFe itself in -ays that are immediately re-arding to it# independently of their conse2*ences for the organism as a -hole, Second# s*ccessive occasions .*ild *pon the achievements of their predecessors# 7p, B@8 $n other animals# accordingly# the dominant occasions of e/perience respond primarily to the infl*ences coming from the .ody# and the p*rposes of these dominant occasions are directed primarily to-ard the -ell0.eing of the .ody, &here is a so*l# to some degree# .eca*se each dominant occasion also responds to the immediately prior dominant occasions, &he animal psyche# ho-ever# has fe- if any p*rposes aside from the -ell0.eing of the organism# so there is not a very strong thread of individ*ality thro*gh time, 'ach dominant occasion responds more to its .ody than it does to its o-n past, $n some of the higher animals# s*ch as gorillas and dolphins# there is s*rely more so*l# in the sense of end*ring individ*alityC .*t it -o*ld seem to .e only in h*man .eings that the emphasis is decisively reversed# so that aims of the psyche that are relatively independent of .odily -elfare# or that are even in opposition to it# can .ecome so strong that the infl*ence from the mental poles of one=s prior dominant occasions 7received thro*gh hy.rid physical prehensions8 can .ecome as important as# or even more important than# the needs of the .ody, &hese aims can .ecome so important that -e -ill p*rs*e them to the point of neglecting the .ody# even endangering it or deli.erately destroying it, &he h*man .eing# in short# evidently has m*ch more so*l than other animals: 'ach dominant occasion of e/perience has m*ch more po-er and the series of dominant occasions is .o*nd together thro*gh time m*ch more strongly, &his t-ofold -ay in -hich the h*man so*l is *ni2*e 7among earthlings any-ay8 co*ld mean that the h*man so*l no- has the capacity to s*rvive apart from the conte/t# the h*man .ody# that -as first necessary to .ring it into e/istence, &he point made .y that last cla*se is an essential ingredient in this nat*ralistic# evol*tionary vie-, Re;ected is gnostic d*alism# .y -hich $ mean the idea that h*man0 li3e so*ls co*ld .e directly created .y God 7or 5emanated from6 the !ne or <rahman8 apart from a long evol*tionary process, $t is pres*med# instead# that a step0.y0step evol*tionary process is the only -ay to create individ*als -ith high0level po-ers, "iving cells co*ld not .e created directly# .*t pres*pposed the e/istence of organelles# -hich in t*rn pres*pposed the e/istence of macromolec*les# and so on, &he emergence of a psyche pres*pposes the e/istence of a central nervo*s system composed of ne*rons# and co*ld not .e created directly o*t of iron and silicon atoms 7as some -ho -rite a.o*t 5artificial intelligence6 s*ppose8# let alone o*t of a primordial chaos of very lo-0 grade act*al occasions# or o*t of nothing, &his philosophy agrees# accordingly# -ith modern tho*ght insofar as the latter insists that a h*man0li3e mind co*ld have first emerged only in the 3ind of environment that is provided .y a h*man0li3e .ody# -hich co*ld only have .een prod*ced .y a grad*al evol*tionary process, &his postmodern philosophy differs# ho-ever# .y s*ggesting that once the h*man mind -as s*fficiently formed# it may have developed the emergent po-er to s*rvive in a neenvironment, &his is my e/plication of .asic limiting principle BA# as stated in the section on parapsychology as not *ltra0revol*tionary, %ot .eing r*led o*t a priori# then# the reality of postmortem life and premortem o*t0of0 .ody e/istence .ecomes an empirical 2*estion,

SL((ARY
$ have s*ggested that there are elements of tr*th and val*e in .oth the conservative

and the revol*tionary stances ta3en .y philosophers of parapsychology -ho .elieve in the reality of receptive and e/pressive psi, $n line -ith the conservative stance# it is right# $ .elieve# to see3 repeata.le e/periments# to see3 to *nderstand the dynamics involved in e/perimental and spontaneo*s psi 7-hile remaining open to the possi.ility that the dynamics involved in these t-o types of psi may .e 2*ite different# and to the possi.ility that there may .e something a.o*t psi that -ill forever fr*strate attempts to prod*ce it1 especially conscious receptive psi and conspicuouse/pressive psi1at -ill >at least apart from spirit*al disciplines that do not have this as a goal?8, &he most important part of the conservative stance is the desire to overcome the appearance of a strong clash .et-een the principles needed to *nderstand psi or paranormal phenomena and the principles needed to *nderstand the phenomena of 5normal6 science and everyday e/perience, &he -ay to f*lfill this desire# ho-ever# is not# $ have s*ggested# to see3 to give *p ca*sal hypotheses# and especially the hypothesis of ca*sal infl*ence at a distance# or to see3 to e/plain psi phenomena in terms of the -orldvie- of late modern science 7incl*ding that aspect of it that most points .eyond itself to-ard a postmodern -orldvie-# 2*ant*m physics8, Rather# recogniFing that the modern -orldvie- is not ade2*ate even -ith regard to the pres*ppositions of daily life and# therefore# the pres*ppositions of normal science# -e sho*ld overcome the tension in 2*estion .y creating or adopting a postmodern -orldvie- 7this is the main tr*th in the revol*tionary stance8 that can do ;*stice to them .oth, $ have so*ght to sho-# finally# that Whitehead=s philosophy# especially as interpreted .y someone a-are of parapsychological phenomena# can ta3e *s a long -ay in that direction# and that the same revisions of the modern -orldvie- necessary to allo- for the hard0core commonsense pres*ppositions of science and daily life also allo- for the reality of psi, Whitehead=s philosophy# ta3ing temporal process as *ltimate# cannot# to .e s*re# allofor tr*e precognition 7as involving retroca*sation8# .*t this is no -ea3ness .eca*se that notion can .e seen to .e *nintelligi.le even apart from Whitehead=s philosophy# and .eca*se alternative e/planations for the phenomena in 2*estion are possi.le, !ne .on*s of this position# .eyond intelligi.ility# is that# if parapsychology is there.y seen to pose merely a revol*tionary rather than an *ltra0revol*tionary threat# more philosophers and scientists may .e a.le to e/amine it rationally,

%otes
1

An earlier version of this paper -as presented at a conference on 5Parapsychology# Philosophy# and Religion: Postmodern Approaches#6 -hich -as held in 199+ at "a Casa de (aria retreat center in Santa <ar.ara# California# -hich cosponsored the conference -ith the Center for a Postmodern World and the Center for Process St*dies,
2

&he conference -as made possi.le .y a grant from "a*rance Roc3efeller# to -hom heartfelt than3s are here.y p*.licly e/tended, $ am gratef*l to 4rederic3 4erre# Iohn Palmer# Stephen <ra*de# oyt 'dge# I*le 'isen.*d# and t-o anonymo*s revie-ers for 8!SPR# all of -hose criti2*es ena.led me to ma3e the present version considera.ly .etter, $ -ish# finally# to add that $ plan event*ally to e/pand this essay into a .oo3# and that $ p*.lish it here in 8!SPR partly in hopes of receiving f*rther helpf*l criticism# -hether in print or privately,
B

Altho*gh this is the first e/tensive treatment of parapsychology or psychical research

from a Whiteheadian perspective# there have .een a fe- shorter essaysC see <ag.y 719GD8# 'slic3 719@B# 19@D8# ooper 719AA8# and O*illen 719D98,
A

&he idea of the inertness of matter -as also *sed to arg*e for the e/istence of God, <oyle and %e-ton# for e/ample# arg*ed that .eca*se matter is devoid of the po-er of self0motion# a divine 4irst (over m*st e/ist, &his arg*ment -as employed against atheists and pantheists -ho proposed that no e/ternal creator -as needed .eca*se matter# .eing self0moving# co*ld have organiFed itself to form the present *niverse 7Elaaren# 19DD8,
G

Certain psi phenomena# s*ch as stigmata# self0levitation# ectoplasmic materialiFations# and o*t0of0.ody e/periences might seem to .e e/ceptions, <*t stigmata -o*ld involve ca*sal infl*ence .y the mind at a distance *nless they -ere tho*ght to .e ca*sed .y the mind=s acting thro*gh the .rain and nervo*s system# in -hich case# if -e -ant to 3eep o*r categories neat# -e co*ld classify stigmata as a psychosomatic# rather than a parapsychological# phenomenon, &he same can .e said of self0levitation# ectoplasmic materialiFations# and other phenomena involving the agent=s o-n .ody, Regarding the o*t0of0.ody e/perience 7incl*ding life after death8# $ -ill s*ggest later that it as s*ch# as distinct from the 7e/trasensory and perhaps psycho3inetic8 evidence for it# need not .e considered paranormal,
:

Westfall -rites else-here 719@+.8 that .esides .anishing life# color# and other 2*alities from nat*re 7as the (ac3enFies correctly point o*t8# 5the mechanical philosophy also .anished from e/istence another deniFen of some previo*s philosophies 1attractions of any 3ind, %o scorn -as too great to heap *pon s*ch notions, 4rom one end of the cent*ry to another# the idea of attractions# the action of one .ody *pon another -ith -hich it is not in contact# -as an anathema to the dominant school of nat*ral philosophy, Galileo co*ld not s*fficiently e/press his amaFement that Eepler had .een -illing to entertain the p*erile notion# as he called it# that the moon ca*ses the tides .y action *pon the -aters of the sea, $n the >1:?9+s# *ygens and "ei.niF fo*nd similar ideas ;*st as a.s*rd for the same reasons, &o spea3 of an attraction -henever one .ody -as seen to approach another -as to philosophiFe on the same plane -ith (oliere=s doctor -ho e/plained the po-er of opi*m to ca*se sleep .y a dormative virt*e it contained, , , , An attraction -as an occ*lt virt*e# and Kocc*lt virt*e= -as the mechanical philosophy=s *ltimate term of oppro.ri*m6 7p, 1AD8,
D

!n this point $ agree -ith the vie-s of# among others# I*le 'isen.*d 719@B# pp, AA0 A:8 and C, W, E, (*ndle 719D@8,
@

4or philosophers -ho re;ect the reality of psi on this .asis# see Armstrong# 19:@# p, B:AC Camp.ell# 19@A# pp, BB# 9109:C 4eigel# 19:+# pp, 2@# 29, 4or -riters -ho accept psi .*t see it as the only good evidence against materialism# see <eloff# 19:2# pp 2GD 2G@C "orimer# 19@A# pp, 119# B+A, Price, 19:D# p, B@
9

$ have disc*ssed these *ltimate pres*ppositions of practice# or 5hard0core commonsense ideas#6 in Griffin# 19@9.# pp, BG0B9# and Griffin H Smith# 19@9# pp, 9+091# 19+019G,
1+

$ have disc*ssed the pro.lems of d*alistic interactionism at greater length in Griffin# 19@@# pp, 1D021 and 19@9a# pp, 1D02:,
11

&-o of Descartes= follo-ers# Arnold Ge*linc/ and %icolas (ale.ranche# said that mind and matter# .eing completely different in 3ind# cannot interact, &he fact that mind and .ody appear to interact they e/plained thro*gh the doctrine of occasionalism: on the occasion of yo*r leg .eing .itten .y a dog# God ca*ses pain in yo*r mindC then# on the occasion of yo*r feeling the pain and deciding to free yo*r .ody from the dog=s grip# God ca*ses yo*r .ody to ma3e the desired moves 7Copleston# 19:+# pp, 1DD01D9# 1@@0

19+8, &homas Reid# Scottish Calvinist philosopher# simply said that if God# .eing omnipotent# -ants mind and matter to interact# God can# in spite of their ontological heterogeneity# ma3e them do so 7Reid# 19:9# pp, 9:09D# 99# 11+# 11@# 12B# 22+# 2A+# B1@8,
12

Regarding gravitation as a possi.le e/ception# see the disc*ssion in the first section# a.ove, &he other o.vio*s e/ception is nonlocality in physics# -hich many physicists noaccept, &his acceptance# $ -o*ld arg*e# is a f*rther move# .eyond indeterminacy# a-ay from modern physics to-ard a postmodern physics, &he strong re;ection of nonlocality as self0evidently false .y physicists# s*ch as 'instein# -ho had strongly em.odied a version of the late modern -orldvie-# and the great interest that the notion of nonlocality has created in and .eyond the physics comm*nity# are signs that a paradigm0threatening development has occ*rred,
1B

Whitehead himself la.els the *ltimate simply 5creativity6 71929M19D@# p, 218, <eca*se he is# ho-ever# a pane/perientialist and th*s denies the e/istence of any 5vac*o*s act*alities#6 meaning act*al things devoid of e/perience 7p, 1:D8# it is correct to refer to the *ltimate as 5creative e/perience,6
1A

$t may seem self0contradictory to say that act*al occasions do not end*re thro*gh time and then to s*ggest that they may last from a .illionth to a tenth of a second, &his iss*e# -hich involves Whitehead=s 5epochal theory of time#6 is too comple/ to disc*ss ade2*ately here, &he main points# ho-ever# are that time does not pre0e/ist an event# as if time -ere a pre0e/istent contin**m thro*gh -hich events end*red# for ho-ever .rief a period, Rather# time is constit*ted thro*gh the relations .et-een events, Alter an event has occ*rred# ho-ever# one can say that it constit*ted a certain period of time, &his is the reason for correcting in the te/t the statement that an occasion 5ta3es6 a certain amo*nt of time -ith the statement that it really 5constit*tes6 this period,
1G

&he reader may .e conf*sed .y the description of things s*ch as molec*les# cells# and h*man .eings .oth as 5end*ring individ*als#6 *nderstood as p*rely temporal societies in -hich there is only one mem.er at a time# and also as 5compo*nd individ*als#6 in -hich there are many act*al entities at once, &he resol*tion of the apparent contradiction is indicated in the te/t .y saying that it is the so*l# not the h*man .eing as a psychophysical -hole# that is the p*rely temporal society, &he h*man .eing as a -hole is a compo*nd individ*al .y virt*e of the dominance of the so*l, &he same is tr*e# analogo*sly# of cells and molec*les, &he molec*le# for e/ample# has 7.y hypothesis8 a series of molec*lar occasions# -hich are regnant in the molec*le as a -hole, <eca*se the molec*lar occasions are regnant# giving the molec*le a degree of *nity of action and response# the molec*le is a compo*nd individ*al &he fact that the molec*lar occasions form a temporally0ordered society# analogo*s to the h*man so*l# ma3es the molec*le also descri.a.le as an end*ring individ*al,
1:

&-o occasions are contig*o*s# ro*ghly# -hen there is no other occasion .et-een them, 4or a more complete acco*nt1the concept of spatial contig*ity is more diffic*lt than that of temporal1see Whitehead# 19BBM19:D# pp, 2+202+B,
1D

Whitehead himself does not spea3 of p*re and hy.rid physical ca*sation# .*t of p*re and hy.rid physical prehension 71929M19D@# pp, 2AG0A:8, <eca*se physical prehension is ;*st the reverse side of ca*sation 7p, 2B:8# ho-ever# it is ;*stifia.le to spea3 of p*re and hy.rid ca*sation,
1@

$ have disc*ssed the reality of time for atoms and s*.atomic particles in Griffin# 19@:,
19

&his does not mean that all or even most sensory perception .ecomes conscio*sC most of it is s*rely s*.liminal,

2+

aving stressed that past events still e/ist to .e prehended 7as in retrocognition# -hen they .ecome prehended conscio*sly8# $ sho*ld perhaps stress that -hen Whitehead says that act*al occasions 5perish#6 this is a misleading term 7-hich has indeed misled many interpreters8, e does not mean that the occasions simply cease to e/ist or even to .e act*al, e means only that their s*.;ective e/perience ceases, 5<*t that does not mean that they are nothing, &hey remain Kst*..orn fact=6 7Whitehead# 19BBM19:D# p, 2BD8, $n fact# .esides losing something# they gain something: the a.ility to e/ercise efficient ca*sation 71929M19D@# p, 298, Accordingly# in 5perishing6 they do not lose the a.ility to .e prehendedC that a.ility is precisely -hat they ac2*ire,
21

4or e/ample# in a .oo3 that is in most respects 2*ite good# Iohn eaney 719@A8 e/amines fo*r alternative e/planations for apparently precognitive events, !f the first one# psycho3inesis 7my %*m.er 1B8# he concl*des that it 5certainly does not stand as a reasona.le e/planation for many correct paranormal predictions6 7p, 918, !f the 5s*.liminal comp*ter theory6 7-hich co*ld cover my alternatives D01+8# he says that it 5fails as a *niversal e/planation of precognition6 7p, 928, &hen# after mentioning t-o others that $ -o*ld not even consider# he concl*des that 5these theories do not seem s*fficient to e/plain most precognitive events6 7p, 9B8, 4rom this concl*sion he infers that most apparently precognitive events m*st involve tr*e precognition# -hich he ta3es to imply that 5part of *s# it seems# is o*tside of time# or is capa.le of assimilating another 3ind of time6 7p, 1+D8, <*t his concl*sion -o*ld .e reasona.le only if 7a8 he had considered an exhaustive list of alternative e/planations# not ;*st a fe-# and 7.8 if he had as3ed not -hether any one of them co*ld handle all the cases .*t -hether all of them together could, eaney=s treatment of this iss*e# nevertheless# is less cavalier than most,
22

ere my position is similar to that of C, W, E, (*ndle 719D@8# altho*gh $ present more alternative e/planations than does he,
2B

&he 7*nderstanda.le8 alarm evo3ed -hen the PE interpretation of apparent precognition seems to .e offered as the only and# therefore# incl*sive alternative e/planation for cases of apparent precognition is ill*strated in G, 4, Dalton=s 719:18 comments on a paper .y W, G, Roll 719:18 on precognition: 5Applied to spontaneo*s cases , , , >Roll=s hypothesis? gives alarming res*lts, A ro*gh chec3 thro*gh a ferecorded so*rces s*ggests that# on this theory# ostensi.le precognitionists have .een responsi.le for at least 1++ deaths# @ rail-ay accidents# G fires# 2 ship-rec3s# 1 e/plosion# 1 stro3e of lightning# 1 volcanic er*ption# 2 -orld -ars, $f PE is really operating on this scale# no one is safe6 7p, 1@B8, !f co*rse# in this -orld no one is safe# so thereductio ad a surdum fails, Dalton=s response# f*rthermore# co*ld simply .e ta3en as f*rther s*pport for I*le 'isen.*d=s 719@B8 s*ggestion that the PE interpretation of apparent precognition is -idely ignored or re;ected more for emotional than for theoretical reasons 7pp, AG0A:# 1AB01AA8, $n any case# it is important# in offering the PE interpretation# to ma3e clear 7as <ra*de# 19@:# pp, 2GD02G@# for e/ample# does8 that one is offering it not as the sole alternative to tr*e precognition and# therefore# not as the e/planation for all cases of apparent precognition,
2A

ere Whitehead=s position is similar to <ishop <er3eley=s# in that .oth agree that to .e actual is to perceive, <*t <er3eley said that to .e perceived is to .e merely ideal# -hereas Whitehead allo-s t-o -ays of .eing perceived# or prehended: 7a8 to .e the o.;ect of a conceptual prehension is to .e merely ideal1to .e an 5eternal o.;ect61.*t 7.8 to .e the o.;ect of a physical prehension is to .e an0o.;ect0that0had0.een0a0s*.;ect# and th*s to .e act*al, &he other .ig difference .et-een the t-o thin3ers is that <er3eley allo-ed only God and h*man so*ls to .e perceivers and# therefore# to .e act*al# -hereas Whitehead 7li3e <er3eley=s contemporary "ei.niF8 allo-s perceivers of all grades# so that 7for e/ample8 cells# molec*les# atoms# and s*.atomic particles are all e2*ally act*al,

2G

Also# the materialistic -orldvie- teaches people to thin3 of all memories as stored in the .rain# and only in the .rain# so that remem.ering involves a relation not to the past at all .*t only to the 7virt*ally8 present .rain,
2:

<eca*se this statement -as made in Religion in the Making 7Whitehead# 192:D19:+8# in -hich Whitehead=s ontology of dipolar occasions of e/perience -as not yet f*lly developed 7he sometimes spo3e of 5physical occasions6 and 5mental occasions6 >192:M19:+# p, 99?8# it is important to note that Whitehead 719BBM19:D8 reaffirmed in !dventures of *deas# one of his latest -ritings# his .elief that his position allo-s for the possi.ility of s*rvival# saying that 5in some important sense the e/istence of the so*l may .e freed from its complete dependence *pon the .odily organiFation6 7p, 2+@8,

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