Lo Cham vs Ocampo (1946) G.R. L-831 Facts: Gregorio T.

Lantin, a doctor of medicine and lawyer, Acting Chief, Medico-Legal Section, Division of Investigation, Department of Justice, was given an assignment by Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon Quisumbing in a letter dated October 8, 1945, which reads: SIR: Pursuant to the request of the City Fiscal of Manila and in accordance with the provision of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, you are hereby temporarily detailed to this office effective today, to assist him in the discharge of his duties with the same powers and functions of an assistant city fiscal. Following his detail, Doctor Lantin signed and filed information in the aforesaid case after, presumably, conducting preliminary investigations. Thereafter, the attorneys for the defendants filed motions to quash on the ground already stated. When two of these motions were denied and one was sustained, the losing parties instituted the instant proceedings for certiorari. Issue: WON the attorney detailed or appointed by the Secretary of Justice to assist the city fiscal of Manila in the discharge of the latters duties, with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or the Solicitor General, according to the provision of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, has authority to sign information. Held: Yes. Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144, provides: SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal. The Secretary of Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General. It will be noted that the law uses general terms. It is a general rule of statutory interpretation that provisions should not be given a restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated. Just as the express enumeration of persons, objects,

situations, etc., is construed to exclude those not mentioned, according to a well-known maxim, so no distinction should be made where none appears to be intended. Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they were enacted. The duties of a public office include all those which truly lie within its scope, those which are essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office was created and those which, although incidental and collateral, are germane to, and serve to promote the accomplishment of the principal purposes. The reason is that the power to sign information, make investigations and conduct prosecutions is inherent in the power to assist a prosecuting attorney, as these words are used in the Administrative Code. It does not emanate from the powers of the Attorney General or Solicitor General conferred upon the officer designated by the Secretary of Justice; it is ingrained in the office or designation itself. The powers of the Solicitor General bestowed on the appointee to assist the fiscal must be held as cumulative or an addition to the authority to sign information, which is inherent in his appointment. In other words, the clause with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General does not exclude the latter authority. The former practice of the Attorney General to which we have alluded portrays a distinction between and separation of the powers or sets of powers. The power of the Attorney General to sign information, as we have pointed out, owed its being, not to the powers legitimately pertaining to his office as Attorney General but to the special provision authorizing him to assist fiscals. And it may be pertinent to know that when the Attorney Generals power to assist provincial fiscals ceased, he stopped signing information. The phraseology of section 17 of Act No. 867 before cited also affords an illustration of the idea that the authority to assist is separate and apart from the general powers of the Attorney General. In the language of this section, the person appointed was (1) to assist the fiscal in the discharge of his duties and (2) to represent the Attorney General in such matters. If the two phrases meant the same thing, then one of them would be superfluous. There is no apparent reason for holding that one or the other was a surplusage.

FAROLAN VS. SOLMAC MARKETING CORPORATION FACTS Petitioner Ramon Farolan was then the Acting Commissioner of Customs while petitioner Guillermo Parayno was then the Acting Chief, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Division. They were thus sued in their official capacities as officers in the government. Nevertheless, they were both held personally liable for the awarded damages. Solmac Marketing Corporation was the owner of an importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products which contained a kind of polypropylene which was restricted, if not prohibited. Upon investigation, it was agreed upon that the subject imports may be released but that holes may be drilled on them by the Bureau of Customs prior to their release. Solmac Marketing Corporation through its counsel wrote to petitioner Commissioner Farolan of Customs asking for the release of the importation. The importation was not released, however, on the ground that holes had to be drilled on them first. Judgment was rendered ordering defendants to release the subject importation immediately without drilling of holes. Thus, petitioners released the same. Even before the RTC rendered its decision, the Clojus shipment was already released to the private respondent in its capacity as assignee of the same. Be that as it may, the private respondent filed its appeal demanding that the petitioners be held, in their personal and private capacities, liable for damages despite the finding of lack of bad faith on the part of the public officers. ISSUE Whether or not the petitioners acted in good faith in not immediately releasing the questioned importation, or, simply, can they be held liable, in their personal and private capacities, for damages to the private respondent. HELD The Court finds it difficult to discredit or disregard totally the defendants defense of good faith premised on the excuse that they were all the time awaiting clarification of the Board of Investments on the matter: We hold that this finding of the trial court is correct for good faith is always presumed and it is upon him who alleges the contrary that the burden of proof lies. In Abando v. Lozada, we defined good faith as refer*ring+ to a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest intention to abstain from taking a nun conscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is the opposite of fraud, and its absence should beestablished by convincing evidence. But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in withholding the release of the subject importation because indeed it was composed of OPP film scraps, contrary to the evidence submitted by the National Institute of Science and Technology that the same was pure oriented OPP, nonetheless, it is the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties

or in making decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. After all, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith.

TUZON AND MAPAGU vs. CA G.R. No. 90107. August 21, 1992 FACTS: On 14 March 1977, Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, adopted Resolution No. 9 soliciting 1% donation of the palay threshed from the thresher operators who will apply for a permit to thresh. The proceeds will fund the construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center Bldg of the municipality. Petitioner Lope Mapagu (treasurer) prepared a document for signature of all thresher/ owner/ operators who applied for a mayors permit. Private respondent Jurado tried to pay the P285.00 license fee for thresher operators but it was refused on the ground that he must first get a mayor permit (by Mapagu) and second, the he did not sign the agreement to give 1% of the palay he produced(by Mayor Tuzon). Jurado filed for an action for mandamus with the RTC in Aparri, Cagayan (CFI then) to compel the issuance of the mayors permit and license. He filed another petition for declaratory judgment against the resolution for being illegal either as a donation or as a tax measure. Named defendants were the same respondents and all the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan The trial court upheld the challenged measure. Jurado appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the validity of Resolution No. 9 and the implementing agreement. Nevertheless, it found Tuzon and Mapagu liable to pay actual and moral damages for acting maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Jurado's application for the mayor's permit and license. As for the Resolution, it was passed by the Sanggunian in the lawful exercise of its legislative powers granted by Article XI, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution

which provided that each LGU shall have the power to create its own source revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. And also under Article 4, Sec. 29, PD 231: The barrio council may solicit money, materials, and other contributionsfrom private agencies and individuals. ISSUES/HELD: 1: WON a resolution imposing a 1% donation is a valid exercise of the taxing power of an LGU. NO. The implementing agency made the donation obligatory. Although again the validity of the resolution was not in issue, the SC observed that: it seems to make the donation obligatory and a condition precedent to the issuance of the mayor's permit. This goes against the nature of a donation, which is an act of liberality and is never obligatory. If it is to be considered as a tax ordinance, it must be shown: 1. to have been enacted in accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax Code; 2. it would include the holding of a public hearing on themeasure; and 3. its subsequent approval by the Secretary of Finance, in addition to the requisites for publication of ordinances in general. 2. WON petitioners are liable in damages to private respondent Jurado for having withheld from him the mayor's permit and license because of his refusal to comply with Resolution No. 9.

The private respondent anchors his claim for damages on Article 27 of the New Civil Code, which reads: Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the Mayor Tuzon's refusal to act on the private respondent's application was an attempt to compel him to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot be said either that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by personal spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado. It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to show that the petitioners singled out the private respondent for persecution. Neither does it appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the mayor's permit and license he needed. The petitioners were not Jurado's business competitors nor has it been established that they intended to favor his competitors. On the contrary, the record discloses that the resolutionwas uniformly applied to all the threshers in the municipality without discrimination or preference. The private respondent complains that as a result of the

NO.Petitioners acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with their honest interpretation of the resolution in question. It was not for them to rule on its validity. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring it invalid, its legality would have to be presumed. As executive officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts. xxx As a rule, a pubic officer, whether, judicial, quasi-judicial or executive, is not personally liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in line of his official duty. xxx It has been held that an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith, that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages. (PhilippineMatch Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu)

petitioners' acts, he was prevented from operating his business all this time and earning substantial profit therefrom, as he had in previous years. But as the petitioners correctly observed, he could have taken the prudent course of signing the agreement under protest and later challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation to "donate." Pendente lite, he could have continued to operate his threshing business and thus avoided the lucrocesante that he now says was the consequence of the petitioners' wrongful act. He could have opted for the less obstinate but still dissentient action, without loss of face, or principle, or profit.

Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan Facts:

Civil case was filed against Enrile in the Sandiganbayan for alleged illegal activities made by Enrile during the Marcos era. Enrirle filed a motion to dismiss and compulsory counterclaim. In the counter-claim Enrile moved to implead Chavez and other PCGG officials on the basis that the case field against him was a harassment suit. The motion to implead Chavez and others was granted by the Sandiganbayan. Chavez and the PCGG officials raised the defense that they are immune from suit by virtue of Sec. 4 of Executive Order NO. 1. It was found in the records of the PCGG, declared by Jovito Salonga, the there are no proof linking Enrile with the illegal activities performed by Marcos. It was further averred that the case filed against Enrile was instigated by Sol. Gen. Chavez. Sol. Gen. Chavez defended himself by saying that he was acting as a counsel and cannot bymade a defendant in a counterclaim. Issue: Whether or not Sol. Gen. Chavez can be made liable for damages in filing the suit against Enrile. Held: The court held that the grounds for allowing the compulsory counter-claim of Enrile was based on the malice or bad faith of Chavez in filing the suit. It was further stated by the court that immunity from suit is granted only because of the fact that the Commission has a multitude of task. Immunity for suit on members of the PCGG and other public officers is available only if such officers are acting in good faith and in the performance of their duty. If the acts done are tainted with bad faith or in excess of authority they can be held liable personally for damages. In the case at bar the Sol. Gen. exceeded his authority and his act is tainted with bad faith by filing baseless suit against Enrile. His office does not give him the license to prosecute recklessly to the injury of another. Thus he is made liable for his actions in the opinion of the court. Domingo vs Rayala Rayala accuses the Solicitor General of forum shopping because it files a motion for reconsideration of the decision on CA-GR SP No. 61026 and then filed a comment in GR 155840 before this Court. We do not agree.

judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly securing a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. There is forum shopping when the following concur: 1. identity of the parties or at least of the parties who represent the same interest on both actions; 2. identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and 3. identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount tores judicata in the action under

consideration or will constitute litis pendentia. When the Republic opted to file a motion for reconsideration, it was merely exercising a right. That Rayala and Domingo had by then already filed cases before the SC did not take away this right. Thus, when this Court directed the Republic to file its Comment on Rayala's petition, it had to comply even if it had an unresolved motion for reconsideration with the CA, lest it be cited for contempt. As to the substantial issue, RA 7877 defines SEXUAL HARASSMENT as follows: Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment - Sexual harassment may be committed in any of the following forms;

1. 2. 3.

overt sexual advances; unwelcome or improper gesture of affection; request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on dates, outing, or the like for the same purpose;

4.

any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification which is generally annoying, disgusting, or offensive to the victim.

Rayala insisted that his acts do not constitute sexual harassment because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual

FORUM SHOPPING is an act of a party, against an adverse

favor as a condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position. Respondent's insistence is unconvincing. Basic in the law of public officers is the THREE-FOLD LIABILITY RULE, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal, and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others. This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment. The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. The CA correctly ruled that Rayala's culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of RA 7877 because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction of sexual harassment. It should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the President, found substantial evidence to support the administrative charge. Yet, even if we were to test Rayala's acts strictly by the standards set in RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true that this calls for a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor. but it is not necessary that such demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude from the acts of the offender. Likewise, it is not essential that the demand, request, or requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that respondent's acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee, which was clearly manifested by the fact that Domingo filed for leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit. POWERS AND DUTIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS Source of Government Authority: sovereignty. Scope of Powers of a Public Officer The people, the

Lo Cham v. Ocampo The duties of a public office includes all those which truly are within its scope: (1) those which are essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office was created; or (2) those which, although incidental or collateral, are germane to and serve to promote the accomplishment of the principal purpose.

Territorial Extent of Powers of Public Officer GENERAL RULE: Where a public officer is authorized by law to perform the duties of his office at a particular place, action at a place not authorized by law is ordinarily invalid. (Note: This rule is applicable to all public officers whose duties are essentially local in nature, e.g. judges.) EXCEPTIONS: (1) Consuls; (2) Police officers, who may arrest persons for crimes committed outside Philippine territory; (3) Doctrine of hot pursuit Duration of Authority of Public Officers The duration of the authority of public officers is limited to that term during which he is, by law, invested with the rights and duties of the office. Construction of Grant of Powers Strict construction. Will be construed as conferring only those powers which are expressly imposed or necessarily implied. Classification of Powers Discretionary Ministerial

Definition Acts which require the exercise of reason in determining when, where, and how to exercise the power Acts which are performed in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done (Lamb v. Phipps) Can be delegated? Generally, NO.

Exception: When the power to substitute / delegate has been given Generally, YES. Exception: When the law expressly requires the act to be performed by the officer in person and / or prohibits such delegation When is mandamus proper? Only if the duty to do something has been delayed for an unreasonable period of time. In all cases. Is public officer liable? Generally not liable Exceptions: if there is fraud or malice Liable if duty exercised contrary to the manner prescribed by law. When is mandamus proper? Only if the duty to do something has been delayed for an unreasonable period of time. Generally not liable Exceptions: if there is fraud or malice Can be delegated? Generally, NO. Exception: When the power to substitute / delegate has been given

exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done (Lamb v. Phipps) Generally, YES. Exception: When the law expressly requires the act to be performed by the officer in person and / or prohibits such delegation In all cases.

Discretion; Discretionary Power Ministerial Duty Q: What is discretion? A: Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. (Lamb v. Phipps) Q: What is a ministerial act?

Is public officer liable?

Liable if duty exercised contrary to the manner prescribed by law.

A: A purely ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. A ministerial act is one to which nothing is left to the discretion of the person who must perform. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. It is a precise act, accurately marked out, enjoined upon particular officers for a particular purpose. (Lamb v. Phipps) Discretionary Ministerial Definition Acts which require the exercise of reason in determining when, where, and how to exercise the power Acts which are performed in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the

Aprueba v. Ganzon Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes on him the right or duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. The privilege of operating a market stall under license is not absolute but revocable under an implied lease contract subject to the general welfare clause. Mandamus never lies to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. Q: When will the writ of mandamus never issue? A: (1) To control discretion; (2) When another adequate remedy exists; (3) To enforce the performance of contractual obligations, as in the issuance of a license / permit (Aprueba v. Ganzon)

Farolan v Solmac Mktg Comp Farolan (acting commissioner of customs) and Parayno (acting chief of Customs Intelligence) has not released the shipment of OPP film waste/scrap for making fibers and films. Customs claim that the products is of higher class considered as polypropylene film which is restricted by LOI. BOI is in conflict in their opinion. Solmac sued Farolan and Parayno claims not releasing it is not done in good faith. RTC: damages in their private capacity. But Farolan not liable, first name is different, must be Ramon not Damian. GOOD FAITH refers to a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Good faith is always presumed and it is upon who alleges the contrary that the burden of proof lies. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
Amado C. Arias & Cresencio D. Data petitioners vs. The SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. Petition to SC GUTIERREZ, JR., J: Summary of Facts: Arias (District Engineer) and Data (Chief Auditor), officials of the Province of Rizal were found guilty by the Sandiganbayan (SB) together with their subordinates and a private citizen (seller of land) for having caused injury to & damage to the Republic of the Philippines in connection with scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the Government as right of way for a floodway project, by allowing & approving the illegal disbursement & expenditure of public funds. The decision of SB insofar as Arias & Data are concerned was overturned by the SC based on the reasoning of reliance of good faith on subordinates. Facts Petitioners Arias Arias (District Engineer) and Data (Chief Auditor), were found guilty by SB for violating sec. 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft Practices Act:

Arias and Data were convicted by SB violating the above provision together with their 3 subordinates & 1 private citizen Gutierrez (seller of land) (6 silang lahat na convicted). The background of the story dates back in year 1975, when the Bureau of Public Works planned the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial floods in some parts of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. This floodway project will traverse certain portions of Ortigas, where the land sold by Gutierrez to the Govt (subject matter in this case) was located The implementation of this floodway project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District headed by Data (District Engineer). In this regard, Data formed a committee headed by Fernando (Supervising Civil Engr) as over-all in-charge (Fernando did not face trial and remains at-large) and 3 other subordinates. The subordinates were Mendoza & Hucom, for acquisition and improvements, and Jose the Instrument man for surveys (Mendoza & Jose are 2 other convicted co-accused). This committee was tasked to inform affected lot owners affected by the floodway project and to receive and process payments. Among the lot owners affected was a 19, 004 sq.m. riceland (subject matter in this case) owned by Agleham, which was previously owned by parents of Gutierrez (private citizen & convicted co-accused) from whom Agleham acquired his property. Gutierrez was one of those who filed an application for payment, holding with her a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed by Agleham. In her application, she submitted fake and falsified documents i.e. Tax Declaration Certificate purporting that the land was residential with fair market value of P80/sq m. These documents were submitted to 2 other convicted coaccused -- examined by Arcaya (Admin. Officer) while Cruz (Senior Engineer) initialed the documents & prepared a Deed of Sale. Cruz later transmitted them to District Engineer Data. Data and Gutierrez both later signed the Deed of Sale. These documents were sent to Director Anolin of Bureau of Public Works, who recommended approval of the Deed of Sale and later returned to Datas office. Hence the sale was registered and a TCT was issued in the name of the Govt. For this sale, a General Voucher was prepared, for the amount of P1.5M plus with certifications of Data and his 3 subordinates (Fernando ,Cruz, and one accountant). This general voucher and other supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for payment by Arias (Chief Auditor), petioner and convicted co-accused. Arias then later issued 16 PNB checks for total sum of P1.5M plus for Gutierrez as payment of property in 1978. In 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on this alleged gross overpricing of Aglehams property. Several Government employees denied signing the certification and gave sworn statements. One of them is Oco, an Assistant Mun. Assessor who provided the genuine Tax Declaration Certificate, showing among others that the subject property is actually a riceland (but classified as residential) and overpriced at P80/sq.m. (instead of appraised value of P5/sq.m.) -- showing that the officials of the District Engineering Office falsified them. The investigators also found that the Deed of Sale was approved by Arias for payment of P1.5, who didnt question the altered amount (snowflaked and amount superimposed) nor checked the veracity of the fake documents.

SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxxxxxxxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions

The case was on trial for 6 years, and SB found 2 petitioners ARIAS & DATA, their 3 subordinates (CRUZ, JOSE, & ARCAYA) & private citizen GUTIERREZ guilty of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Among the 6 convicted accused, only the 2 petitioners, Arias (District Engineer) and Data (Chief Auditor) appealed. ISSUE: WON SB petitioners ARIAS and DATA are guilty as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to cause injury to the Government through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds. NO RATIO: No. 1. Under the Sandiganbayan's decision, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from disbursements which they have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy. The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per square meter value fixed by the assessor in the tax declarations was the correct market value of the Mangahan property and if the Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows that it must have suffered undue injury. In the instant case, the assessor's low evaluation, in the fixing of which the landowner had no participation, was used for a purpose infinitely more weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms the basis for a criminal conviction by the SB. The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square meter for land in Pasig in 1978 would be a fair evaluation. The value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a competent court. We are certain, however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence, the decision, insofar as it says that the "correct" valuation is P5.00 per square meter and on that basis convicted that petitioners of causing undue injury, damage, and prejudice to the Government because of gross overpricing, is grounded on shaky foundations. There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during orderly proceedings has been presented and accepted.

We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent 'on their subordinates and on the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document , letters and supporting paper that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling. There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction. ARIAS PARTICIPATION: Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property started in 1977. The deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the Republic on June 8, 1978. In other words, the transaction had already been consummated before his arrival. Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to investigate . gate the smallest detains of the transaction? Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already worth P80.00 a square meter at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner alarm. Land along Ortigas Avenue on the way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 a square meter. DATAS PARTICIPATION: The committee he formed determined the authenticity of the documents presented to them for processing and on the basis thereof prepared the corresponding deed of sale; thereafter, the committee submitted the deed of sale together with the supporting documents to petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of the supporting certified documents which appeared regular and complete on their face, petitioner Data, as head of the office and the signing authority at that level, merely signed but did not approve the deed of sale as the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works for its final approval. HELD: SB decision SET ASIDE insofar as it convicts and sentences petitioners Arias & Data. They are both acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. Inadequacy of evidence is not sufficient to warrant a conviction. DISSENTING OPINION OF GRINO-AQUINO: Conspiracy of Silence and Inaction - The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed their eyes to the defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if not deliberate omission, to check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. Since partiality is a mental state or predilection, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved by the attendant circumstance instances.

2.

BASIC REASON OF SC: We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally 1. examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing, his signature as the final approving authority. There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were falsified. A key tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of being machine-numbered. The registration stampmark was antedated and the land reclassified as residential instead of ricefield. But were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue in injury and damage to the Government?

MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, petitioner,vs. ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.

On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).The committee constituted found Rayala guilty of the offense charged. Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and Recommendation to the OP, but with the recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.On May 8, 2000, the OP issued AO 119, disagreeing with the recommendation that respondent be meted only the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day considering the circumstances of the case because of the nature of the position of Reyala as occupying the highest position in the NLRC, being its Chairman. Long digest by Ernani Tadili. It was ordered that Rayala be dismissed from service for being found guilty of grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct. Rayala filed Motions for Reconsideration until the case was finally referred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. The CA found Reyala guilty and imposed the penalty of suspension of service for the maximum period of one (1) year. Domingo filed a Petition for Review before the SC. Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review with this Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual harassment. The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review. On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3)petitions. G.R. No. 155831 Domingo Petition 1. The President has the power to remove presidential appointees; and2. AO No. 250 does not cover presidential appointees. G.R. No. 155840 Rayala Petition In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues: 1. Hes act does not constitute sexual harassment; a. demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor; b. the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment, or continued employment; or c. the denial thereof results in discrimination against the employee. 2. Intent is an element of sexual harassment; and 3. Misapplication of the expanded definition of sexual harassment in RA 7877 by applying DOLE AO 250.Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual favor, demand, or request from petitioner in exchange for her continued employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him are without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingos perception of malice in his alleged acts a "product of her own imagination" that led her to file the sexual harassment complaint. Likewise, Rayala assails the OPs interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that RA 7877 is malum prohibitum such that the defense of absence of malice is unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment is considered an offense against a particular person, not against society as a whole. Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA7877. In particular, he assails the definition of the forms of sexual harassment:

FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. Sexual harassment may be committed in any of the following forms: a) Overt sexual advances; b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection; c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited to going out on dates, outings or the like for the same purpose; d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of sexual gratification which is generally annoying, disgusting or offensive to the victim. He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or requirement do not constitute sexual harassment as contemplated by the law. 28 He alleges that the rule-making power granted to the employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only to procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the employer the power to promulgate rules which would provide other or additional forms of sexual harassment, or to come up with its own definition of sexual harassment. 29 G.R. No. 158700 - Republic The Republic raises this issue: Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss respondent Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for committing acts of sexual harassment? 30 The Republic argues that Rayalas acts constitute sexual harassment under AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are acts or conduct of a sexual nature, which are generally annoying or offensive to the victim. 31 It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CAs reduction of the penalty imposed by the OP. Rayalas dismissal is valid and warranted under the circumstances. The power to remove the NLRC Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by the requirements under the law and the due process clause. The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one(1) year suspension, it will not prevent the OP from validly imposing the penalty of dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even though Royal is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to the Civil Service Law. Under the Civil Service Law, disgraceful and immoral conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service. 32 The Republic adds that Rayalas position is invested with public trust and his acts violated that trust; thus, heshould be dismissed from the service. This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article215 of the Labor Code, which states that the Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he reaches the age of 65 only during good behavior. 33 Since Rayalas security of tenure is conditioned upon his good behavior, he may be removed from office if it is proven that he has failed to live up to this standard. All the issues raised in these

three cases can be summed up in two ultimate questions, namely: (1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment? guilty (2) (2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty? suspension (3) CA and OP were unanimous in holding that RAYALA is guilty of sexual harassment. They only differ in the appropriate imposable penalty. That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of sexual harassment is, therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. (4) 39 (5) The principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us. (6) 40 (7) He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position. (8) 41 (9) Rayala urges us to apply to his case our ruling in Aquino v. Acosta (10) . (11) 42 (12) We find respondents insistence unconvincing. Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others. (13) 43 (14) This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment. The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877.Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise: Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainer, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, reemployment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive

or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee. This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of sexual harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an independent civil action for damages and other affirmative relief. Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases,viz.: Sec. 4.Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related, Educ ation or Training Environment (15) (16) . It shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the work-related, educational or training environment or institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of office shall:(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedure for the investigation or sexual harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefore. Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful acts of sexual harassment. The said rules and regulations issued pursuant to this section (a) shall include, among others, guidelines on proper decorum in the workplace and educational or training institutions.(b) Create a committee on decorum and investigation of cases on sexual harassment. The committee shall conduct meetings, as the case may be, with other officers and employees, teachers, instructors, professors, coaches, trainors and students or trainees to increase understanding and prevent incidents of sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the investigation of the alleged cases constituting sexual harassment. The employer or head of office, educational or training institution shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the information of all concerned. The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment. (17) 44 (18) It should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the President, found substantial evidence to support the administrative charge. Yet, even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a "demand, request or requirement of asexual favor." But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude,

from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for asexual favor. Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondents acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee. (19) 45 (20) That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit. (21)

Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He argues that intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him. The SC reiterated that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial. The SC also rejected Rayalas allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get him out of office and thus constitute merely political harassment. On the contrary, ill motive is belied by the fact that Domingo and her witnesses all employees of the NLRC at that time stood to lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant consequences for coming forward and charging their boss with sexual harassment. Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process. He accuses the Committee on Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877. He also scored the OPs decision finding him guilty of "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877. Considering that he was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the verdict is a "sham and total nullity."The SC held that Rayala was properly accorded due process. The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due process safeguards. Although in the beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him, he appeared, personally and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings. On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases, the designation of the offense is not controlling. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein

recited. It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct. 51 Thus, any finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct. With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala committed sexual harassment, we now determine the proper penalty to be imposed. Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under the pertinent Civil Service Rules, disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1)day to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating circumstances cannot be appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty. Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6)months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal. 52 On the other hand, Section 22(o), RuleXVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 19875 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Serviceboth provide that the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal. Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold officeduring good behavior until he or she reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office. 55 In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by law."Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense. WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18,2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026is AFFIRMED (Modification of Penalty). Consequently, the petitionsin G.R. Nos. 155831, 155840, and 158700 are DENIED.