The Role of Apperception in Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Author(s): Hector-Neri Castaeda Source: Nos, Vol.

24, No. 1, On the Bicentenary of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgement (Mar., 1990), pp. 147-157 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215618 . Accessed: 23/10/2013 10:35
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The Role of Apperception in Kant's Transcendental Deductionof the Categories

HECTOR-NERI CASTA&EDA INDIANA UNIVERSITY ERASMUS UNIVERSITEITROTTERDAM

1.

INTRODUCTION

This is a meditation in the role of self-consciousness in Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories. In it Kant seems to me to struggle, albeit not wholly successfully, to execute and use some crucial distinctions. Among them are the distinction between the unity of consciousness and the consciousness of that unity, the distinction between virtual apprehension and the I-think conceptualized consciousness of the unity of consciousness, and the distinction between the de re unity of a thinking entity and the de dicto unity of self-consciousness. These distinctions are intrinsically of the greatest importance; for Kant they are significant because they help demarcate the generality of the conclusion of his deduction. By assessing Kant's struggle with those distinctions we can appreciate better the nature of the deduction and the scope of its conclusion. My concern here is not with the logic of Kant's deduction. As I have explained elsewhere1, no philosophical thesis can be absolutely proven. Any worthwhile proof must, like all excellent logical deductions, pass the test of being subject to the criticism of begging the question. That is, every proof is internalto a theory. In Kant's case the transcendental deduction, as I see it, is a proof or sequence of proofs that start from a set of premises containing major unprovable theses constitutive of Kant's critical philosophy. Such theses include: his Copernican turn; that nonsensitive consciousness is conceptual, that conceptual consciousness is judgmental, i.e., it exists in episodes of judging; the origination of the categories in the forms of judgment; his conceptual (or semantic) holism.
NOUS 24 (1990) 147-157 ? 1990 by Nouis Publications 147

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Since my first encounter with it, Kant's exposition of the transcendental deduction impressed me as most valuable because of the collateral issues it takes up and the subsidiary views it develops, for instance, his view of synthesis, apperception, unity of experience. The transcendental deduction as such is less interesting than the metaphysical deduction. Aside from Kant's success in carrying them out, the latter deduction does make in itself an exciting advance in the development of the critical philosophy.2 Here we are not concerned either with an interpretation of Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories in terms of his general remarks on transcendental deductions or with how that deduction jibes with his later transcendental deductions. In brief, the present investigation is an exercise in Darwinian, rather than Athenian, exegesis3. Hence we assume neither the consistency nor the unity nor the coherence of Kant's views on transcendental arguments. Nor do we assume the opposite. Further, we assume nothing about the validity of the deduction itself. Specifically, here is an exegetical reflection on parts of Section 16 of the transcendental deduction in the second or B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.
2. THE SUBJECTIVE DEDUCTION, AND THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS VS. APPERCEPTION

The most recent essays on Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories (Carl 1989, Beck 1989, Henrich 1989, Guyer 1989, and Strawson 1989) have greatly increased our understanding of its nature. In particular, Henrich has elucidated the normative character of the deduction by showing its juridical background, Carl has traced the history of the deduction through the scrutiny of some of Kant's background and even later writings. Thus he has illumined with intense light the two parts of the deduction: the subjective deduction concerned with the application of the categories to experience, and the objective deduction concerned with the application of the categories to objects and in our knowledge 'of them. I fully agree with Carl in his superlative evaluation (p. 18): I [W. Carl] believe that the subjective deduction is the most important and ambitious project for a deduction of the categories. The situation is perfectly clear. Every experience, whether perceptual or not, has as its core a train of thinking episodes, that is, episodes of conceptual, nonsensitive consciousness. The contents of such episodes are structured complexes of conceptual content. Kant wishes to show that all such content involves the application of the categories, and in the case of empirical content subsumption under them. For instance' in spite oftheir-not yielding knowledge of ob-

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jects, hallucinatory perceptual judgments involve the categories. Judgments about mental states neutral with respect to objects involve applications of the categories. Pure mathematical propositions are thought under the categories, even if they fail to provide empirical knowledge of objects. The propositions we think under the influence of a dialectical illusion-which necessarily fail to constitute the application of the categories. In knowledge of objects-involve short, all thinking is categorial. Consequently, veridical thinking that constitutes knowledge of objects must involve the categories. The objective deduction is, as pertaining to thinking, simply a species of the subjective deduction. That the objects in the world must themselves conform a priori to the categories pivots on the Copernican turn that posits as world a thinkable world. Carl characterizes the subjective deduction as follows (18-19; the labels and the emphatic capitals are mine.): What is essential to a subjective deduction is its aim: [SD. 1] to explain a connectionbetween representationsthat belong to ONE CONSCIOUSNESS and the application of the categories. The central task of a subjective deduction must be [SD.2] to show that there and is some relation between the UNITY OF APPERCEPTION a certain kind of conceptualization of what is given to the senses. SD. 1, and agree with him I accept Carl's initial characterization that Kant saw SD. 1 as entailing the secondary characterization SD. 2. Hence, I see an error in Kant's I reject, however, this entailment.

move from SD.1 to SD.2. Carl explains (pp 16-19) very lucidly how Kant, in his unpublished reflections, accounted for the unity of consciousness in terms of the unity of the thinking thing, and how Kant conceived this thing as a Cartesian self. When Kant discovered the paralogisms and found the Cartesian self indefensible, he stayed within the unity of consciousness. This was the right decision. However, even though he tried, Kant could not stay within the unity of consciousness. He saw that unity as the internal unity of the thought-of self, the I of the I think. This thought-of I is, however, assumed to be precisely the same as the thinking I. Even deprived of its noumenal dimension, that was an assumption permeating Descartes's cogito argument. In his appeal to apperception in his explanation of the unity of consciousness there lingers a Cartesian element4. Carl implicitly records the above in his move from characterization SD. 1 to characterization SD. 2. Carl, however, seems to accept the correctness of the move. If he in fact approves of it, then we have a disagreement. I find an error in Kant's deduction to the large extent that he in fact proceeds as GarL,in my opinion, correctly, describes him as doing:

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The point of his notion of a synthetic unity of apperception was not to explain the possibility of self-ascriptionof experiences;this possibility was taken for granted and should be used [. . .] to explain that representations COULD belong to one consciousness only if they would be combined according to certain rules. (P. 20; his own italics, my capitals.) The error is not to leave here self-ascription unaccounted for. To put it succinctly, the error consists of building an argument that depends essentially on self-ascription, which is irrelevant to the conclusion of the subjective deduction. On the one hand, if selfconsciousness is a condition for the application of the categories, then this condition cannot be dropped. Hence, we have no proof that in nonreflective, egoless consciousness of objects we apply the categories-or combine the representations according to rules. When we realize that most of our thinking is not subsumed under selfascriptions, the error is that of arguing-however conclusively-for much less than we were promised and were led to expect. On the other hand, if the mere possibility of self-ascription is all that is at issue, then we must make sure that the argument does not hinge on the step Necessarily(if self-ascriptionoccursthen the categoriesare applied). For then the relevant possibility of self-ascription yields only that it is possible, in the same type or sense of possibility, that the categories be applied, not that they, or certain rules, are in fact ever applied to all representations that appear in nonsensitive consciousness. In brief, the sense in which a mere possibility yields an actuality has to be secured. Kant, I submit, manifested an awareness of this problem in his famous dictum, to be referred to as the I-think principle, namely: (K.RI) Das Ich denkemussalle meineVorstellungen KONNEN. begleiten Yet Kant did not carry out his struggle to the point of providing an elucidation of the relevant sense of kannen. Carl describes Kant's move from consciousness to apperception as his "moving from a necessary condition to necessary and sufficient condition" (p. 11). As I see the intended comprehensiveness of the subjective deduction (SD. 1), that move is from a necessary condition, which should be sufficient, to a sufficient condition that is not necessary. Evidently, an exegesis of Kant's text should be educational.
3. "THE I THINK MUST BE ABLE TO ACCOMPANY ALL MY REPRESENTATIONS"

A natural reading of (K.RI) assigns to the quantifier 'all' the largest

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scope. Then the I think applies distributively to each representation composing an experience. Presumably, however:
(K.R1) Complexes of representations within one experience are also representations.

This fits well with the fact that the I-think principle is about the unity of consciousness. Hence, the I think applies also collectively, in particular to the totality of representations constituting an experience. A representation seems to be whatever appears in consciousness as an identifiable element or feature. An item can appear in an experience as identifiable without being actually identified because no special discriminating attention is focused on it. There are of course limiting thresholds for attentive discrimination. Thus, to use one of Leibniz's favorite examples: the oceanic roar one hears may be an indivisible representation, even though it is caused by the combination of sonorous effects from a multitude of waves. he even misled himself-by Now, Kant is misleading-perhaps giving his argument a first-person formulation. This invites blurring the crucial distinction between the internal or de dicto and the external or de re construal of certain objects and relations. Given the presence of 'my' his I-think principle looks trivially analytic. Kant's principle seems to be this: (K.RI*) For any thinker X and for any experience E of X's: E CAN be subsumed under an experience E* of X's such that: if e is a representation composing E, then I think e is a
representation composing E*.

Because of (K.R1) the total unity of the experience E is exactly the same as the unity of sub-experiences composing E. (K.RI*) seems to characterize the internal unity of consciousness in terms of a possible subordination of the whole of the experience and each of its contents under an I think. At moments Kant seems to assume a Humeanlike principle like this:
(K.R2) The representation I thinkis NOTHING BUT the representation of the unity of the conciousness of the experience E whose representations e are subsumable under it.

Then the unity of an episode of consciousness is more basic than the existence of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness would thus merely reveal the preexisting unity of the subsumed consciousness, and its contents would be exhausted in representing the unity of the encompassed consciousness. Hence, we MIGHT speak of the unity of an episode of consciousness as the mere possibility of self-

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consciousness. We MAY say further that the unity of consciousness involves a virtual subsumption to an I think, and that this virtual in every subsumption is the form of self-consciousness-present episode of consciousness. The problem, then, is to elucidate the sense in which we MAY speak that way. For this we must ascertain Kant's intended sense of 'can' (kannen). It is easy to posit an ability sense of 'can' that applies to the egoless experiences of an adult person fully absorbed in the contemplation of some show, or in thinking out some problem. In such cases we are dealing not merely with thinkers who have in the past had first-person thoughts, but with thinkers who at any moment can burst into first-person thoughts. Any little itching, or strange noise, or sudden quiet can destroy the egolessness of the experience. But what do we do with the experiences of small children, under, say one year or age, who have only an egoless, external conception of things? Clearly, they think that this or that is such-and-such. Those thoughts are conceptual and involve application of the categories. Yet their consciousness has a unity of content that cannot be convincingly described as the viability of subsumption under an I think. That type of consciousness I have called Externus-type. Perhaps some higher animals are externi-as David Schwayder has urged. In any case, to understand the evolution of consciousness we must reckon with the causal possibility of species with rudimentary egoless conceptual experiences. There must have been early men, or proto-men, of that sort. In waking up we repeat those phylogenetic states and in falling asleep we repeat them in reverse. Ontogeny after all recapitulates phylogeny (Haeckel).
4. "FOR OTHERWISE SOMETHING WOULD BE REPRESENTED IN ME WHICH COULD NOT BE THOUGHT AT ALL ... OR AT LEAST WOULD BE NOTHING TO ME"

Here Kant is given a disjunction of reasons why he holds (K.RI). The last 'me' illustrates the peril noted above of Kant's first-person formulation of his discussion. Transposed to the third person his disjunction for principle (K.RI*) allows of an ambiguity, namely: (K.R3*) If X has a representation r in an experience E but r cannot r in the extended be subsumed under a representationI think subsuming experience E*, then r represents something unthinkable [. . .] or at least something that is NOTHING TO [X] HIMSELF, that is, as far as X CAN TELL ABOUT IT AND ABOUT HIMSELF. (K.R3-) If -, then
-,

or at least something that is NOTHING

'1,o xt

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Patently, (K.R3*) is true. If there is no self-consciousness, then representations are not thought of as one's own. Given the distributive property of I think, if an experience E could have component representations that escape its unity, such representations must fall out of the I think that represents the unity of experience E. Yet such I-think uncapturable representations may be something for the thinker X. Indeed, they may even be captured by a piece of I-less thinking connected to E, and be something to the thinker. Hence, (K.R3-) is false. Cases of so-called blind-sight conform to (K.R3*) but falsify (K.R3-).
5. BLIND-SIGHT AND THE CATEGORIES

A most interesting case of I-less perceptual consciousness is blindsight. Some persons who have lost part of their cerebral cortex connected to vision illustrate what to many specialists seems to be a paradoxical situation. While emphatically declaring that they do not see, such persons are nonetheless able to respond correctly to questions that do require definitely visual information. A certain patient named D. B. in the literature had part of his brain removed, which resulted in his loss of his left visual field, his right field remaining fully operational . . . In the experiments items were placed in his left visual field. He insisted that he (himsea) did not see anything there. He engaged in "guessing," as he called it. He had a perfect score in thirty "guesses." D. B. sometimes reported having a "feeling" that certain figures he said he did not see had certain properties, which they in fact had. Similar studies have been carried out with monkeys. Apparently monkeys and men with blindsight can improve their powers of discrimination of "unseen" objects. Men can also improve the strength of those "feelings" about the "unseen" properties. (See Weiskrantz 1974, 1977, 1980.) Some philosophers see the cases of blind-sight as no perception at all. To them they are evidence that consciousness is a wellentrenched fiction, which science will eventually vanish. (See Churchland 1980.) Patently, an eliminationist interpretation of blind-sight must account for D. B.'s right-field vision. Others interpret blindsight as visual consciousness without self-consciousness. (See Pollock 1988, and Castafieda 1989.) As I see it, in blind-sight there are (at least) two levels of failure of unification of contents of consciousness. First, the integration of the visual contents is incomplete. Second, only the fully integrated part of those contents acquires an owning I. Because of the first failure the contents of blind-sight remain egoless even when the patient learns to link them to those of his other I-owned contents.

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This produces a partial lopsided integration of the contents of his whole experience. In the new experience that encompasses the "guesses" an I owning the "guess" information enters the scene; the new experience remains, however, structurally mixed because it can attain only a partial integration. The contents in D. B.'s left visual field are from the beginning accessible to him as seen, although not realizing that they are in his left field. During the experiments he becomes conscious that he sees them; he thus gains an indirect consciousness, via a third-person route, of his visual consciousness, which remains intrinsically I-less. The I-less visual representations in D. B.'s left field, and the objects they represent, are something visual to him-thus refuting (K.R3-). They are nothing to himself, as far as he is self-conscious conforming to (K.R3*). of his experiencing-thus
6. CRITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF BLIND-SIGHT FOR KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY: SENSITIVE-LIKE VS. CONCEPTUAL AWARENESS OF THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The morals of blind-sight relevant to Kant's transcendental deduction are straightforward. Palpably, D. B.'s "unseen" representations involve the application of the categories. They are, notwithstanding, not able to be accompanied by the representation I think-in a very strong sense of 'be able' (kbnnen). Kant rightly claims that the application of the categories is a necessary constitutive condition of all thinking and of nonsensitive (rather, not purely sensitive) consciousness. He correctly traces the categorical nature of thinking to the unity of consciousness of conceptual thinking. This unity is what the experience-encompassing I think refers to. That is, the I think is the representation that yields CONCEPTUAL awareness of that unity. It is an error to confuse what is there in consciousness with the consciousness conceptualizing it. The defacto unity of consciousness undoubtedly undergirds the contents of consciousness; it may be said that by being de facto present in an experience one has some kind of awareness of it by simply being conscious of the contents of the experience. Nevertheless, that apprehension is not conceptual. The main lesson of blind-sight is that the virtual awareness of the de facto unity of consciousness is NOT conceptual, but rather sensitive-like. Of course Kant could not take the defacto apprehension of the unity of consciousness as sensitive. His Humean-like principle (K.R2) prevents it. The sensitive elements in the content of consciousness come from sensibility and bestow upon experience their empirical character. There is no empirical mark of the I or for that -matter of the unity of consciousness. Kant proclaims that:

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The I think[. . .] this representation is an act of [intellectual] spontaneity, i.e., in no way can it be consideredas belonging to sensibility. Nevertheless, it would seem to be an empirical matter whether an experience with certain content exists. Blind-sight makes it clear that how far the unity of the consciousness of an experience covers and how well it integrates its contents are contingent and empirical matters. Mental activity is contingent, yet it is not sensitive content on which knowledge of objects is grounded. However, it can be known to have occurred. This knowledge should have also an empirical source. The unity of the consciousness of a perceptual experience is a formal structure imposed in the conceptualization of a sensible manifold, and the experiencer finds there in living the experience. But he does not have to conceptualize it as an I think. Kant evinced I suggest that in his insistence on KONNEN begleiten a felt pressure of the need to distinguish between the virtual consciousness of the defacto unity of consciousness and its conceptualized consciousness. He realized that the unity of each episode of perceptual consciousness is an intellectually imposed form on sensible contents-virtually present in the contents of consciousness. This insight is included in his talk of pure apperception. I submit, notwithstanding, that his emphasis on that formal truth got in the way of his seeing the sensitive-like character of our virtual apprehension of the unity of consciousness. Thus, ultimately, he could not fully appreciate the conceptualization involved in self-consciousness, because he did not seize firmly the fact that the application of the concept I think needs a sensitive-like source.
7. CONCLUSION

In general, the unity of the consciousness of an experience E is the unitary integration of the contents of E: it is the form of E. By being present in E that unity is apprehended in a virtual consciousness underlying and demarcating the explicit consciousness constitutive of experience E: its presence is a sensitive-like ground of its virtual apprehension. The virtual consciousness of the unity of an experience E is there even if there is no I that could enter all an I think representation that could-let alone can-accompany sensitiveneither the course And of the representations constituting E. like ground nor the virtual consciousness of it vanishes when they yield explicit I-think conceptualized self-consciousness. Kant's deep insight was that the unity of the consciousness of an experience is the form that encompasses the contents of the experience, and it cannot be provided by the sensory manifold but is furnished by the mind through its application of the categories.

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This nonsensitive nature of the unity of consciousness led him-I submit-to conflate the virtual awareness of the unity of consciousness with an explicitly conceptualized self-consciousness. He did not realize that the subordination, or the mere possibility of the subordination, of experienced content to an I think is not necessary. This is an error on Kant's part. representation I think must BE Kant's principle (K.RJ)-The ABLE [kinnen] to accompany [subordinate] all of one's representadeliberately weak. Yet it is too tions composing an experience-is strong for the purpose of the subjective deduction. Thus in spite of his weak (K.RI) there is in Kant's deduction too much of Fichte's thesis that all consciousness is self-consciousness.56
NOTES

'See Castafieda 1980 especially the sections that discuss dia-philosophy, philosophical arguments and proofs. 2For a complementary discussion of the transcendental deduction see Castafieda 1990. 3For the Athenian/Darwinian methodological contrasts see Castafieda 1978. On the Athenian approach it is assumed that a philosopher somehow writes from a view that, like Athene who sprung forth already mature from Zeus's forehead, is mature and coherent and even complete in the back of his/her mind. Thus texts can be marshaled from anywhere in the philosopher's corpus. On the Darwinian approach each text is interpreted in its terms, all claims of unity and coherence are to be proven, and a philosopher is thought to be capable of attaining great insights while threading on contradictions-not to mention changes of mind and revisions of views. 4Carl writes critically: "But one must see the point of this move [from the unity of the thinking subject to the unity of consciousness] within the overall development of Kant's thought. His notion of the synthetic unity of apperceptionhas been criticized by Paul Guyer, who states that the connection between apperception and synthesis is based on the supposition of Cartesian evidence of our self-identity.15But Kant makes no claim for such evidence, and such a claim would be of no help for the purpose for which the notion is introduced." (Pp. 19-20; Carl's Note 15 on p 250 refers to Guyer 1980, p. 11. I see no obstacle for Kant's using Cartesian evidence for the reality on the thinking thing, or the claim of the noumenon underlying the I of a Cartesian doubt. See Castafieda 1988. My difficulty with deductionis the irrelevancyof self-consciousness Kant's use of apperceptionin the transcendental to the application of the categories to the contents of consciousness. there is no consciousnesswhatever." 5See Fichte 1970, p. 41: "Without self-consciousness For contemporary echoes of this, see, for example, Pollock 1988, Chisholm 1981, and Shoemaker 1968. 6I am most grateful to Harold Pilot (Heidelberg) for having discussed the idea of this paper with me and for having helped me with the German text.
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