Comparative Analysis 1. San Diego v. Nombre et. al with - Caro v. CA and Estate of Olave v.

Reyes

Analysis: In the first case, San Diego v. Nombre, the issue is the capacity and power of an administrator to lease the properties of the decedent. The rule provides that the executor or administrator has the power of administering the estate of the deceased for purposes of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore, exercise all acts of administration without special authority of the Court. For instance, he may lease the property without securing previously any permission from the court. And where the lease has formally been entered into, the court cannot, in the same proceeding, annul the same, to the prejudice of the lessee, over whose person it had no jurisdiction. The proper remedy would be a separate action by the administrator or the heirs to annul the lease. Also, it was discussed that although the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent are similar in some aspects, the provisions on agency, which is found in the Civil Code should not apply to a judicial administrator. Thus, certain circumstances in agency are not true in being a judicial administrator. In the second case, Caro v. Court of Appeals, it deals with an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, which prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. Lastly, while the first case talks about capacity of an administrator and the second case is about trustees, the third case focuses on the claims of parties with emphasis on Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court which states that, "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.". The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court. MOISES SAN DIEGO, SR. vs. ADELO NOMBRE and PEDRO ESCANLAR FACTS: Respondent Adelo Nombre was the duly constituted judicial administrator of the intestate estate subject of the Special proceedings No. 7279. Nombre leased one of the properties of the estate (a fishpond) to Pedro Escanlar, the other respondent. The terms of the lease was three (3) years, with a yearly rental of P3,000.00 to expire on on May 1, 1963, the transaction having been done, admittedly, without previous authority or approval of the Court where the proceedings was pending. In 1961, Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of the court and Sofronio Campillanos was appointed in his stead. Respondent Escanlar was cited for contempt, allegedly for his refusal to surrender the fishpond to the newly appointed administrator. Campillanos filed a motion asking for authority to execute a lease contract of the same fishpond, in favor of petitioner herein, Moises San Diego, Sr., for 5 years from 1961, at a yearly rental of P5,000.00. Nombre opposed to the motion of Campillanos pointing out that the fishpond had been leased by him to Escanlar for 3 years, the period of which was going to expire on May 1, 1963. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the contract of lease entered into by the former administrator Nombre, and Pedro Escanlar on May 1, 1960 was legal. 2. Whether the provisions of the New Civil Code on Agency should apply to judicial administrators. RULING: 1. YES, it was legal.

Respondents contend that this contract, not having been authorized or approved by the Court, is null and void and cannot be an obstacle to the execution of another of lease by the new administrator, Campillanos. This contention is without merit. It has been held that even in the absence of such special powers, a contract or lease for more than 6 years is not entirely invalid; it is invalid only in so far as it exceeds the six-year limit. No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to grant a lease of property placed under his custody is provided for in the present law. Under Article 1647 of the present Civil Code, it is only when the lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot be instituted without special authority. Thus, regardless of the period of lease, there is no need of special authority unless the contract is to be recorded in the Registry of Property. As to whether the contract in favor of Escanlar is to be so recorded is not material to our inquiry.

On the contrary, Rule 85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court authorizes a judicial administrator, among other things, to administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by will. Moran says: "Under this provision, the executor or administrator has the power of administering the estate of the deceased for purposes of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore, exercise all acts of administration without special authority of the Court. For instance, he may lease the property without securing previously any permission from the court. And where the lease has formally been entered into, the court cannot, in the same proceeding, annul the same, to the prejudice of the lessee, over whose person it had no jurisdiction. The proper remedy would be a separate action by the administrator or the heirs to annul the lease. 2. NO, the provisions of the New Civil Code on Agency should NOT apply to judicial administrators.

The Rules of Court provide that An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration, and shall administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by his will. (Sec. 3, Rule 85, old Rules). Lease has been considered an act of administration The Civil Code, on lease, provides: If a lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property, the following persons cannot constitute the same without proper authority, the husband with respect to the wife's paraphernal real estate, the father or guardian as to the property of the minor or ward, and the manager without special power. (Art. 1647). The Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the validity of the contract of lease in favor of Escanlar, notwithstanding the lack of prior authority and approval. The law and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter militates in favor of this view. While it may be admitted that the duties of a judicial administrator and an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in representative capacity), are in some respects, identical, the provisions on agency (Art. 1878, C.C.), should not apply to a judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate (Chua Tan v. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411). A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is required to file a bond. These circumstances are not true in case of agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal. The protection which the law gives the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems from the fact that control by the principal can only be thru agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing court. ELISEO CARO, CARLOS CARO, BENITO CARO, CARMEN CARO, BATAYOLA AND LORENZO CARO, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SERAFIN V. RONZALES, JOSE RONZALES, JR. AND GEMME RONZALES FACTS: Simeon Gallego bought a parcel of land from Loreto Martinez, Presentacion Jereza, Hermenigildo Jereza, Maria Luz Nele Jereza and Maria Elena Jereza. This land was later on sold by Simeon Gallego to Epifanio Caro in 1948. On May 15, 1962, Trinidad Castem, Rolando Iranaya and Eriberto Iranaya sold a parcel of land which they inherited from Custodia Jalandoni, to Epifanio Caro. In the same year, Caro bought another parcel of land from the heirs of Rafael Gaylan. In 1963, Caro had those three (3) parcels of land surveyed and were then designated as Lot No. 54. The parcels of land of Epifanio Caro were denominated as Lot No. 54 and the land claimed by the private respondents Serafin V. Ronzales, Jose Ronzales, Jr. and Gemme Ronzales, as Lot No. 55. The private respondents claim that the questioned land was formerly owned by Pascuala Lacson. Pascuala Lacson was married to Domingo Ronzales. Long before World War II, private respondents and their predessors-in-interest had been living on the questioned land. When Epifanio Caro bought a parcel of land from Simeon Gallego, Jose Ronzales, Sr., his brother Serafin Ronzales, and sister Gemme Ronzales children of Domingo Ronzales, and Pascuala Lacson, were already living in a house of semistrong materials on the questioned land. In June 1973, the spouses Caro filed an ejectment case against Augusta Chavez, Naciso Galila, Timoteo Parreno, Ramon Aranduque and Rafael Galotera, involving Lot Nos. 56, 59 and 60. In 1974, the spouses filed an ejectment and illegal detainer case against Ramon Aranduque, Timoteo Parreno and Augusta Chavez, involving Lot No. 54. On June 4, 1975,Caro filed a complaint for the cancellation of Certificate of Title No. 0-6836, reconveyance, recovery of possession and damages on the ground of fraud. During the pendency of the case, Caro died, so he was substituted by his heirs, namely, Eliseo Caro, Carlos Caro, Benito Caro, Carmen Caro Batayola and Lorenzo Caro. However, the trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the dismissal was affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether or not the action filed by Caro (Civil Case No. 10235) has prescribed.

RULING: Under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable. Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which provides: In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of registration on the original petition or application. This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which provides: Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. Hence, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. In the present case, therefore, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 10235 was filed on June 4, 1975, it was well-within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6836 on September 17, 1970. Unfortunately for the petitioners, however, We agree with the respondent court and the trial court that the private respondents did not employ any fraud in securing title to the questioned land. It is clear from the deposition of Caro that as early as 1948, he was already aware of the adverse claim of the private respondents. He should have been vigilant of his right as the allegedly new owner of the questioned land. What he did was the reverse, he slept on his rights for a number of years. Thus, he is estopped by laches from questioning the ownership of the questioned land. Not only that. There is also estoppel in pais in this case because Epifanio Caro filed his answer with respect to Lot No. 54 only while Purificacion Villanueva flied her answer with respect to Lot No. 55. ESTATE OF AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE vs. HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES FACTS: The estate of Amadeo Matute Olave is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land containing an area of 293,578 square meters. In 1965, herein private respondent Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO), as plaintiff, filed Civil Case No. 4623 against respondents, Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute, as defendants, in their capacities as co-administrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness of P19,952.11 and for attorney's fees of P4,988.02. Defendants Carlos V. Matute and Matias S. Matute denied their lack of knowledge and questioning the legality of the claim of SAMCO. The CFI of Manila issued an order directing the administrators to secure the probate court's approval before entering into any transaction involving the seventeen (17) titles of the estate. The parties in Civil Case No. 4623 of the CFI of Davao, submitted to the respondent court an Amicable Settlement whereby the property of the estate of Davao was conveyed and ceded to SAMCO as payment of its claim. However, the said Amicable Settlement signed by the herein respondents was not submitted to and approved by the then CFI of Manila in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, nor notice thereof made to the beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings. Respondent court, despite the opposition of the other parties and despite the utter lack of approval of the probate court in Manila, approved the said Amicable Settlement and gave the same the enforceability of a court decision which, in effect, ceded the property to SAMCO in payment of its claim for only P19,952.11. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court should have given due course to Civil Case No. 4623, and the Order approving the Amicable Settlement. RULING: It was a mistake on the part of respondent court to have given due course to Civil Case No. 4623, much less issue the questioned Order, dated November 10, 1967, approving the Amicable Settlement.

Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that "no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; ..." The claim of private respondent SAMCO being one arising from a contract may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration proceedings in the CFI of Manila for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave; and the claim must be filed within the period prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." (Section 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court). The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shag share pro-rata in the liquidation of the estate of the deceased. It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in filing Civil Case No. 4623 in the then CFI of Davao was to secure a money judgment against the estate which eventually ended in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than twenty-nine (29) hectares of land belonging to the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave in payment of its claim, without prior authority of the probate court of Manila, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, which has the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court. 2. De Guzman v. De Guzman Carillo with - Kalaw v. IAC

Analysis: Both cases are about the proper application of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court on the Accountability of Executors and Administrators. In De Guzman v. De Guzman Carillo, it specifically discussed on Sections 1 and 7 of the said Rule. The issue is on the propriety of certain disbursements as administration expenses made by the administrator. In Kalaw v. IAC, the significant provision is Section 8 of the said Rule regarding the duty of an executor or administrator which is to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or for disposing of the estate. Testate Estate of the Late Felix J. de Guzman. VICTORINO G. DE GUZMAN, vs. CRISPINA DE GUZMAN-CARILLO, ARSENIO DE GUZMAN and HONORATA DE GUZMAN-MENDIOLA FACTS: The deceased testator was survived by eight children. His will was duly probated, and Letters of administration were issued to his son, Doctor Victorino G. de Guzman. One of the properties left was a residential house. In conformity with his last will, that house and the lot on which it stands were adjudicated to his eight children, each being given a one-eighth proindiviso share in the project of partition, which was signed by the eight heirs and which was approved in the lower court's order but without prejudice to the final outcome of the accounting. The administrator submitted four accounting reports for the period from June 16, 1964 to September, 1967. Three heirs Crispina de Guzmans-Carillo Honorata de Guzman-Mendiola and Arsenio de Guzman interposed objections to the administrator's disbursements in the total sum of P13,610.48. ISSUE: Whether or not certain items declared by the administrator are necessary expenses for the settlement of the estate. RULING: An executor or administrator is allowed the necessary expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate. He is entitled to possess and manage the decedent's real and personal estate as long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He is accountable for the whole decedent's estate which has come into his possession, with all the interest, profit, and income thereof, and with the proceeds of so much of such estate as is sold by him, at the price at which it was sold (Sec. 3, Rule 84; Secs. 1 and 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court).

One of the Conditions of the administrator's bond is that he should render a true and just account of his administration to the court. The court may examine him upon oath With respect to every matter relating to his accounting and shall so examine him as to the correctness of his account before the same is allowed, except when no objection is made to the allowance of the account and its correctness is satisfactorily established by competent proof. The heirs, legatees, distributes, and creditors of the estate shall have the same privilege as the executor or administrator of being examined on oath on any matter relating to an administration account." (Sec. 1[c] Rule 81 and secs. 8 and 9, Rule 85, Rules of Court). I. Expenses for the renovation and improvement of the family residence The probate court allowed those expenses because an administrator has the duty to "maintain in tenantable repair the houses and other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such repair to the heirs or devises" when directed to do so by the court (Sec. 2, Rule 84, Rules of Court). As clarified in the Lizarraga case, administration expenses should be those which are necessary for the management of the estate, for protecting it against destruction or deterioration, and, possibly, for the production of fruits. They are expenses entailed for the preservation and productivity of the estate and its management for purposes of liquidation, payment of debts, and distribution of the residue among the persons entitled thereto. It should be noted that the family residence was partitioned proindiviso among the decedent's eight children. Each one of them was given a one-eighth share in conformity with the testator's will. Five of the eight coowners consented to the use of the funds of the estate for repair and improvement of the family home. It is obvious that the expenses in question were incurred to preserve the family home and to maintain the family's social standing in the community. Obviously, those expenses redounded to the benefit of an the co- owners. They were necessary for the preservation and use of the family residence. As a result of those expenses, the co-owners, including the three oppositors, would be able to use the family home in comfort, convenience and security. We hold that the probate court did not err in approving the use of the income of the estate to defray those expenses. II. Expenses incurred by Librada de Guzman as occupant of the family residence without paying rent Those expenses were personal expenses of Librada de Guzman, inuring to her benefit. Those expenses, not being reasonable administration expenses incurred by the administrator, should not be charged against the income of the estate. III. Other expenses Among these expenses is the sum of P100 for stenographic notes which, as admitted by the administrator on page 24 of his brief, should be disallowed. Another item, "representation expenses", was not explained. It should likewise be disallowed. The probate court erred in allowing as expenses of addministration the sum of P268.65 which was incurred during the celebration of the first death anniversary of the deceased. Those expenses are disallowed because they have no connection with the care, management and settlement of the decedent's estate. The other expenses, namely, P19.30 for the lawyer's subsistence and P144 as the cost of the gift to the physician who attended to the testator during his last s are allowable expenses. IV. Irrigation fee The appellants question the deductibility of that expense on the ground that it seems to be a duplication of the item of P1,320 as irrigation fee for the same 1966-67 crop-year. The administrator in his comment filed on February 28, 1978 explained that the item of P1,320 represented the "allotments" for irrigation fees to eight tenants who cultivated the Intan crop, which allotments were treated as "assumed expenses" deducted as farming expenses from the value of the net harvests. The explanation is not quite clear but it was not disputed by the appellants. The fact is that the said sum of P1,049.58 was paid by the administrator to the Penaranda Irrigation System as shown in Official Receipt No. 3596378 dated April 28, 1967. It was included in his accounting as part of the farming expenses. The amount was properly allowed as a legitimate expense of administration. WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of April 29, 1968 is affirmed with the modifications that the sum of (a) P1,603.11 as the living expenses of Librada de Guzman. (b) P100 for stenographic notes, (c) P26.25 as representation expenses, and (d) P268.65 as expenses for the celebration of the first anniversary of the decedent's death are disallowed in the administrator's accounts. No costs. SO ORDERED.

ANA LIM KALAW, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HONORABLE RICARDO B. DIAZ AND ROSA LIM KALAW, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: Victoria Lim Kalaw filed an amended petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration naming Ana Lim Kalaw, Victoria Lim Kalaw, Pura Lim Kalaw and Rosa Lim Kalaw as the surviving heirs of the late Carlos Lim Kalaw. The trial court issued an order appointing petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as special administratrix. Consequently, petitioner filed a preliminary inventory of all the properties which came into her possession as special administratrix of the estate of her late father. The trial court issued another order appointing petitioner as the judicial administratrix of said estate and a Letter of Administration was issued to the petitioner. Thereafter, Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner to render an accounting of her administration of said estate which was granted by respondent Judge Ricardo Diaz. private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw together with her sisters Victoria and Pura Lim Kalaw filed a motion to remove petitioner as administratrix of their fathers estate and to appoint instead private respondent on the ground of negligence on the part of petitioner in her duties for failing to render an accounting of her administration since her appointment as administratrix more than six years ago. ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of Petitioner as administratix was proper. RULING: YES, it was proper. Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that: SEC. 8. When executor or administrator to render account.- Every executor or administrator shall render an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or for disposing of the estate; and he shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled. The rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his administration within one year from his appointment is mandatory, as shown by the use of the word shall in said rule. The only exception is when the Court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against the estate or for paying the debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which do not exist in the case at bar. WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, the same is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner. 3. Uy Tioco v. Imperial et. al with - Rodriguez v. Ynza

Analysis: Both cases tackle on the claims for payment of attorney's fees for services rendered in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. In Uy Tioco v. Imperial, an Atty. cannot hold the estate directly liable for his fees. The liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the reimbursement from the estate. On the other hand, in Rodriguez v. Ynza, a trustee or administrator who happens to be a lawyer, may engage the services of another lawyer for the benefit of the estate of the deceased. TEODORICO UY TIOCO, vs. CARLOS IMPERIAL, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and ALEJANDRO M. PANIS FACTS: Respondent Panis was counsel for the administration of the estate of the deceased Basilisa Yangco. Before the final settlement of accounts, Panis presented a motion in the probate proceedings for the allowance of attorney's fees in the sum of P15,000. The respondent judge, over the objections in writing presented by the administrator, granted the motion and allowed the fees claimed by Panis. Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as guardian ad litem of the minors Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, the sons and then the only heirs of the deceased, presented a motion for reconsideration under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the grounds that he was not notified of the motion for the allowance of fees and had no knowledge thereof or of the order granting the motion until a few days before the filing of their motion for reconsideration; that the fees allowed Panis were excessive and prejudicial to the interest of the estate; and that considering the nature of the work performed, the services rendered with him did not warrant the payment of the sum claimed. This motion was denied. Attorney Felix Wijangco, on behalf of Panis, filed a motion in the probated proceedings in which be set forth that the minor Bruno Uy Tioco is now deceased and that his share of inheritance will go to his father, the herein petitioner; that the property involved in the case is community property in which one-half belongs to the petitioner; that consequently the minor Pedro Uy Tioco is only entitled to a one-fourth of the property pertaining to the estate, and that therefore his appeal from the order allowing the attorney's fees can only relate to

one-fourth of the amount allowed, wherefore the movent asked that the administrator be ordered to make payments of three-fourths of the amount within five days from the presentation of the motion. To this motion the guardian ad litem objected, but under the date of March 6, 1928, the respondent judge ordered the administrator to make payment of three-fourths of P15,000 within five days. The administrator refused to make such payment, and on March 17th the court, after citing him to show cause, again ordered him to pay as provided for in the order of March 6, under penalty of removal from office. ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the respondent judge to grant the enforcement of the payment of the attorney's fees. RULING: NO, it was not proper to grant the enforcement of the payment of the attorneys fees. The arguments submitted indicate a misconception of the character of the liability for the attorney's fees are claimed are supposed to have been rendered to the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust. The attorney can therefore not hold the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the reimbursement from the estate. Such payment should be included in his accounts and the reimbursement therefore settled upon the notice prescribed in section 682 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated the respondent judge is hereby prohibited from enforcing the payment of the attorney's fees above-mentioned until the appeal taken by Jacinto Yangco, as guardian ad litem for the minor Pedro Uy Tioco, has been passed upon by this court or dismissed. No costs will be allowed. JOSE YNZA vs. HUGO P. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL FACTS: This is an appeal from the orders of the CFI of Iloilo, authorizing payment to Atty. Benjamin Tirol for professional services. Appellant, Ynza, objects to said payment on the ground that Hugo Rodriguez, trustee of the estate of Julia Ynza, being a member of the bar, he did not need the assistance of Atty. Tirol, and that, at any rate, the latter had rendered legal services, not to the estate of Julia Ynza; but to said Hugo Rodriguez in his individual capacity. Issue: Whether or not Atty. Tirol is entitled to payment for services rendered to Rodriguez. Ruling: YES. Rodriguez was named trustee by reason of his qualifications, not as a lawyer, but as an administrator. He was involved in eight cases, not in his private capacity, but as trustee or administrator of the estate of Julia Ynza. It is clear therefore that as counsel for Rodriguez in said cases, Atty. Tirol had rendered services for the benefit of the estate of Julia Ynza. 4. Santos v. Manarang with Quisumbing v. Guison

Analysis: In Santos v. Manarang, the court ruled that the direction in the will for the executor to pay all just debts does not mean that he shall pay them without probate. There is nothing in the will to indicate that the testator intended that his estate should be administered in any other than the regular way under the statute, which requires "all demands against the estates of the deceased persons," "all such demands as may be exhibited," etc. The statute provides the very means for ascertaining whether the claims against the estate or just debt. In the first case, the claim was not presented at all to the committee on claims which had to pass upon it according to the old law, and this court held that the admission of the debt in the testator's will was not a sufficient reason for the court to allow the creditor's claim which had not been presented to said committee. While, in Quisumbing v. Guison, the admission of the existence of the debt in the inventory filed by the administrator was considered by the court, not as sufficient cause for not filing the appellees claim at all, but as one of the reasonable causes or reasons for his failure to file it within the time previously limited.

ISIDRO SANTOS vs. LEANDRA MANARANG, administratrix

FACTS: Don Lucas de Ocampo possessed certain real and personal property which, by his last will and testament he left to his three children. The provision of the will contained matters pertaining to his unpaid obligations. He mentioned that his debts be paid by his wife and the executors of his estate. The debts cited are in favor of the herein petitioner, Santos. Later, the petitioner advanced his cause to the executor of the estate as the person liable to pay the debts contracted by Don Lucas (deceased). ISSUES: 1. Did the court err in refusing to reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering Plaintiff Santos claim? 2. Whether or not the administratix be compelled to pay to Plaintiff Santos the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him. Ruling: 1. In the present case the time previously limited was six months from July 23, 1907. This allowed the plaintiff until January 23, 1908, to present his claims to the committee. An extension of this time under section 690 rested in the discretion of the court. In other words, the court could extend this time and recall the committee for a consideration of the plaintiff's claims against the estate of justice required it, at any time within the six months after January 23, 1908, or until July 23, 1908. Plaintiff's petition was not presented until July 14, 1909. The bar of the statute of nonclaims is an conclusive under these circumstances as the bar of the ordinary statute of limitations would be. It is generally held that claims are not barred as to property not included in the inventory. So also, as indicated by this court in the case last cited, fraud would undoubtedly have the same effect. These exceptions to the operation of the statute are, of course, founded upon the highest principles of equity. But what is the plea of the plaintiff in this case? Simply this: That he was laboring under a mistake of law a mistake which could easily have been corrected had he sought to inform himself; a lack of information as to the law governing the allowance of claims against estate of the deceased persons which, by proper diligence, could have been remedied in ample to present the claims to the committee. Plaintiff finally discovered his mistake and now seeks to assert his right when they have been lost through his own negligence. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. We conclude that the learned trial court made no error in refusing to reconvene the committee for the purpose of considering plaintiff's claims against the estate. 2. The testator, in so many words, left the total net assets of his estate, without reservation of any kind, to his children per capita. There is no indication that he desired to leave anything by way of legacy to any other person. These considerations clearly refute the suggestion that the testator intended to leave plaintiff anything by way of legacy. His claim against the estate having been a simple debt, the present action was improperly instituted against the administratrix. Intestate estate vs. MARIANO GUISON of the deceased Consuelo Syyap. FRANCISCO QUISUMBING,

FACTS: The deceased, Consuelo Syyap, during her life time executed a promissory note for P3,000 in favor of Leonardo Guison payable sixty (60) days from the date thereof, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. The debtor Consuelo Syyap died on November 30, 1940. On December 5 of the same year, intestate proceedings were instituted and notice given to creditors to file their claim within six (6) months, which period for filing claims expired on August 31, 1941. In the inventory filed on April 30, 1941, by the administrator of the estate of the deceased, the said obligation of P3,000 was acknowledged as one of the liabilities of the decedent. The creditor Leonardo Guison died on December 31, 1941, and his son Mariano Guison, who was appointed as administrator of the intestate estate of his deceased father, filed the claim of P3,000 against the estate on March 9, 1943. The attorney for the claimant, in his reply to the answer of the attorney for the administrator of the estate of Consuelo Syyap, stated that the claimant believed in good faith that he was relieved of the obligation to file a claim with the court, because said administrator had assured him that he should not worry about it, since the debt was in the inventory and he would pay it as soon as he was authorized by the court to do so, and that the same administrator had been paying the interest due on the note up to January, 1943. ISSUE: Whether or not the claim filed by the claimant may be allowed by the court after hearing both parties, without necessity on the part of the claimant to file a previous application. RULING: YES. The court deduced that the claim filed by the appellee may be considered as implying an application for time within which to file said claim, and the order of the lower court allowing such claim impliedly granted said appellee an extension of time within which to file said claim. It would have been a waste of time on the part of the court and the

parties in this case, if the court had dismissed the claim and required the appellee to file, first, an application for a period not exceeding one month within which to file his claim, and then to file his claim within the time granted by the court, when the latter would allow the claim after all. Strict compliance with the said requirement of section 2 of Rule 87 would be necessary if a claim had to be presented to and passed upon by the committee on claims according to the old law; but now as it is to be filed with and passed upon by the court itself, no harm would be caused to the adverse party by such a procedure as was followed in the present case. 5. First National Bank of New York v. Cheng Tan with PNB v. CA and Chua

Analysis: In First National Bank of New York v. Cheng Tan, the court argued that although the judgment has been reduced into a mere of right of action; still it does not argue against the proposition that it should be filed with the probate court for corresponding action. To the contrary, reduced, as it has been, to the condition of a mere right of action, it can well be likened to a promissory note. Like the latter, therefore, it should be submitted as a claim to the probate court where the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor is pending. In PNB v. CA and Chua, it pertains to the remedies available to a morgagee. The remedies are alternative in nature and resort to one remedy waives a morgagees right to resort to others. THE FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK, vs. SILVIO CHENG TAN alias SILVIO CHENG PAN,. FACTS: This case pertains to an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage, ordering the defendants therein, Silvio Cheng Tan alias Silvio Cheng Pan to pay, jointly and severally, The First National City Bank of New York. The properties were mortgaged by the defendants and sold at Public auction to satisfy the judgment. After the sale of the mortgaged properties a deficiency judgment arose. As the other defendants in the case had died or could nowhere be found, and the five-year period for the enforcement of the deficiency judgment by mere motion had elapsed without the same having been satisfied, the First National City Bank of New York instituted the present action against Silvio Cheng Tan in the Court of First Instance of Manila to revive the judgment aforesaid. During the pendency of the case Cheng Tan died and was substituted by his legal representative, Serafin Cheng, who contended that plaintiff should file its claim in the intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of said deceased. Opposing the motion to dismiss, plaintiff contended that the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 59502 having ceased to be executory, demandable and operative, the same had been reduced to a mere right of action. ISSUE: Whether or not said revive judgment be filed with the probate court where settlement of the estate of the deceased is pending. RULING: YES. The deficiency judgment is a contingent claim and must be filed with the probate court where the settlement of the estate of the deceased mortgagor is pending, within the period of time fixed for the filing of claims. On the other hand, Section, 5 Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that, among others, judgments for money against the decedent whose estate is in the process of judicial settlement must be filed with the private court within the time limited in the notice given for that purpose, otherwise they will be deemed barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaim in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the judgment creditor. It is true that a judgment rendered in a civil action remaining unsatisfied after 5 years from its date of entry, is reduced to the condition of a mere right of action, but it does not argue against the proposition that it should be filed with the probate court for corresponding action. To the contrary, reduced, as it has been, to the condition of a mere right of action, it can well be likened to a promissory note. Like the latter, therefore, it should be submitted as a claim to the probate court where the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor is pending. Therefore, revived said judgment could not be enforced except through the probate court. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLAN M. CHUA as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late ANTONIO M. CHUA and Mrs. ASUNCION M. CHUA FACTS: Spouses Antonio M. Chua and Asuncion M. Chua were the owners of a parcel of land. Upon Antonios death, the probate court appointed his son, private respondent Allan M. Chua, special administrator of Antonios intestate estate. The court also authorized Allan to obtain a loan accommodation of five hundred fifty thousand (P550,000.00) pesos from petitioner Philippine National Bank to be secured by a real estate mortgage. Allan failed to pay the loan; and for failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate mortgage, through the Ex-Officio

Sheriff, who conducted a public auction of the mortgaged property pursuant to the authority provided for in the deed of real estate mortgage. PNB instituted an action against both Mrs. Asuncion M. Chua and Allan Chua in his capacity as special administrator of his fathers intestate estate. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from pursuing a civil action for the recovery of the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the property securing the same. RULING: YES. The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate. Clearly, in the courts view, petitioner herein has chosen the m ortgage-creditors option of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the deceased, Antonio M. Chua. Petitioner may no longer avail of the complaint for the recovery of the balance of indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its favor. It follows that in this case no further liability remains on the part of respondents and the late Antonio M. Chuas estate.

10