Psychology of Sport and Exercise 14 (2013) 353e361

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Psychology of Sport and Exercise

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/psychsport

Mental representation and learning: The inuence of practice on the development of mental representation structure in complex action
Cornelia Frank a, b, *, William M. Land a, b, c, Thomas Schack a, b, c
a

Neurocognition and Action e Biomechanics Research Group, Faculty of Psychology and Sports Science, Bielefeld University, Universittsstrae 25, 33615 Bielefeld, Germany Cognitive Interaction Technology e Center of Excellence (CITEC), Bielefeld University, Universittsstrae 21-23, 33615 Bielefeld, Germany c Research Institute for Cognition and Robotics (CoR-Lab), Bielefeld University, Universittsstrae 25, 33615 Bielefeld, Germany
b

a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history: Received 5 July 2012 Received in revised form 4 December 2012 Accepted 4 December 2012 Available online 26 December 2012 Keywords: Cognitive representation Knowledge representation Motor learning SDA-M

a b s t r a c t
Objectives: Recent research has elicited distinct differences in mental representations between athletes of different skill levels. Such differences suggest that the structure of mental representations changes as a function of skill level. However, research examining how such mental representation structures develop over the course of learning is lacking. In the present study, we examine the effects of practice on the development of ones mental representation of a complex action during early skill acquisition. Design: For this purpose, we created a controllable learning situation, using a repeated-measures design with a control group. More specically, novice golfers were randomly assigned to either a practice group (n 12) or a control group (n 12). Both groups were tested before and after an acquisition phase of three days as well as after a three day retention interval. Methods: Mental representation structures of the putt were recorded, employing the structural dimensional analysis of mental representation (SDA-M), which provides psychometric data on the structure and grouping of action concepts in long-term memory. In addition, outcome performance of the practice group was measured, using two-dimensional error scores of the putt. Results: Findings revealed a signicant improvement in task performance, as well as functional changes in the structure of the practice groups mental representation. In contrast, no functional adaptations were evident in the mental representation of the control group. Conclusion: Our ndings suggest that motor skill acquisition is associated with functional adaptations of action-related knowledge in long-term memory. 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

During the last 50 years, researchers from cognitive psychology have identied a close relationship between performance and mediating cognitive mechanisms (e.g., Allard & Burnett, 1985; Allard, Graham, & Paarsalu, 1980; Chase & Simon, 1973; Chi & Rees, 1983; French & Thomas, 1987; de Groot, 1965). Along with superior performance, research on expertise has shown that the expert advantage is associated with numerous cognitive adaptations. For instance, experts are better able to recall domain-specic information (Chase & Simon, 1973), to anticipate future events (Mowbray & Rhoades, 1959), and to make fast and accurate decisions (Tenenbaum, 2003). In addition, a long-standing discussion within this eld of research has addressed the role of mental representations within the organization of actions. According to this, expert performance has been suggested to rely on well
* Corresponding author. Neurocognition and Action e Biomechanics Research Group, Bielefeld University, Universittsstrae 25, 33615 Bielefeld, Germany. Tel.: 49 521 106 5129; fax: 49 521 106 6432. E-mail address: cornelia.frank@uni-bielefeld.de (C. Frank). 1469-0292/$ e see front matter 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psychsport.2012.12.001

developed mental representations (Ericsson & Smith, 1991). Specically, highly-skilled individuals are thought to differ from low-skilled individuals both in their reproducibly superior performance and in their underlying representation of the skill in longterm memory (Ericsson, 2007). According to skill acquisition theories, cognitive mechanisms governing task performance develop over the course of learning (e.g., Anderson, 1982, 1993, 1995; Fitts & Posner, 1967; Magill, 2011). To this extent, motor skill acquisition is suggested to be accompanied by changes in the cognitive control structures that mediate the reliance on attention and working memory. More specically, novice motor performance has been suggested to rely heavily on working memory with movements attended to in a stepwise fashion. In contrast, expert performance is suggested to be supported by integrated task control structures that allow for movements to be automated, thereby placing fewer demands on attention and working memory processes (for an overview, see Beilock, Wierenga, & Carr, 2003). Accordingly, expert performance is suggested to be supported by proceduralized representations,

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which do not rely on attentional control, as opposed to representations of novices that are more declarative in nature. During skill acquisition, these mechanisms are proposed to change based on changes in the learners representation of the skill. Specically, during skill acquisition and development, the representation of a novice is thought to change toward the proceduralized representation of an expert (Beilock, Wierenga, & Carr, 2002). In addressing this, Beilock and Carr (2001) investigated attention and memory processes that support motor skill execution. Specically, in order to learn about differences in underlying representations, generic knowledge (i.e., general memory: prescriptive information about a movement) and episodic knowledge (i.e., specic memory: autobiographical record of a particular performance) of novices and experienced golfers on the putting movement were explored. These different types of skill knowledge served as indicators of the degree of elaboration and proceduralization seen in the golfers underlying representations. According to the authors rationale, with increasing expertise, generic knowledge of the putt was thought to increase as the representation of a movement becomes more elaborate. At the same time, episodic knowledge of the putt was suggested to decrease as the representation becomes more proceduralized, running primarily outside of working memory, and thus not leaving a retrievable episodic record of the task performance. Consistent with these assumptions, ndings revealed that, indeed, experienced golfers gave more detailed generic descriptions of the putt, but less detailed episodic descriptions of particular putts, while the opposite was true for novices. From this, the authors concluded that automatized execution of a movement is controlled via proceduralized representations that reduce attention and working memory demands, thereby resulting in greater generic memory but reduced episodic recall. Similarly, after having trained novices for 650 practice putts, Beilock et al. (2002) found episodic descriptions of trained novices to be similar in the number of reported steps to their generic descriptions. Specically, whereas the generic descriptions of trained novices were similar to those of untrained novices, episodic descriptions were in between those of untrained novices and experienced golfers. This suggests that trained novices representations became more proceduralized with practice. From this and other research, the cognitive mechanisms underlying skill execution are thought to change with skill development, with experienced performers relying on more proceduralized mental representations compared to novices. To date, the mental representations underlying performance have been studied in a variety of disciplines using a broad spectrum of methods (see Hodges, Huys, & Starkes, 2007). One of the rst studies in sport addressing the question whether domain-specic knowledge and task performance relate was that of French and Thomas (1987). In their study, the authors examined the relationship of basketball-specic knowledge and basketball skills in children using paper-and-pencil test. Based on their ndings, namely better shooting skill and more basketball knowledge in expert players in comparison to novice players, the authors were one of the rst to highlight the salient role of knowledge in skilled performance. More recently, in his work on differences in the classication and representation of context-specic problem states using specic sorting techniques and interview methods, Huber (1997) found that experts nodes (i.e., central concepts) of representations possess more features compared to novices. Besides that, fewer connections between concepts have been found in novices. Furthermore, by way of categorization tasks, Allard and Burnett (1985) could show that experts adhere to functional principles when classifying problems while novices rather rely on supercial features. With the help of questionnaire methods and

interviews, McPherson et al. have been able to reveal the organization of movement knowledge for tennis (McPherson & Kernodle, 2003; McPherson & Thomas, 1989) and a variety of other sport domains (French & McPherson, 1999, 2004). From this and other research, ndings suggest that experts maintain more rened mental representations for specic domains, and that such elaborate representations allow for a more rened execution of appropriate actions relative to novices (Ericsson, 2007; Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Ericsson & Towne, 2010). Early research on object representations (e.g., Hoffmann, 1986; Rosch, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) suggests that knowledge is represented in taxonomies of hierarchically organized memory structures. Furthermore, these representations are suggested to provide the functional basis for the everyday interaction with objects (Hoffmann, 1990). Similarly, the cognitive action architecture approach (CAA-A, Schack, 2004; Schack & Mechsner, 2006; Schack & Ritter, 2009) suggests that the mental representations of high-level motor skills are also organized within hierarchical memory structures comprised of basic action concepts (BACs). Analogous to the well-established notion of basic concepts in the world of objects (Mervis & Rosch, 1981), BACs denote the cognitive compilation of body postures along with their sensory consequences that are functionally related to the attainment of action goals. From such an action architecture perspective, mental representations can be characterized by well integrated networks of action concepts that serve as tools to facilitate the controllability of the motor system (Blsing, Schack, & Brugger, 2010; Blsing, Tenenbaum, & Schack, 2009; Schack & Ritter, 2009). By way of an experimental approach, Schack and Mechsner (2006) studied the tennis serve in high-level experts compared to low-level and non-tennis players in order to investigate the nature and role of long-term memory in skilled athletic performance. Employing structural dimensional analysis of mental representation (SDA-M; Schack, 2004, 2012), the authors analyzed representational frameworks for the tennis serve, and found that the structures of the experts representations were organized in a distinctive tree-like hierarchy, were remarkably similar across individuals, and were well matched with the functional and biomechanical demands of the task. In comparison, the structures of mental representations in low-level players and non-players were organized in a less distinctive tree-like hierarchy, were much more variable across individuals, and were not as well matched with the functional and biomechanical demands of the task. These results have been shown to generalize across a variety of complex motor skills such as in dancing (Blsing, 2010; Blsing et al., 2009), judo (Weigelt, Ahlmeyer, Lex, & Schack, 2011), volleyball (Velentzas, Heinen, Tenenbaum, & Schack, 2010), wind surng (Schack & Hackfort, 2007), and manual action (Stckel, Hughes, & Schack, 2012). Moreover, recent research on mental representations in special populations such as children and stroke patients (Braun et al., 2007; Stckel et al., 2012) suggests that cognitive structures differ across both skill-levels and age. For example, Stckel et al. (2012) examined the development of mental representations of grasp postures in children of different ages. Similar to the characteristics of experts mental representations, the authors found 9-year-old childrens mental representations to be hierarchically organized according to the function of the grasp postures. Specically, 9-year-old childrens mental representation structures reected distinct differences between comfortable and uncomfortable grasp postures, whereas 7-year-old and 8-year-old childrens mental representations were less structured, and did not indicate any distinct differentiation between comfortable and uncomfortable grasp postures. From these results, the authors concluded that mental representations develop as a function of age,

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such that a childs ability to successfully distinguish between a comfortable and an uncomfortable grasp posture seems to mature on the basis of developing cognitive structures. Differences in the mental representation across skill-levels and age suggest the idea that motor learning leads to functional adaptations in ones mental representation of a motor skill. That is, novices unstructured mental representations are thought to develop into more rened and elaborate representations during the process of learning. This is in line with the general idea of learning within the cognitive architecture framework. From such a perspective, learning is a product of modifying and developing the mediating conceptual structures (BACs) within the memory system (Schack, 2004; Schack & Ritter, in press). However, to date, research has largely focused on the differences between intact groups (e.g., novices and experts) using a between-subjects approach. If we assume that learning results in the modication and development of mental representations, then changes in ones representational structure should be evident over the course of skill acquisition. Therefore, we examined the potential for ones mental representation to functionally adapt to the biomechanical demands of the task during early skill acquisition as a consequence of task practice. By creating an experimentally induced controllable learning situation, we examined whether performance improvement is accompanied by order formation of action-related knowledge in long-term memory. It was predicted that, along with performance improvements, changes to the underlying mental representation would be evident as a consequence of skill acquisition. Specically, it was predicted that during the course of learning, the initial unstructured mental representation of a novice practice group would elicit structural changes in the form of clusters of BACs which are related to the movement and its phases. Furthermore, it was predicted that the structural changes would reect development toward the representation structure of expert performers (i.e., functional adaptations). In contrast, a novice control group, which does not partake in task practice, was predicted to show no changes to their initial unstructured mental representation. Method Participants Twenty-four students (12 women, 12 men; mean age in years 27.3, SD 5.9) participated in the present study. All participants were novice golfers with no previous golf experience. They were randomly assigned to either a practice group (n 12, mean age 26.08, SD 4.48, 6 male) or a control group (n 12, mean age 28.50, SD 6.95, 6 male), who did not practice the putting task. The study was conducted in accordance with local ethical guidelines, and conformed to the declaration of Helsinki. Structural dimensional analysis of mental representation Although various methods that allow for the study of knowledge-based mental representation structures of movements in long-term memory exist (for an overview, see Hodges et al., 2007), most of them are non-experimental and focus on explicit knowledge (e.g., interviews, questionnaires, paper-and-pencil tests). Aiming at an experimental approach in which subjects are not asked to give explicit statements on their representation structure, Schack (2012) introduced structural dimensional analysis of mental representation (SDA-M). This method provides psychometric data on the structure and dimension of mental representations of complex movements in long-term memory. The SDA-M consists of four steps: In a rst step, a split procedure delivers a distance scaling between the BACs of a suitably

predetermined set. In a second step, a hierarchical cluster analysis is used to outline the structure of the given set of BACs. In a third step, a factor analysis reveals the dimensions in this structured set of BACs, and in a last step, the cluster solutions are tested for invariance within and between groups (for details, see Schack, 2012). Selected complex movement and its structure The putt in golf is considered one of the most important parts of the game as it represents 43% of all golf shots taken during a round of golf (Pelz & Frank, 2000). For the purpose of the present study, BACs of golf putting were utilized. In order to specify the BACs of the chosen movement, the following steps were necessary: First, the movement and movement phases were described in detail with the help of standard textbooks (e.g., Hamster, 2008; Pelz & Frank, 2000) and the biomechanical analysis of the golf putt. The parts of the movement considered most relevant resulted in a preliminary set of 27 meaningful body postures. The 27 body postures were further rated and veried by golf experts1 (n 5). In a last step, a nal set of 16 BACs were selected based on the experts ratings. Based on the procedure described above, the following 16 BACs for the putt were identied: (1) shoulders parallel to target line, (2) align club face square to target line, (3) grip check, (4) look to the hole, (5) rotate shoulders away from the ball, (6) keep armsshoulder triangle, (7) smooth transition, (8) rotate shoulders toward the ball, (9) accelerate club, (10) impact with the ball, (11) club face square to target line at impact, (12) follow-through, (13) rotate shoulders through the ball, (14) decelerate club, (15) direct clubhead to planned position, (16) look to the outcome. From a functional and biomechanical perspective (cf. Ghner, 1992, 1999), each of the 16 BACs can be assigned to a particular movement phase: preparation (BAC 1e4), backswing (BAC 5e7), forward swing (BAC 8e11), and attenuation (BAC 12e16). In other words, the rst phase (i.e., preparation phase) consists of the performer setting up and aligning his/her body to the hole. The second phase (i.e., backswing) consists of the start of the backswing and transition between back and forward swing. The third phase (i.e., forward swing) relates to the acceleration of the clubhead as well as to the mechanical and functional qualities associated with clubhead-ball impact. Finally, the attenuation phase consists of the follow through and evaluation of the outcome. Apparatus and task A standard putter and golf ball were used in the present study. Putts were performed on an articial indoor putting green to a target three meters away from the starting point. Participants were instructed to putt a golf ball as accurately as possible to the target, on which the ball was supposed to stop.2 Instead of a hole, a target was chosen for the present study, in order to measure twodimensional error scores as opposed to hits only. The target was marked by a circle 10.8 cm (4.25 in) in diameter in accordance with the size of a regulation golf hole. In order to record the outcome of each golf putt, a video camera was positioned above the target to capture a top-down view of the nal ball position after each putt (eld of view: 3.3 m 1.8 m). Mental representation structure was assessed using a splitting task, rst step of the above described SDA-M, in order to learn

Teaching professionals from different golf clubs in Germany. Although skilled golfers use a strategy of putting past the hole, requiring our novice participants to attempt to stop the ball on the target was not assumed to negatively interfere with performance, as the novices would have not previously developed the strategy of putting past the hole.
2

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about the distance between BACs in memory. This splitting task was performed in front of a computer with the screen displaying the BACs of the golf putt. In detail, the splitting task proceeds as follows: one selected basic action concept is permanently displayed on the screen (anchor concept) while the rest of the basic action concepts are presented successively in randomized order; participants are asked to decide, one after another, whether a given basic action concept is related to the anchor concept or not during movement execution; once a given list of BACs is nished, the next BAC serves as an anchor concept and the procedure continues. The splitting task ends after each BAC has been compared to the remaining BACs in the list. Procedure The present study consisted of three test days (pre-, post-, retention-test) and an acquisition phase (see Table 1). Pre-test On the rst day, participants signed informed consent forms. In order to become familiar with the movement, all participants watched a video of a skilled golfer performing the putting task. Next, the experimenter introduced the participant to the splitting task. First, each participant was presented a randomized list of the 16 BACs of the putt. The experimenter explained the meaning of each of the 16 BACs to the participant in order to ensure comprehension. Next, the participants read the instructions on the screen for how to complete the splitting task. Specically, participants were instructed to decide whether the basic action concepts are related to one another or not during movement execution. Following, the participants completed the splitting task to determine their starting mental representation structures of the putt. Furthermore, the practice group then performed three blocks of 20 putts each to assess their starting performance level. Participants were instructed to putt a golf ball as accurately as possible to the target, on which the ball was supposed to stop. The control group did not perform the putting task. Finally, each participant was asked to not consult any information on golf in general and the putt in particular for the duration of the experiment. Acquisition phase The next three days, participants of the practice group performed the putting task 10 blocks of 20 putts each day with a short break between every two blocks. No feedback on technical issues was given during putting. The only feedback available for the participant was that of the visible outcome (i.e., knowledge of result). The control group did not practice during this time. Post-test and retention-test During post-test (day ve) and retention-test (day eight) all participants completed the splitting task again to determine their nal mental representation structures of the putt movement. Next, participants of the practice group performed three blocks of 20
Table 1 Design of the study including three test days and an acquisition phase. Pre-test Day 1 Practice group Control group SDA-M Putting task SDA-M e Acquisition Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Post-test Day 5 SDA-M Putting task SDA-M e Retention-test Day 8 SDA-M Putting task SDA-M e

putts once more to assess their nal outcome performance. The control group again did not perform the putting task. Data analysis Performance Putting performance was measured by (a) accuracy, (b) bias, and (c) consistency. The accuracy, bias, and consistency of outcomes were assessed using two-dimensional error scores based on the x and y coordinates of each putt using the center of the target as the origin of the axes (see Hancock, Butler, & Fischman, 1995). More specically, accuracy was measured by the mean radial error (MRE), which was dened as a subjects average distance each putt came to the center of the target in centimeters. Bias was represented by subject-centroid radial error (SRE). SRE was dened as the radial distance of the subjects centroid from the center of the target in centimeters. A subjects centroid is a positionally typical shot whose coordinates are given by the average x and average y value of a subjects shots in centimeters. Consistency was measured by bivariate variable error (BVE). BVE is analogous to variable error in one-dimensional analyses, and was dened as the square root of a subjects k shots mean squared distance from their centroids in centimeters. To examine performance during acquisition phase, a 3 (day) 10 (block) within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated for each of the dependent variables. Additionally, performance from pre- to post- and retention-test was examined using a 1 (group) 3 (time of measurement) within-subjects ANOVA for each of the dependent variables. For post-hoc analysis, paired ttests were conducted employing a Bonferroni correction (a .017) to account for the ination of type I errors. Cohens d was used as an estimator of effect size (Cohen, 1992). Mental representation structure Mental representation structure was measured by calculation of mean group dendrograms via cluster analysis (i.e., by summing the Z-matrices of the individuals; for more details see Schack, 2012). For all cluster analyses conducted, an alpha-level of a .05 was chosen, which resulted in a critical value dcrit 3.41. Links between BACs above this critical value were considered as statistically irrelevant. In other words, BACs linked above this line were treated as being not related, while BACs linked below this line resulted in a cluster and therefore were treated as being statistically related. Analyses of invariance were conducted in order to compare differences between cluster solutions. According to Lander (1991, 1992; see Schack, 2012), two cluster solutions are variant, that is signicantly different, for l < .68, while two cluster solutions are invariant for l  .68. In addition, the adjusted rand index (ARI; Rand, 1971; Santos & Embrechts, 2009) was used to examine the similarity between the practice groups mental representation and that of expert performers. The adjusted rand index serves as an index of similarity on a scale from 1 to 1. On this scale, the value 1 indicates that two cluster solutions are different and the value 1 indicates that two cluster solutions are the same. Indices between these extremes rank similarity between two cluster solutions. As a reference structure, mental representations of two experts were used which reected well the four movement phases (i.e., preparation, backswing, forward swing, and attenuation) of the putt. Results Performance Acquisition phase A 3 (day) 10 (block) within-subjects ANOVA on MRE indicated a signicant main effect of day, F(2,22) 23.76, p < .001, h2 p .68, as

Putting practice

Note: SDA-M: structural dimensional analysis of mental representation; putting task: 3 20 putts, putting practice: 10 20 putts each day.

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well as a signicant main effect of block, F(9,99) 13.46, p < .001, h2 p .55 (see also Fig. 1). The day by block interaction, F(18,198) 1.11, p .384, h2 p .09, was not signicant. For bias, a 3 10 within-subjects ANOVA on SRE revealed a signicant main effect of block, F(9,99) 8.04, p < .001, h2 p .42. The main effect of day, F(2,22) 2.49, p .106, h2 p .19, as well as the day by block interaction, F(18,198) 1.35, p .163, h2 p .11, were not signicant. For consistency, a 3 10 within-subjects ANOVA on BVE revealed a signicant main effect of day, F(2,22) 18.61, p < .001, h2 p .63, as well as a signicant main effect of block, F(9,99) 14.19, p < .001, h2 p .56. The day by block interaction, F(18,198) 1.30, p .189, h2 p .11, was not signicant. Thus, for the two dependent variables MRE and BVE, performance improved both over acquisition days as well as within acquisition days, while for SRE performance improved only between acquisition days. Pre-, post-, and retention-test Table 2 presents means, standard deviations, and condence intervals at pre-, post- and retention-test for the three dependent variables (accuracy, bias, and consistency) for the practice group. With respect to accuracy, a within-subjects ANOVA on MRE revealed a signicant effect of time of measurement, F(2,22) 76.15, p < .001, h2 p .87. Post-hoc analyses indicated that MRE decreased signicantly from pre-test to post-test, t(11) 8.49, p < .001, d 1.60, and from pre-test to retention-test, t(11) 11.61, p < .001, d 2.53, but not from post-test to retention-test, t(11) 2.79, p .018, d .54. For bias, a within-subjects ANOVA on SRE revealed no signicant effect of time of measurement, F(2,22) .67, p .500, h2 p .06. Consequently, participants did not differ in their magnitude of bias after task practice. For consistency, a within-subjects ANOVA on BVE revealed a signicant effect of time of measurement, F(2,22) 73.31, p < .001, h2 p .87. Pairwise comparisons indicated that BVE decreased signicantly from pre-test to posttest, t(11) 8.06, p < .001, d 1.37, and from pre-test to retention-test, t(11) 11.72, p < .001, d 2.08, as well as from posttest to retention-test, t(11) 2.90, p .014, d .48. Mental representation structure As can be seen in Fig. 2, cluster analysis revealed little to no clustering in the mean group dendrograms of each group at pre-

test (with critical value dcrit 3.41). More specically, the control groups dendrogram revealed no signicant clusters of BACs, while the practice groups dendrogram displayed only a single cluster pertaining to aspects of movement preparation, that is to say BAC 2 (align club face square to target line) and BAC 3 (grip check). In comparison to the reference structure, both dendrograms reected a very different structure, with the adjusted rand index being zero for the control group and close to zero (ARI .11) for the practice group. While no discernible structure existed for the practice group at baseline (i.e., pre-test), signicant changes were observed after substantial task practice. More specically, during pre-test examination, the groups mean dendrogram displayed only one cluster of basic action concepts. However, post-test examination as well as for retention-test examination of the groups mean dendrograms uncovered an increase in the number of functional clusters (see Fig. 3). Statistical analyses of invariance revealed signicant differences between pre-test and post-test (l .32) as well as between pre-test and retention-test (l .31). The BACs have become clustered into three functional units pertaining to the movement preparation phase and the swing phase. One cluster denoted the preparation of the putt with BAC 1 (shoulders parallel to target line), BAC 2 (align club face square to target line), BAC 3 (grip check), and BAC 4 (lock to the hole). A second cluster related to aspects of the forward swing with BAC 8 (rotate shoulders toward the ball) and BAC 9 (accelerate club). Lastly, a third cluster related to clubheadball impact as indicated by a cluster including BAC 10 (impact with the ball) and BAC 11 (club face square to target line at impact). Although the dendrograms for the post-test and retention-test both displayed a three cluster solution, one slight difference existed between the post-test and retention-test dendrogram. Namely, for the preparation phase, the post-test dendrogram consisted of three BACs (BAC 2 e align club face square to target line; BAC 3 e grip check; BAC 4 e lock to the hole), however, the dendrogram for the retention-test included one additional BAC (BAC 1 e shoulders parallel to target line). Despite this slight difference, the two cluster solutions of post-test and retention-test are statistically considered the same (l .68). To assess the degree of functional adaptation, the mental representations of the practice group were compared to the mental representation of expert golfers (n 2). The adjusted rand index

Fig. 1. Mean radial error in cm per block for the practice group during acquisition phase (i.e., three consecutive days of practice). Error bars represent standard errors.

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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for performance outcome variables across pre-test, post-test, and retention-test for the practice group in cm (n 12). Variable Pre-test M (SD) Accuracy Bias Consistency 63.20 (11.92) 13.23 (10.93) 72.22 (15.99) 95% CI [55.63, 70.77] [6.29, 20.18] [62.06, 82.38] Post-test M (SD) 43.99 (12.04) 8.95 (7.73) 50.60 (15.53) 95% CI [36.34, 51.64] [4.04, 13.86] [40.74, 60.74] Retention-test M (SD) 38.78 (6.65) 10.60 (8.32) 44.33 (10.26) 95% CI [34.60, 43.01] [5.31, 15.89] [37.81, 50.85]

Note: CI condence interval.

indicated that over the course of practice, the mean dendrograms of the practice group became more similar to those of experts. Specically, when being compared to an expert structure, the mean dendrograms of the practice group developed from pre-test (ARI .11) to post-test (ARI .49) and retention-test (ARI .70), with the adjusted rand index approaching the value 1. That is, the cluster solutions became more similar to the reference structure (i.e., expert structure) over time. For the control group, results revealed no changes in the groups mental representation structure for the putt. More specically, for pre-test as well as for post- and retention-test the groups mean dendrograms indicated no clustering of basic action concepts (see Fig. 4). When being compared to the expert structure, the mean dendrograms of the control group did not indicate any development over time (ARI 0 for pre-, post-, as well as retention-test). Each of the 16 BACs of the putting movement were treated as independent across pre-, post-, and retention-testing.

Discussion In the present study, we examined the development and change in both performance and the structure of the mental representation of a complex movement during early skill acquisition. The results clearly demonstrate order formation of action-related knowledge in long-term memory (i.e., changes in mental representation structure) that comes along with improvements in outcome performance over the course of practice. With respect to outcome performance, accuracy as well as consistency increased signicantly over the course of the study.3 That is, participants in the practice group did not only become more accurate but also more consistent in their putting performance. Thus, as we expected, novice golfers outcome performance became better with practice. This result is in line with the power law of practice (Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981; Schmidt & Lee, 2005). The power function and its logarithmic relationships between practice trials and performance state that performance increases as a function of practice. According to Schmidt and Lee (2005), this is especially true for novices since, when being new to a task, there is much room left for improvement. Moreover, since performance improvements recorded at post-test persisted throughout retention test, it can be stated that improved outcome performance reects skill acquisition as a result of motor learning. With respect to mental representation structure, the practice groups structure elicited changes over the course of practice while the control group, without practice, did not show changes in their mental representation structure. Consistent with our predictions, following practice the group dendrogram of the practice group indicated several meaningful clusters relating to the functional phases of the movement (i.e., preparation and forward swing). Moreover, the observed changes revealed a trend toward the representational structure of experts as shown by increases in adjusted rand indices from pre-, to post-, and to retention-test. Thus, the results of the present study clearly demonstrate that practice results in functional adaptations in the mental representation of complex action. That is, motor learning in early skill acquisition is accompanied by order formation of action-related knowledge in the direction of a functional structure of the movement. These ndings extend those of Schack and Mechsner (2006) as well as those of Blsing et al. (2009) who showed differences in mental representation structure in relation to differences in skill level. In these studies, high skill-level was characterized by high order formation, whereas low skill-level was characterized by low order formation. Contrary to such cross-sectional designs, a longitudinal design was chosen for the present study. In doing so, the present study was the rst to show that the mental representation of a complex movement not only differs between subjects according to skill level, but develops over time within subjects

Fig. 2. Mean group dendrograms of (a) the practice group (n 12) and (b) the control group (n 12) for the golf putt at pre-test. The numbers on the x-axis relate to the BAC number, the numbers on the y-axis display Euclidean distances. The lower the link between related BACs, the lower is the Euclidean distance. The horizontal dotted line marks dcrit for a given a-level (dcrit 3.41; a .05): Links between BACs above this line are considered not related; horizontal gray lines on the bottom mark clusters. BACs: (1) shoulders parallel to target line, (2) align club face square to target line, (3) grip check, (4) look to the hole, (5) rotate shoulders away from the ball, (6) keep arms-shoulder triangle, (7) smooth transition, (8) rotate shoulders toward the ball, (9) accelerate club, (10) impact with the ball, (11) club face square to target line at impact, (12) follow-through, (13) rotate shoulders through the ball, (14) decelerate club, (15) direct clubhead to planned position, and (16) look to the outcome.

3 Although accuracy and consistency increased signicantly, a change in bias was not signicant. This nding was due to the distribution of putts being dispersed uniformly about the hole in both the pre-test and post-test.

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Fig. 3. Practice groups mean dendrograms for the golf putt at (a) post-test and (b) retention-test (n 12; a .05; dcrit 3.41).

during skill acquisition. The changes observed in the mental representation structures in the present study highlight initial functional order formation. In other words, preliminary increases in skill level were accompanied by initial changes in the mental representation structure toward an expert structure. The ndings of the present study t well into the large body of research on the learning of perceptual-motor skills, and especially the concept of different stages of skill acquisition (Anderson, 1982,

Fig. 4. Control groups mean dendrograms for the golf putt at (a) post-test and (b) retention-test (n 12; a .05; dcrit 3.41).

1995; Fitts & Posner, 1967). According to Fitts and Posner (1967) proposing three phases of skill learning (cognitive, associative, and autonomous), skill acquisition starts with an early cognitive phase in which a novice attempts to understand a task and its demands regardless of whether the attempts are guided or not. In collecting information and acquiring knowledge, rules may develop resulting in order formation of action-related knowledge, and thus in a functional mental representation structure. Interestingly, while mental representation structures developed over the course of practice, no information on the movement was given besides that provided by the video prior to the pre-test. That is, participants of the practice group received no explicit instructions in terms of movement technique. This gives rise to the assumption that changes in mental representation structure take place during the process of learning without explicit guidance on what to pay attention to and how to perform the movement. This observation is in line with ndings from other studies, suggesting that novices are able to accumulate knowledge that directs their performance, even in the absence of explicit instructions (e.g., Hardy, Mullen, & Jones, 1996). Relating to this, it is currently not clear to what extent explicit or implicit learning processes (cf. Masters, 1992) contribute to the development of mental representation structure of complex actions. Examining the effect of these learning strategies on skill representation may be a fruitful direction for future research. It is also important to note that, besides showing that repeatedly executing a movement leads to functional adaptations in ones mental representation, we were able to show, on the other hand, that not executing a movement does not lead to functional adaptations in ones mental representation. Specically, the mental representation of the control group did not reveal any structure, neither at pre-test, post-test, or retention-test, and thus did not change. Hence, with the longitudinal design of the study, we were the rst to show that participants, who were not practicing the task, revealed stable unstructured representations over time. Consequently, participants did not learn from the method itself. Taken together, by showing that the representation structure of the control group did not change over time, we were able to demonstrate that SDA-M is a reliable method for the investigation of representation structures over time. A potential limitation in the current study was that we did not examine whether the learned skill transfers to a related task. To this extent, we only focused on the persistence of the acquired skill over time, through the use of a retention test. Specically, we retested subjects after a retention interval of 72 h in order to differentiate between immediate performance improvements and persistent performance improvements (i.e., learning). However, it would be valuable to test for transfer in future studies, in order to examine whether the extent of skill transfer relates to mental representation structure. Moreover, investigating the relationship of performance and underlying mental representations on an individual level, rather than group level, may prove to be a valuable objective for future research. Specically, future research should address the extent to which the degree of improvement in an individuals performance over practice coincides with the degree of development in their individual mental representation. To conclude, with the present study it was possible to answer the question if, during early stages of skill acquisition, performance improvement of a complex movement is accompanied by changes in the structure of ones mental representation in long-term memory. According to our results, order formation in mental representation structure develops in novices practicing a complex skill. Although the results of the present study exclusively relate to early skill acquisition, it is proposed that such changes in mental representation structure will proceed during further skill

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acquisition. It would be of interest to learn more about the evolution and the progress of order formation of action-related knowledge, and its relation to learning curves, both on a group as well as an individual level. Therefore, changes in mental representation structure over the course of learning up to a suitable functional and high-level order formation will be a key issue for future research. Specically, to examine ways to facilitate the development of mental representation structure during learning will be a main objective in the future. Focusing on the role of the structure of ones mental representation will hopefully shed further light on how to pave the way to expertise, the way to both high-level order formation and high-level performance. Acknowledgments Cornelia Frank gratefully acknowledges the nancial support from the German Research Foundation grant DFG EXC 277 Cognitive Interaction Technology (CITEC). William Land gratefully acknowledges the nancial support from the EU grant FP7-ICT248311 (AMARSi). References
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