CHAPTER 4:

CONCLUSIUN

Part

I:

Operational Differences

Although t h e fundamental

purpose o f t h i s t h e s i s

is t o

u n c o v e r any common t e n e t s b y w h i c h t w o s u c c e s s f u l
of

pract it loners
in

the operational

a r t operated,

there

is u t i l i t y

d i s c o v e r i n g h o u t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s were d i s i m i l a r

Hence,

before Gudrr i a n

d i s c u s s i n g t e n e t s common t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l m e t h o d s o f and P a t t o n , First, a c o n t r a s t between t h e i r methods it

is i n o r d e r .

i s t r u e t h a t b o t h P a t t o n and G u d e r i a n b e l i e v e d

i n a combined arms c o n c e p t b u t d i s a g r e e d on t h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f c o m b i n e d arms o r g a n i z a t i o n s a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l of war.

G u d e r i a n t h o u g h t t h a t a c o m b i n e d arms t e a m b u i l t a r o u n d t h e tanK--the panzer d i u ision--was the appropriate instrument corps

and g r o u p commanders s h o u l d h a v e a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l t o a c h i e v e t h e o p e r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s Guder i a n s o u g h t . Moreouer

he

b e l i e v e d s u c h p a n z e r d i v i s i o n s s h o u l d b e ernployed i n heavy concentrations of corps-size u n i t s both t o achieve t a c t i c a l Patton, on t h e o t h e r

p e n e t r a t i o n and o p e r a t i o n a l e x p l o i t a t i o n . hand,

e n v i s i o n e d a more b a l a n c e d employment o f armored w h i c h h e o b t a i n e d b y d i s p e r s i n s ti i s a r m o r e d

d i v i s ions,

182

diuisions throughout h i s corps.

Ostensibly,

t h i s gave each o f

h i 5 c o r p s commanders t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o e x p l o i t w i t h a r m o r e d forces tactical p e n e t r a t i o n s achieved by assigned infantry

diuisions.

It i s a r g u a b l e t h a t

in doing t h i s Patton traded the

o p e r a t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y t o e x p l o i t d e e p l y w i t h an a r m o r e d c o r p s for the capability t o e x p l o i t t a c t i c a l l y a t the corps leuel.

It

a l s o s u g g e s t s t h a t P a t t o n ' s c o r p s p e r f o r m e d more o f a t a c t i c a l r o l e t h a n an o p e r a t l o n a l r o l e t h r o u g h o u t h i s E u r o p e a n operations. And s i n c e P a t t o n s e l d o m r e t a i n e d a s i z a b l e

o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e a t army,

it i s doubtful t h a t Patton's

a p p r o a c h t o ach i e u ing o p e r a t i o n a l dec i s i u e n e s s w o u l d have been e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t s t r o n g enemy r e s i s t a n c e . successful campaigns--Falaise-Wgentan, P a l a t inate--were R e c a l l t h a t h i s most

p u r s u i t t u t h e Seine,
in

waged a g a i n s t a r e t r e a t i n s enerny w h e r e a s

troth t h e B u l g e and L o r r a i n e Campaigns, defended staunchly, costly.

In part,

i n w h i c h t h e enemy

P a t t o n ' s a p p r o a c h was b o t h l a b o r i o u s a n d

t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n Guder i a n ' s and P a t t o n

'5

a p p r o a c h e s t o cornbined arms u a r f a r e a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l can be a t t r i b u t e d t o d o c t r i n a l d i f f e r e n c e s . command o f f i m e r i c a n combat f o r c e s , he

leuel

When P a t t o n assumed

inherited a doctrine that

regarded the well

i n f a n t r y d i u i s l o n a s an o r g a n i z a t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y tactical p e n e t r a t i o n and t h e armored d i v i s i o n Moreover, there are h i s t o r i c a l

suited for

appropriate for political,

exploitation,

and g e o g r a p h i c a l r e a s o n s t o be1 i e v e t h a t A m e r i c a had a r t a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of

no m a t u r e c o n c e p t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n a l

183

W o r l d War

I!.

I n e s s e n c e , flmer i c a n c o m m a n d e r s e n t e r e d t h e war

w i t h b o t h a t a c t i c a l a n d a s t r a t e g i c c o n c e p t i o n b u t n o mature understsnding a b o u t how t o l i n K t a c t i c s a n d s t r a t e g y w i t h i n a

t h e a t e r , p r e c i s e l v t h e f u n c t i o n o f o v e r a t i o n a l a r t . Unl iKe P a t t o n , G u d e r i a n e n t e r e d t h e war n o t o n l y w i t h a d o c t r i n e o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t b u t w i t h an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e w i t h which

t o e x e c u t e t h a t d o c t r i n e . More t h a n t h i s , h o w e v e r , G u d e r i a n
helped deuelnp t h e d o c t r i n e and t h e panzer o r g a n i z a t i o n s needed t o execute t h e doctrine,
t h a t doctrine a n d h e was
it

instrumental

in putting

i n t o e f f e c t . Hence,

is n o w o n d e r t h a t G u d e r i a n arms c o n c e p t i o n , t h o u g h

and P a t t o n d i f f e r e d

i n t h e i r combined

it r e m a i n s b o t h t r u e and s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e y

saw t h e n e e d f o r

a c o m b i n e d arms a p p r o a c h t o o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . S e c o n d , w h e r e a s Guder i a n a t t a c l t e d w i t h p a n z e r c o r p s on r e l a t i v e l v n a r r o w f r o n t s , P a t t o n a t t a c K e d on b r o a d f r o n t s w i t h
h i s armor d i s p e r s e d . figair,, d o c t r i n a l d i f f e r e n c e s h e l p e x p l a i n

t h e i r d i f f e r e n t m e t h o d s . What is s i g n i f i c a n t

is t h a t b o t h

P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n saw t h e v a l u e i n s e i z i n g t h e

i n i t i a t i v e and

i n K e e p t n g t h e enemy o f f b a l a n c e , b u t P a t t o n ' s o p e r a t i o n s
f o c u s e d more on r e t a i n i n g t h e t a c t i c a l

i n i t i a t i v e and
i n i t iat iue

Guder i a n ' s o p e r a t i o n s S o u g h t t o r e t a i n o p e r a t i o n a l
try

StpiKing

i n great depth with panzer Corps.

edditionally,

in

o r d e r t o g a i n t h e t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l s u r p r i s e needed t o

seize the operational

i n i t i a t i u e and a c h i e v e t h e d e p t h

n e c e s s a r y f o r o p e r a t i o n a l d e c i s i u e n e s s , G u d e r i a n was w i l l i n g t o g o t o great length:.

In p a r t i c u l a r , h e placed s t r o n g emphasis

194

o n d e c e p t i o n a n d secrecy g a i n e d t h r o u g h movement a t n i g h t a n d o n c o n t i n u o u s o p e r a t i o n s o n c e a n attacK s t a r t e d . A l t h o u g h P a t t o n m a d e 5ome u s e o f d e c e p t i o n a n d n i g h t m o u e m e n t , h e d i d n o t P l a c e much e m p h a s i s o n e i t h e r t e c h n i q u e , remarKing t h a t

it

is b e t t e r t o h a l t t w o h o u r s b e f o r e d W K , r e s t t h e s o l d i e r s , a n d
3 t t a C K

before davn.

Moreover,

he thought

" n i g h t attacKs by

a r m o r were n o t e c o n o m i c a l .
fl t h i r d p o i n t

"< 1>

on w h i c h P a t t o n ' s a n d G u d e r i a n ' s t h i n K i n g

a p p a r e n t l y d i v e r g e d was i n t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e r a d i o . G u d e r i a n saw g r e a t v a l u e i n h a v i n g a s e c u r e means o f r a p i d l y It

t r a n s m i t t i n g fragmentary orders t o forward committed u n i t s .

was i m p o r t a n t f o r h i m t o b e a b l e t o a f f e c t t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s
q u i C K I y b e c a u s e h i s t e c h n i q u e p l a c e d g r e a t r e l i a n c e on t h e s u c c e s s of t a c t l c a l o p e r a t i o n s at t h e schwsrpunKt, which had t o
least

c h a n g e r a p i d l y t o r e i n f o r c e s u c c e s s a g a i n s t p o i n t s of resistance.
To d o t h i s ,

G u d e r i a n n e e d e d a r a p i d means of

communication,

and t h e r a d i o p r o v i d e d j u s t s u c h a means.

P e r h a p s b e c a u s e of

h i s Knowledge of U l t r a a n d t h e a t t e n d a n t

security r i s ~ s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h r a d i o cornmun i c a t I o n s , P a t t o n d i d

n o t p l a c e much e m p h a s i s o n t h e u s e o f

radio.

UnliKe Guderian,

t h e n , he p r e f e r r e d w i r e o v e r r a d i o a n d p e r s o n a l
wire.

c o n t a c t Over

F i n a l l y , w h i l e G u d e r i a n made s p e c i a l e f f o r t s t o m a i n t a i n momentum b y a u o i d i n g f o r w a r d passage t h r o u g h c o m m i t t e d u n i t s a n d b y p a s s i n g c e n t e r s o f r e s i s t a n c e , P a t t o n d i d n o t p l a c e much emphasis on e i t h e r o f t h e s e methods. In f a c t . Patton appeared

IS5

committed t o t h e uiew that t a c t i c a l l y or f i x , e x p l o i t and p u r s u e . panzer d i u i s ions

infantry diuisions penetrate

and armored d i u i s i o n s p a s s t h r o u g h t o Guderian, it w i l l be r e c a l l e d , employed

i n b o t h t h e p e n e t r a t i o n and e x p l o i t a t i o n r o l e ,

a n d d i d so b e c a u s e he b e l i e v e d t h e o r g a n i c p a n z e r - g r e n a d i e r infantry
i n t h e panzer d i u i s i o n s c o u l d p e r f o r m t h e tasK of

penetration: would

moreover,

he be1 ieued a t t a c K i n g m o b i l e f o r c e s

l o s e momenturn if t h e y a t t e m p t e d t o p a s s t h r o u g h l e s s
I t may b e s a i d o f

mobile infantry formations. d i d be object ieue

P a t t o n t h a t he as h i s

i n b y p a s s i n g enemy c e n t e r s o f r e s i s t a n c e ,

ons t o G e n e r a l O e u e r s ' e f f o r t s t o r e d u c e t h e C o l m a r

P o c K e t a t t e s t . < 2 > Two r e s p o n s e s , First, such a view

however,

are

in order here.

i s inconsistent with Patton's decisions t o

Nancy and Metz, Second, o p e r a t i o n s w h i c h were C o s t l y

taKe the c i t i e s of a n d t irne c o n s u m i n g .

a n u n d e r l y i n 9 u l t r r l o r mot i u e f o r

P a t t o n ' s o b j e c t i o n t o e m p l o y i n g f o r c e s t o r e d u c e t h e Colmar P o c K e t was t h a t some o f t h e f o r c e s t o r e d u c e t h a t POcKet w e r e t o come f r o m P a t t o n ' s T h i r d f i r m y .

186

Part

XI:

Common T e n e t s

As

significant

as t h e d i f f e r e n c e s t o be,

i n P a t t o n ' s and
appreciated of

G u d e r i a n ' s o p e r a t i o n s appear t h e y need t o be viewed the s i m i l a r i t i e s basis for Guderian's

t o be f u l l y

i n a perspective t h a t taKes account opera a r t ions..

in t h e i r

especially the principled P a t t o n ' s and in

t h e i r Operational

Indeed,

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t c l e a r l y 5.hared a p r i n c i p l e d b a s i s centralized control of artillery;

six a r e a s :
of

close cooperation or encircle the

g r o u n d and a i r e f f o r t s :

attacKs t o envelop execution o f

enemy a t o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s ; speed: acceptance of flanK

operations

at high

and l o g i s t i c a l r i s K : Each o f even

and p e r s o n a l

leadership a t f r o n t l i n e

units.

these s i m i l a r i t i e s
if s i m i l a r

d e s e r v e s some a m p l i f i c a t i o n , t h e r e w e r e some d i f f e r e n c e s each t e n e t . Though t h e y employment of differed

for

in principle

i n how P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n a p p l i e d

i n t h e c o m p o s i t i o n and d o c t r i n a l b o t h P a t t o n and G u d e r i a n art is

combined arms u n i t s ,

t h o u g h t a combined arms a p p r o a c h t o o p e r a t i o n a l essential. control art of

In p a r t i c u l a r ,
artillery

they

b o t h thought that

centralized

assets

is crucial an o p e r a t i o n Flfter

in execut in9 operational

when t a c t i c a l tactical penetration,

in t h e e a r I y stages of i s t h e tasK

penetration

a t hand.

187

t h e requirement

is f o r a r t i l l e r y t o b e d e c e n t r a l i z e d so t h a t

e x p l o i t i n g and p u r s u i n g u n i t s c a n have a r t i l l e r y f i r e s u p p o r t immediately a v a i l a b l e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t b o t h men

s o u g h t was h i g h l y m o b i l e a r t i l l e r y a n d a f l e x i b l e s y s t e m o f
a r t i l l e r y command a n d c o n t r o l

t h a t would a l l o w a r t i l l e r y f i r e s

t o be massed a t c r i t i c a l p o i n t s of p e n e t r a t i o n and t h e n a l l o w
a r t i l l e r y u n i t 5 t o moue b e h i n d f o r w a r d c o m m i t t e d u n i t s a n d

del iver

i m m e d i a t e l y r c s p o n s i u e f i r e s i n ~ x p l o i t a t i o na n d

P u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s . Guder i a n , more t h a n P a t t o n , t r i e d t o
s u p p l e m e n t o r g a n i c a r t i l l e r y f i r e s u p p o r t by e m p l o y i n g t a c t i c a l aircraft i n c l o s e s u p p o r t m i s s i o n s . The d i f f e r e n c e

in their
tried to

o p e r a t i o n s on t h i s p o i n t

is t h a t G u d e r i a n a p p a r e n t l y

a c h i e v e a h i g h e r degree of

i n t e g r a t i o n between ground and air

u n i t s t h a n P a t t o n . But t h e r e q u irement f o r c o n c e n t r a t e d
a r t i l l e r y c a n n o t b e s o l v e d by a r e l i a n c e

on t a c t i c a l

aircraft

f o r the obvious reason t h a t air support Hence, P a t t o n ' 5 conduct of operational It

is w e a t h e r d e p e n d e n t .

a r t depended on massed

a r t i l l e r y , and l o t s of
T h i r d flrrny c o n d u c t e d b a t t a l i o n s of

it.

is u s e f u l t o r e c a l l t h a t P a t t o n ' s employing
108

its Bulge c o u n t e r - o f f e n s i v e

f i e l d a r t i l l e r y , s u g g e s t i n g an a r t i l l e r y r i c h

cnu ironment

.
i n t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a

S e c o n d , b o t h men saw g r e a t v a l u e

g o o d WorK i n s r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n g r o u n d a n d a i r f o r c e s . Guderian formed a warm, personal r e l a t i o n s h i p with th e air his

c o m m a n d e r s who s u p p o r t e d h i s o p e r a t i o n s i n a l l t h r e e o f major campaigns.

Similarly,

P a t t o n SpOKe

i n g l o w i n g terms of

188

t h e cooperation and a s s i s t a n c e

XI% TfiC r e n d e r e d t o T h i r d a r m y
B o t h P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n Knew

throughout o p e r a t i o n s in Europe. t h a t t h e s u c c e s s of
their

o p e r a t i o n s depended

in large measure

on t h e q u a n t i t y and q u a l i t y of units.

a i r support given to t h e i r

find b o t h q u a n t i t y a n d q u a l i t y o f

support depended on t h e

d e g r e e o f c o o p e r a t i o n a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n e x t a n t b e t w e e n t h e two services. UnmistaKably,

of

a t h i r d t e n e t common t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l in t h e i r e f f o r t s t o attacK into

art

e a c h man

is r e f l e c t e d

o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h s o f enemy d e f e n c e s a n d e i t h e r e n v e l o p o r e n c i r c l e e n e m y f o r c e s . fi1 1 o f G i r d e r ian

' 5

operat ions

indicate

t h a t h e t h o u g h t t a c t i c a l p e n e t r a t i o n f o l l o w e d by r a p i d

e x p l o i t a t i o n i n t o enemy t e r r i t o r y would p r e c i p i t a t e a n
o p e r a t i o n a l c o l l a p s e w i t h i n t h e e n e m y command a n d c o n t r o l structure. In b o t h t h e P o l i s h and F l a n d e r s Campaigns h i s In t h e Russian

thinKing on t h i s s u b j e c t proved correct. Campaign, i n s p i t e of

t h e c a p t u r e of w h o l e armies a n d masses o f

equipment, h i s attaCKS i n t o o p e r a t i o n a l depths d i d n o t have t h e

desired strategic e f f e c t . new m e a n i n g t o of timing Failure i n t h e R u s s i a n Campaign g i v e s importance

" o p e r a t i o n a l d e p t h " a n d amp1 i f ies t h e

i n t h e c o n d u c t of

operational art. Guderian,

remember,

t h o u g h t t h a t H i t l e r 's three- wee^ d e l a y o f O p e r a t i o n d i v e r s i o n of G u d e r i a n ' s Panzer

BfiRBflROSSfi a n d h i 5 t h r e e - w e e K
Army

f r o m i t s f i n a l o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e o f Moscow p r o v e d

f a t a l t o t h e s t r a t e g i c alms o f BeRBaROSSA. P a t t o n , t o o , be1 ieved t h a t s u c c e s s at t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

183

l e v e l of

idar

r e q u i r e s t h a t t a c t i c a l p e n e t r a t i o n be f o l l o w e d by forces are

r a p i d a n d u n r e m i t t i n g p u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s u n t i l enemy e i t h e r e n c i r c l e d or e n v e l o p e d and d e s t r o y e d . trouble in finding a

Because he h a d

" H o t h " o n t h e A l l i e d s i d e who w o u l d

cooperate

in p u t t i n g together great encirclement operat ions,

P a t t o n r a l i e d on envelopment o p e r a t i o n s t o a c h i e v e o p e r a t i o n a l decision. B o t h t h e F a l a i s e - A r g e n t a n and t h e P a l a t i n a t e Patton's style

C a m p a i g n s a r e t h e b e s t examples. o f respect.

in t h i s

Ta some e x t e n t ,

P a t t o n was h a m p e r e d i n h i s e x e c u t i o n

o f O p e r a t i o n a l a r t b e c a u s e n e i t h e r h i s s u b o r d i n a t e commander5

n o r h i s s u p e r i o r s s h a r e d t o any g r e a t d e g r e e h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f how m o b i l e a r m o r e d w a r f a r e s h o u l d h e c o n d u c t e d t o b e d e c i s i v e . Good men t h o u g h t h e y w e r e , t h a t Patton's there i s l i t t l e evidence t o suggest

c o r p s commanders h a d a f i r r n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e operational s u c c e s s a g a i n s t German f o r c e s ; than operational the

requirements f o r

e v i d e n c e shows t h a t t h e y h a d m o r e t z c t i c a l acumen. This d iscursion of operational r a i s e s an Guderian's

d s p t h and dec i s i v e n e s s

i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n a b o u t b o t h P a t t o n ' s and operational a r t t h a t h e r e t o f o r e has been l a r g e l y

ignored or 3lossed over. defined together t h e n an!, as t h a t

If t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

l e v e l of

war

IS

l e v e l u h i c h ernploys t a c t i c a l e v e n t s

linKed

i n a campaign p l a n t o a c h i e v e t h e a t e r s t r a t e g i c g o a l s ,
judgment about t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of a commander's

operational

a r t must r e s t ,

at least in part,

on how w e l l h i s
into desired

o p e r a t i o n a l methods p a r l a y e d t a c t i c a l e v e n t s

198

strategic r e s u l t s . The s u e s t i o n r a i s e d
b e c a u s e t o answer

is d i f f i c u l t t o answer

it i n t e l l i g e n t l y o t h e r e q u a l l y important
The q u e s t i o n , f o r example,

questions must f I r s t be ansuered.

~ r e s u ~ ~ o a s eKsn o w l e d g e o f t h e s t r a t e g i c t h e a t e r o b j e c t i u e s a n d what Clausew i t 2 c a l l e d

"Centers of grau i t y

"

There

is p r o b a b l y

g e n e r a l a g r e e m e n t t h a t b o t h P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n saw t h e
o p p o s i n g enemy f o r c e s as t h e c e n t e r of g r a u i t y , the immediate

o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i u e . D e s t r o y enemy f o r c e s i n large
p r o p o r t i o n s a n d t h e enemy armies w i l l opposing p o l i t i c a l collapse, forcing

leaders t o sue f o r peace.

' 5

Patton c l e a r l y

b e 1 i e u e d t h i s , a n d G u d e r ian Moscow n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g ,

preoccupation with t h e s e i z u r e of

h e t o o s o u g h t t h e d e s t r u c t ion o f enemy

f o r c e s on a g r a n d scale. H i s o p e r a t i o n s i n P o l a n d in France in

i n 1939 a n d

1948 a p p e a r t o b e c l a s s i c e x a r n p l e s o f t h e

a p p r o p r i a t e 1 inKage of t a c t i c a l engagements

in a campaign plan

f o r t h e purpose of bringing about desired s t r a t e g i c results within a theater of operations.

S i m i l a r l y , P a t t o n ' s operations

i n N o r t h FIfrica a n d o n S i c i l y a p p e a r e d t o s u p p o r t t h e t h e a t e r commander
'5

s t r a t e g ic g o a l s .

Howeuer,

a p l a u s i b l e c a s e can b e made t h a t b o t h G u d e r i a n
i n a n i m p o r t a n t way

a n d P a t t o n f a i l e d t o m e a s u r e up

in t h e i r

later campaigns. Both f a i l e d t o understand t h a t t o be

e f f e c t i u e , o p e r a t i o n a l campaign p l a n s m u s t b e p r e d i c a t e d on
theater strategy: Guder i a n
' 5

t h e y have no

l i f e of

t h e i r own! B u t

great operational

"successes" in Russia a p p e a r t o

h a v e t a K e n on a l i f e of t h e i r own, d r a g g i n g t h e t h e a t e r

191

commander's s t r a t e g y after them.

Certainly, t h i s charge

is t r u e

o f P a t t o n , who a t t a c K e d s o f a r a n d s o f a s t a c r o s s F r a n c e t h a t he outran him.

1 2 t h firmy G r o u p ' s a n d SHFIEF's c a p a b i l i t y t o s u p p o r t

F l t every t u r n Patton attempted t o t u r n a t h e a t e r secondary

into not only the primary theater e f f o r t b u t t h e ONLY

effort

t h e a t e r e f f o r t ! Both Bradley and Eisenhower had great difficult:, Patton

' 5

reigning

i n P a t t o n as h e r a c e d a c r o s s E u r o p e .

scheme t o a t t a c K s t r a i g h t t o w a r d F r a n K f u r t w i t h o n e
t h r e e corp s , f o r example, f a i l e d e n t i r e l y t o

a r m y compor.ed o f

taKe a c c o u n t o f E i s e n h o w e r ' s t h e a t e r s t r a t e g y w i t h

its myriad

of p o l i t i c a l

and

logistical considerations.

Analytically,

strategic art g iues s h a p e t o o p e r j t ional a r t , b u t

t h e d y n a m i c s are t h a t one a f f e c t s t h e o t h e r

in practice
and

interactiuely,

t h e real c h a l l e n g e f o r o p e r a t i o n a l t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p in balance. were,

it

l e v e l c G m m a n d e r s is t o Keep

A s c a p a b l e a s b o t h t h e s e men

is f a i r t o s a y t h & t n e i t h e r h a d a f i r r n e n o u g h

understanding of t h e dynamics between o p e r a t i o n a l

and

strategical art.
A f o u r t h t e n e t P a t t o n and Guderian s h a r e

in their

c o n c e p t i o n of

how o p e r a t i o n a l a r t s h o u l d b e c o n d u c t e d c e n t e r s Every b i t of relevant evidence shows

is a b s o l u t e l y

on s p e e d o f o p e r a t i o n s .

t h a t b o t h men t h o u g h t a h i g h t e m p o o f

operations

essential t o success
speed
is a r e l a t i o n a l

i n t h e c o n d u c t of o p e r a t i o n a l

art. Because
is t h a t

t e r m , w h a t b o t h men r e a l l y meant

t o b e s u c c e s s f u l f r i e n d l y commanders m u s t e x e c u t e o p e r a t i o n s a t a speed r e l a t i v e l y greater t h a n t h e speed of t h e enemy's

192

operations.

I n G u d e r i a n ' s c a s e , t h e c l a s s i c e x a m p l e is h i s

a t t a c K a c r o s s t h e Meuse R i v e r a n d s u b s e q u e n t d r i v e t o t h e
coast. In hi: boOK
TO

L o s e a B a t t l e , A l i s t a i r Horne v i v i d l y

d e s c r i b e s n o t o n l y t h e F r e n c h H i g h Command's b u t a l s o t h e l o w e r l e v e l t a c t i c a l commanders' i n a b i l i t y t o act o r react drive.

in a

t i m e l y enough manner t o s t o p G u d e r i a n ' s p a n z e r

C

=lmilarly,

Patton's

high-speed

d a s h e s o u t o f t h e Normandy

beachhead,

across France t o t h e S e i n e R i v e r , t h r o u g h t h e E i f e l ,
in a

a n d a c r o s s t h e P a l a t i n a t e a l l Kept o p p o s i n g German f o r c e s

p e r p e t u a l l y r e a c t i v e s t a t e t r y i n g t o a d j u s t t o a new t a c t i c a l situation rendered i r r e l e v a n t b y a n e v e n newer s i t u a t i o n , B o t h

men came t o s e e t h a t a h i g h r a t e o f o p e r a t i o n s s t e a l s t h e i n i t i a t i v e f r o m t h e enemy, f o r c e s him t o react r a t h s r t h a n

deliberately

a c t , and d e s t r o y s h i s a b i l i t y t o f o c u s combat

p o l d e r a t a d e c i s i v e p o i n t b e c a u s e h i s Command a n d c o n t r o l s y s t e m is i n d i s a r r a y . In essence,

a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h e r speed of

o p e r a t i o n s s e r v e s t o fragment t h e enemy's combat powsr and d e s t r o y h i s c o l l e c t i v e and individual will t o fight. Guderian

a t t e m p t e d t o a c h i e v e a high tempo of o p e r a t i o n s ,

f i r s t , by

t a c t i c a l l y s . u r p r i s i n g t h e e n e m y t h r o u g h d e c e i v i n g h i m as t o t h e l o c a t ion, t irning, composition, and direct ion

Of

t h e attacK.

Then h e e x h o r t e d h i s commanders t o Keep moving d a y a n d n i g h t , b y p a s s i n g p o c K e t s o f enemy r e s i s t a n c e , p o i n t of and attacKing t o t h e

exhaust ion, Patton characteristically p i t t e d one Corps

commander a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r , e x h o r t i n g e a c h t o b e t h e f i r s t t o r e a c h some o b j e c t i v e s u c h a s a r i v e r l i n e . Each Corps and

133

d i u is i o n commander a t t a C K e d a c r o s s a r e a l t i v e l y b r o a d f r o n t , e m p l o y i n g m u l t l p l e p a r a l l e l a x e s t o e n s u r e m a x i m u m c o m b a t power

was f o r u a r d a n d m i n i m a l c o r ~ g e s t i o n o c c u r r e d o n a x e s o f a d v a n c e .
T h u s , d b s p i t e some d i f f e r e n c e s

i n t e c h n i q u e , P a t t o n and

G u d e r i a n saw s p e e d o f

o p e r a t i o n s as o n e o f t h e Key t e n e t s o f

success in o p e r a t i o n a l a r t .
f if

i f t h t e n e t by which P a t t o n and Guderian g u i d e d t h e i r is r e f l e c t e d

conduct of operational art

in each man's
in order

w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t g r e a t f l a n K a n d l o g i s t i c a l risK t o p e n e t r a t e enem)
PiSK

defense;

t o o p e r a t ional depths. Concerning

t o exposed flanKs, t h e r e

is a g r e a t d e a l o f e v i d e n c e t h a t

b o t h men were f u l l y aware o f t h e r i S K t h e y were t a K i n g , a n d t h e y employed air power,

speed of

riuerl ines, cavalry u n i t s ,

and great

operations t o minimize t h a t PiSK.

I n f a c t , b o t h men phenomenon

seemed t o a c c e p t o p e n f l a n K 5 as q u i t e a n a t u r a l high-speed
regarding

in

m o b i l e o p e r a t i o n s a n d 90 t h e f u r t h e r s t e p of
a non-linear

l i n e of

c o n t a c t a s a n o p p o r t u n i t ~t o b e

e x p l o i t e d whenever p o s s i b l e .

Since t h e open f l a n K argument

e n t a i l s r 1 s . K ~a s w e l l a s o p p o r t u n i t i e s , G u d e r i a n a n d P a t t o n saw that
i t was

imperative t o have a clear o p e r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e o r

c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y i d e n t i f L e d , a t t a c K w i t h s u f f i c i e n t mass, a t
great s p e e d t o produce t h e tactical and o p e r a t i o n a l moral
c a s c a d i n g e f f e c t t h a t would l e a d t o o p e r a t i o n a l That, however, decisiveness.

oenarally required that friendly forces attaCK

i n great d e p t h and s p e e d , e x p o s i n g a f r i e n d l y f l a n K somewhere.

B o t h m e n a c c e p t e d e x p o s e d f l a n K s as t h e p r i c e t o b e p a i d f o r

194

o p e r a t i o n a l success.

I t i s m o r e d i f f i c u l t t o maKe a p l a u s i b l e c a s e f o r e i t h e r
G u d e r i a n o r P a t t o n t h a t would show t h e y had a f i r m understanding of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between o p e r a t i o n a l filthough n e i t h e r man h a d

c a p a b i l i t y and l o g i s t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y .

rnuch t o s a y a b o u t h i s own l o g i s t i c a l
t o stretch h i s logistical tether t o
of

o p e r a t i o n s , e a c h was p r o n e

i t s v e r y 1 imits. I n S P i t e
and air r e s u p p l y ,

h e a v y r e l i a n c e on

t r U C K S r

railroads,

each

man, e s p e c i a l l y P a t t o n ,

a t t a c K e d s o f a s t a n d so f a r t h a t h e logistical systern t o t h e p r o b l e m was

exceeded t h e c a p a b i l i t y of h i s u n i t ' s s u p p o r t h i s f u r t h e r operat ions. n o t one of shortage.

Consistently,

materiel shortage but one of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n Moreouer, a l o g i s t i c a l pause i n e v i t a b l y occurred J u s t If such a pause

is

w h e n s u c h a p a u s e was l e a s t d e s i r a b l e . inevitable, comrnander

so t h a t

then

i t may b e t h a t t h e o u t s t a n d i n g o p e r a t i o n a l

i s o n e who p l a n s f o r a n d t i m e s a p a u s e

in operations

i t m o s t b e n e f i t s h i m a n d h i s command.

G u d e r i a n appears pauses than

t o ha'Je b e e n b e t t e r a t t i m i n g a n y s u c h l o g i s t i c a l Patton,
if

i n d e e d P a t t o n was. e v e n aware t h a t s u c h p a u s e s n e e d S u f f i c e i t t o s a y , by d e s i g n o r n e g l e c t , increased logistical

t o be considered.

P a t t o n and Guder ian a c c e p t e d

r iSK to

ach ieve t h e i r operational object iues.

A final

t e n e t b o t h men c l e a r l y b e l i e v e d

in and adhered t o

w i t h o u t f a i l was t h e p r i n c i p l e o f forward locations.

commanding o r l e a d i n g f r o m is

P a t t o n and Guderian understood t h a t t h e r e

n o w o r t h u h i l e s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e p e r s o n a l Presence of t h e

19s

c o m m a n d e r , e s p e c i a l l y when a c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n , battle is t a K i n g p l a c e .

e v e n t , or
invariably

T h e r e f o r e , e a c h man a l m o s t

t u r n e d UP

a t some f o r w a r d L o c a t i o n a t a c r u c i a l time and

p e r s o n a l l y d i r e c t e d t h e a c t i o n , g o t a s t a l l e d *ttacK m o v i n g a g a i n , or w h e n t h e r e w e r e n o r e s e r v e s l e f t , a d d e d w e i g h t t o t h e

m a i n a t t a c K m e r e l y by b e i n g o n s i t e . To a i d i n c o n t r o l l i n 9 t h e
l a r g e f o r m a t i o n s t h e y c o m m a n d e d , b o t h men o p e r a t e d o u t o f

a
a

small m o b i l e f o r w a r d command p o s t a n d made e x t e n s i v e u s e o f

small p l a n e t o e x p e d i t e t h e i r m o v e m e n t a r o u n d t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . A l t h o u g h P a t t o n p r e f e r r e d wire c o m m u n i c a t i o n s o v e r r a d i o a n d G u d e r i a n made f a r g r e a t e r use o f s e c u r e r a d i o t h a n d i d P a t t o n , b o t h men c o m m u n i c a t e d m o s t o f t h e i r c o m b a t o r d e r s t h e i r subordinates. command p o s t s . F i n a l I',

in person a t
the

, n e i t h e r m a n was

least b i t h e s i t a n t t o g i v e on-the-spot

o r d e r s t o committed

c o m b a t u n i t s t w o e c h e l o n s b e l o w t h e i r own l e v e l o f c o m m a n d . Much t o e a c h m a n ' s c r e d i t , t h e y b o t h were c a r e f u l

always t o

i n f o r m any i n t e r m e d i a t e C o m m a n d e r s c o n c e r n e d w h e n d i r e c t i n g t h e
a c t i o n s of It

a u n i t s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h a t commander.
p o s s i b l e t o see in t h e o p e r a t i o n s of

is c e r t a i n l y

Patton and Guderian o t h e r aspects o f t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s t h a t bear

s i m i l a r i t y t o some d e g r e e .

I n some

instances t h e d i f f e r e n c e s in

their operations

is o n e o f e m p h a s i s r n o r e t h a n a n y t h i n g e l s e .

P a t t o n , f o r e x a m p l e , p l a c e d g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s on r e c e i v i n g
t i m e l y combat

information and e s t a b l i s h e d a special

mechanism--Colonel got t h a t

FicKett

' 5

informat ion service--to

ensure he

information.

There

is n o t h i n g , o f c o u r s e , w h i c h s h o w s

196

t h a t G u d e r i a n was n o t
but

interested

i n t imelv combat i n f o r m a t i o n ,
lengths t o

it

is e q u a l l y t r u e t h a t h e d i d n o t g o t o s p e c i a l information i n t h e way P a t t o n d i d .

get such

W h a t t h i s t h e s i s h a s e n d e a v o r e d t o d o is u n c o v e r t h o s e

aspects of Patton appeal t o

d

'5

and Guder i a n

'5

o p e r a t i o n a l methods which

t e n e t o r P r i n c i p l e b y w h i c h e a c h man g u i d e d h i s

t h i n K i n g about t h e art of

war a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l o f
i n v e s t i g a t i o n can be summarized

command.
by

The c o n c l u s i o n o f t h i s

s t a t i n g t h a t G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n s h a r e d a v i e w o f

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t t h a t h e l d t h e f o l l o w i n g s i x t e n e t s as Key t o s u c c e s ~i n t h e a r t o f war a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l level:

( 1 ) F l r t i l l e r y needs t o b e o r g a n i z e d and c o n t r o l l e d i n such a f a s h i o n t h a t its f i r e s can be c o n c e n t r a t e d r a p i d l y a n d y e t b e f l e x i b l e e n o u g h t o move a n d s h o o t during f l u i d , mobile, high-speed operations.

( 2 , S u c c e s s a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l o f command dernands t h a t a i r a n d g r o u n d o p e r a t i o n s b e c l o s e l Y coordinated and mutually supporting.

(3) 3eeK t o c o n d u c t o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s t h a t e n u e l o p or e n c i r c l e enemy force5 a t operational depths.

( 4 ) To b e s u c c e s s f u l , o p e r a t i o n s m u s t b e c o n d u c t e d a t g r e a t s p e e d - - r e l a t i v e l y greater t h a n t h e enemy ' 5 speed of o p e r a t ions.

( 5 ) Success a t t h e operational level requires t h a t c o m m a n d e r s b e w i l l i n g t o taKe c a l c u l a t e d f l a n K a n d l o g i s t i c a l r i s K i b o t h t h e d e p t h and s p e e d o f o p e r a t i o n s appear t o r e q u i r e acceptance of t h e s e risK5.

( 6 ) S u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l c o m m a n d e r s command and l e a d f r o m f o r w a r d l o c a t i o n s , us i n s t h e i r P e r s o n a l p r e s e n c e t o i n f l u e n c e t h e outcome of o p e r a t i o n s .

Having a r r i v e d a t t h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e n a t u r e of

197

Patton

' 5

and Guder i a n

' 5

operational art,

i t Pernairas t o e x p l a i n

Why t h e r e f i n d i n g s a r e i m p o r t a n t t o t h e f l m e r i c a n firmy t o d a y .

198

Part

111:

Implications for

Airland Battle

It

i s arguable t h a t a t t h e beginning of

W o r l d War

I1 the

R m e r i c a n Army d i d n o t P r a c t i c e a n d h a d n o d o c t r i n e f o r operational tactics. art, b u t d i d have a c o n c e p t i o n o f s t r a t e g y and p o l i t i c a l aversion t o large, standing and a

Given Americas armies, her

professional

i n s u l a r geograph i c pos it i o n ,

h i s t o r i c a l t e n d e n c y t o r e l y on h e r economic S t r e n g t h t o w i n wars, this

i s a p l a u s i b l e view

t o hold.

For t h e development o f
large

an o p e r a t i o n a l

doctrine that

e n v i s i o n s t h e maneuver o f
in a theater

m i l i t a r y formations operations

i s only necessary

of

t h a t has t h e r e q u i s i t e space a c r o s s which t o P r i o r t o W o r l d War

m a n e u v e r 1a r a e f o r m a t i o n s .

I I the h e r ican
it is

A r m y h a d no s u c h o p e r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s t o meet b e c a u s e

d i d n o t have world-wide quite different. t o fighting

As

commitments.

Today t h e s i t u * t i o n

a matter of

p o l i c y A m e r i c a now

is committed
i n Western
important

a c o n v e n t i o n a l o r t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r war This f a c t i m p l i e s two

Europe s h o u l d t h e need a r i s e . considerations. well-developed theater First,

t h e Arner i c a n Army n e e d s a c o h e r e n t operational a r t t h a t supports w h a t e v e r t h a t s t r a t e g y may b e . though it remains i t s we

doctrine for
i n Europe,

strategy

R i r l a n d B a t t l e a p p e a r s t o be t h a t d o c t r i n e , problernat i c because of requirement for

t h e n a t u r e o f t h e NRTO A l l i a n c e a n d strategy. Doctrlnally,

a coal it ion theater

199

m u s t g e t t o g e t h e r w i t h o u r a l l i e s i f we a r e s e r i o u s a b o u t
w i n n i n g a war a g a i n s t t h e Warsaw P a c t Second, t o have a d o c t r i n e doctrine i n Western E u r o p e .
is n o t t o h a v e a

in p r i n t only

i n t h e rele9,ant s e r , s e . W e must ensure t h a t every

corps understands Airland Battle
it is r e s p o n s i b l e ,

s t r a t u m of o u r o f f i c e r

d o c t r i n e a n d can e x e c u t e t h e p a r t f o r w h i c h whether tactical or operational d e s e r v e amp1 if i c a t i o n . T h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a we1 1 - d e v e l o p e d

. Both

of t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s

coherent doctrine

is

a t a l l o r d e r b u t n o t beyond reach.
h i s t o r y h a s any u t i l i t y at a l l ,
it

If the s t u d y of m i l i t a r y

is t h a t

it helps

illuminate

w h a t f u n d a m e n t a l s o f t h e a r t a n d s c i e n c e o f war r e m a i n unchanged t h r o u g h time. Such s t u d i e s h e l p u n c o v e r t h e p r i n c i p l e d b a s i s f o r t h e c o n d u c t o f war a n d , h e n c e , h e l p establish the theoretical warfighting. and d o c t r i n a l foundations for

This s t u d y o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l a r t o f P a t t o n a n d

G u d e r i a n c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h a t b a s e o f Knowledge by maKing e x p l i c i t some o f t h e K e y t e n e t s o r p r i n c i p l e s b y w h i c h t h e s e

two c o m m a n d e r s c o n d u c t e d o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . T h o u g h t h e b a s e o f
evidence
is n a r r o w b e c a u s e t h e s t u d y o n l y f o c u s e s on t w o
the operational

s u c c e s s f u l p r a c t i o n e r s of time period, operational

art during a limited

i n l a r g e p a r t its c o n c l u s i o n s are r e f l e c t e d
d o c t r i n e of America's p r i n c i p a l

in the

potential adversary
180-5.

a n d o u r own c u r r e n t d o c t r i n e as r e c o r d e d

i n F i e l d Manual

In s p i t e o f s o m e e v e r l i n g e r i n g b r a n c h p a r o c h i a l i s m i n t h e
A m e r i c a n Flrmy, d o c t r i n a l l y we a r e c o m m i t t e d t o f i g h t i n g as a

200

combined arms team.

Howeuer,

i t w i l l n e v e r b e s u f f i c i e n t merely

t o s a y we a r s c o m m i t t e d t o s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n o f w a r f a r e . F o r a
complete combined arms c o n c e r t ion at t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

level

requires t h a t air and ground o p e r a t i o n s be i n t e g r a t e d in such a

f a s h i o n t h a t t h e maximum e f f e c t o f j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s b e p r o d u c e d when a n d w h e r a n e e d e d . This point

is e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t

c o n s i d e r i n s t h a t t h e requirement

in Western Europe and o t h e r

t h e a t e r s a s well w i l l b e t o f i g h t o u t n u m b e r e d a n d w i n . Consequently, t h e l e s s o n f r o m Patton and Guderian commanders and s t a f f o f f i c e r s a t a l l

is t h a t
WOrK

leuels m u i t

c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y t o a c h i e v e t h e h i g h d e g r e e of c o o p e r a t i o n a n d i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t s e r v ice separateness, p a r o c h i a l i s m , fights, and poor l e a d e r s h i p at t h e t o p f r e q u e n t l y however, budgetary

i m p e d e . More

than this,

we m u s t s t r i v e t o a c h i e v e t h i s c l o s e

w a r K i n g r r l a t i o n s h i p NOW b e f o r e Flmerica g e t s c o m m i t t e d t o a mid-to-high

i n t e n 5 i t y c o n f l ict anywhere because t h e t r a n s i t i o n

is I i K e l y t o b e s h o r t

f r o m p e a c e t o war

in duration.

In P a r t , Ideal

joint doctrine can a i d

i n moving t o w a r d what

is s u r e l y a n

never t o b e f u l l y r e a l i z e d .
T h i s d i s c u s s i o n l e a v e s unanswered o t h e r q u e s t i o n s which do not fall i n t o t h e . j o i n t a r e n a . How, f o r e x a m p l e , s h o u l d US

c o r p s be c o n f i g u r e d f o r o p e r a t i o n s

i n Western E u r o p e t o d a y ? W e

taKe

i t as a g i v e n t h a t t h e y s h o u l d b e c o n f i g u r e d t h e way t h e y

are. S h o u l d corpz. be
be p u r e l y t a c t i c a l

in t h e l o g i s t i c s business o r should they

headquarters?

Is i t p l a u s i b l e t o t h i n K t h a t ,
and l o g i s t i c a l l y s u p p o r t e d ,

as c u r r e n t l y o r g a n i z e d , c o n t r o l l e d ,

201

a US a r m o r e d o r

m e c h a n i z e d d i v i s i o n c o u l d move a t t h e s p e e d a r t as G u d e r i a n o r P a t t o n

required t o execute operational

conducted it? 1 3 c a s e c a n b e made t h a t b o t h t y p e s o f d i v i s i o n have t o o l a r g e of t o o cumbersome an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and l o g i s t i c a l ouerhead and

a command a n d c o n t r o l a p p a r a t u s t o p e r m i t t h e
o p e r a t i o n s Guder i a n and P a t t o n t h o u g h t to
S U C C ~ P .a ~

s o r t o f high-speed

absolutely essential war.

t the operational

level of

Ftn o b v i o u s r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e s p e c u l a t i o n s
G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n d i d w i l l i n W o r l d War 11 i s

i s t h a t what

i r r e l e v a n t t o d a y and this

b e t o o on t o m o r r o w ' s

battlefield.

The s u b s t a n c e o f

c l a i m is t h a t t e c h n o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s h a v e c h a n g e d r e m a r K a b l y s i n c e t h e t i m e P a t t o n a n d G u d e r i a n waged ' w a r , a p p r o a c h t o o p e r a t i o n a l a r t no l o n g e r a p p l i e s . chemical/nuclear battlefield, of for instance, and t h e i r The integrated

r e n d e r s a W o r l d War

I 1 approach t o t h e conduct

operational a r t archaic. high technology

Ftlternatiuely,

i t may b e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t

i n f o r m a t i o n and c o m m u n i c a t i o n systems o b v i a t e t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r s e n i o r cornmanders t o g o f o r w a r d and t o lead. t o e x e r c i s e command a n d c o n t r o l

is that

The r e j o i n d e r t o t h e s e a r g u m e n t s from the truth. place, there

nothing

c o u l d be f u r t h e r In the f i r s t

i s an abundance o f e v i d e n c e even integrated

w h i c h shows t h a t f u t u r e chemical/nuclear/EW

battlefields,
w i l l

battlefields,

be remarKably s i m i l a r t o

t h e b a t t l e f i e l d s on w h i c h P a t t o n and G u d e r i a n f o u g h t . Operations w i l l be fast-moving, fluid, and r a p i d l y c h a n g i n g .

282

Exposed f l a n K s frequently isolated.

a r e 1 i K e l Y t o be t h e normal c o n d i t i o n ,

and and be

Unit5

w i l l be c u t o f f ,

temporarily encircled, information w i l l

Confusion w i l l

1iKely reign, be

intermittent,

and u n i t s w i l l

intermingled.

These words

describe nicely j u s t during the

the sort o f conditions that prevailed

1973 A r a b - I s r a e l i

War.

But this description o f the

m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d a l s o s o u n d s v e r y much I i K e t h e s o r t o f b a t t l e f i e l d a c r o s s which Guderian swept Russia

i n F r a n c e i n 1940,
The n u c l e a r a n d

I n 1941 and P a t t o n a t t a c K e d i n 1944.

c h e m i c a l d i m e n s i o n of

t h e m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d o n l y amp1 i f i e s t h e

necessity f o r maintaining dispersion u n t i l concentrat Ion i s required, purpose5. even more and t h e n r a p i d l y c o n c e n t r a t i n g f o r Hence, operational is

t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r speed o f o p e r a t i o n s
i t wa5

important than

i n G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n ' s day.

C o n s i d e r i n g t h e emphasls t h e S o v i e t s p l a c e on t h e speed o f operat ions, essential t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t high-tempo success a t the o p e r a t i o n a l operat ions are

for

level rises

considerably. Under s u c h b a t t l e f i e l d c o n d i t i o n s a g a i n s t a n u m e r i c a l l r s u p e r i o r enemy, important.

r i s K

a s s e s s m e n t a n d a c c e p t a n c e a r e a l l t h e more

I n o r d e r t o w i n d e c i s i v e engagements and m a j o r
commanders

b a t t l e s t h a t a r e l i n K e d as p a r t s o f a campaign p l a n ,

m u s t be a b l e t o s e e a h e a d i n t i m e a n d s p a c e a n d b e w l l l i n 9 t o accept a t t h e r i g h t t i m e c a l c u l a t e d r i s K s t o t h e i r own f o r c e s .

I t may e v e n b e t r u e t h a t t h i s t h e s i s c o n f i r m s w h a t we h a v e
always i n t u i t i v e l y Known a b o u t s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n a l art:

283

speed of

operat ions,

c o n c e n t r a t e d and

integrated fires, depth i n t i m e and space,

envelop i n 2 maneuver,

iSK

acceptance,

i n it i a t i u e r e t e n t i o n ,
edge a r e a l l

and p e r s o n a l

leadership at t h e c u t t i n g ingredients for success a t

absolutely essential l e v e l of war.

the operational

B u t even Knowledge of requires the further where,

the various

ingredients
KnOW

in a recipe
when,

e x p e r t i s e and j u d g m e n t t o each

a n d how much o f

i n g r e d i e n t t o mix t o produce t h e b o l d n e s s as w e l l as r e f i n e d level

desired result.

A c e r t a i n amount o f

m i l i t a r y judgment o f command.

i s what

i s required a t the operational

B o t h G u d e r i a n and P a t t o n e x e r w l i f i e d r e f i n e d m i l i t a r y judgment,

b o l d n e s s and a

h i g h degree o f for their

which helps account

successes

in b a t t l e .

It i s a l s o easy t o a p p r e c i a t e

in

b o t h men t h e i r

warr i o r qua1 i t i e s . juncture of

Each r e 1 i s h e d t h e t h o u g h t o f a b a t t l e and t o o K p a i n s t o b e w h i c h shows t h a t G u d e r i a n and

being at t h e c r i t i c a l there. And t h e r e

i s much e v i d e n c e

Patton developed t h e i r l o n g - t e r m procesz. o f s e l f -educat ion, teaching, and

r e f i n e d m i l i t a r y judgment through a included

g r o w t h and m a t u r a t i o n t h a t experiences,

a broad range of

r e f l e c t ion,
u t i l i t y

intellectual

self-discipline. then, lies

F? f u r t h e r

t o t h e s t u d y of

military history,

i n t h e broadened
who

Perspect i v e such a study a f f o r d 5 t h e contemporary s o l d i e r , must be p r e p a r e d t o d e a l w i t h an u n c e r t a i n f u t u r e

a n d o n whose

s h o u l d e r s and c o n s c i e n c e t h e b u r d e n of begins. Airland Battle doctrine w i l l

s u c c e s s f a l l s when w a r if,

l i K e l Y come t o n o u g h t

when t h e t i m e comes t o

l i v e o r d i e by t h e p r i n c i p l e s

it

204

implies, w e d o n o t h a v e i d a r r i o r s who c a n a p p l y t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s t o t h e circumstances at hand. If such heady sounding idealism

is, i n p a r t ,

the stuff

of which w a r r i o r s 1iKe Heinz Guderian

its

a n d G e o r g e P a t t o n a r e m a d e , t h e n we w o u l d d o w e l l t o f o s t e r

g r o u t h b y c o n t i n u i n g t o s t u d y t h e l . e men a n d t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l methods.

205

ENDNOTES

1 George S . P a t t o n , H o u g h t o n M i f f l i n Corwanr.

Jr., War As I Knew I t ( B o s t o n :

1347), p . 3 3 5 .

2 War As

I Knew

It, p.214.

206