De Castro vs JBC, G.R.

191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directing the Judicial and Bar Council: (1) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010; (2) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice; (3) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and(4) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision. Motions for reconsideration were herein filed by the petitioners with the aversion that a plain reading of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments. ISSUE: Whether judicial appointments are exempted from the ban on midnight appointments stated under Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. HELD: YES: We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary. The decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme C ourt. We cannot allow the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the purpose of any quarter.