III. Rule 1, Section 1 to 6, Rules of Court Hernandez v.

Rural Bank, 81 SCRA 75

This case is about the propriety of a separate action to compel a distress rural bank. which is under Judicial liquidation, to accept a check in payment of a mortgage debt. Facts: Spouses Francisco S. Hernandez and Josefa U. Atienza obtained from the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. a loan of P6,000 secured by a mortgage property upon their 2 lots in Cubao. Lucena bank became a distress bank and was advised by the Monetary Board to reorganized and was given directives to follow, if not would be taken over by the Central Bank. In the issued resolution by the Central bank, Lucena bank together with its board of directors filed a complaint to CFI Manila to restrain the resolution. Hernandez (withdrawee) wanted to pay a loan via check issued to him by San Pablo colleges which was refused to said bank. The vice president of said bank told Hernandez that the bank cannot process said payment because of its pending case with the court. He did not inquire through the Central bank if he can take actions on the said matter. In a civil case, the Central bank petitioned with CFI Manila for assistance and supervision in the liquidation of the Lucena bank. The Superintendent of Banks as ordered by Monetary Board to concert the assets of Lucena bank to money. Acting on Hernandez case, Associate Superintendent of Banks suggested that he settle his loan with cash or check by drawing to other banks since Lucena bank is already closed. Instead, Hernandez deposited said check advising to the association with CFI of Lipa City. Actions Taken: Hernandez enclosed his check with a letter to the clerk of court. Later, Hernandez and his wife filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Lipa City to compel the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., the Central Bank as liquidator, and Jose S. Martinez as receiver, to accept the check and to execute the cancellation of the real estate mortgage. The Hernandez spouses also asked for moral damages in the amount of P10.000 and attorney's fees of P3,000. Central bank filed Motion to Dismiss. It alleged there was improper venue since the encumbered lots where located in Quezon City. Lower court ordered Lucena Bank or the Central Bank, as liquidator, to accept the honor the check, to cancel the mortage, and to pay Hernandez spouses (P25,000 as moral damages (not P10,000 as prayed for the complaint) plus P1,000 as attorney's fees. Issue: Improper Venue (Yes) Ruling: Trial court should have dismissed the action because the venue thereof was improperly laid in Batangas. The term "resides" in section 2[b] of Rule 4 refers to the place of actual residence or domicile.) Hernandez spouses, after having become cognizant of the fact that the Lucena bank was under liquidation, chose to file a separate action against that bank for redemption and damages. Although residents of Cubao, Quezon City, where the mortgage lots are located and which was the address used by them in dealing with the Lucena bank, they chose Lipa City as the venue of their action. They ignored the liquidation court. Evidently, one of their objectives was to obtain against the Lucena bank a judgment for moral damages which they surmised would not be granted by the Manila liquidation court. The liquidation court or the Manila court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the Hernandez spouses that their mortgage obligation had already been extinguished by means of their tender of the check issued by the San Pablo Colleges.

As far as lawful and practicable, all claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should be filed in the liquidation proceeding. The judicial liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank. The lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience only one court, if possible, should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should assist the Superintended of Banks and controls his operations. In the course of the liquidation, contentious cases might arise wherein a full-dress hearing would be required and legal issues would have to be resolved. Hence, it would be necessary in justice to all concerned that a Court of First Instance should assist and supervise the liquidation and should act umpire and arbitrator in the allowance and disallowance of claims. The judicial liquidation is a pragmatic arrangement designed to establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness.

Philippine National Bank v. CA, 153 SCRA 437 (August 31, 1987)

Petition to review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: Donata Montemayor through son Salvador Vitug mortgaged to PNB several parcels of land to secure a loan in said bank to serve as guarantee in loan granted to Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani in the amount of P40, 900.00. Another mortgaged was acquired by Donato Montemayor to guarantee payment of loan of her son Salvador Vitug amounting P35, 200 duly registered with the RD. The bank foreclosed the said properties. Subject property was acquired by Donata Montemayor as a widow. Action Taken: The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which is claimed to be the conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the properties as null and void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs. Montemayor, L-5297 decided by this Court on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an action for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein the properties were found to be conjugal in nature. Ruling: The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of the properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in goodfaith for at the time the mortgages covering said properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of the mortgagor. Actions for recovery of real property and for partition are real actions, however, they are actions in personam that bind only the particular individuals who are parties thereto. The PNB not being a party in said cases is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it appear that the PNB was aware of the said decisions when it extended the above describe mortgage loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal nature of said properties it would not have approved the mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor without requiring the consent of all the other heirs or co-owners thereof. Moreover, when said properties were sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith.

Tesorero v. Mathay (185 SCRA 328 G.R. No. L-69592 May 8, 1990)

Petition for review on certiorari, with a prayer for a restraining order Facts: Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. filed with BOE (Bureau of Energy) for approval of sound appraisal of its properties and equipment amounting to P339,311,139.00 which was priory done by Technical and Management Service (Phil.), Inc. upon assessment of its assets which was disapproved. Later, another appraisal was done by Asian Appraisal Co., Inc. amounting to P302,109,000.00. BOE conducted its own verification of the assets of Davao Light with an approved value of P282,024,877.40 which was said as reasonable to the appraised value.

Action Taken: Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by BOE. Davao City filed a Petition in Intervention. Petitioners filed their memorandum, instead of a brief. Respondents filed Manifestation that they be allowed to adapt their comments in their respective brief. Issue: (a)Whether or not certiorari is the proper remedy in this case? (YES) (b)Whether or not the properties included in the appraisal should be excluded. Ruling: (a)There is no question that certiorari is not the proper remedy in this case as PD No. 1206 creating BOE provides for an appeal to the Office of the President within seven (7) days from receipt of notice of its decision or orders. Thereafter, under the Interim Rules Implementing Sec. 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, final decisions, orders, awards or resolutions of all quasijudicial bodies other than those specifically excepted are reviewable by the Intermediate Appellate Court. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities (Galdo v. Rosete, 84 SCRA 239 242-243 [1978]); that every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from unacceptable plea of technicalities (Heirs of Ceferino Morales v. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 304, 310 [1975]); that this Court in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, decided to disregard technicalities in order to resolve the case on its merits based on evidence (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc., et al. v. Cleofas, 121 SCRA 287 [1983]; Helmuth Jr. v. People of the Philippines, 112 SCRA 573 [1982]). (b) Court cannot substitute its judgment or discretion for that of the BOE whose decisions and determinations particularly on matters of facts are entitled to great weight and respect. But it is equally accepted that exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of exception, among which is that where the question litigated upon is purely legal one, the rule does not apply. (Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 307 [1976]; Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 [1984]; Limorco v. Board of Administrations, PVAO, 133 SCRA 43 [1984]; National Housing Authority v. C.A., 121 SCRA 777 [1983]). It is likewise true that while administrative determination on questions of law is persuasive on courts and carries with it a strong presumption of correctness, nonetheless, the interpretation and application of laws is the court's prerogative. (Cadwallader et al. v. Abedela 98 SCRA 123 [1980]; Philex Mining Corp. v. Zaldiva 43 SCRA 479 [1972]). Decision of the Board of Energy is hereby MODIFIED by approving only the sum of P122,175,433.40 as the fair and reasonable value of the properties, assets and equipment in service as of October 9, 1981 of DALIGHT.

Manila Hotel v. Ca, 384 SCRA 515

Petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions

Facts: Samuel Acordo was hired as Food and Beverage Director by the Manila Hotel. His services was however terminated on ground of loss of confidence and failure to improve the profitability of its operations. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The complaint was dismissed by Labor Arbiter. It was however reversed by the NLRC.

Ruling: The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
of the petition. Pertinent portion of Rule 65, Section 1 and Rule 46, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provide: SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

SECTION 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of noncompliance with requirements. - It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. . . . . Liberal construction of the rule has been allowed by this Court in the following cases: (1) where a rigid application will result in manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed Rule 2, Section 1 to 6 Rebolido vs. CA, 170 SCRA 800 (1989)

Facts: Pepsi Cola was served summons, in connection w/ a case for damages arising from vehicle-collision, through Sison who represented herself as a person authorized to received court process as she was a secretary of the legal dept. of Pepsi Cola. Later, Pepsi Cola was dissolved, & all its debts & liabilities were assumed by PEPSICO. Meanwhile, Pepsi Cola was declared in default in the aforementioned case, & writ of execution was served on PEPSICO. The latter now moves to vacate judgment, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the court as the summons was served on the legal secretary of Pepsi Cola, not PEPSICO. Ruling: The person who has a valid claim against a corporation, whether it arises in contract or tort should not be deprived of the right to prosecute an action for the enforcement of his demands by the action of the stockholders of the corporation in agreeing to its dissolution. The dissolution of a corporation does not extinguish obligations or liabilities due by or to it." Herein, the right of action of Rebollido, et al. against Pepsi Cola and its driver arose not at the time when the complaint was filed but when the acts or omission constituting the cause of action accrued, i.e. on March 1, 1984 which is the date of the accident and when Pepsi Cola allegedly committed the wrong. There was valid service of summons. 1. Although Pepsi Cola was already dissolved when summons was served, the same may be served upon the same person upon whom the process could be served before the dissolution. Therefore, service to any of the persons in R 14 Sec. 13 is allowed. 2. Purpose of Summons: To render it reasonably certain that corporation will receive prompt & proper notice in an action vs. it. 3. Liberal Interpretation of Sec. 13: That there is Substantial Compliance w/ the requirement of Sec. 13if the purpose for the service of summons is attained, & the person served knew what to do w/ the legal papers served upon him.

De Guzman Jr. vs. IAC, 192 SCRA 507 (1990)

Petition for review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals Facts: Action taken:

Issue: Ruling:

Baliwag Transit Inc. v. Ople, 171 SCRA 250 (1989)

Facts: Action taken: Issue: Ruling Bachrach Motors vs. Icarangal, 68 Phil. 287

Facts: Action taken: Issue: Ruling

Agustin v. Bacalan , 135 SCRA 340 (1985)

Flores vs. Mallare-Philipps, 144 SCRA 377

Facts: Abalos spouses sued to recover possession of a lot in Quezon City registered in their name. The squatters, against whom the action was filed, lost the case in the QC RTC so they appealed to the CA on the ground that the RTC erred in not dismissing the case for failure to comply w/ the Katarungang Barangay conciliation procedure. CA granted.

Ruling: RTC had jurisdiction. When the Abalos spouses filed their complaint, they placed QC as their address. But they were
able to change it to Caloocan upon leave of ct. w/o the respondents objecting. The requirement of conciliation cannot be enforced since the property is in QC, where the respondents reside, while the Abalos spouses live in Caloocan (PD 1508 Sec. 20). Respondents effectively waived their right when they failed to object to the correction of the Abalos residence fr. QC to Caloocan participated in the trial on the merits. The fact that they argued their case & adduced their evidence amounts to a waiver of this defense. Once a party submits to the jurisdiction of the ct. & participates in the trial on the merits, he cannot thereafter, after an unfavorable judgment, take a total turnabout & say that compliance w/ PD 1508 was not made. FLORES V MALLARE-PHILIPPS: Example where it is possible to allege facts in pleading that gives rise to 2 causes of action: misjoinder of parties L: lack cause of action a separate case (WIT?) Strategy: file answer for 1st cause of action; file MTD for 2nd cause of action

Strategy: file answer for 1st cause of action; file MTD for 2nd cause of action

V. Rule 3 Section 1 to 3: Parties to a Civil Action Iron and Steel Authority v. CA, 249 SCRA 538 (1995)

Facts: Petitioner ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry. PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years counting from August 9, 1973. When ISAs original term expired on Octo ber 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31, 1979. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The construction of such steel mill was considered a priority and major industrial project of the government. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NSC. Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated November 16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of MCFCs present occupancy rights on the subject land. Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed. Issue: WON the Government is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISAs term? (YES) Ruling: Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the Government of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic. We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as legal personality. When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed by the RP, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties and functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the RP. When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequence of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charters and, by way of supplementation, the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since in the instant case, ISA is a nonincorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.

In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under PD 272. The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved. From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISAs statutory term did not by it self require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

Travel Wide Associated Sales, Inc. vs. CA, 199 SCRA 205 (1991)

Facts: Action taken: Issue: Ruling

Rala v. Ralla, 199 SCRA 495 (1991)

Facts: Action taken: Issue: Ruling

Tampingco vs. IAC, 207 SCRA 652

Facts: Action taken: Issue: Ruling

Pascual v. Pascual, G.R. No. 157830, November 17, 2005

Facts: Action taken: Issue: Ruling

VI. Rule 3, Section 4 to 6: Parties to a Civil Action Begosa v. Chairman, PVA, 32 SCRA 66 (1970)

Facts: Action taken: Issue: Ruling

American Express Co. v. Santiago, 49 SCRA 75 (1973)

Facts: Action taken: Issue: Ruling