arTS & CulTure This is the final report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century,

21st Century, an all-party

Commission preparing an independent national security strategy for the united Kingdom. Based on

Shared Responsibilities
CrIMe
DeMoCraCy & CulTure
research and Commission deliberations over a two-year period, the report sets out a wide range of proposals
designed to make our country and its citizens, businesses, and communities more secure.
DIGITal

Shared Responsibilities
eCoNoMy
eDuCaTIoN our recommendations include:
eNVIroNMeNT
• a new approach to the situation in afghanistan and Pakistan
eQualITIeS
• Proposals to improve the uK’s energy security
A national security strategy for the UK
euroPe
FaMIlIeS • Measures to address radicalisation and the threat of terrorism here in the uK
The final report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century
HealTH • The call for a transformation in our approach to defence policy, and measures to strengthen both NaTo
HouSING and the european pillar of the transatlantic alliance WWW.IPPr.orG
INTerNaTIoNal
• Measures to strengthen and improve the institutions handling security at the centre of government INTerNaTIoNal
MeDIa
MIGraTIoN
• Proposals for improved global governance SeCurITy

PuBlIC INVolVeMeNT • a call to strengthen and deepen the legitimacy of the security strategy we pursue.
PuBlIC SerVICeS
reGIoNS our report, as with our interim report, Shared Destinies: Security in a Globalised World, is a call to action.
SeCurITy We face serious and worsening international security challenges but provided we are willing to learn lessons,
SoCIal PolICy to change the way we think, to find the necessary political will and to adapt our policy solutions and

The final report of the ippr Commission on National Security in the 21st Century
TraNSPorT
instruments to new circumstances, there is much that can be done. In the post 9/11, post financial crisis
world of complex threats and limited national resources, this report charts a safer course for the country in
WelFare
turbulent times.

Institute for Public Policy Research

30–32 Southampton Street
london WC2e 7ra
united Kingdom
tel: +44 (0)20 7470 6100
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email: info@ippr.org

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2 SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

Summaryand
Recommendations
Thissummaryisdividedintofourparts:
• Asetofobservationsonthecurrentsecuritycontext
• Astatementofprincipleswhich,intheviewoftheCommission,shouldshapeand
underpintheUK’sresponsetothatcontext
• Asummaryoftheconclusionsreachedinthereport
• AlistofalltheCommission’srecommendations,whichturntheseconclusionsinto
callsforspecificactioninawiderangeofareas.

Observationsonthecurrentsecuritycontext
AspartoftheworkforourInterimReport,publishedinNovember2008,the
Commissionanalysedtheunderlyingdriversoftheinternationalsecurityenvironment
andmadeaseriesofbasicobservationsonthenatureofthechallengesnowfaced.We
standbythoseobservations1 today.Theyarethat:
• Aprocessofglobalisationandpowerdiffusionischangingthenatureofglobalorder,
dilutingthecontrolofnationalgovernments,deepeninginterdependenceacross
bordersandempoweringafarwiderrangeofactorsthanbefore.Theseactorsinclude
statesthatareemergingontotheworldstage,butalsoprivatecompanies,non-
governmentalorganisations(NGOs),terroristorganisations,criminalgangsandothers.
Theoverallresultisincreasedfreedomforsometodisruptordestroy,andreduced
statedominanceofthesecurityenvironment,sothatnostatetodaycanprovidefor
itssecurityneedsbyactingaloneandstateinstitutionsingeneralareunderpressure
toadapt.
• Fragileandunstablestatesoutnumberstrong,accountableandstableonesinthe
internationalsystemtodaybymorethantwotoone,anddisorderlystatesarenowa
greaterthreattointernationalpeaceandsecuritythanisinter-statewar.
• Climatechange,globalpovertyandinequalityareexacerbatingthisproblemandthe
combinationofthesefactorswithresourcescarcityiscontributingtoaglobalconflict
environmentthatstilltakestoomanylives,displacestoomanypeopleandviolates
toomanyhumanrights.
• Transnationalcriminalnetworkshaveexpandedtheirtraffickingoperationsindrugs,
armsandpeopleandinmanycountriesareunderminingandcorruptingstate
governancearrangementsfromwithin,facilitatingandprofitingfromviolentconflict
intheprocess.
• Aglobalisedneo-jihadiideologyhasemergedasasignificantdriverofthe
internationalsecuritylandscape.
• Wehavenowenteredasecondandfarmoredangerousnuclearageinwhich
proliferationnotonlytootherstatesbutalsotonon-stateactorsisagreaterdanger
thaninter-statenuclearconflict.
• Rapidadvancesininformation-andbio-technologiesarecreatingnewvulnerabilities,
makingcyber-crime,cyber-terrorismandnewformsofbiologicalwarfareallmore
likelyinthefuture.
• Thecombinationofglobalisation,urbanisationandevercloserhumancohabitation
withagreaterdiversityofanimalspeciesisexposinghumanitytogreaterrisksfrom
pandemicdisease.

1.Thefullanalysisthatunderpinsthese
• ComplexityhasenteredthephysicalinfrastructureofmodernlifeintheUKandour
observationsisavailableintheInterim relianceonstretchedandinterconnectedinfrastructureshasincreased.Morecritical
Report(ippr2008). infrastructureisnowinprivatesectorhandsthanformanydecades,andthepriorities
 3

ofcompanieshave,naturally,beenprofit,notresilience.Theresultisnewinternal
pointsofsocietalvulnerabilityandlessdirectstatecontroloftheservicesessentialfor
everydaylife.
Theseobservationsdescribeamuchchangedandevolvingworld.But,justas
importantlyforUKnationalsecuritystrategy,therelativeplaceoftheUKanditsmajor
alliesintheworldorderischangingtoo.Inthisreport,wedrawattentiontothe
followingimportantaspectsofthatcontext:
• ThepositionoftheUnitedStatesinworldaffairsischanging.
ItisourviewthattheUnitedStateswillremaintheworld’smostpowerfulnationfora
decadeormore,butitwillholdthatpowerinadifferentcontext,notasthesingle
superpower,butasthepowerofgreatestoverallimpactinamultipolarworldinwhich
newmajorplayersareemergingontheworldstage.
Theglobalfinancialcrisisandtherecessionthathasfollowedinitswakehave
acceleratedthetrendtowardsarelativedeclineinUSpoliticalinfluence.TheUSfaces
severeeconomicstrainsathomeandstrongerchallengestoitsgloballeadership
abroad.Atthesametime,itisbecomingmorefocusedonthegenuinelyglobalspread
ofitsinterestsandalliances,andEuropeisbecominglesscentraltoitsoverallworld
view.
Thefulleffectsofthelong-termprocessesofchangeunderwaycannotbepredicted,
butitispossiblethatwiththesechangesintheUSpositionwemayalsobeseeing
thebeginningoftheendoffivecenturiesofdominanceofWesternpower,
institutionsandvaluesoverinternationalaffairs.
• Althoughstillsomeoftherichestcountriesonearth,theindividualcountriesof
Europe,includingtheUnitedKingdom,arelikewisecontinuingalongandgradual
processofdeclinerelativetootherpowersemergingontotheglobalstage.Both
demographictrendsandfuturerelativeeconomicgrowthpotentialsuggesta
continuationofthistrend,unlesscooperationamongtheEuropeanpowersleadsto
theEuropeanUnionemergingasamoreeffectiveplayerontheworldstage.
• ThereareharderconstraintsontheamounttheUK,theUSandtheEuropeanNATO
alliescanaffordtospendonsecuritythantherehavebeenformanydecades.These
constraintsaregrippingusjustassecurityrisksarediversifying,theglobalrecessionis
bitingandlong-termpressurestowardscompetition,conflictandstatefailureare
buildingupintheinternationalsystem.FinancialpressureswithinEuropemayalso
causeadditionalstrainsinthetransatlanticpartnership.

Principles
Giventhisoverallcontext,thisreportidentifiesandappliesprinciplesthatwebelieve
shouldunderpinUKnationalsecuritystrategyinthecircumstancesdescribed.These
principlesaresetoutbelow.Whiletheyfurnishaviewonthespecificissuesconfronting
ustoday,theyalsoactasaguidetothelonger-termsecuritychallengesfacingtheUK.
1.TheobjectiveofanationalsecuritystrategyshouldbetoprotecttheUKpopulation
fromthefullrangeofriskssothatpeoplecangoabouttheirdailylivesfreelyandwith
confidenceunderagovernmentbasedonconsent.
2.Theriskstonationalsecuritymustbedefinedwidelyincurrentconditions,tocover
majorman-madethreatsandnaturaldisasters.
3.Inplayingourroleontheinternationalstage,Britishsovereigntymustbeexercised
responsibly.Thismeanshelpingothercountriesandpeoplestoaddresstheirown
problems,becauseinaninterconnectedworldtheneedsandwell-beingofourown
peoplearelinkedtotheneedsandinterestsofothers.
4.Amajorincreaseinlevelsofmultilateralcooperationisneeded.
5.ExtensivepartnershipworkingwithintheUK,withtheprivatesector,withcommunity
groupsandwithlocalgovernmentandcitizensasindividuals,mustlikewisebeafeature
ofsecuritypolicy.
4 SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

6.Demonstratingandestablishinglegitimacyofstateactionisastrategicimperative.
7.Weneedtorefineourconflictpreventionpolicy.Whenwelltargetedandbasedona
goodunderstandingofthedynamicsofemergingproblems,preventiveactionsaves
money,livesandpoliticalrelationships.
8.Acommitmenttobuildingnationalresilience,especiallyinourinfrastructure,by
“Inshort,the measuresincludingeducatingandincreasingtheself-relianceofourcommunities,isan
Commission integralpartofsecuritypolicy.

believesthat 9.Weneedflexibleandwellcoordinatednationalcapabilities,forgingawiderangeof
policyinstruments,militaryandnon-military,intoacoherentwhole.
governmentneeds
tothinkbroadly, Inshort,theCommissionbelievesthatgovernmentneedstothinkbroadly,prepare
thoroughlyandactearly.Becausetoday’schallengesaremorediverseandcomplex,and
prepare becauserelativestatepowerisnowmorelimited,governmentshavealsotocoordinate
thoroughlyand theirinternaleffortmoreeffectivelyandtocooperateexternallywithmanyotheractors
actearly” whileatthesametimebeingcarefultodemonstratethelegitimacyoftheactionthey
take.
Thisconcept,ofadistributed2,coordinatedandlegitimateresponsehasbeenusedto
shapemuchofthestructureandcontentofthisreport.

2.Adistributedresponseisonespread
overawideareaandsharedbya
numberofactorsatavarietyoflevels.
Policyconclusions
Giventhecontextandprinciplesoutlined,weconcludethat:
• Tohelpbuildadistributedresponseexternally,theUKmustinvestpoliticalcapitaland
resourcesineffortstobuildmoreeffectiveinternationalcooperation.Ifwecan
encourageotherstodothesame,wecanpushuppower,responsibilityandeffective
actiontomultilateralinstitutionsandextendtheirauthorityintopoorlyregulated
areasoftheglobalspace.Wesuggestitisimportanttodothisacrossawiderangeof
issues,includingenergycompetition,climatechange,nuclearproliferation,thecontrol
ofbiologicalandchemicalweapons,terrorism,transnationalcrime,cyber-security
challengesandtheincreasinglyimportantusesofouterspace.
• TobuildadistributedresponseinternallyintheUK,andtodealwithchallenges
relatedtoresilience,counter-radicalisationandcounter-terrorismathome,central
governmentneedstodevolveanddelegatepowerandresponsibilitydownandoutto
localgovernment,communities,NGOs,businessesandcitizensandtoenlistallof
themaspartnersinthedeliveryofnationalsecurity.
• Tocoordinateourownwidelydispersednationaleffortandtobetterintegrateour
instrumentsatnationallevel,theUKneedstostrengthenthestrategiccentreof
governmentandtobreakdownthebarriersbetweendepartmentalstovepipes;to
conductnotaStrategicDefenceReviewbutaStrategicReviewofSecurityinthe
widestsense,whichincorporatesbutgoesbeyondarmeddefence;toestablisha
singlecross-governmentsecuritybudgetincorporatingallareasofspendingon
nationalsecurity,includingdefence;toreviewtherole,relationshipsandremitof
theDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DfID)sothatitsactivitiescanbe
moreeffectivelyintegratedwiththesecurityeffort;andtoenhancetheDiplomatic
Service,sothatitiscapableofthemoredemandingtaskswenowneeditto
perform.
• Onlegitimacy,wearguethereisaneedtothinkmorecreativelyandbemore
demandingofourselveswhenitcomestodemonstratingitinpractice.Thisismore
thanaquestionofvalues.Itispartofthewiderpoliticalstrategywithinwhichour
securitypoliciesmustsit.OurrecommendationsinChapter11ofthisreport,and
summarisedbelow,putfleshontheseideas.
Inadditiontotheseconclusionsonoverallstrategy,theCommissionhasreached
importantconclusionsonarangeofmorespecificissues.
• OntheimmediatechallengeofAfghanistan-Pakistan,weconcludethatsuccessthere
requires:moreassistanceforPakistan;moreeffectiveintegrationoftheinternational
 5

effort;bettercoordinatedregionaldiplomacy;andtheuseofmilitaryforceonlywithin
awiderpoliticalstrategythatprotectsciviliansandbuildslegitimacyontheground.
Suchanapproachwillbeneededalsoinanyfutureinternationalinterventions.
• WecallforurgentinvestmentintheUK’sstrategicgasstoragecapacityandformore
cooperationonenergyattheleveloftheEuropeanUnionaspartofawiderpackage
ofmeasuresonenergysecurity.
• Ondefence,wecallforatransformationofthearmedforcesand,withinthecontext
ofthealliancesofwhichweareapart,forgreaterdefencecapabilityspecialisation.
Wepointtoover£24billionoffutureplanneddefencespendingthatneedstobe
re-thoughtaspartofafullStrategicReviewofSecurity.
Alliances
Onalliancerelationships,theCommissionhasexaminedthefollowingfiveoptionsfor
theUK.
1.TheUKcouldtrytoperpetuatethestatusquo,inwhichthecountrydependsona
versionofthetransatlanticalliancethatisheavilyreliantonAmericancapabilitiesand
resourcesandinwhichtheUKtriestoretainfull-spectrumdefencecapabilitiesbutona
muchsmallerscalethantheUS.
2.ItcouldpursueamajorstrengtheningofEuropeandefenceandsecuritycooperation,
notasanalternativetoNATObutasaroutetoreducingabsolutedependenceonthe
UnitedStateswhilecontinuingtobuildmoreeffectivemultilateralinstitutionsasa
longer-termproject.
3.Itcouldlooktosomeotherintergovernmentalgrouping,suchastheCommonwealth,
toplayagreaterroleorchooseadhoc arrangementsforspecificissues.
4.Itcouldtrytogoitaloneandonlylookforallieswhenabsolutelynecessary.
5.Itcouldpursueahedgingstrategythatassumesthatnofundamentalchoicesare
necessaryandleavesallfouroftheaboveoptionsinplay.
Inthisreport,wemakeadeliberatechoice.WearguethatOption2aboveservesthe
nationalsecurityinterestsoftheUKmoreeffectivelythananyother.Weneedto
buildbetterglobalinstitutionsacrossawidefront,butfortheforeseeablefutureUK
securitywillbebestservedbyourmembershipofthetransatlanticalliance.Thecosy
statusquo,however,inwhichtheUStakesmuchofthestrainwhileEurope
dissipatesitslimiteddefenceandsecurityresourcesonduplicatedcostsandColdWar
museumarmies,willnotbeavailableindefinitely.IfwedonotstrengthenNATOby
reinforcingitsEuropeanpillar,notjustondefencebutonwidersecurityissuestoo,
theresultwillbeneitherthestatusquonorsomeotherfantasyofwidercollective
securitycooperation.Therewillbeafuturecrisisthatleavesusvulnerabletoshifting
Americaninterestsandopinion,relativeUSdeclineandEuropeandisunityand
weakness,whenNATO’spoliticalgluefailstoholdandEuropeisleftmoreexposed
thanatanytimesincetheSecondWorldWar.
TheBritishandEuropeanrelationshipwiththeUnitedStatesshouldthereforeremainthe
strongestpillarofournationalsecuritystrategy,butitcannotbetheonlyone.
StrengtheningoursecuritybaserequiresfarmoreeffectiveactionatEuropeanlevel.We
needtoinvestpoliticalcapital,diplomaticeffortandfinancialresourcesintheEuropean
SecurityandDefencePolicy.WehavetopersuadeourEuropeanpartnerstoraisetheir
minimumlevelsofsecuritycommitmentandresources.AndweneedtomodifytheUK’s
defenceposturetopursuegreatercapabilityspecialisationwithintheoverallalliance
effort,areducedscaleofcommitmenttofull-spectrumcombatcapabilities,andmore
targetedinvestmentinthekindsofcapabilitieswearelikelytoneedintheless
conventionalconflictenvironmentofthefuture.
Therearerisksinrelyingmoreonothers.Inreality,however,bothduringtheCold
Warandsince,wehavebeenlivingwiththoserisksformanyyears.Thereisagreater
danger,inourview,intakingtheUnitedStatesforgrantedorinattemptingtorely,
inevitablyinadequatelygiventheresourceconstraints,onanyeffortwecanmount
6 SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

ourselves.NoEuropeancountry,includingthisone,hastheresourcestogoitalone
todayandattemptingtodosowouldbeamisjudgementofhistoricproportions.
Resources
Onthequestionofresourceconstraintsandthepublicfinances,weconcludethatthe
debateisjumpingtoofasttowardsraisingtaxesormakingcuts,skippingoverthe
questionofhowwegetmorevalueoutofwhatwealreadyspendonsecurity.Bothcuts
andtaxincreasesmaywellbenecessary,butbeforewegettothatstageweshouldbe
fullyexploringanapproachthat:
• Isbasedonaproperstrategicassessmentofthreatsacrossthewholesecurity
spectrumandthatdeploysourresourcesinawaythatisruthlesslytargetedatthose
threatsonacross-departmentalbasis
• Facesuptodifficultchoicesondefencepolicyandmoreeffectivelycoordinatesand
exploitssynergiesacrossdevelopmentandsecurityspending
• Makesbetter,moretargeteduseofotherresources.If,forexample,wecansave
moneybyreplacingtheIDcardschemewithmorepervasiveuseofbiometric
passports,thenthatoptionshouldbeexplored.Ifwecansavemoneybybuilding
moreeffectivecooperationandcollaborationbetweentheMoDpolice,theBritish
TransportPoliceandtheCivilNuclearPolice,allofwhichplayaroleinprotecting
elementsofthenationalinfrastructure,weshouldlooktodoso.
Weshouldalsoadoptanapproachthat:
• Makesmoreofouralliancessothattheburdenismoreeffectivelysharedbetween
internationalpartners
• Coordinateswiderinternationalactionmoreeffectivelytoensurebetteroutcomesfor
themoneyweinvest
• Rationalisesourprocurementpolicytotargetessentialcapabilities
• Makesarealityofwellplannedandrelativelycheapeffortsatconflictprevention
insteadofwastingmoneyandliveswhenconflictshavebrokenout
• Lookstospreadthecostsandeffortinareaslikeprotectionofthecriticalnational
infrastructure,energysecurityandmaritimepiracyfairlyacrossthepublicsector,
privatebusinesses,consumersandcitizens.
Wedonotpretendthatthesechoiceswouldmiraculouslyremovetheresourceproblem
weface,butaddressingthatproblemwithoutafundamentalre-thinkwillundermine
publicsupportforcontinuedinvestmentinnationalsecurityandwouldbeshort-sighted.
Itwouldalsobeamissedopportunitybecausethescaleofthefiscalpressurewe
currentlyfaceisanopportunitytogetonandtackletherangeoftaskswesetoutinthis
reportandshouldbedoinganyway.

Recommendations
Thespecificrecommendationsthatflowfromtheseoverallconclusionsarepresented
below,intheorderinwhichtheyappearinthefullreport,wheregreatercontextand
detailforeachrecommendationisprovided.
Chapter3:DealingwiththechallengeofAfghanistanandPakistan
Recommendation1: TheGovernmentshoulddirectmoreresourcesatthesituationin
Pakistan,bothintermsofcapacitybuildingandoperationalsupporttohelpthe
Pakistanisecurityforcesdealdirectlywiththethreatfrommilitants,andintermsof
developmentassistance.TheborderareasofPakistanarenowtheepicentreofthe
challengeswefaceintheregion.ItisfromherethatbothAfghanistanandPakistanare
beingdestabilisedandfromthisareathatmilitantgroupscanplantheirattacks,bothin
theregionandintheWest.
Recommendation2: InrelationtoAfghanistan,whileacknowledgingtheneedforalong-
termcommitmentontheUK’spart,theCommissionbelievesweneedmuchmoreclarityand
realismonthenatureoftheendstatewearetheretohelpdeliver.Thefocusneedstobeon
 7

helpingthewritofthedemocraticallyelectedgovernmentinKabulrunthroughoutthe
country,andonpreventingAfghanistanfrombeingusedasabasefromwhichtoattackus.
Itshouldnotbeontryingtoimplantourownculturalnormsinacountrythatisnotours.
Recommendation3:TheinternationalcommunityneedsasingleplanforAfghanistan,
developedinpartnershipwiththeAfghanauthorities,withtightlydefinedprioritiesand
adeterminationbyallmembersoftheinternationalcommunitytooperateitwithreal
unityofpurposeandvoice.Thereareover50countriesengagedinbilateralactivitiesin
Afghanistan,andmanymultilateralorganisationsareactivetoo.Thepowertodo
somethingaboutcoordinatingallthiseffortlieswiththeinternationalcommunity,not
withouradversariesontheground.
Recommendation4:Theuseofmilitaryforce,bothinAfghanistanandintheborder
areasofPakistan,mustbelockedmorefirmlywithinacoherentpoliticalplanthatis
designedtodefeattheadversariesweface.Thatplanshouldprioritisethesafetyand
protectionofAfghanciviliansandshouldbefullyexplainedtothepeopleofthecountry.
Recommendation5:TheUKgovernmentshould,withinternationalpartners,further
developitseffortsatnarcoticseradicationinAfghanistanbypursuingamultidimensional
strategyfocusedoncropdestruction,livelihoodsubstitution,anddealernetwork
disruption.ThiswillhelpbothtodevelopAfghanistan’slegaleconomyandtoundercut
theTaliban,whichprofitsfromthenarcoticstrade.
Recommendation6: TheGovernmentshouldsupportandencouragetheUStopursuea
widerregionalapproachtoimprovingthesituationinAfghanistanandPakistan.Many
neighbouringcountriesareaffectedbywhatisgoingonthereatthemomentandthe
regionhasseveralwider,interlockingsecuritychallengesthatrequireregionalsolutions.
India,China,Russia,IranandthecountriesofCentralAsianeedtobebroughtintoa
coordinatedprocess.
Recommendation7: TheUK’scapacityforcombinedcivilian-militarystabilisationand
reconstructionoperationsmustquicklygrowin-countryandincreasinglybeAfghanised
wherepossible.WehavebeengoodatwinningmilitaryvictoriesinAfghanistan,butless
goodatbuildingastablepeaceafterwards.
Chapter4:Energysecurity
TheUKhasbeenusedtoplentifulsuppliesofenergy,oftenavailableclosetohomeand
atlow,stableprices.Thiseraisnowover.Wearebecominganenergy-importingcountry,
moreexposedtoarangeofrisksthataccompanyincreasedrelianceonothers.Of
particularconcernisthesupplyofgasfrommainlandEurope,whichwillbeagrowing
featureoftheUK’senergymixintheyearsahead.Consequently:
Recommendation8: TheUKshouldcontinuetopressforanintegratedandcoordinated
gasmarketacrossthewholeoftheEU.TheintegrationoftheEuropeangasmarketisa
foundationstoneofEUunityovercomingdecadesanditisinallmemberstates’interests
toensurethatEuropecannotbedividedbysuppliersseekingtoexertpoliticalinfluence.
Recommendation9:TheUKshould,asamatterofurgency,furtherdevelopitsstrategic
gasstoragecapacity,andgovernmentshouldsetatargetdateforachievingtherequired
capacity.Privatesectorproviderswillnotprovidethestrategicreserveweneed.Strategic
gasstorageisvitaltoensuringsupplyandtheavoidanceofpossibleenergyblackmail.
Recommendation10:TheGovernmentshouldfurtherdevelopalternativestogasin
powergeneration.Aspressuretocutcarbonoutputincreases,aswitchfromcoaltogas
islikelyinpowergeneration.Topreventthisfromfurtherincreasingourexposureto
importedgas,theUKneedstoexplorerenewables,furtherdevelopcarboncaptureand
storagetechnologyand,ifitpursuesmorenuclearpower,ensurethishappenswithout
creatingadditionalsecurityrisks.
Recommendation11: TheUKshouldfollowtheexampleofCaliforniaandestablisha
regulatorystructurethatgenuinelyincentivisesbothsupplycompaniesandconsumersto
saveenergyandincreaseefficiencylevelsintheuseofgas.Thisagainwouldcontribute
toreducedrelianceonimportedgasandthereforetoimprovednationalsecurity.
8 SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

Chapter5:Defencepolicy
Itisclearthereisablackholeinthedefencebudget.Therehavealsobeenstrainsonthe
operationaleffectivenessoftheArmedForcesduetotheintensityofrecentoperations.
TheCommissionbelievesthissituationcannotcontinueasitis.
Recommendation12: AfullreviewoftheUK’sdefencerequirementsisneededurgently,
butthisreviewshouldformanintegralpartofawiderStrategicReviewofSecurity.It
shouldnotbeaStrategicDefenceReviewconductedinisolationfromtherestof
governmentthinkingonnationalsecurityrisksandresponses.Thedefencecomponent
ofthiswiderreviewshouldfocuson:increasedcapabilityspecialisation;capabilities
requiredtohandlerisksthatarespecifictotheUK;areducedcommitmenttothefull
spectrumofconventionalwarfightingcapability;anemphasisonpost-conflict
stabilisationandreconstructioncapabilities;andanewapproachtotheUK’snuclear
deterrent,Trident.Eachoftheseisaddressedinfurtherrecommendationsbelow.
Recommendation13: Thefuturedefenceinvestmentprogrammeshouldpursue
greaterUKdefencecapabilityspecialisationwithinthecontextofadeepeningof
EuropeandefenceintegrationandthewiderNATOallianceofwhichweareapart.
Weneedafocusoncommandandcontrolassets,tacticalground-airsupport,
heavyliftaircraft,cyberwarfarecapability,andSpecialForces.Wealsoneedto
emphasisehighqualityServicepersonneltrainingandanincreaseinoverallService
numbers.
Recommendation14: TheGovernmentshouldgivehighprioritytothecapabilities
requiredtodealwitharangeofUK-specificsecuritychallenges.Thesemightinclude
majorcivilcontingencies,majorterroristincidentsonUKterritory,smallscaleriskstoUK
communitieslivingabroad,andsomeelementsofmaritimesecurity.
Recommendation15: TheGovernmentshouldthoroughlyre-examine,aspartofa
StrategicReviewofSecurity,itsprojecteddefenceequipmentrequirements.Thisre-
examinationshouldexploreallviableoptionsforcapabilitydowngradingandquantity
reductions,aswellasforcompletecancellationofsomeequipmentprogrammes.For
illustrativeratherthancomprehensivepurposes,wesuggestthatprogrammessuchas
theFutureCarrier,theJointStrikeFighter,andpurchasesofType45Destroyersandof
Astuteclasssubmarinesshouldbeintheframe.
Recommendation16: TheUKshouldcreateaStabilisationandReconstruction
Force,onlytheheadquartersofwhichshouldbeapermanentstandingelement.
Thiswouldbeajointcivilian-militaryforce,partlystaffedfromatrainedcivilian
reserve,capableofbeingdeployedintostilldangerouspost-conflictenvironments
atshortnotice.
Trident
TheCommissionbelievesfirmlyintheneedtopursueaworldfreeofnuclearweapons
andintheneedfortheUKtoplayanactiveroleinbringingthatabout.Inthe
meantime,andinrelationtoTrident,theCommissionrecommends:
Recommendation17:ThefutureofBritain’sindependentnucleardeterrentshouldbe
consideredasanintegralpartoftherecommendedStrategicReviewofSecurity.This
shouldconsider:
• Whether,astheCommissionbelievesisthecase,aminimumUKdeterrentisstill
needed
• Thebestandmostcost-effectivewaytoprovideit,includingconsiderationofwhether
weshouldreplacetheTridentsystem,asiscurrentlyplanned,seektoextendthelife
ofthecurrentsystemfurtherordecidethatsomeothersystemforprovidingBritain’s
deterrentinanucleararmedworldwouldbebettersuitedtothestrategic
circumstancesinwhichwethenfindourselves
• Theopportunitycostsofmaintainingourdeterrent,inallitspossibleforms,forother
sectorsoftheUKdefenceandsecuritybudget.Thismusttakeintoaccountthecosts
thatwouldbeinvolvedindecommissioningTridentanditsfacilities.
Recommendation18: Inordertomaintaintheoptionofrefreshingthecurrentsystemas
 9

partoftheStrategicReviewofSecurity,theUKshouldcontinuewiththecrucial
ongoingpreparatoryworkontheconcept,designandassessmentphasesoftheTrident
refresh.
Recommendation19: Toprovidemaximumadditionalflexibilityinourposition,theUK
shouldalsonowrecommencedetailedexploratoryworkonthecostsandviabilityofa
furtherrun-on,beyond2024,oftheexistingVanguardsubmarinehulls,sothatthe
StrategicReviewofSecurity,shoulditconcludethatTridentistheappropriatewaytogo,
canalsoconsiderthisoptionifdesired.
Recommendation20: Finally,beforeanyfurtherdecisionofsubstanceistakenonthis
matter,Parliamentmusthaveafurtheropportunitytovote.
Chapter6:Deepeningalliancecooperation:NATO,theEUandthetransatlantic
partnership
Inlinewiththecommentsmadeearlierinthissummaryontheneedtostrengthenthe
EuropeanpillarofNATO,theCommissionmakesthefollowingrecommendations.
Recommendation21:RegardlessoftheoutcomeoffuturedeliberationsontheEU’s
TreatyofLisbon,theUKgovernmentshouldsupport,fullyengageinandifnecessary
leadmovestocreatepermanentstructureddefencecooperationamongapioneergroup
ofEuropeanUnioncountries.
Recommendation22: Pioneergroupdefenceministers,backedwherenecessarybytheir
nationalleaders,shouldalsopursueincreasedlevelsofinvestmentinpriorityareassuch
ason-the-groundforceprotection,improvedtransporttoandwithinthefieldof
operations,bettercommunicationsandintelligence,improvedlogisticsandmore
precision-guidedweapons.
Recommendation23: Onthesupplyside,weneeddeepercollaborationintheEuropean
defenceindustry,particularlyasthisrelatestolandandseasystems.Thereisstillwasted
researchanddevelopmentinvestmentinsmall-scalenationaldefenceindustriesinthese
areas,inflatedpricestotheEuropeantax-payer,andconsequentlymissedexport
opportunitiesforEuropeandefencemanufacturers.Thisallneedstobestrippedout,via
Europeandefenceindustryconsolidation.
Recommendation24: Tohelpfreeupresourcesformuchneedednewinvestments,
Europeancountriesshouldeachpursuemorepoolingofresourcesandahigherdegree
ofrolespecialisation.Clearly,totalrelianceonrolespecialisationwouldbedangerousin
theabsenceofprioragreementonstrategyandcommitmentstodeployforces,but
provideditdevelopsincrementallyandtakesplaceonastrictlyvoluntarybasis,itshould
beencouragedandexpandedwhereverpossible.
Recommendation25: Atthestrategiclevel,thereisanurgentneedforanagreedEU
externalcrisismanagementdoctrine,whichwouldcovertherangeofissuesfrom
preventiveengagementandinterventioninhostileenvironmentstopeacekeeping,
conflictstabilisationandpost-conflictreconstruction.
Recommendation26:Toensurethatanydoctrineismorethancosmetic,thereisalsoa
needtoinvestintherightkindsofEuropeancapabilities.EUcountriesshouldincrease
thenumberofBattlegroups3 onstandbyatanyonetime,whileexpandingthesizeof
supportunitssuchaslogisticians,engineers,helicoptersquadrons,medicsand
intelligenceteamsthatmayberelevantnotonlytoshort-termBattlegroupinterventions
butalsotolonger-termstabilisationoperations.Individualcountriesshouldalsoinvest
moreinbuildingdeployablegendarmerie,policingandciviliancapabilitiesneededfor
post-conflictstabilisationandreconstructionoperations.
Recommendation27:TostrengthenEuropeanabilitiestodealwithlesstraditional
securitychallengesliketransnationalcrime,andtomakemoreeffectiveuseofborder
crossingpointsasopportunitiesforinterdictionsofarms,drugsandpeoplesmuggling,
theUKshouldbothmorefullyengageandsupporttheEUsecuritybodyFrontex’s
activitiesatthebordersoftheEuropeanUnionandpursueamuchenhancedandmore
3.AnEUBattlegroupisamilitaryforce
centralisedrolefortheEuropeanPoliceOffice,Europol. consistingofatleast1,500combat
soldiersdrawnfromEUmemberstates.
10 SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

NATOreform
Recommendation28:There-thinkofNATO’sStrategicConcept,initiatedatthe60th
AnniversaryStrasbourg-KehlSummit,shouldbeusedasanopportunitytore-affirmthe
commitmenttocollectivedefence,asavehicletoclarifyandupdatetheorganisation’s
roleandmissionfortoday’schangedcircumstances,andtostimulatefurtherdebateon
whatNATOsolidarityandthecollectivesecurityguaranteemeaninpracticeincurrent
conditions.SinceweliveinaworldwhereEuropeanandNorthAmericancountriescan
behithardfromaremotepointandwithlong-termeffects,solidarityrequiresNATO
membersbothtocommittothedefenceofhometerritoryandalsotobecollectively
willingandcapableofrespondingtonon-conventionaland‘outofarea’challenges.This
hastobecomeacorefeatureofbothdeterrenceandcollectiveself-defence,notan
optionalextra.
Recommendation29: Inthecontextoftheeconomicdownturn,thereintegrationof
FranceintoNATOmilitarystructuresandtheappointmentofafourstarFrenchgeneral
toleadAlliedCommandTransformationinNorfolk,Virginia,effortsatthetransformation
ofNATOcapabilitiesmustnowbeaccelerated.
Recommendation30:FargreaterconsiderationshouldbegiventohowNATO’smilitary
capabilitiescanbeusedincoordinatedfashionwithpolicing,civiliananddevelopment
instrumentsaspartofmoreeffectiveandintegratedstrategiesinconflict,post-conflict
andcomplexemergencysituations.
Recommendation31: NATOmustcontinueattemptstoreformitsinternalprocedures
andorganisation.Itcannotanylongerbethesametightlyorganised,consensus-based
organisation.Itneedsreformtoitspersonnelstructures,forceplanninganddecision-
making,aswellasitsfinancing.Inparticular,the‘costs-fall-where-they-lie’approach
needstobereplacedbyfinancialcontributionsthatarebasedonsizeofmembercountry
GDP.Thosecountries,suchastheUKandGermany,thatinsistonlimitingtheNATO
budgettonoughtpercentgrowthinrealterms,yearonyear,shouldalsodesistfrom
doingso.
Recommendation32:NATOmustkeepitsdooropentonewmemberswherethisis
consistentwithitsfundamentalidealsandpurpose.Thecriteriaofmembership,bothcivil
andmilitary,needtobemadeclearerandmoredemanding,butwheretheycanbemet,
newmembersshouldbeconsidered.Nonon-memberstateshouldhaveavetooverthis
process.
Chapter7:Strengtheningglobalcooperation

Actiononfragilestates
Theconsequencesflowingfromweakandfragilestatesareapotentiallygreaterthreatto
securitytodaythantheactionsofstrongones.Totacklethisissuemoreeffectively,the
Commissionbelieves:
Recommendation33:TheUKgovernmentshouldadoptapoliticalratherthana
technocraticstancewhenengaginginfragilestatesanditshouldencourageotherstates
andinternationalinstitutionstodothesame.Providingassistancetoincumbent
governmentsintheseenvironmentscansometimespropupflawedandillegitimate
politicalregimes.Weneedtofindwaysofdeliveringfinancialaidthatareconditionalon
improvementsingovernance,citizenship,peaceanddevelopment.
Recommendation34:TheGovernmentshouldincreaseitsengagementwithandsupport
forregionalorganisationsthatpromotegoodgovernanceintheirspheresofinfluence.
OrganisationssuchastheAfricanUnion(AU),theNewPartnershipforAfrican
Development(NEPAD)andtheAfricanPeerReviewMechanism(APRM),whilestill
facingchallenges,havehadsomesuccessinfosteringaccountablepoliticalgovernancein
theirregionandwouldbenefitfromincreasedinternationalsupport.
Recommendation35:TheGovernmentshouldgivefullsupporttoapackageof
measuresdesignedtoreducecorruptionandincreaselegitimacyinweakandfragile
states.Corruptionintheseenvironmentsfurtherunderminesgoodgovernance,destroys
livesandcreatessecurityrisks.
 11

Recommendation36: TheGovernmentshouldcommittomorepredictable,effectiveand
longer-termassistancetofragileandpost-conflictstates.Stableassistancepackagesare
particularlyimportantinpost-conflictenvironmentswheretooofteninternational
assistancebeginstotaperoffjustastheabsorptivecapacityofthestateisincreasing.
Recommendation37: Whereitisappropriatetodoso,theGovernmentshouldincrease
investmentinpooledresourcesforfragilestates.Donorcoordinationinthese
environmentsisoftenpoorandcommonaimsandobjectivesunclear.
Climatechangeandenergycompetition
Climatechangeisthemostpotentlong-termthreatfacinghumanityandthegreatest
challengetoouringenuityandleadership.Therearenoscenariosinwhichunchecked
climatechangeisgoodforeitherinternationalornationalsecurity.TheUKhaslimited
influenceonthisissueandanenforceableinternationalagreementonemissionstargets
isunlikelyintheshortterm.However,wecanstillactand,inourview,theUKshould
focusontwoissueswithoutwhichanyeffectiveinternationalactiononclimatechange “Thereareno
willbeimpossible:first,howmitigationandadaptationeffortsindevelopingcountries scenariosinwhich
aretobefinanced;andsecond,howlow-carbontechnologydevelopment,transferand
deploymentaretobeorganised.Consequently,theCommissionbelieves: uncheckedclimate
Recommendation38:TheUKgovernmentshouldsupportthecreationofacoordinating
changeisgoodfor
bodyforinternationalclimatefinanceflowsaimedatsupportingclimatechange eitherinternational
adaptationandmitigationactivitiesindevelopingcountries. ornational
Recommendation39: TheGovernmentshouldprioritisesupportfortechnologytransfer security”
initiatives,especiallyinenergyefficiency.Whileemissionsreductionstargetsandcarbon
pricingissuesframeinternationalengagementonclimatechangeintermsofburden-
sharing,thedevelopmentoflow-carbontechnologytransformsthatengagementintoa
discussionaboutsharingtheindustrialgainsthatwillflowfromactiontomeetthecrisis.
Thisisinherentlymoreproductive.
Inaddition,becausethereisaseriousdangerofcompetitionandconflictoverfossilfuel
energysuppliesinfuture,particularlyoncetheglobaleconomycomesoutofrecession,
theCommissionbelieves:
Recommendation40: TheGovernmentshouldplanforandadvocateatrulyglobal
forumforenergycooperation(withoutprecludingexpansionoftheInternationalEnergy
Agency).Thiswouldhelptolimitcompetitivepressurebyimprovinginternational
cooperationandcoordinationonthisissue.
Nuclearnon-proliferation
TheCommissionbelievestheGovernmentshouldvigorouslypursuethegoalofanuclear
weapons-freeworld.Thisisagoalthatmaytakegenerationstodeliverbutactionin
pursuitofitmustbeginimmediately.Intakingactiontohelpbringthisabout:
Recommendation41: TheUKGovernmentshouldvigorouslypursueastrengtheningof
theNon-ProliferationTreaty(NPT)provisionsonmonitoringandcompliance,toprovide
greaterassurancestoallpartiesontheeffectivenessoftheTreaty.TheInternational
AtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)AdditionalProtocol,requiringastatetoprovideaccessto
anylocationwherenuclearmaterialispresent,shouldbeacceptedbyallnationssigned
uptotheTreatyandthepolicygoalshouldbetomakesuchacceptancemandatoryat
theNPTReviewConferencein2010.
Recommendation42: TheGovernmentshouldprovidefurtherpracticalhelptothose
statesthatwishbutareunabletofullyimplementSecurityCouncilResolution1540on
thesafetyandsecurityofnuclearstockpiles.
Recommendation43:TheGovernmentshouldcontinuetoadvancethecaseforthe
internationalisationofthenuclearfuelcycleandforthecreationofnuclearfuelbanks
underIAEAcontrol.
Recommendation44: TheGovernmentshoulduseallitsinfluenceinsideNATOto
ensurethatthereviewofNATO’sstrategicconceptproducesaresultsensitivetoand
supportiveoftheneedforasuccessfulstrengtheningoftheNPT,boththroughoutthe
2010NPTReviewConferenceperiodandbeyond.
12 SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

Inadditiontoanefforttopromoteastrategicdialogueonnon-proliferationamongthe
P-5(theUS,UK,France,RussiaandChina),moreover:
Recommendation45:TheGovernmentshouldalsofundandcontributetoasecond,
informaltrackofdiplomaticactivityinvolvingformerseniorofficialsandpolicyexperts
fromtheP-5plusIndia,IsraelandPakistan.
Biologicalandchemicalweapons
Biologicalandchemicalweaponsareagrowingconcern.Toaddressthechallengesinthis
area:
Recommendation46:TheUKgovernmentshouldusetheperiodleadinguptothe2011
ReviewConferenceoftheBiologicalandToxicWeaponsConvention(BTWC)topushfor
thecreationofaneffectiveverificationmechanismforthistreatyandtoimprovethe
monitoringofstatecompliancewithitsterms.
Recommendation47: TheGovernmentshouldtakestepstorestartstallednegotiationson
theestablishmentofanOrganisationfortheProhibitionofBiologicalWeapons,similarin
structuretotheOrganisationfortheProhibitionofChemicalWeapons(OPCW)thatwas
setupin1997toensureimplementationoftheChemicalWeaponsConvention(CWC).
Recommendation48: TheGovernmentshoulduseitspositionasaDepositoryStatefor
theBTWCtotakealeadindevelopingprogrammestoeducateindividualscientistsabout
thepotentialsecurityimplicationsoftheirwork.
Recommendation49:TheGovernmentshouldworkwithothermajorpowersto
eliminatetheloopholesrelatedtolawenforcementintheChemicalWeaponsConvention
(CWC),whichhaveencouragedsomestatestodevelopnewandincapacitatingchemical
agentsbasedonadvancesinneuroscience.
Cyberandspacesecurity
Aswebecomemoredependentonnetworkedtechnologiesandcommunicationsrouted
throughsatellites,twootherareasareripeforstrengthenedinternationalcooperation.
Thefirstoftheseiscyber-security.Onthis,webelieve:
Recommendation50:TheUKgovernmentshouldincreaseitspoliticalandfinancial
supportforglobalactiontoenhance‘cybersecurity’,recognisingthehighpriorityalso
beingplacedonthisbytheObamaAdministrationintheUS.Asafirststep,concerted
actionataEuropeanlevelisrequiredthroughsupportingandbuildingonthegoodwork
ofEuropeanNetworkandInformationSecurityAgency(ENISA).
Onspacesecurity,wealsobelieve:
Recommendation51: TheGovernmentshouldpromotetheideaofafollow-ontreatyto
theOuterSpaceTreaty,andpursueanyandallotherpossibleformsofcooperative
dialoguetodeveloptheinternationallegalregimearoundthemilitaryusesofspace.
Chapter8:Resilience
Astherecommendationsaboveindicate,athemerunningthroughtheCommission’swork
hasbeenthatwelivetodayinacomplex,denselynetworkedandheavilytechnology-reliant
society.Extensiveprivatisationandthepursuitofcompetitiveadvantageinglobalised
marketshavealsoledustoparedownthesystemswerelyuponuntillittleornomarginfor
errorremains.Wehaveswitchedtoleanproduction,stretchedsupplychains,decreased
stockinventoriesandreducedredundancyinoursystems.Wehaveoutsourced,offshored
andembracedajust-in-timeculturewithlittleheedforjust-in-case.Thismagnifiesnotonly
efficiencybutalsovulnerability.Everythingdependsoninfrastructurefunctioningsmoothly
andtheinfrastructureofmodernlifecanbebrittle:interdependentsystemscanmakefor
cascadesofconcatenatedfailurewhenonelinkinthechainisbroken.
Criticalinfrastructure
TheCommissionbelievestheUKmustdomoretoaddressthechallengesthatflowfrom
thecontextdescribed.Inparticular,webelieve:
Recommendation52: TheUKgovernmentshouldreviewitspowerstomandaterealistic
minimumlevelsofresilienceinrelationtoallcriticalinfrastructuresandinrelationtoall
 13

areasofinterdependencebetweendifferentinfrastructuresectors.Wherewider
interpretationoramendmentofexistinglegislationisnotsufficientandnewprimary
legislationisrequired,thisshouldbeincludedintheplannedfurtherBillonCivil
Contingencies.
Recommendation53:TheGovernmentshouldbringtogetherregulatorsofthedifferent
infrastructureindustriesandrequirethemtoenforcehigherresiliencestandardsintheir
ownsectors,aswellastoinvestigateandstrengthenresilienceinareasof
interdependenciesbetweensectorsandinsectorsupplychains.
Recommendation54: TheGovernmentshouldgofurtherandsignaltosectorregulators
thatitwouldwelcomeinvestmentbyutilityprovidersinrelevantareasoutsidetheirown
corebusinessareaswheresuchinvestmentwouldreduceinterdependenceonother
elementsoftheinfrastructure.Investmentbythepowergenerators,nationalgridand
energydistributioncompaniesinmobilecommunicationsthataremoreresilientagainst
powerfailure,forexample,wouldbewelcome.
Recommendation55:TheGovernmentshouldinstructtheOfficeofCommunications
(Ofcom)tomakeadequatespectrumavailabletoensureemergencyserviceaccessto
nextgenerationmobiletechnology.Thiswillbeincreasinglyimportanttotransmitting
andreceivingthedatarequiredforsituationalawarenessandcoordinatedandtimely
emergencyresponseinthefuture,andmaybeespeciallyimportantforoccasionswhen
Airwavetrafficishighest,suchasduringtheLondon2012OlympicandParalympic
Games.
Recommendation56: TheGovernmentshouldworkwiththeOfficeofGasand
ElectricityMarkets(Ofgem)toensureasupportiveregulatoryenvironmentforrapid
investmentinSmartGrids.Bydiversifyingandlocalisingsourcesofenergysupply,this
technologycouldsubstantiallyincreasetheoverallresilienceoftheUK’senergy
infrastructure.
Recommendation57: TheGovernmentshouldtasktheCentrefortheProtectionof
NationalInfrastructure(CPNI)withthedevelopmentofsecurityrecommendationsaimed
atmitigatingcommandandcontrolrisksassociatedwithSmartGridsastherehavebeen
concernsraisedinthisarea,iftheiruseissignificantlyexpanded.
Recommendation58: Industryshoulddevelopmarketingcommunicationscampaignsto
promotetheuseofSmartGridcapabilitiesbydomesticconsumers,includingtheuseof
attractiveoff-peaktariffsthatareassociatedwiththem.
Recommendation59: TheGovernmentshouldtasktheCPNItocarryoutathorough
analysisoftheextenttowhichspace-basedtechnologiesareembeddedinourcritical
infrastructureandconductacriticalassessmentofthequalityofexistingmitigation
planningagainsttheirloss.
Inordertoensurethatweaknessesinthesoftwarecodethatincreasinglyrunscritical
partsofourinfrastructureareminimised:
Recommendation60:TheGovernmentshouldalsoapproachtheEuropeanCommission
andtheincomingSwedishPresidencytosponsoraprogrammeforthecreationofa
rangeofsecureandreliablestandardsoftwaremodules(suchassimpleoperating
systems,databasemanagementsystemsandgraphicaluserinterfaces).Thesemodules
shouldbedevelopedusingformalmethodsandbemadeavailablefreeofcharge
throughanopensourcelicencetoencouragetheirwidespreaduse.
Enterpriseresilience
NotalloftheactionrequiredtomaketheUKmoreresilientshouldcomefrom
governmentdirectly.Thebusinesscommunitymustmakeimprovementstoo.To
encouragethis:
Recommendation61:TheGovernmentandbusinessorganisationsshouldworktogether
onacommunicationscampaign,specificallytargetingsmallandmediumsized
enterprises(SMEs),toovercomemisconceptionsabouttheresilienceofexisting
infrastructureservices.SomeSMEsassumethatbasicserviceswillbeprovidedunder
almostallcircumstancesandthatback-upplansarethereforenotrequired.
14 SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

Recommendation62:TheGovernmentandbusinessorganisationsshouldencourage
majorpurchasersofinfrastructureservices(including,forexample,logisticsandpower
companies)todemandarangeofoptionsandservice-levelagreementsforthe
availabilityofresilientinfrastructureservicesagainstarangeofpricepoints.Thiswould
helptostimulateaprivatesectormarketformoreresilientservices.
Recommendation63: TheGovernmentshouldencouragetheprovisionoffinancial
incentives,suchasinsurancepremiumreductions,forSMEstoundertakebusiness
continuityplanning.
Recommendation64: TheGovernmentshoulddisseminatetoSMEsreal-lifecasestudies
ofinstanceswherecompanieshavefoundtheyhavebenefitedfromhavingbusiness
continuityplansinplace.
Recommendation65: TheGovernmentshouldproduce‘boardroombriefs’onresilience
forcompaniestouseintheircorporategovernance.
Recommendation66: TheGovernmentshouldpromoteBusinessContinuityPlanningas
anelementofCorporateSocialResponsibility,establishaschemeofChampionsof
Resilience,andencouragebigbusinessestoinsistonsatisfactionoftheBritishStandard
onBusinessContinuity,BS25999amongtheirsupplierssotheirpurchasingpowerdrives
thisstandardmoredeeplyintothesupplychain.
Communityresilience
Sincecentralgovernmentcannotpreventalldisastersoralwaysbeonsiteimmediatelyto
providethenecessaryresponse,communitiesandcitizensneedtotakemore
responsibilityforresilienceintheirlocalareatoo.TheCommissionthereforebelieves:
Recommendation67:TheGovernmentshouldassistcommunitiestounderstandrisk-
orienteddecision-makingprocessesandoutcomesandenablethemtoaccessfundingto
buildcommunity-levelschemes,localnetworksandcapacitytocontributetoresilience
ontheground.
Recommendation68:LocalandRegionalResilienceForumsshouldreviewhow
theymightbenefitfromfurtherthirdsectorinvolvement,whatrelevanttraining
theycouldfacilitateforinterestedindividualsandvoluntaryandcommunitysector
organisations,andhowtheycouldmorewidelyconsultonanddisseminatetheir
emergencyplans.
Recommendation69: TheGovernmentshouldissuemoreadvicetothepublicon
basicpreparatoryactionsthatcouldbetakenatalocalleveltobolsterresilience.Itis
important,inthiscontext,thatwhenadviceisissuedtothewholepopulation,it
actuallyreachesthem.Effectivecommunityresiliencereliesoneffectiveinformation
provision.
Recommendation70:TheGovernmentshouldexaminetheextenttowhichexisting
goodpracticeinthefieldofcommunityemergencyresponseandsupportnetworks,such
astheKeswickFloodActionGroup,WRVS(whichgivessupporttotheelderly)andthe
RadioAmateurs’EmergencyNetwork(RAYNET),offermodelsforbroaderadoption.
Finally,onresilience,theGovernmentshouldencouragearesponsenotonlyfromlocal
communitiesbutalsofromtheUK’sinformationandcommunicationstechnology
community.Inparticular:
Recommendation71:Governmentshouldfacilitatethecreationofthecyberequivalent
of‘NeighbourhoodWatch’,byengagingpositivelywiththelaw-abidingtechnical
community(systemsadministrators,internetserviceproviders,‘white-hat’or‘ethical’
hackersandothers)toenlisttheirhelpinsecuringimportantsystemsandnetworks.
Chapter9:CounteringradicalisationandterrorisminsidetheUK
TheCommissionremainsconcernedaboutthe‘homegrown’terroristthreat,thequality
oftheGovernment’sunderstandingoftheradicalisationofBritishcitizens,andthe
strengthofthe‘Prevent’strandofitscounter-terrorismstrategy.Wefocusmanyofour
recommendationsinthisarea.Inparticularwebelieve:
 15

Recommendation72: TheGovernment,CharityCommissionandMosquesandImams
NationalAdvisoryBoardshouldencourageandsupportmosquemanagement
committeestoemployBritishimamswhoareproficientintheEnglishlanguage,havean
understandingofmodernUKyouthcultureandaretrainedtobeabletodiscuss
controversialtopicssuchasjihadandhumanrightswiththeircongregations.Thiswould
helptoreconnectmoreestablishedinstitutionswiththeyoungMuslimpopulation.
Recommendation73: TheGovernmentshouldtrainfrontlineyouthworkersdealingwith
youngpeoplewhoarevulnerabletoradicalisingmessagesinhowtoaddresstheissues
involved,buildingonworkalreadyunderwaywiththeYouthJusticeBoard.
Recommendation74:TheGovernmentshoulddevelopfurthermaterialstoassistlocal
authoritiesandtheirpartnerstounderstandUKIslaminallitsdiversity,withits
associatedculturesandtraditions,andtounderstandwhichdenominationsandsystems
areconcentratedinwhichareas.
Recommendation75:TheGovernmentshouldcommissionfurtherresearchtounderpin
thiseffort.Thisshouldfocuson:
• TheradicalisingeffectsofglobaleventsatUKstreetlevel
• Therelationshipsbetweennon-violentIslamistideologiesandterrorismintheUK
• Theprocessesofdisengagementfromviolenceandderadicalisation
• ThedynamicsofextremismamongmorerecentlyarrivedBritishimmigrantcommunities.
Withregardtoinformationsharing,webelieve:
Recommendation76:Thereshouldbefurthermovementfroma‘needtoknow’
approachtoa‘responsibilitytoprovide’mentality.GovernmentshouldsharewithLocal
AuthorityChiefExecutives,CouncilLeadersandPoliceBoroughCommandersmore
sanitisedinformationandintelligenceproductsregardingperceivedvulnerabilitiesto
radicalisationintheirrespectiveareas.
Recommendation77: Moregoodpracticeon‘Prevent’shouldbesharednationally:itis
currentlyconcentratedinonlyasmallnumberoflocalauthorities,usuallythosethat
haveexperiencedterroristandcounter-terroristactivitydirectly,andthelessonslearned
needtobespreadmorewidely.
Recommendation78:TheGovernmentshouldexpandthenumberofhigh-securitypolice
andprisoncells.ThecustodysuiteofLondon’sPaddingtonGreenPoliceStationisnowno
longerbigenoughandthelackofappropriateprisoncapacityelsewheremeansthatBritain’s
convictedterroristsareexcessivelyconcentratedinBelmarshPrison.Thisconcentrationdoes
notsupportourwiderattemptstodealwiththeproblem,anditmayinfactexacerbateit.
Recommendation79: TheProbationService’ssmall,new,centralcounter-terrorismunit
shouldbesupportedtodevelopthecapabilityandcapacitytounderstandandsupport
growingnumbersofindividualsonprobationwhohavebeenreleasedfromcustodyafter
havingbeenconvictedforterrorism-relatedoffences.Somesuchindividuals,suchasAbu
IzzadeenandSaminaMalik,havealreadybeenreleased.Manymorewillbereleasedin
theyearstocome.
Recommendation80:TheGovernmentshouldexplainfurtherhowitsstatedwillingness
toaddresslegitimategrievances,includingwithregardtoUKforeignpolicy,willbe
carriedforwardinpractice.
Recommendation81:TheGovernmentshouldworkwiththepoliceandCrownProsecution
Servicefollowingterroristconvictionstoreleasemoreinformationtothepublic(fromwhom,
ofcourse,jurorsaredrawn)aboutthenatureofdisruptedterroristplots.Thiswouldassist
withpublicunderstandingofthenature,locationandseverityoftheterroristthreat.
Recommendation82: TheGovernmentshouldfurtherreviewitsuseoflanguageinthis
arena,buildingontheworkofResearchandInformationCommunicationsUnit(RICU)
withintheHomeOffice.Wewelcometheannouncementthatphrasessuchas‘waron
terror’willnolongerbeused.
16 SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

Recommendation83: TheGovernmentshouldreview,inconsultationwiththepublic,the
unintendedimpactsatcommunitylevelofexistingcounter-terrorismpolicyandpractice.
Recommendation84: ThepoliceandpartneragenciesmustnowrecruitmoreMuslim
staff.Whetherinspecialistdepartments,deliveringtrainingorperformingcommunity-
facingroles,thelanguage,lifeskillsandculturalandreligiousunderstandingsuchstaff
bringtothecounter-terrorismeffortisinvaluable.
Chapter10:Makinggovernmentmoreeffective
TheCommissionbelievesimprovedcoordinationoftheUKgovernmenteffortisvitalin
currentconditions.Notonlyaresecuritythreatsandhazardsmorediversebut
governmentitselfneedstointegrateawiderangeofpolicyinstrumentstobeeffectivein
response.Tostrengthenstrategiccoordinationofthenationalsecurityeffortandto
breakdowndepartmentalstovepipesinWhitehall,theCommissionbelieves:
Recommendation85: TheGovernmentshoulddeveloptheexistingMinisterial
CommitteeonNationalSecurity,InternationalRelationsandDevelopment(NSID)intoa
NationalSecurityCouncil(NSC)atgovernment’sheart.Thisshouldbechairedbythe
PrimeMinisteror,inhisorherabsence,byanotherveryseniorfigurefromtheCabinet.
ThecentraltaskoftheNSCshouldbetodevelopaclearviewonthenationalsecurity
challengesfacingthecountryandacross-departmentalstrategicresponse.
Recommendation86:TheGovernmentshouldreplacethepracticeofconducting
periodicstrategicdefencereviewswithaprocessofconductingaregularStrategic
ReviewofSecurity(SRS).Thisshouldhappeneveryfiveyearsandshouldincludebutgo
wellbeyondissuesrelatedtodefencetoconsiderthesecuritycontextinitsentirety.
Recommendation87: TheGovernmentshouldcreateasinglesecuritybudget,covering
theentirenationalsecurityterrain,asatooltoensurethattheNationalSecurityCouncil
hasfullvisibilityofallcurrentgovernmentspendingofrelevance,canmakeinformed
trade-offsbetweendifferentsecurityinvestmentpriorities,hasareadyfacilitytotransfer
financialresourcesbetweendepartmentalbudgetsifnecessaryandcandosointhemost
effectiveandopenlyaccountablewaypossible.
Inaddition,webelievesomechangestotheworkoftheDepartmentforInternational
Development(DfID)arerequired.AswepointedoutinourInterimReport,global
povertyandinequalityaremajordriversofinstability,andviolentconflictisamajor
barriertodevelopment.WesupportmovestakenbyDfIDoverthepastfiveyearsto
understandthecausesofconflict,tomakeitsdevelopmentworkmoreconflict-sensitive
andtoshiftadditionalresourcestowardsfragileandconflict-affectedstates.Toensure
moreeffectiveintegrationofsomeelementsoftheworkofDfIDintothewiderUK
nationalsecurityeffort,however,theCommissionbelievesfurtherchangeisneeded.Asa
result,wealsorecommend:
Recommendation88: TheInternationalDevelopmentAct2002shouldbeamendedto
saythatthemissionoftheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentistopromote
developmentthroughpovertyreductionandthepromotionofconditionsofsafetyand
securityinthedevelopingworld.Webelievethischangeisnecessarytoremoveany
ambiguitythatmayexistoveraDfIDroleindevelopmentactivitiesnotdirectlyrelatedto
povertyreduction.
Recommendation89:TheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentshouldpublish
explicitcriteriafordecidingwhereitsresourcesareallocatedandforwhatpurpose.These
arecurrentlyabsent.Aspartofthischange,wewouldliketoseeaportionoftheDfID
budgetmadeavailableforactivitiesthatwouldnotordinarilybeclassifiedasaid,suchas
stabilisationandreconstructionactivitiesinconflict-affectedareas.Inordertomakesure
thatthisdoesnotunderminelongertermeffortsordiminishtheassistanceforfragile
andfailingstatesrecommendedinChapter7,thismayneedtobedonethroughthe
creationofaRapidResponseFund.
Recommendation90:GovernmentshouldconductareviewintohowDepartmentfor
InternationalDevelopmentandForeignandCommonwealthOfficeoperationsin
overseaslocationscanbemoreeffectivelycoordinated.Wearenotconvincedthat
 17

runningparalleloperations,asiscurrentlythecaseinmanyplaces,isacost-effective
wayofoperatingordeliversthebestresults.
Webelievethattherecommendedchanges(alongwiththerecommendationthatthe
UKcreateajointcivilian-militaryStabilisationandReconstructionForce,putforwardin
Chapter5),whencoupledtoDfID’songoingeffortstoimproveitsroleandcontribution
onissueslikejusticeandsecuritysectorreformin-country,wouldimproveDfID’s
contributiontomeetingbothdevelopmentchallengesindangerousplacesandnational,
regionalorglobalsecuritythreats.
Beyondthis,webelieveotherchangestothemachineryofgovernmentarealso
necessary.Werecommend:
Recommendation91: TheCabinetSecretaryshouldhaveasingleseniorDeputyfor
NationalSecurityatPermanentSecretarylevel;andthenationalsecuritysecretariatin
theCabinetOfficeshouldbeexpandedtoprovideproperservicingandcoordinationof
businessfortheNationalSecurityCouncilandtoensurethatdecisionstakenbyitare
followedupacrossWhitehall.
TopromotemoreeffectiveexternalchallengetotheGovernmentonnationalsecurity,we
believe:
Recommendation92: TherecentlycreatedNationalSecurityForum,apanelofeminent
individualsfromoutsidegovernment,shouldhaveanindependentratherthana
ministerialchair,abudgetthatwouldenableittocommissionitsownexternalresearch,
andenoughofficesupporttoallowpublicationofitsownconclusions.
Recommendation93: TheGovernmentshoulddeveloptheideaofasingleUK
intelligencecommunity(bywhichwedonotmeanasingleintelligenceagency,whichwe
arenotinfavourof),withaclearlyidentifiedheadatpermanentsecretarylevel(who
couldalsobethechairpersonoftheJointIntelligenceCommittee[JIC]).
Recommendation94: ThesingleheadoftheUKintelligencecommunityshouldbegiven
responsibilityforcoordinatingallofthehorizon-scanningactivitygoingonacross
government,inordertoensurethatitisproperlycoordinatedandthat,where
appropriate,issuesarebroughttotheattentionoftheNationalSecurityCouncil.
Recommendation95:TheGovernmentshouldincreasethecapacityoftheintelligence
communitytoanalyseandmakeuseofthehugeamountsofopensourceinformation
nowavailable.
Recommendation96:TheStrategicReviewofSecurityshouldtakeintoaccountthe
contributiontosecuritymadebytheUK’sdiplomaticcapabilitiesandensureadequate
levelsoffundingforthiscomponent.
Chapter11:Theroleandrequirementsoflegitimacyinnationalsecuritystrategy
IntheviewoftheCommission,quiteapartfrombeingcrucialtotheoperationofany
democraticstate,demonstrablelegitimacyofactioncanbeaninfluencemultiplierwhen
itcomestoattemptstomanagetheinternationalsecurityenvironment.Inaworldwhere
poweriswidelydispersed,itisanimportantpartoftheroutetoissue-specificalliances
andpartnershipsandconsequentlytogreaterpolicyreach.Webelieve,therefore,that
legitimacyisastrategicnecessity,notapleasantbonus,andthatapparenttensions
betweenlegitimacyofactionandseriousnessofpurposeare,forthemostpart,illusory.
Inourview,legitimacyresidesinademonstratedcommitmenttoanumberofmore
specificideas.Theseinclude:
• Acommitmenttotheruleoflawathome
• Acommitmenttoarules-basedinternationalsystemandtoconformitywith
internationallaw
• Awillingnesstoupholdandprotectfundamentalhumanrights
• Acommitmenttomoredemocraticandtransparentpolicymaking,opentoawide
arrayofinputsandsubjecttoeffectivepublicscrutinyandaccountability.
18 SharedResponsibilities| Summaryandrecommendations

TheUKhasmuchinitshistorytobeproudofinrelationtomanyoftheseareasandin
spiteofourcolonialhistory,weshowasolidunderstandingofandrespectforother
cultures.Equally,however,wedonotalwaysliveuptosuchidealsaswellaswemightin
practice.Themorewidelyacommitmenttotheseideasissharedandpractisedathome
andaroundtheworld,themorelikelywearetoenjoybothnationalandinternational
securitynowandinthelongterm.Consequently,theCommissionmakes
recommendationsinanumberofrelatedareas.Theseinclude:
Theruleoflawathome
TheCommissionbelieves:
Recommendation97: Suspectedterroristsshouldbetreatedassuspectedcriminalsand
shouldbedealtwithusingthestandardCriminalJusticeSystem.
Recommendation98: TheGovernmentshouldcontinuetoexplorewaysinwhich
interceptevidencemightbeusedincriminalproceedingswithoutprejudicingnational
security.
Recommendation99: TheGovernmentshouldputadraftConstitutionalBillofRights
andResponsibilitiesfortheUnitedKingdombeforeParliament,asacontributionto
effortstowinheartsandmindsandtohelpcounter-radicalisation.
Publicaccountabilityandengagementinpolicymaking
Inthisarea,theCommissionbelieves:
Recommendation100:TheGovernmentshouldstrengthentheroleofciviceducationin
theNationalCurriculumtaughtinourschools,withtheaimofinstillinganawarenessof
thenationalandinternationalneedforinterculturalunderstanding.
Recommendation101: AshasalreadybeenmootedbyGovernment,asingleNational
SecuritySelectCommitteeshouldbesetupinParliament,madeupofmembersofboth
Houses,withamembershipalsodrawnfromacrossotherrelevantSelectCommittees.
Recommendation102:ThelevelofresourceandprofessionalsupporttotheIntelligence
andSecurityCommitteeshouldalsobeincreased,toallowittobetteroverseethecrucial
butalsohighlysensitiveworkoftheintelligencecommunity.
Recommendation103:TheGovernmentshoulddedicateadditionalresourcestothe
ForeignandCommonwealthOfficeoutreachprogrammeandexpanditintoabroader
ongoingprogrammewhichwouldsystematicallyinformtheBritishpublicabout
importantforeignpolicyquestionsandissuesandfacilitateamoreopendialogueand
exchangebetweeninterestedmembersofthepublicandFCOministersandofficials.
Arules-basedinternationalsystem
Atinternationallevel,wemayneedtoworkwithawiderrangeofpartnerstobuildthe
rules-basedorderthatweseek,includingthroughtheG20,theUnitedNationsandother
groupings.Buttwoissuesremainfundamentaltoourattemptstopursueprogressinthis
area.Thefirstrelatestotheuseofforceandthesecondtohumanrights.Onthese,the
Commissionbelieves:
Recommendation104:Iftheuseofmilitaryforceisdeemednecessary,itshouldbe
basedontheprinciplesoftheUnitedNationsCharterorthespecificapprovalofthe
SecurityCouncil.Wherethelatterisnotpossiblebecausenationalinterestsparalysethe
SecurityCouncileveninthefaceofserioushumanrightsviolations,ahumanitariancrisis
oradevelopingthreattointernationalpeaceandsecurity,thenanyactiontakenshould
haveastrongclaimtolegitimacyinotherelementsoftheUNCharter,beconsistentwith
internationallaw,beproportionate,haveareasonableprospectofsuccess,andshould
onlybetakenasalastresortafterallpeacefulanddiplomaticavenuestoavertconflict
havebeenexhausted.
Onhumanrightsandtorture,theCommissionbelieves:
Recommendation105: TheGovernmentshouldensureitsownagentsareproperlytrained
asinterrogators,employonlylegalmethods,andchallengerobustlyallegedorsuspected
tortureorcruel,inhumanordegradingtreatmentofprisoners,wherevertheyencounterit.
 19

Recommendation106:TheGovernmentshouldsignandratifytheInternational
ConventionfortheProtectionofAllPersonsfromEnforcedDisappearance.
Recommendation107: TheGovernmentshoulduseitscloserelationshipwiththeUnited
StatestoencouragetheUStoratifyinternationaltreaties,conventionsandcovenantson
theRightsoftheChild(ratifiedbyallUNmemberstatesexcepttheUSandSomalia);
theEliminationofAllFormsofDiscriminationAgainstWomen;ForcedDisappearances;
Protocol1totheGenevaConventions;andtheRomeStatuteoftheInternational
CriminalCourt(increasinglyimportantinaworldinwhichthepowerofnon-stateactors
isgrowing).
Recommendation108: TheGovernmentshouldalsoputmoreeffortintopromotingand
defendinghumanrightsaroundtheworldbyapplyingwhateverpressureitcanbringto
bearonregimesthatviolatethoserights.Thereisaparticularneedtodothisin
countriesintheMiddleEastandNorthAfricawithwhichwehavefriendlyrelationsbut
wheretoolittleisdonetorespecthumanrights.Althoughwemayhavelimitedcapacity
forinfluencebilaterallyinmanyofthesecases,weshouldseektoensurethathuman
rightsissuesareakeyelementshapingtheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy,apartof
EUactivitywithagreaterpotentialforregionalinfluence.
Recommendation109: TheGovernmentshouldavoidattemptingtodeportsuspect
foreignnationalsonthebasisofmemorandaofunderstandingordiplomaticassurances
tocountrieswhichpractisetorture,unlesssucharrangementscanincluderobust
independentadditionalmonitoringtoensurethesafetyoftheindividualsinvolved.