1. De Guzman v CA Facts: 1.

Cendena was a junk dealer and was engaged in buying used bottles and scrap materials in Pangasinan and brought these to Manila for resale. 2. e used two !"wheeler trucks. #n the return trip to Pangasinan$ he would load his %ehicles with cargo which %arious merchants wanted deli%ered to Pangasinan.

&. For that ser%ice$ he charged freight lower than regular rates. 'eneral Milk Co. contacted with him for the hauling of ()* cartons of milk. +. #n the way to Pangasinan$ one of the trucks was hijacked by armed men who took with them the truck and its cargo and kidnapped the dri%er and his helper. #nly 1)* cartons of milk were deli%ered. ). ,he Milk Co. sued to claim the %alue of the lost merchandise based on an alleged contract of carriage. !. Cendena denied that he was a common carrier and contended that he could not be liable for the loss it was due to force majeure. (. ,he trial court ruled that he was a common carrier. ,he C- re%ersed.

.ssue: /hether or not Cendena is a common carrier0

eld: 1es$ Cendena is properly characteri2ed as a common carrier e%en though he merely backhauled goods for other merchants$ and e%en if it was done on a periodic basis rather than on a regular basis$ and e%en if his principal occupation was not the carriage of goods.

-rticle 1(&2 makes no distinction between one whose principal business acti%ity is the carrying of persons or goods or both$ and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary acti%ity. .t also a%oids making a distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation ser%ices on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering ser%ice on an occasional$ episodic or unscheduled basis. 3either does it make a distinction between a carrier offering its ser%ices to the general public and one who offers ser%ices or solicits business only from a narrow segment of population.

2. Planters Products Inc. v CA Facts: 1. Planters Products 4Planters5 purchased from Mitsubishi .nternational Corporation of 67- of 8$*** metric tons of urea fertili2er which the latter shipped aboard the cargo %essel owned by pri%ate respondent 499995 from -merica to :a 6nion. 2. Prior to its %oyage$ a time charter party was entered into between Mitusbishi as shipper;charterer and 9999 as ship"owner. -fter the 6rea fertili2er was loaded in bulk by ste%edores hired by the shipper$ the steel hatches were closed with hea%y iron lids which remained closed during the entire journey. &. 6pon arri%al of the %essel$ the hatches were opened with the use of the %essel boom. Planters unloaded the cargo from the holders into the steel bodied dump trucks. <ach time the dump trucks were filled up$ its load of urea was co%ered with tarpaulin before it was transported to the consignee=s warehouse located some 4)*5 fifty meters from the wharf. .t took 4115 ele%en days from planters to unload the cargo. ,he report submitted by pri%ate marine and cargo sur%eyors re%ealed a shortage in the cargo$ and some portion in the cargo was contaminated with dirt$ rendering the same unfit for commerce. +. PP. filed an action for damages with the CF. Manila. ,he defendant carrier argued that the strict public policy go%erning common carriers does not apply to them because they ha%e become pri%ate carriers by reason of the pro%isions of the charter"party. ,he court a >uo howe%er sustained the claim of the plaintiff against the defendant carrier for the %alue of the goods lost or damaged. ). #n appeal$ respondent Court of -ppeals re%ersed the lower court and absol%ed the carrier from liability for the %alue of the cargo that was lost or damaged. ?elying on the 18!@ case of ome .nsurance Co.%. -merican 7teamship -gencies$ .nc.$ the appellate court ruled that the cargo %essel M;A B7un PlumC owned by pri%ate respondent 9999 was a pri%ate carrier and not a common carrier by reason of the time charterer"party and that the Ci%il Code pro%isions on common carriers which set forth a presumption of negligence do not find application in the case at bar. .ssues: 1. /hether a common carrier becomes a pri%ate carrier by reason of a charter"party. 2. /hether or not the respondent is a common carrier. &. /hether or not the respondent is liable for damages.

?uling: 1. ?esp carrier$ in the ordinary course of business$ operates as a CC$ transporting goods indiscriminately for all persons. /hen petitioner chartered the %essel M;A B7un PlumC$ the ship captain$ its officers and compliment continued to be under its direct super%ision and control. ardly then can we charge the charterer$ a

stranger to the crew and to the ship$ with the duty of caring for his cargo when the charterer did not ha%e any control of the means in doing so. ,his is e%ident in the present case considering that the steering of the ship$ the manning of the decks$ the determination of the course of the %oyage and other technical incidents of maritime na%igation were all consigned to the officers and crew who were screened$ chosen and hired by the shipowner. - public carrier shall remain as such$ notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a %essel by one or more persons$ pro%ided the charter is limited to the ship only$ as in the case of a time"charter or %oyage"charter. .t is only when the charter includes both the %essel and its crew$ as in a bareboat or demise that a common carrier becomes pri%ate 2. ?espondent is a common carrier. ,he term common carrier is defined in -rticle 1(&2 of the Ci%il Code. ,he definition refers to carriers either by land$ water$ or air which holds themsel%es out as ready to engage in carrying goods on transporting passengers or both for compensation as a public employment and not as a casual occupationD if the undertaking is a single transaction$ not a part of the general business or corporation$ although in%ol%ing the carriage of goods for a fee$ then the person or corporation offering such ser%ices is a pri%ate carrier. .n the case at bar respondent carrier transports goods indiscriminately for all persons. Eeing such$ he is a common carrier. &. ,he court ruled in the negati%e. /hile respondent is a common carrier$ he has sufficiently o%ercome by clear and con%incing proof the prima facie presumption of negligence$ due to the manner of storage of the goods during the %oyage. ,he presumption of negligence on the part of the respondent carrier has been efficaciously o%ercome by the showing of eFtraordinary 2eal and assiduity eFercised by the carrier in the care of the cargo. -rticle 1(&+ of the 3ew Ci%il Code pro%ides that common carriers are not responsible for the loss$ destruction or deterioration of the goods if caused by the charterer of the goods or defects in the packaging or in the containers. ,he Code of Commerce also pro%ides that all losses and deterioration which the goods may suffer during the transportation by reason of fortuitous e%ent$ force majeure$ or the inherent defect of the goods$ shall be for the account and risk of the shipper$ and that proof of these accidents is incumbent upon the carrier.

3. Loadstar Shipping vs CA Facts: #n 3o%ember 18$ 18@+$ loadstar recei%ed on board its M;A BCherokeeC bales of lawanit hardwood$ tilewood and -pitong Eolideni2ed for shipment. ,he goods$ amounting to P!$*!($ 1(@. /ere insured for the same amount with the Manila .nsurance Company against %arious risks including B,otal :oss by ,otal :oss of the AesselC. #n 3o%ember 2*$ 18@+$ on its way to Manila from the port of 3asipit$ -gusan Gel 3orte$ the %essel$ along with its cargo$ sank off :imasawa .sland. -s a result of the total loss of its shipment$ the consignee made a claim with loadstar which$ howe%er$ ignored the same. -s the insurer$ M.C paid to the insured in full settlementof its claim$ and the latter eFecuted a subrogation receipt therefor. M.C thereafter filed a complaint against loadstar alleging that the sinking of the %essel was due to fault and negligence of loadstar and its employees. .n its answer$ :oadstar denied any liability for the loss of the shipper=s goods and claimed that the sinking of its %essel was due to force majeure. ,he court a >uo rendered judgment in fa%or of M.C.$ prompting loadstar to ele%ate the matter to the Court of -ppeals$ which howe%er$ agreed with the trial court and affirmed its decision in toto. #n appeal$ loadstar maintained that the %essel was a pri%ate carrier because it was not issued a Certificate of Public Con%enience$ it did not ha%e a regular trip or schedule nor a fiFed route$ and there was only Bone shipper$ one consignee for a special cragoC. .ssue: /;3 M;A Cherokee was a pri%ate carrier so as to eFempt it from the pro%isions co%ering Common Carrier0 ?uling: :oadstar is a common carrier$ because: a. .t is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of public con%enience b. and this public character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of the goods in >uestion was periodic$ occasional$ episodic or unscheduled. Further$ the bare fact that the %essel was carrying a particular type of cargo for one shipper$ which appears to be purely co"incidentalD it is no reason enough to con%ert the %essel from a common to a pri%ate carrier$ especially where$ as in this case$ it was shown that the %essel was also carrying passengers. c. -rticle 1(&2 also carefully a%oids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation ser%ice on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such ser%ice on an occasional$ episodic or unscheduled basis. 3either does -rticle 1(&2 distinguish between a carrier offering its ser%ices to the Hgeneral public$H i.e.$ the general community or population$ and one who offers ser%ices or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.

. !irst Philippine Industrial Corp. vs CA Facts: 1. Petitioner is a grantee of a pipeline concession under ?.-. 3o. &@($ as amended$ a contract$ install and operate oil pipelines. ,he original pipeline concession was granted in 18!( and renewed by the <nergy ?egulatory Eoard in 1882. 2. 7ometime in Ianuary 188)$ petitioner applied for a mayor=s permit with the #ffice of the Mayor of Eatangas City. owe%er$ before the mayor=s permit could be issued$ the respondent City ,reasurer re>uired petitioner to pay a local taF based on its gross receipts for the fiscal year 188& pursuant to the :ocal 'o%ernment Code. &. .n order not to hamper its operations$ petitioner paid the taF under protest in the amount of P2&8$ *18.*1 for the first >uarter of 188&. +. First Phil filed a complaint for taF refund against resp City of Eatangas and its ,reasurer reasoning that: a. the imposition and collection of the business taF on its gross receipts %iolates 7ec. 1&& of the :ocal 'o%ernment CodeD b. the authority of cities to impose and collect a taF on the gross receipts of Bcontractors and independent contractorsC under 7ec. 1+14e5 and 1)1 does not include the authority to collect such taFes on transportation contractors for$ as defined under 7ec. 1&14h5$ the term BcontractorsC eFcludes transportation contactorsD and c. the City ,reasurer illegally and erroneously imposed and collected the said taF$ thus meriting the immediate refund of the taF paid. ). ?espondents assert that pipelines are not included in the term Bcommon carrierC which refers solely to ordinary carriers as trucks$ trains$ ships and the like. ?espondents further posit that the term Bcommon carrierC under the said Code pertains to the mode or manner by which a product is deli%ered to its destination.