Am Soc (2010) 41:358367 DOI 10.

1007/s12108-010-9106-x

From Structure to Agency to Process: The Evolution of Charles Tillys Theories of Social Action as Reflected in His Analyses of Contentious Politics
Jack A. Goldstone
Published online: 20 August 2010 # Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010

Abstract Charles Tillys social theories shifted over the course of his career from an early focus on quantitative and macro-sociological approaches to a later focus on relations and agency. His studies of state-making also shifted, from a focus on conflict and capitalism to explorations of democracy. This paper details these shifts and places them in the context of broader trends in comparative-historical and political sociology. Keywords Tilly . Structural theory . Agency . Comparative-historical sociology . Political sociology . Contentious politics When I began studying social theorists in college, our instructor warned us to be aware of the differences between the young Marx and the more mature Marx. The former was more philosophical, humanist, and sensitive to personal experience, drawn to such topics such as alienation and discrimination. The latter was far more macrostructural and determinist, focused on deriving large-scale patterns, if not laws, of historical development from his structural theory of class relations. Of course this was an over-simplification the young Marx was vitally interested in history, and the mature Marx remained obsessed with alienation and oppression. Still, the distinction between the young and mature Marx was useful for drawing attention to a genuine shift in the nature of Marxs theorizing, from an approach centered more on patterns of personal relations to an approach centered on macro-structures and class-relations. I find myself seeing something of the same pattern although exactly in reverse! in the development of Charles Tillys work. The young Tilly was a pioneer in using detailed quantitative evidence to establish structural differences from which he could derive large-scale patterns of popular mobilization and state formation. The mature Tilly focused much more on personal relationships, particularly through his analysis of trust networks and their crucial role in democratization. Tracing how Tillys work moved from his early focus to the later one can help illuminate his theories of social action and how they developed over the course of his career.

J. A. Goldstone (*) George Mason University, Arlington, VA, USA e-mail: jgoldsto@gmu.edu

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I should note that Tillys shift was accompanied by a broader anti-structuralist movement in the discipline of comparative-historical sociology. Todays prevailing younger generation of comparative-historical sociologists (Steinmetz 1999; Adams et al. 2005) view themselves as purveyors of a cultural turn, who began their academic careers fighting a campaign to overturn the structuralist simplicities of their teachers and more senior colleagues. But that is not wholly accurate. Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly, myself, and others of that ilk were just material structuralists; we thought that one could build a story of pivotal historical moments from a description of the material resources that states, elites, and popular groups had, or fought over, and could bring to bear on their conflicts. The younger generation turned to culture, but they were for the most part cultural structuralists. When Richard Biernacki (1995) talks about work in different countries, or Julia Adams (2007) writes about the impact of family organization on power, they are talking about how cultural structures constrain and drive social behavior. Tillys shift was of a different nature. Tilly never became a culturalist. Values, semiotics, ideological motivations, or arbitrarily shifting meaning systems never occupied a major role in Tillys theorizing. He retained his belief in the practical value of collective action throughout his work. Rather, the shift in Tillys focus was from seeking to identify the critical characteristics of groups whether they be inhabitants of a region, workers in an industry, or participants in collective action and the relationships of groups with each other and most importantly with states, as drivers of historical change, to asking how groups constitute themselves through networks involving particular relationships among individuals and how those networks interact with states to define the character of state-society relations. For the young Tilly, groups were examined as aggregates people who shared a set of motivations or interests, and could draw on certain resources to tackle certain shared concerns and opportunities. Politics could be reduced to identifying the critical groups, their relationships to the state (e.g. were they inside or outside the polity?), the resources that these groups and the states could bring to bear in their relationships, and their motivations. That is, of course, the essence of the sociological imagination to find powerful patterns in the hodge-podge of social reality. Without an excitement about finding simplifying patterns to help structure our understanding of social reality, there is little more to sociology than the compilation of scattered observations. The appeal of finding an overarching pattern that seems to explain divergent outcomes is one of the great attractions and intellectual excitements of our discipline. But the problem of the young and when I was young I myself didnt know this was a problem is that we know far too little about social life to accurately understand it. Whether one is speaking of personal experience, or knowledge of history or ethnographies or social settings, it takes decades of study to learn the detailed texture and variation of social reality. But lacking that knowledge, we take shortcuts to understand it. If were lucky, some of us find shortcuts, or grand patterns, that are useful ways to structure further research for us and for others. No one was more successful at this than Charles Tilly.

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The Context in the 1960s It is important in understanding Tillys early work to recall the context in which it was set. In the 1960s and early 1970s, there were two dominant traditions in the study of revolution and collective action in American social science and both saw such actions as invariably a bad thing, irrational and unnecessary. The most influential tradition was the functionalism of Talcott Parsons, particularly as developed by Neil Smelser (1963) and Chalmers Johnson (1966). In this view, smoothly-functioning societies socialized people to conform to norms and institutions that reproduced the social order over time. Collective protest and revolutions only arose when such socialization failed, and people became alienated from the social order and anomic. Desperate to find a new social order, they attacked the old norms and institutions and sought abruptly to create new ones. The second major tradition was rooted in the social psychology of frustration-aggression theory. In this view, as expressed by Ted Robert Gurr (1968, 1970) and Feierabend and Feierabend (1972), collective protest and revolution reflected mass frustration and anger, brought about by discrepancies between peoples expectations and their perceived conditions. The development of a large and growing gap spurred frustration and anger, which led people to violent political actions. These two traditions were synthesized in the work of Huntington (1968), who argued that as a countrys political institutions became modernized, growing more powerful and more centralized, if people were not socialized into meaningful political participation a gap would arise between their desired level of political participation and their perceived political exclusion. This would lead to frustration and aggression, producing violent mass political behavior. Tilly found all of these approaches repulsive, and fought against them from the beginning. Tilly saw collective action as not invariably bad, but as sometimes good and necessary. He did not see people acting collectively to pursue political change as anomic or frustrated, but rather as people acting rationally to protect themselves or seize opportunities to improve their situation. Moreover, he insisted that people did not act as anomic or angry masses, but as members of particular groups, who had to be mobilized to act collectively in deploying their group resources against particular opponents (often the state) for specific ends. One sees this very clearly in Tillys first major work, the Vendee (Tilly 1964), examining the bloody counter-revolution in southwest France during the French Revolution. For Tilly, the insurrection in the Vendee was not a violent backlash of irrational peasants who could not adapt to the new realities of the Revolution. Rather, by painstaking examination of which groups, in which particular circumstances, acted for particular ends, Tilly demonstrated that the violence was rooted in the relationships of particular groups to markets and urbanization. The demands of the new revolutionary state fell differently on those who were differently situated with respect to markets and urban areas, producing cooperation with the new Revolutionary state in some groups, but a sharp clash of interests for others. The urban/rural capitalist/coercion axes were thus Tillys shortcuts for understanding the patterns of collective action in the Vendee. Tilly continued to use these axes to explore a variety of issues in state formation and social mobilization for about 20 years, from 1975 to 1995.

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Counting and Categories Methodologically, Tilly was virtually addicted to 22 tables and charts as the way to clarify the relationships that he examined. These appear in almost all of his works throughout his lifetime, emerging perhaps most clearly in From Mobilization to Revolution (Tilly 1978), the main work in which Tilly sought to replace the functionalist and psychological theories of revolution with an alternative theory based on resource mobilization by concrete groups. But behind the 22 tables, which were mainly conceptual tools for relating data to theorizing, was a more profound methodological commitment, based on counting and categories. From his work in The Vendee, Tilly became persuaded that even great historical events and large political shifts could be explained by the process of counting events, actions, actors and then placing the items counted into appropriate categories. A comprehensive compilation of data on who, what, where, and when would provide the basis for explanations of why and how major historical events occurred. This commitment, and his extensive and systemic work on quantitative social science (which earned Tilly an early membership in the National Academy of Sciences), was embodied in the collaborative work he undertook to compile extensive counts of strikes and other forms of collective action in France, Germany and Great Britain. This work appeared in several books spanning two decades, including Strikes in France (Shorter and Tilly 1974), The Rebellious French (Tilly et al. 1975), and Popular Contention in Great Britain, 17581834 (Tilly 1995). In all of these studies, Tilly works from the micro-level, gleaning counts of local events from newspapers and other contemporary sources, then using the flow of events across categories of place and type of action to chart the development of the modern state. But counting and categorizing appears in more macro-works as well. European Revolutions 14921992 (Tilly 1996) was Tillys effort to make sense of 500 years of European history by counting and categorizing revolutions. In order to have enough events to count, Tilly defined revolution somewhat broadly, as any instance in which state sovereignty was sufficiently challenged that multiple contenders arose making viable claims to control portions of a states former territory. This definition produced over 700 events that could be precisely counted and categorized, underpinning large claims about the process of state-making, incorporation, and resistance over centuries. In Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 9901992 (Tilly 1990), Tillys emphasis is more on categories than on counting; but the axes of capital and coercion return. Counting comes in through a focus on state revenues another theme central to Tillys work throughout his career and the need for ever greater revenues for states to prevail in international wars. Tilly here demonstrates how the search for greater revenues did not produce a simple linear increase in some abstract quality of stateness, but a competition among states with varied models of administration and revenue extraction. Categorizing states according to whether they relied primarily on coercion (land taxes) or capital (taxes on trade and manufacturing), or a combination of the two, Tilly was able to demonstrate first how larger units eventually superseded smaller ones, and then how the characteristics of state administrations varied systematically according to their category.

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These were powerful ways to bridge issues being studied by historians and sociologists and political scientists, and produced an unrivaled legacy of vital work on topics from urbanization and state formation to collective action and revolutions. Yet at that very point, Tilly became aware that there was something not quite satisfying, and deeply incomplete, in his explanations. Having pursued with such vigor big structures, huge comparisons, and large processes, to draw on the title of one of his methodological works in this period (Tilly 1989), showing how various factors shaped the outcomes of long-term state development, he now wanted to understand better how history worked from the ground up in terms of the choices made by individuals.

Contentious Politics, Agency, and Networks This move was spurred by criticism from his friends Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow, who in 1995 pointed out to Tilly that the study of social movements had passed from a study of resource mobilization to look more at framing (the subjective side of mobilization), relational aspects (networks of recruitment), and complex interactions driven by agency (groups reacting to shifts in opportunity structure by changing their tactics and strategies). Tilly had of course contributed to this shift by his own development of the concept of repertoires of collective action. This had emerged from Tillys counting and categorizing of protest events; he discovered that protests seemed to involve particular kinds of events that were widespread at certain times, but then died out and were replaced by new forms of protest. Folk-protests harsh music, noisemaking, and burning in effigies gave way to more formal petitioning, marching, and strikes as industrialization and state expansion unfolded. Yet Tilly tended to use the shift in repertoires more as markers of long-term processes of political and economic change than as something to analyze in terms of the decisions and agency of collective actors. By contrast, McAdam and Tarrow had built on the concept to trace the dynamics of social protest in terms of agents use of modular forms of protest actions or of creatively changing tactics in response to changing opportunities. Excited by the prospect of new areas to explore, Tilly helped to mobilize resources himself, for an extensive collaborative examination of these and related topics. With support from the Mellon Foundation, Tilly, McAdam, and Tarrow organized a multi-year set of seminars at Stanfords Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, running from 1996 to 1999, including a wide variety of other scholars and graduate students as both regular participants and special guests. These seminars had three explicit goals: the first was to better integrate the studies of social movements, nationalism, revolutions, and democratization that seemed to be operating as independent areas of scholarship. The second goal was to extend the geographic range of events studied from Tillys (and McAdams and Tarrows) focus on Europe and the United States to the rest of the world, seeing if different or similar theoretical frameworks could account for contentious politics in Latin America, Africa, and Asia as well as Europe. The third goal was to examine contentious politics from new angles, using perspectives and topics that had not been common in Tillys prior work, including spatial relations, youth and gender roles, leadership, threat/opportunity dynamics, religion, and emotions, among others.

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Three separate collaborative volumes emerged from those years. Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (Aminzade et al. 2001) presented the seminar s insights on new perspectives and topics. This volume included work by seminar regulars Ronald Aminzade, Jack Goldstone, Elizabeth Perry, and William Sewell Jr., usually in tandem with McAdam, Tarrow, or Tilly, on a variety of regions and issues, and was perhaps the best summary of the range of work by the seminar as a whole. States, Parties, and Social Movements (Goldstone 2003), a volume featuring the work of the seminar s talented graduate students, examined the links between social movements and democratization (including civil rights, party formation, and how movements influence democratic governments), and looked at Mexico, India, and eastern Europe as well as the United States. But the volume in which Tilly invested most was Dynamics of Contention (McAdam et al. 2001), coauthored with McAdam and Tarrow. This work marked a considerable shift in Tillys approach. Aside from expanding his view to other regions, the book clearly propelled Tilly to examine democratization as a process, rather than as merely an outcome of state formation and social struggles. Instead of items to count and categorize, the book unveils a bewildering variety of new terms to denote things grouped loosely as mechanisms and processes: polarization, opportunity/threat spirals, competition, certification, category formation, constitution and appropriation of identities, brokerage, scale shift. There are a few 22 graphs (Tilly could hardly visualize his arguments without them), to be sure, but the language and approach are far less categorical, more contingent, and more firmly based on an agency perspective than his previous work. Yet Dynamics of Contention remained a profoundly confusing book. The proliferation of cases (15, ranging from Mau Mau and Swiss Unification to the U.S. Civil Rights movement and the fall of the Soviet Union) and of mechanisms and processes, the latter combined in varying ways in different cases, was unwieldy. The sections by different authors remained separate, rather than soundly integrated. The book presented a host of wonderful examples and insights, but no clear theoretical framework. A much more successful effort to grapple with many of these issues was Tillys solo effort, Durable Inequality (Tilly 1998). That book is Tillys first sustained examination of how large structures of inequality are created and sustained by relations among individuals that revolve around oppositional and group identities. It argues quite directly that understanding the world in terms of existing categories is not sufficient. Instead, to truly understand the power of inequality and why it endures we have to understand how people construct the categories and identities by which they define themselves, and others. Inequalities of race, gender, social status, and political power, Tilly argues, are neither given in nature nor simply constructed in arbitrary ways. Instead, specific groups of individuals cooperate to establish boundaries around certain social identities, and then hoard opportunities and practice discrimination and exclusion to preserve an asymmetric status relative to other groups. Even though members of the lower group may practice emulation and adaptation and even enjoy some individual social mobility, the inequalities among groups are difficult to overcome precisely because they are not simply traditional carryovers or neutral social constructions, but were deliberately created and are actively maintained and

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defended by higher groups to secure considerable benefits to themselves, while allowing them to exploit others. Durable Inequality was a treatise on how people formed themselves into categories; but that was only half of what Tillys friend Harrison White had termed the catnet character of social groups. According to White, social groups had two joint elements: first, the members of a group belong to a common category based on their identities, interest, occupation, location, or other characteristics of their component individuals. Second, members of the group interact with each other within the framework of a relational network one can map ties of exchange, marriage, socializing, school, or other connections among the component individuals. Tilly had started to develop his ideas about social networks with varying characteristics in Durable Inequality and Dynamics of Contention. The latter book introduces the notion of trust networks as an essential part of public politics in democracies, in the chapter that Tilly contributed on democratization in Great Britain. For Tilly, trust networks were key to describing the distinctive relations among people in democratic societies. In Tillys view, people had to trust each other to cooperate in democracies, and they had to trust the government to invest in such voluntary behavior as voting, paying taxes, and military service. These two concepts categorical inequality and trust networks became the kernel of Tillys theory of democratization, in which two critical processes are the insulation of public politics from categorical inequality and integration of trust networks into public politics (Tilly 2005, p. xii).

Network Dynamics and the Process of Democratization Despite his efforts in Durable Inequality and Dynamics of Contention, Tilly believed that he had not yet unpacked the issue of trust, what it was, how it arose, and how it affected politics. He quickly expanded his chapter on British democratization from Dynamics of Contention into a book, Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650 2000 (Tilly 2004). Still, in 2005 he wrote, regarding the latter book, that it refined, corrected, and expanded my contribution to Dynamics of Contention. ... however, I realized that both my story concerning exactly how connections between trust networks and public politics change and my evidence concerning those change remained perilously thin (Tilly 2005, p. xiii). This realization led to Trust and Rule (Tilly 2005) and Democracy (Tilly 2007), in which Tilly sets out his theories of network dynamics and democratization. These two books offer a relational account of democratization. Trust networks, built on peoples willingness to risk assets and efforts in relationships with others, allow people to repel predators and bargain with states. As such trust networks grow larger and more resilient, they are capable of insulating themselves from categorical inequalities by adopting and enforcing norms of behavior and responsibility that apply to all regardless of such inequalities. When state actors have to deal with groups comprising such trust networks on a large scale, instead of with isolated individuals or local groups, states have to become more responsive to the populace. To the extent that states accept the need for consultation and accountability to the population, and integrate with public trust networks to the point of taking

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responsibility for enforcing behavioral and responsibility norms agreed upon by the networks, true democracy (as opposed to just elections, which are sometimes just a facade, or constitutions which are often ignored or discarded) emerges. Tilly also recognized that the relations in trust networks can weaken and segregate in times of crises, and that states can react with coercion as well as consultation. Thus he notes that there can be both democratization and de-democratization depending on circumstances. Democratization is thus not an inevitable march across categories of government, but the outcome of multi-level negotiations among diverse actors. By developing this theory of how democracy comes not from capitalism or urbanization or other large impersonal processes, but from the gradual building of trust between citizens and state actors, Tilly seemed determined to turn his earlier work upside down. Of course, there was a constant in all of this, and that was Tillys extraordinary dedication, not to any particular model of society or social change, structural or otherwise, but to building richer, more accurate, more complete explanations of the events, processes, and changes that puzzled him. At first, as with many of us, the path to those explanations seemed to lie in powerful structural relationships from which one could deduce what would happen. But later, with the accumulation of more detailed, nuanced, and varied knowledge and Charles Tillys knowledge grew exponentially came an appreciation of how much individuals resist and reshape the structural forces that seem to control them, so that explanation doesnt seem sound anymore unless it accounts for human variety, creativity, and agency.

From Structure to Agency to Processes I must confess that I find it satisfying to describe this trend in Charles Tillys work because I find myself drawn along a similar path. My early work was driven by a determination to find a pattern behind seemingly disparate social processes. Inspired by my teachers, Theda Skocpol, George Homans, Nathan Keyfitz, Harrison White, Daniel Bell, and Shmuel Eisenstadt, I wanted to find broad explanations for a variety of episodes of revolution and rebellion across several centuries in Europe and Asia (Goldstone 1991). I found an explanation in a few key relationships weaving together large-scale social processes, most of which had also been central in Tillys work: population change, urbanization, and shifts in the material resources of states and elites. However, my more recent work, trying to identify the factors that led to Europes unique emergence as the globes demographic, economic, technological, and military leader in the 19th and 20th centuries, led to me to discount material and structural factors as insufficient for explanation. Instead, I had to dig down to explanations that lay in networks, contingent processes, and emergent relationships among states, elites, and popular groups to trace how they gave rise to momentous intellectual, political, and economic shifts (Goldstone 2002, 2006, 2008). Now, just as Tilly was still defending the basic insights of The Vendee (1976), despite his later turn, admitting he had made it too simple but that the key insights were still largely correct, I too will still defend the relationships described in Revolution and Rebellion (1991) as providing valid understandings for many aspects of those events. But I would no longer describe that work as providing complete or even fully satisfying explanations. To fully understand not only the broad similarity

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and timing of events, but also the motivations of the key actors and the detailed variations in the processes and outcomes of these events requires more attention to the roles of revolutionary leaders, of different concepts and visions of social and political change, and to the detailed interactions of personalities and events. Thus I too am shifting my ground. John Foran, Eric Selbin, and I are working on a new book on revolutions that tries to weave together a variety of material, cultural, structural, and agency-driven elements to provide a more satisfying account of the processes and outcomes of revolutions than my demographic-structural account alone could provide (Foran et al. 2011). Moreover, as I began to study why Europe and England in particular pioneered modern industrialized economies I found that I had to rely more and more on understanding creativity, small-group relationships, and subtle variations in cultures across and within societies, in order to provide any kind of reasonable solutions to the puzzles I encountered. So my explanation of the rise of the West depends far more on uniquely emerging cultural variations and details of network structure among specific groups than on any large-scale social-structural processes. What I have found, and I believe Tilly found as well, is that we need to listen more closely to views that we had opposed earlier in our careers. We have come to recognize that much of the dynamism behind social changes come from the constant tension in social life between individual innovation and socially-imposed convention. For explaining social life, as Anthony Giddens has argued in his structuration theory (Giddens 1993) and Sewell (1992) has elaborated in his work on structure and agency, one has to constantly be alert to the possibilities of innovation within and against convention, even while granting conventions and institutions their role as the baseline set of expectations, practices, and understandings in which action is embedded. For explaining longer-term social change, one has to be especially alert to the difference between historical periods and places where convention dominates, and those where innovation breaks through with transformative results. Indeed, I would argue (and do so in my forthcoming book on the origins of modern economic growth) that the onset of modernity was not so much a shift from one set of conventions and institutions to another, although of course that did occur. Rather, it was marked by a permanent shift in the balance between innovation and convention such that innovation, instead of being relatively rare and generally overshadowed by fidelity to or incremental reinterpretation of classical models, itself becomes expected and institutionalized as part of conventional behavior, thus blurring the lines between stability and instability, individual and social, the novel and the normal. But that is another story for another time. At this moment, I simply wish to pay tribute to Charles Tillys career of changing views but constant innovation, and to mourn our loss. One last thing I do know Tilly would not want us to ever rest content with any particular view, but to keep finding new intellectual trajectories and to change our views once again.

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