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Gamsakhurdia versus Saakashvili: The Fanatic Populist and the Sporadic Democrat Iren Aloyan Introduction
When talking about the USSR one might think of a large communal apartment in which national state units, various republics and autonomous provinces represented separate rooms.1 The year of 1985,after Gorbachev introduced his farfamed perestroika program with an ambitious rhetoric of glasnost (openness), the countdown for the clashing of the communal apartment began. As Slezkine puts it in, the tenants of various rooms barricaded their doors and started using the windows, while the befuddled residents of the enormous hall and kitchen stood in the center scratching the backs of their heads2. Georgians the titular nations of one of the rooms were considered to be bad roommates.Indeed, the road to independence has been extremely though for Georgians, with an enduring civil and two separatist conflicts3. When in the 1990 Zviad Gamsakhurdia headed the Georgian nationalistic movement for independence, the majority of the population was enthusiastic about his campaign and was following him. As Barrington might argue this was predominantly linked to the enduring fatigueof the Georgian nation, predicated by the persistent efforts of the Soviet Union, and even before the Russian Empire, of undermining the national identity of Georgians and their territorial integrity,but also to their anxiety with the 1989 April 9 bloodbath organized by the Soviet Army. Georgia for Georgians was the bold slogan of the Gamsakhurdia national movement, which is admittedly considered by some scholars as radically exclusivist4.
1 Yuri Slezkine, The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism ,Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (1994):452 2 Slezkine, p. 452 3 Lowell W. Barrington, ed., After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,2009), 248 4 Barrington, After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist State, p. 288

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However as history has shown the fatal and sometimes romantic leader of the Georgian revolution was only to achieve his goal of independent statebuilding, whereas the other endeavors, such as full integration and georgianization of the population from the breakaway regions of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Ajaria, saw a fiasco: the regions eventually became more disintegrated from Georgia. After the 2003 Rose Revolution, Mikheil Saakashvili, the figurehead of the Rose Revolution and the incumbentPresident of Georgia, was supposedly to be the one to implement the Gamsakhurdias agenda of a united Georgia and to regain the losses Georgia had. As soon as Saakashvili came to power, his main challenge was the speedy reestablishment of Georgias territorial integrity, to which Saakashvili made a deep personal commitment.1Interestingly enough, none of the Georgian leaders after Gamsakhurdia era (in fact, this regardsthe Second President of Georgia Eduard Shevarnadze), have been so explicit and enthusiastic about the territorial integration of Georgia. This is one of the reasons the young and enthusiastic leader of the Rose Revolution might be compared to the figurehead of the Georgian independence struggle. Whether this comparison is reasonable and if yes what are the differences and similarities between the two leaders and their nationalism programs will be argued and demonstrated in this paper.

Intellectual Nationalist versus USeducated Reformer

Admittedly, the prevailing theory of describing nationalism and ethnicity is the one advanced by the instrumentalists. The latter assumes that ethnicity and nationalism are a means in the hands of a stratified and isolated group, the elite, who mobilize nations around latent or forgotten ethnic identities2. In this case the leadership prioritizes and puts the main emphasis on the political process that this ethnic or nationalistic mobilization may engender, rather than strives to return the historical justice, as the leaders might argue. Nevertheless, no matter how different the goals and the aims of the leaders of nationalist movements are from the one of its followers, in
1S  vante E. Cornell and F. Starr, eds.,The Guns of August: Russias War in Georgia (New York:M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 91 2 DonaldL. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (London and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 5

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the majority of cases masses do usually enthusiastically follow their leaders, and the latter may be often loyal and passionate about their cause, which was obvious in case of Gamsakhurdia1. But virtually who are these nationalist leaders whom people follow? This issue has been debated by many scholars, and in different cases nationalism has originated among professionals, bureaucrats, lower clergy, and even among some rulers. However, the role of intelligentsia in national movements has always been emphasized. By reproducing, retelling, revising national myths, symbols, etc., the intellectuals and artists develop national ideologies around which people mobilize. This stratum often assumes the role of a certain mediator who diffuses and reaches the nationalistic ideology to the people2. The role of intelligentsia in the national liberation movement of the Soviet Union republics has been pivotal. In fact, after Gorbachev put forward his reform agenda of liberalization, the Soviet Republics saw a burst and emergence of civil society(liberal intelligentsia), which started to mobilize and to voice out issues which it would not omitted to do formerly for the simple fear of being incarcerated. Namely, this layer of society, using its intellectual capacity contributed to shaping a nationalistic discourse which eventually poured into and fueled the immense wave of national movements3. In 1989 the leader of the national liberation movement of Georgia and consequently its First President became foreignlanguage specialist Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Gamsakhurdia was born in a family of intellectuals; his father was a wellknown Georgian author. As a teenager, Gamsakhurdia had started to express his dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime and nationalism sentiments. He has been the leader of several human rights organizations, such as the Helsinki Group formed in 1970s, and has written for the underground publications called samizdat. The explicit protest and liberal mood of Gamsakhurdia naturally was not welcomed by the Soviet regime, for which Zviad, as a dissident, has passed many years in the Soviet prisons. Once he was released, as a result of recantation, which he would later reason by the need of preserving the nationalistic
1 Ibid., p. 288 2 AnthonyD. Smith, Ethnosymbolism and Nationalism A Cultural Approach, (London and New York:Routledge, 2009), 70 3 Christoph Zurcher, The PostSoviet Wars, Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus,( New York and London: New York University Press, 2007), 39

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movement of Georgia1,Gamsakhurdia never stopped the propaganda of his nationalistic rhetoric which eventually served as a base for the freedom movement of Georgia As already mentioned, Mikheil Saakashvili, the young leader of the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, and subsequently the President of Georgia had set among political priorities to reinstall the territorial integrity of Georgia. Mikheil Saakashvili was born in Tbilisi in 1967, has graduated from the School of International Law in Kiev and studied in the United States. Since the age of 35 Saakashvili had held various important political positions, such as Minister of Justice, Mayor, etc. While analyzing the background and the career path of the two leaders a major difference between them, which will be later seen to have an impact on their nationalist rhetoric,emerges. As a dissident and intellectual, Gamsakhurdia has never been a mere politician, or maybe he has never been one. He was the symbol of the national liberation movement; meanwhilehe has never been praised as a good executive or administrator2. During the Gamsakhurdia era, the shadow economy was proliferating in Georgia, corruption was abundant and in fact the country was on the verge of economic collapse3. On the contrary, Saakashvili and his team had come to contribute to the implementation of democratic and political reforms in Georgia (e.g. due the extensive liberalization process administered by Saakashvili Georgia appeared in the top ten rankings of World Banks Doing Business index.) According to Brubaker the ethnic leaders are often welleducated and represent the middleclass of the society, whereas the rank andfile members of the national movements are not enough skillful and represent the lower layers of society4.This assumption is true in the case of Gamsakhurdia, an intellectual, who has cooperated with and whose nationalism movementto some extent relied on the nationalist militia, such as the Mkhederioni, led by a thief in law Jaba Ioseliani a formation of paramilitary forces pursuing their
1 Per Gahrton, Georgia: Pawn in the New Great Game, (New York: Pluto Press, 2010), 79 2 Gahrton, Georgia: Pawn in the New Great Game, p.81 3 Zurcher, The PostSoviet Wars, Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, p.146 4 Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity without groups, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 100101

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own lucrative, and often criminal interests rather than state interest. On the contrary, the policy of Saakashvili and his entire agenda was backed up by a steady block of professionals who had former political experience and relevant education, such as theheavyweight politicians 1Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze. However, as the both cases might eventually show and here a commonbiographic feature might be emphasized after certain developments the supporters of the both presidents eventually became the leading members of their opposition, which in case of Gamsakhurdia was fatal, with the paramilitary forces largely contributing to his downfall2. As already mentioned being educated by Western traditions, Georgia under the rule of Mikheil Saakashvili had an explicit Western vocation. For the West, Georgia was thought to become a cradle of democracy in the South Caucuses. The loyalty of Georgia towards Western traditions was also articulated in the Georgias 2005 National Security Concept, in which NATO was considered to be the guarantee for security, while EU was seen as a contributor to market economy and democratic reforms.3When Zviad Gamsakhurdia launched his movement he proclaimed himself as a liberal nationalist, comparing himself to De Gaulle.4 However, unlike Saakashvili, the West has never seen Gamsakhurdia as the promoter of western democratic standards in Eastern Europe, in his turn Gamsakhurdia was totally alienated from the Western countries, which regarded with total indifference the overthrow of the radically antihegemonic regime of Zviad Gamsakhurdia5. In fact, at that timethe West had a much more important concern: elimination of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.6. When coming to power Saakashvili decisively pronounced that he had made some steps for reconciliation and rapprochement with the Russians the closest cousins of the Georgians7.However, after the 2008 August war, seeing Saakashvilis western inclination as a treat to Russian hegemony in the Caucusesthe cousins of the Georgians
1 Starr, The Guns of August: Russias War in Georgia, p. 89 2 Zurcher, The PostSoviet Wars, Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, p. 127;Cornell and Starr, The Guns of August: Russias War in Georgia, p. 146 3 Cornell and Starr, The Guns of August: Russias War in Georgia, pp. 99100 4 Ibid., p.156 5 Ibid., p.29 6 Ibid., p.19 7 Ibid.,p.123

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declared the Georgian president to be a political corpse1. Like his young colleague eventually became, Gamsakhurdia has always been a person nongrata for the Russians a Russophobe. The features indicated above, have had their implications on shaping the nationalism agendas of the both leaders which we will demonstrated below.

Popular Nationalism versus Civic Nationalism

Nationalism can be defined as an ideology or political movement which seeks for certain gains, certain rights or privileges for the nation, through amobilized and selfdefined community.2 In a broad sense nationalism is about and for nationbuilding and/or territory. The national movements are held for an eventual control over territory;if it is enough powerful the movement achieves its goalsthrough state building or destruction of states.3 This was the case in the former Soviet Union, where the nationalism movements (in conjunction with other factors) that rose after the Gorbachev liberalization policy brought to the collapse of the USSR and the making of new independent republics formerly the state units of the Union. In fact, the liberalization process of the Soviet ethnofederal republic, where the numerous ethnic groups and their aspirations were controlled from above4 based on the divide and rule principle, crashed as soon as the national movements in the sovereign republics were given more space within the perestroika policy. Georgia was among the first states of the USSR to undergo a large scale national movement, which successively turned into a liberation movement, but as it will be shown below the Georgian nationalism, more specifically Gamsakhurdias movement was not only about controlling territory.Besides, if it is true that nationalism movement is a form of selfdefense5, it is equally right to assert that the nationalism movement originated by the majority may consequently raise the self defending instinct of the national minorities. This occurred in Georgia.
1 Ibid.,p.179 2 Barrington, After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist State, p. 289 3 Ibid., p.34 4 Zurcher, The PostSoviet Wars, Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, p.34 5 R.G. Suny, The Revenge of the Past, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993),156,

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The nationalist rhetoric of Gamsakhurdia Georgia for Georgians, and his talks about ethnogeny of Georgia1 was perceived by the minorities inhabiting Georgia as a direct threat for georgianization and discrimination. This mainly regards the regions of South Ossetia (formerly autonomousoblast of USSR), Ajaria and Abkhazia (formerly autonomous republics). As a result the Abkhazians, Ajarians and South Ossetians started to claim for independence, which did fit not into the nationalistrhetoric of Gamsakhurdia. This emerged into a series of violent conflicts with two wars in South Ossetia (19891991) and Abkhazia (19921993) and the eventual loss of control on the territories. Affluent with a chauvinistic and emotional rhetoric, Gamsakhurdias nationalist movement may be described as follows: According to a number of scholars, the ethnic nationalism in the postcommunist territory emerged as result of the revival of national identities, which were entrenched by the central government, but were able to survive within almost a century2. The nationalism movement of Gamsakhurdia was an ethnicnationalist movement, seeking to the reestablishment the Georgian identity3. Brubaker singles out the following features of ethnic nationalism illiberal, ascriptive, particularistic, and exclusive4. o Gamsakhurdias movement was particularistic: the core ideology of it was based on the Georgian nation, or more precisely ethnic group; it neglected the other ethnic groups living in the country referring to minorities as guests5, and had a differential and discriminatory approach to Abkhazians and South Ossetians, treating them as autochthonous and nonindigenous, respectively. o Gamsakhurdias movement was ascriptive and exclusive:he was an uncomprising nationalist, a chauvinist who believed that Georgia was for Georgians, he identified Georgia with himself, and whoever disagreed with him was considered a traitor of the country. Gamsakhurdias nationalism was illiberal: he cooperated with paramilitary forces and criminals (see above).To some extent his
1Z  urcher, The PostSoviet Wars, Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, p.128 2 Brubaker, Ethnicity without groups, p. 52 3 Barrington, After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist State, p. 269 4 Brubaker, Ethnicity without groups, p.141 5 Gahrton, Georgia: Pawn in the New Great Game, p. 8

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nationalist movement was fed by the dirty money of these criminal groups. Gamsakhurdia was an autocratic dictator, who believed that for achieving a full independence an autocratic regime was needed in the country.1He had undermined a number of democratic principles (e.g. he had changed the mode of election local government turning them into centrally appointed prefectures). Moreover, the movement was illiberal as at frequently resorted to means of hard power and violence, whenever its interests were not met,like in the case of the clashes in the breakaway regions, Admittedly, as Jones argues referring to Barrington,Georgian nationalism was sovereigntyseeking and aimed secure the territorial integrity of Georgia2. But it is worth to not that the nationalism of Gamsakhurdiawas alsostateseeking, or at least it became so after a little while. This was an antiimperialistic, more precisely antiSoviet freedom movement, striving for anindependence and sovereign state for the nation that had common values and was mobilized in a community. The nationalist movement of Gamsakhurdia was a popular movement.It was not a civic national movement with an even engagement of the citizens, but it was able to mobilize masses in huge demonstrations, rallies, etc3. Zviad Gamsakhurdiawas the charismatic leader whose vision of ethnic nationalism was shared the majority of Georgians4. This support was conditioned by a number of factors, but the predominant causes were: the fear of being russified, and the threat of minorities, mainly the ones living in South Ossetia and Abkhazia that were persistently under the disposal of the Moscow as a tool to turn down Georgia5. Many Georgians considered Gamsakhurdiathe messiah of independence from Soviet Union, howeverfor the intellectuals he was a dictator and a fascist who ruined the country6. Indeed, when in 1990 Gamsakhurdia and his party, Round Table of National Liberation won at the elections of the
1Z  urcher, The PostSoviet Wars, Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, p. 156 2 Barrington, After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist State, p. 267 3 Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, p. 150 4 Gahrton, Georgia: Pawn in the New Great Game, p. 83 5 Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, p.140 6 Zurcher, The PostSoviet Wars, Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus, p.127

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Supreme soviet, the Georgian parliament was comprised of populists rather than intellectuals, which more enabled Gamsakhurdia to attain his goal of absolute power. After his forced resignation and till the end of his days (he died in 1993in obscure circumstances) Gamsakhurdia continued his nationalist movement even from abroad. Because, he no more had power nor enjoyed the popularity, his movement had transformed into an ultranationalism, where every means were justified for achieving the end, even the cooperation with Abkhazian separatists who were once considered as guests. In opposition, to Gamsakhurdias popular, sometimes fanatic rhetoric of nationalism, Mikheil Saakashvili, came to power as a US educated liberal democrat. As already mentioned, the two leaders had totally different backgrounds,with the nationalism sentiments of Saakashvili having the following features: Like Gamsakhurdia, Saakashvilis policy was welcomed by the majority of the society. The leader of the Rose Revolution, Saakashvili was thought to be the one to put Georgia on a democratic path which would bring to its Western affiliation, including EU membership. Brief, the Rose Revolution was a new breath in the underdeveloped Georgia, and fed the society with very much optimism. All this meant that at least at an initial stage Saakashvilis agenda, including his zeal for territorial integrity, was accepted by the population, and this was evident by the fact that in 2004 Saakashvili was elected President by an overwhelming majority of voices. Unlike Gamsakhurdias freedom movement, the nationalism under Saakashvili cannot be anyhow sorted as stateseeking: at that time Georgia was already an independent state with its national borders, although not so clearcut. It can neither be defined as anethnic nationalism, as Saakashvili used more liberal and universal methods and rhetoric, besides was not about the revival of the national identity of Georgians, which was so much oppressed in the Soviet times. The core spirit and aim of the rhetoric wasthe reestablishment of the Georgian territorial integrity, rather than the assimilation of the minorities from the breakaway regions. Obviously, the national movement of Saakashvili was sovereigntyprotecting, seeking to restore the territories on which Georgia had lost its authority.

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In the beginning of his campaign, Saakashvili had opted for the principlesof soft power, with noviolent measures and severe nationalistic rhetoric. He supposed that he could cooperate with the minorities of the breakaway regions, without undermining their national identity. Admittedly, his national movement had some attributes of civic nationalism, unlike the exclusively popular movement of Gamsakhurdia. From the very first moment Saakashvili had announced to reiterate the Georgian integrity by liberal, universal and voluntarism measures.Saakashvili presumed that his reform agenda would result in the economic stability and attractiveness of Georgia, which would in its turn,push the nations of the isolated regions to voluntarily integrate with Georgia for the sake of their own prosperity. This presumption proved correct in case of Ajaria, when its President Aslan Abashidze voluntarily resigned, after the regions economic crisisbecause of the embargo, imposed by Georgia. As Brubaker argues civic nationalism is to be praised, as it is more inclined and set on a peaceful track, whereas ethnic nationalism has a more conlflictual potential1.In this case whether the nationalism of Saakashvilis nationalist might be perceived as civic is strongly undermined, for the liberal aspirations of the Georgian young leader were soon to evaporate, when they faced the resistance of the two other regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Hoping to find support from the West Saakashvili launched an armed conflict against the regions, overstepping his once proclaimed principles of soft power. The August war against South Ossetia and to some extent Abkhazia was the result of the implementation of hard power by Saakashvili. Resorting to methods of violence Saakashvili behaved similarly to Gamsakhurdia, but as his predecessor, he was never to achieve a success causing a deeper isolation and disintegration of the regions. Like Gamsakhurdia strived for authoritarianism, Saakashvilis inclination to become an authoritarian president is quite obvious. After coming to power he has introduced a number of constitutional amendments, which diminishes the checks and balances mechanism, grantinglarge power to the President. This authoritarian behavior could also be well observed in his quest to territorial integrity. In an interview to BBC Saakashvili has announcedGeorgias

1 Brubaker, Ethnicity without groups, pp.140141

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territorial integrity is the goal of my life1. Such strong and emotional announcements as well as his unpredictable, sporadic behavior, has given ground for drawing parallels between his erratic and fatal predecessor Gamsakhurdia. The arguments brought above demonstrate that this comparison is somehow justified even though there are significant differences. This primarily, regards the goals, as well as the timelines of the national movements. However, it is evident that neither Gamsakhurdia nor Saakashvili have found the clue for dealing with the minorities in Georgia, claiming them to be irresolvable, for the Russian have direct implication and interest in the conflicts. However, as much as the instrumentalist theory, which focuses on the utility of the national identity as a tool in the hands of elites for serving to their own interests, is true, the failure of the Georgian rulers to reconcile with the minorities cannot be neglected. Georgia is still waiting for Charles De Gaulle2, which Gamsakhurdia and Saakashvili never became.
. 1990 , : , 2003 , , : , ` : ` :
1 Gahrton, Georgia: Pawn in the New Great Game, p. 151 2 Ibid., p. 75