MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., G.R. No.

47800 December 2, 1940 Doctrine: Social Justice

LAUREL, J.:
Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic: 1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and 2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provi sions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the app roval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulati ons to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion? 2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people? Held: 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the

promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving. 2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex. Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number. Facts: Petitioners filed for a Writ of Prohibition to prevent the expropriation of her land inMaypajo, Rizal. Petitioner contends that:1.Respondent is without authority to negotiate for a bank loan used aspartial payment for her property.2 . L a n d i n q u e s t i o n i s i n p a r t c o m m e r c i a l , m a k i n g i t e x e m p t f r o m A c t 359 (expropriation of private lands)3.Expropriation will impair the obligation of contracts4 . V a l u e s e t b y l o w e r c o u r t i s e r r o n e o u s Issue: Whether or not the land is expropriable under sec 4 of Art13 of PC. Held: No, the land is not. Various laws support the legitimacy of expropriation of private lands (Commonwealth Act 539, sec1 provides for expropriation/purchase of private lands & expropriation for subdivision of small lots,sec2 provides for the designation of authority to any agency to carry outexpropriation, and sec4 art13 PC empowers CONGRESS to expropriatep r i v a t e l a n d s ) . W h e t h e r o r n o t p r i v a t e l a n d s c a n b e e x p r o p r i a t e d regardless of location, area or nature is reflected in the purpose for theConstitutional provision, which is to break up large estates for the

benefito f s m a l l l a n d o w n e r s . T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n d o e s n o t s e e k t o u n d e r m i n e property rights, and sec 4 art 13 allows only for expropriation for publicbenefit of a few families does not constitute public benefit. There is no lineto determine when public use can be used as basis for expropriation;decisions must be made on a case-to-case basis. Deciding in favor of ther e s p o n d e n t s m a y o n l y g i v e r i s e f o r m o r e o p p r e s s i v e c a s e s o f expropriation.Wherefore, Petition GRANTED National Housing Corp. v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985) F: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt-owned corp. and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to the SC ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter, covered by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service? HELD: Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government owned and controlled corporation. The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil service system. All offices and firms of the government are covered. This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCC belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements. "Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. xxx For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt- owned or controlled corps. whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the Labor Code, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does not mean that such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service. xxx The infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of Sec. 1, Art. XII-B [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] of the Consti. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt to create a host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code funded by a willing legislature. A govt-owned corp. could create several subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their

officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Dec. and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraint in the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all govtowned or controlled corps. could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorp. under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such corps. in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed National Service Corp. v. NLRC, 168 SCRA 125 (1988) -- The civil service does not include Government owned or controlledcorporations (GOCC) which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law.F: Eugenio Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation. She claims she was illegally dismissed. NLRC ruled orderingher reinstatement. NASECO argues that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order her reinstatement. NASECO as a government corporation byvirtue of its being a subsidiary of the NIDC, which is wholly owned by the Phil. National Bank which is in turn a GOCC, the terms andconditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law citing National Housing v Juco.ISSUE: W/N employees of NASECO, a GOCC without original charter, are governed by the Civil Service Law.HELD: NO. The holding in NHC v Juco should not be given retroactive effect, that is to cases that arose before its promulgation of Jan 17, 1985. To do otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated because under the 1973 Constibut prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco, this court recognized the applicability of the Labor jurisdiction over disputes involving terms andconditions of employment in GOCC's, among them NASECO.In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCC, the 1987 Consti starkly differs from the 1973 consti where NHC v Juco wasbased. It provides that the "civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,including government owned or controlled corporation with original charter." Therefore by clear implication, the civil service doesnot include GOCC which are organized as subsidiaries of GOCC under the general corporation law. People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Panis GR No. L5867477, July 11, 1990 FACTS: On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that herein private respondent Serapio Abug, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he cannot be

charged for illegal recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the Labor Code says there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the Trial Court in its Orders dated June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981. In the instant case, the view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the innocence or guilt of the private respondent of the crime of illegal recruitment COURT RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the CFIs Orders and reinstated all four information filed against private respondent. The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a presumption, and not to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto. Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create the said presumption. People v Goce Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie! RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE and NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused, NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 113161 August 29, 1995 Facts: On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a

syndicate and in large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442) as amended by Section 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 2018, was filed against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and herein accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, alleging That in or about and during the period comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad, to (1) Rolando Dalida y Piernas, (2) Ernesto Alvarez y Lubangco, (3) Rogelio Salado y Savillo, (4) Ramona Salado y Alvarez, (5) Dionisio Masaya y de Guzman, (6) Dave Rivera y de Leon, (7) Lorenzo Alvarez y Velayo, and (8) Nelson Trinidad y Santos, without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor. Four of the complainants testified for the prosecution. Rogelio Salado was the first to take the witness stand and he declared that sometime in March or April, 1987 he was introduced by Lorenzo Alvarez, his brother-in-law and a co-applicant, to Nelly Agustin in the latter's residence at Factor, Dongalo, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Representing herself as the manager of the Clover Placement Agency, Agustin showed him a job order as proof that he could readily be deployed for overseas employment. Salado learned that he had to pay P5,000.00 as processing fee, which amount he gave sometime in April or May of the same year. He was issued the corresponding receipt. Also in April or May, 1987, Salado, accompanied by five other applicants who were his relatives, went to the office of the placement agency at Nakpil Street, Ermita, Manila where he saw Agustin and met the spouses Dan and Loma Goce, owners of the agency. He submitted his bio-data and learned from Loma Goce that he had to give P12,000.00, instead of the original amount of P5,000.00 for the placement fee. Although surprised at the new and higher sum, they subsequently agreed as long as there was an assurance that they could leave for abroad. Thereafter, a receipt was issued in the name of the Clover Placement Agency showing that Salado and his aforesaid co-applicants each paid P2,000.00, instead of the P5,000.00 which each of them actually paid. Several months passed but Salado failed to leave for the promised overseas employment. Hence, in October, 1987, along with the other recruits, he decided to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to verify the real status of Clover Placement Agency. They discovered that said agency was not duly licensed to recruit job applicants. Later, upon learning that Agustin had been arrested, Salado decided to see her and to demand the return of the money he had paid, but Agustin could only give him P500.00. Ramona Salado, the wife of Rogelio Salado, came to know through her brother,

Lorenzo Alvarez, about Nelly Agustin. Accompanied by her husband, Rogelio, Ramona went to see Agustin at the latter's residence. Agustin persuaded her to apply as a cutter/sewer in Oman so that she could join her husband. Encouraged by Agustin's promise that she and her husband could live together while working in Oman, she instructed her husband to give Agustin P2,000.00 for each of them as placement fee, or the total sum of P4,000.00. Much later, the Salado couple received a telegram from the placement agency requiring them to report to its office because the "NOC" (visa) had allegedly arrived. Again, around February, or March, 1987, Rogelio gave P2,000.00 as payment for his and his wife's passports. Despite follow-up of their papers twice a week from February to June, 1987, he and his wife failed to leave for abroad. Complainant Dionisio Masaya, accompanied by his brother-in-law, Aquiles Ortega, applied for a job in Oman with the Clover Placement Agency at Paraaque, the agency's former office address. There, Masaya met Nelly Agustin, who introduced herself as the manager of the agency, and the Goce spouses, Dan and Loma, as well as the latter's daughter. He submitted several pertinent documents, such as his biodata and school credentials. In May, 1986, Masaya gave Dan Goce P1,900.00 as an initial downpayment for the placement fee, and in September of that same year, he gave an additional P10,000.00. He was issued receipts for said amounts and was advised to go to the placement office once in a while to follow up his application, which he faithfully did. Much to his dismay and chagrin, he failed to leave for abroad as promised. Accordingly, he was forced to demand that his money be refunded but Loma Goce could give him back only P4,000.00 in installments. As the prosecution's fourth and last witness, Ernesto Alvarez took the witness stand on June 7, 1993. He testified that in February, 1987, he met appellant Agustin through his cousin, Larry Alvarez, at her residence in Paraaque. She informed him that "madalas siyang nagpapalakad sa Oman" and offered him a job as an ambulance driver at the Royal Hospital in Oman with a monthly salary of about $600.00 to $700.00. On March 10, 1987, Alvarez gave an initial amount of P3,000.00 as processing fee to Agustin at the latter's residence. In the same month, he gave another P3,000.00, this time in the office of the placement agency. Agustin assured him that he could leave for abroad before the end of 1987. He returned several times to the placement agency's office to follow up his application but to no avail. Frustrated, he demanded the return of the money he had paid, but Agustin could only give back P500.00. Thereafter, he looked for Agustin about eight times, but he could no longer find her. Only herein appellant Agustin testified for the defense. She asserted that Dan and Loma Goce were her neighbors at Tambo, Paraaque and that they were licensed recruiters and owners of the Clover Placement Agency. Previously, the Goce couple

was able to send her son, Reynaldo Agustin, to Saudi Arabia. Agustin met the aforementioned complainants through Lorenzo Alvarez who requested her to introduce them to the Goce couple, to which request she acceded. Denying any participation in the illegal recruitment and maintaining that the recruitment was perpetrated only by the Goce couple, Agustin denied any knowledge of the receipts presented by the prosecution. She insisted that the complainants included her in the complaint thinking that this would compel her to reveal the whereabouts of the Goce spouses. On November 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant guilty as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment. Issue: Whether or not Agustins act of introducing couple Goce falls within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Art 13(b) in relation to Art 34 of the Labor Code. Held: The testimonial evidence hereon show that she indeed further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. All four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement agency. As correctly held by the trial court, being an employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical for appellant to introduce the applicants to said spouses, they being the owners of the agency. As such, appellant was actually making referrals to the agency of which she was a part. She was therefore engaging in recruitment activity. There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad. It is undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send people abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to give her the money she demanded in order to be so employed. WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant Nelly D. Agustin. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. SAMINA ANGELES YCALMAFACTS: Maria Tolosa Sardea was working in Saudi Arabia when shereceived a call from her sister, Priscilla Agoncillo, who was inParis, France. Priscilla advised Maria to return to the Philippinesand await the arrival of her friend, accused-appellant SaminaAngeles, who will assist in processing her travel and employmentdocuments to Paris, France. Heeding her sisters advice, Mariaimmediately returned to the Philippines. Marceliano Tolosa who atthat time was in the Philippines likewise received instructions fromhis sister Priscilla to meet accused-appellant who will also assist inthe processing of his documents for Paris, France.Maria and Marceliano eventually met accusedappellant. Duringtheir meeting, accused-appellant asked if they had the moneyrequired for the processing of their documents. Maria gaveP107,000.00 to accused-appellant at Expert Travel Agency.Subsequently, she gave another P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 asadditional payments to accused-appellant. Marceliano, on the other hand, initially gave P100,000.00 to accused-appellant and he gavean additional P46,000.00 and US$1,500.00 at the United CoconutPlanters Bank in Makati.Analyn Olpindo met accused-appellant in Belgium. At that time,Analyn was working in Canada but she went to Belgium to visither in-laws. After meeting accused-appellant, Analyn Olpindocalled up her sister, Precila Olpindo, in the Philippines and told her to meet accused-appellant upon the latters arrival in thePhilippines because accusedappellant can help process her documents for employment in Canada. Precila Olpindo eventuallymet accused-appellant at the Expert Travel Agency. Accused-appellant asked for the amount of $4,500.00, but Precila was onlyable to give $2,500.00. No evidence was adduced in relation to the complaint of VilmaBrina since she did not testify in court.Accused-appellant told Precila Olpindo and Vilma Brina that itwas easier to complete the processing of their papers if they startfrom Jakarta, Indonesia rather than from Manila. Precila Olpindo,Vilma Brina and accusedappellant flew to Jakarta, Indonesia.However, accused-appellant returned to the Philippines after twodays, leaving behind Precila and Vilma. They waited for accused-appellant in Jakarta but the latter never returned. Precila and Vilmaeventually came home to the Philippines. They started looking for her but they could not reach her.Elisa Campanianos of the Philippine Overseas EmploymentAgency presented a certification to the effect that accused-appellant was not duly licensed to recruit workers here and abroad.In her defense, accused-appellant averred that she never represented to the complainants that she can provide them withwork abroad. She insisted that she was a marketing consultant andan international trade fair organizer. She met Priscilla Agoncillo inFrance and they became friends. Priscilla asked her to assist her siblings, Maria and Marceliano, particularly in the processing of their travel documents for France. Accused-appellant told Priscillathat she can only help in the processing of travel documents andnothing more. It was Priscilla who promised employment to Mariaand Marceliano. She received money from complainants not in theform of placement fees but for the cost of tickets, hotelaccommodations and other travel requirements. She has the samedefense for Analyn Olpindo whom she met in Belgium.After trial on the merits, the trial court found accused-appellantguilty of illegal recruitment and four (4) counts of estafa. The casewas elevated to the Court of Appeals.Accusedappellant alleged that she never promised nor offered any job to the complainants.She pointed out that not one of thecomplainants testified on what kind of jobs were promised to them,how much they would receive as salaries, the length of their employment and even the names of their employers, which are basic subjects a prospective employee would first determine. ISSUE: Whether or not Angeles is guilty

with four (4) counts of estafa and one (1) count of illegal recruitment RULING: 1.) Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) elementsconcur: 1) that the offender has no valid license or authorityrequired by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitmentand placement of workers; and 2) that the offender undertakeseither any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practicesenumerated under Article 34. 3 Article 13(b), of the Labor Code provides, thus:(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includesreferrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in anymanner, offers or promises for a fee employment to twoor more persons shall be deemed engaged inrecruitment and placemen t.To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused-appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such thatthe latter were convinced to part with their money in order to beemployed. 4 To be engaged in the practice of recruitment and placement, it is plain that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad.Plainly, there is no testimony that accused-appellant offeredcomplainants jobs abroad. Hence, accused-appellant SaminaAngeles cannot be lawfully convicted of illegal recruitment.2.) Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code,the elements of estafa are: (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Clearly, these elements are present in thiscase. 8 Although Samina Angeles did not deceive complainants into believing that she could find employment for them abroad,nonetheless, she made them believe that she was processing their travel documents for France and Canada. They parted with their money believing that Samina Angeles would use it to pay for their plane tickets, hotel accommodations and other travel requirements.Upon receiving various amounts from complainants, SaminaAngeles used it for other purposes and then convenientlydisappeared. Complainants trusted Samina Angeles because shewas referred to them by their own relatives. She abused their confidence when she led them to believe that she can process their travel documents abroad, thus inducing them to part with their money. When they demanded from Samina their travel documents,she failed to produce them. Likewise, she failed to return theamounts entrusted to her.Clearly, Samina Angeles defrauded complainants by falsely pretending to possess the power and capacity to process their traveldocuments.P107,000.00 Maria; 190,00 Marceliano; 61,200Precila.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision isMODIFIED Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145 F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD 1920 and EO 1022, POEA Administrator Achacoso ordered the closure of the recruitment

agency of Horty Salazar, having verified that she had no license to operate a recruitment agency. He further ordered the seizure of the documents and paraphernalias, being used or intended to be used as the means of commiting illegal recruitment. This order was enforced on 26 January 1988. Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor) validly issue warrants of serach and seizure (or arrest ) under Art. 38 of the Labor Code? HELD: NO. The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022, now embodied in Art. 38 of the Labor Code, are the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilights moments. Under Art. III, Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is only judges and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President of the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation. The Sec. of Labor , not being a judge. may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Art. 38, par. C of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. a. Existence of probable cause. Probable cause is such facts and circumstances as would reasonably make a prudent man believe that a crime have been committed and that the documents or things sought to be searched and seized are in the possession of the person against whom the warrant is sought. Without probable cause, there can be no valid search warrant. See Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938) NITTO ENTERPRISES vs. NLRC and ROBERTO CAPILIFIRST DIVISION / KAPUNAN, J. : Daylo, Jerome Dela CruzSeptember 29, 1995 Series: 6FACTS: Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired RobertoC a p i l i s o m e t i m e i n M a y 1 9 9 0 as an apprentice machinist, molder and coremaker as e v i d e n c e d b y a n apprenticeship agreement 2for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rateof P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage. On August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a pieceof glass which he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearbyh o s p i t a l . Further, Capili entered a workshop within the office premises which was not his work s t a t i o n . There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the process injured his left thumb.T h e following day he was asked to resign. Three days after, , p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t f o r m a l l y f i l e d b e f o r e t h e N L R C Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of

other monetary benefits.T h e L a b o r A r b i t e r r e n d e r e d h i s decision finding the termination of private r e s p o n d e n t a s v a l i d a n d dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. On appeal, NLRC issued an order reversing the decision of theLabor Arbiter. The NLRC declared that Capili was a regular employee of Nitto Enterprises and not an apprentice.C o n s e q u e n t l y , L a b o r A r b i t e r issued a Writ of Execution ordering for the reinstatement o f C a p i l i a n d t o c o l l e c t his back wages. Petitioner, Nitto Enterprises filed a case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Does the NLRC correctly rule that Capili is a regular employee and not an apprentice of Nitto Enterprises? LAW: Article 280 of the Labor Code RULING: Yes. The apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executedon May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the lat ter as an apprentice in the trade of "care m a k e r / m o l d e r . However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990.Notwithstanding the absence of approval by theDepartmentofLaborand Employment,theapprenticeshipagreementwasenforcedthedayitwassigned.Theactoffilingthep r o p o s e d apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and E m p l o y m e n t i s a p r e l i m i n a r y s t e p t o w a r d s its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship.N i t t o E n t e r p r i s e s d i d n o t c o m p l y w i t h t h e requirements of the law. It is mandated that ap p r e n t i c e s h i p agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeshipprogram duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. Thus, the apprenticeship agreement has no force andeffect; and Capili is considered to be a regular employee of the company. Filamer Christian Institute vs IAC and Kapunan Labor Standards Human Resources Development Torts Section 14, Rule X, Book III, IRR (Labor Code) NOTE: This case reversed Filamer vs IAC (October 16, 1990) Daniel Funtecha was a working student of Filamer. He was assigned as the school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was the son of the school president and at the same time he was the schools jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa returned to the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the students early in the morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go home together. Funtecha had a student drivers license so Masa let him take the drivers seat. While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit

an elderly Kapunan which led to his hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha. In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable for the tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article 2180 which provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer assailed the decision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR, working scholars are excluded from the employment coverage hence there is no employer-employee relations between Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence only attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being the school janitor. The CA denied Filamers appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable. HELD: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this time Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions of any other laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself. The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code. Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masas house is beneficial to the school because this enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

G.R. No. 122917 MARITES BERNARDO et al. vs. NLRCTHIRD DIVISION / PANGANIBAN, J. Daylo, Jerome Dela CruzJuly 12, 1999 Series: 7FACTS: The 43 petitioners are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far EastBank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called "Employment Contractfor Handicapped Workers". The said agreement provides for the manner of how they are hired and be rehired, the amountof their wages (P118.00 per day), period of employment (5 days a week, 8 hours a day, training for 1 month, 6 monthsperiod) and the manner and methods of how their works are to be done (Sort out bills according to color; Count eachdenomination per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting machine; Wrap and label bills per hundred; Putthe wrapped bills into bundles; and Submit bundled bills to the bank teller for verification.) Many of their employmentswere renewed every six months. Claiming that they should be considered as regular employees they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and recovery of various benefits. Labor arbiters decision: complaint is dismissed for lack of merit (the terms of the contract shall be the law between the parties.). Affirmed by the NLRC (Art. 280 is not controlling herein but Art. 80) (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons wasnot applicable, "considering the prevailing circumstances of the case.") and denied motion for reconsideration. ISSUES: Does petitioners considered as regular employees? LAW: Art.78 & 80 of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons. RULING: Yes. The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months and whosecontracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal.The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with Article 80, however, the application of Article 280 of the Labor Code is justified because of the advent of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons) whichmandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualifiedablebodied person (compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances) 27 of the petitioners areconsidered regular employees by provision of law regardless of any agreement between the parties as embodied in article280 in relation to article 281 of the Labor Code.The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Hence, theemployment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exist. Without a doubt, thetask of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank.When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby becameregular employees. No employer is allowed to determine indefinitely the fitness of its employees. Those who have workedfor only 6 months and employments were not renewed are not considered regular employees.