Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in West Africa: An Overview of Sierra Leone and Liberia

Case Study Christiana Solomon (with an initial contribution by Jeremy Ginifer) July 2008

Contribution to the Project on:

DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict Security-building in the Interests of the Poor

Table of Contents
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Objectives of the Overview Paper on DDR in West Africa............................ 2 1.2 Structure of the Overview Paper ..................................................................... 2 1.3 Methodology ................................................................................................... 2 1.4 Key Lessons Learned ...................................................................................... 3 2. Contextualising the Need for DDR: Civil Conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia . 3 2.1 The Onset of Violent Conflict in Liberia ........................................................ 4 2.2 The Onset of Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone ............................................... 5 2.3 DDR Strategy and Framework ........................................................................ 5 2.4 Reviewing Disarmament and Demobilisation................................................. 6 2.4.1 Shortcomings in the Process .................................................................... 7 2.4.2 Reintegration Challenges ....................................................................... 10 3. DDR and Related Programming .......................................................................... 13 3.1 Security Sector Reform ................................................................................. 13 3.1.1 SSR in Sierra Leone ............................................................................... 13 3.1.2 SSR in Liberia ........................................................................................ 13 3.2 Links Between DDR and SALW .................................................................. 15 4. Conclusion and Lessons Learned......................................................................... 16 4.1 Limited Amount of Financial Resources ...................................................... 16 4.2 National Ownership....................................................................................... 16 4.3 Missing Link between Reintegration and Disarmament and Demobilisation . 16 4.4 Cross-border Movements .............................................................................. 17 4.5 Differentiated Assistance Packages between Agencies Funded by Different Donors ...................................................................................................................... 17 4.6 High Concentration of Ex-combatants in Urban Locations .......................... 18

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in West Africa: An Overview of Sierra Leone and Liberia
Christiana Solomon and Jeremy Ginifer

1. Introduction
The outbreak of violent conflict in Liberia in 1989 and in Sierra Leone in 1991 marked the beginning of a change in the political, economic and security configuration of the Mano River Union (MRU) sub-region. These crises betrayed the once lofty goals of economic integration and peaceful co-existence between the two MRU countries. 1 The conflicts also marked the beginning of the war economy phenomenon in the sub-region. Armed militia captured natural resource enclaves to facilitate the exploitation and barter of timber, rubber and, most importantly, diamonds, for weapons and private accumulation. The violent conflicts have had the combined effect of fostering the transnational combatant or fighters without borders, making the Mano River Basin 2 , and by extension, West Africa, an attractive and viable arena for mercenaries and the illicit trade in small arms. A significant number of these combatants opted out of the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes in Sierra Leone and Liberia and continued fighting in Cte dIvoire. In effect, the regional dynamics of the crisis in Sierra Leone and Liberia created a conflict system that also afflicted Cte dIvoire. The direct costs of the conflicts were catastrophic. An estimated 350,000 people were killed, half of whom were civilians. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) spilled over the regions porous borders, further exacerbating the vulnerability of the region and stretching the already weak infrastructure in host states. Furthermore, the conflicts have impeded the socio-economic development of the affected countries. Poverty is endemic with over 75 per cent living on less than one US $ 1 a day. There is an estimated 80 per cent unemployment and literacy is around 37 per cent. The Liberian and Sierra Leonean peace and reconstruction processes follow the standardised templates. These are characterised by peace agreements, followed by deployment of peacekeepers, a disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programme, security sector reform (SSR), and elections to establish democratic governance and the rule of law. A range of projects are also undertaken to revive the developmental process. Successful DDR is seen as a prerequisite for long-term peace and stability. Ostensibly, DDR is supposed to restore security and stability through weapons collection and ensure the human security of ex-combatants and local communities. Ultimately, the DDR process is supposed to lay the foundations for the long-term and sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants in order to consolidate post-conflict peacebuilding.

The MRU was established on 3 October 1973 under the Mano River Declaration, initially between Liberias President William Tolbert and Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone. The aim was to foster a union for economic co-operation and social integration. Guinea later joined the Union on 25 October 1980 for geo-political expediency since it borders the two countries. Its goal was to facilitate regional dialogue, social development, foster multi-lateral cooperation, and economic integration as well as shared ideals among its member countries. See Mano River Declaration, 3 October 1973. 2 The MRU is a political entity, whereas the Mano River Basin is the geographical location of the three countries

DDR in Sierra Leone was established as part of the Lom Peace Agreement of 1999. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established and charged with providing security and supervising DDR, prior to the convening of elections. In Liberia the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) outlined the activities to lay the foundation for the implementation of the peace process. In Liberia, disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) were central components of the Peace Agreement and were specifically enshrined in the mandate of the United Nations (UN) Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Liberias DDRR process was supposed to lay the foundations for security which would enable elections to be convened. 1.1 Objectives of the Overview Paper on DDR in West Africa

This overview paper seeks to make the case for rejecting the business as usual approach to DDR in war-affected countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia. DDR has to be contextspecific and respond to the characteristics of the individual national situations. DDR approaches ultimately have to recognise and inculcate the cultural values and standards of target societies so that appropriate DDR incentives can be deployed. In addition, where conflicts have afflicted whole regions, it is necessary to adopt a region-wide DDR strategy to ensure that national processes complement and enhance each other. This paper will provide a brief overview of DDR in Liberia and Sierra Leone, focussing on the human security implications of the process. The traditional international DDR model tends to prioritise the collection of arms. The number of weapons collected continues to serve as a benchmark for the success of DDR, rather than the extent to which it has improved human security. Furthermore, DDR processes have not been successful in redressing gender imbalances or advancing social and economic reintegration. Thus, while weapons collection is a desired objective, it cannot be pursued independently of the broader structural reforms or ignore the human security needs at the community level. 1.2 Structure of the Overview Paper

The assessment is divided into three sections. The first section presents the operational process of DDR in Sierra Leone and Liberia. It acknowledges that progress has been made in disarming and demobilising ex-combatants, but it also highlights the serious challenges that remain in implementing the reintegration process. Section two will address the issue of the interface between DDR and related programming such as security sector reform (SSR) and the management of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The third section provides an assessment of how DDR in West Africa could have been organised, targeted in a more effective way to lay the foundations for community ownership of the process. 1.3 Methodology

Information and analysis used in this paper draws extensively on desk research and the authors experience as Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Consultant with UNMIL in Liberia from August to November 2006. While in Monrovia the author worked with a wide range of national and international actors including: ex-combatants; local civil society representatives; government officials and international civil servants. Their perspectives have been supplemented by secondary sources in the compilation of this paper.

1.4

Key Lessons Learned

The paper draws the following lessons from the analysis: The DDR process should be designed around the ex-combatants family and not focus exclusively on the individual. In this regard, families have to play a more pronounced role in the DDR process. However, it is necessary to also acknowledge that while the dependents of combatants should also be the target of DDR, in technical terms it is not always easy to identify them due to the propensity for data to be falsified or obtained in the first instance. As a general practice there needs to be a continuous assessment of the efficacy of the incentive DDR package to assess its positive or negative impact on the objectives of the process; Reintegration projects in Liberia and Sierra Leone, particularly those that seek to promote post-conflict employment, were not adequately conceived or suited to the economy and labour market of these post-conflict countries. A number of projects that were implemented focused on training people in computer technology rather than placing an emphasis on agriculture and other trades which would have been more appropriate in rural areas without access to electricity; Donors and implementing agencies have not demonstrated an unequivocal commitment towards learning from their mistakes and reviewing their support to DDR processes. Therefore, this culture of adopting a reflective posture is vital to ensuring the success of future DDR processes; Resource mobilisation for programmes is necessary in order to ensure that there is no interruption of the DDR process, which could have implications for the stability of a country. This overview only provides a partial analysis of DDR West Africa, because it did not include Cte dIvoire or Guinea-Bissau. Given the regionalisation of the conflict system in West Africa, it would be necessary to assess the processes in all the countries affected in order to map out regional DDR strategies.

2. Contextualising the Need for DDR: Civil Conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia
West Africa is a challenging environment in which to conduct DDR. The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone have had a knock-on effect on neighbouring countries in the region, in particular Guinea, Cte dIvoire and Guinea-Bissau. Guinea has not yet succumbed to violent conflict though there are internal political tensions. Cte dIvoire remains politically unstable and volatile, while the demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration and SSR in Guinea-Bissau have markedly improved the security environment. The armed conflicts in West Africa have been fought almost exclusively with small arms and light weapons and the majority of combatants have been young men between the ages of 15 and 25 years. There notable parallels between Liberia and Sierra Leone in terms of the historical, geographical, cultural and political factors that triggered the conflicts. Consequently, lessons from the attempts at reconstruction in both countries can potentially inform the DDR processes in Cte divoire. Domestic politics in both Liberia and Sierra Leone have been characterised by mis-rule, corruption and patronage systems. In Liberia the True Whig Party was dominant between 1822 and 1980. In Sierra Leone the All Peoples Congress (APC) governed from 1968 to

1992. The desire by these two parties to remain in power fostered inefficient, unaccountable and repressive political systems in which executive power was centralised. State power was consolidated through the security apparatus and was used to suppress dissent and perpetuate authoritarian regimes that committed human rights violations. These political systems proved to be unsustainable and the fragmentation of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), led to the onset of violent conflict. In the vacuum created by the fragmentation of the states armed forces private military companies plied their trade and factions created by the disintegration of armies coalesced to form armed militia groups. 2.1 The Onset of Violent Conflict in Liberia

Although Liberia is nominally the oldest western-style constitutional democracy in Africa, basic principles of democracy and human rights have not been well established in its modern era. Inadequate governance, mainly by the elite settler community, and its control of economic activities in conjunction with external actors has been constraint on economic well-being and social integration of the country. Conflict between ethnic groups over resources and property was aggravated by contradictory customary and statutory laws as well as by historical claims and ambiguous land tenure systems. Religious tensions have resulted from the widespread notion that Liberia was founded on Christian principles which has led to the consequent alienation of Muslims and the Mandingo ethnic group. The coup dtat of 1980 initially brought hopes for expansion of the indigenous political base in Liberia. However, this did not materialise as President Samuel Doe and his allies rapidly consolidated power and adopted the same exclusionary governance practices as their predecessors. This in turn triggered another round of political resistance, which culminated in the formation of the National Patriotic Font of Liberia (NPFL) that spearheaded a popular uprising against the repressive regime of President Doe in December 1989. The conflict, or more accurately the series of conflicts, in Liberia led to further fragmentation and coalition formations, primarily along supposedly ethnic lines and involved the widespread violation and abuse of human rights by all parties. In 1999 a threeyear period of relative calm prevailed. However, hostilities resumed in 2001 and culminated in violence throughout the country during the June-August 2003 period. It was in the aftermath of this latest chapter in Liberias tragic history of civil conflict that the warring sides agreed to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 18 August 2003. Since that date, the CPA has provided the political and substantive roadmap guiding all international planning efforts to bolster Liberias post-conflict recovery. The combined effect of 133 years of settler oligarchy and, from 1980, five years of military rule and corrupt and repressive civilian rule laid the foundation for the14-year intermittent civil war. The conflict led to militarisation of all aspects of the population and the severe erosion of governance institutions and practices as well as a devastated the economy. It is in this context that DDR had to proceed following the signing of the CPA in 2003.

2.2

The Onset of Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone

As in the case of Liberia before the Doe-led coup, Sierra Leone was herald as an oasis of calm in a turbulent sub-region until the retirement of Stevenss in 1985. Subsequently, a crisis of governance confronted his successor, President Joseph Momoh, in the mid-1990s. The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) orchestrated a coup in 1992 which punctured the myth of stability. Beneath the faade of 30 years of stability domestic politics was defined by rampant corruption, one-party authoritarian rule, an ethnicised and politicised armed forces, violations of human rights and the lack of respect for the rule of law. Political dissent was ruthlessly suppressed. External actors often in collaboration with the governing elite, played a prominent role in the economy of the country. Lebanese business interests virtually controlled the economy and dominated the retail sector and manufacturing industries. Inadequate governance led to an under-achieving economy which spurred widespread protests by students and the labour unions. This fostered the gradual weakening of the state system and profligate theft of the countrys natural resource wealth in particular diamonds. 3 When the violent conflict eventually broke out in Sierra Leone in 1991, it adopted a similar trajectory to the events in Liberia. Combatants were drawn from the uneducated and unemployed youth as well as the marginalised rural populations. Formal military authority collapsed and the army lacked the weapons and discipline to defend the state against the armed militia movements. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) armed militia leaders established a predatory regime in areas they controlled in effect privatising strategic resources. All vital state institutions collapsed and the ensuing violence destroyed any sense of society. After a decade of sporadic civil war between, 1991 and 2001, Sierra Leone became one of the worlds poorest and socially fragmented states. At least one million people were displaced internally and externally. The DDR process was instigated by the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The vast majority of combatants were disarmed and demobilised in the second half of 2004, but the root of the social and political causes of conflict have not yet been adequately addressed. 2.3 DDR Strategy and Framework

The conclusion of a moderately successful DDR programme in Sierra Leone meant that elements of the programme were replicated in neighbouring Liberia, whose war was intimately linked to Sierra Leones through the interplay between the RUF and the Liberian administration led by Charles Taylor. The following common characteristics were evident in the Sierra Leonean and Liberian DDR process: The peace agreements established interdepartmental National Commissions (NCs) for DDR (NCDDR-Sierra Leone) or DDRR (NCDDRR), as it was known in Liberia. National Commissions were meant to serve as the focal point around which national

Liebenow, G., Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege, Ithaca & London, Cornell University Press, 1969; Sesay, A.,A Historical Background to the Liberian Crisis, in M. Vogt (ed.) The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt, Lagos: Gabumo Publishing Co. Ltd, 1992, pp. 29-49; Cartwright, J., Politics in Sierra Leone: 1947-67, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970; Foray, C.P., The Road to One-Party State: The Sierra Leone Experience, Africanus Horton Memorial Lecture delivered at the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 9 September 1988. Formerly a member of the APC, Foray provides insights on the internal workings of the party.



initiatives would be based. These Commission formulated strategies and policies on DDR activities and supervised the a Joint Implementation Units (JIU); DDR targeted the main warring groups and local militias; Disarmament was conducted at reception centres around the country set up to register and collect weapons. Ammunition was destroyed by explosives teams at disposal sites nationwide, while the weapons were temporarily stored in containers until they could be transported to the capitals. Prior to their destruction, all collected weapons were recounted and catalogued according to their make and serial number; In order to qualify for entry to DDR, participants had to be 18 years and older and either present a serviceable weapon or ammunition which met the required entry criteria. Children and women also took part in the DDR. A child under 18 years associated with the fighting forces also referred to as a CAFF; or a woman associated with the fighting forces also referred to a WAFF. Groups were disarmed in a shared weapons category; During demobilisation ex-combatants went through a medical screening process. They were subsequently issued with an ID card, registered to reintegration process, and received a package of non-food items. During their encampment period, the excombatants participated in a series of pre-discharge orientation sessions dealing with trauma healing and psycho-social counselling service. Civic education was also offered as well as general information and sensitisation seminars. Women were also provided with reproductive health and sexually based gender violence (SBGV) counselling. Transitional Safety Net Allowances (TSAs) of US $ 300 were given to the excombatants, in two instalments. This enabled them to become self-reliant during their first three months in the resettlement location of their choice. They also received travel allowances to visit their local communities. Reviewing Disarmament and Demobilisation

2.4

DDR process in Sierra Leone and Liberia faced considerable challenges in their implementation. The first effort to disarm combatants in Liberia started in 1997 followed by refugee resettlement and national elections. This effort was unsuccessful and paradoxically facilitated the re-recruitment of combatants who went on to take part in renewed violent confrontation between 1999 and 2003. 4 A second phase began on 7 December 2003, after the CPA was signed, and it only lasted until 27 December 2003 due to the lack of adequate security. Progress in these DDR process was undermined by several factors, including: the complexity of the task since ex-combatants from three groups were based in different parts of the country; insufficient numbers of UNMIL peacekeepers to provide security; the incomplete construction of cantonment sites and lack of preparation on the part of service providers; difficulties in getting accurate information to combatants so as to sensitise them to the DDRR process; an under-estimation of the initial level of response from combatants to the DDR initiative. The UNs initial estimate of a total of 38,000 ex-combatants proved to be totally inaccurate. Moreover, the armed factions had failed to submit comprehensive

International Crisis Group (ICG), Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability, ICG Africa Report No 43, 2002, pp.2-7.

lists of their combatants, which not only contributed to the delay of the DDRR process but also made it impossible to predict the number of ex-combatants to be expected. 5 In one instance in Liberia armed combatants who were due to undergo DDR in Camp Scheifellin rioted in Monrovia and subsequently took over the Camp, resulting in the deaths of 9 citizens, several wounded and the damaging of property. 6 By this point slightly more than 13,000 combatants had been were disarmed. In what was supposed to be the final phase of DDR, from 15 April to 31 October 2004, a total of 103,019 ex-combatants were disarmed. Of these 13,872 of which were children and 101,495 were eligible for reintegration. In addition, 27,000 weapons, 6,153,631 rounds of ammunition and 29,274 heavy munitions had been collected. 7 In Sierra Leone the initial phase of DDR begun in February 1998. However, the process was suspended in December 1998 due to inadequate preparation and security problems in the countryside. Ultimately, in that instance only about 3,200 combatants were disarmed. A second attempt at DDR took place in 1999 following the Lom Peace Agreement. However, this process was also flawed because disarmament started before cantonment sites were ready and the number of peacekeeping troops deployed was inadequate. Ceasefire violations were rampant and the level of security deteriorated rapidly resulting in the programmes suspension. DDR resumed in May 2001, after the programme had been significantly revised and re-designed. This phase of the DDR process continued until January 2002 when the conflict was officially declared terminated. Overall, 72,500 combatants were disarmed and demobilised, including 4,751 women and 6,787 children. 42,330 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were collected and destroyed. 2.4.1 Shortcomings in the Process Despite widespread disarmament and demobilisation (DD) in both countries, the exercise was far from comprehensive. The success of DDR depended on an adequate capacity in Liberian and Sierra Leonean institutions to transparently manage activities and resources. Such capacity can be supplemented but not replaced by the initiatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or other groups and partners. In the case of Liberia, the revenue initially available was insufficient to pay adequate salaries to key civil servants. There was also a lack of capacity to let ensure the provision of basic services like water and electricity and the financing the retraining of excombatants. Therefore, a key observation of this process is that external resources made available as grants and soft loans are a necessary, but not sufficient, component of DDR. The DDR implementation capacity throughout Liberia was undermined by inordinately high levels of insecurity; uncertainty about the future; lack of programme management expertise; scarcity of functioning facilities and essential equipment; and insufficient numbers of in-country officials with the appropriate skills to oversee the programme. From

The Analyst, NECs False Start, 20 May, 2005, available at: www.analystnewspaper.com/ nec_false_start.htm, accessed November 2007. 6 See International Crisis Group, Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Peril, ICG Africa Report No 75, Freetown/Brussels, 30 January 2004, p. 15. 7 NCDDR, DDRR Consolidated Report, 24 November 2004; NCDDRR, DDRR Consolidated Report Phase (Status of Disarmament and Demobilisation Activities as at 1/16/2005) Vol. 1, 2 & 3, from http://humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/coordination/sectoral/DDR/index.asp, accessed 1 October 2007.

the start of the programme, some fundamental prerequisites should have been fulfilled namely: a stronger management capacity in local and national government institutions, so that they could absorb and utilise resources effectively as well as deliver essential services where and when they are needed; better organisational skills at the local level to re-establish community-level institutions that support social development and economic growth; ensuring that ex-combatants, returnees and IDPs are able to find work and shelter, meet their basic needs, and eventually become re-integrated into Liberian society; ensuring that the rule of law was guaranteed through minimal judicial, police and corrections services and the protection of human rights.

The conflict in Sierra Leone and its aftermath exacerbated economic mismanagement and resulted in: a decline of the countrys Gross Domestic Product (GDP); the flight of human and financial capital; and the accumulation of debt arrears; and forcing the government to depend heavily on foreign income. When hostilities resumed in 2000 the post-war recovery stalled and GDP growth declined further. The productive capacity outside the agricultural sector practically ground to a halt and the government barely functioned. As a consequence insecurity and instability increased. In addition, physical infrastructure disintegrated and public services broke down, concomitantly unemployment escalated. 8 Prior to the conflicts in Liberian and Sierra Leone and in the during the DDR processes poverty in both countries was, and still remains, relatively high due to limited job opportunities. The levels of poverty in both societies also meant that there is a limited access to basic services like education, health, water, and sanitation. This undermines the general capacity to promote the development of social capital which is vital for economic regeneration. Table 1: DDR weapons collection in Liberia and Sierra Leone DDR Phase Number of Combatan Implementing Agency Disarmed 22/11/96 - 9/02/97 20,332 7/12/03 31/10/04 103,019 (DDRR was suspende from 27 Dec 2003-15 Apr 2004) 3,200 Sierra Leon 02/98-12/98 10/99-05/00 18,898 18/05/01-01/02 72,490 Figures culled from CAII (1997), NCDDRR (2004) 9 Liberia ECOMOG/UNOMIL UNMIL/JIU/other UN agencie

ECOMOG UNAMSIL/NCDDR UNAMSIL/Tripartite Commis

The major impediments to DD in both countries can be described as follows:

Europa, Africa Yearbook, 1996; The World Bank Group, Sierra Leone: 1980-2000, http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata.html, accessed on 3 August 2003; Barclay, A., Consolidating Peace through Governance and Regional Cooperation: The Liberian Experience, in Adedeji, A. (ed.) Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance, London, Zed Books, 1999, pp.297-316. 9 Creative Associates International Inc., Assessment of the Disarmament and Demobilisation Process in Liberia, June, 1997; NCDDRR, DDRR Consolidated Report, 2004.
8

Shortcomings in the screening process. As a result of the inadequate nature of the screening processes, significantly large numbers of people were able to go through DDR. There was no standardised screening procedure or set questions, and it was virtually impossible to separate legitimate combatants from those regular citizens trying to gain admittance into the programme. In Liberia for example, UNMIL received funds to rehabilitate former combatants as part of the regular assessed peacekeeping budget. But this was not undertaken in a systematic manner. The initial funds set aside for the DDR programme were based on an estimate of 38,000 ex-combatants. In the end, however, 107,000 individuals entered the programme and were eligible to receive benefits. Donors were reportedly unwilling to make up the shortfall and the programme was faced with major problems. Whether the fundamental problem lies with loose eligibility criteria or a gross underestimation of absolute numbers, it is evident that operational and logistical demands exceeded the donor communitys ability to support the process politically and financially. This suggests that relying too heavily on external sources to undertake DDR can prove to be counterproductive. Similarly, a flawed screening process in Sierra Leone particularly affected ex-child soldiers. Children who did not have knowledge of weapons, and could not dismantle them, identify certain parts or explain what ammunition they used, were labelled as separated children and reunited with their families, instead of being demobilised. If indeed they had been involved in violent conflict this could potentially have ramifications for their psychological well-being. Lack of accurate records renders an assessment of the level of success of the disarmament programme rather problematic, in the absence of a baseline figure of actual number of weapons in circulation prior to the DDR process. With no accurate figure of weapons stockpiles available, it is difficult to assess to what extent the disarmament process was successful; Short demobilisation period: The programme has also suffered from inadequate implementation of the demobilisation of ex-combatants. Generally, the encampment period was widely viewed to be too short to effect any substantial and sustained change in behaviour and attitudes, and was certainly too short to break up existing command and control structures amongst the armed factions. The three-week period initially planned for demobilisation in Liberia was subsequently reduced to five days. This has been palpably inadequate in addressing the psychological, social, and health needs of many of the ex-combatants who had witnessed years of combat. It has become little more than a pro forma waiting period between turn in of weapons or ammunition and turn over of money. Likewise in Sierra Leone, the encampment period was limited in duration, inconsistent and ignored the specific needs of women and children; Women and children have not been particularly well-served by DDR in Sierra Leone. Having learned from that experience, UNMIL loosened entry criteria in order to include more women and children. While the percentage of children (9.8 per cent) in the Liberian process is about the same as in Sierra Leone, that of women, whose roles were varied, (bush wives, cooks, spies, frontline fighters and porters), is 17.4 per cent compared to 6.5 per cent in Sierra Leone. Encampment of women and children: Unlike Sierra Leone, following disarmament in Liberia, women and men were housed in separate quarters of the cantonment site.

Children were transported by child protection agencies to interim care centres (ICCs) where they were housed until they could be reunited with their families. This addressed protection issues raised in Sierra Leone and ensured that women were not at risk of abuse and continued violence either from their husbands or other fighters from a different faction; Communication and co-ordination. A key issue which has hamstrung DDR is that, at the policy level, joint implementation has failed to function in a very cohesive manner. Relations between some UN agencies and officials, and other agencies have been particularly strained, with several policy-makers openly critical of one another. The concept of joint effort, joint co-ordination and complementarity tended to quickly disintegrate into unilateral action and finger pointing when things went wrong; Local ownership. The national commissions and local communities have been critical of the donor community, claiming they have been sidelined throughout much of the process and set-up to fail; Regional concerns. In addition to technical shortcomings, both programmes have also been criticised for being designed and implemented with insufficient thought given to regional considerations. In a region as volatile as West Africa, this has potentially grave implications. Long, porous borders between Liberia, Sierra Leone and their neighbours mean that what happens in one country invariably impacts the others. This is especially the case with regards to transient fighters and their weapons. The moment Sierra Leone launched its DDR programme and started paying for weapons and ammunition, an instant market was created, with reports of arms and ammunition being brought into the country from Liberia and Guinea. Similarly, in Liberia, arms were smuggled in from Guinea with the intention of selling them to individuals seeking to gain entry into the DDRR. In March 2004, Cte dIvoire announced the details of their forthcoming DDR programme. Confounding Liberias DDRR process is the fact that in neighbouring Cte dIvoire the ex-combatants will be receiving considerably more money (US $900) for their weapons than the Liberians (US $300) when (and if) the disarmament process finally takes place. This has prompted speculation that many Liberian fighters may be holding back their weapons so that they may cash them in next door. 10

2.4.2 Reintegration Challenges There is a dangerous disconnect between DD and R in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which has the potential of dismantling achievements so far achieved and undermining the human security of local communities. Several factors are responsible for this. One is the waiting period between the end of DD and the commencement of R, while the other dimension relates to the adequacy (or otherwise) of the available R programmes. The R aspect of the programme is meant to provide ex-combatants with vocational training and formal education, so as to create sustainable livelihoods and ease their economic and social reentry into society. In the war-torn societies under review, reintegrating ex-combatants is not the same as it would be in the case of a well-functioning society. Naturally, reintegration is the aim, but the question remains: reintegration into what? In many cases, reintegration is just not
UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, Cte d'Ivoire: Hopes of October disarmament dashed as reforms remain blocked, 30 September 2004.
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possible. Most ex-combatants have been socialised out of their families. The changes they have gone through are too great for them, and they need immense assistance in order to rebuild a civil existence so that they are able to care for themselves and their dependents, where possible. The reintegration component of the DDR programme generally has a three-prong targetbased approach, namely, formal education, vocational training and apprenticeship skills training. CAFFs are reintegrated through the United Nations Childrens Funds (UNICEF) Community Education Investment Program (CEIP). Notwithstanding the existence of dedicated DDR commissions, there were programmatic and institutional gaps with regards to reintegration. These included the lack of a broad and consistent socio-economic profiling of combatants; the failure to implement financial management skills training for the many ex-combatants inexperienced in managing demobilisation and other money; reintegration financing shortfalls; ex-combatants low levels of education and skills; limited capacities of local and international organisations delivering long-term reintegration; short periods of inconsistent and ineffective training; incompetent and corrupt Commission staff; and the lack of a proactive monitoring mechanism. The majority of the ex-combatant enterprises collapsed due to these factors, while agro-based enterprises were also hard-hit by the lack of elaborate and workable cooperatives support mechanisms. The ex-combatants had been thrown into the deep-end of the sea without adequate preparation. Compounded by unfavourable economic and labour environments, the reintegration process has not been successful. All this has had important human security consequences for ex-combatants, their dependents and the communities in which they are located. In a war-torn society, like Sierra Leone or Liberia, opportunities are limited. Excombatants expectations with regard to peace are often very high and these expectations of a future society far outweigh the post-war realities. Immediately after the conflict, optimism prevails but gradually pessimism and disillusionment take over as they fail to secure livelihoods, as well as a better future for themselves and their dependents. Moreover, traditional support structures are partly exhausted as a result of the deprivation caused by the conflict. After many years of absence, some combatants have lost their position of trust and respect in the family and in the community. They are no longer part of a network that depends on their labour for daily survival; in fact their presence has become an embarrassment and social reintegration becomes challenging. Reintegration challenges in Liberia deserve elaborating, as they are more prevalent than in Sierra Leone. They are compounded by poorly developed and in some cases corrupted governance systems where communities may not properly be represented, fuelling or exacerbating identity divisions. In addition to the broad division between the dominant minority Americo-Liberians and indigenous communities which perseveres in substantially unequal political, economic and social balances of power, other inter-ethnic hostilities continue to present problems. Hitherto instrumental inter-ethnic conflicts have assumed symbolic and primordial significance given the alleged mutual desecration of shrines and other symbols of significance by rival ethnic groups. This is particularly true for the Poro practicing ethnic groups who accused the Muslim practicing Mandingo ethnic groups of desecrating their shrines. As a consequence, eleven of Liberias 16 ethnic groups who have the Poro and Sande traditions have mobilised a pan-Poro revolt against the Mandingoes, thereby creating high levels of human insecurities.

Land disputes, which are prominent in the North-west of the country and have developed an ethnic undertone, are rendering reintegration challenging in Liberia. Old patterns of conflict over land ownership are increasingly drawn into the new conflict dynamics. In addition to an ambiguous land tenure system and traditional claims to land, the return of IDPs and refugees has sparked off land and property disputes around Liberia. Until recently, the lands and homes of the losers of the war were widely regarded as part of the spoils of war by the victors. Inter-ethnic hostility has become an alibi for looting and vandalisation of property. Land and houses are often occupied by others who may, in turn, have been driven from their own homes during the war. Official records may also have been destroyed, or were never entirely accurate to begin with. Ownership and transfer documents are also often forged, or some who have lived on particular land or property for years may not have an official title, because it was only recognised through customary law. The situation in Nimba County is the most prominent of this phenomenon. However, interethnic rivalry is also prevalent in Lofa, Sinoe and Gbarpolu counties. In particular, antiMadingo sentiment is widespread in Nimba, Lofa and Gbarpolu, whilst the Sarpo-Kru rivalry dominates Sinoe. Failure to reconcile different ethnic groups has impacted considerably on communities and their economic and social well-being, particularly women and girls, and can jeopardise community safety and security and the longer-term prospects for recovery. Poor governance systems and lack of shared vision create a context within which other conflict factors flourish, for example, disgruntlement of unemployed youth and former combatants within the context of an abundance of poorly regulated and managed natural resource-rich areas. Illegal exploitation of resources presents an ongoing challenge for the governments in proving they can manage their natural resources. Liberias and Sierra Leones abilities to manage their natural resources present challenges for the governments in realising good governance, ensuring sound economic development which promotes the human security of the local communities and the nation at large, and in sustaining social reintegration. The dire economic environment in West Africa exacerbates youth and ex-combatant discontentment, and makes reintegration pressures that much more challenging. People are less inclined to return to their communities if there are no job prospects, not to mention a lack of basic social services. Repatriating, resettling, and reintegrating over 50 per cent of their citizens displaced both internally and externally represents an ongoing challenge for Liberias and Sierra Leones efforts to build peace and lay a foundation for development. It is difficult to understand why the reintegration programmes emphasis has not been placed more solidly also on agriculture. This is not an area amenable to easy solutions. While only 3.7 per cent of demobilised Liberian fighters expressed a preference for agriculture as the focus of their reintegration package, 16 per cent of ex-combatants opted for agriculture in Sierra Leone. A number of reasons are possible as to why agriculture has not been a popular option for ex-combatants. They have to do mostly with intergenerational tensions that centre on access to land, the local legal and political system, and the lack of viable infrastructure. In much of Liberia and Sierra Leone, access to land has been problematic, in particular for ex-combatants who are not treated as a specific preferential target group under official land laws. Land is traditionally organised around strict lineage hierarchies. The descendants of

the man considered to have been the original settler of a village usually own all the land around it. Rather than selling or giving land to others, they grant rights to use parts of it. Over time, use rights harden into de facto ownership, and later generations often have considerable security in laying claim to large swathes for cultivation. Use rights for relative newcomers, young men, and women, however, are insecure. While all local land is theoretically revocable by the descendants of the original settler, legitimate long-term rights to use a plot in the traditional system derive from the amount of work put into improving it. Felling trees, clearing brush, and in the case of swamp rice, preparing a plot for cultivation all give a farmer priority for using the same land again.

3. DDR and Related Programming

3.1 Security Sector Reform The backdrop for SSR in Sierra Leone and Liberia go beyond the violent conflicts. 11 Throughout their histories, the practice of the state and its armed forces has run counter to notions of human security and democratic governance. Instead they have been consistently implicated in human rights abuses and served as instruments of fear and repression. 3.1.1 SSR in Sierra Leone Since 2001, SSR was spearheaded by the British government. Important steps towards consolidating military security are long-term commitments by the British-led International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) to train and reform the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) until 2010. The underlying rational is the simple logic that no meaningful and sustainable development in Sierra Leone will prevail without adequate security provisions by professional and well-equipped armed forces. Furthermore, the British government has allegedly guaranteed to intervene within 48 to 72 hours in the face of imminent challenges to Sierra Leonean security. Reflecting on the signposts above, the notable outcomes of SSR so far include the creation of a right sized, better trained and professional armed forces; creation of a National Security Adviser (NSA) and functioning Office of National Security (ONS); establishment of a Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU) with suitably qualified personnel; and publication of the Defence White Paper. The Commonwealth Community Safety and Security Project (CCSSP) has led the retraining and re-equipping of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) with a view to improving both its effectiveness and public reputation. The process has prioritised local needs policing, addressing police misconduct and corruption and reducing crime. 3.1.2 SSR in Liberia The CPA introduced a fragile peace in Liberia, which remains upheld by UNMIL. It also calls for restructuring and reforming the AFL, the national police, and other state security agencies, but is silent on strengthening civilian oversight. The CPA stipulates that the parties also request that the United States of America play a lead role in organising this

11

See Fayemi, K., Governing Insecurity in Post-Conflict States: The Case of Sierra Leone and Liberia in Bryden, A. and Hnggi, H., (eds.), Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, Geneva: Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004.

restructuring programme, in particular, the AFL, which was originally based on the US model and has previously received United States assistance. 12 The decision that Liberia should have an army of 2,000 soldiers based in Camp Scheffelin at the outskirts of Monrovia was made by the US Pentagon, based on a technical review and a projection of what the Liberian government would be able to sustain financially, ignoring national consensus. 13 There has been widespread criticism of the US governments unilateral decision to outsource re-training and restructuring of the army to an American private security company, DynCorp, as non-transparent and dictatorial.14 There is a general lack of consultation or local input into DynCorp, a US-based private military company owned by a US company, Veritas Capital, which specialises in security and aircraft maintenance services. DynCorp has a three-year contract to retire the old AFL and recruit and train the new soldiers, while PAE (Pacific Architects and Engineering) has been charged with the physical rehabilitation and upgrading of two army bases. The CPA gives policing responsibilities during the transition period to the UN Civil Police (UN CivPol) with a target of 3,000 officers. Candidates for the new force could come from within and outside the Liberia National Police (LNP). Of greater concern, however, is that the restructuring plan being produced by the Liberian Ministry of Defence with Pentagon assistance does not devote adequate attention to the question of civil management of the army. Furthermore, other security agencies, including, the National Security Agency, National Bureau of Investigation and Bureau for Immigration and Naturalisation are completely left out of the plan. Although the National Security Review is intended to feed into the formulation of a national security strategy, the bulk of the Liberian review was undertaken by the RAND Corporation (financed by the US). RAND delivered their final report to the President in May 2006 and the Government is currently reflecting on how to proceed. The content of the report remains confidential, but is known to recommend that the security strategy (not the review) is discussed with civil society and the legislative to achieve national consensus.15 Concerns about SSR in Sierra Leone and Liberia revolve around continued funding and sustainability of the armed forces, effective oversight mechanisms, and local ownership of the process. The United Kingdom (UK) and US governments have contributed significantly to the reform processes and there are concerns over the respective governments abilities to sustain the capacity and standards achieved so far. A funding gap could potentially have a knock-on effect on other reform processes and create human insecurities for communities unless there is a clear plan to deal with this gap.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties, Accra, 18 August 2003, Article VII (1b). 13 United States European Command, Employment and Structure Brief for the New Armed Forces of Liberia (NAFL). The Headquarters of the United States European Command developed an Employment and Structure Brief for what it called the New Armed Forces of Liberia (NAFL), and not the Liberian National Defence Force (LNDF) as stipulated by the DAC Workshop. Defence Advisory Committee (DAC) of the Ministry of National Defence conducted a Consultative Workshop in Monrovia. 14 Over the past three years DynCorp has been contracted by the US government to train new police forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. 15 CSDG-DCAF Report, p. 3.

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SSR was not closely linked with DDR in terms of its design. A SSR strategy was not in place when DDR was mandated and agreed, rather SSR emerged later. This has led to disjunctions between these two processes. Moreover, the fact that these closely related phases are taking place in fragile and post-conflict states provide major challenges that should be speedily addressed. Unlike Sierra Leone, the lack of a holistic response to Liberias security problems has not resulted from, nor is it a reflection of, a comprehensive review of Liberias security environment, with a clearly articulated national strategy and security policy. Overall, it would appear that there is no coherent SSR framework so far in the Liberian reconstruction process. At best, each component of the security system is undergoing changes in the expectation or assumption that pieces of the puzzle would all fit together once reform has been accomplished. The long-term success of the reform efforts in both countries will depend on improvement in the overall governance environment in-country, improved co-ordination of all security sector processes and public confidence in the security forces, which is not completely restored though slowly returning. Last, unless security forces are paid a liveable wage, it is unrealistic to expect they will cease shaking down civilians for money and serve the national good. For example, the monthly pension of a retired senior warrant officer with 30 years service in Sierra Leones army is only Le32, 000 (about 6). Active soldiers are paid minimum salaries with small in-kind housing and rice provisions. 3.2 Links Between DDR and SALW

The Arms for Development (AfD) Programme in West Africa is an innovative programme designed to fill the gaps left in the DDR programme. It aims at collecting and destroying residual weapons and ammunition that were voluntarily surrendered or discovered through search operations; assisting the Government of Liberia (GoL) and Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) in developing new legislation and licensing procedures for the control of SALW; and developing a community-based approach to weapons collection. In this programme, communities, and not individuals, are offered the incentive of a project worth around $18,000, if their communities are declared weapon-free. For the communities that participated, Project Management Committees (PMC) were nominated by the local communities and trained in weapons collection and project management. In some cases, alternatives to firearms are provided: for example, the construction of traps to protect crops from wild animals instead of relying on hunters with firearms. The projects chosen by the communities are implemented once a community is declared weapons-free by the police. AfDs success has largely depended on its capacity to target armed groups and individuals excluded from the formal DDR programme; contribute to creating community security and confidence by collecting surplus weapons; address regional and border issues that DDR rarely deal with; facilitate community sensitisation; and utilise community reconciliation mechanisms that are under-utilised during DDR. Criticisms mainly pertain to administrative incompetence and incomplete weapons surrender in communities.

4. Conclusion and Lessons Learned

Sierra Leone and Liberia have had important moderate successes since implementing their respective DDR programmes. Much remains to be done, however, and the full transition to sustainable peace and securing human security will require continued support from the international community. While DDR is a standardised template, it is worthwhile to realise that the programme occurs in unique national settings and should be crafted accordingly. The following broad findings and recommendations can be taken from the two case studies, and can potentially inform future processes. Many of these are essentially the same issues that have been observed time and again over the last fifteen years in post-conflict processes, they have, however not be fully incorporated into DDR programming. 4.1 Limited Amount of Financial Resources

Serious gaps in funding from the donor community have meant a slow and limited start to implement rehabilitation and reintegration programmes in West Africa. Much of the available financial resources are consumed by services to ex-combatants at the various cantonment sites. The strong resource priority and coordination emphasis given to the DD process, in most cases, deprives the reintegration process the importance it deserves in the peace process. Taking away the guns will not always ensure stability as the ex-combatants are forced to gain their livelihood in meaningful ways instead of rent-seeking activities by the barrel of the gun. The donor community should match resource needs with available funding sources and instruments, and in the right amounts of time. 4.2 National Ownership

Full national ownership of DDR requires the participation of national governments, the former armed opposition and members of local civil society. Full national ownership also implies that local actors are involved in decisions about objectives, strategies, programme design and implementation. In sum, they should drive the programme. Simply creating a national commission however, is insufficient to ensure local ownership, in particular in facilitating social reintegration. In practice, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, DDR focussed on the involvement of government or of government and the armed opposition. DDR has failed to maximise local ownership of the process and citizens in both countries feel excluded from the planning and implementation of certain key programmes, which in turn impacts on the sustainability of the programme. 4.3 Missing Link between Reintegration and Disarmament and Demobilisation

Notwithstanding the moderately effective disarmament and demobilisation of excombatants, the equally important reintegration component was inadequately addressed in both countries. One of the major salient features of a successful DDR programme is the reduced time gap between discharge from the cantonment sites and reintegration opportunity the ex-combatants get at preferred areas of settlement. However, reintegration activities have limited time frame, scope and are unsustainable. The reduced encampment period produced mass discharge without adequate pre-discharge orientation and effective counselling on reintegration preferences which are the fundamentals of proper profiling and

informed choices. Under such practice, it is evident that the rate of opportunity generation would not match that of demobilisation and discharge, subsequently leading to a high number of unemployed ex-combatants. The groundswell of discontent posed by ineffectively reintegrated and disgruntled ex-combatants present a threat to human, national and regional security. There is a strong need to conceive DDR as an inter-connected and integral process with no gap between the two Ds and R. 4.4 Cross-border Movements

The unstable situation in Cte dIvoire continues to present a serious threat to the stability that now prevails in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In particular, there are concerns about the possible movement of armed groups from Cte dIvoire into Liberia; the possible recruitment of former Liberian combatants, including children, for operations in Cte dIvoire; and the possible influx of Ivorians who might seek refuge in Liberia in the event of a resumption of violence in Cte dIvoire. Since ex-combatants constitute a major threat to human security in West Africa if not properly reintegrated, efforts should be made to build a strong link between the national governments in the region. This would lead to a convergence of interest in the security configuration of the region, consequently addressing both the demand and supply side of the ex-combatants equation. Similarly, UN missions and officials in the two countries should strengthen coordination and communication links with other UN missions across West Africa, in an attempt to promote cooperation. Developing such links would most certainly lead to a valuable exchange of information between UN Missions, tabling of numerous programme and policy recommendations, and facilitate the harmonisation of DDR programmes in West Africa. However, it is questionable whether this would translate to any concrete action on the ground level, given the notoriety of UN inter-mission/agency rivalry. 4.5 Differentiated Assistance Packages between Agencies Funded by Different Donors Some donors want to undertake rehabilitation and reintegration activities through bilateral initiatives where such protracted initiatives of different players doing the same similar programmes could lead to discrepancy of quality of service and polarisation of excombatants. The multitude of agencies involved in DDR can often create confusion and management conflicts. The United Nations has invariably adopted a lead role in Sierra Leone and Liberia, but various NGOs and aid groups, are also typically involved. In Liberia, for example, UNICEF leads child DDR (for combatants aged seventeen and younger), and no less than six other groupsincluding the World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), Action Aid, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)administer adult DDR. More emphasis should be placed on comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable approach to DDR.

4.6

High Concentration of Ex-combatants in Urban Locations

Of the total number of ex-combatants discharged, over half have preferred to settle in Freetown or greater Monrovia and the surrounding suburbs. This could be attributed to the availability of job and other opportunities and current concentration of rehabilitation and reintegration projects around the capitals. Moreover the lack of referral centres in the provinces or counties is a contributing factor to the urban migration. Another important factor contributing to the urban drift is the concentration of NGOs and service delivery agencies around the capitals due to the highly centralised nature of the political systems and the delayed restoration of traditional and civil organs of administration and capacity for law enforcement in the rural settings.