TOPIC: Jurisdiction over the parties JAPRL Development Corp., Limson and Arollado, Petitioners v.

Security Bank Corporation (SBC), Respondent G.R. No. 190107 650 SCRA 645 FACTS: JAPRL is a domestic corporation engaged in fabrication, manufacture and distribution of steel products, applied for a credit facility in the amount of P50,000,000 with (SBC). The application was approved . Petitioners Limson and Arollado, JAPRL Chairman and President, respectively, executed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement (CSA) in favor of SBC wherein they guaranteed the due and full payment and performance of JAPRLs guaranteed obligations under the credit facility. As paragraph 10 (c) of the Credit Agreement provided that if any undertaking embodied in the Credit Instrument or in any certificate, statement or document submitted to SBC turns out to be untrue, or is violated, such will constitute an event of default committed by JAPRL and its sureties. SBC soon discovered material inconsistencies in the financial statements drawing SBC to conclude that JAPRL committed misrepresentation. It sent a formal letter of demand to petitioners for the immediate payment of its obigations. Petitioners failed to comply with SBCs demand, hence, SBC filed a complaint for sum of money with application for issuance of writ of preliminary attachment before the RTC of Makati City against JAPRL, Limson and Arollado. When the Makati RTC reduced to writing its open court Order, it instead declared the dismissal of SBCs complaint without prejudice SBC filed a motion for reconsideration to which Limson and Arollado separately filed an "Opposition (Ad Cautelam) wherein they claimed that summons were not served on them,. Hence, the Makati RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over their person. At any rate, they raised defenses against SBCs claim that they acted as sureties of JAPRL. ISSUE: Whether RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the person of petitioners. RULING: When a defendants appearance is made precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, it cannot be considered as appearance in court. Limson and Arollado glossed over the alleged lack of service of summons, however, and proceeded to exhaustively discuss why SBCs complaint could not prosper against them as sureties. The filing of their respective "Opposition[s] Ad Cautelam" and "Manifestation[s] Ad Cautelam," was "by way of special appearance" they having sought affirmative relief by praying for the archiving of SBCs complaint. By those pleadings asking for affirmative relief, the petitioners thereby voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC. As expressly stated in Rule 14, Section 20, of the Rules of Court, the defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. It is well settled that any form of appearance in court, by the defendant, by his agent authorized to do so, or by attorney, is equivalent to service except where such appearance is precisely to object to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant.

TOPIC: Verification VALLACAR TRANSIT, INC., Petitioner, vs. JOCELYN CATUBIG, Respondent G.R. No. 175512 649 SCRA 281 FACTS: Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and the franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus with Quirino C. Cabanilla is employed as a regular bus driver of petitioner. Respondents husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr., was on his way home riding in tandem on a motorcycle with his employee, Teddy Emperado. The bus driven by Cabanilla and the vehicle driven by Catubig collided, that lead to Catubigs death. Cabanilla was charged of a Criminal Case but was dismissed by MCTC of Manjuyod-BindoyAyungon of the Province of Negros Oriental. Thereafter, respondent filed before the RTC a Complaint for Damages against petitioner, based on Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the Civil Code. Petitioner asserts that respondents complaint for damages should be dismissed for the latters failure to verify the same. The certification against forum shopping attached to the complaint, signed by respondent, is not a valid substitute for respondents verification that she "has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of her personal knowledge or based on authentic records." ISSUE: Whether the complaint for damages need to be verified. RULING: There is no procedural defect that would have warranted the outright dismissal of respondents complaint. As a general rule, a pleading need not be verified, unless there is a law or rule specifically requiring the same. The 1997 Rules of Court, clearly provides that a pleading lacking proper verification is to be treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect. However, it also just as clearly states that "except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit." No such law or rule specifically requires that respondents complaint for damages should have been verified. In addition, verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement, and mainly intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. When circumstances warrant, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, petitioner vs. WILLIAM GOTHONG & ABOITIZ (WG&A), INC., respondent G.R. No. 158401 542 SCRA514 FACTS: Petitioner WG&A, is a duly organized domestic corporation engaged in the shipping industry. Respondent PPA for brevity, is a government-owned and controlled company created and existing by virtue of the provisions of P.D. No. 87 and mandated under its charter to operate and administer the country's sea port and port facilities. After the expiration of the lease contract of Veterans Shipping Corporation over the Marine Slip Way in the North Harbor, petitioner WG&A requested respondent PPA for it to be allowed to lease and operate the said facility. The request was approved and a Contract of Lease was executed. Believing that the said lease already expired, respondent PPA subsequently sent a letter to petitioner WG&A directing the latter to vacate the contested premises and to turnover the improvements made therein pursuant to the terms and conditions agreed upon in the contract. Petitioner WG&A wrote PPA urging the latter to reconsider its decision to eject the former. Said request was denied by the PPA. Petitioner WG&A commenced an Injunction suit before the RTC of Manila. Petitioner claims that the PPA unjustly, illegally and prematurely terminated the lease contract. It likewise prayed for the issuance of a TRO to arrest the evacuation. Petitioner WG&A amended its complaint, the admission of which met strong opposition from the respondent PPA. It postulated that the reformation sought for by the petitioner constituted substantial amendment, which if granted, will substantially alter the latter's cause of action and theory of the case. RTC issued an Order denying the Admission of the Second Amended Complaint. CA set aside the RTC orders. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the admission of the second amended complaint. RULING: CA did not err in finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Order denying the admission of respondent's second amended complaint. The RTC applied the old Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, instead of the provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amending Section 3, Rule 10, providing for Amendments by leave of court that substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. The Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." The application of the old Rules by the RTC almost five years after its amendment by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure patently constitutes grave abuse of discretion.