Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938. HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed r easonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have

been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

Chua Huat vs CA
FACTS: Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. requested Manila City Engineer and Building Official Manuel del Rosario to condemn the dilapidated structures located in Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners. The said official issued notices of condemnation to petitioners based onInspection Reports showing that the buildings suffered from structural deterioration of as much as 80%. The condemnation orders stated that the subject buildings were found to be in dangerous condition and therefore condemned, subject to the confirmation of the Mayor as required by Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. It was

stated that the notice was not an order to demolish as the findings of the City Engineer are stillsubject to the approval of the Mayor. The Mayor confirmed the condemnationorders. More than 3 months after the issuance of the condemnation order, petitioners protested against the notices of condemnation on the ground that the buildingsare still in good physical condition and are structurally sound. Later, the City Engineer issued a demolition order. Manuel Uy and Sons Inc. The Court issued the TRO and required respondents to comment. Respondents prayed that the petition be dismissed claiming that: (1) the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive domain of the City Engineer pursuant to Sections 275 and 276 of its Compilation ofOrdinances (also Revised Ordinances 1600); and (2) the power to condemn and remove buildings and structures is an exercise of the police power granted the City of Manila to promote public safety. ISSUE: (1) WON the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Official; (2) WON the City Mayor and City Engineer committed grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of such powers. HELD: (1) YES. The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Officials. The Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila and theNational Building Code, also provide the authority of the Building Officials, with respect to dangerous buildings. Respondent City Engineer and Building Official can, therefore, validly issue the questioned condemnation and demolition orders. This is also true with the Mayor who can approve or deny the condemnationorders as provided in Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. (2) NO. The orders were made only after thorough ocular inspections were conducted by the City's Building Inspectors. The results of the inspections were set forth in a memorandum dated 16 November 1982 where it was shown that allthe buildings had architectural, structural, sanitary, plumbing and electrical defects of up to 80%. The respondent Mayor's The petitioners filed a Petition for

Prohibition, with PI or TRO against the City Mayor, City Engineer, Building Officer and

act of approving the condemnation orders was likewise done in accordance with law. Petitioners were given the opportunity to protest the condemnation but only did so long after the lapse of the period (7 days) allowed them under Section 276 of the Compilation ofOrdinances of the City of Manila.

It is a settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." (Chua Huat vs. CA, G.R. No. L-53851, July 9, 1991)

TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts:

Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by themunicipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code (2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipalityof Virac is unconstitutional and void.

Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance

under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.

TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC G.R. No. 40243, 11 Mar 1992, 207 SCRA 157 Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of

Virac.Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code.

Tatel filed a petition for preliminary injunction to prevent council from implement such a resolution. Respondent municipal officials contended that petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On unconstitutional. the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 is unconstitutional and void. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipalcorporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads: The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipalordinance: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.

Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance is discriminatory in that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted The mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain in the absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without themunicipal authorities doing anything about it. The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government.