Action, Desire and Subjectivity in Prabhakara Mimamsa

Action, Desire and Subjectivity in Prbhkara Mms
Elisa Freschi
Contents
1 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3 3.1 Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Action, Desire and Subject: Emergence of the topic . . . . . . . . Ritual as paradigm and the conundrum of desire . . . . . . . . . Prbhkara Mms on the conundrum of desire . . . . . . . . Summing up the Prbhkara Mms view of the self . . . . . Integration of the three aspects of subjectivity . . . . . . . . . . . How to interpret the above? The ontology reading . . . . . . . . Body and subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Transient sense- and thought- faculties . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 Embodiment as the ontological presupposition for a phenomenological self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . How do Prbhkara Mms arguments for the subject dier from R.M. Chisholms ones? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Body and subject: Mms and Chisholm . . . . . . . . Concluding remarks on the ontological interpretation: Peculiarities of the Prbhkara position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The phenomenological interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Which kind of proprioperception arises through a Vedic prescription? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The two interpretations in Rmnujcrya . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Body and subject and the three aspects of subjectivity: Is Rmnujcryas a phenomenological interpretation? . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Primary sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secondary sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 6 6 8 9 10 12 12 15 15 19 20 21 23 24 24 26 26 27
3.2
3.3 4 4.1 4.2
5 6 7
1 Foreword
As it is frequently the case, Mmsakas started their inquiry on the self out of concerns rooted in their primary focus, the Veda, and then extended its precinct of application to the sphere of ordinary experience, too. At a later stage, they adopted and adapted views about the subject elaborated by other schools, but I will not deal primarily with them, since they can probably be better
1 Foreword
examined by experts of, e.g., Nyya, whereas proper-Mms (and even less so, Prbhkara Mmsaka) theories have until now received little attention, and since interestingly even Mms authors did not focus primarily on them, as can be seen by their peripheric position or absence in (as far as I know) all Mms works, from abaras to Prthasrathis, from Maanas to padevas ones. Consequently, I will now present a short sketch of Mms views about the self according to their historical origin (inquiries on the Veda) (Hermeneutical part, 2-3.1), and then try to read them using the framework of Western philosophy, and especially of the dierence between an ontological and a phenomenological approach. As my guide in Prbhkara Mms, I will focus on Rmnujcrya, a rather late but extremely accurate author1 . I will use the notion of self or subject (I am using the latter term in order to avoid any confusion with the Advaita Vednta notion of tman/brahman) that emerges from Mms Vedic exegesis. Such a historical premiss is needed because Indian philosophers in general did not write methodological forewords to their works. Investigating into the origin of an idea is, hence, crucial to understand its import. Since Rmnujcryas exegesis of the Veda does not explicitly point to a phenomenology (or ontology) of the subject, at some points, I will have to supply details in order to try to address further related points, and I will use the principle of charity, that is, I will try to build a coherent view out of his remarks. In order to do that, I will use whenever possible Rmnujcryas own works, and alternatively those of Rmnujcryas predecessor (and main source) likantha Mira, or in case of need of a further Mms author, such as Somevara Bhaa. A last comment is needed in order to explain why I will use modern and contemporary Western philosophers in order to compare their views with Mms ones. First, this has to do with our natural way to know things. No one learns the Chinese script at once, because we learn things through assimilating the unknown, and in order to do that, we must be able to make it look less unknown. In order to be learnt, the unknown has to be known, but for a piece of novelty. Studying Indian Philosophy is, in my opinion, of fundamental importance insofar as it oers external (and, hence, unexpected) stimuli to the contemporary debate. But in order to understand an alien philosophy one has to be able to get in touch with it. In this sense, comparisons may be useful. On the other hand, comparisons are also useful in order to make one aware of the fundamental dierences in the approaches one examines. Many (possibly: most) of them appear only by contrast. These (together with my personal ignorance) are also the main reasons why I avoided comparisons with authors using a more technical approach, since in such cases comparisons does not help immediate awareness of the topic, and the quest for dierences may end up in an investigation into technicalities of, e.g., each authors formal language.
1
On Rmnujcryas time and personality, see Freschi 2008 (Freschi East and West).
2 Action, Desire and Subject: Emergence of the topic

Historically, Mmsakas started to look at the subject because of Vedic statements dealing with the agent of sacrice (yajamna). I will leave aside, here, any question about the accuracy of their interpretation of these statements. In fact, I am sure they misinterpreted them at least from the point of view of contemporary Vedic scholars2 . From the Mms point of view, the subject enters the proscenio as a sacricer. Mmsakas spent time and energy to identify him/her (the alternance of genders is not a matter of gender correctness only, as shown in MS 6.1.16-20, about the adhikra of women to sacrice). And what did they have at their disposal, in order to identify the adhikrin, that is, the one who has the right and who ought to sacrice? Vedic statements such as svargakmo yajeta (the one who is desirous of heaven should sacrice), dealing with desire. Hence, desire was the rst candidate as the distinctive mark (lakaa) of the subject. Within their ritual hermeneutics, Mmsakas further speculated on the link between desire and initiation of action. A signicant step in this process is abaras statement: After [the prescription the one who is desirous of heaven should sacrice] has made the one who is desirous of heaven responsible [for the sacrice], it says he should sacrice. In this way is this distinctive mark of the responsibility (adhikra) established3 . To that, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu comments: abara schliet sein Kommentar zu JS 6.1.3 mit einer fr die Exegetik der Mms-Schule entscheidend wichtigen Lehre, da das Begehren des Himmels (svargakma) eine fundamentale Bedingung fr die Verleihung der Befugnis [adhikra] zum Opfer ist (Yoshimizu1994). More interestingly, Prbhkara Mmsakas linked desire with the fact of recognising oneself. In the case of the Veda, this amounts to recognising oneself as the one who has been enjoined (niyojya), and is linked with responsibility (adhikra). Lastly, the fact of being responsible for an act is the cause for one to act. Hence the (indirect) link between desire and agent. According to Rmnujcrya, whenever a Vedic passage says, e.g., the one who is desirous of heaven should sacrice with the Full and New Moon Sacrices, whoever desires heaven feels addressed by that injunction (stage 1: desirous subject) and cannot avoid identifying herself as the subject to whom the injunction refers (stage 2: enjoined subject). Hence, he or she understands that she is the one who is entitled to perform the sacrice (stage 3: responsible subject). Finally, she
2 Garge writes about abaras interpretation of the gveda: abara is inclined to interpret gveda verses as well as words, in a sense suited to the ritualistic purposes. He looks upon the gvedic Gods as mere recipients of oblations and not as representing some phenomena in nature as Yska holds (Garge 1952, p. 158). 3 svargakmam adhiktya yajeteti vacanam ity adhikralakaam ida siddha bhavati, Bh ad 6.1.3). Yoshimizu mentions a parallel in pastamba rauta Stra, see Yoshimizu1994
or he engages in the performance of the prescribed sacrice (stage 4: agent subject). [Objection:] But how is it that there is no other way [besides using it as a specication for the prompted person] to connect (anvaya) the result [to the prescription]? [Answer:] It must be replied: for instance, the one who is desirous of heaven (svargakma) is rstly connected (anvi-) [to the prescription] as the prompted one (niyojya), insofar as he understands (budh-) that I have to do (krya) something I did not know about before [hearing this Vedic prescription] (aprva). Thereafter, [he is connected] as the responsible one (adhikrin) since [he realises that] as the ritual act (karman) is an instrument to realise (sdhana) it (heaven), this act (karman) has to be performed (anu-sth-) by me for the sake of realising (siddhi) that. The responsibility (adhikra) is the cognition of ones purpose as in relation to an act. It is called [also] competence (aivarya). [Finally, one is connected] as a doer (kart) when one performs (anusth-) it (the ritual act). Thus, the three stages (prompted, responsible and doer) are the successive [conditions] of only one [type of person] (i.e., the one who is desirous of heaven). Among them, the condition of being prompted is related to the injunction (niyoga). The other two stages are related to the act (karman). 4 So, desire is the motive of (ritual) action. Indeed, there cannot be (ritual) action without desire. Moreover, desire operates directly on the (ritual) agent to be. In the following lines (see next quotation), Rmnujcrya explains how a ritual agent is unconceivable without desire and how desire must necessarily be present for one to undertake an action. This is not just a restatement of Kumrilas well-known motto without a motive, even a fool does not act, since desire is not just (as will be seen below) the motive of action, but rather the identication (vieaa) of the agent. Without desire, the agent is not just inactive, but he or she does not even exist as a subject. Rmnujcrya also elaborates further on the three stages mentioned above by considering them in reverse order, from the view-point of what is prescribed by the Veda. The core meaning of the Veda, according to Prbhkaras, is not something established (as in Vednta), but rather something to be brought about. Since the Veda is an independent instrument of knowledge, it gives information which cannot be ascertained through any other instrument of knowledge. Hence it is non-precedented (aprva) by any of them. But even from such a non-human point of view, desire is necessary, because nothing can be brought about by itself. The Veda needs a doer for its rituals to be realised; being a doer
4 nanu phalasya katha prakrntarenvaysambhava. ucyate. tath hi prathamam aprvam evamameda kryam iti boddhtay niyojyatvennveti svargakma purua. sa pact tatsiddhaye tatsdhane karmai maynuheyam ida karmety adhikritay. karmai mdarthyajnam adhikra.aivaryam iti yvat. tadanutihan karttay. ity ekasyaiva tisro vasth kramabhvinya. tatra niyojyatva niyoge. itarad avasthdvayam karmai. (TR IV, 10.4, TR, p. 58).
means being responsible towards an act, and in order to take responsibility for an act one has to be prompted to undertake it. And one feels prompted because she or he desires the result mentioned in the prompting prescription. And the prompted person cannot be unspecied (viia), thus heaven (svarga) is connected as the specication of the prompted person. Since the prompted person is not unspecied, indeed, when in the vivajit [sacrice], etc., nothing relating to the prompted persons sphere is directly mentioned (ruta), the prompted person is supplied (adhyhra) and the result is postulated (parikp-) as his specication (vieaa) because of the [prescriptions] expectation (kk) for a prompted person. To elaborate: in he should sacrice with the vivajit[sacrice] the optative (lin) ending (of he should sacrice, yajeta) informs that something unknown before [hearing this Vedic prescription] (aprva) has to be done. And since this non-preceded duty (krya) cannot by itself be performed (anu-sth-), it cannot take place (sambh-) without the performance of [the injunctions] content (viaya). Therefore, a doer (kart) who performs (anu-sth-) it, is indirectly implied (kip-). And one cannot be a doer without being responsible (adhikra). Whoever knows (j-) that this act (karman) relates to me, he performs (anu-sth-) it. And it is not [possible] to be responsible without being prompted. He who knows the injunction as this has to be done (krya) by me, fully understands (adhi-ava-so-) the act (karman), which is an instrument to realise (sdhana) it (injunction), in this way: It is for my own sake, since it is the instrument to realise what I have to do. And he cannot be unspecied (viia), therefore heaven (svarga) which has happiness (sukha) as its general (smnya) characteristic (lak-), which is present (anuvt-) in the various means to realise (sdhana) happiness such as cattle, a son, food (anndya), and which is longed for (apek-) by everyone is postulated (parikp-) [if a specication lacks].5
5 na cviio niyojyo bhavatti svargo niyojyavieaataynveti. yato nviio niyojyaataevrutaniyojyake vivajiddau niyojykkvat niyojydhyhre tadvieaatay phalaparikalpanam. tathhi vivajit yajeta ity atra liprva kryatay pratyate. tasya ca kryatva svato nuhtum aakyatay viaynuhnam antarea na sambhavatti tadanuht kartkipyate. karttva cdhikram antarea na sambhavati. yo hi madyam ida karmeti jnti, sa eva tad anutihati. sa cdhikro na niyojyatvam antarea. yo hi niyoga mameda kryam iti jnti, sa etatsdhana karma madyakryasdhanatay madartham ity adhyavasyati. sa ca nviiobhavitum arhatti tadvieaatay pauputrnndydinnsukhasdhaneu anuvttas sukhasmnyalakaa sarvpekitas svarga parikalpyate. yady api rutaniyojyasthale pi niyogasya niyojykk kartradhikrapralikayaiva tathpi tatra niyojyasya skc chrutatvt prathama tennvaya. tad api tatsiddhaye dhikrikartbhym iti kkkramam andtyaivnvaya. arutasthale tu tray apy arutatvvied kkkrameaiva kartradhikriniyojynvaya iti sthiti. yato niyojynvaya kartrdipralikay, ato yatrnyato nuhnalbha tatra na niyojyakalpana, yathdhyayanavidhau. sa hy adhypanavidhiprayuktasvaviaynuhno na niyojyam apekate. adhypanavidhi cdhyayanam antaredhypansambhavt adhyayanam api prayukte. yath v uttarakratuvidhiprayojyam dhnam. yath v prayjdividhaya.
2.1 Ritual as paradigm and the conundrum of desire

This all could have nothing to do with the Classical and Upaniadic concept of an tman, if Mmsakas had not used their ritual categories to interpret also Upaniadic statements about the tman. This is a typical Mms move, since Mmsakas are always keen to interpret in a ritual way Upaniadic statements. Hence, they maintained that the tman Upaniads refer to is nothing but the sacricial agent. Similarly, Rmnujcrya uses also worldly examples of niyojya, such as the one who is desirous of a well-nourished condition should drink milk and Devadatta, cook! (TR IV 9.3.1; NR ad AN III, ad 23-25, NR, pp. 251-2). Moreover, as it was often the case, Kumrila applied the concept of the necessary link between desire6 and action (until now used in ritual and Vedic hermeneutic) also to worldly matters. For instance, he claimed that the Buddha could not speak, if as Buddhists state he had no desires. This leads to the well-known conundrum of desire. In its classical formulation, the conundrum sounds like that: how is liberation from desire achievable, if not through ones desire for it? In the Mms case, if there is no subject unless there is desire, liberation from desire would be tantamount to liberation from the subject itself. In a recent book (Framarin 2009, Christopher Framarin debated this conundrum and proposed to follow Fred Schuelers suggestion and distinguish between two types of desire: the one we have to get rid of (let us call it passion) and the one we need in order to initiate whatever an action, including that of getting rid of passions (let us name it will) (see Schueler 1995).
2.2 Prbhkara Mms on the conundrum of desire

Does this distinction apply to the Mms theory? The kind of desire the Mmsaka uses as a tool to identify the adhikrin, the responsible subject, is a worldly passion (rga), such as the desire for rain, cattle, a son, etc. Nor does Kumrila accept the distinction between two sorts of desire when he refutes that the Buddha, who has overcome passions, may still undertake his teaching activity. More in general, is (worldly) desire accidental to the Mms notion of subject? I do not think so. First of all, Mmsakas are too strong empiricist to accept something which overtly contradicts worldly experience, unless there is a strong evidence for it. And we do not have any strong evidence against the universal link of desireaction-subject, neither through direct perception nor through the Veda. However, Kumrilas interpretation of desire (and of liberation) might be controversial (on this subject, see the debate between Roque Mesquita (Mesquita 1994) and John Taber (Taber 2007), and my analysis of the dissonance between
te hi pradhnavid adhikria niyojya kalpayantti. (TR IV, 10.4-5 of my own unpublished edition, p. 58 of the 1956 edition). 6 And not just will, as with the Naiyyika icch, see below and 2.2.
Kumrila and his commentator Prthasrathi Mira in V sambandhkepa 110-111, Freschi 2007, pp. 56-59). The contradiction may be solved if it is suggested that Kumrilas account is quite strict as regards worldly experience, whereas liberation (and, hence, ones progress towards it) are not part of its domain. Whatever the case, in the following I will only refer to Prbhkara Mms texts. In these texts, the problem of desire is somehow dierently put, since desire is used to identify the subject to which the injunction refers, but the main stress lies on the injunctions content as something to be done (krya). The concept of enjoined (niyojya) is crucial in the Prbhkara Mms hermeneutics. The Veda is an instrument of knowledge (prama), according to this school, because it imparts an injunction (it has, hence, a deontic authority and no epistemic one, according to the distinction proposed by J. Bochenski (Bochenski 1974). This injunction is also called niyoga, and its content is called aprva or krya. All these terms refer to the fact that the Veda imparts a duty (krya, something to be done), which is altogether new (aprva, non-precedented [through any other instrument of knowledge]) and has a deontic form (niyoga, injunction). Hence, it does not exist unless in this prescriptive form. The centrality of niyoga as the Vedas meaning (artha, meaning and purpose) entails that the Veda is basically an order directed towards its listeners, the niyojyas. The latter are not listeners whatsoever, since in order for the process from (Vedic) order to action to take place, one has to recognize the duty as ones own (mama idam kryam or the like). This can only happen if the order deeply regards the listener. This happens, Prbhkaras continue, if it regards his/her desires. One feels that one ought to sacrice, that the duty to sacrice has been stated directly for oneself, because one recognizes oneself as the one towards whom the injunction (e.g. svargakmo yajeta) has been formulated. So, desire is a necessary element for a human being to get involved in Vedic actions (and in worldly ones, since Vedic actions are for Mmsakas the paradigm of all actions). Does this also mean that desire is objectively necessary? In other words, is desire needed only from the human perspective or is it also independently of the desiring subjects perspective the cause for the undertaking of an action? In fact, there are Prbhkara statements about the opposite, such as the following: na ca phalam antarea pravttyasambhava (VM II, ad v. 30). But they mostly regard the absence of the fruit, not of the desire itself. The reward is, in fact, not the point. According to the Prbhkaras the action is not directed by it, unlike what is maintained by Maana (in his Mms garb) and somehow by Kumrila (prayojanam anuddiya na mao pi pravartate). Instead, the action has an intrinsic value. BUT, it is not subjectively initiated, unless one strives for its result. Does this mean that the Veda tricks its listeners, promising a fruit which will never occur? This is altogether denied by Kumrila, who assumes that there is an aprva (non-precedented) energy, risen by the sacrice and lasting until its result. Prabhkara is less concerned with the ontological
justication of the arousal of the result. For him, the Veda is a valid instrument of knowledge. Hence, a result will follow because the Veda says it will. But we do not need to focus on it, since the purpose of the Veda (vedrtha) does not consist in the sacrices fruits, but rather in the very fact that a (sacricial) action has to be done. The fruit is an element of this execution, and it is no more important than any other element.
2.3 Summing up the Prbhkara Mms view of the self

In the preceding pages and in the following scheme, I highlight some elements of the Prbhkara Mms view about the self. I could not nd any text explicitly connecting them all, and the desire/agent connection might have little or no signicance outside the hermeneutic context. The next sections are meant to explore whether the opposite is the case and desire and action do play a role for ones awareness of oneself as a subject and/or for the ontological denition of what a subject is. The elements hinted at in Mms discussions about the subject can be broadly distinguished in two groups, namely statements about how the subject is, and statements about how it is known. To the rst group (viewing the subject as a prameya) belong, for instance: 1. (against Advaita Vednta, Nyya-Vaieika) The subject desires 2. The subject is active (knowledge is included in action7 ) 3. The subject is a continuously lasting entity, ensuring memory, self-recognition etc. 4. The body is the instrument of the subjects experience (bodily movements are, hence, just a consequence of the subjects actions) To the second group (discussing the pramas to know the subject) belong, for instance: 1. The subject becomes aware of itself through its desires 2. This process is initiated by a Vedic statement (that is, through abdaprama), see infra, p. 23 3. According to Kumrila, the subject is identical with the content of I and is hence seized through ahampratyaya in every verbal cognition featuring an I8 4. According to the Prbhkara Mms, the subject is known in every cognitive act
See Freschi forthcoming. For an interesting discussion of the import of this identity, see Watson 2006, 3. This way to know the subject also means that it is thought to be the substratum of the notion of I (whereas Prabhkara rather argues, even in regard to the knowing aspect of the subject, that it appears in cognition as its subject, i.e., as the agent of cognition, see infra 25.
8 7
Such statements refer to dierent aspects of the subject: the subject as knower, as agent and as emotional being. I am including in the latter both desire and experience which could be further distinguished because of Prabhkaras distinction between karttva and bhokttva in regard to the tman (tasmt sucyate kartbhokttaivtmeti, Bhat, 1.1.5, tmavda, Prabhkara Mira 1929, p. 173), without the further addition of desire as a distinct element9 . Let me now try to connect the two groups: known through (Bha) ahampratyaya = aspect knower agent desiring known through (Prbhkara) savids svapraka
Veda
The link of the desiring subject to the agent presupposes the intermediate step of the responsible subject (adhikrin). More important, here, the agent aspect is seen by Prabhkara not as the core element, but as the result of a process initiated through the fact that one desires, and going through his/her being enjoined and being responsible for the act. A sheer agent (for instance, the sacricer according to whose size the sacricial audumbar pillar is cut) is not a responsible person and, hence, does not become aware of himself as a subject10 .
2.4 Integration of the three aspects of subjectivity

The Prbhkara Mms subject did not emerge out of an epistemological discussion, but rather out of hermeneutic concerns. More in detail, it emerged as the self referred to in svargakmo yajeta. It owns desires and is responsible of actions. Both of them are immediately grasped through ones inner awareness (more precisely: others movements are only inferable so TR II, whereas ones own initiations of actions are available to inner awareness). Hence, I think that his concept of a self does not describe a trascendental self, like Immanuel Kants one. It is not postulated as a pre-requisite for our theoretic or moral acts to
9 I am extremely grateful to Mag. Eunyee Choi for making me aware that the coincidence of these three aspects of a self is not necessary. She mentioned as her source J.N. Mohanty, Mohanty 1970, but I could not locate any discussion about it in that book. Instead, an interesting denition can be found in Perry: In philosophy, the self is the person considered as agent, knower, subject of desires and conscious subject of experience. These are philosophically the most central parts of a persons self-concept: I am the person doing this, wanting this, and having these sensations and thoughts. It is this concept of ourselves that is extended through memory and anticipation and forms the basis of personal identity, I am the person who did this and will do that; I am the person who had this experience and wants to have it again (Perry 2002, p. 190). The integration of the rst three aspects will be discussed below, 10; that of the subject of experience in the Prbhkara conception of a subject will be discussed later, 15. 10 See MS 3.1.6 and Bhat thereon. I owe the insightful remark on the distinction of agent and responsible to to Yoshimizu, see Yoshimizu1994
3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading
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be logically possible. On the other hand, it gradually emerges out of ones perception of actions or desires. One achieves the subject as the result of a complex process of recognition. In Rmnujcryas hermeneutic description, this process sounds as follows: desire my desire my responsibility I decide to act
mine or my are here not to be interpreted as possessive pronouns (since the substrate they stand for is still not established). They rather indicate a loose reference to a still indeterminate oneself: this desire is connected to \me\. Unfortunately, Rmnujcrya did not insert the epistemological self within this process. However, in order to study the Veda, one needs to undergo a specic education and to acquire many notions. Since in any process of knowledge, the cognitive act (savid ) is according to the Prbhkaras self-revealing, and since it reveals at the same time also the object known and the knower, one may imagine that the Vedic student is already acquainted with this knower-aspect when he rst listens to a Vedic injunction although probably he is not aware of it as co-referential with the subjects feeling and active aspects. Later, then, he becomes aware of himself as an enjoined person, and eventually as responsible for the ritual action enjoined. In order to be responsible for an action, one needs the training mentioned above (children, strangers, dras, etc. will never be held responsible for ritual actions, even if they should accidentally listen to a prescription). Hence, the Vedic student is now in the position to integrate the knower-aspect he experienced already within his experience of himself as an agent and a moral subject. In sum, the knower-aspect, experienced while studying the Veda is later integrated within ones experience of oneself as a desiring agent since this experience presupposes the study of the Veda. Hence, one is reminded of ones experience of learning it and (if my hypothesis is correct) integrates the knower-aspect in the desiring-agent picture.

Are the Prbhkara Mms views devised in order to build also an ontology or a phenomemology of the subject? In Prbhkara texts there are surely many pages dedicated to the ontology of the subject (see likantha Miras Tattvloka, a chapter of his PrP), but they are hardly original and rather repeat (or adjust) arguments found in NyyaVaieika and Bha Mms texts about the distinction between body, mind, senses and tman; the way to know it; its status once liberated. In general, the use of the term tman seems to mark the beginning of an ontological discussion. But what about the concept of an active, desiring subject we highlighted above? Is it an ontological category or not? In order to understand whether it is meant to build an ontology of the subject, one could test it by checking whether it is able to address problems such as the following ones:
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1. Self: some classical Indian objections The challenge of reductionism/physicalism (Lokyatas) The Bundle of perception theory (Buddhists) 2. Self: some contemporary problems The challenge of reductionism/physicalism The Bundle of perception theory (Hume: the self is nowhere to be grasped. One only grasps perceptions and, when there are no perceptions, there is also no self as in deep sleep. Others: there are just properties and no substratum for them). Both kind of reductionism want to prove that the subject (the soul) is nothing exceeding the material body. A variant of this theory which is very much worth consideration is P.F. Strawsons claim that persons are irreducible to a mind/body dualism. A person, hence, cannot be further analysed into two components (Strawson 1959). As for the Bundle of perception theory, its most well-known Western formulation is David Humes one: we are never intimately conscious of anything but a particular perception; man is a bundle or collection of dierent perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual ux and movement (Hume, Treatise on the Human Nature, I.I.VI) Which is, allegedly, proven through a sort of abhvaprama: For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. (A Treatise of Human Nature. Book I, Part IV, section VI (Of Personal Identity). Against these objections, one might take recourse to several Classical Indian arguments in favour of the existence of a subject, most of which are endorsed also by Prbhkara authors. As for the role of the agent/desire argument within ontology or phenomenology, it may be used against physicalism if this is understood as aiming to identify psychological states and properties with physical states and properties. In fact, it is relatively easy to identify a sensation with its physical correlate, but less easy to identify desire with a physical state. Moreover, the feeling of ownness in desire represents a further challenge to the essay to reduce the rst-person experience to a third-person perspective.
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3.1 Body and subject

3.1.1 Transient sense- and thought- faculties As for the body/soul problem, that is, the ontological relation between this (active, desiring, knowing) subject and the body, Mmsakas are quite clear from the time of the Bh in denying any identity11 . The subject is neither tantamount to the body, nor is it a quality of the body or a part of it. The subject is, hence, not a material soul weighing so and so. In Roderick Chisholms words, Thus we could say, as Bishop Butler [(1692-1752)] did, that our gross organized bodies with which we perceive the objects of sense, and with which we act, are no part of ourselves We see with our eyes in the same way we see with our glasses. (The Analogy of Religion, Part I, Chapter 1). The eyes are the organs of sight, not the subject of sight. (Chisholm, Self-Prole in Roderick M. Chisholm, p.74). This leads to a further problem: what is the link between the subject and its faculties? All Indian philosophical schools I am aware of think that both sense and thought faculties are transient (like the body), and that the subject is just the one who is conscious of operations going on automatically. Does this apply to the Mms case in the same way? The distinction body/subject surely allows the Mmsaka to distinguish between psychic and sensory functions, with the latter pertaining to the body. Moreover, manas is also said to belong to the body12 . On the other hand, the Mms identies as characteristics of the subject even qualities which are not attributed to it by Nyya and, even more so, Advaita Vednta. According to the latter, only consciousness is intrinsic to the subject. All the rest of what contemporary Western common opinion considers to be psychical qualities (such as will and eort) is, instead, attributed to the internal organ (antakaraa made of buddhi, ahakra and manas), which is as perishable as the gross body. Against that, Mms admits most (if not all) of these qualities as typical of the subject. This may imply either narrowing down the role of buddhi, etc. (see infra, 4.2), or no longer considering knowledge, eort, etc., as qualities. Such is the position of Somevara, who stated that action (including knowledge and will) inheres in the subject (see Freschi forthcoming). I will not deal here with the problem of what an action is (see on this topic Freschi 2010 and Freschi forthcoming). Suce it to say that according to Mmsakas an action is dierent from a bodily movement and that it consists in ones initiation of an act (prayatna or pravtti )13 . Hence, many Mmsakas
11 See, for instance, the prvapakin (not contradicted as far as this point is concerned) in Bh ad 1.1.5, abara and Dignga 1968, p. 34: ptracayana vidhya ya sa ea yajyudh yajamno jas svarga loka yti. pratyaka hi tad dahyate. na caia yti iti vidhiabda. 12 And the mind is within the body [and] it is atomic in size (mana ca antaarra paramuparimam, PrP, Tattvloka, p. 332). 13 By the way, a further similarity with R.M. Chisholms philosophy, is his idea that actions are, with the Aquinas, those which occur ex voluntate deliberata. Just like Kumrila and
13
may include among actions also psychic acts such as knowing or wishing. This move is explicit in Somevara Bhaa, who, however, seems thereby to explicate the philosophical consequences of Mms exegetical theories (Freschi forthcoming). Further details on the role of ahakra, buddhi and manas It could also be the case that the agent- and desiring-self described above is in itself essentially active, knower, desiring, etc. and only uses additional psychic organs such as buddhi, ahakra and/or, according to some schools, citta as the depository of past sensations. In fact, these terms are never used in the TR and hardly at all in likantha Miras PrP (where, moreover, ahakra seems rather a nontechnical term meaning the concept of an I as in I go, I know the pot etc.)14 . Buddhi is used at the beginning of likantha Miras defence of the tman (PrP Tattvloka), in order to state that the latter is distinct from buddhi and sense organs, but then not discussed again. Manas is used by Rmnujcrya, but seems to refer only to its function as the inner sense organ. For instance, again in TR IV 11.6.2 it is said that eort (prayatna) is knowable through the manas. This does not imply that the manas is aware of it. mnasapratyakavedya rather parallels the frequent string cakurdigrhya (or similar), indicating the instrument through which one knows something. The other main source of Rmnujcrya, the Bha Prthasrathi Mira, discusses ahakra, etc. within his rebuttal of the Skhya view and denies the Skhya view on ahakra, but not its existence. However, in Prthasrathis understanding the ahakra seems to be nothing more than the fact that an I exists (and not a subjectivity organ), since one of the evidences in favour of it is the necessity of an I (i.e., a located subject) in order to make sense of sentences such as I am the father (Prthasrathi Mira 1977, p. 256, tmavda, 1977 p. 256). Moreover, Prthasrathi Mira, follows Kumrila in maintaining that the
Somevara Mira, Chisholm connects actions to intentions, endeavours (what I called above eorts) and to the fact of bringing about (Chisholm, Reply to Douglas N. Walton in Roderick M. Chisholm, p.213). Post-Kumrila Mmsakas are probably even more extreme in admitting as actions endeavours independently of their being successful. 14 All occurrences of this term are found in a short passage of PrP, Tattvloka, p.327, debating with Crvkas on whether the body is the subject. The Siddhntin proposes to use the ahakra as an evidence against the identication of tman and body and the opponent replies with examples for the contrary: [S]: And through the support of the concept of an I (ahakra), again there is a rebuttal of the theory that the self is the body. [PP]: It is not so. In I know the pot the knower has the rank of the I (ahakra). Since it is so, there is consent of the usage of I in I go, I am fat etc., only in regard to the body. Hence, the body alone is perceptible [and] it is seized as knower. And an inference which goes against direct perception does not hold (ahakrvalambanena punardehtmavdapratyavasthnam. naitadevam. ghaam aha jnmti jtur ahakrspadbhtatvt aha gacchmy aha sthla itydv ahakrasya arra eva pravttyavivdc charram eva pratyaka jt pratyate, pratyakavirodhe cnumnam tmna na labhata iti). NB: I would rather expect ahakrspadbhtatvt and pravttyavivdt to be on the same level: since the knower is equated to the I and since the I is found to be the same as the body, the body is the knower!
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tman can be seized as the concept of I (ahampratyaya) and, hence, de facto eliminates the need of a separate ahakra: [PP:] Isnt it the case that, like in the case of the body (who has been proven to be only metaphorically referred to with the pronoun I in Im fat, etc.), also the conception of the I in regard of the self is a plain error? [S:] No, because there is no subsequent cognition invalidating [this conception]. [PP:] In the case of yogins (who transcend the notion of an I) there is a subsequent invalidating cognition. [S:] No, since there is no evidence for that. [See indeed the following verses:] In the same way, even the ones who have reached the supreme level of yoga | these masters among the masters of yoga also think of the I in regard to the self || [In fact, they say:] The I is the origin of the whole world, as it is [its] end | [] And in fact the ahakra which evolves from the [Skhya] Prakti cannot be the origin of the whole world [hence they are instead referring to the tman]15 . Nonetheless, a doubt is raised by the term antakaraa in TR IV 10.11. Traditionally this refers to the psychic faculties together (as being the instrument of the self). Literally, it might also designate only manas, but the passage requires something able to feel satisfaction. Nor did I nd a source text which might have inuenced Rmnujcryas terminological choice. More in general, I could not detect any distinct examination of the psychic organs within an ontology of the psyche either in Prthasrathis nor in any other Mmsakas texts. Summing up, these psychic organs may well have a role also in Rmnujcrya (and in Prbhkara Mms in general), but their help is only subsidiary and does not aect the fundamental nature of the self. For instance, the self is surely the knower, although it needs sense-organs and maybe also psychical ones in order to know.
15 nanu arravad tmany apy ahamabhimno bhrntir eva? na, bdhbhvt. yoginm asti bdha iti cet? na, prambhvt. tath ca ye pi yogasya par khm upgat | yogevarevars te pi kurvanty tmany ahamatim || 21 || aha ktsnasya jagata prabhava pralayas tath | [] na hi mahadvikro hakra ktsnasya prabhava (stradpik, 1.1.5, Sastradipika [stradpik] of Prtha Sarathi Misra with the Commentary called Yuktisneha Praprai by Pandit Rama Krishna Misra, pp. 349-350).
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3.1.2 Embodiment as the ontological presupposition for a phenomenological self The body is anyway an essential instrument of the subject, which can have experiences only through it. The link between subject and body is based on the formers karman and is, hence, necessary. The body is not merely a mass of material substances, but it is the abode of experience (bhogytana, TR II; PrP Tattvloka p.331). Hence, likantha and Rmnujcrya state that nothing like plant bodies exist, since plants are not able to experience anything (bhognupalambht, TR II, p.17). Moreover, they also deny ayonija bodies (lit. bodies not born from a womb), since they are nowhere to be seen (TR II, ibidem, PrP Tattvloka, p.332). In a footnote to the PrP text, its learned editor explains that ayonija bodies are described in the Vaieika system (VS 4.2.5) and attributed to Gods and i s (i.e., superhuman creatures)16 . Whatever our contemporary view about that, it is noteworthy that the body, although sharply separated from the subject, does not exist independently of it. In short, Prbhkara Mmsakas hold a view akin to what Brian Garrett labels the Intermediary view (between Cartesianism and Reductionism) and attributes to John Locke. So understood, this view holds that persons are psychophysical substances, which are necessarily embodied (Garrett 1998, p. 320)17 . In this connection it is worth remembering that Rmnujcrya criticises the belief in a God exactly because in order to be omnipotent and omniscient He needs to have a body, but His having a body leads to further logical problems (TR IV, 9.4.5, 1956 edition p. 55). Moreover, the Veda is said to be apaurueya, that is, not [the work] of a person, thus denying both a human author and God as author. Hence, the nexus between personhood and embodiment is not denied even in the case of superhuman beings.
3.2 How do Prbhkara Mms arguments for the subject dier from R.M. Chisholms ones?
It easy to see how several of the ontological arguments hinted at above have been implemented also by Western thinkers. A short excursus on them will hopefully help (especially Indologists non familiar with philosophical discussions) to distinguish what does not belong to this sphere in the Prbhkara argumentation.
16 yat punar aprthivam ayonija arra kevaladharmdhipatyanibandhana kaicid abhyupagamyate, tat sarvaarr prthitvvyabhicrn nnumtu akyate (PrP Tattvloka, stris edition p.332). It is impossible to infer that body not made of earth, not born out of a womb and having as condition [for its occurrence] only the Power of Dharma, which is admitted by some [i.e., the Vaieikas]. In fact, all bodies without exception are made of earth. I am grateful to Prof. Harunaga Isaacson for the following answer to an on-line query of mine on this subject: The power of dharma: In other words, these divine bodies are supposed by those who believe in them to be conditioned only by dharma, unlike bodies such as ours which are conditioned by both dharma and adharma. Isaacson also pointed out a corresponding passage in PrP, vimalajana, PrP, p. 306, where bodies made of dharma and of adharma are explicitly mentioned. 17 For a longer discussion, see also Garrett 1991, pp. 62; 69-70.
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The appeal to common sense is particularly evident in Roderick Chisholms claim that there are some pre-analytic facts about the self which are innocent until proven guilty. In this way, he can discuss common-sense notions (such as that of the self and of its ownership of feelings, thoughts and desires) in order to state that either one accepts them, or one is bound to give a satisfying explanation of such a well-spread error. (This would, however, not apply necessarily to a Buddhist thinker, who would reply that common sense is, in fact, our gaoler and, therefore, we cannot rely on it if we want to escape worldly existences.) The appeal to self-presenting evidences is also the key-point of Chisholms defence of the self. Against Humes Bundle theory, he quotes Price: As Professor Price once observed, it looks very much as though the self that Hume professed to be unable to nd is the one that he nds to be stumbling (H.H. Price, Humes Theory of the External World, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1940, 1940, pp. 5-6; quoted inp. 39)18 (In a somehow similar vein, Indian authors of various Theistic schools within and outside Vednta (until the Pratyabhij school) have said that the self is undeniable, since it is established whenever one tries to deny it19 ). An argument driven out of common experience, the continuity-argument is also crucial for Chisholms dealing with mereology. In several of his essays, Chisholm ponders the problem of what happens of a thing whose parts have, gradually, all been substituted. Does it still exist as such? Chishom does not yield a denitive answer, but he is sure that even if we were to say that it still exists, this would only be in a loose sense. This position is called mereological essentialism, as it states that parts are essential to things and that things cease
18 A more detailed version of Chisholms argument is the following: The diculty is that Hume appeals to certain evidence to show that there are only impressions or perceptions, and that when he tells us what this evidence is, he implies not only (i) that there is, as he puts it in his example, heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, but also (ii) that there is someone who nds heat or cold [], and moreover (iii) that the one who nds heat or cold is the same as the one who nds love or hatred and the same as the one who nds light or shade, and nally (iv) that this one does not in fact stumble upon anything but perceptions. It is not unreasonable to ask, therefore, whether HUmes report of his fourth nding is consistent with his report of the second and third. If Hume nds what he says he nds, that is to say, if he nds not only perceptions, but also that he nds the, and hence that there is someone who nds them, how can his premises be used to establish the conclusion that he never observes anythign but perceptions? (p. 40). 19 See PK 1.1.2: What intelligent being could ever deny or establish the cognizer and agent, the Self, Mahevara, established from the beginning (disiddhe)? (kartari jtari svtmany disiddhe mahevare | ajatm niedha v siddhi v vidadhta ka ||) and commentaries thereon (translation and text from Utpaladeva 1994. Isabelle Rati translates as follows Abhinavaguptas explanation of the relevant point: [] [Similarly, this person] must perform the refutation (niedha) in this way: if [this self] is not manifest, accordingly, [this person] is insentient (jaa); and it has [already] been stated that this [refutation] is not possible for an insentient [entity]; nor is it (possible) for a sentient [entity, for this sentient entity would precisely have to prove that it is not sentient]. (Rati 2007, 361, fn.98). I am grateful to Isabelle Rati for pointing out this passage.
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to exist if they loose their parts20 . On the other hand, argues Chisholm, I do not cease to exist if I loose a hand. Hence, persons can be said to last in a sense in which things cannot. I am the same person as one year ago, although the material components of my body might be altogether dierent. On the other hand, a chair whose parts have been replaced may be said to last only in a loose sense. Hence, from mereological essentialism one can conclude that we are not to be identied with our bodies21 . One might propose a dierent kind of link between body and subject. But Chisholm stresses the sharp distinction between body and what he calls person. In doing so he argues, in an Indian garb, for the necessity for qualities to inhere in quality-endowed substances: Therefore it is not possible for modes to have modes; and it is necessary that every substrate be a substrate. A further consequence is that the person is not a mode of his body. For it is obvious that the person has modes. [] Could I be a mode of my body? It is certain that I have modes; there is one for each of my psychological properties. But we have seen that modes themselves do not have modes. Therefore I cannot be a mode of my body. (Chilsholm, Self-Prole in Roderick M. Chisholm, pp. 71, 73). By the way, as for what a mode is, in Chisholms terminology, It will be convenient to read the converse of x is a mode of y as y is the substrate of x. Our denition of mode should allow us to say [] that a house is a mode of a heap or aggregate of building materials and that the heap or aggregate of building materials is not a mode of the house. [] Our denition of mode should also allow for the possibility that a mode, though ontologically dependent upon its substrate, may yet change its substrate. The house or ship may have one heap as its substrate today and another one tomorrow. (Chilsholm, Self-Prole in Roderick M. Chisholm, p. 66). Further, Chisholm is quite close to the (nearly) Pan-Indian way of distinguishing a subject from its instruments, even the ones allowing it to think and perceive, such as the sense-faculties and the inner sense (or mind, manas). Observe his reply to an imaginary objector: Persons, being thinking things, must have a complex structure. [] After all, you cant think unless you have a brain. And those little things [what Chisholm calls persons, see below about the body/subject problem] dont have brains!
20 In Chisholms words, mereological essentialism applied to substances amounts to: x is a substance, if and only if: for ally, if y is a part of x, then x is necessarily such that y is a part of it. (Chilsholm, Self-Prole in Roderick M. Chisholm, p. 67). 21 It is interesting to note how mereology had a major role also in Buddhism, but led to opposite conclusions. See Kapstein, Matthew (1988): Mereological Considerations in Vasubandhus Proof of Idealism (Vijaptimtratsiddhi). Idealistic studies 18/1, 32-54.
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The hypothesis being criticized is the hypothesis that I am such a microscopic entity. But note that I do have a brain. And therefore, according to the hypothesis in question, the microscopic entity has one, too the same one that I have, the one that is inside my head. It is only a confusion to suppose that the microscopic entity [] has another brain which is in fact inside of it. The brain is the organ of consciousness, not the subject of consciousness unless I am myself my brain. The nose, similarly, is the organ of smell and not the subject of smell unless I am myself my nose. But if I am one or the other the brain or the nose then, I the subject, will have some organs that are spatially outside me. Moreover, Chisholms concept of person might be said to be especially close to the Mms one, since it includes the abilities to think and desire, which are not necessarily included in the self (tman) in classical Indian philosophy (Advaita Vednta excludes desire and Nyya-Vaieika denies thought as characteristic of the self, see p. 12). In fact, Chisholm writes: We could use the term mind, as Descartes had used the term mens, to refer to that which has psychological properties to that which thinks, senses, believes, desires. In this case, we would be using mind to mean the same as person and hence to designate such entities as you and me. (Chilsholm, Self-Prole in Roderick M. Chisholm, ed. by Rogdan Bagu, p.71). More in general: The following may be taken as being paradigmatic cases of psychological attributes: judging; being sad about something; being pleased about something; wondering about something; feeling depressed; seeming to oneself to have a headache; and being appeared to redly. [] Any property which is possibly such that it is exemplied by just one thing and which includes every property it implies or involves is psychological. This formula provides us with an interpretation of one traditional thesis namely, that whatever is purely qualitative is psychological. We will dene the psychological by reference to that which is purely qualitative. But we will not dene the psychological as that which is purely qualitative, since certain psychological attributes for example, thinking about ones brother are not purely qualitative. (Chisholm 1989, p. 99). Lastly, Chisholm takes it for granted (possibly as part of his appeal to common-sense) that there are many persons. The same tenet is defended by Mmsakas against Advaita Vednta authors (see, e.g., likantha Mira, Tattvloka p.345).
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3.2.1 Body and subject: Mms and Chisholm How far is, on the other hand, Chisholms approach from the Mms one? 1. Mmsakas are quite clear about the fact that the subject is not a material substance, whereas Chisholm does not rule out the possibility of the person being a material substance with no parts, possibly situated in the brain 2. The body is according to Mmsakas not just a material substance whatsoever. It is linked with the subject through the latters karman and because it is the abode of its experiences. 3. Mmsakas (and possibly all other Indian philosophers apart from Lokyatas, Jainas and obviously Buddhists) argue that the subject is all-pervading, and explain in this way its connections with the bodys organs. On the other hand (see quote above, p.18), Chisholm maintains that it is possible for a subject to use organs which are spatially outside it. 1. Once one endorses a dualism between psychic and physical properties, one is bound to explain how do the two work together in ones body (assuming that one agrees that a body is a mass of matter and that its movements are psychically determined). Chisholms answer denies the dualism. Prbhkaras one, on the other hand, stresses the bridge-function of fruition (bhoga) and action (see infra, point 2). More in detail, the point seems to be that, according to Chisholm the postulation of an extra entity, purely psychical, such as what one commonly refers to as mind has no epistemological grounds. Psychical properties can be ascribed also to a material substance (according to what he calls a double aspect theory (Chisholm 1989, p. 123, On Metaphysics, p. 123). Hence, we can well be a material substance having also psychical properties. But what material substance are we? As already seen, we cannot be our body, since this is an ens successivum22 , whereas a person is not (Chisholm 1989, pp. 124-5 On Metaphysics, pp.124-5): [T]he theory does not imply that there is certain matter that is incorruptible. It implies rather that there are certain material things in all probability, certain material particles or subparticles that are incorrupted and remain incorrupted as long as the person survives. The theory would be, then, that I am literally identical with some proper part of this macroscopic body, some intact, nonsuccessive part that has been in this larger body all along. This part is hardly likely to be the Luz bone, of course; more likely, it would be something of a microscopic nature, and presumably something that is located within the brain. (On Metaphysics, Chisholm 1989, p. 126).
22 An ens successivum is an entity which is made up of dierent things at dierent times. An ens nonsuccessivum is an individual thing that is not made up of dierent things at dierent times.
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2. According to Prbhkara Mms, on the other hand, the material substance constituting a body can become the vehicle of experience of its guest, the subject, which is intrinsically linked to it through its karman. In sum, the material body is the result of mental properties like the good or bad actions (intended by Mmsakas as initiations of actions and not as body movements) done in ones past. Ones psychic properties are immediately and necessarily linked to a body, since one intrinsically desires fruition and, consequently, strives for action. The two action and fruition, in fact, originate in the psyche, but need a body in order to be performed. Ones link to a single body is secured by karman. 3. Chisholms position entails that there are as many persons as there are brains. The fact that the subject is considered as absolutely non-material in Prbhkara Mms leads it, in order to ensure the possibility of its contact with the present body and the future ones, to admit its all-pervasiveness. But, if it is all pervasive, than why should not one argue, as with the Advaita Vednta (and other schools, such as the aiva Pratyabhij one), that there is only one subject? This claim is refuted on the ground of the diversity of, for instance, ones own pain from someone elses one and, more in general, because it is counter-intuitive. The existence of other subjects (tman) is admitted through inference out of the eorts (or initiations of actions, prayatna) one sees in other bodies23 .
3.3 Concluding remarks on the ontological interpretation: Peculiarities of the Prbhkara position
In sum, the subject is the substrate of desires and actions (including among them knowledge). It grounds the validity of our notion of an enduring self, of ownership in regard to our thoughts, feelings and desires, and of memory. At this point, one might argue: how can the establishment of an agent-self inuence the establishment of a knower-self? The same might be argued in regard to the emotional-self. Apart from the hermeneutical answer discussed above, 2.4, Prbhkaras try to bridge the rst and the last one by claiming that spontaneous desire (that is, passion, rga, not resolution, cetan or sakalpa) leads one to action. Naiyyikas add knowledge as a necessary intermediate step (knowledge-will-action) in order to involve the knower-self, too, but risk in this way to under-estimate the emotional-aspect. The agent-aspect also tends to be under-estimated in many Indian philosophical schools (most of all in Skhy, see Watson 2006, pp. 90-92, Torella 1994, Bronkhorst 1996, pp. 611-618). Maybe, Prbhkaras stressed the agent- and the emotional-self because these are the aspects we are more immediately aware of? One might perceive a patch of blue as such (not necessarily aected by the fact that I am perceiving it), whereas desire and action are necessarily felt as ones own (see also infra, p.24). This question leads me to the next section.
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For the whole inference, see Freschi forthcoming.
4 The phenomenological interpretation
21

First of all, do at all Classical schools of Indian Philosophy distinguish between Phenomenology and Ontology? They surely lack a terminological distinction. Prabhkaras (and the general Indian) habit of writing comentaries instead of treatises may also fail to convey additional information on this. However, in many cases schools oppose one another exactly because they erroneously interpret as metaphysical/ontological a statement which was not meant to be one. For a Mms example, let me recall the Prbhkara account of the prescriptive character of the Veda. Prbhkaras say that the content of the Veda is always something to be realised and never something which is already there. Hence, it would not be correct to interpret it along the lines of our descriptive reading of language. Similarly, the link between subject and desire emerges not out of investigations on the ontology of the subject, but as the pragmatic consequence of its Dasein in the world (in this world and not in all possible worlds). In sum, a non-ontological stance is possible, although hard to ascertain, apart from indirect elements. In the present case, it might be suggested that the usage of tman tends to mark an ontological argumentation, whereas purua is more generically employed in the sense of person, that is, as dening the kind of beings we all identify with, without taking into account the problem of their link to a material body, their duration, etc. A further hint to a phenomenological orientation of the Prbhkara account of the subject may lie in its appraisal of the pain-argument. Whereas it can be conceived that the contents of epistemic experiences are not necessarily related to an individuality, since they can be conceived as universally valid, independent of a particular subject, in the case of the contents of pain- or pleasureexperiences their subject-dependence is hardly deniable (since not everything which is pleasant to one is pleasant to anyone else). Hence, pain-experiences are used by Prbhkaras against the idea of a single Self which only due to illusion appears as divided into many concrete individuals. In his Tattvloka, likantha writes: Like in a single body the distinction among the sensation referring to a foot, etc., does not get confused, in the same way in several bodies it will not get confused. In fact, a sensation referring to the foot does not [occur] in the head, nor does a sensation referring to the head [occur] in the foot. Nor is it possible to say that a sensation inheres only in a foot [or other parts of ones body and not in a distinct subject], since these [body parts] are not conscious (a-ja). In fact, a conscious subject (jt ) is [necessarily] connected with the sensations, since these have the form of a specic pain [and pain can only be felt by a conscious subject]. Hence the ancients say that this (belief that the pain is in the foot or the head) is a delusion [typical] of childish people. [One says] In my foot there is
22
a (painful) sensation, In my head there is a (painful) sensation: in all sensations a single aicted one appears. And the connection with pitta and the other [qualities whose unbalance causes diseases] is not contradictory even in case of unconscious [body parts] such as the foot. The distress (dukha born out of this [qualities unbalance], [on the other hand,] inheres only in the self 24 . Let us assume that this phenomenological alternative is correct and that Prbhkaras did not intend primarily to describe the ontology of the subject. In fact, the characters of activeness and desire seem interesting marks to recognise someone as a subject and, hence, as someone who has potentially the right and also the responsibility (I am using both terms to translate adhikra) to act. Moreover, they are even more so in case one speaks from the point of view of what a subject thinks of herself. Indeed, for a subject its being desirous is evident (that is, empirically certain25 ), whereas, e.g., its ontological structure (as distinct from mind and sense-faculties, to name just one example) is not. In sum, the Prbhkara account may point primarily to: 1. ones feeling of oneself (as desiring, active, endowed with free will), 2. the emergence of ones concept of oneself through the fact that one has been enjoined to do something, 3. the emergence of a social concept of the subject through its social role in sacrice. (Points 2 and 3 explicitly echo the titles of two books on Emmanuel Lvinas26 .)
yathaikasminn eva arre pddivedanvyavasth na vyatikryate, tath nnarreu na vyatikariyata iti! na hi pdagat vedan irasi, na v irogat vedan pde. na ca vedan pddiv eva samavaitti akyate vaktum, tem ajatvt. jt hi vedanbhis saha sambadhyate, dukhaviearpatvt tsm iti. tad ida blajanamohanam iti vddh. pde me vedan, irasi me vedaneti sarvavedansv eko dukh prakate. Pddiu tu santpdika samavaiti. [] acetannm api paddn pittdisayogo na virudhyate. tajjanya dukham tmany eva samavaiti. (PrP, pp. 345-6). Even in this passage, especially because of the conclusive remark on pitta, etc., ontology and phenomenology tend to be conated. 25 Chisholm summarizes his view of what is empirically certain as follows: I said that a proposition is empirically certain for a given subject S provided that the proposition is one that is (a) contingent, (b) such that accepting it is epistemically preferable for S to withholding it, and (c) there is no contingent proposition i such that accepting i is more reasonable for S then accepting the proposition in question. Then I said: Propositions that are empirically certain, in this sense, will be propositions about what are traditionally called states of mind propositions about thinking, feeling, and believing. No proposition that is empirically certain for a given subject S will imply the existence of any person other than S. If I am not in pain, then the proposition someone is in pain cannot be empirically certain for me (R.M. Chisholm, Objects and Persons: Revisions and Replies, in Ernest Sosa (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, vols.7/8 of Grazer Philosophische Studien, 1979, p. 324. Chisholms own quote comes from The Self and the World in Wittgenstein and his Impact on Contemporary Thought, Hlder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna 1978, pp. 407-410, p. 410.) 26 Ulrich Dickmann, Subjektivitt als Verantwortung and Stephan Moebius, Die soziale Konstituierung des Anderen.
24
23
From this point of view, it would be beside the point to argue against this perspective from the standpoint of the ontology of the subject and, e.g., of brain cells, since a better understanding of how the brain works would not change the way we feel about ourselves (as, e.g., endowed with free will and activity). The underlying assumption is that the Prbhkara account of the subject as niyojya highlights, on a personal level, ones recognising ones own desiring nature. On the other hand, on an external level, ones nature of subject in its ethical and social signicance is constituted through ones being enjoined to sacrice. It did not pre-exist the injunction. As explained by Ian Kaplow, ones feeling of oneself (and, even more so, of oneself as a subject) is not innate: Zudem heit dies, da Wesen mit mentalen Ereignissen (zumindest diejenigen, die in der Welt ihr mentales Instrumentarium erfolgreich intentional einsetzen) auch ein propriozeptives Gefhl haben: Sie knnen unterscheiden zwischen dem, was zu ihnen selbst gehrt, und dem, was nicht Ich ist. Es sollte in diesem Zusammenhang erwhnt werden, da diese Leistung keineswegs selbstverstndlich zu sein scheint; falls Propriozeption tatschlich angemessen als Gefhl bezeichnet werden kann, darf sie nicht als unmittelbar oder gegeben hingenommen werden. Die Tatsache, da z.B. menschliche Babys dieses Gefhl erst erlernen mssen, weist darauf hin, da Propriozeption eine Leistung ist, die einen komplexeren Apparat an kognitiven Vorgngen voraussetzt (Ian Kaplow, S.72). I am suggesting that, within the history of Prbhkara Mms, this proprioperception of oneself as subject rst occurred through Vedic injunctions enjoining a desirous one to act.
4.1 Which kind of proprioperception arises through a Vedic prescription?

Several thinkers, especially the ones trained also in Phenomenology, have stressed the primitive character of inter-subjectivity27 . The world we experience, they argue, is not made of monads who later connect to each other. Rather, our Dasein in the world consists of an inter-subjective experience, out of which one can, at a later stage, insulate a single I or thou. In this sense, the fact that the Prbhkara agent does not become aware of itself on its own is signicant. It becomes aware of itself insofar as s/he is enjoined. The Vedic prescriptions do not single him/her out of many with a Thou, but insofar as they identify him/her with his/her salient characteristic, namely, his/her desire for something. The Prbhkara agent is, hence, from its very beginning, part of a complex world of relations, with a text (an Authority), with desired goals, with its own desiring nature. Immediately thereafter, the whole world of pragmatic relations intervenes with sacricial roles and acts.
27
Mohanty 1970, p. 101, Olivetti2007.
24
P.T. Raju (Raju 1994, p. 165) is somehow sceptical about the fact that for Prabhkara the subject (tman is not apprehended as an I, as it happens for Kumrila (see infra, p.14) but rather only out of the Veda. This givenness of the subject only through a prescription (the Veda is essentially prescriptive according to Prabhkara) is however signicant for the non-isolation of the subject since the moment it is apprehended.
4.2 The two interpretations in Rmnujcrya

Rmnujcrya, seems to presuppose a self (called tman or purua) which is active (cf. TR IV 11.6.2) and includes knowledge among its possible activities (cf. TR IV 3.11.1). The above analysis seems to allow the conclusion that it is also intrinsically desiring. 4.2.1 Body and subject and the three aspects of subjectivity: Is Rmnujcryas a phenomenological interpretation? The stress on action and desire may have some advantages in order to solve the conundrum of the link between an immaterial subject and its body. But in what respect can desire and action be more suitable to connect one to ones body and to ones feeling of subjectivity than, for instance, consciousness and knowledge? Knowledge can designate either the act of knowing something (and in this case it is included in action) or a general state of awareness (and in this case it is included in consciousness). Consciousness, cit, is considered by many authors as the inner nature of the self. It is, however, unsuitable to link it to a body, a social world, an individual subjectivity, exactly because it lacks intentionality (in Brentanos sense of being directed to something else). Moreover, even if compared to knowledge in the rst sense, the intentional contents of desire and eort directly involve the fact that one perceives them as related to oneself (Pramavda authors speak, in this regard, of a grhya and a grhaka aspect within the act of desiring that is, the desired object and the desire itself but this is strongly counterintuitive in denying the chain hinted at above, p.10). In short, it is probably not a case that Pramavda authors started from knowledge in order to deconstruct the necessity of a knower independent of the act of knowledge and then expanded the argument to the eld of desire, action, etc., where also only an act is deemed to exist. And it is not a case that Rmnujcrya, on the other hand, starts with desire, where the rst-person perspective imposes itself as unavoidable on a phenomenological level and then generalises the existence of a subject in action and knowledge (as a kind of action), arguing that there is something extra (atiaya, see below) in my knowledge, which distinguishes it from a knowledge. In fact, although it might be argued that mineness comes in degrees (so Metzinger 2003, chap.6) or that it is illusory, it is hard to deny that there is a fundamental dierence between a desire and my desire and that it is, hence, hard to be persuaded that nothing more than the action of desire exists (and that the mine-part is
25
just a component within it)28 . More in detail: Prbhkaras argue (see PrP, T, around p.328 CHECK) that a knower separate from knowledge is necessary in order to distinguish ones own knowledge and the others ones. But, a Pramavdin might argue, it is enough to specify instead of the self-existence of the knower the time and space where this cognitive act takes place. This cannot happen in the same satisfactorily way in the case of desire, where time and space still cannot explain the intrinsic dierence between hunger and my hunger. Lastly, how are action and desire apprehended? And how is the subject who is endowed with them? The self (tman) is only inferable according to many Nyya authors. On the contrary, the Bhas (and some Naiyyikas), maintain that it is apprehended as the I in every cognition (through mnasapratyaka). The Prbhkaras, as already hinted at, distinguish between the knower and the agent/desiring/(experiencing) aspect. The rst one appears within every cognition act: In the same way, the self is not mind-perceptible, as there would a contradiction between the agents and the objects condition. The denomination I know myself is on the other hand metaphorical. But, when the objects are illuminated, [the self] becomes evident because it is the substratum of cognition. Whatever cognition (savid ) is three times illuminating. The experience (anubhava) of the knower (gen. ogg.) is necessarily present among the experiences of the knowable contents. Since otherwise there would be no superiority (atiaya) of what has been known (savid ) by oneself or by someone else. And since it is so, it is congruous (upapad-) that [the self] is seized (upalabh-) together with the [knowledges] contents (viaya). Indeed, the self does not appear separated from the contents nor do contents appear (bhs-) if the knower does not appear. Therefore, in regard to the content (which is the self), just such a (I know X) cognition (savid ) is a means of knowledge. And it causes the person (purua) to become a [knowledges] content [though not an object]. Hence, the person is not an object (karman) although it is part of the result (phala) of that cognition. It is only an agent (kart ) [of cognition]29 .
28 On a similar vein, although referring to experiences in general and not to desire in particular, Dan Zahavi writes:
In contrast to physical objects which can exist regardless of whether or not they de facto appear for a subject, experiences are essentially characterized by having a subjective feel to them, i.e., a certain (phenomenal) quality of what it is like or what it feels to have them (Nagel 1986: 15-16; Jackson 1982; James 1890: I/478). Whereas the object of my perceptual experience is intersubjectively accessible in the sense that it can in principle be given to others in the same way that it is given to me, my perceptual experience itself is only given directly to me. It is this rst-personal givenness of the experience which makes it subjective (Zahavi 2000, p. 60).
29
tath tm ca na mnasapratyaka. karmakartbhvavirodht. m jnmi iti vya-
5 Conclusion
26
Noteworthily, then, the knower is not known through focusing on oneself and away from worldly experience. On the contrary, it (just like the agent- and the emotional-subject) are apprehended within worldly experience, as a part of it. The agent/desiring aspect is, instead, known through a Vedic prescription. I suggested above that the immediate availability of the knower aspect may be useful insofar as it enables one to insert the knower aspect within the newly apprehended oneself (see supra, 2.4). More in general, TR II (dedicated to ontology) does not explicitly endorse the defence of the subject I attributed here to its author. However, the chapter is the shortest one in TR and seems to be nothing more than a summary of earlier views on disparate themes (from jti to obscurity, from Brahminhood to plants bodies). Possibly, its author was mostly interested in hermeneutical and epistemological matters and, if my opinion is correct, dealt even with ontological problems, such as the existence of a subject, from these points of view. In this sense, Rmnujcryas approach diverges from likanthas one, who directly deals with the tman-defence in his PrP T. likanthas view seems, in fact, more ontologically grounded. For instance, manas is analysed; it is distinguished from tman and the qualities of the latter are said to arise due to a contact of the eternal tman with manas (PrP T, p.330CHECK).
5 Conclusion
The Prbhkara Mms subject did not emerge out of an epistemological discussion, but rather out of hermeneutic concerns. More in detail, it emerged as the enjoined person referred to in svargakmo yajeta. It owns desires and is responsible of actions. Both of them are immediately grasped through ones inner awareness. And both actions and desire make the subject immediately aware of the body which is the only chance for it to experience the world. Hence, although on the ontological level the Prbhkara metaphysics may not improve much on the general Indian (but not Buddhist or Jaina) account of a subject dierent from its body but linked to it through karman, a phenomenological interpretation of the Prbhkara view may shed some light on the Indian and Western troublesome link between two distinct and yet connected entities. Moreover, the Prbhkara approach does not ground an isolated self, but rather a subject which becomes aware of itself when a text (the Veda) enjoins it to do something, does connecting it from the outset to action, to a social scenario (the sacrice) with other agents, and to an order pronounced by an Other.
padeas tu bhkta. kin tu viayeu prakamneu jnrayatay prakate. sarvpi savit tritayaprakik. avaya jtur anubhavo meynubhavev anuvartate. anyath svaparasavedyayor anatiaya syt. viayais sahopalambhaniyama ca eva saty upapanna. na hy tm viaynanuviddho vabhsate viay ca boddhary anavabhsamne bhsante. tasmt saiva savid viaye pramam. saiva purua viaykarotti tatsavittiphalabhgitve pi puruasya na karmat. karttaiva (TR II, p. 17). Cf. also PrP T p.334.
6 Primary sources
27
6 Primary sources
Prthasrathi and Rmnujcrya (1937). Nyyaratnaml of Prthasrathimira with the commentary of Rmnujcrya entitled the Nyakaratna, critically edited with an introduction and indexes. Ed. by K.S. Rmaswami stri iromai. Gaekwards Oriental Series 75. Baroda. Prthasrathi Mira. Sastradipika [stradpik] of Prtha Sarathi Misra with the Commentary called Yuktisneha Praprai by Pandit Rama Krishna Misra. Ed. by Laxman Shastri Dravid. Chowkhamb Sanskrit Series 188, 189, 190, 225 and 226. Benares: Vidya Vilas Press. (1977). stradpik. Ed. by Kioradda Svm. with bhmik and ippa by Subrahmaya str a Hind k by the editor. Vras: r Sdhubel Sasktamahvidylaya. Prabhkara Mira (1929). Bhat by Prabhkara Mira with the commentary juvimal of likantha Mira [reaching until ad MS 1.1.32]. Ed. by A. Chinnaswami Sastri. Chowkhamb Sanskrit Series 391. Benares: Vidya Vilas Press. Rmnujcrya (1956). Tantrarahasya. A Primer of Prbhkara Mms, critically ed. with Introduction and Appendices. Ed. by K.S. Rmaswami stri iromai. Baroda: Oriental Institute. abara and Dignga (1968). Materialien zur ltesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmammms. Ed. by Erich Frauwallner. Kommission fr Sprachen und Kulturen Sd- und Ostasiens; Philosophisch-Historische Klasse; Sitzungsberichte. Wien: sterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. likantha Mira (1961). Prakaraa Pacik of likantha Mira with the Nyya-Siddhi of Jaipuri Nryaa Bhaa. Ed. by A. Subrahmanya Sastri. Darana Series 4. Benares: Benares Hindu University. Utpaladeva (1994). The varapratyabhijkrik of Utpaladeva with the authors Vtti. Critical Edition and annotated translation. Ed. by Raaele Torella. Serie Orientale Roma LXXI. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.
7 Secondary sources
Bochenski, J.M. (1974). Was ist Autoritt? Freiburg, Basel, and Wien: Herder. Bronkhorst, Johannes (1996). The self as agent: a review article. In: Asiatische Studien/tudes Asiatiques, pp. 603621. Chisholm, Roderick M. (1989). On metaphysics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. isbn: 0816617678 9780816617678. Framarin, Christopher G. (2009). Desire and motivation in Indian philosophy. London; New York: Routledge. isbn: 9780203883679 0203883675. Freschi, Elisa (2007). Desidero Ergo Sum: The Subject as the Desirous One in Mms. In: Rivista di Studi Orientali 80.
7 Secondary sources
28
(2008). Structuring the Chaos: Bha Mms Hermeneutics as Depicted in Rmnujcryas straprameyapariccheda. Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of the Forth Section. In: East and West 58. (forthcoming). Did Mms authors formulate a theory of action? In: Pushpika: Tracing Ancient India Through Text and Traditions. Contributions to Current Research in Indology. Ed. by Nina Mirnig, Pter-Dniel Sznt, and Michael Williams. Vol. I. Oxford: Oxbow Books Press. Garge, Damodar Vishnu (1952). Citations in abara-Bhya (sic) (A Study). Deccan College Dissertation Series. Poona: Deccan College. Garrett, Brian (1991). Personal Identity and Reductionism. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51.2, pp. 361373. (1998). Persons. In: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. by Edward Craig. Vol. 7. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 318321. Mesquita, Roque (1994). Die Idee der Erlsung bei Kumrilabhaa. In: Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde Sd-Asiens 38, pp. 451484. Metzinger, Thomas (2003). Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. Cambridge MA, London: MIT Press. Mohanty, Jitendranath (1970). Phenomenology and ontology. Den Haag: Martinus Nijho. isbn: 9024750539 9789024750535. Perry, John (2002). Identity, personal identity, and the self. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub. isbn: 0872205215 9780872205215. Raju, P.T. (1994). Activism in Indian Thought. In: Studies in Mms. Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume. Ed. by R.C. Dwivedi. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, pp. 131168. Rati, Isabelle (2007). Otherness in the Pratyabhij philosophy. In: Journal of Indian Philosophy 35, pp. 313370. Schueler, G. F. (1995). Desire its role in practical reason and the explanation of action. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. isbn: 0585020469 9780585020464. Strawson, Peter Frederick (1959). Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics. London: Methuen. Taber, John (2007). Kumrila the Vedntin? In: Vednta and Mms: Interaction and Continuity. Ed. by Johannes Bronkhorst. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Torella, Raaele (1994). Introduction. In: The varapratyabhijkrik of Utpaladeva with the authors Vtti. Critical Edition and annotated translation. Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. Watson, Alex (2006). The Selfs Awareness of Itself: Bhaa Rmakahas Arguments against the Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self. Wien: De Nobili. Zahavi, Dan, ed. (2000). Exploring the Self. Philosophical and Psychopathological perspectives on self-experience. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Action, Desire and Subjectivity in Prabhakara Mimamsa

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Action, Desire and Subjectivity in Prbhkara Mms

3.3 4 4.1 4.2

2 Action, Desire and Subject: Emergence of the topic

2 Action, Desire and Subject: Emergence of the topic

2 Action, Desire and Subject: Emergence of the topic

2 Action, Desire and Subject: Emergence of the topic

2 Action, Desire and Subject: Emergence of the topic

2.1 Ritual as paradigm and the conundrum of desire

2.2 Prbhkara Mms on the conundrum of desire

2 Action, Desire and Subject: Emergence of the topic

2 Action, Desire and Subject: Emergence of the topic

2.3 Summing up the Prbhkara Mms view of the self

2 Action, Desire and Subject: Emergence of the topic

2.4 Integration of the three aspects of subjectivity

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading

3.1 Body and subject

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading

3 How to interpret the above? The ontology reading

For the whole inference, see Freschi forthcoming.

4 The phenomenological interpretation

4 The phenomenological interpretation

4 The phenomenological interpretation

4 The phenomenological interpretation

4.1 Which kind of proprioperception arises through a Vedic prescription?

Mohanty 1970, p. 101, Olivetti2007.

4 The phenomenological interpretation

4.2 The two interpretations in Rmnujcrya

4 The phenomenological interpretation

tath tm ca na mnasapratyaka. karmakartbhvavirodht. m jnmi iti vya-

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