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General Information __________________________________________ 6
Topic Analyses _______________________________________________ 22
Topic Analysis by Grant Sinnott _____________________________________ 23
Topic Analysis by Mark Allseits _____________________________________ 27
Topic Analysis by Cameron Silverglate _______________________________ 32
Frameworks _________________________________________________ 37
Pro Arguments with Con Responses ____________________________ 42
Action Justified Because of The Non Proliferation Treaty ________________ 43
A/2 Action Justified Because of The Non Proliferation Treaty ________ 47
Unilateral Action Superior to Multilateral ____________________________ 50
A/2 Unilateral Action Superior to Multilateral _____________________ 53
Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat __________________________________ 55
A/2 Nuclear Terrorism is a Real Threat __________________________ 61
U.S. Military Presence Stabilizes Regions _____________________________ 64
A/2 U.S. Military Presence Stabilizes Regions _____________________ 72
U.S. Military Action Prevents a Middle Eastern Arms Race _____________ 76
A/2 U.S. Military Action Prevents a Middle Eastern Arms Race _____ 80
Unilateralism Allows for a Faster Response ___________________________ 83
A/2 Unilateralism Allows for a Faster Response ____________________ 87
Moral Obligation _________________________________________________ 89
A/2 Moral Obligation _________________________________________ 92
A Nuclear Iran Poses A Threat To The United States ___________________ 94
A/2 A Nuclear Iran Poses A Threat To The United States ___________ 97
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Iranian Proxies in South America __________________________________ 100
A/2 Iranian Proxies in South America ___________________________ 105
U.S. Action Prevents Israeli Military Action Against Iran _______________ 108
A/2 U.S. Action Prevents Israeli Military Action Against Iran _______ 111
Proliferation Can Lead To Accidental Nuclear War ___________________ 114
A/2 Proliferation Can Lead To Accidental Nuclear War ____________ 117
Unilateral Force Prevents Allied Proliferation ________________________ 119
A/2 Unilateral Force Prevents Allied Proliferation ________________ 123
Alternative Unilateral Methods ____________________________________ 127
A/2 Alternative Unilateral Methods _____________________________ 131
U.S. Counterterror Policies Inhibit Nuclear Proliferation _______________ 135
A/2 U.S. Counterterror Policies Inhibit Nuclear Proliferation _______ 138
Vertical Proliferation is a Threat ___________________________________ 141
A/2 Vertical Proliferation is a Threat ___________________________ 146

Con Arguments with Pro Responses ___________________________ 149
Military Action Lacks Long Term Solvency __________________________ 150
A/2 Military Action Lacks Long Term Solvency __________________ 155
Multilateral Support Is Preferable And More Effective ________________ 160
A/2 Multilateral Support Is Preferable And More Effective _________ 165
Just War Theory _________________________________________________ 168
A/2 Just War Theory _________________________________________ 174
U.S. Attack Will Necessitate Future U.S. Attacks ______________________ 177
A/2 U.S. Attack Will Necessitate Future U.S. Attacks ______________ 181
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Military Force Creates Economic Backlash __________________________ 184
A/2 Military Force Creates Economic Backlash ___________________ 187
U.S. Attack Would Cause Long Term Intervention ____________________ 192
A/2 U.S. Attack Would Cause Long Term Intervention ____________ 196
Nuclear Proliferation Is Good ______________________________________ 199
A/2 Nuclear Proliferation Is Good ______________________________ 203
Sanctions Better Solve Nuclear Proliferation _________________________ 207
A/2 Sanctions Better Solve Nuclear Proliferation __________________ 213
U.S. Military Force Incentivizes Proliferation _________________________ 218
A/2 U.S. Military Force Incentivizes Proliferation _________________ 221
U.S. Attack Would Violate International Law ________________________ 223
A/2 U.S. Attack Would Violate International Law ________________ 229
Military Force Fails With Disasterous Consequences __________________ 233
A/2 Military Force Fails With Disasterous Consequences ___________ 237
Military Force Will Create Massive Backlash _________________________ 239
A/2 Military Force Will Create Massive Backlash _________________ 245
Diplomacy Better Solves Nuclear Proliferation ________________________ 249
A/2 Diplomacy Better Solves Nuclear Proliferation ________________ 254
U.S. Attack Would Cause Anti-American Sentiment ___________________ 258
A/2 U.S. Attack Would Cause Anti-American Sentiment ___________ 266
Military Force Harms Soft Power __________________________________ 268
A/2 Military Force Harms Soft Power ___________________________ 271

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Resolved: Unilateral military force by the United States is justified to prevent
nuclear proliferation.

Foreword: We, at Champion Briefs, feel that having deep knowledge about a topic is just as
valuable as formulating the right arguments. Having general background knowledge about the
topic area helps debaters form more coherent arguments from their breadth of knowledge. As
such, we have compiled general information on the key concepts and general areas that we feel
will best suit you for in- and out-of-round use. Any strong strategy or argument must be built
from a strong foundation of information; we hope that you will utilize this section to help build
that foundation.

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Nuclear Weapon States and Estimated Stockpiles

History of Nuclear Proliferation

United States (1945):
Creation: The program known as the Manhattan Project, directed by US physicist
Robert Oppenheimer and General Leslie R. Groves, involved over 30 different research,
production, and testing sites. These included both plutonium and uranium enrichment
facilities as many paths were pursued in parallel to ensure success and speed up the
program. 5 By the end of the war, four different technologies were industrialized, and
implosion and enrichment strategies succeeded at about the same time (Charnysh 2).
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Expansion: By 1954, the first Hbombs were successfully tested by both countries, but
the world hardly became safer. The United States has produced an estimated 66,500
nuclear bombs and warheads of 100 types and modifications for its operational stockpile
since 1945. Virtually any part of the Earth's surface is within the reach of the current US
arsenal (Charnysh 2).

Spurring Global Expansion w/ USSR: Ironically, [President Eisenhowers] his
predictions actualized to a large extent as a result of the program he pioneered. Its
positive contribution notwithstanding, the Atoms for Peace program accelerated the
global spread of nuclear weapons technology as the United States and the Soviet Union
began giving out nuclear research reactors to their friends and allies to establish strategic
ties with developing countries in the Cold War frenzy. The United States signed more
than 40 nuclear cooperation agreements, including the treaties with apartheid South
Africa and Francisco Francos fascist government in Spain. The Soviet Union assisted
China and North Korea. Algeria, Bangladesh, Colombia, the Congo, Ghana, Israel,
Jamaica, Peru, Syria, Turkey, and many of Eastern European countries were rewarded
with nuclear technology. The United States all but gave nuclear weapons to India by
training Indian scientists and providing nuclear materials and technology
(Charnysh 3).

Russia (Soviet Union/USSR) (1949):
As Professor of International History David Holloway states, The decision to build
that atomic bomb was a profoundly political decision, intended to secure the
countrys international prestige and security in the post-war period. To catch up with
the United States, the increasingly isolated Soviet Union launched a full-speed secret
nuclear weapons program, putting effort into both the processing and the enrichment
paths to the bomb. The Soviet luminaries of science were assisted by a group of
German physicists taken to the Soviet Union after Germanys surrender as well as
by the Soviet military intelligence. The crash program to get the bomb as soon as
possible whatever the cost succeeded in 1949 when a nuclear device made with
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plutonium was tested. The uranium route to the bomb worked out shortly afterward, and
the first thermonuclear weapon was tested in August 1953 (Charnysh 4).

Hot Zones Loose nukes: Before its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union had more than 27,000
nuclear weapons and enough weapons-grade plutonium and uranium to triple that number. Since,
severe economic distress, rampant crime, and widespread corruption in Russia and other former
Soviet countries have fed concerns in the West about loose nukes, underpaid nuclear scientists,
and the smuggling of nuclear materials. Security at Russias nuclear storage sites remains
worrisome (Loose Nukes). Since 1993, there have been 419 cases of smuggled or stolen
nuclear materials worldwide. Today, about 1.6 million kilograms of highly enriched uranium and
500,000 kilograms of plutoniumenough to make more than 125,000 nuclear bombsexist in
nations across the globe (Koren).

United Kingdom (1952):
After the bomb was produced, the United States unilaterally broke its nuclear
partnership with Britain in 1946 (McMahon Act), fearing further proliferation. The
British immediately advanced on an independent push for the bomb and tested a
plutonium-implosion bomb in 1952. The US and Soviet tests of the hydrogen bomb in
1952 and 1954, respectively, led the British government to launch an effort to also
develop thermonuclear weapon, which was successfully tested in 1957. Once it was
too late to deter the British from acquiring the weapons capabilities, initial qualms
evaporated, and the US-UK cooperation was restored. Subsequent purchase of US
submarine missiles further enhanced British nuclear capabilities. The British forces
even deployed US tactical nuclear weapons under a NATO provision of nuclear sharing.
In 2008 the British arsenal was estimated to comprise 180-200 warheads (48
available on patrol at any given time) (Charnysh 4).

France (1960):
France had been involved in nuclear research before World War II and resumed its
nuclear program, devoted to basic and peaceful scientific research, in the 1950s.
However, after three of its former allies acquired the atomic bomb, a secret Committee
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for the Military Applications of Atomic Energy was formed and a development
program for delivery vehicles was launched (Charnysh 5).
Reasons for Getting the Bomb:
Several factors led to the fateful decision to acquire the bomb. To Charles de Gaulle,
producing a French bomb meant answering the question Will France remain France?
Having suffered a loss of status at the end of WWII, and yet another crushing
political defeat by a former colony in the Suez Crisis, Paris decided to reinforce its
global status by obtaining an independent nuclear deterrent. A compounding factor
was security considerations. France was losing the Indochina war, and Eisenhowers
refusal to assist the isolated French army at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 undermined the
credibility of American security guarantees. Germanys renewed sovereignty after
WWII was also perceived as a threat to French security. Powered by pride and fear,
the French nuclear weapons drive succeeded in 1960 when a device using a byproduct of
the civilian program plutonium was exploded (Charnysh 5).

China (1964):
Anxious about the nuclearization of the West, China signed an agreement with the
Soviet Union whereby Beijing supplied uranium ore in exchange for the Soviet
technical assistance in developing nuclear weapons. In 1953 China established a
research program under the guise of civilian nuclear energy. Initially, the Chinese
decided to pursue both the enriched uranium and plutonium routes, but after the Soviet
aid was cut off in 1960, scarcity of technical expertise and financial resources dictated
that the more developed enrichment route be continued. China tested an atomic bomb
using highly enriched uranium (HEU) in 1964. The first plutonium explosion came in
1968. China has also presumably tested a hydrogen bomb (Charnysh 5).

Iran:
Nuclear program condemned and sanctioned under multiple UN Security Council
Resolutions
Possesses ballistic missiles with a range of at least 1,500 km
Produced 95.4 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% as of February 2012 (Iran).
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Iran's nuclear program began in the 1950s but was slow to progress. The United States
supplied the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) with a small 5MWt research
reactor (TRR), fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU), in 1967. In 1973, the Shah
unveiled ambitious plans to install 23,000MWe of nuclear power in Iran by the end of the
century, charging the newly founded Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) with
oversight of this task (Iran).
Iran signed long-term nuclear cooperation agreements with Pakistan and China, in 1987
and 1990 respectively. Accords with both countries involved the training of Iranian
personnel, and China also agreed to provide Iran with a 27KW miniature neutron source
reactor (MNSR) and two 300MW Qinshan power reactors. [7] In January 1995, Russia
announced that it would complete Bushehr's construction and agreed to build three
additional reactors (Iran).

Israel:
Israel began its search for nuclear weapons at the inception of the state in 1948. As
payment for Israeli participation in the Suez Crisis of 1956, France provided nuclear
expertise and constructed a reactor complex for Israel at Dimona capable of large-
scale plutonium production and reprocessing. The United States discovered the
facility by 1958 and it was a subject of continual discussions between American
presidents and Israeli prime ministers. Israel used delay and deception to at first keep
the United States at bay, and later used the nuclear option as a bargaining chip for a
consistent American conventional arms supply. After French disengagement in the
early 1960s, Israel progressed on its own, including through several covert operations, to
project completion. Before the 1967 Six-Day War, they felt their nuclear facility
threatened and reportedly assembled several nuclear devices. By the 1973 Yom Kippur
War Israel had a number of sophisticated nuclear bombs, deployed them, and
considered using them. The Arabs may have limited their war aims because of their
knowledge of the Israeli nuclear weapons. Israel has most probably conducted several
nuclear bomb tests. They have continued to modernize and vertically proliferate and
are now one of the world's larger nuclear powers. Using bomb in the basement
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nuclear opacity, Israel has been able to use its arsenal as a deterrent to the Arab
world while not technically violating American nonproliferation requirements
(Farr).

Hot Zone - Iran & Israel:
The threat from Irans nuclear program is growing but not yet imminent.
Credible evidence suggests 1313Risk and Rivalry Iran, Israel and the Bomb that Iran is
pursuing a nuclear hedging strategy that aims to develop the indigenous technical
capability to rapidly produce nuclear weapons at some point, should Irans supreme
leader decide to do so. However, Iran is at least a year and likely further away from
developing nuclear weapons.
Multiple Iranian nuclear futures are possible. If Irans nuclear progress continues,
the supreme leader could conceivably be satisfied with stopping at a threshold
capability just short of full-fledged weaponization. If the Iranian regime chooses instead
to cross the nuclear threshold, the ultimate size and character of Irans nuclear arsenal
could follow a number of different pathways, each of which would produce different
risks.
Iran is unlikely to deliberately use a nuclear weapon or transfer a nuclear device to
terrorists for use against Israel. The Iranian regime is not suicidal and is sufficiently
rational for the basic logic of nuclear deterrence to hold.
A nuclear-armed Iran would nevertheless be more aggressive and dangerous than
an Iran without nuclear weapons. If Tehran thought that its nuclear deterrent would
protect it against retaliation, Iran would be emboldened to increase its support for proxies
in the Levant and terrorism abroad.
A more crisis-prone Israeli-Iranian rivalry would create some inherent risk of
inadvertent nuclear war. The possibility of Israeli-Iranian nuclear escalation has been
somewhat exaggerated, but it is not trivial and would have potentially devastating
consequences (Khal 6).

Pakistan:
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Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was established in 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, who founded the program while he was Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural
Resources, and later became President and Prime Minister. Shortly after the loss of East
Pakistan in the 1971 war with India, Bhutto initiated the program with a meeting of
physicists and engineers at Multan in January 1972. India's 1974 testing of a
nuclear "device" gave Pakistan's nuclear program new momentum. Through the late
1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and
expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these
efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him
knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position
at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Dr. Khan
also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment technologies from
Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta
facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed
an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and
technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities. In 1985, Pakistan
crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to
have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued
advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the
nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987 (Pakistan
Nuclear Weapons).

India:
Indias nuclear policy was also in!uenced by Indias international security
condition as well as by domestic variables such as the vagaries of political change and
the in!uence of bureaucratic elites. Indeed, Indias decision to build a nuclear force
was taken only in the late 1980s, much after it had become clear that Pakistan
with Chinese technological assistance had made rapid advances in the nuclear
weapons programme. As for bureaucratic in!uence, some defence scientists played a
key role in keeping the weapons programme alive even when there was no political
support or indeed, active opposition, while other bureaucrats were responsible for
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creating political awareness of Indias declining nuclear options. Nevertheless, these
variables suggest a moderate Indian approach to nuclear weapons and thus
reinforce the dominant tendency towards a political rather a military approach to
looking at nuclear weapons. They do not suggest any dramatic changes nor rapid
advances in Indias nuclear weapons programme (Rajagopalan 95).

Hot Zone Pakistan & India:
The escalation in nuclear capabilities has caused alarm because, despite recent
improvements in relations between the two countries, the threat of a nuclear conflict
remains. There were fears of a military clash in 2008, shortly after Pakistan-based
terrorists launched a multi-target attack on Mumbai, while in 2002 there were real
concerns that rising tensions could lead to a nuclear attack. Those concerns are based
on Pakistan's development of "first-strike" tactical short-range warheads to counter
India's superior conventional forces and weak mechanisms to avoid misunderstandings
between the two countries in a military build-up (Nelson).
The danger is that the two countries have yet to develop the channels of dialogue
between their military chiefs to ensure there are no catastrophic misunderstandings
over troop movements and military exercises. (Nelson).

North Korea:
North Korea has periodically asserted its need for a nuclear deterrent since the
Korean War, when the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons against it.
Although North Korea joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1985, Pyongyang announced its decision to
withdraw from the NPT in 2003, having apparently used membership in the treaty
as a faade while it covertly developed a nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang's
long-standing nuclear weapons efforts culminated in nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and
2013. The UN Security Council has issued a series of sanctions against North Korea's
nuclear program, including Resolution 1695, Resolution 1718, Resolution 1874, and
Resolution 2087. The Six-Party Talks between North Korea, South
Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States began in 2003 with the goal of
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denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. However, these talks have been suspended
since April 2009. Tensions have continued to rise since North Korea torpedoed the South
Korean naval ship, the Cheonan, and shelled the island of Yeonpyeong in 2010. North
Korea possesses full nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, including a presumed basic
capability to enrich uranium, although the functionality of its centrifuges has not yet
been substantiated to the outside world. North Korea is building a small light water
reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon, which will be fueled by the enriched uranium after it is
completed (North Korea).

Hot Zone Korean Aggression:
In a swiftly escalating cycle of harsh international reactions to the test and toughening
rhetoric of war from Pyongyang, North Korea invalidated the 1953 armistice
agreement, cut hot lines to Seoul and Washington, threatened to raze Seoul and
strike U.S. targets, and closed the jointly operated industrial zone in Kaesong to nearly
500 South Korean workers (Thakur).
North Korea has a long history of serial threats and provocations, including the
sinking of the corvette Cheonan that killed 46 crew and the shelling of South
Koreas Yeonpyeong Island in 2010. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, who died in late
2011, was skilled at calibrating tensions and cooling it in return for oil, aid or
respect. But the son who succeeded him, Kim Jong Un, is a young and inexperienced
leader. He might be trying to reprise his fathers and grandfathers tactics of
ratcheting up tensions, winning additional concessions, distracting attention from
domestic problems, and then winding down tensions again (Thakur).

Mutually Assured Destruction

Prior to the production of nuclear weapons, war could be waged with an acceptable cost
to the victor, since much of the war could be fought and won on enemy soil. However, with the
advent of nuclear weapons and the fear of mutually assured destruction, wars are less likely to
occur because a nuclear war would cause insurmountable damage to both the victor and the
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loser. In short, any conceived benefits of war are outweighed by the possibility of enormous
costs.
In addition, Nuclear weapons largely balance the strength of two countries, which
can prevent war. For most of history, wars were decided by a superior military force. The side
with the most soldiers, or best technology, or largest industrial production would almost certainly
be victorious. A victory through military superiority made it possible for a more powerful nation
to exert its will on a weaker nation. Recently, nuclear weapons have balanced the playing
field between countries with strong and weak militaries. The fact is that no amount of
tanks, planes, or ships can protect a nation against a well-hidden stock of defensive nuclear
weapons. A weaker nation merely needs to acquire a few nuclear weapons, after which the
amount of damage either state can inflict on the other will be roughly even. In this way, nuclear
weapons balance military inequities, and prevent stronger nations from starting wars
against weaker nations.
The sheer power of nuclear weapons facilitates cautious decisions and negotiations,
which in turn prevents war. Nuclear weapons are frightening. To many, their power to
destroy is incomprehensible. This fear is amplified by the fact that we have not witnessed a
nuclear war: the terrors that accompany a war with nuclear weapons are unknown.
However, it could be argued that this fear is beneficial. As Ziegler suggests, when both sides
possess enormous means of destruction, the traditional fear of losing war is joined by a
second fear, that of ever getting into a war in the first place. Thus, the sheer power of
nuclear weapons forces leaders to think long and hard about entering a war. Furthermore,
communication between nation states increases because both sides have much to lose.
Communication, in turn, helps clear misperceptions about a rival state's intentions.
Understanding rival intentions helps, nations avoid crises; and leads both nations towards
a common middle ground. Thus, the fear that accompanies nuclear weapons helps prevent
war.
Fourth and finally, Nuclear weapons prevent conflict by debunking militaristic
glorifications of war. When a country overvalues military virtues, people forget the
undeniable atrocities that accompany war and instead see it as beneficial to the nation and
the individual. Proponents of militarism romanticize war to raise popular support for war.
Militarism suggests that war helps shape an individual's virtues, such as loyalty, bravery,
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discipline, and strength. In this mindset, war is seen as a rite of passage to manhood.
Nuclear weapons dissolve these militaristic illusions. They expose the realities of war; instead
of men toughing it out on the battlefield, cities are obliterated with the single press of a button.
Faced with nuclear weapons, no amount of loyalty, bravery, or strength will protect the
soldier. Rather than the glorious rite of passage to manhood, nuclear war becomes the cold
slaughter of soldiers and civilians alike. In this way, nuclear weapons reduce militarism,
thereby preventing war.

Unilateral vs. Multilateral Action

Unilateralism:
No country can rule out unilateral action in cases that involve its very survival. Self-
defense is permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and pre-emptive self-
defense may be necessary when a terrorist organization presents a strong or
imminent threat. President Bush's military action in Afghanistan was largely unilateral,
but was carried out against a backdrop of support from NATO allies and UN resolutions
(Nye)

Multilateralism:
However, some transnational issues are inherently multilateral and cannot be
managed without the help of other countries. Climate change is a perfect example. The
US is the largest source of greenhouse gases, but three quarters of the sources originate
outside its borders. Without cooperation, the problem is beyond American control. The
same is true of a long list of items: the spread of infectious diseases, the stability of
global financial markets, the international trade system, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, narcotics trafficking, international crime syndicates
and transnational terrorism.
Multilateralism is a mechanism to get other countries to share the burden of
providing public goods. Sharing also helps foster commitment to common values. Even
militarily, the US should rarely intervene alone. Not only does this comport with the
preferences of the American public - polls show that two-thirds of Americans prefer
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multilateral actions to unilateral ones - but it has practical implications as well. The
US pays a minority share of UN and NATO peacekeeping operations, and the legitimacy
of a multilateral umbrella reduces collateral political costs to America's so-called "soft"
or attractive power - ie, its aid and cultural initiatives (Nye).

Choosing which is best:
Finally, in choosing between multilateral and unilateral tactics, Americans must
consider the effects of the decision on its soft power, which can be destroyed by
excessive unilateralism and arrogance. In balancing whether to use multilateral or
unilateral tactics, or to adhere or refuse to go along with particular multilateral
initiatives, any country must consider how to explain its actions to others and what
the effects will be on its soft power (Nye).
If the US first makes an effort to consult others and try a multilateral approach, its
occasional unilateral tactics are more likely to be forgiven. But if America succumbs to
the unilateralist temptation too easily, it is likely to encounter the criticisms that the
Bush Administration is now encountering. In such cases, the likelihood of failure
increases, because of the intrinsically multilateral nature of transnational issues in a
global age, and the costly effects on US soft power that unaccepted unilateral actions
may impose. Even a solitary superpower should follow this rule of thumb: try
multilateralism first (Nye).
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Works Cited

Charnysh, Volha. "A Brief History of Nuclear Proliferation." Nuclear Age for Peace Foundation.
N.p., 2009. Web. <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/pdfs/Proliferation_History.pdf>.
Farr, Warner D. "The Third Temple's Holy Of Holies: Israel's Nuclear Weapons." Air War
College. Air University, Sept. 1999. Web. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-
pubs/farr.htm>.
"Iran." NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. N.p., 2013. Web. <http://www.nti.org/country-
profiles/iran/nuclear/>.
Kahl, Colin H., Melissa G. Dalton, and Matthew Irvine. "Risk and Rivalry: Iran, Israel, and the
Bomb." Center for New American Security. N.p., June 2012. Web.
<http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_RiskandRivalry_Kahl_0.pdf>
Koren, Marina. "Top Ten Cases of Nuclear Thefts Gone Wrong." Smithsonian Magazine. N.p., 4
Feb. 2013. Web. <http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/Top-Ten-Cases-of-
Nuclear-Thefts-Gone-Wrong-189690171.html>.
Nelson, Dean. "India and Pakistan 'escalate Nuclear Arms Race'" The Telegraph. N.p., 5 June
2012. Web.
"North Korea." NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. N.p., May 2013. Web.
<http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/nuclear/>.
"Nuclear Weapons and the Second World War." MIT OpenCourseWare. N.p., Spring 2009.
Web. <http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/political-science/17-42-causes-and-prevention-of-war-
spring-2009/assignments/MIT17_42S09_student1assn2.pdf>.
Nye, Joseph S. "Unilateralism vs. Multilateralism." Project Syndicate. N.p., 24 Sept. 2002. Web.
<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/unilateralism-vs--multilateralism>.
"Pakistan Nuclear Weapons." Strategic Security Projecy. Federation of American Scientists, 11
Dec. 2002. Web. <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/>.
Rajagopalan, Rajesh. "India's Nuclear Policy." National Institute for Defense Studies. N.p., 2009.
Web. <http://www.nids.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2009/e_06.pdf>.
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Thakur, Ramesh. "North Korean Nuclear Crisis." Japan Times. N.p., 11 June 2013. Web.
<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/06/11/commentary/north-korean-nuclear-
crisis/#.UhQ0KWTwJns>.
"World Nuclear Stockpile Report." Ploughshares Fund. N.p., 2 May 2013. Web.
<http://ploughshares.org/world-nuclear-stockpile-report>.

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The best way to approach this topic is by breaking down all of the key terms. The rest of
the brief will provide definitions that will give you a literal meaning, but I think it will be
important to understand how certain interpretations can interact with each other to allow for
different lines of argumentation. After breaking down the individual parts of the resolution, this
analysis will then delve into which lines of argumentation will work best with each strategy.

The word unilateral can be interpreted in a couple of ways: either A) an action solely
taken by the U.S or B) an action where the U.S. bears the vast majority of the burden. There is an
argument to be made on both sides about the scope and parameters of the resolution. The
affirmative will most likely want to expand the topic, and the negative will seek to constrict it.
With this in mind, the affirmative could argue that because almost no actions in the world are
taken without the consent or approval of other countries, that it is only fair if the affirmative can
include actions and policies spearheaded by the U.S. On the flip side, the negative could easily
interpret the resolution more rigidly. By citing the literal definition of unilateral and by
explaining that bilateral and multilateral policy options are clearly different, the negative could
create a very persuasive case that exists outside of theoretical argumentation about what debate
"should be."

The next term in the resolution is "military force." There is a lot of room to play around
here. I'll start out with some of the more abusive interpretations, and then offer an explanation
for the one I find the most persuasive. This is the part of the resolution that locks the affirmative
into their advocacy (AKA what they are going to have to do in the round). The standard or
condition that the advocacy must meet will be established by the term "justified", but more on
that later. Starting with a potential negative position - the more abusive of the two. The negative
can interpret military force to include the presence of troops and or military bases. It is important
to remember that this interpretation would immediately impact on how you evaluate the first
term unilateral. By expanding the definition of military force to include troop presence and bases,
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the affirmative would be EXTREMELY hard pressed to find any examples of what would then
be a unilateral action, because the negative has made the use of foreign bases/troops/supplies
things that would expand the definition of unilateral to bilateral or multilateral. To do this, the
negative needs to come up with a clever definition or interpretation of the word force, and, also
be prepared to beat back arguments about abusiveness. I think the affirmative can counter this
strategy quite well by interpreting the word "force" as literally as the negative should interpret
unilateral. This will allow the affirmative to carve out unique advocacies based upon specific
ACTIONS. The key word in the last sentence is actions because even if the policy includes the
consent or logistical support of other countries, your interpretation of force as actions based
policies will allow you to avoid the more nit picky negative positions. Due to the large number
of burdens that this resolution places on the affirmative, I think the second interpretation of force
is the most persuasive because it allows for solid debate by both sides. If the negative loads to
many eggs into a single "trick," they could easily be left high and dry.

The next phrase "is justified is the one I find the most interesting in the resolution. This
term sets up a condition the affirmative has to meet, and that negative must show the affirmative
doesn't meet. After listening to a lot of argumentation about this term, I think it needs to be
cleared up. If youre going to take the time to define it, then define it well and explain it with
warrants. If not then just leave it a muddled mess, and it probably will not hurt or help you. I do,
however, think the first option is the better choice. I think most people will define what is just
from the government perspective as: the action that promotes the most good for the most people,
utilitarianism/consequentialism. Under most interpretations of this ethical system, for the action
to be just it must promote the most good. This means for the negative they would only have to
prove that a functional alternative would do one more iota of good, and they would stop the
affirmative from meeting that condition. Sadly, this is true for almost any interpretation of what
is "just." I think there is a case for the affirmative to make about only having to prove that the
action is good to be just. Although, this line of argumentation wouldn't function under a system
of morality, but rather a basic interpretation of what debate should be. By claiming that the
affirmative just needs to prove the action in the resolution is good, the affirmative could claim
this allows for the most fair and equal debate. Otherwise, the negative could easily just show that
one option cost 1 dollar less or saves on less live, which would ins to facto make the affirmative
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unjust. This discussion leads into the next term "to prevent nuclear proliferation," which I will
touch on briefly before bringing the analysis full circle.

The action is taken with the purpose/goal of preventing nuclear proliferation. I think very
simply that proliferation means the spread of weapons. This can interpreted as the spread of
weapons to states not in the NPT, as some definitions define it. This would of course preclude
terrorists because they are not a states. Another interpretation could include the spread of nuclear
technology for energy/weapons. However, I just think this position is most likely not supported
in real literature, and it would most likely be developed from some interestingly interpreted cards.

To sum it all up, I think the affirmatives best strategy is to argue that we have to
compare all reasonable real world scenarios where would we use unilateral military force. They
should try and generate some unique benefits to the use of unilateral force in those scenarios, and
then explain how the implementation in the real world would generate other positive benefits.
This gives you uniqueness and allows you to best meet that condition set by "justified. I honestly
think a drone advocacy/ NK invasion/ Iran invasion position best gets you there. On the negative,
start by setting up all of those abusive hurdles at different points in the resolution, then if they
start to beat them back just fall back to a fair interpretation. There is no need to use too many
tricks, just try and win on substance. They will already be fighting a time skew that puts them at
a disadvantage. The negative should run advocacies that will critique all unilateral action and
then should have a specific scenario in which unilateral action does a lot of serious damage.
Ultimately, the best debates will come down to comparisons between warrants about why
unilateral or multilateral actions are better, but this topic leaves so much mud in the way of that
goal that I doubt most debates will get there.

In addition to the strategy that is offered in this section and the advice given on how to
run certain positions, the next part of this analysis is going to offer a more in depth discussion of
substance. The best affirmative positions are going to be carved out around plan-based action.
There is solid evidence that talks about why the United States should invade specific countries to
stop nuclear proliferation. When this topic comes to mind, the immediate place one is to think of
is Iran. The high probability of Iran getting nuclear weapons makes it a hot topic in international
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relations. Of course where would Iran and the United States be without their good friend Israel?
This is where the topic at hand gets interesting because this throws another actor into the
scenario. There are a couple of ways to approach this new actor. The negative could claim that
the U.S would attack with them as an ally in all situations eliminating the affirmatives ground.
The affirmative, however, could argue that the reason the United States should intervene is that
Israeli involvement would not be beneficial, because of their inferior military and increased
political backlash stemming from their invasion. The rest of the world really doesnt love the
Israel. Moreover, there is an argument to be made that the United States couldnt actually take
the action without it being bilateral or multilateral. This would bring about the question
reasonability, but I think there is evidence to warrant the U.S taking the action.

The next serious area of substance in most debates will surround the question of whether
or not intervention is positive in the terms of the quantity of nuclear proliferation before and after
intervention takes place. There are many arguments to be made that intervention will increase the
overall amount of proliferation. When you look to make these arguments, its important to look at
literature talking about intervention in general. This literature will talk about destabilization or
the increase in stability that intervention can have. Just remember that substance is a crucial part
of this topic.

Good Luck!

About Grant Sinnott

Grant Sinnott was a Public Forum debater for Lake Highland Prep in Florida and
graduated in May 2013. He was the Champion of the 2013 NFL National Tournament, the
Sunvitational, Sunvitational Round Robin, the Florida State Tournament. Additionally, he was a
finalist at the Tournament of Champions, the Glenbrooks, and Emory. Throughout his career, he
amassed 10 TOC bids among other achievements. Grant will be attending the University of
Florida in the Fall.

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Welcome back everyone and I hope you all are looking forward to the 2013-2014 debate
season. This topic, in my opinion, is a great topic to learn the fundamentals of debate and will be
a true test of who is the better debater in round and not necessarily about who is the better
researcher. Dont get me wrong; this topic warrants just as much reading as any other topic.
However, this topic is one that is not nested in empirical findings but rather is nested in the
debaters ability to think on their feet.

This topic is very interesting in its nature, because it is straying away from what PFD
used to be all about. Topics used to focus more on real tangible issues that would mandate
debaters to do large amounts of quantitative research to accompany and support the conceptual
aspects of debate. What I mean by the conceptual aspect of debate is the understanding of why
things happen. The most common example of this that comes to mind when thinking about this
topic would be the concept of MAD or mutually assured destruction. For those of you who
dont know what MAD is, it essentially contends that no country will use nuclear weapons to
attack another nation because the victim country of the initial nuclear attack will either retaliate
with nuclear weapons or one of the victims ally nations will retaliate with nuclear weapons. This
is the concept of deterrence, which is explained through the theory of mutually assured
destruction. This topic is unique in the sense that for the most part this topic is not one that calls
for a very big numbers debate. It is not going to be a very card by card-oriented debate but rather
a debate that often times will be focusing on the big picture.

I found myself in almost all cases as a very card and stat oriented debater who
frequently focused on the minutia of the debate while spending a minimal amount of time linking
back to the big picture and talking about how things happen logically. For those of you who are
like me, you are going to have to adapt. Adaptation was one of the greatest skills that I had
learned in debate but I think that a lot of people view adaptation as something that you only have
to do for the judge, but adaptation comes in many forms. You have to adapt to each and every
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topic because each of the new topics that you will have to debate this year and in the years to
come will have unique and more polarized views on certain issues, different types of topic
literature, and different aspects of the resolution that may be more appealing than others. In order
to be successful on this topic I believe that a lot of teams who are more hyper specific technical
debaters will need to take a step back from their usual tactics and start to look at the big picture.

This topic, more than others, will force debaters to analyze how international relations
function. In this instance, we are talking about international relations in a nuclear world and how
that may affect the international community and the United States. A great example of this would
be the idea of MAD. MAD is a widely accepted and is grounded in history and explains rational
actors, for the most part nations, will not use nuclear weapons because of the fear of retaliation
via other nuclear arsenals.

This is interesting because we know that we cant really throw numbers at this argument
to attack but rather we have to take a step back from the way we would normally think. You as
the debater need to think about argument logically, or read a lot of authors who critique the main
theories for nuclear weapons in international relations. An example of doing this would be
realizing that there are more than rational state actors in this world. Thus, the idea of MAD
doesnt apply to actors who do not fall under the category of rational. There are a few different
types of actors. Rational actors are actors who realize the consequences of them taking an action.
Irrational actors are actors who take actions that are not predictable and are not in their own
interests. Non-rational actors will be one of the most common actors when speaking about
nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear terrorism. An example of this would a terrorist who
claims that his religion mandates him to kill. The act of killing a random person as an act of
terror in the community is not rational, but that doesnt make someone irrational because the
terrorist is choosing to take an action. Terrorists, for the most part, fall under the category of non-
rational actors because they acknowledge the risks that they will incur for acts of terror but are
willing to take those consequences.

On the idea of running a nuclear terror argument, I have come to realize that there is a lot
of competing evidence about whether or not terrorists can facilitate a successful nuclear attack.
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Whenever there is a topic to where you know that there will be evidence clash on a certain issue
like nuclear terrorism, you need to be prepared to defend your evidence, the warrants behind
your evidence, the credibility of your authors, the dates of your evidence, etc. It is important for
the affirmative to do three things when arguing nuclear terrorism on this topic. First, the
affirmative must prove that terrorists have the motive to attack the United States or another
country with nuclear weapons. Second, the affirmative must prove that terrorists have the
capability to successfully attack their target, be it the US or not. Third, the affirmative must
prove that the United States can unilaterally use its military to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons to or by terrorists. Notice how there is still something missing from this
argument, which is the impact section. This is something that you as the debater must focus on in
order to win arguments not only on this topic, but also on any topic in general. Probability x
Magnitude = Threat or Impact

This is a commonly accepted weighing mechanism that has grown in importance over the
years in the PFD community. Probability is the likelihood that your impact will happen, while
magnitude is the severity of the issue at hand and your ability to solve for that issue. There is one
major weighing mechanism left that should also be taken into account, the time frame. This
argues that impacts that happen now are more important than impacts that will happen later in
the future. A great generic example of this is that implementing a high cost economic policy that
will yield benefits in 100 years while you are in a recession. While the benefits might come 100
years down the road and potentially be big, the impact of spending money in a recession on a
high cost policy will do more harm than good. Thus, the time frame can become a voting issue
for the judge as well. Time frame on this topic might play a role if you are talking about the time
frame of the U.S.s ability to attack Iran before it gets a nuclear weapon, but the impacts of using
a nuclear weapon are in my opinion relatively timeless. Thus, I dont think that when a nuclear
attack will happen is all that relevant. If the U.S. were to strike Iran now, to prevent them from
getting a nuclear weapon for another two years, but then they strike the U.S. when they get the
weapon in two years, it really doesnt matter when they would strike the U.S. because a life is a
life regardless of what year the person was born in.

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There is another way in which you need to adapt and I believe that will be a key element
of success for tournaments like Yale, Crestian, Blue Key, etc. which is to decrease the amount of
contentions that you run in your case. The topic of nuclear weapons proliferation has been an
issue that has filled the press since the start of the Cold War and because of the magnitude of a
full out nuclear attack, countries often times make the headlines still today by using their nuclear
weapons to try and pressure non-nuclear states to take certain courses of action. Because of this,
topic literature exists about nuclear weapons from the Cold War era all the way up through
modern day.

There is a lot of different knowledge and input from a wide variety of different authors on
this topic. I believe that because of the amount of topic literature that exists, there is a large
number of authors who write specific indicts to other authors claims. In many instances you will
find the author who was accused responding in a later journal or article to the accuser and so on
so forth. What that means is if you try and go for too many different positions in your case, you
will create a very shallow debate because you will not be fully carrying out a debate. This also
means that you should be looking for specific authors in your research and then looking for
authors who indict those authors. This will lead you on an adventure that will allow you to kind
of see how the debate will pan out before you ever step foot into a round.

You will only be arguing the tip of the iceberg if you try and go for too many arguments
on this topic and ignoring the massive part of the debate that lies below the surface. Thus, it
could be advantageous for you to take one position and argue that position from two or maybe
even one different position(s). An example of this could be that the United States should
unilaterally attack Iran before Israel intervenes. This is not something that could be explained in
a quick blippy contention because you need to prove so many different steps in order for your
argument to be held true. First you need to prove that Iran poses a threat to the United States or
international community, and that that threat justifies the use of unilateral military force by the
United States to try and intervene to solve the problem. Then you need to prove that the United
States has the knowledge of where Iran is stashing their nuclear reactors and production facilities
that the United States could attack. Then you need to prove that the United States can
successfully attack all of Irans bases before Israel does. As you can see, there is a very tenuous
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link story or series of arguments that you need to win in order to make this argument function.
Do not let this scare you away from running arguments like this because there is a great deal of
validity behind it. What that means is that a short contention will not allow you to run
contentions like this, because you will miss some of the very important links that you need to
establish in order to garner the impact of striking Iran before Israel does. After coaching this
topic over summer at camps, I have come to the conclusions that teams who took fewer positions
and really fleshed out one or two argument(s) were the teams that were winning rounds.

So, what does this mean for you as the debater when you are researching for this topic?
As always, you should start researching this topic by using this brief and going on an excursion
of your own to start to read some of the author names that you find in this brief. While a lot of
times, you will be able to reference a lot to specific numbers to make your argument convincing,
I feel that this topic is going to be more about you associating certain theories with author names.
For example, the theory of MAD is often associated with the author Kenneth Waltz. Things like
this in preparation will be very helpful to you because this debate will be more focused on a
conceptual debate and not a numbers debate.

Good luck and have fun! I hope to see you all at a few tournaments this year.

About Mark Allseits

Mark Allseits attended and competed for Pine View School and graduated in May 2013.
He competed in Public Forum Debate during his four-year forensics career. He was the
champion of the 2013 Tournament of Champions and the Yale Invitational, earning Top Speaker
awards at both tournaments. Additionally, he placed in the top four at the NCFL Grand National
Tournament in his junior year and the Florida State Championship in his junior and senior years.
Additionally, Mark acted as the coach of Pine Views debate team, working with over 50 Public
Form Debaters to build a successful program. Mark is currently a freshman at Western Kentucky
University, majoring in political science.

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Summer vacation is over, and debate season is here. Lazy Mondays will soon be coffee
induced, leisure time will transform into the prep variety (there isnt much to go around, except
at Yale), and time spent building sand castles will be used bulldozing straw men. This year,
however, the NFL is ringing in even more change: a two-month topic. But because the multi-
month topic didnt propel PF towards Policy quickly enough, the debate gods deemed nuclear
proliferation the ideal catalyst.

I kid the NFL, and mean no disrespect to the powers that be. To the contrary, the
structural change and topic area are welcome and timely. But before analyzing the resolution,
lets evaluate the benefits and detriments of a two-month topic.

The NFL most likely created one September/October topic for two reasons.

First: The topic will overlap that of the International Public Policy Forum. The IPPF is
an international debate contest both written and oral starting in October. This year, the topic
is Resolved: As a last resort, unilateral military force is justified to minimize nuclear weapons
proliferation. Im no etymologist, but this topic seems eerily similar to the NFLs Thats
probably because it is. In years past, most PF debaters prepped either the IPPF or PF topic. Now
that they are the same, debaters can and should do both.

Second: Novice and new debaters often find single-month topics overwhelming. The
time extension allows such students time to learn the ins and outs of PF.

Unfortunately, a longer topic breeds rehashed arguments. Fight the temptation to be
content with your initial cases/briefs, and explore the depths of the resolution. Fresh arguments
and analysis later in the month will make any judge feel like a worm in a fresh pot of soil.
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We are now ready to roll up our sleeves, hike up our skirts, and delve into our topic:
Resolved: Unilateral military force by the United States is justified to prevent nuclear
proliferation. Lets break this down. Unilateral military force is difficult to define because it
encompasses a wide array of tactics. For example, nuking the Isfahan Nuclear Center in Iran and
sending a troop to North Korea with a BB Gun are both types of unilateral military force. The
former is obviously more extreme. To circumnavigate this disparity, I recommend one of two
things.

First: Playing off the word prevent in the resolution, you could argue that any force
with the end goal of preventing proliferation should be far reaching. In the context of our
example, BB guns in Kim Jong-Uns backyard wont prevent anything. While a nuclear bomb is
a bit of an overreaction, it is at least in the realm of unilateral military force that actually seeks to
prevent. I recommend this tactic for Con, because you can paint the picture of the big bad wolf
blowing down everyones house. Is that ever justified?

Second: Research current unilateral and multilateral military tactics. This should shed
light on what countries are presently doing to prevent proliferation. With those in mind, Pro or
Con could argue that the United States would peruse tactics which other actors unilateral and
multilateral already use. This brings the debate into the realistic realm.

Lets fast forward to the term nuclear proliferation. Yes, we skipped justified, but
we will be back I pinky-promise. In nuclear weapons literature, there are two types of
proliferation: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal proliferation refers to nation-states or
nonstate entities that do not have, but are acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the
capability and materials for producing them. Vertical proliferation refers to nation-states that
do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the
technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons.
1
The debate
should address both.

1
Siuel, victoi W., anu Baiiy S. Levy. "Piolifeiation of Nucleai Weapons: 0ppoitunities foi
Contiol anu Abolition." Am } Public Bealth 97.9 (2uu7): 1S89-S94. Web. 1S Aug. 2u1S.

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Justified will no doubt be the most contentions word in the resolution. As such, most
frameworks will address it. There are literature and theories that discuss the justice of war, but
most are antiquated: St. Thomas Aquinass Just War Theory, for example. If this is an approach
you wish to take, I recommend researching articles published during the Iraq invasion. Ill put
some examples in the footnotes.
2

That aside, there are a few broad interpretations of justified. A simple cost-benefit
analysis is the most common. Essentially, if unilateral military force creates a certain degree of
more benefits than harms, the action is justified. This seems silly. What is the cost-benefit
ratio for justice? 51% benefits:49% harms? 70:30? 90:10? Can there be a bright-line? If you
think there is, will your opponents agree? How about the judge? Even if everyone in the world
agrees on a ratio, shouldnt some benefits and harms hold more weight? But lets pretend this is
not an issue; the cost-benefit ratio makes the debate purely speculative. Think about it. We are
arguing about an ambiguous action towards an undisclosed country (or nonstate actor), and now
you want me to weigh quantified harms and benefits? There must be a better approach.

The situational approach dictates that some current situation justifies unilateral military
force. This could manifest itself in a few ways. For example, Iran has violated various
international treaties. Is that enough? Probably not. Lets give it another try: Iran has violated
various international treaties, sanctions dont work, and the international community has turned a
blind eye. This situation may warrant unilateral military force. Other criteria could be that all
other options are exhausted, or there is a reasonable chance for success. The situational
approach is an updated Just War Theory. Again, literature written before or the during the Iraq
invasion comments on the morality of a preemptive intervention. There might be some similar
analysis on a prospective Syria invasion. The situational framework approach will give the
debate structure.

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The last justified approach I want to explore is the magnitude comparison. Put simply,
if the magnitude of the problem is greater than that of the action, then said action is justified. For
example, if you step on my foot, it is unjustified for me to shoot you. In the criminal justice
system, they try to find a punishment that matches the crime. In the context of the debate, the
comparative magnitude analysis will allow a wide arrange of arguments whilst keeping structure.

With that, lets look at specific arguments.

I anticipate a fair amount of Con teams arguing that proliferation is good. In 1981,
Kenneth Waltz wrote The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better, where he argues
that more nukes actually create stability. While this argument can work, I would exercise
caution. Not only is this an upward battle in the eyes of the judge, but the Pro may also still win
the debate based on things such as miscalculation and nuclear terrorism. So, in order for this
argument to be effective, couple it with a few things that dont contradict. A comprehensive list
of unexhausted policy alternatives is a great starting point. Think diplomacy, sanctions,
multilateralism, etc. Essentially, you get the best of the Waltz argument without all the bad that
unilateral force creates. Other arguments such as a sovereignty disadvantage do not
contradict Waltz.

That being said, Pro will have an easier time arguing that nuclear proliferation is harmful.
As such, Con should probably focus most of their attention on the action and consequences of
unilateral military force. With this mentality, you could argue that unilateral military force will
not solve the problem. I would take it further. Argue that intervention exacerbates proliferation.
If argued effectively, Con teams can link into most Pro offense. What is more, unilateral
military force might dissuade a nation from proliferating nuclear material, only to expedite
another possibly more harmful weapons program.

You could also use the above strategies under the guise of a magnitude comparison
framework. Make unilateral military force seem as harmful as possible and deem nuclear
proliferation a nonissue. This way, you weigh the two spheres head to head. If you can
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effectively prove that the magnitude of the problem does not warrant the action, you should win
the round.

Pro should not have a hard time proving that nuclear proliferation is harmful. But dont
forget, the debate is not about the harms of nuclear war or even the possession of nukes. It is
only about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Arguments like nuclear terrorism and
miscalculation are golden, but you need to link them to proliferation. That said, arguments
which deal with these harms can only be so effective. Every Pro team is going to tell the judge
that proliferation is awful, so make your arguments stand out. I recommend doing a probability
analysis. If your horrendous impacts are going to happen tomorrow or are already happening,
just about any action seems justifiable. Proliferation in Iran creating regional instability is an
argument with high magnitude and probability. Unilateral military force is the quickest
response.

Pro should also be ready for the onslaught of alternatives to unilateral force Con will no
doubt provide. Proving high probability of harms is one route. You can also argue that just
because one action might work doesnt mean all others are unjustified.

Whichever route you take, remember to always push the boundaries of the topic. Two
months is a long time. Use it well.

Oh yeah: Try to have a little fun while youre at it. Good luck!

About Cameron Silverglate

Cameron Silvergate is a two-time National Champion: Public Forum (NCFL 2013),
Congressional Debate (NFL 2013). He recently graduated from American Heritage High School
in South Florida where he debated all four years. In his time at Heritage, Cameron was ranked as
high as first in the Nation. In addition to NFL Nationals, and NCFL Nationals, Cameron won
Villiger, Nova Titan, and Wake Forest. He also broke to late elimination rounds at multiple
tournaments, including the TOC, Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Emory, Sunvite and Blue Key.
Cameron will be attending Wake Forest University in the fall to study political science and
economics.
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!"#$%&'"( 16 In oiuei to claiify the iounu, we offei the following obseivation: Baviu
Albiight at the Institute foi Science anu Inteinational Secuiity
1
wiites that "|Sjince an Iian
with nucleai weapons woulu be a high impact event, futuies with a low piobability, oi
those that aie unlikely to occui, aie still highly impoitant anu coulu have a seveie impact.
Thus, woiking to lowei theii piobability of occuiience is impoitant." This analysis iings
tiue foi othei nucleai piolifeiatois, because the magnituue of the pioblem is simply too
laige. Thus, the thiesholu foi unilateial militaiy foice shoulu be loweieu when uealing
with nucleai piolifeiation.

78,5#9#-4'96 Albeit lengthy, this fiamewoik gives Pio a moie manageable buiuen
of pioof. I woulu couple this with a case that effectively poitiays the potential
haims of nucleai piolifeiation.

:9)&%"6 The fiist option is to agiee with the fiamewoik anu piove that nucleai
piolifeiation is not a high-magnituue issue. The seconu, piobably easiei, option is to
exploie othei iesponses than unilateial militaiy foice. Because the piobability of
Pio's haims is infinitesimal, a less uestiuctive solution is piefeiable. The time fiame
of the solution (within ieason) is not impoitant.

1
http:isis-online.oiguploausisis-iepoitsuocuments0SIP_Template_SNaich2u12-
1.puf
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!"#$%&'"( /3 In oiuei to claiify the iounu, we offei the following: when analyzing the
teim "justifieu," we obseive that pioblems can waiiant multiple solutions. To that enu,
each piospective solution shoulu be vieweu as an inuepenuent justification. 0ne action's
justifiability shoulu not impact anothei's.

45,6#7#-8'73 This allows you a way aiounu the Con aigument that othei options
(multilateial, sanctions, uiplomacy) aie still on the table. Simply aigue that each of
those, in auuition to unilateial militaiy foice, is justifieu.

97)&%"3 The most effective way to answei this fiamewoik is to weigh the haims of
unilateial militaiy foice against those of the alteinatives. If the foimei is fai moie
uestiuctive than the lattei, anu both achieve similai objectives, the foimei isn't
justifieu. The 0niteu States uoes not opeiate in a vacuum - it weighs its options.

:'7 !"#$%&'"()

!"#$%&'"( 13 In oiuei to the claiify the iounu, we offei the following obseivation: victoi
Siuel at the Ameiican }ouinal of Public Bealth
2
explains that theie aie two types of nucleai
piolifeiation: hoiizontal - when nations uon't have, but aie acquiiing, nucleai weapons -
anu veitical - when nations have, but aie incieasing the amount of, nucleai weapons.
Because the iesolution uoes not uiffeientiate, my opponents must piove the use of
unilateial militaiy foice justifiable towaius both.

45,6#7#-8'73 This heightens the Pio's buiuen of pioof. Aiguments that paiallel the
concept of justice with both types of piolifeiation will be effective unuei this
fiamewoik.

2
http:www.ncbi.nlm.nih.govpmcaiticlesPNC196SS12
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34)&%"5 Theie aie a few uiffeient ways to hanule this fiamewoik. Fiist: Accept it
anu shift the buiuen on the Con. Nake them show a ciicumstance wheie unilateial
militaiy foice is justifieu foi one type of piolifeiation anu not the othei. Seconu:
Explain that you only neeu to piove unilateial foice justifieu moie times than not.
This might actually make youi buiuen of pioof easiei.

!"#$%&'"( /5 In oiuei to claiify the iounu, we offei the following obseivation: any
unilateial militaiy foice with the enu goal of pieventing piolifeiation shoulu be fai
ieaching. Thus, touay's uebate is only about the categoiy of tactics that have a ieasonable
chance of "#$%$&'()&*

67,8#4#-9'45 This fiamewoik will magnify youi impacts about the haims of
unilateial militaiy foice. Also, it uisallows Pio fiom auvocating noninvasive types of
foice.

34)&%"5 The best way to iesponu to this fiamewoik is to be iational. Explain that
the 0niteu States will likely puisue militaiy tactics similai to those othei countiies
anu entities alieauy use. Noieovei, any tactic that minimizes nucleai piolifeiation
is a step towaius pievention.

:%4%"#8 !"#$%&'"()

!"#$%&'"( 15 In oiuei to claiify the iounu, we offei the following obseivation: foi piopei
weighing, aiguments shoulu be evaluateu on cost-benefit scale. If unilateial militaiy foice
cieates moie benefits than haims, it is justifieu. The conveise is also tiue.

67,8#4#-9'45 This is a iun-of-the-mill cost-benefit analysis. While it is simplistic
anu uifficult to justify, it will no uoubt gainei lay appeal anu cieate a soliu
founuation foi effective weighing.

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. 41

!"#$%&'"( /3 In oiuei to claiify the iounu, we offei the following obseivation: foi piopei
weighing, aiguments shoulu be evaluateu on a compaiative magnituue scale. If the
magnituue of the pioblem is gieatei than that of the piospective action, the action is
justifieu. The conveise is also tiue.

45,6#7#-8'73 This is a gieat way to set up the iounu. Aftei uetailing the
costsbenefits of unilateial militaiy foice anu nucleai piolifeiation, both siues can
weigh.

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DE) F#* !"#<;@)"-+;#* D")-+=

Argument: The NPT applies to all states except for India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea,
none of which currently abide by the treaty.

Warrant: All declared nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states signed the treaty.

The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, Council on Foreign Relations. Jun 25
2013. Web. Aug. 20, 2013. www.cfr.org/arms-control-disarmament-and-
nonproliferation/global-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/p18984#p5

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the core component of the global
nonproliferation regime, and establishes a comprehensive, legally binding framework
based on three principles: (1) states without nuclear weapons as of 1967a year before
the treaty opened for signatureagree not to acquire them; (2) the five states known to
have tested nuclear weapons as of 1967the nuclear weapon states (NWS)agree to not
assist other states in acquiring them and to move toward eventual disarmament; and (3)
the nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) are guaranteed access to civilian nuclear
technology and energy development. NNWS are subject to safeguards to ensure that
materials and technology from civilian activities are not diverted to weapons programs.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the implementing body for the NPT,
monitoring compliance with the treaty and assisting NNWS in developing civilian
technology. Although the scope and mandate of the NPT and the IAEA are relatively
broad, there is a critical gap in coverage: 189 states are party to the treaty, but three
of the world's nine nuclear powersIndia, Israel, and Pakistanhave never joined,
and a fourthNorth Koreawithdrew in 2003. Thus, even if enforcement of the
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existing regime were not an issue, nearly half of the world's nuclear-armed states are
excluded from its provisions.
Argument: International institutions fail to contain the spread of nuclear weapons

Warrant: This has been empirically true since the end of the Cold War


International instruments for combating nuclear proliferation were largely successful
before 1991, but are proving unable to meet today's challenges. Although three states
(India, Israel, and Pakistan) are known or believed to have acquired nuclear weapons
during the Cold War, for five decades following the development of nuclear technology,
only nine states have developedand since 1945 none has usednuclear weapons.
However, arguably not a single known or suspected case of proliferation since the early
1990sPakistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, or Syria was deterred or reversed by
the multilateral institutions created for this purpose.

Argument: The UN Security Council is ineffective at enforcing the NPT

Warrant: Iran was able to defy the UNSC


Despite the broad legal coverage of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a string
of failures since the early 1990s have highlighted the ineffectiveness of existing
nonproliferation instruments to deter would-be nuclear weapon states. In theory, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can refer countries that do not comply with
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the NPT to the UN Security Council (UNSC), which in turn can impose sanctions or
other punitive measures. In practice, however, political calculations have often caused
deadlock at the UNSC, enabling nuclear rogues such as Iran to defy successive,
fairly weak UN sanctions resolutions with virtual impunity. The IAEA did however,
refer Syria to the UNSC in June 2011 due to an "absence of confidence that Syria's
nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes."

Argument: Military action is necessary to stop nuclear proliferation.

Warrant: There is no other way to stop proliferation.

Monroe, Robert. Nonproliferation requires enforcement, The Hill. Sep. 12 2012. Web.
Aug. 20, 2013. Thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/249049-
nonproliferation-requires-enforcement

Is there an alternative that would avert disaster? Absolutely! The way to prevent
proliferation is simply to stop the proliferators. Nonproliferation requires enforcement! If
deterrence is used, early-on and powerfully, most potential proliferators will be stopped
without violence. If a proliferator continues, military force should be used. This
undoubtedly will result in casualties and disruptions, but nothing to compare with those
suffered if the proliferator gains nuclear weapons. Importantly, the first time deterrence
or military force stops a proliferator, the world will be renewed. Proliferation will
cease. Nonproliferation will become the norm. Fear will be replaced by confidence in a
safer world.

Argument: The US should enforce the NPT

Warrant: The US is the only state that can do so in the short term

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Monroe, Robert. Nonproliferation requires enforcement, The Hill. Sep. 12 2012. Web.
Aug. 20, 2013. Thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/249049-
nonproliferation-requires-enforcement
But who is to enforce nonproliferation? Theres a near-term and a far-term answer. Far-
term first. This answer is in the Nonproliferation Treaty itself, which created two tiers of
states. The NPT approved five nuclear-weapons states, the permanent members of the
UN Security Council (U.S., UK, France, Russia, and China). All other states are to
remain non-nuclear-weapons-states. Currently, 185 nations have voluntarily signed the
NPT in non-nuclear status, recognizing that, so long as the NPT regime holds, this frees
them from worries over attack by a nuclear-armed neighbor or aggressor. The enforcers
of the regime must be the five nuclear-weapons states, acting collegially. This is not
possible today because of past animosities and conflicts; but we would surely evolve to
this within decades as lack of alternatives becomes clear to both tiers of states. In the
near-term, the US, the worlds true leader, must have the courage and sense of
responsibility to accept this burden and save the world from destruction. Target the
most immediate threat Iran and try deterrence first (although were years late).
Inform Iran that if it does not dismantle its nuclear weapons facilities, we will be forced
to do so. Then, if necessary, use conventional military force to accomplish it.

Analysis: This is essentially the realistic argument for the pro side. Since multilateral action
has failed to curb nuclear proliferation, the US has the justification and moral authority to
enforce the nuclear non-proliferation, even if it just in the short term. Thus the only way to
enforce the conditions of the NPT is via unilateral military action.

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Answer: It would be hypocritical for the US to do this.

Warrant: The US has failed to follow its responsibilities in reducing its nuclear arsenal.


At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, in return for agreement from the nonnuclear
weapon states to extend the treaty indefinitely, the United States and other nuclear
powers reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear disarmament. But despite major cuts in
the numbers of U.S. and Russian operationally deployed nuclear warheads, both countries
still retain massive stockpiles that account for more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear
weapons. Many NNWS have repeatedly called for the NWS to make even deeper
reductions in their arsenals and argued that the NWS foot-dragging is undermining the
legitimacy of the NPT. This perceived failure to make progress toward disarmament has
been one factor in the unwillingness of many UN members to support sanctions against
Iran for NPT violations, which many developing countries see as a justifiable--even
admirable--response to the hypocrisy of the nuclear weapon states. In 2010, the U.S.
government revealed it had 5,113 warheads in its nuclear arsenal.

Answer: The US is not permitted by International Law to unilaterally enforce the NPT

Warrant: Article 51 of the UN charter (International Law) only permits unilateral military
action when there is an armed attack against another country

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Article 51, United Nations Charter: Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the
Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression. Charter of the United
Nations. Web. Aug. 16 2013.
<www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.

Answer: Breaking the treaty is not a justification for using unilateral military force

Warrant: There are several justifications for using unilateral military force

Nye, Joseph. Welch, David. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An
Introduction to Theory and History. Boston: Pearson Longman, 2011. Print.

In Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer, a political scientist who presents the state
moralist position, discusses four situations that could morally justify war or military
intervention in the absence of overt aggression. The first exception to a strict rule is
preemptive intervention, exemplified by the Israeli attack in 1967. If there is a clear
and serious threat to a states territorial integrity and political sovereignty, it must
act right away or it will have no chance to act laterThe second exception to the strict
rule against intervention occurs when intervention is needed to balance prior
interventionThe third exception to the rule against intervention is when it is
necessary to rescue people who are threatened with massacre.

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Analysis: The con team can respond by arguing that the US has not eliminated its nuclear
arsenal, and that the US lacks the authority under international law to launch unilateral military
action. The pro team can respond to these responses by arguing that the US has reduced its
arsenal, even if it has not eliminated it, and that justification via international law and moral
justification are not necessarily the same thing.
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Argument: Military action can effectively reduce nuclear proliferation.

Warrant: Military action can destroy nuclear facilities, has worked in the past.

Ruhl, Lothar. German Council on Foreign Relations. (January 8, 2005) Preventing
Nuclear Proliferation | IP Journal. Retrieved August 17, 2013, from https://ip-
journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/preventing-nuclear-proliferation

In extreme cases, military intervention or preemption could well be employed to
thwart acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states through destruction of
facilities with developing nuclear technology, on the pattern of Israels 1981 air
strike against Iraqs French-built Osirak nuclear reactor. Military counterproliferation
is just the opposite of soft security. Its exercise of hard security through military
action necessarily violates the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries
that have acquired or are seeking to acquire nuclear weapons or production facilities,
experimental capacity, or technological components for developing and producing such
weapons.

Argument: Multilateral military action will not be effective.

Warrant: Multilateral military action requires approval from all members of the UN Security
Council.

Nye, Joseph. Welch, David. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An
Introduction to Theory and History. Boston: Pearson Longman, 2011. Print.

Unlike the balance-of-power system of the nineteenth century, the offensive use of
force was now illegal for any state that signed the Un charter, with three exceptions:
any use of force had to be for either self-defense, collective self-defense, or collective
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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security. The UN designers also created a Security Council composed of five permanent
members and a rotating pool of nonpermanent members. The Security Council can be
seen as a nineteenth-century balance-of-power concept integrated into the collective
security framework of the UN. The Security Council can pass binding resolutions
under Chapter VII of the charter. If the five great power policemen do not agree,
they each have a veto, which is like a fuse box in a house lighting system.

Warrant: Russia opposes military action against Iran.

Russia says would be threatened by Iran military action, Reuters. Jan. 13 2012. Web.
Aug. 17 2013. www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/iran-russia-nato-
idUSL6E8CD2XU20120113

Russia would regard any military intervention linked to Iran's nuclear programme
as a threat to its own security, Moscow's departing ambassador to NATO warned on
Friday. Iran is our neighbour, Dmitry Rogozin told reporters in Brussels. And if
Iran is involved in any military action, it's a direct threat to our security. Rogozin
was speaking two days after the killing of a nuclear scientist in Tehran by a hitman on a
motorcycle. Kremlin Security Council head Nikolai Patrushev, who is close to Russian
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, said Israel was pushing the United States towards war
with Iran, according to the Interfax news agency. Russia, however, opposes a boycott of
Iranian oil. We are definitely interested in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, Rogozin said on Friday. But at the same time, we believe that any country
has the right to have what it needs to feel comfortable, including Iran. Rogozin, often
described as an anti-Western hawk, was appointed deputy prime minister in December,
and will oversee Russia's defence sector when he returns to Moscow.
Argument: Sanctions and diplomacy ineffective.

Warrant: Sanctions and diplomacy strengthen Irans resolve and gives them more time to enrich
uranium.

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Iran Sanctions Are Dangerously Ineffective, The Jewish Institute for National Security
Affairs. Jul. 16 2012, Web, Aug. 17 2013, www.jinsa.org/publications/jinsa-
reports/iran-sanctions-are-dangerously-ineffective#.Ug-97lO9yoc

Due to careful planning, even these "toughest yet" sanctions have been neutered by
clever Iranian government policies, helped along by weak implementation and White
House-issued waivers, lack of sustained EU commitment to their enforcement, and
outright opposition by Russia and China. As we wrote in February, sanctions are a
short term tactic doomed to failure in the foreseeable future... Sanctions, cyber
attacks, propaganda campaigns and targeted killings of Iranian nuclear scientists
may slow the mullah's progress but, if anything, fortify their resolve to prevail.
Meanwhile, negotiations simply provide Iran time to enrich more uranium. The pursuit
of nuclear weapons is something the Iranian leadership views as a strategic
imperative. Indeed, ideological and security concerns clearly trump the economy in
Tehran. Furthermore, as some analysts have suggested, the Iranian government believes
that defiance in the face of western sanctions is yet another reason for the greater Islamic
world to emulate Iran's revolutionary example.

Analysis: This argument essentially says that the only way to feasibly reduce nuclear
proliferation (or to have solvency) is through unilateral action. Multilateral action fails because
of the limitations of the Security Council, and diplomacy/sanctions are completely ineffective.
This only leaves unilateral action left.

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Answer: The question of whether multilateral military action is more effective than unilateral
military action is irrelevant because we are debating whether unilateral action is justified. Even if
unilateral military action is more efficient, that does not make it just. Thus, this line of
argumentation does not prove the resolution true.

Answer: Multilateral action can occur outside of the United Nations For instance, a joint US-
Israeli strike against Iran.

Warrant: The US is collaborating with Israel on military issues.

Martin Dempsey, Politics, Power, and Preventive Action Will America Help Israel
Attack Iran. The Council on Foreign Relations, Aug. 15 2013, Web, Aug. 17
2013, Blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/08/15/will-america-help-israel-attack-iran/
Israel and the United States have been closely collaborating on any number of
fronts, especially in the area of intel sharing, so that we can come to a common
understanding of the threat and of the likely timelines that we might have to confront. I
probably met with [Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces, Benny Gantz] more than
any other of my counterpartsnearly every other month since Ive been the chairman.
Thatll continue because we have common interests in the defense of Israel as well as
ensuring that as you know, weve said were determined to prevent Iran from becoming
a nuclear weapon state. So I can assure you that we are collaborating with the Israeli
military on intel sharing and on our posture. I will say it does not rise to the level of
joint military planning, but were closely collaborating.
Answer: Russia opposes Iranian nuclear weapons proliferation.

Warrant: Nuclear Iran would threaten Russias interests.

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Parker, John. Strategic-Perspectives. National Defense University, Mar. 2012, Web,
Aug. 17 2013, www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/strategic-perspectives/Strategic-
Perspectives-9.pdf

Most Russian experts now believe that Iran is advancing toward a military nuclear
weapons programthough it has not made a final decision to go all the wayand a
ballistic missile program to accompany it. Russia sees these programs as a threat to its
interests. Moscows decision to toughen its approach to Iran on the nuclear issue is likely
to remain the basis of Russian policy in the period ahead, so long as the U.S.-Russia
reset does not totally collapse, especially if Iran does not move toward greater
cooperation with the IAEA. Russias looming domestic and external challenges will
strengthen the inclination to continue some variant of reset, even if through Putins
clenched teeth.

Analysis: The response to this is that the argument does not affirm the resolution because it does
not prove whether unilateral action is justified. You can counter this by arguing that if nuclear
proliferation poses such a threat, and if unilateral action is the only way to stop it, that such
action is in fact justified.

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Argument: Nuclear terrorism poses a threat to the United States

Warrant: Al-Qaeda seeks nuclear weapons.

Emerson, Steve and Joel Himelfarb, The Jewish Policy Center. Would Iran Provide A
Nuclear Weapon to Terrorists? 15 August 15 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<www.jewishpolicycenter.org/1532/iran-nuclear-weapon-to-terrorists>.

Al-Qaeda continued its efforts to obtain WMD and nuclear know-how throughout the
1990s. Then, in 2000, a Russian National Security Council official announced that al-
Qaeda's Taliban allies had sought to recruit a nuclear expert from a Russian facility.
Shortly before September 11, bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri met with two
senior Pakistani nuclear weapons experts who were Taliban supporters. Although they
denied providing bin Laden with any useful information, the Pakistani experts admitted
to The Washington Post in December 2001 that they provided detailed technical
information in violation of Pakistani security laws. Even after being driven from his base
in Afghanistan, bin Laden has continued his quest for nuclear weapons. In 2004,
captured al-Qaeda operative Sharif al-Masri told interrogators that al-Qaeda seeks
to acquire nuclear materials in Europe and move them to Mexico, and from there,
across the border into the United States. In 2005, two jihadists were arrested in
Germany trying to obtain uranium. One of them was an Iraqi who had trained in al-
Qaeda's camps and was associated with September 11 planner Ramzi Binalshibh. While
we do not know the extent to which bin Laden's network has achieved success, the
Obama Administration is on record as stating that al-Qaeda continues to try to
acquire nuclear weapons technology and know-how. Al-Qaeda is still there in the
region, ever dangerous and publicly asking people to attack the U.S. and publicly asking
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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nuclear engineers to give them nuclear secrets from Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, the
Special U.S. Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan, said on September 16.

Warrant: The risk of nuclear terrorism increases with nuclear proliferation.

Allison, Graham T. How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?
Council on Foreign Relations. 20 April 2007. Web. August 15, 2013.
<www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/likely-nuclear-terrorist-attack-united-
states/p13097>.

We should ask ourselves every day: Are nuclear materials that could fuel a terrorist's
bomb more or less secure than they were a year ago? Thanks to initiatives like the Nunn-
Lugar program, highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Russia are far safer from theft
today than they were in the early 1990s. But the risk that terrorists will buy or steal
nuclear material from a rogue state increases as more countries acquire the ability
to produce weapons-usable material. Therefore it is vitally important to roll back
North Korea's nuclear program and to constrain Iran before it reaches its
enrichment finish line. By becoming a nuclear-armed state, each will trigger a cascade
of proliferation in its neighborhood.

Warrant: Iran has a track record of supporting terrorist groups.

The Iranian Nuclear Threat: Why it Matters. 17 July 2013. Web. 15 August 2013.
<www.adl.org/israel-international/iran/c/the-iranian-nuclear-threat-why-it-
matters.html>.

Iran's regime is a source of extremism and destabilization in the region and around the
globe. Iran is generally considered to be the leading state sponsor of terrorism, providing
financial support and training for organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad
and others, and is believed to be behind many Shiite insurgents in Iraq. Iran is responsible
for the bombings of the Israeli Embassy (1992) and the Jewish community center (1994)
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in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which killed over 200 people and wounded hundreds more.
Its leaders have repeatedly called for Israel's demise and have propagated base anti-
Semitism, including the denial of the Holocaust. The Iranian government is also backing
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in his governments brutal campaign against rebel
forces and Syrian citizens. Iran supplies the Assad regime with financial and military
support, and its proxy Hezbollah recently began fighting alongside the Syrian
government.

Warrant: Iran may provide a nuclear weapon to Hezbollah in response to an Israeli attack on its
nuclear facilities; the United States can prevent this with action.

Emerson, Steve and Joel Himelfarb, The Jewish Policy Center. Would Iran Provide A
Nuclear Weapon to Terrorists? 15 August 15 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<www.jewishpolicycenter.org/1532/iran-nuclear-weapon-to-terrorists>.

Iran could also provide a nuclear weapon to any of its proxy terrorist organizations in
conflict with Israel. Indeed, Iran could see this is an insurance policy. In the event that
Israel launches a preemptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, Tehran may conclude
that it has nothing to lose by turning nuclear technology over to terroristsnotably
Hezbollah. Iran already has smuggling routes to the group. Recently, it smuggled massive
quantities of weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, in an attempt to help it to rebuild the
weapons arsenal destroyed by Israel during the 2006 war. As a result of that smuggling,
Hezbollah now has more than three times the number of missiles it had at the start of that
war. Israeli military officials acknowledged in November that Hezbollah now has
Iranian-made Fajr rockets that reach Tel Aviv and possibly Israel's nuclear facility at
Dimona.

Impact Warrant: An apple sized nuclear device would kill hundreds of thousands of people.

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Dahl, Fredrick. Governments Warn About Nuclear Terrorism Threat Reuters. 1 July
2013. Web. August 15, 2013. <www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/01/us-nuclear-
security-idUSBRE96010E20130701>.

Amano earlier warned the IAEA-hosted conference against a "false sense of security"
over the danger of nuclear terrorism. Holding up a small lead container that was used to
try to traffic highly enriched uranium in Moldova two years ago, the U.N. nuclear chief
said it showed a worrying level of knowledge on the part of the smugglers". This case
ended well, he said, referring to the fact that the material was seized and arrests were
made. But he added: We cannot be sure if such cases are just the tip of the iceberg.
Obtaining weapons-grade fissile material - highly enriched uranium or plutonium - poses
the biggest challenge for militant groups, so it must be kept secure both at civilian and
military facilities, experts say. An apple-sized amount of plutonium in a nuclear
device and detonated in a highly populated area could instantly kill or wound
hundreds of thousands of people, according to the Nuclear Security Governance
Experts Group (NSGEG) lobby group.

Warrant: Hundreds of nuclear thefts per year; dirty bombs are a potential threat.

Dahl, Fredrick. Governments Warn About Nuclear Terrorism Threat Reuters. 1 July
2013. Web. August 15, 2013. <www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/01/us-nuclear-
security-idUSBRE96010E20130701>.

But experts say a so-called dirty bomb is a more likely threat than a nuclear bomb. In a
dirty bomb, conventional explosives are used to disperse radiation from a radioactive
source, which can be found in hospitals or other places that are generally not very well
protected. More than a hundred incidents of thefts and other unauthorized activities
involving nuclear and radioactive material are reported to the IAEA every year, Amano
said. Some material goes missing and is never found, he said.

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Warrant: 15-40% chance that a dirty bomb attack on the Los Angeles-Long Beach port would
be successful.

Dirty Bomb Unlikely, But Costly, Researchers Say. Global Security Newswire. 8
August 2007. Web. August 15, 2013 <www.nti.org/gsn/article/dirty-bomb-
unlikely-but-costly-researchers-say/>.

Terrorists attempting a dirty bomb attack on the Los Angeles-Long Beach port would
probably fail, but the economic consequences of a successful strike could climb into the
tens of billions of dollars, according to a June study by two University of Southern
California researchers. For terrorists to conduct a radiological weapon attack, they would
need to achieve several challenging intermediate tasks, making final success unlikely,
said Heather Rosoff and Detloff von Winterfeldt of the university's Center for Risk and
Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events. Considering the difficulties associated with
obtaining and transporting radioactive material, building the dirty bomb, and detonating
the device successfully, our preliminary analyses suggest that the chances of a
successful attempt are no better than 15-40 percent for a scenario in which terrorists
dispersed a medium amount of radioactive material through a bomb at the port. Attempts
to use larger amounts of material would reduce the chances of success, they said, and
terrorists would probably attack different targets if they were only able to acquire smaller
amounts.

Impact Warrant: Would cause large economic damage.

Dirty Bomb Unlikely, But Costly, Researchers Say. Global Security Newswire. 8
August 2007. Web. August 15, 2013 <www.nti.org/gsn/article/dirty-bomb-
unlikely-but-costly-researchers-say/>.

While the human damage would probably be low, the economic effects could be large if
the port were forced to shut down for a significant period of time. If the site could be
decontaminated within two weeks while waiting cargo ships simply remained
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outside the port, the cost could be limited to about $130 million. However, if the
port were closed for a year, the economic effects could climb to $100 billion, the
study found7$

Analysis: This is one of the major arguments for the pro side of the resolution. However it is a
major argument because it is incredibly strong. Nuclear terrorism is one of the few arguments
that can arguably provide moral and legal justification under international law for the U.S. to
attack a country such as Iran over its nuclear weapons program.

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Answer: States will be deterred from giving nuclear weapons to terrorist groups because the
U.S. will know which states proliferated the weapons to terrorists.

Warrant: State or terrorist group will not remain anonymous.

Lieber, Keir. Why States Wont Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists. Georgetown
University and Dartmouth University joint paper. 15 August 2013.
<www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00127>.

We conclude that neither a terror group nor a state sponsor would remain
anonymous after a nuclear terror attack. We draw this conclusion on the basis of four
main findings. First, data on a decade of terrorist incidents reveal a strong positive
relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood
of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are
traced back to the perpetrators. Second, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the
U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally97 percent (thirty-six of thirty-
seven) for incidents that killed ten or more people. Third, tracing culpability from a
guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor is not likely to be difficult: few
countries sponsor terrorism; few terrorist groups have state sponsors; each sponsored
terror group has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors
terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a
weapon. In sum, attribution of nuclear terror incidents would be easier than is typically
suggested, and passing weapons to terrorists would not offer countries an escape
from the constraints of deterrence.

Warrant: A state giving away nuclear weapons would invite retaliation.

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Walt, Stephen M. Will States Give Nukes to Terrorists? Scholars Say No. Harvard
University. 25 July 25, 2013. Web. 15 August 2013
<walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/25/why_we_dont_need_to_worry_about_
a_nuclear_handoff>.

The fear that nuclear-armed states would hand weapons to terrorists has been a staple of
U.S. threat-mongering ever since 9/11. It was a key part of the justification for invading
Iraq in 2003, and it forms part of the constant drumbeat for military action against Iran.
But it never made much sense for two reasons. First, a nuclear-armed state has little
incentive to give up control over weapons it has labored long and hard to acquire, for
what could the state possibly gain from doing so? Second, a state giving nuclear weapons
to terrorists could never be sure that those weapons would not be traced back to it and
thereby invite devastating retaliation.

Answer: Dirty Bombs are not a major threat stemming from proliferation.

Warrant: Irans production of nuclear material has nothing to do with a dirty bomb.

Conca, James. Mitt Romney, Iran And Dirty Bombs -- So Very, Very Wrong Forbes.
21 September 21 2012. Web. 15 August 2013.
www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2012/09/21/mitt-romney-iran-and-dirty-
bombs-so-very-very-wrong/>.

Iran is not a dirty bomb threat in the least. Dirty bombs have nothing to do with nuclear
bombs, nothing to do with fissile material like enriched uranium or even plutonium, and
nothing to do with having a weapons program. U[ranium] and P[lutonium] are the
least effective materials to use in a dirty bomb, emitting the wrong kind of radiation,
occurring in the wrong form to disperse, are well-tracked and extremely expensive,
and are much more valuable in a real nuke. Even the stupid terrorists know this.

Warrant: Dirty bomb material will come from other sources.
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Conca, James. Mitt Romney, Iran And Dirty Bombs -- So Very, Very Wrong Forbes.
21 September 21 2012. Web. 15 August 2013.
www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2012/09/21/mitt-romney-iran-and-dirty-
bombs-so-very-very-wrong/>.

Although many variables determine the effectiveness of an RDD attack, the key factor is
the quantity and type of radiological source material that is dispersed. The differences in
sources relate to their specific activity (the type and amount of radiation emitted), and its
chemical form (whether it is a powder, and non-metal solid or a metal). Most radiological
sources have the wrong kind of radiation, are in the wrong form (metal versus powder) to
be effective, or are really hard to get. For a dirty bomb, by far the best material is
137CsCl powder. It emits a hard penetrating gamma ray, comes as a powder that is easily
dispersable, and is very cheap, about $2 per Curie. There are over 10,000 sources that
exceed 1000 Ci, and perhaps a thousand that exceed 100,000 Ci. Note that the largest
sources use 60Co, 137Cs or 90Sr. This is because their applications are such that the
larger the sources, the more cost-effective the application, e.g., for food irradiation
applications, the larger the source, the faster the conveyer belt carrying the food can
move below the source, the higher the through-put and the higher the profit. Because
food and produce irradiation greatly extends shelf life, and the USDA approved
importation of irradiated food in 2002, there are now greater incentives for deploying
food irradiators in counties that export produce into the United States. Market-driven
forces to increase radioactive sources in these industries will continue, particularly in the
case of 137Cs and 60Co, and particularly in economically depressed regions such as
Russia and India. It is critical that regulations and oversight increase as this market
increases, and that appears to be happening. So Mr. Romney needs to check with experts
in this field, of which we have many, before making foolish statements that distract from
the serious threats that we need to address in the Middle East.

Analysis: There are a number of ways to respond to this argument first, that states wont give
weapons to terrorists, and second, that dirty bomb production is not linked to nuclear weapons
proliferation. The answer to these responses is that although they claim that the probability that a
state will give nuclear weapons is low, it is not impossible. If you provide a good probability vs.
magnitude weighing analysis, this will get you very far.
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Argument: United States presence creates security in a region.

Warrant: Power Projection is becoming the cornerstone of US hard power.

Corley, Col. Michael J. "The Future of Power Projection." Strategy Research Project. US
Army War College, 9 Apr. 2002. Web. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA404513>.

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Warrant: Power Projection is becoming the cornerstone of US hard power. (first in arg)

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Corley, Col. Michael J. "The Future of Power Projection." Strategy Research Project. US
Army War College, 9 Apr. 2002. Web. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-

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Warrant: Presence creates a fear of war.

Atwell, Robert. "Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for
DoD." Institute for Defense Analyses, July 2002. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0207thomason.pdf>.

In the mid-1990s, Zakheim et al. [1996] conducted an extensive assessment. Based upon
a variety of interviews with foreign representatives, they concluded that US presence,
especially naval presence, provides strong assurance value to friends and allies in many
parts of the world. The study team found that interviewees shared the view that US
military presence is crucial to preserving stability, which in turn is crucial to regional
economic growth, itself a US economic and national security interest. Many
respondents were even more explicit about the linkage between military presence
and the preservation, indeed enhancement, of their own and US economic interests.
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This feeling was said to be widespread throughout each of the regions. In 1995,
Thomason et al. found two principal things: first, US allies and friends indicated
very clearly that they were more assured by greater, rather than less, US military
presence. Second, in some parts of the world (Western Europe and Korea) land-
based presence was considered much more helpful, all things considered, than sea-
based presence in providing assurance, whereas in other parts of the world (e.g.,
much of the Persian Gulf), just the opposite appeared to be true.

Argument: Autocratic governments are more likely to pursue nuclear weapons.

Warrant: Autocratic or personalist, leaders act in their own self-interest.
Way, Christopher. Making it Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear Proliferation.
Cornell University. July 2012. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/jlw338/WayWeeksNukes.pdf

A growing literature on the politics of authoritarianism has revealed significant variation
in the domestic institutional structure of dictatorships, with important consequences for a
variety of domestic and international outcomes including, we argue, nuclear
proliferation. Here, we first introduce the concept of personalist dictatorship,
describing the institutional structures of these regimes. We then explain why
personalist dictators are particularly likely to covet nuclear weapons, and face fewer
constraints in pursuing this strategy. One of the most consequential ways in which
dictatorships vary is the extent to which the leader faces institutionally-induced
constraints on his rule, or put differently, faces important veto players. In some
authoritarian regimes, known here as personalistic, a paramount leader enjoys
enormous personal discretion over government decisions, to an extent unseen even
in other dictatorships. In these regimes, nominal institutions such as the military or
political parties have little independent power, and one individual leader has
achieved dominance over the entire state structure. This concept is related to, but
different from the concept of neo-patrimonialism in that it is possible for a personalist
regime to have well-developed bureaucracy, as long as the regime structure is ultimately
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dominated by a single individual. Stalins Soviet Union, which is personalist but not
neopatrimonial, provides a case in point.

Warrant: The types of leaders are more rash in governments where the leaders are not elected.

Way, Christopher. Making it Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear Proliferation.
Cornell University. July 2012. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/jlw338/WayWeeksNukes.pdf

We re-ran the models presented in Tables 1 and 2 using Cox models. To ease
interpretation, we exponentiated the coefficients and report the resulting hazard ratios in
Table 3. In this form, we explore this possibility more thoroughly in the supporting
information appendix.675coefficient can be read as the number by which we would
multiply the risk (hazard) of starting a nuclear weapons program in a given year for a
one-unit increase in the independent variable. To illustrate, the first entry in Table 5
reports a coefficient of 2.49 on the personalist regime variable. This indicates that
the risk of starting a weapons program in a given year among personalist regimes
is 249 percent the risk for non-personalist regime types(in other words, it is about
149 percent higher).

Argument: Irans government is malleable and not definite, and the US can support stability.

Warrant: The Iranian clerics consider changing the government.

Iran's clerics consider removing Supreme leader and President Ahmadinejad. IB Times.
June 2009. Web. 17 Aug. 2013. http://www.ibtimes.com/irans-clerics-consider-
removing-supreme-leader-president-ahmadinejad-283674

Iran's clerical leaders are said to be considering removing the position of the
Supreme Leader and forcing the resignation of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
when the government said it had arrested the daughter and other relatives of
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former President. Iran's state-owned Press TV said on Sunday the daughter and four
other relatives of former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanijani were released later. The
country's Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council are reported to be
considering the formation of a collective leadership to replace the position of supreme
leader according to Al Arabiya, citing sources in the holy city of Qom. The Assembly of
Experts, a body of Islamic clerics, is responsible for overseeing the Supreme Leader and
can even remove the Supreme Leader should they decide to.

Argument: US interventions result in democracy.

Warrant: US military interventions remove dangerous governments.

Peceny, Mark. The Promotion of Free and Fair Elections During Military Interventions.
International Studies Association. Mar. 25, 2006. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/8/8/7/page
s98871/p98871-23.php

The results for hostile French intervention in Model 2 are perhaps our most surprising.
The dispatch of French military forces does not seem to have an immediate impact on
target government institutions, as the insignificant estimate for French intervention in
Model 2 indicates. What was not anticipated was the political liberalization that seems to
occur in the wake of hostile French military action, captured by the decay variable that
accompanies French intervention in Model 2. This finding appears to stand in stark
contrast to the secondary literature on post-1945 French military activity overseas,
particularly in Africa. A closer examination of this outcome indicates that it was the
result of a single case. In 1989, the French military ousted a French mercenary, Bob
Denard, who had taken control of the Comoros government in a coup that same
year. French military action resulted in a positive 11 point swing in the polity scores
for Comoros. There can be little doubt that the French military intervention was crucial
for the political liberalization of Comoros, as the countrys first democratic elections
were held shortly afterward. At the same time, however, it is difficult to generalize from a
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single case, particularly when the case seems to run counter to the broader pattern of
French military intervention. In our sample, the vast majority of French interventions
(81%) were explicitly designed to support undemocratic target governments. The most
we can say given this evidence is that the impact of French military intervention is mixed.
Finally, hostile US intervention is positive and statistically significant at the .001
level in both Model 2 and Model 4. Neither of the decay variables associated with
hostile US intervention is significant in these models, suggesting that the initial gains
made in political liberalization during the intervention tended to persist but further
gains were not made. Converting the estimate in Model 4 to a probability helps to
provide substantive meaning to these results. Holding all of the other variables in
Model 4 at their means, a hostile US intervention increases the probability a state will
democratize by 18.1%.

Argument: Democracies reduce conflict

Warrant: Democracies choose not to go to war with on another in the interests of its citizens.

Lagon, Mark. Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the
International Community. Council on Foreign Relations. Feb. 2011. Web. 17
Aug. 2013. < http://www.cfr.org/democratization/promoting-democracy-whys-
hows-united-states-international-community/p24090>

Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion is not a
panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that
established democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy realists
advocate working with other governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of
character, and suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the world.
However, durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus and
peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international conduct
for governments.

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Perkovich, George. "Extended Deterrence on the Way to a Nuclear-Free
World."Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. May 2009.
Web. <http://icnnd.org/Documents/Perkovich_Deterrence.pdf>.

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Way, Christopher, and Jessica Weeks. "Making It Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear
Proliferation." Cornell University. July 2012. Web.
<http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/jlw338/WayWeeksNukes.pdf>.

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Warrant: Power Projection leads to deterrence.

Bush III, Richard C. "U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and
Challenges." The Brookings Institution, June 2010. Web.
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2010/06/nuclear-deterrence>.

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Analysis: This argument can be very effective if layered properly and clearly. Make sure you
establish that U.S. military presence stabilizes the region. Then explain that this stabilization
leads to democratization, which is positive for the region, and for the U.S.

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Answer: Countries are more likely to go nuclear after being attacked.

Warrant: Attacks on a given country make that country act more irrationally.

Singh, Sonali. The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test. Journal of
Conflict Resolution. 2004. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-422-2012-
S1_NP/Syllabus/EReadings/04.2/04.2.SinghWay2004The-Correlates.pdf

The findings also offer considerable support for the commonsense theory of nuclear
proliferation, in which states go nuclear when they face a significant military threat to
their security that cannot be met through other means (Sagan 2000). In fact, there are no
cases of the determined pursuit of nuclear weapons by countries not experiencing a
subjectively threatening security environment. Given this fact, one has to question the
wisdom of policies aimed at countering proliferation that may well increase the
subjective insecurity of incipient proliferators. To be sure, one would not want to reward
proliferation by lavishing resources on countries that pursue nuclear weapons, yet nothing
in our analysis suggests that policies that produce a higher level of security threat can be
anything but counterproductive to the aim of discouraging the pursuit of nuclear
weapons. Policies aimed at a graduated reduction of threat would seem to be more
productive. A straightforward reading of our results suggests that actions aimed at
the following would reduce a countrys temptation to pursue nuclear arms: reduce
the threat posed by its external environment, accelerate economic growth so that it
moves well beyond the threshold of temptation and onto the decreasing hazard
portion of the relationship between development and risks of proliferation,
encourage integration into the world economy, and encourage a defensive alliance
with a great power. Arguably, current American policies toward proliferators have
exactly the opposite effects. In the context of our model, they would probably result in
an increasing predicted hazard rate.
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Warrant: Statistically, military disputes increase after the initial strike.

Singh, Sonali. The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test. Journal of
Conflict Resolution. 2004. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-422-2012-
S1_NP/Syllabus/EReadings/04.2/04.2.SinghWay2004The-Correlates.pdf

Even more striking, participation in an enduring rivalry increases the hazard rate
nearly fourfold (382%) compared to a country not so engaged, and the effect for the
actual acquisition of weapons is even greater (at 743%). Frequency of militarized
dispute involvement also produces a powerful effect: increasing the 5-year moving
average of the number of disputes per year by two yields a 52% increase in the likelihood
that a country will go nuclear.

Answer: US military operations jeopardize stability in America.

Warrant: Unpopular military operations cost American lives and credibility for future
operations.

Conroy, Barbara. The Futility of U.S. Intervention in Regional Conflicts. CATO
Institute. 2004. Web 17 Aug. 2013. < http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-209.html>

Interventionism also jeopardizes U.S. vital interests in other ways. The most obvious
threat is to the lives of American soldiers sent into the conflict. Once troops have been
deployed, it becomes a vital interest to ensure their security. If they are in danger or if
troops have been taken hostage, the United States has a responsibility to protect them. It
was for that reason that President Clinton announced March 31, 1994, as the date for
withdrawal from Somalia and, at the same time, took what appeared to be the
contradictory action of sending several thousand additional troops to Mogadishu. To
guarantee the security of the troops already there, additional forces had to be
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deployed. The intervention had created a threat to U.S. interests where there had
previously been none. Intervention in regional wars is a distraction and a drain on
resources. Diverting time, money, and manpower from areas that have a significant
impact on national security to peripheral non-security interests is never desirable.
But in the event of a crisis that affects U.S. vital interests, it is downright dangerous. It is
difficult for the United States to be well prepared to protect national security when its
military resources are diffused all over the globe and are configured to participate in
nebulous peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. Unnecessary interventions also
waste another very important and readily depleted resource: public support for U.S.
military operations. Failed military missions engender tremendous public skepticism
about future operations. Although that caution may serve a useful purpose in keeping
troops out of other regional conflicts, it may be dangerous in the event of a genuine threat
to national security. The American people's support is essential to the success of military
operations. Lack of public support when vital interests are at stake could weaken
American resolve--and therefore jeopardize our ability--to protect those interests.

Answer: Destabilization occurs in a different form, with that being anti-american sentiment.
Warrant: US military force creates terrorism and insurgent movements.

Conroy, Barbara. The Futility of U.S. Intervention in Regional Conflicts. CATO
Institute. 2004. Web 17 Aug. 2013. < http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-209.html>

Another cost of military intervention is a rise in anti-American sentiment, which was
evident throughout the Cold War in Africa and Latin America and more recently in
Somalia. When U.S. Marines made their dramatic landing in Mogadishu in December
1992, the Somalis greeted them with cheers. Less than a year later, on October 3,
1993, 18 Americans died in a single day at the hands of Somalis. Hatred of the
United States was unmistakable, particularly in the gruesome and widely published
photograph of smiling Somalis dragging the corpse of an American soldier through
the streets. Despite the apparent goodwill at the beginning of the mission, American
involvement was violently resented once the United States became part of the war.
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In view of the likelihood that the Third World, or the south, will be the site of many
future conflicts, American intervention could provide the impetus for an era of
divisive north-south confrontation. An interventionist policy could also make the
United States a high-priority target for terrorists and other disgruntled factions. The
flaring of hostility toward American military personnel in Somalia may be an omen of
that danger.

Analysis: Answering this argument requires a full understanding of the empirical instances when
intervention has occurred. Use examples of intervention to show how the ensuing anti-American
sentiment creates destabilization, not stabilization. Using the lessened credibility answer, can be
very effective, since the impact is linear in that a poor decision will taint future decisions the
U.S. military tries to make.

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Argument: The U.S. can effectively stop the arms race between powerful Middle Eastern
countries.

Warrant: Saudi Arabia is investing in nuclear technology.

Russel, Richard. Off and Running: The Middle East Nuclear Arms Race. National
Defense University. 2010. Web. 21 August 2013. <www.ndu.edu/press/middle-
east-nuclear-arms-race.html>.

Iran's suspected pursuit of nuclear weapons could contribute to a regional nuclear
arms race in the Middle East. Nation-states already are hedging their bets that Tehran
will one day harbor a nuclear weapons arsenaleven if it is an undeclared one. In the
Persian Gulf, the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), led by Saudi Arabia,
has publicly announced plans to invest in the nuclear power industry. The GCC
members claim that they are hedging their energy needs against future days when their oil
reserves are depleted. The GCC, however, probably has in mind sending a not too thinly
veiled threat to Iran. They too could follow suit with nuclear weapons programs
under the guise of civilian nuclear programs if Tehran does not cease its uranium
enrichment activities.

Warrant: Other countries in the area will be interested as well.


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Elsewhere in the Middle East, countries are interested in nuclear power programs that
could lay foundations for military nuclear weapons programs. Turkey, a state with one
geopolitical foot in Europe and the other in the Middle East, has showed renewed interest
in its nuclear power infrastructure. Egypt, too, has publicly declared its revamped interest
in nuclear power technology. It appears that Syria was harboring a clandestine nuclear
program until Israel, the first nuclear weaponscapable state in the Middle East, launched
airstrikes in the fall 2007 to destroy its North Koreansupplied nuclear reactor.

Warrant: These countries would be interested because they fear a nuclear Iran.


The relatively sudden surge in Arab state interest in nuclear technology after the
exposure of Iran's clandestine centrifuge program suggests that they perceive a
more acute threat from Iranian nuclear weapons in the future than from Israel's
nuclear weapons today. The Arab states, after all, have lived with Israel's veiled nuclear
weapons capabilities for decades, but only after Iran's nuclear efforts became public did
they move from rhetoric to investment in concrete capabilities. Israeli nuclear weapons
were more an affront to Arab prestige than an acute security threat and never sparked a
widespread nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The Arab states undoubtedly fear that
nuclear weapons in Iranian hands will bolster Iranian power and influence in the Gulf and
Middle East. Nuclear weapons would enable Tehran to even more aggressively
support its growing surrogate influence through Shia militias in Iraq, Hizballah in
Lebanon, and Hamas in the Palestinian community. The Arab states probably
calculate that they would be exceedingly vulnerable to Iranian political coercion and
military intimidation. The Arab Gulf states would be especially eager to have nuclear
weapons to deter the use of Iranian ballistic missile and nuclear weapons use against
them.

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Warrant: Saudi Arabia can purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan.

Golov, Avner & Amos Yadlin. A Nuclear Iran: The Spur to a Regional Arms Race?
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). 5 April 2013. Web. 17 August
2013. August 21, 2013. <www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-
Feature/Detail/?id=162351&contextid774=162351&contextid775=162349&tabid
=1454238763>.

However, Saudi Arabia also has alternatives to its own technological capabilities. If the
Saudi regime decides to achieve military nuclear capability, it can simply purchase
it. The royal houses close connections with the regime in Pakistan have prompted a
number of reports on Saudi involvement in funding Pakistans nuclear program. Saudi
Arabia can take advantage of these connections in order to purchase ready-made
weapons. Aharon Zeevi Farkash, former head of IDF Military Intelligence, addressed this
possibility already in 2003 in the Knessets Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee:
The Saudis are conducting negotiations with Pakistan over buying nuclear
warheads for their surface-to-surface missilesThey have decided that they will tip
the balance of fear in light of Irans armament, and intend to station the Pakistani
warheads on Saudi soil. That same year, the Guardian reported on an official Saudi
document showing that the kingdom was considering acquiring nuclear weapons in order
to deter threats from Iran . The document likewise revealed a fear of dependence on the
US nuclear umbrella. There are also reports that the issue arose in meetings between
Saudi and Pakistani leaders. Those who claim that Iranian nuclear weapons will not
bring about an arms race do not address these considerations with the requisite
seriousness.

Analysis: Although hard to prove beyond a doubt, this argument can be a compelling one for
both sides. The argument that Irans neighbors will feel threatened if Iran gains a nuclear weapon
is highly logical, and will convince many judges that these other countries will take the next step
and attempt to acquire nuclear weapons on their own. The pro side essentially argues that it
prevents a nuclear domino effect in the Middle East by stopping Iran from proliferating now. The
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most powerful warrant for this is that Saudi Arabia can purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan.
Egypt and Syria, which are in disarray now, will probably not pursue nuclear weapons, and
Turkey is covered under the US/NATO umbrella.
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Answer: The U.S. will extend its nuclear umbrella over other countries in the Middle East.

Warrant: With U.S. nuclear protection, these states will have no reason to pursue nuclear
weapons.

Mearsheimer, John. Nuclear-Armed Iran Would Bring 'Stability' But Risks. The
University of Chicago. 9 July 2012. Web. 21 August 2013.
<www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec12/iran2_07-09.html>.

The United States is going to extend its nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia and over
Turkey, the way it extended it over Germany and Japan during the Cold War. And we
will make it perfectly clear to the Iranians that they cannot blackmail anybody. So there
will be no great incentive for Turkey or for Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons. But
even if they do acquire nuclear weapons, what are they going to do with them?

Answer: Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia would not seek nuclear weapons for various reasons.

Brown, Hayes. Nuclear Iran Unlikely To Cause Mideast Nuclear Arms Race Think
Progress. 19 Feb. 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/02/19/1607851/cnas-nuclear-mideast-
iran/>.

Iranian development of a nuclear weapon would not necessarily cause its arch-rival
Saudi Arabia to pursue its own, contrary to conventional wisdom, says a new report out
today from the Center for New American Security.

Titled Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next? the
report was drafted by former Obama Pentagon official Colin Kahl, along with Melissa
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Dalton and Matthew Irvine. Going against the conventional narrative, the researchers
determine that the risk of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East following an Iranian
nuclear test, while greater than zero, is unlikely. Two of the main regional powers
Egypt and Turkey would be unlikely to seek nuclear weapons due to lack of a
threat from Iran on the part of the former and the guarantee of NATOs nuclear
umbrella on the part of the latter. This leaves the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the
most likely country in the Middle East to try to obtain nuclear weapons should Iran ever
choose to build nuclear weapons. Saudi nuke acquisition, according to conventional
wisdom, could either be in the form of a reformatting its native civilian nuclear research
program to support military aims or a deal with Pakistan to provide a nuclear guarantee
against Iran. Either of those scenarios is far less likely than most would imagine,
according to the report. Instead, as shown in the chart below, the authors believe that
its far more probable that the Kingdom would rely on scaling up its conventional
defenses against Iran or relying on a United States nuclear guarantee.

Answer: Saudi Arabia has no infrastructure to create nuclear weapons; Pakistan will not sell
them nuclear weapons.

Miklos, Timothy. Iran Proliferation Triggering a Nuclear Domino Effect in the Middle
East: An Unrealistic Scenario International Affairs Review. 3 March 2013. Web.
21 Aug. 2013. <www.iar-gwu.org/node/468>.

Saudi Arabia has virtually no domestic nuclear infrastructure, resources, or knowledge
base to conduct a crash program. It is also an NPT state and has many U.S. military and
foreign investors on its territory, making it difficult to support such a program. Its only
option would be to purchase a nuclear weapon from Pakistan. However, Islamabad is
unlikely to spare any weapons, as they are needed to deter India. Additionally, selling a
nuclear weapon would bring world condemnation on Pakistan and leave it a pariah state
surrounded by nuclear enemies. Riyadh would risk losing the support of the United States
if it were to attempt to pursue a deterrent, leaving it open to an Israeli strike. Instead,
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Saudi Arabia will likely rely on its preferred weapons of cash and diplomacy, finding
the U.S. nuclear umbrella a more attractive offer.

Analysis: This argument may be difficult to respond to, however, Saudi Arabia is not and would
not likely feel threatened by a nuclear Iran. Additionally, con can respond by saying that
Pakistan will not sell Saudi Arabia nuclear weapons. Both of these answers will function pretty
well against this argument.
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Argument: With Unilateral military force, a country can respond much faster to a dangerous
situation.

Warrant: Multilateralism in the U.N. invites clashing of worldviews, slowing down the time it
takes the UN to make a decision.

Holmes, Kim R. "Smart Multilateralism and the United Nations." The Heritage
Foundation. 21 Sept. 2010. Web. 19 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-
and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations>.

Multilateralism is not an end in itself. It is one of many foreign policy tools, admittedly
a very important one, in the diplomatic kit. For the United States, multilateralism faces
its greatest challenge at the United Nations, where the all-too-frequent clash of
worldviews between liberty and authoritarian socialism has stymied multilateralism
more than facilitated it. If the United States is to advance its many interests in the
world, it needs to pursue multilateral diplomacy in a smarter, more pragmatic manner.
This is especially true when Washington is considering actions taken through the United
Nations. A decision to engage multilaterally should meet two criteria: First, it should be
in Americas interests, and second, it will serve to advance liberty. Unless the United
States can achieve both these ends acting within the U.N. system, it should find ways to
work around it.

Warrant: Countries rarely agree on how to address a problem, which can undermine potential
solutions.

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The need for multilateralism is obvious. Nations share concerns about many problems
and issues for which coordinated efforts could be mutually beneficial. Yet only rarely do
all governments agree on the nature of a problem and the means to address it. At
times, negotiations result in a less-than-perfect, but still acceptable, course of action.
Disagreements can also lead to no action or the use of force or other confrontational
measures. One of the purposes of multilateralism is to minimize the number and
intensity of such confrontations. The process itself, however, is fraught with political
challenges that can undermine potential solutions and even lead to other problems.

Warrant: Acting unilaterally allows the US to not based on the rules or norms of the UN.

Bass, James E. "Unilateral Vs. Multilateral Engagement: A Scenario-Based Approach To
Guiding Americas Future Foreign Policy." Air Command and Staff College. Apr.
2009. Web. 19 Aug. 2013. <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-

Second, the system of checks and balances built into the US Constitution produced a
separation of powers that limits the governments ability to endorse multilateral
commitments. Specifically, two-thirds of the Senate must support a treaty for ratification
to occur. This construct makes it possible for political minorities to hinder multilateral
engagement. For example, during World War I the Republican-controlled Senate rejected
US membership in the League of Nations despite President Wilsons support. Third,
Americas current hegemonic status provides incentive to act unilaterally because
multilateral engagement is based on rules and norms rather than power. As a
consequence, the weaker power is strengthened from the benefits of multilateral
cooperation, while the stronger power endures the costs of restraint. For example, a
given UN convention limiting freedom of action with regard to national instruments
of power could severely hamper achievement of US strategic objectives putting vital
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interests at risk. On the same note, such a convention could embolden a weaker
adversary to hold US interests at risk without fear of retribution assuming that the
US will limit its response within the restraints of the convention.

Warrant: Acting unilaterally allows the U.S. to fulfill U.S. interests, avoids the U.S. taking on
the responsibility of supporting in multilateral efforts, and allows the U.S. to respond quickly.


Proponents of unilateralism note a number of problems with multilateral
cooperation. First, multilateral arrangements limit the power that the US derives
from its hegemonic status by restricting the range of options available to act on
issues of national interest. The argument follows that a unilateral engagement policy
affords the US full sovereignty and the freedom to pursue courses of action devoid
of outside interference. Second, multilateral institutions subject the US to free-riding
and buck passing. In the first instance, the US is subject to the costs of
participation as an endowed contributor, while free-riding members benefit from
the resources supplied by the US, incurring no costs of membership. In the second
case, inefficiencies in the institution develop when responsibilities are not clearly
delegated. Often a key contributor in multilateral institutions, the US bears the
burden of responsibility because lesser members neglect to assume a contributing
role. Third, practicing multilateralism usually requires consent of all members
when engaging institutional issues. This course of action not only prevents members
from acting swiftly, it also results in watered down policy that limits goals and
restricts means for implementation. Lastly, opponents of multilateralism suggest that
involvement in international institutions weakens US sovereignty by subjugating it to
institutional governance. Unilateralists fear this arrangement could mandate US
engagement on issues which the US has no interest.
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Analysis: This argument is very logical. The first few cards in this argument talk about how
multilateral efforts almost always lead to countries bickering amongst one another and
inefficiencies. However, when the U.S. acts without anyone (while sure there are some
consequences) we get things done quickly and with non-watered-down policies. You have to
read files about how nuclear proliferation could damage U.S. interests, or something about how
nuclear proliferation is a general threat. Also, some of these cards say that multilateralism is
good and we need it, but that doesnt mean that we cant use the policy that allows us to respond
the quickest and with the most effective strategies.

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Answer: Multilateralism is best.

Warrant: Multilateralism ensures that U.S. national security is protected, our long term goals
are not undermined, and U.S. global leadership is maintained.


The United States in recent years has demonstrated a preference for unilateral
engagement that has undermined its long-term interests. Specifically, since the 9/11
terror attacks, the US has employed its unchallenged power and the freedom of
action afforded by a unilateral engagement policy to attain national interests rather
than constrain its actions to the rules and impediments of multilateral cooperation.
This strategy has evoked hostility toward the US and eroded the USs international
legitimacy. The situation suggests that unilateral engagement is inadequate in the
new foreign policy context and that an alternative policy must be employed by
future US leaders to secure Americas future. As President Obamas administration
takes office America carries the cost of preceding unilateral foreign policy. The time is
right to reexamine Americas foreign policy strategy to chart a course of action that will
best assure the future interests of the US and its allies. This research argues that a
multilateral engagement foreign policy will ensure national security is protected and
Americas global leadership maintained regardless of future changes in the
international system. Analysis of alternative futures by means of the scenario-planning
process suggests multilateral engagement provides an attractive course for securing
national security and maintaining Americas global leadership.
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Warrant: The U.S. needs multilateralism to combat global terrorism and nuclear proliferation
increasing.


Clearly, with global terrorism and nuclear proliferation abounding, the United
States cannot abandon multilateral forums. Americans understand this. Surveys
show that most Americans appreciate the value of having a forum like the U.N. where all
the worlds nations talk. They just want it to do a far better job and not to work against
the United States or freedom in general. Smart multilateralism always will require
hard decisions and hard-nosed determination. Sometimes the United States will need
to ask for help, which is a vulnerable negotiating position even when we are protecting
others interests. Yet we must never be so desperate for help that we start cutting
bargains on issues of lesser importance to us. The United States also must resist
tempering its decisions by how much criticism they might provoke. We will never
please everyone; we should prepare for and expect criticism. Our diplomats and
policymakers should be strategic, respectful, and consistent in their negotiations. Our
allies eventually will see that we are serious and that what they do and say in multilateral
forums matters very much to us.

Analysis: I think the first answer for this is super compelling. When the U.S. acts with other
countries were best able to up hold the goal of protecting our national security and promoting
global peace. Multilateralism may not have the fastest response time, but the U.S. could actually
find more effective strategies with other countries compared to acting just by itself. Additionally,
there are so many multilateral efforts happening now that have been slightly effective (NPT) and
you can also talk about those as examples.

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Argument: We have a moral obligation to prevent nuclear war because of the risk of extinction.

Warrant: Reducing the threat of extinction by one billionth of one billionth of one percentage
point is worth twice that number.

Bostrom, Nick. "Existential Risk Prevention as a Global Priority." Existential Risk
Prevention as a Global Priority. 2012. Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.existential-risk.org/concept.html>.

Even if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the
possibility of space colonization and software minds, we find that the expected loss of
an existential catastrophe is greater than the value of 10
16
human lives. This implies
that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one
percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives. The
more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10
54
human-brain-emulation subjective
life-years (or 10
52
lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly. Even
if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a
technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that
the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth
of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human
lives.

Argument: The U.S. has a moral obligation to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Warrant: Obama argues, as the worlds leader, the US has a moral obligation to reduce the
number of nuclear weapons.

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Thomas, Shawna. "Obama: US Has 'Moral Obligation' to Lead in Reducing Nuclear
Stockpiles." NBC News. 25 Mar. 2013. Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<http://worldblog.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/25/10858624-obama-us-has-
moral-obligation-to-lead-in-reducing-nuclear-stockpiles?lite>.

The president said he believes the United States has a moral obligation to act
and lead the world in reducing nuclear stockpiles. He continued, I say this as
president of the only nation ever to use nuclear weapons. I say it as a Commander-in-
Chief who knows that our nuclear codes are never far from my side. Most of all, I say it
as a father, who wants my two young daughters to grow up in a world where
everything they know and love cant be instantly wiped out.

Warrant: We have entered into a time in which politicians have to consider the actual risk of
nuclear war and the risk of extinction.

Schell, Jonathan. "The Jonathan Schell Reader: On the United States at War, the Long
Crisis of the American Republic, and the Fate of the Earth." Google Books. 2004.
Web. 16 Aug. 2013. <http://books.google.com/books?id=8N2wv_T9VZkC>.

In that sense, the question of human extinction has been on the political agenda of
the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need
for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry
about it. At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary
between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the
arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear
that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in
existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of
uncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of
extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably
greater than that of any other risk and as we make our decisions we have to take
that significance into account.
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Warrant: We have a moral obligation to prevent extinction because of the impact it would have
on society.

Schell, Jonathan. "The Jonathan Schell Reader: On the United States at War, the Long
Crisis of the American Republic, and the Fate of the Earth." Google Books. 2004.
Web. 16 Aug. 2013. <http://books.google.com/books?id=8N2wv_T9VZkC>.

Up to now, every risk has been contained within the framework of life; extinction would
shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all
human purpose would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility
of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risk that we run in the ordinary
conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a
mathematician's analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be
fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still
infinity. In other words, once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have
no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor
anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking,
there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will
bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have
no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a
certainty that their use would put an end to our species. In weighing the fate of the
earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the
earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose
us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to
reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution.

Analysis: You have to use evidence from the other arguments in the brief about how nuclear
proliferation increases the likelihood of nuclear war. These cards force the con to go beyond just
saying We wont go to war. You have to make sure both you and your partner explain that
even if the risk of nuclear war is 1%, the U.S. still has a moral obligation as a moral actor to
prevent the impacts of nuclear proliferation. You must also add a card from the argument about
how unilateralism is the most efficient because then you can argue that this risk is averted in a
pro world when the U.S. attack unilaterally.
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Answer: US is acting as a world leader to decrease the number of nuclear weapons.

Warrant: President Obama has pledged to reduce stockpiles, negotiate with Russia to reduce
theirs, and work to reduce the global stockpile.

Calmes, Jackie. "Obama Asks Russia to Join in Reducing Nuclear Arms." The New York
Times, 19 June 2013. Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/20/world/europe/obama-asks-russia-to-join-
in-reducing-nuclear-arms.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>.

After a comprehensive review, Ive determined that we can ensure the security of
America and our allies, and maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent,
while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one-third, Mr.
Obama told an audience of 4,500 gathered in scorching heat on the east side of
Berlins historic Brandenburg Gate the side of the city walled off by the Soviets
during the darkest days of the cold war. And I intend to seek negotiated cuts with
Russia to move beyond cold war nuclear postures. The proposal to limit American
and Russian deployed strategic warheads to about 1,000 each would bring the two
countries back to around the levels of 1954, experts said. The president also vowed to
work with NATO to reduce the unrestricted smaller tactical nuclear weapons still in
Europe and to push the Senate to finally ratify the 17-year-old Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. Taken together, the moves revived the effort Mr. Obama began in Prague in
2009 to put the world on a path to eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, one of
the most idealistic, if hotly disputed, aspirations of his first term.
Warrant: The US has attempted to lead a movement to reduce nuclear stockpiles.
Entous, Adam. Barnes, Julian. "U.S. to Propose New Phase In Nuclear-Arms Cuts." The
Wall Street Journal, 19 June 2013. Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873245209045785540106431164
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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52.html>.

WASHINGTONPresident Barack Obama will make the case for a new phase in
nuclear-weapons reductions that would reduce arsenals by another one-third in a
major foreign-policy speech in Berlin on Wednesday, a senior Obama administration
official said. A one-third cut would allow Washington and Moscow to lower the
number of warheads to between 1,000 and 1,100 each, down from the New Start
limit of 1,550. That still would leave them with more than enough warheads to
deter any current or future adversary, said U.S. officials. The president determined
that we can ensure the security of the United States, and our allies and partners, and
maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent, while safely pursuing up to a one-
third reduction in deployed strategic nuclear weapons from the level established in the
New Start treaty, a senior Obama administration official said of Mr. Obama's message
in the speech.
Analysis: You need to use cards from the argument that sanctions solve, as well as the argument
that diplomacy solves and couple them with one of the cards in this argument. The argument is
saying that the US is successfully acting alone, which means the U.S. realizes there is a moral
obligation and is fulfilling this obligation. This may seem a little backwards, but it takes away all
ground for the AFF because you can explain sanctions arent unilateral, cyber attacks arent
unilateral, diplomacy is also rarely unilateral. All of the other attempts by the US to stop nuclear
proliferation are multilateral, and were already doing them. Essentially, we have a moral
obligation, but we already realize that unilateral actions are ineffective and were acting in the
most effective way- multilaterally.
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Argument: A nuclear Iran would give it the cover to increase its aggressive foreign policy.

Warrant: Nuclear weapons would embolden Iran.

The Iranian Nuclear Threat: Why It Matters. Anti-Defamation League. Jul. 17 2013.
Web. Aug. 20 2013, from <www.adl.org/israel-international/iran/c/the-iranian-
nuclear-threat-why-it-matters.html>

Nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian regime will have severe repercussions for
American security and the security of our allies. A nuclear-armed Iran would
embolden Iran's aggressive foreign policy, resulting in greater confrontations with
the international community. Iran already has a conventional weapons capability to hit
U.S. and allied troops stationed in the Middle East and parts of Europe. If Tehran were
allowed to develop nuclear weapons, this threat would increase dramatically. Iran is one
of the world's leading state sponsors of terrorism through its financial and
operational support for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and others. Iran could
potentially share its nuclear technology and know-how with extremist groups hostile
to the United States and the West.

Argument: Iran is threatening to use nuclear weapons.

Warrant: The Ayatollah has stated that Iran will use nuclear weapons if attacked by Israel [So
we must prevent Iran/Israel from ever getting to this situation.

Iran threatens to "raze" Israeli cities in nuclear standoff, CBS News. Mar. 21 2013.
Web. Aug. 20, 2013, www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57575546/iran-threatens-
to-raze-israeli-cities-in-nuclear-standoff/
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Iran will "raze" Israeli cities to the ground if the Jewish state launches an attack
against it, threatened Ayatollah Ali Khameni on Wednesday. Reuters reports that
Iran's highest authority made the remarks during a live broadcast on state television. At
times the officials of the Zionist regime (Israel) threaten to launch a military invasion but
they themselves know that if they make the slightest mistake the Islamic Republic
will raze Tel Aviv and Haifa to the ground, said Khameni. Khameni's comments
coincide with President Barack Obama's three-day visit to Israel and the West Bank,
where at a press conference held Wednesday with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu, Mr. Obama reiterated that U.S. policy is to prevent Iran from acquiring
a nuclear weapon. We prefer to resolve this diplomatically and there is still time to do
so. However, Mr. Obama also reassured Israel that, the United States will continue to
consult closely [with Israel] ... I will repeat: all options are on the table; we will do
what is necessary [to] prevent Iran from getting the world's worst weapons.

Argument: Nuclear terrorism stemming from Iran is a threat to the US.

Warrant: Iran has a history of supporting terrorist groups.

Emerson, Steven. Himelfarb, Joel. Would Iran Provide A Nuclear Weapon to
Terrorists? Jewish Policy Center. Web. 2009, Web, Aug. 15 2013,
www.jewishpolicycenter.org/1532/iran-nuclear-weapon-to-terrorists

Iran could also provide a nuclear weapon to any of its proxy terrorist organizations
in conflict with Israel. Indeed, Iran could see this is an insurance policy. In the event
that Israel launches a preemptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, Tehran may
conclude that it has nothing to lose by turning nuclear technology over to
terroristsnotably Hezbollah. Iran already has smuggling routes to the group.
Recently, it smuggled massive quantities of weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, in an
attempt to help it to rebuild the weapons arsenal destroyed by Israel during the
2006 war. As a result of that smuggling, Hezbollah now has more than three times the
number of missiles it had at the start of that war. Israeli military officials
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acknowledged in November that Hezbollah now has Iranian-made Fajr rockets that reach
Tel Aviv and possibly Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona.

Analysis: Although this argument will be common in this topic, it is very powerful. Irans
leaders have made threats against the United States and Israel the question is whether these
threats of nuclear war will become a reality if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. The pro side needs to
make the argument that Iran currently supports terrorist groups and opposes the US/Israel every
chance it gets. It is not a large stretch for the pro team to then argue that we should take Irans
future threats seriously.
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Answer: Iran is a rational actor and thus will not use nuclear weapons.

Warrant: Iran has historically behaved rationally.

Waltz, Kenneth. Why Iran Should Get the Bomb, Foreign Affairs. Jul-Aug 2012, Web,
Aug. 20 2013, <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/kenneth-n-waltz/why-
iran-should-get-the-bomb>

One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate
surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental
misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international system. The first
prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately
irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by
"mad mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any
other leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they
show no propensity for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the
United States and Israel to assume otherwise.

Warrant: Iran is seeking nuclear weapons for its own security; it does not want to attack the
United States.

Waltz, Kenneth. Why Iran Should Get the Bomb, Foreign Affairs. Jul-Aug 2012, Web,
Aug. 20 2013, <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/kenneth-n-waltz/why-
iran-should-get-the-bomb>

Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if
Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security,
not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at
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the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own
preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz
despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its
planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want
to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to
such a move.

Answer: Israel will not attack Iran

Warrant: Israel is being too open about attacking Iran, the US does not support an Israeli attack
on Iran.

Berg, Raffi. Iran crisis: Would Israel launch an attack. BBC News. Mar. 19 2013. Web.
Aug. 20 2013. www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21768360

However, Mr Netanyahu's frequent warnings are taken by some as an indication he
is not intending to act. Among the doubters is Yossi Melman, one of Israel's leading
security and intelligence journalists. "Netanyahu's threats are not realistic. He's always
talking about it - if you talk about it too much then I don't believe you have intentions
of doing it, because in the past when Israel and Israeli leaders wanted to do something
they did it without talking," says Mr Melman, author of Spies Against Armageddon:
Inside Israel's Secret Wars. "That was the case when we destroyed Iraq's nuclear
reactor, that was the case in 2007 with the Syrian nuclear reactor. Yes Netanyahu's
aware of history, but he is making this stupid, unnecessary comparison with the Holocaust
- we are not facing a new Holocaust. "I think Israel will not attack Iran for many
reasons, above all because the United States doesn't want Israel to attack Iran - it's as
simple as that."

Answer: A US attack on Iran would undermine the world economy.

Warrant: Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation.
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Iran starts war games in Strait of Hormuz, Al Jazeera English. Dec. 28 2012, Web, Aug
20 2013, www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2012/12/2012122862357402782.html

Iranian officials have often said Iran could block the strait - through which 40 percent
of the world's sea-borne oil exports pass - if it came under military attack over
its disputed nuclear programme.

Impact: This would lead to a 50% rise in the price of oil

Krauss, Clifford. Oil Price Would Skyrocket if Iran Closed the Strait of Hormuz,
NYTimes.com. Jan. 4 2012, Web, Aug. 20, 2013,
www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/business/oil-price-would-skyrocket-if-iran-closed-
the-strait.html?_r=0

If Iran were to follow through with its threat to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, a vital
transit route for almost one-fifth of the oil traded globally, the impact would be
immediate: Energy analysts say the price of oil would start to soar and could rise 50
percent or more within days.

Analysis: Conversely, the con side needs to argue that nuclear weapons should be treated
differently, as there use would certainly invite a response from the US or Israel. If Irans leaders
are rational, they would not want to give up power over their country, and thus would not use
nuclear weapons.
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Argument: Nuclear plants provide the material for dirty bombs.

Warrant: The radioactive materials developed in nuclear plants can be used to make a dirty
bomb and are weakly protected.

Helfand, Ira. "Nuclear Terrorism." BMJ Group. 9 Feb. 2002. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.nci.org/02NCI/03/bmj_356.htm>.

In addition to the reactors themselves, nuclear power plants harbour enormous quantities
of radioactive materials in spent

fuel pools. On average these spent fuel pools contain
five times

as much radioactive material as the reactor core, and they are

housed in
simple corrugated steel buildings even more vulnerable

to attack than the reactor
containment buildinggs.
2
The vulnerability

of nuclear power plants is highlighted by
reports that 47% of

US nuclear power plants failed to repel mock terrorist attacks

conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission during the 1990s.
3
The results of an
attack on either a reactor or a spent fuel pool

could equal or exceed the effects of the
1986 Chernobyl disaster,

which led to 30 acute deaths from radiation sickness, at least

1800 excess cases of childhood thyroid cancer, the evacuation

of 100 000 people, and the
radioactive contamination of vast tracts

of land in several countries (figure).
4
Terrorists
could also attack a city with a "dirty bomb" in which radioactive material is
dispersed by conventional explosives.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
estimated that such an attack

could cause more than 2000 immediate and long term
deaths and

billions of dollars in property damage if a cask of spent fuel

rods were
dispersed in Manhattan at midday.
Warrant: Nuclear weapon proliferation provides the means necessary to launch a dirty bomb
attack.
"The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime." Council on Foreign Relations, 25 June
2013. Web. 20 Aug. 2013. <http://www.cfr.org/arms-control-disarmament-and-
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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nonproliferation/global-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/p18984>.
Nuclear weapons proliferation, whether by state or nonstate actors, poses one of
the greatest threats to international security today. Iran's apparent efforts to
acquire nuclear weapons, what amounts to North Korean nuclear blackmail, and the
revelation of the A.Q. Khan black market nuclear network all underscore the far-from-
remote possibility that a terrorist group or a so-called rogue state will acquire
weapons of mass destruction or materials for a dirty bomb.
Warrant: Iran is spreading its influence through proxies in Latin American countries.

Denim, Sue. "Is Iran Infiltrating South America for Terrorism?" The Commentator, 29
May 2013. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.thecommentator.com/article/3655/is_iran_infiltrating_south_americ
a_for_terrorism>.

The Argentine prosecutor who accuses former Iranian officials of masterminding the
1994 bombing of a Buenos Aires Jewish center is now accusing Iran of infiltrating South
America to carry out terrorist attacks. Alberto Nisman said Wednesday that Iran's
government is setting up intelligence networks in Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile,
Colombia, Guyana, Surinam and Trinidad and Tobago."
Warrant: Iran has growing Hezbollah networks in the Americas.
"Iron Triangle of Terror: Iran, Hezbollah, and Los Zetas? | Analysis Intelligence."
Analysis Intelligence, 19 Dec. 2011. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://analysisintelligence.com/intelligence-analysis/iron-triangle-of-terror-iran-
hezbollah-and-los-zetas/>.

There are two major Hezbollah networks operating in the Americas under the
direction of the Iranian Quds Force. The first is the Nassereddine network, operated by
a former Lebanese citizen that became a Venezuelan and is now the second-ranking
diplomatic official to Syria. He currently resides on Margarita Island and runs money
laundering operations for the group. The other network is purportedly run by Hojjat
al-Eslam Mohsen Rabbani, a culutral attach from Iran who is involved in various
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recruitment activities and frequently travels under false papers in Latin America.
The two networks together make up the majority of Hezbollahs activity in the
Americas.
Warrant: Irans influence in Latin America is dangerous because of their possible cooperation
with Los Zetas.
"Iron Triangle of Terror: Iran, Hezbollah, and Los Zetas? | Analysis Intelligence."
Analysis Intelligence, 19 Dec. 2011. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://analysisintelligence.com/intelligence-analysis/iron-triangle-of-terror-iran-
hezbollah-and-los-zetas/>.
Now back to the cartels. Why is the link between Hezbollah and Los Zetas so
important? The main concern is that if Hezbollah and Los Zetas are cooperating on
drugs (which they are to the tune of hundreds of millions), then why would they not
cooperate on weapons? Hezbollah and other extremists may be willing to export their
knowledge of IEDs to the cartels. The relationship between Hezbollah and Los Zetas
appears to have already expanded beyond drugs. In October 2011, the US authorities
revealed that there was an attempt made by Iran to assassinate the Saudi
ambassador on US soil. It looks like Los Zetas was intricately involved with Iran in
this and other related plots, The alleged plot also included plans to pay the cartel,
Los Zetas, to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Washington and the Saudi and Israeli
Embassies in Argentina, according to a law enforcement officialThe plotters also
discussed a side deal between the Quds Force, part of Irans Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps, and Los Zetas to funnel tons of opium from the Middle East to Mexico.
Other information that we have found would corroborate the existence of a relationship
between Hezbollah and Los Zetas.
Warrant: Iran uses South America as a springboard for attacks on the US.
Christy, Patrick. "FPI Bulletin: House Panel to Examine Iran's Threat in the Western
Hemisphere." The Foreign Policy Initiative, 9 July 2013. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-bulletin-house-panel-examine-irans-
threat-western-hemisphere>.
Indeed, Iran has established a long record of attempting to use the region as a
springboard to launch attacks against the United Stats. For example, an Iranian-
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American pleaded guilty in October 2012 to conspiring with officials in the Iranian
military to hire a Mexican drug cartel to assassinate the Saudi Arabian
Ambassador to the United States. Moreover, several individuals with ties to the
Iranian regime were arrested in Trinidad in June 207 and charged with planning an
attack John F. Kennedy International Airport. One of the conspirators, Named Abdui
Kadir, was arrested while on airplane headed to Iran via Venezuela. According to the
Department of Justice, Kadir met with contacts in the Iranian revolutionary leadership,
including Mohsen Rabbani, the former cultural attach indicted for his leading role in the
1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The
Justice Department also noted that Kadir, a former Guyanese official, later
admitted that he regularly passed information to Iranian authorities about
sensitive topics, including the Guyanese military, and believed himself bound to
follow fatwas from Iranian religious leaders.
Warrant: Iran could use proxies to launch a dirty bomb in the US.
Heard, Linda S. "Iran Dispute: More than a War of Words." Intrepid Report, 1 Mar.
2012. Web. 20 Aug. 2013. <http://www.intrepidreport.com/archives/5102>.
Mitt Romney has been scaremongering, saying Iran could provide fissile material to
Hezbollah and Hamas, which could disseminate it around Latin America and even
bring it into the US to explode dirty bombs. Romney asserts that the Obama
administrations sanctions against Irans Central Bank arent sufficiently crippling and
criticized Americas commander-in-chief for not letting Tehran know that military
options are not just on the table they are in our hand.
Warrant: Iran could use smuggling routs for a dirty bomb to launch on the US
Purvis, Carlton. "Military Strike on Iran Would Have 'Little Impact' on Its Nuclear
Weapon Capability." Security Management. N.p., 21 Mar. 2012. Web. 20 Aug.
2013. <http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/military-strike-iran-would-
have-little-impact-its-nuclear-weapon-capability-009701?page=0,0>.
Drug traffickers move thousands of pounds of drugs into the U.S. at a time. These same
routes could be used to easily smuggle in a dirty bomb using radioactive material
provided by Iran, said Michael Braun Former DEA Assistant Administrator and Chief of
Operations. Dirty bombs would be used because Iran does not yet have the capability to
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produce a conventional nuclear weapon.

Analysis: You just have to use the first two cards to explain that nuclear proliferation (as it
increases) increases the amount of material available for dirty bombs. Then you have to explain
that Iran is proliferating (theres another argument in the brief about this) or argue they have
enough in the status quo for a dirty bomb. Then explain with the next few cards how this is an
issue, as Irans proxy influence is spreading throughout Latin America. The last two cards argue
that an attack is probable, (which you argue is more likely as Irans influence throughout the
region is expanding.) Then you have strong links into the argument. If they can directly attack
the US and kill our citizens, why cant we take action now

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Answer: At attack wont happen on the US.

Warrant: Iran isnt stupid they wont just give a dirty bomb to a proxy network, and they have
had the material to do so before yet havent. Why now?

Walsh, Jim. "Do the GOP Candidates Get Iran?" CNN, 24 Feb. 2012. Web. 20 Aug.
2013. <http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/24/opinion/walsh-gop-iran>.

Perhaps the most bizarre answer on Iran came from Mitt Romney. His chief concern?
Iran will give enriched uranium to Hezbollah or Hamas, who would then travel to Latin
America and then maybe on to the U.S. to detonate a dirty bomb. First, nuclear weapons
and dirty bombs are fundamentally different things, like the difference between a
shotgun blast to the head and a slap on the wrist. Second, the data here is clear.
Governments, especially paranoid ones, don't just hand off nuclear material to some
wacky third party, if only because they fear the wacky group will use it against them
if relations sour. Enriched uranium is also a terrible material for building a dirty
bomb. Finally, Iran has for decades had plenty of dirty bomb material it could use
for such an attack. And yet it hasn't happened.

Warrant: Iran doesnt have many allies in the region, and some countries in Latin America have
spoken out against the nuclear program support for the regime is just not there.

Weitz, Richard. "Global Insights: Ahmadinejad's Latin American Tour Highlights Iran's
Isolation." The World Politics Review, 17 Jan. 2012. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11186/global-insights-
ahmadinejads-latin-american-tour-highlights-irans-isolation>.
Irans failure to develop closer ties with many Latin American countries is in part
due to the fact that Tehran has developed a reputation in the Western Hemisphere
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for welching on its promises. Few if any of the lavish gifts Ahmadinejad has promised
in the past have materialized, and many of the commercial deals with Latin American
states that Iran has announced with great fanfare -- such as Irans 2007 pledge to spend
hundreds of millions of dollars constructing a seaport for Nicaragua at Monkey Point --
were never implemented... Even now, however, Tehrans ties with the most
important South American countries are marginal and often strained. Although
Irans economic relations with Argentina have grown considerably, these have not
yielded diplomatic improvements. Argentinians still hold Iran responsible for
Hezbollahs terrorist attacks in Argentina in 1992, when the Lebanese group
bombed the Israeli Embassy, and in 1994, when it attacked a Jewish community
center in Buenos Aires. Argentina has been an outspoken critic of Irans nuclear
program and endorsed using U.N. sanctions to impede it.

Warrant: Irans support in the region comes mostly from Venezuela, but Chavez is gone.

Walser, Ray. "The Future of Iran's Influence in Latin America." The Jewish Policy
Center. n.d. Web. 22 Aug. 2013. <http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/3233/iran-
influence-latin-america>.

Iran's strongest support, however, continues to come from Venezuela's Hugo
Chavez. The former army lieutenant colonel delights in flaunting support for Iran
and the so-called "axis of unity." Publicized ties between the two have included a direct
air link; Iranian investments in auto, bicycle, and cement factories; and joint petroleum
and mining ventures. Reports of military cooperation abound but remain hidden from
public view. . . Nevertheless, Iran's future relations with Venezuela are heavily
contingent on Chavez's ability to hold on to the presidency he has held since 1999. In
2011, Chavez underwent surgery to remove a "baseball size tumor." He returned to Cuba
for surgery and therapy in 2012 and speculation about his ability to live to compete in the
October presidential elections abound. An electoral victory by opposition candidate
Henrique Capriles Radonski would certainly lead to a swift downgrading of ties
with Iran.
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Analysis: Most of Irans influence was dependent on support from Venezuela (like fiscal and
diplomatic support.) However, the last card argues, without Chavez their bilateral relations will
not be that strong. That gives you an ability to mitigate their link level into this argument.
Additionally, this argument depends on defining vertical proliferation (increase of technology of
nuclear weapons) as proliferation just attack that link. Define proliferation as horizontal
(building more), and then explain why a dirty bomb isnt linked to proliferation. Also the first
card is super good and gives several reasons as to WHY Iran would never attack the US
including that theyve had the material to build a dirty bomb for forever, and they havent. So
whats changed?
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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Argument: US military action is superior to Israeli military action

Warrant: Israeli military action would only delay, not destroy, Irans nuclear capability.

Harel, Amos. Israeli strike would only delay Iran's nuclear program by two years Israel
News Broadcast. Haaretz. 3 Aug. 2012, Web, 21 Aug. 2013,
www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/israeli-strike-would-only-delay-iran-
s-nuclear-program-by-two-years-1.455651

An Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would delay its manufacture of nuclear
weapons by no more than two years, according to the prevailing assessment.
This assessment holds that Iran's nuclear program would technically be set back by only a
year. But it would likely take Iran another year on top of that to overcome side effects of
the strike that would cause additional delays.

Warrant: The US can stop Irans nuclear program because it has superior military technology
that can destroy Irans Fordow nuclear facility.

Entous, Adam. Barnes, Julian. Video - Iran, Possible War -- U.S. Redesigns Bunker
Buster Bomb To Hit Iran Nuclear Complex - WSJ.com. 2013, Web, 21 Aug 2013,
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582004578459170138890756.html

The Pentagon has redesigned its biggest "bunker buster" bomb with more
advanced features intended to enable it to destroy Iran's most heavily fortified and
defended nuclear site. U.S. officials see development of the weapon as critical to
convincing Israel that the U.S. has the ability to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear bomb
if diplomacy fails, and also that Israel's military can't do that on its own. Several
times in recent weeks, American officials, seeking to demonstrate U.S. capabilities,
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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showed Israeli military and civilian leaders secret Air Force video of an earlier version of
the bomb hitting its target in high-altitude testing, and explained what had been done to
improve it, according to diplomats who were present. In the video, the weapon can be
seen penetrating the ground within inches of its target, followed by a large
underground detonation, according to people who have seen the footage. The newest
version of what is the Pentagon's largest conventional bomb, the 30,000-pound Massive
Ordnance Penetrator, or MOP, has adjusted fuses to maximize its burrowing power,
upgraded guidance systems to improve its precision and high-tech equipment intended to
allow it to evade Iranian air defenses in order to reach and destroy the Fordow
nuclear enrichment complex, which is buried under a mountain near the Iranian
city of Qom. The upgraded MOP designed for Fordow hasn't been dropped from a plane
yet. The improvements are meant to address U.S. and Israeli concerns that Fordow
couldn't be destroyed from the air. Overcoming that obstacle could also give the West
more leverage in diplomatic efforts to convince Iran to curtail its nuclear program.
"Hopefully we never have to use it," said a senior U.S. official familiar with the
development of the new version. "But if we had to, it would work."

Warrant: The US would not have to violate any other nations airspace.

Cartwright, James. Yadlin, Amos. Israeli or U.S. Action Against Iran: Who Will Do It If
It Must Be Done? The Atlantic. 28 May 2013, Web, 21 Aug. 2013.
www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/israeli-or-us-action-against-
iran-who-will-do-it-if-it-must-be-done/276295/

Any Israeli operation would have to cross the airspace of at least one other country
(Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, or Syria). Yet a U.S. attack could be launched directly
toward Iran from bases or aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.

Warrant: US action could improve its standing in the Sunni world

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An attack by either country is unlikely to provoke widespread anger or sympathy for the
Iranian regime among Arabs in the region, especially given widespread Sunni hostility
toward Tehran for its ongoing support of the embattled Syrian regime. Many analysts
also believe that Gulf leaders would applaud an attack in private, however harshly they
condemn it publicly. Yet given the historical tensions between Israel and the Arab world,
an Israeli attack would probably draw greater criticism than a U.S.-led attack. In fact, a
U.S strike might even help America repair its tarnished image in the Sunni world (though
it would likely incense the masses in Afghanistan and Pakistan given U.S. military
involvement in those countries).

Analysis: This argument is essentially a comparison between Israeli and US military action.
Most military analysts believe that Israel will not let Iran obtain nuclear weapons, and will
attempt a military strike against Iran to achieve that goal. If this is the case, then an attack against
Iran is inevitable. The pro side can argue that if military action against Iran is inevitable, the US
should launch the strike because it has superior military capabilities to Israel

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Answer: Any attack bad would increase Iranian terrorism.

Warrant: Iran has a worldwide terrorist network.

Kemp, Geoffrey. Gay, John Allen. Commentary: The High Cost of War with Iran, The
National Interest, 25 Mar. 2013, Web, 21 Aug. 2013.
nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-high-cost-war-iran-8265

This will not be the only front of a war, however. Irans leaders have threatened
the West with retaliation too frequently and too publicly to simply ignore an attack.
Iran has agents and allies that may commit acts of terrorism. Lebanese Hezbollahs
deadly bombing of a bus full of Israeli tourists in Burgas, Bulgaria and the discovery of a
similar plot in Cyprus are examples of this capability. And assassination plots against
Israeli diplomats in India, Georgia, Thailand and Kenya, as well as the Saudi ambassador
in Washington, show Iranian willingness to commit acts of terrorism as part of its
strategy.
Answer: An Israeli attack will end hostilities more quickly

Warrant: Because Iran is a credible threat to Israel, Russia and China will be more likely to
support a peaceful resolution


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Assessments of the day after an Israeli or U.S. strike range from limited Iranian
retaliation that could be checked within days to full-scale regional war. If the United
States attacked, however, it would have less moral authority than if Israel attacked -
- Israel could legitimately claim that it was acting in self-defense. Moreover,
Washington's ability to serve as an honest broker in negotiating a ceasefire would be
diminished if it ordered the strike. For their part, China and Russia would be less
incensed by an Israeli strike than a U.S. attack, and perhaps more willing to play a role in
post-strike de-escalation.

Answer: An Israeli attack will be more effective

Warrant: Israel has more experience attacking nuclear facilities


The U.S. military's superior capabilities -- including B-2 stealth bombers, air refueling
craft, advanced drones, and 30,000-pound massive ordnance penetrators -- are more
likely to severely damage Iranian targets. Yet the United States has no operational
experience in strikes against such facilities, unlike Israel, which successfully
conducted similar operations against the Osiraq nuclear reactor near Baghdad in
1981 and, according to foreign press, against a Syrian reactor in 2007.

Answer: Only Israel justified in attacking Iran

Warrant: Israel is the only country facing a potential existential threat from Iran

!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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Yet the Iranian nuclear program does not pose an existential threat to the United
States as it does to Israel, so only an Israeli attack could legitimately claim self-
defense. Numerous U.S. officials, including President Obama, have therefore qualified
their warnings against a unilateral attack by recognizing Israel's sovereign right to defend
itself.

Analysis: The con team can counter by arguing that war against Iran in general is bad, and that
Israel has a more legitimate reason to attack Iran than the US does. The pro side can respond to
these arguments by noting that the US is the only side offering solvency for Irans nuclear
program (through its new bunker-busting bombs) and then linking in to impacts of Iran not
getting a nuclear weapon (such as less nuclear terrorism) to outweigh the harms of the original
attack against Iran.
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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Argument: Although rational actors may not start nuclear war, our reliance on technology and
human fallibility make nuclear war a possibility.

Warrant: False alarms from nuclear warning systems may lead to nuclear war.

Philips, Alan F. 20 Mishaps that Might Have Caused Nuclear War. The Nuclear Age
Peace Foundation. Web. 17 August 2013. <nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-
issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/accidents/20-mishaps-maybe-caused-nuclear-
war.htm>.

Despite all precautions, the possibility of an inadvertent war due to an unpredicted sequence of events
remained as a deadly threat to both countries and to the world. That is the reason I am prepared to spend the
rest of my life working for abolition of nuclear weapons.

One way a war could start is a false alarm via one of the warning systems, followed by an increased level
of nuclear forces readiness while the validity of the information was being checked. This action would be
detected by the other side, and they would take appropriate action; detection of the response would tend to
confirm the original false alarm; and so on to disaster. A similar sequence could result from an accidental
nuclear explosion anywhere. The risk of such a sequence developing would be increased if it happened
during a period of increased international tension. On the American side many "false alarms" and
significant accidents have been listed , ranging from trivial to very serious, during the Cold War . Probably
many remain unknown to the public and the research community because of individuals' desire to avoid
blame and maintain the good reputation of their unit or command. No doubt there have been as many
mishaps on the Soviet Side. Working with any new system, false alarms are more likely. The rising moon
was misinterpreted as a missile attack during the early days of long-range radar. A fire at a broken gas
pipeline was believed to be enemy jamming by laser of a satellite's infrared sensor when those sensors were
first deployed.

Warrant: It is possible that tensions between Israel and Iran could lead to a false alarm.

!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. ""#
Goldberg, Jeffrey. How Iran Could Trigger Accidental Armageddon. Bloomberg. 23
January 23 2012. Web. 16 Aug. 2013. <www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-
24/how-iran-may-trigger-accidental-armageddon-commentary-by-jeffrey-
goldberg.html>.

Bruce Blair, the co-founder of the nuclear disarmament group Global Zero and an expert on nuclear
strategy, told me that in a sudden crisis Iran and Israel might each abandon traditional peacetime
safeguards, making an accidental exchange more likely. A confrontation that brings the two nuclear-armed
states to a boiling point would likely lead them to raise the launch- readiness of their forces -- mating
warheads to delivery vehicles and preparing to fire on short notice, he said. Missiles put on hair-trigger
alert also obviously increase the danger of their launch and release on false warning of attack -- false
indications that the other side has initiated an attack. Then comes the problem of misinterpreted data, Blair
said. Intelligence failures in the midst of a nuclear crisis could readily lead to a false impression that the
other side has decided to attack, and induce the other side to launch a preemptive strike.

Warrant: In a crisis, it is rational to expect an attack.

Goldberg, Jeffrey. How Iran Could Trigger Accidental Armageddon. Bloomberg. 23
January 23 2012. Web. 16 Aug. 2013. <www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-
24/how-iran-may-trigger-accidental-armageddon-commentary-by-jeffrey-
goldberg.html>.

Blair notes that in a crisis it isnt irrational to expect an attack, and this expectation makes it more likely
that a leader will read the worst into incomplete intelligence. This predisposition is a cognitive bias that
increases the danger that one side will jump the gun on the basis of incorrect information, he said. Ross
told me that Irans relative proximity to Israel and the total absence of ties between the two countries -- the
thought of Iran agreeing to maintain a hot line with a country whose existence it doesnt recognize is far-
fetched -- make the situation even more hazardous. This is not the Cold War, he said. In this situation we
dont have any communications channels. Iran and Israel have zero communications. And even in the Cold
War we nearly had a nuclear war. We were much closer than we realized.

Analysis: This argument is pretty straightforward, but strategic, in this topic. Many con teams
will argue mutually assured destruction and claim that nuclear war will not happen because
leaders of countries will act rationally and realize that nuclear war harms both sides. This
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argument undercuts MAD because it argues that nuclear war can occur accidentally from false
alarms. If you win this argument, you can provide a justification for why we should limit
nuclear proliferation and refute MAD at the same time.
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Answer: The possibility of accidental nuclear war is not justification for unilateral military
action.

Warrant: Article 51 of the UN charter (International Law) only permits unilateral military
action when there is an armed attack against another country.

Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and
Acts of Agression. United Nations Charter. Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>.

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security.

Answer: Accidental launches are not likely.

Warrant: 1) The nuclear powers have not had accidental launches; 2) Proliferating states, even
those that are economically challenged, will devote significant resources to preventing accidental
launches because they fear retaliation.

Waltz, Kenneth. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Better, Adelphi Papers.
16 August 16. <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm>.

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If the survival of nuclear weapons requires their dispersal and concealment, do not prob-
lems of command and control become harder to solve? Americans think so because we
think in terms of large nuclear arsenals. Small nuclear powers will neither have them nor
need them. Lesser nuclear states might deploy, say, ten real weapons and ten dummies,
while permitting other countries to infer that the numbers are larger. The adversary need
only believe that some warheads may survive his attack and be visited on him. That belief
should not be hard to create without making command and control unreliable. All
nuclear countries must live through a time when their forces are crudely designed.
All countries have so far been able to control them. Relations between the United
States and the Soviet Union. and later among the United States, the Soviet Union, and
China, were at their bitterest just when their nuclear forces were in early stages of
development, were unbalanced, were crude and presumably hard to control. Why should
we expect new nuclear states to experience greater difficulties than the old ones were able
to cope with? Moreover, although some of the new nuclear states may be
economically and technically backward, they will either have an expert and highly
trained group of scientists and engineers or they will not produce nuclear weapons.
Even if they buy the weapons, they will have to hire technicians to maintain and
control them. We do not have to wonder whether they will take good care of their
weapons. They have every incentive to do so. They will not want to risk retaliation
because one or more of their warheads accidentally strikes another country.

Analysis: The main response to this argument is that the potential for some harm to occur does
not justify unilateral military action, though multilateral action might be justified. The other way
to respond to this argument is by explaining that states will devote considerable resources to
preventing this from happening, because of the catastrophic consequences that would ensue if
there was an accidental launch.
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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Argument: United States presence deters proliferation.

Warrant: United States agreements with Japan create a foothold in Asia.

Schoff, James. Realigning Priorities: The U.S. Japan Alliance and the Future of
Extended Deterrence. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. March 2009. Web.
17 Aug. 2013. <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf>.

Today, the U.S.-Japan alliance remains the cornerstone of Americas security strategy in
the Asia-Pacific. Japan continues to host the largest contingent of U.S. forces in Asia
(currently around thirty-five thousand), including the regions only base for a Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) and the only forward-deployed U.S. aircraft carrier, together
with many other assets that are regularly deployed for training and operations in Korea,
the Philippines, Thailand, various parts of Central Asia, and elsewhere. Japan has often
been flexible in accommodating Americas use of its Japan-based military assets for
operations within and outside of the region. In addition, Japan pays for three-quarters
of the total cost for stationing U.S. forces there (and over 50 percent of the total cost
for host nations contributions paid by twenty-six American allies around the world
(U.S. Department of Defense 2004a). The U.S.-Japan alliance is still bound together
by a strong sense of common interests and shared values, and although this mantra
is repeated often enough to risk reducing it to a clich, it remains true and helps to
explain the continued relevance and strength of this bilateral relationship.

Warrant: Japan has no need to attain a nuclear bomb because U.S. intervention prevents
conflict.

!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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Schoff, James. Realigning Priorities: The US Japan Alliance and the Future of Extended
Deterrence. Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. March 2009. Web. 17 Aug.
2013. <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf>.

For decades, Japan has enjoyed a favorable security balance or surplus in the
region, thanks to Americas nuclear umbrella, U.S. forward-deployed forces, and
the absence of a near peer on the seas or in the skies that could possibly threaten
Japan, apart from perhaps the Soviet Union. The fact that the Soviet Union was
locked in a titanic struggle with America was oddly comforting to Japan, since
Washingtons deterrence credibility was quite high vis--vis such a stark ideological
enemy of relatively minor global economic consequence. To deal with the security
challenges that did exist, Japans favored approach ( for a variety of legal, political,
diplomatic, and budgetary reasons) has long been external balancing (through the U.S.
alliance) coupled with incremental internal improvements in the areas of national defense
and support for regional and international operations. Interviews in Japan for this project
revealed concern among defense planners that external balancing might not be as
effective in the future as it has been in the past.

Warrant: Removal of US troop presence creates a security vacuum.

Wortzel, Larry. The Future U.S. Military Presence in Asia: Landpower and the
Geostrategy of American Commitment. April 1999. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB75.pdf>.

The presence of American military forces in the region was one of the reasons that U.S.
nuclear deterrence was extended to our allies in Korea and Japan. As in Europe, the
stationing of U.S. conventional forces provided a deterrent option that is reinforced
by the nuclear dimension. American nuclear deterrence, therefore, is also welcome
in Northeast Asia for its contribution to security and stability in the region. Chinas
military strategists may complain that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a threat to China;
but they acknowledge in private discussion that without extended deterrence, as
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provided for in the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Republic of Korea defense treaties, Korea
might develop nuclear weapons and Japan could follow suit. Chinas leaders even
realize that without the defensive conventional arms provided to Taiwan by the United
States under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Taiwan might develop nuclear weapons.
Japanese military strategists express their own concerns about South Korea. Threatened
by the probability that North Korea has developed a nuclear capability, without the
protection of U.S. extended deterrence, the South would probably respond in kind by
developing its own weapons. Certainly South Korea has the requisite technological level
to develop nuclear weapons. In the event of the reunification of the Korean peninsula,
because the North already has a nuclear capability, Japan would face a nuclear-armed
peninsula. Tokyo might then reexamine its own commitment to defense relying on
conventional weapons with the support of the Japanese populace. Strategic thinkers in
China and Japan acknowledge that the continuation of extended deterrence might inhibit
Japan from going nuclear in such a case. Barry Posen and Andrew Ross, two Americans,
make this same argument: . . . Japans leaders would be less likely to develop a nuclear
arsenal as a hedge against Korean pressure. Strong U.S. diplomacy combined with
continued extended deterrence, argue some of Korea and Japans strategic thinkers, might
convince the regime in charge of a reunified Korea to dismantle whatever devices the
North has built instead of improving them.

Warrant: The lack of a nuclear umbrella creates uncertainty.

Park, Hahnkyu. Japans Nuclear Option: Its Possibilities and Limitations. Center for
International Studies. 2002. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1976-
5118.2002.tb00272.x/abstract>.

Finally, a loss of Japanese confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which may be
mainly caused by the weakening or breakdown of the U.S.-Japan alliance system, would
have the most decisive effect on Japans move toward nuclear armament. Japan has
largely depended on its security from the US.-Japan security alliance since the end
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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of World War 11. Therefore, the weakening of the U.S.-Japan alliance would create
a serious problem in Japans security. If Japan believed that it could not rely on its
security from the U.S.-Japan security alliance any more, Japan would have to pursue its
independent nuclear capability.

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Answer: Japans economy depends on nuclear energy.

Warrant: Japans economy produces nuclear energy at the expense of fossil fuels.

Noda says Japanese Lifestyle rely on Nuclear Power. The Asahi Shimbun. 30 May.
2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201205300041>.

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said on May 29 that Japans suspended nuclear reactors
must be restarted for the sake of the countrys economy and its people. Nuclear energy
has accounted for 30 percent of electricity supply (in Japan), Noda told the Lower
House plenary session. The Japanese economy and the people's lives could no longer
get along if we were to part with it immediately. He added: I will make a decision on
the restart of nuclear reactors, for which safety and necessity have been confirmed, with
the understanding of local governments concerned.

Answer: Japan would collapse its economy if it went for the bomb.

Warrant: Japan relies on nuclear energy, for which it receives permission from the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty to obtain materials. Obtaining nuclear weapons would destroy the
treaty.

Yokota, Takashi. The N Word. Newsweek. June 12, 2009 Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/06/12/the-n-word.html>.

Japan, moreover, now occupies the nuke-free high ground and would risk losing its
innocence if it went nuclear. According to an internal 1995 study by Japan's defense
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establishment, reversing the country's no-nukes policy would trigger the collapse of
the Nuclear Non--Proliferation Treaty regime, as the withdrawal of the world's only
nuclear victim could fatally undermine confidence in the system. Such a move would
also severely damage relations with WashingtonTokyo's most important ally
and the alarm in Beijing and Seoul could set off a nuclear race across East Asia.
Japan would get the blame. The consequences for Japan's energy supplies and economy
could be equally catastrophic. If Japan broke out of the NPT, the countries that now
supply it with nuclear fuel, including Canada, Australia and the United States, would
surely hold back their shipments, which are currently conditioned on the fuel's peaceful
use. That would be a nightmare for Japan, which relies on nuclear energy for nearly a
third of its electricity.

Answer: Japans constitution prohibits the possession of nuclear weapons.

Warrant: Japan will not pursue an unconstitutional act.

Yokota, Takashi. The N Word. Newsweek. June 12, 2009. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.

It sounds plausible. After all, Japan is one of the only great powers that doesn't
already boast its own nuclear deterrent. Though Tokyo has officially vowed never to
possess, build or even allow nuclear weapons onto its territorypromises born from
Hiroshima and the pacifist constitution imposed on Japan by its U.S. occupiers after
the warsome big-name Tokyo politicians have questioned that stance in recent
years. In April, Goji Sakamoto, a lawmaker from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party,
said that Japan should at least threaten" to go nuclear. Shinzo Abe, who was prime
minister from 2006 to 2007, once reportedly told a room full of college students that
possessing nukes wouldn't violate Japan's constitution as long as the arsenal was
"small in scale." And after Pyongyang's first nuclear test in 2006, senior LDP member
Shoichi Nakagawa and Prime Minister Taro Aso (then foreign minister) called for public
debate on the question.
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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Answer: Japanese polls indicate an aversion to obtaining a nuclear weapon amongst the
Japanese citizenry.

Warrant: The Japanese government will not act counter to the opinion of their citizens.

Yokota, Takashi. The N Word. Newsweek. June 12, 2009 Web. 17 Aug. 2013.

Yet this is all just rhetoric. For one thing, despite North Korea's threats and
China's growing military and political power, the Japanese people remain dead set
against building nuclear weapons. Polls conducted over the past three years show that
less than 20 percent of the public currently says it favors possessing such a deterrent.

Answer: Japan could not build a bomb.

Warrant: The island of Japan lacks the size necessary to test a bomb.

Yokota, Takashi. The N Word. Newsweek. June 12, 2009. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.

For another, Japana crowded island nationlacks the space to test a bomb.
Japan has large stockpiles of plutonium for its nuclear-energy industry. But
plutonium-type bombs require physical testing to verify their efficacy. (Uranium
bombs are considerably simpler and so may not need physical testing, but Japan doesn't
have the weapons-grade uranium to make such a device.) While some experts argue that
Japan could test a plutonium weapon by detonating it underground, othersincluding
former defense chief Shigeru Ishibainsist that there is simply nowhere to do so in such
a densely populated nation. Simulations would not be sufficient; those only work after at
least one actual test.

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
Analysis: In order to defeat this strong argument, debaters must layer their responses. They can
first make the claim based on feasibility that Japan does not have the capability to build a nuclear
bomb, as the island of Japan is too small. Similarly Japanese citizens are not in favor of building
the bomb and a nuclear bomb violates the Japanese constitution, so debaters must question the
intent of Japan to obtain the bomb with or without the support of the United States nuclear
umbrella. Finally the most difficult argument to answer would be that Japans economy relies on
nuclear energy, and countries, through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), supply the
nuclear energy Japan has. Thus, if Japan would even attempt to develop the bomb, Japans
economy would collapse from the lack of nuclear energy that its economy relies on.
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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Argument: The U.S. has successfully used alternative unilateral counter-action techniques to
combat nuclear proliferation.

Warrant: The U.S. has developed bunker bombs, capable of destroying Irans facilities and
could use them if talks fall through.

Keek, Zachary. "US Tests Iran Bunker Buster Bomb...So What?" The Diplomat. 12
June 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013. <http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-
blog/2013/06/12/us-tests-iran-bunker-buster-bombso-what/>.

According to media reports, last year the U.S. conducted the first test of its newly
minted GBU-57B massive ordnance penetrator against a nuclear facility replica.
The Jerusalem Post reported that the replica cost millions of dollars to build, was made
of concrete and buried under dozens of feet of dirt and rocks. The MOP successful
destroyed the nuclear facility. The massive, 30,000 pound GBU-57A/B MOP cost
somewhere between US$400 million and US$500 million to develop and each bomb
costs around US$3.5 million to manufacture. It would be carried and dropped by
Americas B-2 stealth bombers. It was developed after U.S. officials began to doubt
that their existing conventional bombs could destroy Irans underground nuclear
facility, Fordow, located near the holy city of Qom. U.S. officials reportedly decided
to share the result of the test with allies like Israel to demonstrate Washingtons
resolve to attack Irans nuclear facilities should negotiations fail, thus reducing the
likelihood that Israel would launch unilateral attacks against Iran. U.S. officials also
reportedly hope that the MOPs existence will increase their leverage in negotiations with
Iran over its nuclear program.
Warrant: The U.S. has been developing bunker buster bombs to be more effective and
increase their chance of success to destroy Irans facilities.
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

Entous, Adam, and Julian E. Barnes. "Pentagon Bulks Up 'Bunker Buster' Bomb to
Combat Iran." The Wall Street Journal, 2 May 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873245820045784591701388907
56.html>.

The Pentagon has redesigned its biggest "bunker buster" bomb with more
advanced features intended to enable it to destroy Iran's most heavily fortified and
defended nuclear site. The newest version of what is the Pentagon's largest
conventional bomb, the 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator, or MOP, has
adjusted fuses to maximize its burrowing power, upgraded guidance systems to
improve its precision and high-tech equipment intended to allow it to evade
Iranian air defenses in order to reach and destroy the Fordow nuclear enrichment
complex, which is buried under a mountain near the Iranian city of Qom. The
upgraded MOP designed for Fordow hasn't been dropped from a plane yet. U.S.
officials said they believe the enhanced U.S. bunker-busting capability decreases
the chances that Israel will launch a unilateral bombing campaign against Iran
this year and possibly next year, buying more time for the Obama administration
to pursue diplomacy after Iran holds elections in June. Israeli officials declined to
comment. Israeli officials maintain they reserve the right to attack Iran. The new
version of the weapon also includes changes to the guidance system to improve
precision. U.S. officials say precision is important because, if the U.S. decides to
strike Iran, the Air Force may need to drop more than one MOP on the exact same
spot to thoroughly destroy Fordow.

Warrant: Recent tests verify the U.S. has bunker-busting bombs capable of penetrating Irans
nuclear facilities.

Fisherman, Alex. "US Experiment: Pentagon Destroys Replica of Underground Nuclear
Facility." Ynet. 7 July 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4389481,00.html>.
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

The Pentagon has recently completed a series of field exercises on US soil as
part of which a replica of an underground nuclear facility was destroyed,
Yedioth Ahronoth reported Friday. The tests were declared a resounding
success having exceeded all expectations. The results of the experiment were
relayed to friendly nations with the aim of reassuring them as to the US's ability to
destroy Iranian nuclear facilities in a single strike. It was also meant to convey
that the US is serious in its intentions to attack Iran should circumstances
allow it. The experiment included the firing of several bunker buster bombs
first introduced by the US Defense Department in July 2012. The GBU-57 B
bomb is mounted on a B-2 bomber and as part of the experiment penetrated
the underground facility's concrete ceilings.

Warrant: The bombs would also work on North Korea.

Entous, Adam, and Julian E. Barnes. "New 'Bunker Buster' Has a Message for Iran."
The Australian, 4 May 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/new-bunker-buster-has-a-
message-for-iran/story-e6frg6so-1226634894939>.

The changes made to the MOP reflect a close US analysis of what it would take to
destroy Fordow. On the bomb itself, the detonator fuse had been adjusted
specifically to withstand impact with layers of granite and steel that encased the
nuclear facility, officials said. The latest version is also designed to operate in
"contested environments". It is equipped with capabilities designed to counter
Iran's air defences and keep the bomb on target if the Iranians try to knock it off
course. Iran has invested heavily in recent years in air defences and electronic warfare.
Officials said they believed the enhanced bomb would be even more effective against
North Korea's nuclear bunkers, which are believed to be less heavily fortified than
Iran's.

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Analysis: These cards may appear to be long, but each one has several different warrants and
provides the background information you need to understand WHY bunker buster bombs are
successful. Bunker buster bombs are a way that you can prove that U.S. unilateral military
action could be successful in taking out Irans nuclear program. Its a pretty straightforward
argument, and one I think is pretty persuasive. Most of the literature suggests that this is the
course of action the U.S. will take to prevent Israel from launching a preemptive strike; this is
the most effective way to stop and/or slow Iran.
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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Answer: Attacking Iran would be a failure.

Warrant: Attacking Irans facilities would only increase the chances they would acquire a
nuclear weapon, and would commit the U.S. to re-attacking Iran every couple years.

Keek, Zachary. "US Tests Iran Bunker Buster Bomb...So What?" The Diplomat. 12
June 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013. <http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-
blog/2013/06/12/us-tests-iran-bunker-buster-bombso-what/>.

In many ways, attacking Irans nuclear facilities would increase the likelihood that
Iran would acquire an actual nuclear arsenal, rather than a breakout nuclear capability
which would be the likely outcome if the current course of action is continued without
any agreement being reached. Iranian leaders are almost certain to use such an attack
to justify withdrawing from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and to
revoke Ayatollah Khameneis fatwa against building nuclear weapons. After all,
every governments most sacred responsibility is the protection of its people and its
sovereignty. An attack on Iran would also likely lead to the collapse or substantial
fracturing of the Western-led international economic campaign against Iran. This,
along with the Iranian regimes ability to mobilization more resources for the
nuclear program owing to the greater national demand for doing so, would increase
the amount of resources the Islamic Republic would have available to rebuild its
nuclear program. At the same time, an attack on Iran would commit the U.S. to
conduct follow-up attacks on Irans nuclear facilities every couple of years for the
indefinite future. In other words, the U.S. would have committed to pursuing the policy
that Israeli leaders calling mowing the grass. There has been significant discontent in
Tel Aviv about this policy, which is why many Israel experts assess that its operations
against its enemies are often tactical successes but strategic failures. In the case of the
U.S. attacking Iran ever couple of years, ultimately there would almost certainly be
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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a failure of some sort that would result in Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon.

Warrant: Attacking would only slow the program, requiring follow-up action.

Iran Nuclear Sites May Be Beyond Reach Of Bunker Busters" Reuters. 12 Jan. 2013.
Web. 17 Aug. 2013. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/12/us-iran-nuclear-
strike-idUSTRE80B0WM20120112>.

Austin Long, an assistant professor at the School of International and Public
Affairs at Columbia University, told Reuters the arrival of the MOP does not solve
the Fordow problem but it does make it easier. Many experts are skeptical. Mark
Fitzpatrick, an Iran expert at London's International Institute for Strategic Studies,
said that Natanz was buried under several layers of dirt and concrete but it was
nevertheless possible to damage it with precision bombing with one sortie to create
a crater and second sortie to burst through the bottom of the crater to the facility
below. But the chamber at Fordow might be impenetrable, he said, due to its
presumed depth. His doubts were echoed by Robert Henson, Editor of Jane's Air-
Launched Weapons, to Reuters, who said it was likely that Fordow had been built to
survive a sustained assault. We know for a fact - or as near a fact as possible - that
you will not be able to stop this program with air strikes. There continues to be a
whole lot of hysterical posturing about this. In the meantime, it keeps backing the
Iranians into a corner, he said.

Answer: Cyber attacks on Iran were not unilateral.

Warrant: The Stuxnet Virus was a byproduct of bilateral cooperation between Israel and the
U.S.

Broad, William J., John Markoff, and David E. Sanger. "Israeli Test on Worm Called
Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay." The New York Times, 15 Jan. 2011. Web. 17
Aug. 2013.
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "##
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?pagewan
ted=all&_r=0>.

The Dimona complex in the Negev desert is famous as the heavily guarded heart of
Israels never-acknowledged nuclear arms program, where neat rows of factories
make atomic fuel for the arsenal. Over the past two years, according to intelligence
and military experts familiar with its operations, Dimona has taken on a new,
equally secret role as a critical testing ground in a joint American and Israeli
effort to undermine Irans efforts to make a bomb of its own. Behind Dimonas
barbed wire, the experts say, Israel has spun nuclear centrifuges virtually identical to
Irans at Natanz, where Iranian scientists are struggling to enrich uranium. They say
Dimona tested the effectiveness of the Stuxnet computer worm, a destructive
program that appears to have wiped out roughly a fifth of Irans nuclear centrifuges
and helped delay, though not destroy, Tehrans ability to make its first nuclear
arms. To check out the worm, you have to know the machines, said an American expert
on nuclear intelligence. The reason the worm has been effective is that the Israelis tried
it out. Though American and Israeli officials refuse to talk publicly about what goes
on at Dimona, the operations there, as well as related efforts in the United States,
are among the newest and strongest clues suggesting that the virus was designed as
an American-Israeli project to sabotage the Iranian program.

Analysis: I dont think the way to answer bunker busters is with evidence saying that they will
kill civilians (which exist) because youre not answering their argument. You need to explain
that attacking Iran gives them more motivation and resources to develop their nuclear program.
Bunker busters will never be successful in completely tackling the program because if we use
them, it will perpetuate the problem. I think the best way to answer this is to pull cards from the
diplomacy solves argument and articulate that multilateral sanctions give us the best option
without going to war.
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Argument: U.S. counterterrorism encouraged counterterror efforts on a worldwide scale.

Warrant: Successful U.S. action creates a common global goal.

Kosnik, Mark. An Analysis Of The United States Use Of Military Force Against
Terrorism. Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. May 1999. Web. 18
Aug. 2013. <http://programs.wcfia.harvard.edu/files/fellows/files/kosnik.pdf>.

The strikes also encouraged a worldwide law enforcement effort against bin Ladens
organization, which has led to numerous arrests and has kept bin Laden on the defensive.
Finally, from a long-term perspective, the military strikes contributed to the
containment of terrorism by reinforcing the message sent to Qaddafi in 1986 and
Saddam Hussein in 1993, that the U.S. was willing to take the strongest action
available to punish terrorism and protect U.S. national interests. On balance, U.S.
military strikes against bin Laden limited an emerging terrorist threat and
contributed significantly to the long-term war against terrorism.

Warrant: The deaths of terrorist leaders prevent an organization from functioning.

Bergen, Peter. Should We Still Fear Al-Qaeda. CNN. February 6, 2013. Web. 18 Aug.
2013. <http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/03/opinion/bergen-al-qaeda-deadly>

Osama bin Laden, the group's founder and charismatic leader, was buried at sea a year
and half ago and despite concerns that his "martyrdom" would provoke a rash of attacks
in the West or against Western interests in the Muslim world there has instead been....
nothing. Meanwhile, CIA drone strikes in Pakistan during President Obama's
tenure alone have killed 38 of al Qaeda's leaders in Pakistan, according to a count
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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by the New America Foundation. Cameron vows to fight terror in N Africa Al
Qaeda threatens more attacks Al Qaeda in Mali behind Algeria attack. Those drone
strikes were so effective that shortly before bin Laden died he was contemplating
ordering what remained of al Qaeda to move to Kunar Province in the remote,
heavily forested mountains of eastern Afghanistan, according to documents that
were discovered following the SEAL assault on the compound where bin Laden was
hiding in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Core al Qaeda is going the way of the dodo.

Warrant: Decapitation creates infighting over the possible successor.

Staeheli, Paul. Collapsing Insurgent Organizations Through Leadership Decapitation: A
Comparison of Targeted Killing and Targeted Incarceration in Insurgent
Organizations. Naval Postgraduate School. March 2010. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518738.pdf>.

Insurgent leaders, knowing they are targeted by government forces, must make the
critical decision to name a successor or not to name a successor. Some insurgent
leaders name a successor to prevent internal power struggles or infighting when the
leader is killed or captured. The presence of a second-in-command allows the
insurgent leader to transfer his leadership legitimacy to his successor and also
facilitates the continuation of insurgent operations once the leader is captured or
killed by government forces. However, by naming a successor, the leader allows
government forces to target the second-in-command as well as the leader, But In
organizations where no successor is named, new leaders must establish themselves in the
hierarchy, which results in delays in operations. For example, following the death of
Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban in Pakistan, numerous people claimed
authority to lead the Tehrik-i-Taliban. The infighting resulted in the deaths of several
Taliban leaders and the loss of time to conduct operations against the Pakistani
Government.

Warrant: Decapitation forces disorganization of operations.
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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Staeheli, Paul. Collapsing Insurgent Organizations Through Leadership Decapitation: A
Comparison of Targeted Killing and Targeted Incarceration in Insurgent
Organizations. Naval Postgraduate School. March 2010. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518738.pdf>.

The elimination of key leaders also removes the individuals who possess the knowledge
of operations, resources, financing, and synchronization of attacks. The destruction of
human capital in leadership positions hinders the effectiveness of the organization to
conduct large-scale, coordinated attacks. Replacing key terrorist leaders with equally
skilled surrogates is difficult due to the years of training and experience required to
effectively organize and support a terrorist network. The elimination of key terrorist
leaders also forces the remaining leaders to go into hiding. To avoid elimination,
the terrorists must constantly change locations, keep those locations secret, and keep
their heads down, all of which reduces the flow of information in their organization
and makes internal communications problematic and dangerous. Motivating
Palestinian fighters during Israels campaign against Hamas leadership was also difficult
when Hamas leadership was in hiding. After Israel killed Yassin, Hamas appointed
Rantisi as his successor. Israel promptly killed Rantisi. Hamas then announced that it
had appointed a new leader but would not name him publicly: hardly a way to inspire
the groups followers. In addition, Daniel Byman observes that the Israeli policy of
targeted killings increases the number of attacks, but the number of Israeli deaths
declines, indicating that the effectiveness of the attacks diminished.

Warrant: Loose nuclear material in other countries is secured by the United States.

Tobey, William. Cuts to Nuclear Security Will Make Us Less Safe. Politico. May 14,
2013. Web 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23100/cuts_to_nuclear_security_
will_make_us_less_safe.html?breadcrumb=%2Fproject%2F62%2Fusrussia_initia
tive_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism>.
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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The largest U.S. programs in this field are run by the National Nuclear Security
Administration, which also builds and maintains the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
These efforts have successfully enabled the United States and Russia to secure or to
dispose of hundreds of tons of fissile material, enough for tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons, ensuring it will not be vulnerable to theft by terrorists. Despite these
accomplishments carried on by the past four administrations, important work remains
undone. Yet the presidents budget proposal for 2014 would cut about $400 million
from NNSAs nonproliferation programs. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative,
which helps nations convert research reactors from fuels that use highly enriched
uranium to those that use low enriched uranium (unsuitable for weapons) and to
return the resulting fresh and spent fuel to secure storage, would be cut by $79
million. This program is at the very core of the presidents pledged four-year effort to
secure vulnerable nuclear material by 2014.

Analysis : You need to stress the idea that U.S. Counter-terrorist tactics are successful at
inhibiting nuclear proliferation. This concept will be very persuasive for the judges,
because many of these policies are already implemented, so it will be difficult for Con to
claim that these actions will result in a doomsday scenario, since that scenario has yet
to manifest itself.

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Answer: U.S. military aid, in any form, creates foreign terror.

Warrant: U.S. counterterrorism defines the enemy that terrorists seek to fight.

Neumayer, Eric. Foreign Terror on Americans. Journal of Peace Research. 2011. Web
18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/geographyandenvironment/whoswho/profiles/neumayer/pd
f/terror%20on%20americans.pdf>.

Turning to our variables of main interest, we find evidence in favour of our hypothesis.
In particular, the three military support variables exert a positive impact on the number
of US victims. All three show a significant and positive relation to the number of
American terror victims, as our theory predicts. The three variables also exert a
substantively important influence on the dependent variable. A one standard
deviation increase in the measure of military aid, arms exports and military
personnel raises the expected count of anti-American terrorism by 135%, 109% and
24%, respectively.

Answer: Drone war, specifically, creates disproportionate blowback.

Warrant: Drones create an us vs. them mentality.

Exum, Andrew. Death From Above, Outrage From Down Below. New York Times.
May 16, 2009. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?pagewanted=all>.

!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
First, the drone war has created a siege mentality among Pakistani civilians. This is
similar to what happened in Somalia in 2005 and 2006, when similar strikes were
employed against the forces of the Union of Islamic Courts. While the strikes did kill
individual militants who were the targets, public anger over the American show of force
solidified the power of extremists. The Islamists popularity rose and the group became
more extreme, leading eventually to a messy Ethiopian military intervention, the rise of a
new regional insurgency and an increase in offshore piracy. While violent extremists may
be unpopular, for a frightened population they seem less ominous than a faceless enemy
that wages war from afar and often kills more civilians than militants. Press reports
suggest that over the last three years drone strikes have killed about 14 terrorist
leaders. But, according to Pakistani sources, they have also killed some 700 civilians.
This is 50 civilians for every militant killed, a hit rate of 2 percent hardly
precision. American officials vehemently dispute these figures, and it is likely that
more militants and fewer civilians have been killed than is reported by the press in
Pakistan.

Warrant: Public outrage spreads across multiple countries.

Exum, Andrew. Death From Above, Outrage From Down Below. New York Times.
May 16, 2009. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?pagewanted=all>.

Nevertheless, every one of these dead noncombatants represents an alienated
family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that
has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased. Second, public
outrage at the strikes is hardly limited to the region in which they take place
areas of northwestern Pakistan where ethnic Pashtuns predominate. Rather, the
strikes are now exciting visceral opposition across a broad spectrum of Pakistani opinion
in Punjab and Sindh, the nations two most populous provinces. Covered extensively by
the news media, drone attacks are popularly believed to have caused even more civilian
casualties than is actually the case. The persistence of these attacks on Pakistani territory
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
offends peoples deepest sensibilities, alienates them from their government, and
contributes to Pakistans instability.

Analysis: To answer this argument, you need to cut off the link to the perceived benefit, and
then outweigh the potential benefit with the harms of counterterrorism policies. Specifically,
stress the fact that these policies lead to outrage, which increases the number of terrorists.
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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Argument: Vertical proliferation is a major threat.

Warrant: Vertical proliferation is nuclear proliferation.

Sidel, Victor and Barry S. Levy. "Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for
Control and Abolition." US National Library of Medicine. The American Journal
of Public Health, Sept. 2007. Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963312/>.

Nuclear weapons pose a particularly destructive threat. Prevention of the proliferation
and use of nuclear weapons is urgently important to public health. Horizontal
proliferation refers to nation-states or nonstate entities that do not have, but are acquiring,
nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them.
Vertical proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and
are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical
sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons. Because
nation-states or other entities that wish to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons need
methods for delivering those weapons, proliferation of delivery mechanisms must also be
prevented. Controlling proliferationand ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons
involves national governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and
professional organizations, and society at large.

Warrant: Controlling proliferation is a necessary challenge (including vertical proliferation is
important for global security).

!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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Controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the major challenges we
face as a global society. Given that public health is what we, as a society, do
collectively to ensure the conditions in which people can be healthy,1(p189) controlling
the proliferation of nuclear weaponsand ultimately abolishing themmust be a major
global health priority.

Warrant: Vertical proliferation is also dangerous because development of technology can create
delivery mechanisms to launch said weapons.


The threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons has 3 major aspects:
1. The development of the capability for producing or acquiring nuclear
weapons by countries that do not currently have nuclear weapons
(horizontal proliferation).
2. The increase of weapon stockpiles by countries that currently have
nuclear weapons, the improvement of technical sophistication or
reliability of these weapons, and the development of new weapons,
such as mini-nukes or battlefield nuclear weapons (vertical
proliferation).
3. The acquisition of nuclear weapons or the materials and knowledge by
individuals or nonstate entities, often termed terrorists, to produce nuclear
weapons (another form of horizontal proliferation). Another important
component of the nuclear proliferation issue involves delivery mechanisms.
In order to pose a nuclear threat, nations or other entities not only need these
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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weapons but also need missiles or other methods for delivering them.

Warrant: Proliferation is defined as both vertical and horizontal.

Arbatov, Alexei. "Proliferation Without Borders." Russia In Global Affairs. Spring 2004.
Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&sqi=
2&ved=0CHAQFjAJ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fkms1.isn.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine
%2FFiles%2FISN%2F15100%2Fichaptersection_singledocument%2F2cb4d097-
db6a-4682-bb2f-
b0b829a76cb3%2Fen%2F15_Chapter%2B13.pdf&ei=icAOUoWWLea42QXV-
YCIBA&usg=AFQjCNGXS1Z8OqH3KRFXoG9LxlwkPgs1Cw&sig2=Esg0jVU
bnYhLNifDDCuphw&bvm=bv.50768961,d.aWc&cad=rja>.

The buildup of nuclear armaments by the largest states, concomitant with the desire of
an increasing number of non-nuclear countries to obtain them, have remained closely
interconnected phenomena. This is why any nuclear arms race is often described as
nuclear proliferation: there exists vertical proliferation (a nuclear buildup by the
leading nuclear states) and horizontal proliferation (an increase in the number of
countries having nuclear armaments in their armies).

Warrant: NKs nuclear facilities that are used to enrich uranium have doubled in size.

Berning, Sarah. "North Korea Expanding Nuclear Plant." Deutsche Welle. 13 Aug. 2013.
Web. 16 Aug. 2013. <http://www.dw.de/north-korea-expanding-nuclear-plant/a-
17014801>.

However, the complex is also thought to have been used to produce the fissile
material for North Korea's 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests. And its capacities seem to
be expanding. Based on satellite imagery, the Institute for Science and International
Security (ISIS) recently revealed that the building containing a gas centrifuge plant
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for uranium enrichment has been enlarged to twice its original size. In a report
published on August 7, the Washington-based think-tank says the expansion would
allow a doubling of the number of centrifuges installed at the facility. Centrifuges are
devices that are linked up in series and spin uranium in a gaseous form that can be used
either to power reactors or arm nuclear weapons, depending on the degree of
enrichment.

Warrant: The Uranium North Korea is enriching is very close to the type used solely for
military purposes.

17014801>.

Located some 90 kilometers north of the capital Pyongyang, a huge complex dominates
the landscape. The site is believed to be at the heart of North Korea's controversial
nuclear program. The Yongbyon complex is North Korea's main nuclear facility,
operating its first known atomic reactor. According to government data, the plant
housed 2,000 centrifuges in 2010, producing low enriched uranium (LEU),
reportedly to fuel an experimental light water reactor for the power-starved
country.According to Phillip Schell, expert in arms control and nuclear non-
proliferation at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the
technologies and materials required to produce LEU are very similar to the ones
needed to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), which can be used for military
purposes. Mostly, only the configurations of the centrifuge cascades need to be
changed, he told DW.

Warrant: NK can produce enough uranium for two atomic bombs in the next year

!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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17014801>.

According to the ISIS, the images provided by the satellite companies Digital Globe and
Astrium Geoinformation Services indicate that work on the structure began sometime in
March this year. North Korea could in theory install 2,000 more centrifuges in the site for
a total of 4,000, thus enabling the production of enough weapon-grade uranium for up to
two atomic weapons per year. The research center assessed that the communist
regime of Kim Jong Un could have already procured enough raw materials and
equipment, many acquired from abroad, to build and install that number of
centrifuges. Whatever the reason for the expansion of the building may be, Koblentz
is of the opinion that this reflects North Koreas increasing confidence in its ability
to successfully enrich uranium. Centrifuges are delicate machines and it typically takes
countries several years to learn how to operate them properly. Once countries master
centrifuge technology it is natural for them to expand the production capacity of their
facilities. The international community is increasingly concerned about North Korea's
nuclear program, as the country withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty in 2003 and
does not allow inspectors into its nuclear facilities, making the prospect of the
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula appear in even further distance.

Analysis: The link card you will need for this argument to work can be any of the generic U.S.
justified in unilateral action warrants. Basically, all of these cards help you prove that
proliferation does include vertical proliferation, so you can talk about North Korea. There are
lots of impacts you can use here: allies in the region, economic impact with disruption of trade
through the waters surrounding the Koreas, and upsetting China. Make sure you use the cards
above that North korea is rapidly vertically proliferating.

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Warrant: Vertical proliferation peaked in the 80s horizontal proliferation is occurring at a
much faster and aggressive rate.

Arbatov, Alexei. "Proliferation Without Borders." Russia In Global Affairs, Spring 2004.
Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&sqi=
2&ved=0CHAQFjAJ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fkms1.isn.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine
%2FFiles%2FISN%2F15100%2Fichaptersection_singledocument%2F2cb4d097-
db6a-4682-bb2f-
b0b829a76cb3%2Fen%2F15_Chapter%2B13.pdf&ei=icAOUoWWLea42QXV-
YCIBA&usg=AFQjCNGXS1Z8OqH3KRFXoG9LxlwkPgs1Cw&sig2=Esg0jVU
bnYhLNifDDCuphw&bvm=bv.50768961,d.aWc&cad=rja>.

The vertical proliferation reached its peak in the late 1980s when the Soviet Union
and the United States each possessed 10,000 to 12,000 nuclear warheads in their strategic
forces. Coupled with their tactical nuclear arsenals, this figure reached 30,000 to 40,000
munitions in each of the states. The horizontal proliferation has over the last 50 years
covered nine countries (the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, France, China, Israel, South
Africa, India and Pakistan). The collapse of the Soviet Union produced four new
nuclear states (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan). Later, three of them turned
their nuclear weapons over to Russia. Another four countries (South Africa, Brazil,
Argentina and Iraq) made attempts to develop nuclear weapons of their own, but later
gave up such attempts for one reason or another. Two countries (North Korea and Iran)
are considered to be threshold states, i.e. those on the verge of obtaining nuclear
weapons. If they cross the line then it is possible in a worst-case scenario that
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

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many more countries may join the nuclear club in the subsequent 10 to 20 years
(Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Saudi Arabia). Malaysia and
Indonesia have also been displaying interest in the nuclear issue of late, while Iraq,
Brazil, Argentina and some more countries may resume their nuclear programs

%*,/)"7 Noith Koiea is not iapiuly ueveloping theii piogiam.

8-""-*+7 Noith Koiea oveistates the capabilities of theii facilities fiequently. It's not a big
thieat.

17014801>.

However, Gregory D. Koblentz, a Stanton Nuclear Security fellow at the Council
on Foreign Relations, points out that North Korea has a history of overstating its
military prowess to intimidate its enemies. He says, for instance, that North Korea
has paraded mock-ups of some of its long-range missiles despite the fact that these
missiles have never been flight-tested. Building a new foundation and roof is a cheap
way to make other countries think that your centrifuge program is larger and more
advanced than it really is, he told DW.

8-""-*+7 Noith Koiea can't hit the 0.S.

Szoldra, Paul. "North Korea Is Not Even Close To Hitting The US With A Nuke."
Business Insider. 8 Mar. 2013. Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.businessinsider.com/us-in-danger-north-korean-nuclear-attack-2013-
3>.

As North Korea continues to talk of war against their neighbor to the south, they've also
started to threaten the United States, saying that thermonuclear war may be on the
!"# %"&'()*+, -*. %*,/)", 0)1+)(2)" 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
horizon. Reality, yet again, is not on the side of Pyongyang. The North Koreans still
need a few things a reliable long range, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM),
a nuclear warhead built to fit that missile, and the technology that can guide it
through launch, reentry, and hitting the target, according to the Federation of
American Scientists. North Korea has test fired a number of missiles with varying
ranges. They've been successful with some short and medium range platforms, but
their long range capabilities have been marked with many failures.

Warrant: North Korea built a rocket capable of hitting the U.S., but it spun out of control almost
instantly once launched.

Szoldra, Paul. "North Korea Is Not Even Close To Hitting The US With A Nuke."
Business Insider. 8 Mar. 2013. Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.businessinsider.com/us-in-danger-north-korean-nuclear-attack-2013-
3>.

In early December, though, North Korea's Unha-3 launch found moderate success.
Which is a little terrifying, given its presumed specs and capabilities. While they can't be
independently verified, we do know that it too is a three-stage rocket, based on the Unha-
2 design, measuring about 105 feet tall and eight feet in diameter. Its primary stage
engine carries 80,000 kg of fuel, its second stage carries an additional 7,000 kg, and its
final stage shot a 220-pound weather satellite, the Kwangmyongsong-3, into polar orbit.
A satellite which quickly, hilariously, and dangerously spun out of control.

Analysis: You need to point out that theres no way to actually verify the intensity or the
development of their program. There are so many steps to overcome before North Korean can
launch a weapon (Szoldra card) that it seems highly improbable. You can use the argument that
sanctions are effective, or just make arguments as to why multilateralism is better to get some
offense.

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Argument: Military action will not end Irans nuclear program.

Warrant: Military options are not likely to end or delay an Iranian nuclear program.

Albright, David. "Preventing Iran From Getting Nuclear Weapons: Constraining Its
Future Nuclear Options." The Institute for Science and International Security, 5
Mar. 2012. Web. 16 Aug. 2013. <http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-
reports/documents/USIP_Template_5March2012-1.pdf>.

Pre-emptive or preventive military options to end Irans nuclear program are often
offered as the best alternative to negotiations but appear unlikely to succeed. Despite
the current political dialogue in Israel and the United States about a growing urgency to
strike Iran, short of full-scale war or occupation, most military options are oversold as
to their ability to end or even significantly delay Irans nuclear program.

Warrant: Bombing campaigns will not destroy Irans alternate production capabilities.


Limited bombing campaigns are unlikely to destroy Irans main capability to
produce weapon-grade uranium for nuclear weapons using its gas centrifuge
program.

Warrant: Destroying Iranian nuclear facilities would only put it back two years.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#"
"Why the U.S. Should Negotiate With Iran." Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, 07 Feb. 2013.
Web. 17 Aug. 2013. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-08/why-the-u-s-
should-negotiate-with-iran.html>.

Second, that the destruction of Irans nuclear facilities would set the countrys
uranium enrichment program back by two or more years, but could not -- short of a
U.S. invasion or regime change in Tehran -- end it.

Warrant: The Israeli bombing of Husseins program in the 1980s shows that bombing does not
kill a program.

"Attacking or Threatenting Iran Makes No Sense (Key Points)." American Foreign
Policy Project. 2009. Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<http://americanforeignpolicy.org/military-option-iran/attacking-iran>.

Israel's bombing of Saddam Hussein's Osirak reactor in 1981 is widely cited as a
favorable precedent for bombing Iran. It should not be. We now know that Israel's
bombing of the Osirak reactor did not stop Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons
program. On the contrary, it so enraged Saddam Hussein that he covertly
expanded that program by more an order of magnitude, according to the later,
independent reports of two Iraqi nuclear scientists. It took Operation Desert Storm
and the inspections regime that followed it to bring the program to a halt.

Argument: A military attack would expedite Irans nuclear program.

Warrant: An ineffective bombing could lead to a bigger and stronger nuclear program.

Future Nuclear Options." The Institute for Science and International Security. 5
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

Iran has dispersed its centrifuge program across many facilities, several whose locations
remain secret. More importantly, Iran has mastered the construction of centrifuges
and has likely even secretly stockpiled an unknown number of centrifuges, despite
problems in their operation and limits to Irans supply of raw materials. An
ineffective bombing campaign that does not eliminate these capabilities would leave
Iran able to quickly rebuild its program and would motivate it to launch its own
Manhattan Project, resulting in a Middle East region that is far more dangerous
and unstable.

Warrant: Bombing Iranian facilities will only trigger a rage and drive the program underground.


But bombing Iran's nuclear facilities without a subsequent invasion would merely
trigger rage in Iran, and solidify their intention to pursue nuclear weapons in secret.
Nuclear capacity lies mostly in knowledge. Facilities can be hidden. If hit and destroyed
they can be re-built. As Secretary of Defense Gates put it: Even a military attack
will only buy us time and send the program deeper and more covert.

Warrant: Bombing would have a rally-around-the-flag effect in a largely pro-American
population.


Bombing these facilities would kill large numbers of Iranian civilians, with disastrous
consequences not only for the victims and their loved ones, but for the United States.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

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Bombing Iran would change all that. A population that is now largely pro-
American and angry with their own government would be enraged against the
United States, and would rally round the flag against a foreign enemy (just as we
would in their shoes). It is hard to imagine a better way to play into the hands of
hardliners in Iran.

Impact Warrant: The use of military force could only at best temporarily set back the program
and at worst have counterproductive effects.

Davenport, Kelsey. "Iran Nuclear Brief." The Arms Control Association, Jan. 2013. Web.
17 Aug. 2013. <http://www.armscontrol.org/files/Iran_Brief_01_09_2013.pdf>.

The use of military force against Irans extensive and highly dispersed nuclear
infrastructure, short of a complete military occupation of the country, can only
temporarily set back Irans program and would likely prompt Iran to eject the
IAEA inspectors and actively pursue nuclear weapons. Consequently, the military
option would be counterproductive and costly, and would foreclose diplomatic
options, erode international support for sanctions, lessen Irans isolation, and
possibly trigger a regional war leading to enormous civilian casualties and human
suffering.

Impact Warrant: The negative repercussions of a strike would affect American goals in the
region.

Maloney, Suzanne. "How to Contain a Nuclear Iran." The American Prospect. Mar. 2012.
Web. 18 Aug. 2013. <http://prospect.org/article/how-contain-nuclear-iran>.

Conversely, the negative repercussions of a military strike would be dramatic and
sustained. Iran could be expected to retaliate against U.S. and Israeli interests and
allies across the region, directly as well as through its network of terrorist proxies
that includes Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. Israelis would likely
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
endure an onslaught of rocket fire and a revival of suicide bombings. Arab Gulf states
might see their oil infrastructure targeted and their Shia populations agitated by Iranian
subversion. All of the other American goals in the regionfrom promoting peace
between Israelis and Palestinians to ensuring the free flow of oilwould be
jeopardized. Although many regional governments would probably support a strike on
Tehran, either tacitly or logistically, regional populations might well erupt in the wake
of new U.S.led military action in the region, particularly if it were a sustained.

Analysis: This argument is very similar to the putting a small bandage on a huge wound
argument. Iranian nuclear proliferation is very obviously a threat but doing something that at best
only puts it off for a short period, or at worse exacerbates the problem, is not in the best interest
of the United States. There is very valid evidence warning that the fallout from attacking Irans
program far outweighs the benefits, which will be important to weigh during the rebuttal
speeches in round.
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Answer: A military act could end Irans program once and for all.

Warrant: A military attack could decimate Irans facilities, plants and tunnel entrances.

Albright, David. "PREVENTING IRAN FROM GETTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
CONSTRAINING ITS FUTURE NUCLEAR OPTIONS." The Institute for
Science and International Security. 5 Mar. 2012. Web. 16 Aug. 2013. <http://isis-
online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/USIP_Template_5March2012-1.pdf>.

This site is deeply buried and less vulnerable to military strikes, but the IAEA would
relatively quickly detect any diversion of LEU here, leading to draconian sanctions
and possibly military strikes against a range of nuclear facilities. In addition,
although aerial strikes would be hard pressed to destroy the centrifuges underground at
the Fordow plant, they are likely to destroy critical supporting facilities on the
surface, including power plants and tunnel entrances that could cause a temporary
halt of centrifuge operations. Moreover, an attack by the United States could likely
cause substantial destruction to tunnel passageways leading to the chamber
containing the centrifuge cascades.$

Argument: Short-term solvency gives the U.S. more time.
Warrant: Tehran is too close to developing a weapon.

"3 Views on What the US Should Do about Iran's Nuclear Program." The Christian
Science Monitor. 26 Sept. 2012. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/One-Minute-Debate/2012/0926/3-
views-on-what-the-US-should-do-about-Iran-s-nuclear-program/Support-Israeli-
attack-That-will-break-the-nuclear-fuel-cycle-and-buy-time-for-regime-change>.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
Tehran is perilously close to achieving nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles for
worldwide delivery. It is far too advanced in its entire program for sanctions to stop it
now. And because the world's intelligence on Iran is imperfect, Iran may be even closer
to a nuclear bomb than we think, especially considering its longstanding cooperation
with North Korea, about which we know far less.

Warrant: Using force on Iran buys the international community more time.

Science Monitor, 26 Sept. 2012. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.

The other possibility is that someone, now most likely Israel, uses force to break
Iran's control over the nuclear-fuel cycle, not permanently, but long enough to buy
time for the broader objective of finally overthrowing the Tehran regime.

Warrant: A strike is only a step in the process of halting the program.

Cartwright, James. "Israeli or U.S. Action Against Iran: Who Will Do It If It Must Be
Done?" The Atlantic. 28 May 2013. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/israeli-or-us-action-
against-iran-who-will-do-it-if-it-must-be-done/276295/>.

Attacking Iran's nuclear facilities is but a tactical step toward the strategic goal of
permanently halting the regime's drive toward nuclear weapons. Mechanically
damaging the program is not an end goal in itself, since no amount of bombs can
destroy Iran's nuclear knowhow. Any strike must necessarily be followed by
negotiations and a self-enforcing diplomatic deal that prevents Tehran from reconstituting
the program or achieving breakout capability in the future.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

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Impact Warrant: A nuclear-armed Iran would start an Iranian arms race.

Science Monitor. 26 Sept. 2012. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.

The most likely is that Iran gets nuclear weapons, bringing the chilling prospect of
nuclear holocaust for Israel. A nuclear-armed Iran would also dramatically shift the
balance of power in the Middle East, prompting Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and
others to acquire nuclear capabilities. And it would increase the risk of global nuclear
terrorism.

Argument: Letting Iran continue with their program risks an Israeli attack.

Warrant: Israel will strike if Iranian behavior doesnt change.

Sorcher, Sara. "Insiders: Israel Will Attack Iran." NationalJournal.com. Oct. 2012. Web.
18 Aug. 2013. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/insiders-israel-
will-attack-iran-20121009>.

If the U.S. strategy in 2013 does not produce noticeable changes in Iran's
behavior," one Insider said, "then either Israel will convince the U.S. to strike (their
preferred option) or they will go it alone (and the U.S. will share in the consequences)."

Warrant: Israel is concerned that they are running out of time.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
Sorcher, Sara. "Insiders: Israel Will Attack Iran." NationalJournal.com. Oct. 2012. Web.
18 Aug. 2013. <http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/insiders-israel-
will-attack-iran-20121009>.

Other Insiders believed an Israeli attack is imminent. The drums of war are beating
louder and louder, and the Israelis are concerned they are running out of time to
mount an effective attack on the Iranian nuclear program, one Insider said. The
Israelis have lost the element of surprise but believe their nation's existence is
threatened by the Iranian program, thus making it likely they will strike Iran in the
coming months.

Warrant: Israel would not have the same amount of international support if they were to strike.

Capaccio, Tony. "U.S. Bombing Iran Stirs Less Strife Than Israel, Cartwright Says."
Businessweek. 29 May 2013. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-05-29/u-dot-s-dot-bombing-iran-stirs-
less-strife-than-israel-cartwright-says>.

Israeli strikes would almost certainly not enjoy the same international support as a
U.S. strike, Cartwright wrote in the note, released today by the Washington Institute For
Near East Policy.

Warrant: A U.S. airstrike would be preferable to an Israeli Strike.

Capaccio, Tony. "U.S. Bombing Iran Stirs Less Strife Than Israel, Cartwright Says."
Businessweek. 29 May 2013. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-05-29/u-dot-s-dot-bombing-iran-stirs-
less-strife-than-israel-cartwright-says>.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
U.S. air strikes against Iranian nuclear research and production facilities, if
warranted, would result in fewer political repercussions than Israeli attacks,
according to an analysis by a former member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Analysis: A U.S. attack could realistically end the Iranian program if it does enough damage.
More importantly though, if it doesnt completely end the program, it could buy the international
community more time to permanently end it. This increased time could also prevent an Israeli
strike, which spurs far more harm than one conducted by the US.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

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Argument: A United States attack without multilateral consent exacerbates the problem.

Warrant: A U.S. preemptive attack without authorization could violate international law.

Smith, Jeffrey H. "Providing a Legal Basis to Attack Iran." Council on Foreign
Relations, Sept. 2012. Web. 19 Aug. 2013. <http://www.cfr.org/iran/providing-
legal-basis-attack-iran/p29173>.

But in the absence of U.N. authorization, many nations, including some of our allies,
are likely to believe that a preemptive attack would violate international law, just as
they believed the U.S. invasion of Iraq violated international law (despite the prior
Security Council resolutions).

Warrant: A U.S. unilateral attack could weaken international support.

Long, Austin. "Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran." Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, The Iran Project, Sept. 2012. Web. 16
Aug. 2013.
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/IranReport_091112_FINAL.pdf>

The United States would likely seek some kind of international mandate for military
action against Iran, and attempt to put together a large multinational coalition. But if the
U.S. and/or Israel end up attacking Irans nuclear program without such a
mandate, hard-won international support for maintaining sanctions against Iran
could be substantially weakened. China and Russia would loudly condemn military
actions against Iran, and some European nations might pull back from a sanctions
regime after such attacks. Iran would be seen by many around the world, Muslims
and non-Muslims alike, as the victim of unjustified American and/or Israeli military
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#"
action. Sanctions are at present one of the main coercive levers against Iran; the heaviest
sanctions on Iranian oil sales and access to worldwide banking have just come online.
The weakening of the sanctions regime as a result of a military action would
represent a significant break in the global solidarity against the Iranian nuclear
program.

Warrant: Iran could receive international support for their program.

Aug. 2013.

With the breakdown of cooperative international efforts to isolate Iran, there is the
possibility that Iran might receive new support for its military capacity. For
example, Russia might be willing to sell Iran advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
that would make future attacks on Iran more costly and difficult. Russia is currently
withholding sales of these systems because they fall under U.N. sanctions, but this
decision and others could be revisited after strikes on Iran. Also, Iran now faces severe
limits on its ability to acquire from abroad a variety of dual-purpose materials and
components for its centrifuges and other nuclear technology. States that see Iran as the
victim of an unjustified attack might become more willing to share information and
material with Iran. This could potentially enable Iran to produce more advanced
centrifuges than the country is currently able to produce, given material and
technical shortages.

Argument: A multilateral approach would be more effective at solving nuclear proliferation.

Warrant: A long-term strategy to end Iranian program requires international cooperation.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

But as we seek and engage in negotiations for a long-term solution, the key goal must
be, at the same time, to implement additional measures to delay, thwart, and deter
Irans acquisition of nuclear capabilities and inhibit its ability to break out. In
particular, such a strategy should focus on several key priorities:
More effective legal mechanisms to stop Iran from acquiring key goods for its
nuclear programs. A priority is Chinas domestic enforcement of sanctions and
trade controls; Better detection of Irans illicit procurement efforts and
broader enforcement of legal mechanisms worldwide;
Increased efforts in countries of transit concern to prevent Iran from
transshipping banned goods; Stepped up operations to detect clandestine Iranian
nuclear activities, including heightened intelligence operations inside Iran aimed
at detecting secret nuclear sites and activities and encouraging defections of
nuclear program;
Covert action to slow Irans nuclear program, particularly if the conflict
transforms into a protracted Cold War style stand-off between Iran and several
members of the international community; and,
Increased economic and financial sanctions aimed at augmenting pressure,
combined with an effort to displace Iranian oil exports.
A parallel strategy alongside pressure is to seek interim negotiated
constraints on Irans nuclear program that serve to reduce concerns about an
Iranian breakout or dash to the bomb. Iran can receive tangible benefits in return
for reducing its options to build nuclear weapons quickly and in secret. All sides
could build valuable trust, something currently in short supply.

Warrant: Multilateral efforts ensure state specialization and division of labor.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
Slaten, Kevin. "The Decline of U.S. Hegemony: Regaining International Consent." The
Ohio State University, Mar. 2008. Web. 19 Aug. 2013.
<https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/31784/paperFINAL_v3_with_ti
tle.pdf?sequence=1>.

Mentioned above, states must increasingly cooperate with other state and non
state actors in order to provide security for their citizens. The search for cost
efficient security also encourages geographical and functional specialization of state
and nonstate actors; thus, one should see a sort of global division of labor,
where various NGOs, IGOs, and states tend to fill particular roles in providing
global security.

Warrant: In a multilateral system, states share resources and burden which decreases the
likelihood of conflict.


The ultimate and most effective international system of authority is a democratic one in
which every nation explicitly consents to the system of decisionmaking that addresses
global security concerns. In such a system, states pool their resources and share the
burden of common security issues, which minimizes the likelihood of
misunderstanding and conflict.

Analysis: The first part of this argument explains why the U.S. acting unilaterally could and
would likely undermine multilateral efforts against Iran by either losing international support or
giving countries like Russia a reason to support their program. The second part explains why
acting multilaterally would more effectively end Irans program. Overall, the international
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

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community has more resources and ability to limit Irans program, even if it takes a bit more
effort to coordinate.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

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%73 8 9(:+;:-+*&-: 0(11"&+ <, =&*>*&-2:* %#. 9"&* ?>>*@+;A*
Answer: Multilateral efforts are ineffective at stopping nuclear proliferation.

Warrant: Multilateral institutions have deterred no case of nuclear proliferation.


However, arguably not a single known or suspected case of proliferation since the
early 1990sPakistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, or Syria was deterred or
reversed by the multilateral institutions created for this purpose.

Warrant: Government to government negotiations are more effective at successfully ending
nuclear weapon pursuing countries, as shown by Iran and Libya.


The continued advancement of Iran's nuclear programdespite the implementation of
crosscutting economic sanctions and near universal global condemnationhas
elicited serious concerns from states including Israel, the United States, and Saudi
Arabia. Additionally, recent nonproliferation success stories, such as Libya's abandoning
its nuclear program in 2003 and the accession of all of the Soviet successor states except
Russia to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as nonnuclear weapon states,
have been the result of direct government-to-government negotiations and pressure
rather than action by global bodies.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "##

Warrant: Political calculations cause deadlock, which gives countries more time to develop
their programs.


In practice, however, political calculations have often caused deadlock at the
UNSC, enabling nuclear rogues such as Iran to defy successive, fairly weak UN
sanctions resolutions with virtual impunity.

Warrant: Multilateral programs lack enforcement capabilities.

"The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime." Council on Foreign Relations. 25 June

Another problem is the lack of adequate verification and enforcement mechanisms
available to the IAEA, whose budget, intelligence capabilities, and technological
resources fall far short of what would be needed to detect, prevent, or punish NPT
violations.

Impact Warrant: Although multilateralism is important, it is fraught with challenges that
prevent it from being effective in certain situations.

Foundation. Sept. 2010. Web. 19 Aug. 2013.
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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

The need for multilateralism is obvious. Nations share concerns about many
problems and issues for which coordinated efforts could be mutually beneficial. Yet
only rarely do all governments agree on the nature of a problem and the means to
address it. At times, negotiations result in a less-than-perfect, but still acceptable, course
of action. Disagreements can also lead to no action or the use of force or other
confrontational measures. One of the purposes of multilateralism is to minimize the
number and intensity of such confrontations. The process itself, however, is fraught
with political challenges that can undermine potential solutions and even lead to
other problems.

Analysis: The most important argument against this claim is that multilateralism has historically
been ineffective at preventing nuclear proliferation. You can use the examples of North Korea
and Iran, or the fact that each separate country has to sort through a different agenda in order for
actions to take place.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

!78 9 :(,+ ;-& <=*"&>

Argument: In order to engage in military force, a state must evaluate whether the war is just
through a set of universal principles established by the just war theory.

Warrant: Just cause, the first principle of just war theory, explains that a state only can enter
war for a just reason.

Orend, Brian. "War." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 04 Feb. 2000. Web. 17 Aug.
2013. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/>.

"1. Just cause. This is clearly the most important rule; it sets the tone for everything
which follows. A state may launch a war only for the right reason. The just causes
most frequently mentioned include: self-defence from external attack; the defence of
others from such; the protection of innocents from brutal, aggressive regimes; and
punishment for a grievous wrongdoing which remains uncorrected. Vitoria suggested
that all the just causes be subsumed under the one category of a wrong received.
Walzer, and most modern just war theorists, speak of the one just cause for resorting to
war being the resistance of aggression. Aggression is the use of armed force in violation
of someone else's basic rights."

Analysis: Make arguments to the judge that stopping nuclear proliferation is not a just cause
through a variety of means. For example, you could argue proliferation is actually good or that
Iran is trying to acquire nuclear energy not weapons, making it an unjust cause.

Warrant: The right reason must be the only reason that a country uses when entering war.

Orend, Brian. "War." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 04 Feb. 2000. Web. 17 Aug.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
"2. Right intention. A state must intend to fight the war only for the sake of its just
cause. Having the right reason for launching a war is not enough: the actual
motivation behind the resort to war must also be morally appropriate. Ulterior
motives, such as a power or land grab, or irrational motives, such as revenge or
ethnic hatred, are ruled out. The only right intention allowed is to see the just cause for
resorting to war secured and consolidated. If another intention crowds in, moral
corruption sets in. International law does not include this rule, probably because of the
evidentiary difficulties involved in determining a state's intent."

Analysis: Use right intention to restrict your opponents from making an argument saying we
should stop nuclear proliferation because on accident, something else happens. They can only
prove a war is just if the intention is right.

Warrant: A state must follow the proper process to enter a war. Unfortunately, any swift
decision made against Iran would always be outside the President's power and therefore, unjust.

Orend, Brian. "War." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 04 Feb. 2000. Web. 17 Aug.

"3. Proper authority and public declaration. A state may go to war only if the
decision has been made by the appropriate authorities, according to the proper
process, and made public, notably to its own citizens and to the enemy state(s). The
appropriate authority is usually specified in that country's constitution. States failing
the requirements of minimal justice lack the legitimacy to go to war."

Koons, Robert. "Just War and the Iran Crisis." Public Discourse, Witherspoon Institute, 7
Mar. 2012. Web. 21 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/03/4901/>.

Given the United States Constitution, it is the sole prerogative of the Congress to
issue any ultimatum with a declared state of war among its threatened
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
consequences. The president lacks the constitutional authority to issue such an
ultimatum or declaration. There may be cases in which action must be taken swiftly,
leaving no time for the Congress to convene and make its decision, but that is
certainly not the case here, with at least several months before a decision to launch
a war must be made. Consequently, no action (either by American or allied forces)
authorized solely by the president can be just.

Warrant: War must be the last option. If war is not the last option, then we are disregarding the
life of our victim by taking it away to benefit our considerations. On top of that, surprise attacks
can never be a just war as they are never the last option, so discussion about cyber attacks, strikes
like the strike against Osirak, all would negate.

Orend, Brian. "War." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 04 Feb.
2000. Web. 17 Aug. 2013. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/>.

"4. Last Resort. A state may resort to war only if it has exhausted all plausible,
peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict in question, in particular diplomatic
negotiation. One wants to make sure something as momentous and serious as war is
declared only when it seems the last practical and reasonable shot at effectively resisting
aggression."

Mar. 2012. Web. 21 Aug. 2013.

Last resort matters because when we go to war prematurely, we cannot act with
the right intention. If war is something other than our last resort, we reveal our
unjust disregard of the humanity of our enemies. The only justification for killing a
human being (outside of capital punishment) is to prevent that persons participation in
some unjust killing of another, and to do so only after they have formed the firm
intention to kill. When we kill prematurely, we allow other considerations to weigh
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#"
against the value of their lives, and we deny the inherent dignity of our enemies
when we anticipate evil intentions that they have not yet formed. I cannot legitimately
shoot someone now in self-defense, simply because, given his wicked disposition, he will
almost certainly intend to kill me at some time in the future.

Mar. 2012. Web. 21 Aug. 2013.

Just war theory resolutely opposes any surprise attack, such as that of the Japanese
on Pearl Harbor, precisely because such an unanticipated action can never be a last
resort. Sneak attacks do not provide the prospective enemy with an ultimatum that
it can meet and thereby avert the catastrophe of war. A just war against Iran,
therefore, would have to be a declared war.

Analysis: This principle is also a fantastic link to alternatives (for example, sanctions) because
if there is a better alternative it directly proves that the use of force is unjust.

Warrant: A state must have a high probability of success. Therefore, attacking Iran would be
unjust unless it was confirmed that an attack would prevent all Iranian nuclear proliferation.
Pushing it back would be unjust without the knowledge of an imminent attack


"5. Probability of Success. A state may not resort to war if it can foresee that doing
so will have no measurable impact on the situation. The aim here is to block mass
violence which is going to be futile. International law does not include this requirement,
as it is seen as biased against small, weaker states."

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
Analysis: Use this principle as a burden on your opponents. In order for the affirmative to win
the round, they MUST prove that there is a high probability of success; otherwise, the war will
be a fruitless and, resultantly, unjust attempt.

Mar. 2012. Web. 21 Aug. 2013.

Its true that we could be justified in thwarting an imminent attack now, even if
doing so wouldnt prevent all future acts of aggression. However, in this case, there
is no specific attack that we would be thwarting: we would be merely postponing the
acquisition of the means for an attack, and such mere postponement cannot justify
the intentional killing of Iranians. It may be that a prolonged and massive air assault
would increase the probability of success, and thereby be more defensible than a limited
campaign, but plans for such an all-out campaign would call for even more stringent
examination on the grounds of proportionality, as well as evaluation of the American
peoples willingness to see such a massive effort through to its conclusion.

Warrant: The war provides a net benefit of goods over harms.


"6. Proportionality. A state must, prior to initiating a war, weigh the universal goods
expected to result from it, such as securing the just cause, against the universal evils
expected to result, notably casualties. Only if the benefits are proportional to, or
worth, the costs may the war action proceed. (The universal must be stressed, since
often in war states only tally their own expected benefits and costs, radically discounting
those accruing to the enemy and to any innocent third parties.)"

Warrant: Comparative justice must occur for a war to be just.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
Koons, Robert. "Just War and the Iran Crisis." Public Discourse. Witherspoon Institute, 7
Mar. 2012. Web. 21 Aug. 2013.

Comparative justice means that the nation initiating the war must be significantly
less guilty in the relevant respects than is the prospective enemy. It is not sufficient to
be more just as a whole: comparative justice refers to the morally relevant features of the
enemy being used as the cause of war. To be sincerely intending to act for a just cause
against a possible enemy, the enemy must not have an equally just cause of the same kind
against ones own nation, since ones intention cannot be properly focused on
rectifying an injustice on the part of another nation while harboring a similarly
unjust intention on ones own part. Thus, right intention requires comparative justice.

Analysis: Above are the principles of just war theory. You should pick two or three to run in
your case and establish that if you win one, just one, of these arguments that the force is not
justified, necessitating a negative ballot. For example, one of the principles could be just cause
and you could run a contention about how stopping nuclear proliferation is a bad thing because it
decreases the chance of mutually assured destruction.
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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

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Answer: Just war theory is outdated.

Warrant: Originating centuries ago, just war theory has failed to fully adapt to the 21st century,
still reliant on principles created when Christian morality and the use of mass fighting were
popular at the time.

Hower, Sara. "Three Problems for Just War Theory in the 21st Century." Academia.edu,
Apr. 2006. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.academia.edu/917831/Three_Problems_for_Just_War_Theory_in_th
e_21st_Century>.

Just war theory was conceived at a time when armies massed against one another
along a front and when Christian morality provided a common ethical framework
for the Western world. Neither of those circumstances obtains in the postmodern
and technological environment of the twenty-first century, and while writers such as
Michael Walzer and Oliver ODonovan have made important contributions to updating
just war thinking, it is clear that evolving technical and philosophic issues call for a
radical re-examination of the ethical possibility of a just war within our contemporary
world.

Answer: Just war theory fails to adapt for our technology.

Warrant: With drones keeping pilots safe and nuclear weapons holding the ability to eliminate
millions of people in seconds, the current scenarios of war have completely changed and,
unfortunately, just war theory has failed to adapt to the new scenarios, rendering it inapplicable.

Apr. 2006. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
e_21st_Century>.

First, just war theory must address how technological issues have changed the
calculus by which decisions to embark upon preventive or pre-emptive
warfare might be necessary or justified.

Answer: New forms of warfare have made just war theory useless.

Warrant: Just war theory provides no lens on how to evaluate the use of force against terrorist
entities and the growing risk of weapons of mass destruction, as these scenarios didn't exist in the
past either.

Apr. 2006. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
e_21st_Century>.

Second, the rise of non-state actors such as al-Qaeda coupled with the increasing
availability of weapons of mass destruction, has changed the picture dramatically
for those who seek to distinguish just from unjust warfare.

Answer: Just war theory ignores international institutions.

Warrant: International institutions completely change how war is evaluated, now requiring
more consent from other states.

Apr. 2006. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
e_21st_Century>.
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The role of the international community as possessing some authority to legitimize
the just use of force (and to question the unjust use of force) by allied states is a
necessary one in this century, even as it raises questions about the sovereignty of
nation-states. The possibility of a common frame of justice by which to judge state
actions may increasingly depend more on consent than appeals to an objective
moral order.

Analysis: Limit the application of just war theory, describing how much times has changed.
Especially point out how just war theory doesn't near apply to the resolution as it involves
weapons of mass destruction, which completely changes the calculus that countries use to
determine if war is a just and/or beneficial option.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "##

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Argument: A U.S. attack would lead to future military actions.

Warrant: Military action would reduce the possibility of permanent political resolution.

Wilson International Center for Scholars. The Iran Project, Sept. 2012. Web. 16
Aug. 2013.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/IranReport_091112_FINAL.pdf=

While it is not impossible that aerial attacks could drive Iran to the negotiating table, we
believe that military action probably would reduce the possibility of reaching a more
permanent political resolution of concerns about Irans nuclear program. In fact,
we believe that a U.S. attack on Iran would increase Irans motivation to build a
bomb, because 1) the Iranian leadership would become more convinced than ever that
regime change is the goal of U.S. policy, and 2) building a bomb would be seen as a way
to inhibit future attacks and redress the humiliation of being attacked. Iran could also
withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and end all cooperation
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), leaving the international
community with greatly reduced knowledge of Irans nuclear program.

Warrant: There are few historical cases of air strikes producing the result of negotiations.

Aug. 2013.

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
Any sort of military action that could lead to outright war would have a significant
impact on the possibility of reaching a more permanent political resolution of concerns
about Irans nuclear program (as well as concerns about Irans regional role and many
other issues that are central to U.S. security interests in the greater Middle East). Of
course, there is a chance that punishing aerial attacks might drive Iran to the negotiating
tablealthough we know of very few historical cases in which air strikes combined
with other forms of pressure (but without the use of ground troops) produced such a
result.

Warrant: In the aftermath of attacks, loss of resolution might necessitate a future attack.

Aug. 2013.

If no lasting resolution of tensions over Irans nuclear program can be achieved in
the aftermath of U.S. and/or Israeli attacks (as discussed below, we believe military
action is more likely to reduce than enhance the prospects for such a political resolution),
attacks might need to be resumed at some future point.

Warrant: There are many ways an attack could lead to an escalation of original plans.

White, Jeffrey. "What Would War with Iran Look Like?" The American Interest
Magazine. July-Aug. 2011. Web. 20 Aug. 2013. <http://www.the-american-
interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=982>.

Moreover, a wars goals at the outset of conflict may not remain stable. Early sudden
successes or unanticipated failures can lead to the escalation of initially limited goals,
particularly if terminating hostilities proves difficult.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
Warrant: There are many ways an attack could lead to future attacks.


In summary, an attack on Iran could produce dynamics that would push either or
both sides to escalate the conflict even if neither had an interest or an initial
intention to do so. Iranian civilian casualties, for example, could provoke Iran to
step up its response. This becomes more likely as the scale of a U.S. attack increases.
Downed U.S. aircrews could lead to search and rescue operations that could become
significant military actions in their own right. The need to restrike targets that were
missed or inadequately damaged could also prolong the conflict and involve
additional forces. As the conflict developed, internal and external political pressures
could press both antagonists to escalate the fighting.

Warrant: The more the U.S. militarily acts against Iran, the more difficult it will be to stop.

Aug. 2013.

The more ambitious the objectives of military action and the longer the conflict goes on,
the more difficult it would be to design an effective exit strategy.

Impact Warrant: Conducting multiple military attacks against Iran would have significant
costs.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
Aug. 2013.

In addition to the financial costs of conducting military attacks against Iran, which
would be significant (particularly if the U.S. had to carry out thousands of sorties and if it
had to return to the use of force periodically for years to come), there would likely be
near-term costs associated with Iranian retaliation, through both direct and surrogate
asymmetrical attacks.

Analysis: Attacking Iran first with Stuxnet and then again with a military strike could put the
U.S. on a road of constantly taking military action against Iran with no avail or end. This not
only incurs significant costs to the American citizen, but also only stops the program for short
periods of time or leads to it being expedited. Therefore, other alternatives should be taken.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#"

%73 8 9:0: %++-;< =>?? @*;*,,>+-+* A(+(&* 9:0: %++-;<,

Answer: A focused U.S. attack will not cause widespread conflict.

Warrant: A narrowly focused attack would restrict the scope of conflict.

Magazine, July-Aug. 2011. Web. 20 Aug. 2013. <http://www.the-american-

The U.S. government has military options corresponding more or less to these aims. A
Peenemnde option would presuppose a narrowly focused, short duration strike
largely limited to nuclear facilities. It would aim to inflict serious damage, but also
to restrict the scope of conflict. Such an attack would rely on U.S. stealth systems,
electronic warfare, cruise missiles and air power. U.S. allies could play a supporting
role, especially in dealing with an Iranian response, but American forces would carry the
brunt of the action.

Warrant: Iran did not react to the Stuxnet attack.

Brown, Gary D. "Why Iran Didn't Admit Stuxnet Was An Attack." National Defense
University Press, 2011. Web. 20 Aug. 2013. <http://www.ndu.edu/press/why-
iran-didnt-admit-stuxnet.html>.

The Stuxnet virus aimed at Iran was not just another cyber threat; it appeared
specifically directed at the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz as well as the
computers that perform automated tasks controlling, for example, water plants and
electric power grids. Yet Tehran dismissed the delay in making the Bushehr nuclear
plant operational as due to technical reasons and did not name Stuxnet as the
culprit.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

Argument: The attacks are only meant to delay the Iranian nuclear program, which they do.

Warrant: Stuxnet was effective at slowing Irans program.

Shamah, David. "Expert: Stuxnet Part of Long-term Effort to Stop Iran Nukes." The
Times of Israel. 27 Feb. 2013. Web. 21 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.timesofisrael.com/expert-stuxnet-part-of-long-term-effort-to-stop-
iran-nukes/>.

But if one of the goals of Stuxnet was to significantly delay Irans nuclear
development, the various generations of the virus have apparently been doing the
job, said Pavel. Iran itself has admitted on several occasions that viruses have slowed
their nuclear progress, so we can certainly take them at their word on that, he said. If
the research by Symantec is correct and the earlier version of Stuxnet did slow the
program, then this is evidence for a long-standing policy by the people behind
Stuxnet to impede Iran. And it does appear that the tool they used to execute this
policy Stuxnet has been effective.

Warrant: An military strike could delay Irans program for four years.

Aug. 2013.
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/IranReport_091112_FINAL.pdf

We believe that extended military strikes by the U.S. alone or in concert with Israel
could delay Irans ability to build a bomb by up to four yearsif the military
operation is carried out to near perfection, with all aircraft, missiles, and bombs working
to maximum effect.

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

Analysis: One answer to this argument is that a focused military strike would not lead to a
significant conflict, looking to Stuxnet as an example. Moreover, it is not actually a bad thing
that the U.S. is doing multiple attacks on Irans program. It serves the purpose of making sure
they dont get nuclear weapons. Although multiple attacks have costs, they are significantly
outweighed by the costs the U.S. would have to occur if Iran was able to require a weapon.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

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Argument: If the U.S. attacks Iran's nuclear program, Iran may retaliate by closing the Strait of
Hormuz, devastating the world's economy.

Warrant: Iran has asserted its right to close the Strait of Hormuz if attacked.

Hirshfeld, Rachel. "Iran Warns of Strait Closure If US Chooses 'War,'" Israel National
News, 25 Jan. 2013. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/164555>.
"Ambassador Hassan Danaie-Far insisted that Tehran retained the right to close the
Strait of Hormuz, through which a third of the world's traded oil passes, in response to
any aggression, military or otherwise. What else (US President Barack) Mr. Obama can
do? Danaie-Far told AFP through an Iranian embassy translator. "The only remaining
card on the table is war. Is it to their benefit? Is it to the benefit of the world? Is it to the
benefit of the region?" He added that if Iran faced a "problem," it would be within its
rights "to react and to defend itself." Asked if it could try to close off the strait, Danaie-
Far replied: "If there is some movement and action from our enemies, including US,
against us, as a part of natural reaction, that may happen." "Everybody would be a loser
in that case," he added. When asked if only military or other types of pressure could
warrant such a move, he told the news agency, It can include all of them. "

Warrant: An attack against Iran could push them to close the Strait of Hormuz.

Ratnesar, Romesh. "Protracted Iran Conflict Could Drive Oil Prices Up $60 Barrel."
Bloomberg, 08 Mar. 2012. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-08/protracted-iran-conflict-could-drive-oil-
prices-up-60-barrel.html>.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
"Tehran might attempt to sabotage oil facilities in Saudi Arabia and southern Iraq,
launch missiles into Israel, or deploy small attack vessels to harass tankers in the Arabian
Sea. The nightmare scenario would be a move by Iran to choke off access to the Strait
of Hormuz -- most likely by unleashing its stockpile of 2,000 mines -- through which
40 percent of the worlds seaborne oil supply travels. The U.S. has warned that such a
step would provoke an all- out assault on Irans military. Would Tehran take that risk? If
Iran concluded its regime were threatened, it might try to make the conflict as big as
possible, as quickly as possible, to bring other powers in to mediate, says McNally."

Impact: If Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz, oil prices would subsequently skyrocket.

Krauss, Clifford. "Oil Price Would Skyrocket If Iran Closed the Strait of Hormuz." New
York Times, 4 Jan. 2012. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/business/oil-price-would-skyrocket-if-iran-
closed-the-strait.html>.

"If Iran were to follow through with its threat to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, a
vital transit route for almost one-fifth of the oil traded globally, the impact would be
immediate: Energy analysts say the price of oil would start to soar and could rise 50
percent or more within days."

Impact: Oil spikes, like the Iran could potentially cause, tend to lead to recessions.

Nelder, Chris, and Gregor Macdonald. "There Will Be Oil, But At What Price?" Harvard
Business Review, 4 Oct. 2011. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2011/10/there_will_be_oil_but_can_you.html>.

"The connection between oil shocks and recessions has been understood for decades.
We have ample historical evidence that when petroleum expenditures reach 5% of
GDP, recession typically follows. Annual energy expenditures rose from 6.2% of U.S.
GDP in 2002 to a painful 9.8% in 2008, which was immediately followed by an
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
economic crash. And now oil is sending energy expenditures back above 9% of GDP, just
as we see fresh indications that the recession persists. This is not a coincidence."

Analysis: A U.S. military strike against Iran would only spell an economic disaster for the
United States. Iran has sufficient ability and intent to close the Strait of Hormuz if attacked.
Such a move could cripple our oil dependent economy.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

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%73 8 9:;:+-&< ="&>* !&*-+*, ?>"#"):> @->A;-,B

Answer: Iran has even admitted that they will not close the strait.

Warrant: Deputy Naval Commander and Iran's Foreign Minister both redacted claims that Iran
would potentially

Kennedy, Charles. "Iranian Navy: Strait of Hormuz Will Not Be Closed." CNBC.com, 25
July 2012. Web. 18 Aug. 2013. <http://www.cnbc.com/id/48321958>.

"However in a move that reduces the potency of those threats, Alireza Tangsiri, deputy
naval commander in Iran's Revolutionary Guards, has come out and stated that
while the enemies constantly state that the Islamic Republic of Iran intends to close
the Strait of Hormuz, we say that common sense does not dictate that Iran would
close the Strait of Hormuz as long as it makes use of it. This follows a similar
thought given by Irans Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi to Reuters earlier this
month; that Iran will not follow through on any threats to block the strait unless
their own vessels were first denied use of the strait."

Answer: Iran couldn't close the strait.

Warrant: Our military power is far superior to the Iranian forces.
Coughlin, Con. "Can Iran Close down the Strait of Hormuz?" The Telegraph. 5 Jan.
2012. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/8995261/Can-Iran-
close-down-the-Strait-of-Hormuz.html>.

"But if the Iranian military threat is much more potent than it was in the 1980s, the
Pentagon insists that it still would be no match for US firepower. One aircraft carrier is
able to deploy more air power than the entire Iranian air force, and it is difficult to
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argue with the assessment of most military analysts that it would take just a few
days to knock out the entire Iranian military effort."

Answer: The world could easily combat a short-term oil shortage caused by a closure of the
strait.

Warrant: Strategic reserves maintained by 28 countries would replace oil unable to travel
through the strait.

Aleaziz, Hamed, and Robin Mills. "Why Closing the Strait of Hormuz Would Backfire
on Iran." National Journal. 29 May 2013. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.nationaljournal.com/why-closing-the-strait-of-hormuz-would-
backfire-on-iran-20120114>.

"There is another possibility: strategic reserves maintained by the International
Energy Agency, an organization of 28 major oil-importing states. Reuters reported on
Friday that the agency is discussing releasing strategic oil stocks in the event of a
Hormuz shutdown. Each member, including the U.S. and its European partners,
is required to maintain oil stocks equal to 90 days worth of imports in case of a
market emergency. China has about 20 days of stocks but plans to expand this to 100
days' cover, while India is working on a two-week reserve. These emergency supplies
would likely replace Hormuz-based oil for the time it would take the U.S. Navy to
defeat an Iranian blockade of the Strait--about two weeks, according to analysts from
Societe Generale, a major financial-services firm. But they could not outlast a
significantly prolonged closure or disruption. Instead of an outright blockade, Iran might
aim instead at disruption or sabotage, creating uncertainty and making military
countermeasures more problematic.

Answer: Iran depends on the Strait of Hormuz just as much as the rest of the world does.

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Warrant: Iran's economy is primarily based on oil exports and the Strait of Hormuz is vital to
retaining their oil exports. A shutdown of the strait would likely also shutdown the Iranian
economy.

Aleaziz, Hamed, and Robin Mills. "Why Closing the Strait of Hormuz Would Backfire
on Iran." National Journal, 29 May 2013. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.nationaljournal.com/why-closing-the-strait-of-hormuz-would-
backfire-on-iran-20120114>.

Despite Iran's tough talk, it seems unlikely that the country would cut off what amounts
to its own lifeline. Iran also relies on an open and fully operational Hormuz. As
reported in The New York Times, Iran exports almost 2 million barrels of oil a day
through the Strait to countries like China. And the Iranian government, according
to researchers at the U.S. Institute of Peace, receives 65 percent of its revenues
through its oil industry; would Iran's shaky economy be able to take such a hit?
Probably not."

Answer: Iranian closure of the strait would be not strategic.

Warrant: Closure of the strait would help unify the West and even other Gulf countries, while
also giving them sufficient reason to destroy the rest of Iran's military capabilities.

Pasternak, Andrew. "In Spite of Threats, Iran Will Not Close Strait of
Hormuz."PolicyMic, 2011. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.policymic.com/articles/3062/in-spite-of-threats-iran-will-not-close-
strait-of-hormuz>.

"Iran would also not be able to maintain any shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz. The
inevitable result of this action would be military conflict, as a long-lasting shutdown of
the Strait would be unacceptable to both the other Gulf countries and the oil-
dependent global economy. This type of conflict would play exactly towards the
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strengths of the United States and its allies by becoming a naval and aerial conflict.
Any military conflict with the West, and in particular the U.S., would be remarkably
lopsided. Irans navy has no ship larger than a frigate, with the majority of
equipment being outdated and small in quantity. The air force is almost non-
existent, consisting mostly of aircraft from before the fall of the Shah. In an
environment where many are just looking for an excuse to hit Irans nuclear
reactors and neuter Irans military capabilities, the regime would be playing right
into their hands."

Warrant: By closing the strait, Iran would only push its allies farther away, while also
alienating itself even more dramatically. Not to mention, creating a greater incentive to diminish
the oil sector that Iran is so dependent on.

Pasternak, Andrew. "In Spite of Threats, Iran Will Not Close Strait of
Hormuz."PolicyMic, 2011. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.policymic.com/articles/3062/in-spite-of-threats-iran-will-not-close-
strait-of-hormuz>.

"Finally, such a maneuver would further alienate Iran from all of the Gulf countries. Iran
already does not have good relations with Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, but shutting the
Strait of Hormuz would push the UAE and Qatar further away from Iran. Iraq,
whose Shiite-led government has better relations with Iran than most, would also be hurt
by such a move from Tehran. Around the world, countries would be less inclined to
work with Iran, who would become even more of a global pariah. It would also
encourage other countries to seek out other sources of petroleum (such as Canada)
and further develop alternative energy sources, neither of which is beneficial for
Tehran."

Analysis: There are too many drawbacks for Iran to actually close the Strait. Aside from the fact
that Iran depends on the strait for its own economic needs, by shutting down the strait, Iran
would alienate itself from its allies, pushing Iranian leaders to even concede that they will not
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close it. On top of that, the international community has many mechanisms to minimize the
impact through global strategic oil reserves and a fantastic American base in Bahrain.

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Argument: A U.S. strategy could include long-term engagement.

Warrant: In order to bring down the regime, the U.S. may need to wage a long-term war.

Aug. 2013.

Rather, once negotiations are abandoned for military action, it would become extremely
difficult to pursue diplomatic discussions unless and until the Iranian regime surrenders
or capitulateswhich seems unlikely, although not impossible. As asserted above, in
order to achieve Irans capitulation or to bring down the regime, the United States
would probably have to use ground forces and wage a long-term war.

Warrant: The U.S. may need to enact long-term military action to prevent a nuclear Iran.

Aug. 2013.

Privately, some national security experts and advisors may have embraced the more
modest objective of delaying Irans ability to build a nuclear weapon, as a step toward
prevention; but some others may have embraced objectives that are far broader than
official statements currently suggest. Even in order to fulfill the stated objective of
ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb, the U.S. would need to conduct a
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significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely
several years.

Warrant: More ambitious objectives also require long-term U.S. military commitment.

Aug. 2013.

If the U.S. decided to seek a more ambitious objective, such as regime change in
Iran or undermining Irans influence in the region, then an even greater
commitment of force would be required to occupy all or part of the country. Given
Irans large size and population, and the strength of Iranian nationalism, we estimate that
the occupation of Iran would require a commitment of resources and personnel
greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars combined.

Impact Warrant: Iran would retaliate and expand a war with the U.S.


All we can say, then, is that the regime would not try to martyr itself, nor would it be
passive. Most likely, Iran would seek to prolong and expand the war, attrite U.S.
forces and morale, and weaken the resolve of coalition members. Iran has the
means, methods and allies with which to respond in this fashion, and it has made
clear that it would use them.

Warrant: An Iranian war would rely on the navy and air force.
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McElroy, Damien. "US Military Chief in Overstretch Warning on Iran." The Telegraph.
May 2008. Web. 21 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/1929929/US-
military-chief-in-overstretch-warning-on-Iran.html>.

Adml Mullen is known to be concerned that his forces are overstretched and last week
he ruled out US army involvement in any attack on Iran, saying the burden would
lie with the navy and air force.

Impact Warrant: An Iranian war would extremely stress an already overstretched U.S. military.

Mulrine, Anna. "Why the Pentagon Thinks Attacking Iran Is a Bad Idea." U.S. News &
World Report, 07 Aug. 2008. Web. 21 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2008/08/07/why-the-pentagon-thinks-
attacking-iran-is-a-bad-idea>.

Since taking over as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff last year, Adm. Mike Mullen
has repeatedly warnedoften quite publiclythat military action against Iran, though
possible, would be extremely stressing for an already overstretched U.S. military.
I'm fighting two wars, and I don't need a third one, Mullen said recently.

Warrant: Exiting the war could also be difficult.


Short of inflicting a total defeat on Iran, an outcome that seems scarcely conceivable,
exiting the war could be challenging if Iran chooses to fight on in some form of
asymmetric conflict. We might then have to compel Iran to quit, and that could
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potentially require the application of force well beyond what was originally agreed
upon within the United States or with coalition partners.

Impact Warrant: A U.S. attack would only be the first phase of war.


Our first consideration in analyzing the likely course of war with Iran is that a U.S.-led
attack would be merely the first phase of a war, the opening act of an extended
drama whose scenes would unfold, not according to any script, but to an emergent
logic of its own. Given the political context in which military engagement would rest,
even a minor attack would likely become a major test of strength involving not only
the United States and Iran but also a host of allies and associates. It is therefore
disingenuous to try to frame military action against Iran as a simple raid or even
a broader operation. We are talking here about war, with attendant potential
high costs to all combatants in terms of military casualties, civilian damage and
economic disruption.

Analysis: This point connects a U.S. attack to a long-term military conflict with Iran. If the U.S.
were to attack Iran, retaliation would basically be inevitable. The only question is whether this
retaliation would lead to a full-fledged war. The evidence above shows that it is very likely that it
would and the impacts of war include civilian and economic losses that could be weighed in the
round.

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Answer: American public would not allow another war.

Warrant: Americans are still recovering from Iraq and the closing of Afghanistan.

Hussain, Murtaza. "Why War with Iran Would Spell Disaster - Opinion - Al Jazeera
English." Al Jazeera, Sept. 2012. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201291194236970294.html>

Romney and many other leading Republican figures have called for pre-emptive war
against Iran, and have continually upped the ante in terms of threats of military action
throughout the election campaign. This alarming and potentially highly consequential
rhetoric is occurring in a context where the American people are still recovering
from the disastrous war in Iraq and winding down the US occupation of
Afghanistan, while at the same time coping with the worst economic drought since
the Great Depression.

Warrant: American public has battle fatigue; war with Iran would exacerbate those impacts.

Hussain, Murtaza. "Why War with Iran Would Spell Disaster - Opinion - Al Jazeera
English." Al Jazeera, Sept. 2012. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201291194236970294.html>

For a country already nursing the wounds from the casualties of far less intense conflicts
and still reeling from their economic costs, the sheer battle fatigue inherent in a large-
scale war with Iran would stand to greatly exacerbate these issues.

Warrant: Most Americans prefer to continue negotiations with Iran.
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"American Public Opposes Israel Striking Iran." Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and
Development. University of Maryland,College Park, Mar. 2012. Web. 20 Aug.
2013. <http://sadat.umd.edu/>.

Seven in ten (69%) favor the US and other major powers continuing to pursue
negotiations with Iran, a position that is supported by majorities of Republicans (58%),
Democrats (79%) and Independents (67%).

Warrant: Only 17% of American public in favor of attack against Iran.

"War on Iran? Most American, Israeli Citizens Oppose." Common Dreams, Feb. 2012.
Web. 20 Aug. 2013. <https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2012/02/03-1>.

A new United Technologies/National Journal poll shows only 17% of the US public
supports military action against Iran and a November PIPA (Program on International
Policy Attitudes) poll shows that only 43% of Israeli Jews support a military strike on
Iran.

Impact Warrant: Americans are opposed to a war with Iran.

Sarkisian, Joseph. "Poll: 75% of Americans Don't Support an Israeli Strike on Iran."
PolicyMic. 2012. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.policymic.com/articles/5843/poll-75-of-americans-don-t-support-an-
israeli-strike-on-iran>.

On the American side, it says that the long, protracted, and unjust war that just ended in
Iraq taught Americans to err on the side of caution when making decisions about whom
to go to war with. U.S. citizens are clearly opposed to sending troops to fight another
trumped up war for no good reason. Additionally, it says that Americans do not feel so
strongly that the U.S. should protect Israel at all costs when interests do not align.

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Analysis: Although many times American public opinion does not have significant weight in
policy, waging another war in this political climate after Iraq and Afghanistan would basically be
political suicide. The American people, as well as the international community, would need more
than an imminent threat as a reason for a full-fledged attack.
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Argument: Nuclear war decreases the chance of conflict.

Warrant: Nuclear symmetry decreases the odds of war.

Rauchhaus, Robert. "Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis: A Quantitative
Approach." Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, post
2007. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Rauchhaus_Evaluating_the_Nu
clear_Peace.pdf>.

When a nuclear asymmetry exists between two states, there is a greater chance of
militarized disputes and war. In contrast, when there is symmetry and both states
possess nuclear weapons, then the odds of war precipitously drop.

Warrant: Nuclear weapons deter even irrational leaders.

Approach." Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, post
2007. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
clear_Peace.pdf>.

Unlike conventional deterrence in previous eras, nuclear deterrence is extremely
robust because even irrational or unintelligent leaders are likely to recognize the
exceedingly high cost of nuclear war. Thus, proponents of nuclear deterrence claim
with a high degree of confidence that the probability of major war among states having
nuclear weapons approaches zero.

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Warrant: More nuclearized countries reduces imbalances and produce more stability.

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb." Foreign Affairs, Council on
Foreign Relations, July-Aug. 2012. Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.cfr.org/iran/iran-bomb/p29001>.

Such language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled up
whenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far,
every time another country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club,
the other members have always changed tack and decided to live with it. In fact, by
reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more
regional and international stability, not less.

Warrant: India and Pakistan is an example of rival states keeping peace due to nuclear weapons.


In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to
target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than
their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it.
Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two
countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent.
If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always
have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states.

Warrant: When countries acquire a bomb, they decrease their aggressive action.

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History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly
vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a
potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear
states from bold and aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less
bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both
become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would
break this mold.

Argument: Middle Eastern instability due to unchecked nuclear power.

Warrant: The Middle East is the only region in which a nuclear arsenal is unchecked.


Israel's regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the
past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no other region
of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal,
not Iran's desire for one that has contributed most to the current crisis. Power, after all,
begs to be balanced.

Warrant: Israels military imbalance makes enemies anxious to develop weapons.


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But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short
term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's
proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made
its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again.

Warrant: Iranian weapons for security, not offensive capabilities.


not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at
the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own
preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz
despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its
planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not
want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American
response to such a move.

Analysis: This response can completely flip the tone of the debate. If a team can adequately
prove that more nuclear weapons could actually promote peace and stability, especially by using
the example of the Middle East, then all responses saying that military action endangers that
would be null and void. However, the only way to run this argument is if the case being
presented coincides with this advocacy. If this argument is presented in tandem with a position
centered on reducing nuclear weapons, a team risks double-turning themselves.

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Answer: Nuclear weapons create more conflict.

Warrant: Nuclear weapons increase the likelihood of crises.

Approach." Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Post
2007. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
clear_Peace.pdf>.

Moreover, nuclear weapons are generally associated with higher likelihoods of
crises, uses of force, and conflicts involving lower-levels of casualties.

Warrant: Nuclearized states more likely to engage in militarized disputes.

2007. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
clear_Peace.pdf>.

In all other instances but this one, the coefficients are positive which indicates that
states with nuclear weapons are more likely to engage in militarized disputes
(crises), to use force, and to be involved in uses of force that result in fatalities.

Warrant: The probability of force and crisis initiation increases between nuclearized states.

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2007. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
clear_Peace.pdf>.

Similarly, the probability of crisis initiation and limited uses of force between two
states is found to increase when both states possess nuclear weapons.

Warrant: Although military balance is stable at nuclear war, it becomes less stable at lower
levels.

2007. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
clear_Peace.pdf>.

As many have noted, Jervis provides one of the clearest definitions of Snyders stability-
instability paradox: To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-
out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.

Answer: Iran having a nuclear weapon is dangerous.

Warrant: Tehran could increase its support for terrorism.


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Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime
is rational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with
a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and increase its support for
terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with
nuclear arms.

Warrant: Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism.

Bruno, Greg. "State Sponsors: Iran." Council on Foreign Relations. Oct. 2011. Web. 17
Aug. 2013. <http://www.cfr.org/iran/state-sponsors-iran/p9362>.

The U.S. State Department considers Iran the world's most active state sponsor of
terrorism. U.S. officials say Iran provides funding, weapons, training, and
sanctuary to numerous terrorist groups--most notably in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Lebanon--posing a security concern to the international community.

Argument: More nuclear weapons increase the threat of nuclear war.

Warrant: More weapons increase the probability of accident or miscalculation.

"Nuclear Weapons: What Should Our Policy Be?" Choices for the 21st Century
Education Program. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, n.d.
Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.choices.edu/resources/documents/nukes_options_000.pdf>.

Today, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons stand at the ready, many on hair trigger
alert, threatening the lives of hundreds of millions of people and quite possibly the future
of civilization itself. As long as imperfect human beings are in charge of nuclear
weapons, the continued existence of these weapons offers too many possibilities for
accident or miscalculation. These weapons make us less, not more, secure.

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Warrant: Reducing the amount of nuclear weapons decreased the threat of terrorists getting one.

Education Program. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University,
n.d. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.

Reducing the number of nuclear weapons around the world will reduce the likelihood
that terrorist groups will acquire them.

Warrant: Huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons in countries increase the risk of theft,
proliferation and use by terrorists.

n.d. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.

Rogue states are working to build or acquire nuclear weapons. Terrorist networks are
looking for opportunities to acquire these and other weapons of mass destruction. The
worlds huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons, a remnant of the Cold War, increase the risk
of theft, proliferation, and even intentional use.

Analysis: At the highest level, the claim can be made that whether or not weapons are safely
guarded, more weapons in the world increase the likelihood of accidental launch or terrorist
acquisition. Beyond that, this literature shows that nuclear states are more likely to engage in
smaller scales of conflict such as proxy wars. Although it isnt all out nuclear war, nuclearized
states are still endangering U.S. citizens and citizens abroad. Moreover, although past countries
like China have acquired nuclear weapons and become more bellicose, a terrorist state sponsor
like Iran getting them would be detrimental to world security.
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Argument: Sanctions constrain Irans ability to develop nuclear weapons.

Warrant: Sanctions have complicated Iranian nuclear efforts and made it more vulnerable to
disruption.


Granted, these measures have not led Iran to submit to the Security Councils requests,
but for several years they essentially achieved a freeze in the total number of
centrifuges Iran installed and complicated its efforts to build and deploy more
advanced centrifuges. As a result, Irans future nuclear options are more limited
now than just a few years ago. Its programs are better understood by the
international community and are more vulnerable to disruption and delay.

Warrant: Iran is neither self-sufficient nor able to solve the problems of its nuclear program due
to sanctions.


A major challenge for Iran is its difficulty in finding outside assistance in overcoming
bottlenecks in its efforts. It is by no means self-sufficient in making all the goods it
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needs for its nuclear programs nor is it able to solve problems encountered in its
deployment of nuclear technologies.

Warrant: Countries that could give these goods to Iran are united under sanctions.


Nonetheless, many countries that make the goods Iran needs to build and expand
its nuclear facilities are now far more united in implementing U.N. Security Council
bans on supplying Irans nuclear programs. Irans centrifuge program depends on
high-tech imports, including high quality maraging steel (grade 300 or 350), high
quality carbon fiber, vacuum pumps, and vacuum measuring equipment. But these
goods are no longer easy for Irans smuggling networks to obtain.

Warrant: Carbon fiber is an example of Irans inability to find adequate materials for its
program.


But Irans efforts to manufacture these advanced centrifuges likewise face shortages of
vital raw materials. In the case of the bellows of one advanced centrifuge design, Iran
has sought to substitute carbon fiber for maraging steel, a raw material found in
current Iranian centrifuges but one that has become difficult to acquire internationally.
Iran likely believes it has a better chance of obtaining adequate carbon fiber abroad. But
carbon fiber is also increasingly more difficult for Iran to acquire internationally due to
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trade controls and sanctions; its recently announced domestic efforts to make carbon
fiber are not likely to yield a fiber adequate for use in centrifuges any time soon.

Impact Warrant: Overall, sanctions hinder Iran from having a successful and effective nuclear
program.


As previously discussed, sanctions, when enforced, have successfully prevented Iran
from purchasing goods for its centrifuges, inhibited domestic production of centrifuges,
and forced it to make undesirable design changes in its centrifuges.

Impact Warrant: Sanctions are being better implemented and enforced than in the past.


Iran is currently facing many obstacles as it seeks vital goods abroad for its nuclear
programs. U.N. Security Council sanctions along with domestic and regional sanctions
have complicated its smuggling operations. Sanctions laws are now more standard and
universal; they are being better implemented and enforced.

Argument: Sanctions are a part of the long-term solution of eliminating Iranian nuclear
capabilities.

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Warrant: One of the key priorities of disarming Iran is increasing economic and financial
sanctions.


be, at the same time, to implement additional measures to delay, thwart, and deter
Irans acquisition of nuclear capabilities and inhibit its ability to break out. In
particular, such a strategy should focus on several key priorities:

Increased economic and financial sanctions aimed at augmenting pressure,
combined with an effort to displace Iranian oil exports.

Argument: Sanctions hurt Irans economy.

Warrant: Overall, sanctions both prevent Iran from obtaining goods and restricts its economic
activity.


Unilateral sanctions have proven effective in reinforcing multilateral measures,
closing loopholes, and putting additional pressure on Iran to negotiate in a
meaningful manner. Unilateral and regional sanctions imposed by the United States,
European Union, and other Western countries have made it more difficult for Iran to
obtain the goods it needs for its nuclear program, and increasingly restricted its
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "##
ability to conduct routine economic business. These measures go further than U.N.
sanctions by listing and prosecuting additional entities and individuals associated
with illicit procurement, enforcing additional travel bans, targeting Iran with
financial sanctions by making it illegal for domestic businesses and banks to
transact with Iranian banks, implementing sanctions against Irans energy sector
and military sector, and sanctioning Irans key shipping industries.

Argument: A military attack would undermine sanction effectiveness.

Warrant: Attack could undermine international support.

Aug. 2013.

The United States would likely seek some kind of international mandate for military
action against Iran, and attempt to put together a large multinational coalition. But if the
U.S. and/or Israel end up attacking Irans nuclear program without such a
mandate, hard-won international support for maintaining sanctions against Iran
could be substantially weakened. China and Russia would loudly condemn military
actions against Iran, and some European nations might pull back from a sanctions
regime after such attacks. Iran would be seen by many around the world, Muslims
and non-Muslims alike, as the victim of unjustified American and/or Israeli military
action. Sanctions are at present one of the main coercive levers against Iran; the heaviest
sanctions on Iranian oil sales and access to worldwide banking have just come online.
The weakening of the sanctions regime as a result of a military action would
represent a significant break in the global solidarity against the Iranian nuclear
program.

Warrant: Attacking Iran can make them look like a victim and allow them to receive support.
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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#"

Wilson International Center for Scholars. The Iran Project. Sept. 2012. Web. 16
Aug. 2013.

With the breakdown of cooperative international efforts to isolate Iran, there is the
possibility that Iran might receive new support for its military capacity. For example,
Russia might be willing to sell Iran advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that
would make future attacks on Iran more costly and difficult. Russia is currently
withholding sales of these systems because they fall under U.N. sanctions, but this
decision and others could be revisited after strikes on Iran. Also, Iran now faces
severe limits on its ability to acquire from abroad a variety of dual-purpose materials and
components for its centrifuges and other nuclear technology. States that see Iran as the
victim of an unjustified attack might become more willing to share information and
material with Iran. This could potentially enable Iran to produce more advanced
centrifuges than the country is currently able to produce, given material and
technical shortages.

Analysis: This argument gives sanctions as a suitable alternative to a military attack. It first
illustrates how sanctions in the status quo are inhibiting Irans nuclear program and economy to
prevent them from making a bomb. It then shows how sanctions are also important to keep
around in the long term. In addition, the last argument shows how a military attack could
undermine all the current progress sanctions have made, preempting the claim that attacks can be
done in tandem with sanctions.

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

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Answer: Sanctions are only a tool, not a long-term solution

Warrant: Sanctions are not long term solvency.


According to Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations,
Sanctions are only a means to an end. Our ultimate goal is to ensure that
Iran enters into full compliance with all its international nuclear obligations
and takes the steps necessary to resolve outstanding questions.

Answer: Company suppliers and Iranian smugglers circumvent U.N. sanctions.

Warrant: China remains vulnerable to Iranian smuggling.


There remain significant gaps, notably, the weak implementation of U.N. Security
Council sanctions by China. China remains vulnerable to Irans smuggling of vital goods
for its nuclear program. Smugglers use front companies to buy from Chinese suppliers or
Western high technology subsidiaries located within its borders. There remain many
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concerns about Irans continued ability to transship goods through countries with weak
implementation of sanctions or trade controls, commonly called countries of !transit
concern.

Warrant: U.S. has difficulty sharing information with companies to make sure they avoid sales.


Governments inform companies about the latest procurement schemes used by Iran
in order to help these firms avoid making accidental bad sales. Governments receive
information about Iranian procurement attempts from companies, which is useful in
informing intelligence assessments about Irans requirements, activities and smuggling
techniques. The United States, perhaps surprisingly given its focus on stopping
Irans smuggling, has found it difficult to implement such a system because of
regulatory and classification issues over this type of information sharing with
companies. However, it should continue attempting to implement such a system.

Argument: It is currently difficult to punish Iranian smugglers multilaterally.

Warrant: There currently is a lack of consensus on international prosecution and extradition
law.


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Many problems currently exist which impede successful prosecutions, such as barriers
to the sharing of evidence and witnesses among countries, lack of bilateral extradition
treaties or laws in both countries that cover the crime, lack of specific laws altogether
against smuggling in some countries, and an absence of strong uniform penalties against
the crime. Countries need to improve their laws against dual-use smuggling as a few
recent extradition cases of the United States against smugglers arrested in Europe have
shown. These cases fell through due to a lack of European recognition of U.S. dual-use
export laws, underlining a need for more consensus and new regimes to handle this
transnational issue.

Answer: Sanctions take too much time.

Warrant: Sanctions require consensus and only result in marginal improvements.


Although new U.N. Security Council sanctions are politically difficult and time
consuming to achieve because they require consensus, while they usually result in
only marginal improvements to existing sanctions, they are worthwhile to pursue.

Answer: Sanctions could have a reverse effect.

Warrant: Human suffering caused by sanctions can lead to a rally-around-the-flag effect.

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

Human suffering and social unrest arising from these sanctions could cause harsh
government crackdowns, amplifying social misery, or measures could instead backfire by
creating a rally-around-the-flag effect.

Warrant: Definition of rally-around-the-flag effect.

Putnam, Joshua T. "Rally Around the Flag Phenomenon." University of Georgia, post
2006. Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<http://jtputnam.myweb.uga.edu/Research%20Paper%20Sample.pdf>.

The rally around the flag effect states that public opinion, often measured by presidential
approval rating, will increase during times of conflict.

Warrant: Sanctions would either have no effect or a negative effect on preventing nuclear
program development.

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb." Council on Foreign Relations,
July-Aug. 2012. Web. 16 Aug. 2013. <http://www.cfr.org/iran/iran-
bomb/p29001>.

Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear
program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building its weapons despite countless
rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its
security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to change its
mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more
vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate
deterrent.

Answer: A military strike with sanctions could end Irans program.

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Warrant: Pairing a military strike with sanctions could lead Iran to abandon the bomb.

Wexler, Robert. "Israel and Iran: An Attack Might Be Necessary, but Not Yet." World
Affairs Journal. May-June 2012. Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/israel-and-iran-attack-might-be-
necessary-not-yet>.

Maintaining a credible threat of a military strike, in synch with crippling international
sanctions, could lead an Iranian regimeconcerned first and foremost with survival, and
facing pressure from a discontented and fearful publicto calculate that it is best served
by abandoning the current rush toward a bomb.

Analysis: Debaters will have to strategically decide how to address the sanctions argument. The
first approach would be to point out that sanctions are not meant to be a long term solution but
instead lead a country to diplomacy, which countries like Iran or North Korea are unlikely to do.
The second would be to show the issues of enforcing sanctions in a short and efficient timeline
and punishing sanction violators internationally. The most offensive answer, however, would be
to point out that sanctions could actually lead a country to increase its proliferation of nuclear
weapons.

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

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Argument: Countries want nuclear programs to offset the United States ability to militarily
intervene.

Warrant: Iran wants nuclear weapons for security and preservation.

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb." Council on Foreign Relations.
bomb/p29001>.

not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent
at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure
its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of
Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced
its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not
want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response
to such a move.

Warrant: North Korea posses a program to combat the major powers in the region.

Maass, Richard. "Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony." Hamilton
College, post 2009. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass_article.pdf>.

North Korea currently pursues a controversial nuclear program to combat power
disparities with the United States and other major powers in the Far East, such as China
and Japan.
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Warrant: Nuclear weapons place states like Iran on a more equal playing field.


Essentially, nuclear weapons place states on a level playing field, producing an
equalizing effect. Relatively weaker nations favor nuclearization as a way of leveling
the playing field (Trachtenberg, 2002, pg. 152). States, such as Iran, recognize they
cannot conventionally match U.S. military power and thus seek alternative means to
combat the U.S., in an effort to offset their own relative weakness (US Department of
Defense, 2001, pg.1).

Warrant: Military intervention creates resentment in foreign governments.

Conry, Barbara. "The Futility of U.S. Intervention in Regional Conflicts." Cato Institute,
May 1994. Web. 18 Aug. 2013. <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-209.html>.

Not only does inappropriate military intervention fail to reconcile regional
conflicts, it also has negative consequences for the United States. There can be
significant political costs, ranging from diminished American credibility, as the result
of an unsuccessful mission, to resentment on the part of foreign governments and
populations of Washington's meddling in their affairs.

Warrant: Nuclear weapons make states feel powerful and respected and allows for their
sovereignty to be protected.

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. ""#

To states, nuclear weapons comprise a symbolic asset of strength and as a prerequisite
for great power status. On a simplistic level, nuclear weapons make states feel more
powerful, respected and influential in world politics. When it is in their best interest,
states develop nuclear capabilities to ensure their own sovereignty and to potentially
deter other states from attacking.

Analysis: This is an argument that critiques the overall way the United States government
conducts its foreign policy in the Middle East. By constantly intervening in the Middle East, the
United States is actually incentivizing countries like Iran and North Korea to develop nuclear
weapons in order to protect their interests and sovereignty. Therefore, any impacts regarding
proliferation are effectively multiplied in magnitude by utilizing U.S military force.

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. ""#

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Answer: Not using military force could set negative precedent for other countries.

Warrant: Negotiating with Iran could lead countries to develop their own programs.

Albright, David. "Nuclear Iran: Not Inevitable." Institute for Science and International
Security. Jan. 2009. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Iran_paper_final_2.pdf>.

The risk is that some of these states may view negotiations with Iran negatively, perhaps
as an implicit acceptance of Irans nuclear capability, leading them to either make a
separate accommodation with Iran or develop their own nuclear weapons capabilities.

Answer: Not using military force could create proliferation.

Warrant: Iran is not going to stop the program until the U.S. makes them

Hegseth, Pete. "Stopping Iran's Bomb." National Review Online. 29 May 2013. Web. 18
Aug. 2013. <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/349510/stopping-irans-
bomb>.

Recent independent reports seconded by Israeli officials put Iran at least 80 percent
of the way toward having enough weapons-grade nuclear material for a bomb. Sanctions
havent deterred the Iranians from pursuing a nuclear weapon, nor have toothless
international resolutions. The Israeli officials we met with underscored the cold fact
that the Iranians will not change their behavior until they believe the U.S. not
Israel will act to prevent them.

Impact Warrant: A nuclear-armed Iran would start an Iranian arms race.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

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Science Monitor, 26 Sept. 2012. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.

The most likely is that Iran gets nuclear weapons, bringing the chilling prospect of
nuclear holocaust for Israel. A nuclear-armed Iran would also dramatically shift the
balance of power in the Middle East, prompting Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and
others to acquire nuclear capabilities. And it would increase the risk of global nuclear
terrorism.

Analysis: Answering this argument is just a matter of using cost benefit analysis. While there are
potential harms of continuing to use force in the Middle East, the harms of a nuclear Iran or a
Middle Eastern arms race are things that must be addressed promptly and effectively. Another
interesting argument would be that not using force against one country shows other countries
they can do the same, setting up a precedent of United States weakness in preventing nuclear
proliferation.
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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. ""#

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Argument: A U.S. preemptive attack would violate Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Warrant: The U.N. Charter is meant to forbid force against foreign countries.

Maggs, Gregory E. "How The United States Might Justify A Preemptive Strike On A
Rogue Nations Nuclear Weapon Development Facilities Under The U.N.
Charter." Syracuse University College of Law, Oct. 2006. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.law.syr.edu/_assets/documents/student-life/law-review/maggs.pdf>.

The U.N. Charter is a multilateral treaty that the United States, Iran, North Korea, and
most other nations of the world have ratified.23 This treaty generally forbids members of
the United Nations to use military force against foreign countries.

Warrant: Article 51 specifically says a nation can respond to an armed attack.


Consider first the text of Article 51: Nothing . . . shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations . . .. The words if an armed attack occurs appear to impose a
condition that is antithetical to the whole idea of a preemptive strike. By definition,
a preemptive strike occurs before any actual armed attack happens.

Warrant: A U.S. preemptive attacks would violate the Article 51 of the UN Charter.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. ""#
Hager, L. Michael. "Obama Help with Israeli Preemptive Strike on Iran Would Violate
International, US Law." The Christian Science Monitor. 15 Mar. 2012. Web. 20
Aug. 2013.
<http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0315/Obama-help-with-
Israeli-preemptive-strike-on-Iran-would-violate-international-US-law>.

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter acknowledges the right of a member state
to take military action in self-defense when responding to an armed attack. The
charter does not, however, justify preemptive attacks in response to a buildup of
military capacity (nuclear or otherwise) or much less a response to mere hostile
intent. When the Senate ratified the UN Charter as a treaty in 1945, Article 51 became a
part of US law by the terms of Article VI of the US Constitution.

Warrant: Iran would need both the actual weapon and intent to use it in order for imminent
threat to be present.

McGreal, Chris. "Iran's Nuclear Programme: Legal Debate Stirs over Basis for US or
Israeli Attack." The Guardian, Apr. 2012. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/12/iran-military-attack-legal-
debate>.

"In terms of Iran, I don't even think it's enough under the UN charter for the US to say
Iran has a nuclear weapon. At a minimum, they would actually have to have a nuclear
weapon, and they would have to issue some kind of concrete threat to use it against
Israel or some other country before a military response would be acceptable," he
said.

Impact Warrant: U.S. preemptive strike creates negative precedent for future countries.

International, US Law." The Christian Science Monitor, 15 Mar. 2012. Web. 20
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Aug. 2013.

Every country has a vital stake in respecting the shared norms of international law.
Without legal norms, violence has no limit. An America that okays preemptive strikes
today opens itself to such attacks by other countries tomorrow.

Impact Warrant: Expanding the notion of pre-emptive attack would set a negative precedent.

debate>.

"Where does this kind of radically expanded notion of pre-emptive attack stop?"
asked Ackerman. "What's going to happen when China feels threatened by Taiwan, or
India by Pakistan, or vice versa? We would be setting a precedent here which be a
very serious blow to the rule of international law."

Warrant: Bush violated Article 51 when invading Iraq.

International, US Law." The Christian Science Monitor, 15 Mar. 2012. Web. 20
Aug. 2013.

In doing so, he sent a powerful message that any nation should be allowed to attack
another on the ground of presumed military capacity and/or hostile intent. Article 51
suffered a severe blow along with the citizens of Baghdad.
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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. ""#

Warrant: U.S. invasion of Iraq decreased the amount of international consent it had on the
world stage.

Ohio State University. Mar. 2008. Web. 19 Aug. 2013.

Moreover, in March of 2003, the U.S., without United Nations approval, invaded and
proceeded to occupy IraqThrough its actions and attitudes, the United States has lost a
large amount international consent.

Warrant: Americas authority over NATO countries significantly decreased during the Bush
administration.


I argue in this essay that during the Clinton administration, the U.S. possessed a
significant amount of authority over most NATO countries enough authority that
America lead hegemony among those states and those states consented to
American actions in international relations. Additionally, I show that this authority
declined significantly due to policy changes during the Bush administration.

Warrant: A way to gauge U.S. hegemony is how states vote in the UN.

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. ""#

If subordinates have internalized the norms of a hegemon, then one would expect
to see subordinates voting in the UN like the hegemon (the expected role of a
subordinate state). If the subordinate states voting behavior is similar to the U.S., then
one can argue that this is proof of hegemonyOn the other hand, if subordinate
voting behavior is significantly different from the U.S., then one can conclude with a
fair amount of certainty that hegemony does not exist, for if a state is not voting like
America, then it would be difficult to argue that this state simultaneously legitimates
U.S. authority and norms.

Impact Warrant: A decrease in voting similarities in OECD and NATO countries shows U.S.
hegemony has decreased due to unlawful U.S. unilateral action.


Not only does the significant difference disappear between the OECD mean V (.284)
and the NATO mean V (.237) during the Bush administration (2001 2005), but a
significant difference exists at the .001 level between the NATO mean V during Clinton
years (.407) and during Bush years (.237). This significant difference reflects a decline
in U.S. hegemony among states that, during the Clinton administration, voted
significantly more similar to America in the UN General Assembly.

Analysis: Although the United States is still currently the world hegemon, violating international
law has negative impacts on both the U.S. and the international community. Specifically for the
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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. ""#
U.S., American soft power decreases leads to less nations aligning with them and their policies,
evident in the voting patterns of the UN. For the whole world stage, U.S. preemptive attacks
could create a negative precedent for other countries.
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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. ""#

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Answer: U.S. does have a justified basis for attacking Iran.

Warrant: The U.S. can attack using the law of pro-active self defense.

debate>.

Alan Dershowitz, the renowned jurist and supporter of Israel, has argued that the US
and the Jewish state can invoke a long-standing right under customary international
law of "pro-active self-defense" as well as article 51 of the United Nations charter.

Warrant: Defending against rogue and hostile states upholds international law.

debate>.

"In order to preserve international law we have to defend it once in while. I think
we have to defend it against rogue states or states that have expressed a hostile
intentions, like Iran and like North Korea. The only reasonable thing to do is to take
those weapons out. Remove that threat and the world is going to be safer."

Warrant: The U.S. and Israel already have legal grounds for assault due to Iran sponsoring
terrorist attacks.

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
debate>.

Then there are those who argue that the legal grounds for a military assault have already
been met because the US and Israel are already under attack from "terrorist
organizations" sponsored by Iran.

Warrant: An interpretation of the Article 51 allows for response to an imminent attack, using
precedent from the Caroline Case of 1842.


The second most widely accepted view is that Article 51 recognizes a right to use
military force in response not only to an actual armed attack but also when faced
with an imminent armed attacke.g., enemy warships on the horizon, troops
massed on the border, and planes in the aireven if the imminent attack has not yet
begun. This interpretation relies on historic practice reaching at least back to the
Caroline Case of 1842.In the course of communications with the British, Secretary of
State Daniel Webster agreed that a nation could strike in self-defense, even before
suffering an attack, when the necessity of that self-defense is instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.

Warrant: Since rogue nations engage in attacks against the U.S., they could be used as
justification for using military force.

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

On the contrary, as this essay demonstrates with numerous recent and widely-publicized
examples, the nations that the United States most likely would strike, Iran and North
Korea, constantly are engaging in conventional armed attacks and other aggression
against allies of the United States. Provided that certain likely conditions are met,
these hostile actions could justify the United States in using military force against
these nations nuclear weapons development facilities under historically-accepted
interpretations of the United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter).

Warrant: North Korea and Iran could be attacked due to their armed attacks/aggression against
the US.


The basis for this position is simply stated: Nations like Iran and North Korea
constantly are engaging in actual armed attacks and other aggression that by
themselves justify the use of military force. The United States might cite one of these
armed attacks as a ground for using military force and, in using that force, could
destroy nuclear weapons development facilities.

Analysis: This response is to mostly illustrate to your judge that there are multiple ways in
which the use of American force can be justified in the UN Charter. If you can prove that the
international stage can believe its lawful, you then would have to prove that the international
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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#"
stage would approve of that action. This is when arguments showing that there is no other option
to ending a nuclear program would illustrate that it is an action of last resort, ensuring that U.S.
action would not lead to losses in soft power.
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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "##

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Argument: Any attempt to disrupt nuclear proliferation would be futile and would have
disastrous consequences.

Warrant: Any use of a military force by any country would be unable to get one hundred
percent confirmation that the nuclear target has actually been destroyed.

Friedman, George. "War and Bluff: Iran, Israel and the United States." Stratfor Global
Intelligence, 11 Sept. 2012. Web. 19 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/war-and-bluff-iran-israel-and-united-states>
Dispersed sites reduce Israel's ability to strike hard at a target and to acquire a
battle damage assessment that would tell Israel three things: first, whether the target
had been destroyed when it was buried under rock and concrete; second, whether
the target contained what Israel thought it contained; and third, whether the strike
had missed a backup site that replicated the one it destroyed. Assuming the Israelis
figured out that another attack was needed, could their air force mount a second air
campaign lasting days or weeks? They have a small air force and the distances involved
are great.

Analysis: This scenario makes an attack even more of a risk. If we believe we have destroyed
their reactor, but in reality we have not, it would be a major blow to our intelligence, as we
would potentially stop monitoring what we believe to no longer exist.

Warrant: There is little to no evidence that Iran is even pursuing a nuclear weapons program, so
an attack could never succeed.

Butt, Yousaf. "An Israeli Strike Won't Delay Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program. It Will
Start It." The Christian Science Monitor. 05 Sept. 2012. Web. 19 Aug. 2013.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
<http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0905/An-Israeli-strike-
won-t-delay-Iran-s-nuclear-weapons-program.-It-will-start-it>.

While there is no clear indication Iran is currently working on a nuclear weapon, there is
considerable evidence to the contrary. In fact, following the release of the 2011
National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, US Director of National Intelligence James
Clapper confirmed in the spring of 2011 that he had a high confidence that Iran
had not restarted their nuclear weapons program. And International Atomic Energy
Agency inspectors continue to meticulously monitor Irans stockpile of enriched uranium
to make sure none is being diverted to any military related activities. Mohamed El-
Baradei, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate who spent more than a decade as the
director of the IAEA, said that he had not seen a shred of evidence that Iran was
pursuing the bomb during his time at the agency (1997 2009), adding All I see is
the hype about the threat posed by Iran. Even Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
acknowledged this fact: Are [the Iranians] trying to develop a nuclear weapon? No.
But we know that theyre trying to develop a nuclear [weapons] capability. And thats
what concerns us. Of course, a nuclear weapons capability comes with the territory: Any
nation with a fully developed nuclear fuel cycle has such a weapons capability.

Warrant: The use of military force has failed to prevent military-related nuclear proliferation in
the past; rather, it has encouraged it. The perfect example is the Israeli attack on the Iraqi Osirak
reactor.

Butt, Yousaf. "An Israeli Strike Won't Delay Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program. It Will
Start It." The Christian Science Monitor. 05 Sept. 2012. Web. 19 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0905/An-Israeli-strike-
won-t-delay-Iran-s-nuclear-weapons-program.-It-will-start-it>.

Recent analysis shows that a previous Israeli strike in 1981, on Iraqs civilian
Osirak nuclear reactor complex led Saddam Hussein to demand a nuclear deterrent
and was actually the trigger for Iraq launching a full-scale effort to weaponize. A
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decade later, by the time of the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq was on the verge of a nuclear
weapons capability.

Warrant: An attack on Iran would likely involve a tactical nuclear strike.

Chossudovsky, Michel. "Towards a World War III Scenario? The Role of Israel in
Triggering an Attack on Iran." Centre for Research on Globalization, 13 Aug.
2010. Web. 17 Aug. 2013. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/towards-a-world-war-
iii-scenario-the-role-of-israel-in-triggering-an-attack-on-iran-2/20584>.

The preferred nuclear weapon to be used against Iran are tactical nuclear weapons
(Made in America), namely bunker buster bombs with nuclear warheads (e.g.
B61.11), with an explosive capacity between one third to six times a Hiroshima
bomb. The B61-11 is the nuclear version of the conventional BLU 113, or Guided
Bomb Unit GBU-28. It can be delivered in much same way as the conventional bunker
buster bomb.

Warrant: The United States actively has a plan to pre-emptively use nuclear weapons in
military operations against Iran.


In 2004, drawing upon the initial war scenarios under TIRANNT, Vice President Dick
Cheney instructed USSTRATCOM to draw up a contingency plan of a large scale
military operation directed against Iran to be employed in response to another
9/11-type terrorist attack on the United States on the presumption that the
government in Tehran would be behind the terrorist plot. The plan included the pre-
emptive use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state: The plan includes a
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large-scale air assault on Iran employing both conventional and tactical nuclear weapons.
Within Iran there are more than 450 major strategic targets, including numerous
suspected nuclear-weapons-program development sites. Many of the targets are
hardened or are deep underground and could not be taken out by conventional
weapons, hence the nuclear option.

Warrant: An attack on Irans nuclear facilities would lead to major fallout and the deaths of up
to millions.

Stone, Wade. "Good-bye Dubai? Bombing Irans Nuclear Facilities would leave the
Entire Gulf States Region virtually Uninhabitable." Centre for Research on
Globalization, 11 May 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.globalresearch.ca/good-bye-dubai-bombing-irans-nuclear-facilities-
would-leave-the-entire-gulf-states-region-virtually-uninhabitable/5334737>.

Indeed, in regards nuclear disasters and environmental catastrophes, Fukushima would
absolutely pale in comparison to that caused by the bombing of Irans nuclear sites. The
nuclear fallout from such an event would be extreme, to put it mildly. Tens, if not
hundreds of thousands of innocent Iranians would likely die within the first year of
such a strike, while millions more would die within a decade or two of some form of
radiation-induced cancer. And since a significant portion of that nuclear fallout would
end up either immediately, or over the course of the next weeks and months in the
Arabian Desert, where the winds, year after year, would gather it up along with the
particles of sand and dust into gigantic roiling irradiated storms (remember, hundreds
of such sand and dust storms annually), not a person living anywhere in the Gulf State
region would be safe from exposure. The Persian Gulf, too, would soon be so irradiated
and toxic and lifeless that it might as well be renamed the New Dead Sea.

Analysis: Explain to the judges that any attack against nuclear facilities would likely fail, but
only motivate Iran's nuclear program. Even more problematic, an attack, likely using tactical
nuclear weapons could kill millions of innocent civilians.
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Answer: Our intelligence has very likely discovered all of Iran's nuclear facilities.

Warrant: With a plethora of intelligence opportunities for the United States to discover long-
term Iranian nuclear developments, it is unlikely that the United States would be unaware of
nuclear facilities in a pre-emptive strike.

Kroenig, Matthew. "Time to Attack Iran." Foreign Affairs. Jan.-Feb. 2012. Web. 17 Aug.
2013. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-
attack-iran>.

This scenario is possible, but not likely; indeed, such fears are probably overblown. U.S.
intelligence agencies, the IAEA, and opposition groups within Iran have provided
timely warning of Tehrans nuclear activities in the past -- exposing, for example,
Irans secret construction at Natanz and Qom before those facilities ever became
operational. Thus, although Tehran might again attempt to build clandestine
facilities, Washington has a very good chance of catching it before they go online.
And given the amount of time it takes to construct and activate a nuclear facility,
the scarcity of Irans resources, and its failure to hide the facilities in Natanz and
Qom successfully, it is unlikely that Tehran has any significant operational nuclear
facilities still unknown to Western intelligence agencies.

Answer: The United States could easily avoid collateral damage in a strike against Iran.

Warrant: The most critical nuclear plants are far away from civilian centers, while U.S.
technology and strategy could prevent collateral damage on top of that.

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Kroenig, Matthew. "Time to Attack Iran." Foreign Affairs. Jan.-Feb. 2012. Web. 17 Aug.
attack-iran>.

Washington would also be able to limit civilian casualties in any campaign. Iran built
its most critical nuclear plants, such as the one in Natanz, away from heavily
populated areas. For those less important facilities that exist near civilian centers,
such as the centrifuge-manufacturing sites, U.S. precision-guided missiles could
pinpoint specific buildings while leaving their surroundings unscathed. The United
States could reduce the collateral damage even further by striking at night or simply
leaving those less important plants off its target list at little cost to the overall
success of the mission. Although Iran would undoubtedly publicize any human suffering
in the wake of a military action, the majority of the victims would be the military
personnel, engineers, scientists, and technicians working at the facilities.

Answer: The U.S. and Israel are unlikely to target or strike facilities that pose a civilian risk.

Warrant: The nuclear reactor near civilians and that could actually lead to massive casualties
through leakage probably would not be struck as it has nothing to do with a military program.

Marcus, Jonathan. "Analysis: How Would Iran Respond to an Israeli Attack?" BBC
News. 03 July 2012. Web. 18 Aug. 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-17261265>.

Experts say that the functioning nuclear reactor at Bushehr is unlikely to be a
target due to the fact that it has nothing to do with a potential military programme
and radiation leakage could cause widespread civilian casualties. But, of course,
aircraft can be downed and bombs and other air-launched weapons can go astray.

Analysis: A U.S. strike would be incorporating the best intelligence and, fortunately, be able to
significantly limit civilian casualties to only Iranians directly involved in the nuclear program.
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Argument: The use of the U.S. military force would create massive backlash.

Warrant: Iran has immense missile capabilities with the ability to do massive damage to our
close allies.


In November 2006, Iran tests of surface missiles 2 were marked by precise planning in a
carefully staged operation. According to a senior American missile expert the
Iranians demonstrated up-to-date missile-launching technology which the West had
not known them to possess. Israel acknowledged that the Shehab-3, whose 2,000-km
range brings Israel, the Middle East and Europe within reach.

Warrant: Iran's missile capabilities can potentially avoid the missile defense systems that Israel
currently possesses, leaving the Israeli people almost defenseless.

"Report: New Iranian Missile Launchers Could Overwhelm Israeli Defenses." USNI
News, 31 May 2013. Web. 19 Aug. 2013.
<http://news.usni.org/2013/05/31/report-new-iranian-missiles-could-overwhelm-
israeli-defenses>.

Iran could have enough launchers to send a salvo of medium range ballistic
missiles that would overwhelm Israeli ballistic missile defense systems, according to a
Wednesday report from IHS Janes. A May, 26 broadcast on Iranian television
showcased a collection of transporter erector launchers (TELs) capable of launching
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the Iranian Shahab-3 guided ballistic missiles. Iranian television footage showed at
least 26 TELs lined up in two rows for the event, which marked their purported delivery
to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force, which operates the
countrys ballistic missiles, according to the report.

Warrant: Iran is determined to launch deadly force in retaliation.


Tehran has confirmed in several statements that it will respond if it is attacked.
Israel would be the immediate object of Iranian missile attacks as confirmed by the
Iranian government. The issue of Israels air defense system is therefore crucial. US and
allied military facilities in the Gulf states, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and
Iraq could also be targeted by Iran.

Warrant: Iran has carefully structured its alliances with many organizations that could pose and
potently deadly threat to U.S. soldiers and interests if we get entangled in military force with Iran.

Policy Project, n.d. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.

As part of its deterrent to a feared U.S./Israeli attack, Iran has assiduously developed
close relationships with Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Iran, militias in Iraq and
warlord clans in Afghanistan. These groups are not puppets of Iran. They have their
own agendas. Nonetheless, experts find it quite likely that some or all of these groups
would retaliate against U.S. forces as a gesture of solidarity with Iran, particularly if
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they perceived Iran to have been attacked without just cause. Our troops' lives
would be put at risk by any rash decision to attack Iran.

Warrant: Any attack on Iran would likely not follow the plan, as Iran has had the time and the
need to plan retaliation and defenses against a military strike directed toward their nuclear
facilities, so time-table and collateral damage estimates are almost completely baseless.

Boyle, Michael. "The US Must Stop the Strategic Blunder of an Attack on Iran." The
Guardian, 27 Feb. 2012. Web. 19 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/feb/27/us-must-
stop-attack-on-iran>.

One of the most alarming aspects of the current debate over a strike on Iran is the extent
to which Israeli leaders appear to have discounted this possibility. According to
journalist David Ignatius, some Israel leaders have imagined that this operation will
probably be a short war scenario, where five days of strikes are followed by a UN-
sponsored cease-fire. But Israeli leaders made a similar calculation when they
attacked Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon in 2006 and that war dragged on
for 33 days, with a much higher Israeli and Lebanese death toll than originally
envisioned. Wars rarely follow the scripts or timelines that leaders set out for them. It's
hard to believe that Iran given weeks of notice of impending strike by Israel
would play along with the script that Israeli leaders have laid out.

Analysis: Vividly describe the devastating ramifications of any use of military force against
Iran's nuclear facilities. Paint the picture that Iran has worked tirelessly to build an extremely
powerful retaliatory system to discourage attacks and will use it at all costs. Then, get into the
details of the amount of casualties that would be lost after a retaliatory attack (involving missiles,
terrorism, etc.) against the U.S. and/or Israel.

Warrant: The reportedly successful strikes against Syria's and Iraq's nuclear reactors are not a
valid comparison to a potential strike against Iran's. Iran has used its nuclear ambitions to create
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a sense of national pride, while they have demonstrated their "at-all-cost" mentality by standing
ground under some of the toughest sanctions of all time.


Similarly, there is no reason to assume that Iran will respond in the same stunned
way that Iraq and Syria did after Israeli's strikes on their facilities. Iran's well-
publicized and extensive nuclear program currently, the subject of intense
international scrutiny and a matter of national pride is of a different nature than the
secretive and singular programs held by Iraq and Syria. At the time of the Israeli
attack, neither Iraq nor Syria had made their nuclear programs the public
centerpiece of their foreign policy. But Iran has done so, and it has proven willing to
bear crippling sanctions and international condemnation to sustain its nuclear
ambitions. While Iraq and Syria were willing to take the punch and not fire back, it
is hard to imagine Iran doing the same given how much it has invested politically
in nuclear power. Iran's government, already paranoid and facing widespread domestic
discontent, may also calculate that it could not afford to let such an affront stand without
some kind of military response. The domestic pressure to respond from a furious
population could even back Tehran into a corner where some kind of violent
response is necessary, rather than optional. It is also probably not lost on the
Iranian leadership that striking back against Israel has political benefits in
producing a "rally around the flag" effect and that such a show of defiance may
even extend its shelf life.

Warrant: Unlike the relatively easy and safe Israeli strike against the Iraqi Osirak reactor, Iran's
nuclear facilities pose a great challenge for military forces, forcing them to fly a complicated and
potentially sovereignty-violating route to attack.

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While these assumptions have set the stage for the debate over an Israeli strike on Iran,
there is no reason to believe that a replay of these events is likely in this instance. In
contrast to the small numbers involved in the Osirak strike, American defense
officials have estimated that Israel would need to use at least 100 planes and would
have to fly a relatively complicated route, most likely across Iraqi airspace, to
conduct an attack on Iranian facilities. Given Iran's capabilities and the prospect of
retaliation during and after the strike, Israel is unlikely to focus exclusively on
destroying the dispersed and often protected nuclear facilities, but will probably extend
its target list to include radars and other air defenses, as well as much of Iran's air
force, its command and control structure, and some key facilities for elite military
units (such as the Quds force). Israel is also unlikely to take unnecessary risks with
retaliation against its civilians and may try to destroy any conventional missile
capacity that Iran retains with additional air strikes or covert operations.

Warrant: Unlike Osirak, a preventative aerial strike on Iran would take large scale raids
comparable to those in Iraq.


Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration identified Iran and Syria as
the next stage of the road map to war. US military sources intimated that an aerial
attack on Iran could involve a large scale deployment comparable to the US shock
and awe bombing raids on Iraq in March 2003: American air strikes on Iran
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would vastly exceed the scope of the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osiraq nuclear center
in Iraq, and would more resemble the opening days of the 2003 air campaign against
Iraq.

Analysis: Many teams will surely site the Israeli strikes against the Iraqi and Syrian reactors as
successes to compare a potential American strike to. You, however, should point out Iran's
nuclear ambitions are completely different from those of Syria's and Iraq's. Iran's nuclear
ambitions are a sense of pride, as they have demonstrated by withstanding sanctions; moreover,
an attack against Iranian nuclear facilities would require a far greater amount of forces. Clearly,
these comparisons are false.

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Answer: Extreme retaliation from Iran would only occur if it felt its regime was threatened.

Warrant: A targeted operation would pose little threat to the entirety of the Iranian regime,
giving them little reason to resort to its worst forms of retaliation.

Kroenig, Matthew. "Time to Attack Iran." Foreign Affairs, Jan.-Feb. 2012. Web. 17 Aug.
attack-iran>.

None of these outcomes is predetermined, however; indeed, the United States could do
much to mitigate them. Tehran would certainly feel like it needed to respond to a U.S.
attack, in order to reestablish deterrence and save face domestically. But it would also
likely seek to calibrate its actions to avoid starting a conflict that could lead to the
destruction of its military or the regime itself. In all likelihood, the Iranian leadership
would resort to its worst forms of retaliation, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz
or launching missiles at southern Europe, only if it felt that its very existence was
threatened. A targeted U.S. operation need not threaten Tehran in such a
fundamental way.

Answer: The U.S. could take steps to limit any Iranian retaliation.

Warrant: By clearly stating that the U.S. does not have intentions to overthrow the Iranian
regime and establishing clear redlines in which the U.S. would respond to overthrow the regime,
Iran would be unlikely to expose itself to assured destruction and, likewise, wouldnt
catastrophically backlash.

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attack-iran>.

To make sure it doesnt and to reassure the Iranian regime, the United States could first
make clear that it is interested only in destroying Irans nuclear program, not in
overthrowing the government. It could then identify certain forms of retaliation to
which it would respond with devastating military action, such as attempting to close
the Strait of Hormuz, conducting massive and sustained attacks on Gulf states and U.S.
troops or ships, or launching terrorist attacks in the United States itself. Washington
would then need to clearly articulate these redlines to Tehran during and after the
attack to ensure that the message was not lost in battle. And it would need to accept the
fact that it would have to absorb Iranian responses that fell short of these redlines without
escalating the conflict. This might include accepting token missile strikes against U.S.
bases and ships in the region -- several salvos over the course of a few days that soon
taper off -- or the harassment of commercial and U.S. naval vessels. To avoid the kind of
casualties that could compel the White House to escalate the struggle, the United States
would need to evacuate nonessential personnel from U.S. bases within range of
Iranian missiles and ensure that its troops were safely in bunkers before Iran
launched its response. Washington might also need to allow for stepped-up support to
Irans proxies in Afghanistan and Iraq and missile and terrorist attacks against Israel. In
doing so, it could induce Iran to follow the path of Iraq and Syria, both of which
refrained from starting a war after Israel struck their nuclear reactors in 1981 and
2007, respectively.

Answer: Iran's missile capacity is steeply exaggerated.

Warrant: With an air force far behind that of the Israelis, Iran would find it near impossible to
successfully stage any sort of a counterattack. Moreover, they are clearly over-reliant on their
missiles to retaliate at the point where they only have limited stockpiles and limited means of
actually launching their inaccurate stockpiles.
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News, 03 July 2012. Web. 18 Aug. 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-

"Iran's ability to strike back directly against Israel is limited, says Mark
Fitzpatrick, director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Its antiquated air
force is totally outclassed by the Israelis and it has only a limited number of ballistic
missiles that could reach Israel. Mr Fitzpatrick says Iran's missile arsenal includes "a
modified version of the Shahab-3, the Ghadr-1, which has a range of 1,600km (995
miles), but Iran only has about six transporter-erector launchers for the missile".
"Iran's new solid-fuelled missile, the Sajjil-2, can also reach Israel, but it is not yet fully
operational," he adds. But, Mr Fitzpatrick argues that both of these missiles are too
inaccurate to have any effect against military targets when armed with conventional
weapons. Nor are they a very effective way to deliver chemical or biological
weapons, and Iran does not have nuclear weapons. In summary, he believes that an
Iranian missile strike would be only a symbolic gesture.

Answer: Iran's ability to use proxies and to conduct attacks is limited.

Warrant: Iran has proven in multiple occasion that its ability to strike back at Israel is weak,
which is why there attacks are only attempted, not successful.

News, 03 July 2012. Web. 18 Aug. 2013. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-

Mr Byman is uncertain about how effective such Iranian operations might be. Iran's
reported attempted attacks in India and Thailand show it remains determined to
strike at Israel, presumably in retaliation for Israeli killings of Hezbollah figures like
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Imad Mughniyeh and the suspected attacks on Iranian nuclear scientists. However,
these recent attacks were not well executed, suggesting that Iran's services'
professionalism is uneven, he argues.

Analysis: Although Iran has asserted the ability to retaliate against the U.S. and Israel in the case
of a strike, their actual abilities remain unproven, if not doubtful. Your opponents will likely be
reading claims from the Iranian government, so explain how the logical and strategic moves that
Iran will make won't be catastrophic and then point to Iran's track-record of failing to
successfully retaliate to demonstrate the low risk of any possible Iranian retaliation.

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CON Diplomacy Better Solves Nuclear Proliferation

Argument: Diplomatic solutions remain the best alternative to solving nuclear proliferation in
the long term.

Warrant: Meaningful negotiations remain the best way to solve an Iranian nuclear crisis in the
long term.


Absent a meaningful negotiated settlement, which remains the best way to resolve
the nuclear crisis with Iran, its longer-term prognosis is difficult to predict without
broader application.

Warrant: A key priority of deterring Iran in the long term is a parallel diplomatic strategy to
build up trust in the short term.


be, at the same time, to implement additional measures to delay, thwart, and deter Irans
acquisition of nuclear capabilities and inhibit its ability to break out. In particular, such a
strategy should focus on several key priorities:

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o A parallel strategy alongside pressure is to seek interim negotiated
constraints on Irans nuclear program that serve to reduce concerns about
an Iranian breakout or dash to the bomb. Iran can receive tangible benefits
in return for reducing its options to build nuclear weapons quickly and in
secret. All sides could build valuable trust, something currently in short
supply.

Warrant: Iran interested in confidence building measures.

Davenport, Kelsey. "Iran Nuclear Brief." The Arms Control Association. Jan. 2013. Web.

Iran appears to be interested in confidence building measures that include
acknowledgement of its right to enrich under certain conditions, guarantees that
further sanctions would not be imposed, and assurances that Iran will not be
subjected to a military attack.

Argument: Earlier diplomatic attempts can serve as a template for future negotiations.

Warrant: Earlier diplomatic attempts lay an acceptable outline for a long-term compromise.


The best remedy is a negotiated long-term resolution of the nuclear issues. Although
Iran remains difficult to engage in a comprehensive negotiated solution, the shape of a
future solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis is important to consider now. Several earlier
attempts to engage Iran in a long-term solution have laid the basis for an acceptable
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outcome including illuminating creative diplomatic methods of achieving a
compromise.

Warrant: Earlier attempts show that there should be a series of concessions; example list given.


These earlier efforts have created a sound foundation to build on. One lesson is that
because the situation is so complicated, the negotiating goal should be a framework
agreement that can incorporate a series of stages where each step includes
concessions by Iran matched with incentives or concessions by the P5+1

1. Updated, verified !freeze for freeze" agreement.
2. Iran coming clean in a verifiable manner about its past and possible ongoing
nuclear weaponization activities and accomplishments and receiving significant sanctions
relief.
3. Intensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification, temporary
suspension of sensitive Iranian nuclear programs, and provisional suspension of
U.N. Security Council sanctions.
4. IAEA certification of absence of undeclared nuclear activities, resumption of Irans
nuclear program, provision of major incentives package, and end of U.S. sanctions.
5. Growth of Irans civil nuclear program and end of all remaining sanctions.

Arguments: There are multiple circumstances in which diplomatic compromises can be made.

Warrant: Iran willing to make concessions in exchange for recognition of their right to enrich.

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In an October 8, 2012 interview with Der Spiegel, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar
Salehi said that Iran is prepared to offer an exchange in which Tehran would
voluntarily limit the extent of our enrichment program in return for a guaranteed
supply of fuel rods and a recognition that Iran has the right to enrich. One of the
attractions of this proposal is that it gives Iran a view of the end-game.
Recognition of the right to enrich ensures Tehran that a negotiated settlement will
respect future enrichment under certain guidelines. Moreover, it is not inconsistent
with the current position of the P5+1.

Warrant: P5+1 could more clearly give Iran enrichment capabilities under certain
circumstances.


For example, the P5+1 proposal could be enhanced by more clearly recognizing that
at a future date Iran will be allowed to enrich under certain circumstances, such as
fully meeting its IAEA safeguards obligations. The P5+1 also should consider
requiring that Fordow be shut on a temporary, rather than permanent basis, with the
option for re-opening the facility in the future if increased monitoring and
verification measures, such as implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol, are
in place.

Argument: A new administration change makes diplomacy more likely.

Warrant: Opposition of past negotiations likely motivated by dislike of Ahmadinejad.

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Davenport, Kelsey. "Iran Nuclear Brief." The Arms Control Association. 2013. Web. 17
Aug. 2013. <http://www.armscontrol.org/files/Iran_Brief_01_09_2013.pdf>.

The opposition was likely motivated in part by opponents dislike of
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who supported the fuel swap.

Warrant: New Iranian president willing to engage in serious talks.

Esfandiari, Golnaz. "Iran's Rohani Says U.S. Sending Mixed Messages."
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. 7 Aug. 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.rferl.org/content/iran-rohani-us-nuclear/25068525.html>.

The former nuclear negotiator [Iran's new president, Hassan Rohani] said
constructive dialogue and negotiations based on mutual respect could lead to a win-
win situation. He said Iran was ready to engage in serious talks without wasting
time, and would respond appropriately to practical measures by the United States.

Analysis: Diplomacy is often overlooked as an argument because it doesnt seem offensive.
However, the shortfalls of the diplomacy argument can be utilized as reasons for it to be
applicable in a round. For example, the fact that the U.S. government has had a past with
diplomacy can be used as a template for better negotiations in the future with new
administrations. The last argument gives examples of what routes could be taken if diplomacy
was pursued; it also shows than Iran is willing. Finally, by establishing that its important to look
at long-term solvency, diplomacy becomes the only route that ensures international cooperation.
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A/2 Diplomacy Better Solves Nuclear Proliferation

Answer: Diplomacy is not effective.

Warrant: Diplomacy will not change a country that is bent on acquiring nuclear weapons.

Waltz, Kenneth N. "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb." Council on Foreign Relations.
bomb/p29001>.

First, diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its
pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record
indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded
from doing so.

Warrant: Diplomatic talks failed to denuclearize North Korea.

Bajoria, Jayshree. "The Six-Party Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program." Council on
Foreign Relations. 8 Mar. 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/six-party-talks-north-koreas-nuclear-
program/p13593>.

So far, the Six Party Talks have failed to denuclearize North Korea and have
elicited few results. Several experts think North Korea is now determined to be
recognized as a nuclear weapons state. Indeed, in 2012, the North Korean leadership
included a new preamble to its constitution that describes the country as a nuclear state
and a militarily powerful state that is indomitable.

Answer: Diplomacy is time consuming and delaying.

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!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "##
Warrant: Working diplomatically through treaties and agreements will take a long time without
producing significant results.

n.d. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.

The dangers posed by nuclear weapons are present today. Working only through
already-established treaties and agreements will take too long. It is unlikely to
produce meaningful reductions at the pace needed.

Warrant: Short term confidence steps only pushes off issues.


MIT senior fellow James Walsh says that by focusing on short-term confidence-
building steps, the negotiators would only push the can down the road.

Argument: U.S. Government ineffective at working with new governments.

Warrant: Washington is giving new Iranian government mixed signals.

RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 7 Aug. 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.

Rohani focused on what he characterized as Washington's mixed signals in his
postinaugural press conference on August 6. The statements of the White House
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
are not in line with some of the behavior we're seeing, he said. Overall, I'm not
pessimistic about the future of negotiations.

Warrant: Congress is undermining Iranian agreements.

RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 7 Aug. 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.

Thielmann believes Congress is making talks with Iran more difficult for the White
House. Instead of giving the president of the United States some running room in terms
of wavers for some aspects of the sanctions that are already in place, he says, instead
the Congress is insisting on new sanctions and the removal of waivers, which makes
it particularly difficult for the president to negotiate an agreement with Iranians
because obviously the Iranians are going to want some evidence that their
cooperation will allow for a scaling back of the sanctions that are definitely hurting
their country.

Warrant: New North Korean government is unpredictable.

Chanlett-Avery, Emma. "North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal
Situation." Congressional Research Service. 5 Apr. 2013. Web. 17 Aug. 2013.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf

Unfettered by many of the norms that govern international diplomacy, the leadership in
Pyongyang, now headed by its dynastic Great Successor Kim Jong-un, is
unpredictable and opaque. So little is known about the new leader that the
uncertainty surrounding policymaking in Pyongyang may be more murky than it
was under Kim Jong-il. U.S. policymakers face a daunting challenge in navigating a
course toward a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue with a rogue actor.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
Analysis: In the short term, diplomacy either delays the inevitable or takes too much time to be
effective. In the long term, diplomacy has been historically ineffective at deterring a nation from
getting nuclear weapons, especially in the case of North Korea. In addition, the U.S. Congress is
undermining the presidents ability to compromise with new Korean and Iranian governments.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

!78 9 :;0; %++-<= >"(?. !-(,* %#+@A%)*&@<-# 0*#+@)*#+

Argument: U.S. attack would cause anti-American sentiment in Iran.

Warrant: An attack on Iran would unify the population against the U.S.

Aug. 2013.

On the contested issue of whether military action would weaken or strengthen Iranian
public support for the current regime, we conclude that U.S. and/or Israeli strikes are
more likely to unify the population behind the government than to generate
resistance.

Warrant: U.S. strike would help Iranian hardliners and build a rally-around-the-flag effect.

Pillar, Paul R. "Regional and Global Consequences of U.S. Military Action in Iran."
Georgetown University, Nov. 2007. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/cpass/Articles/Iran%20mil%20risks%20Nov0
7%20Pillar.pdf>.

Any U.S. military strike would be a political boon to Iranian hardliners such as
President Ahmadinejad, whose political strength rests in large part on a message of
threat from, and confrontation with, the United States. The confirmation of that
message that an attack would provide, in addition to a more general rally-around-
the-flag effect, would distract attention from the hardliners poor economic performance
and reduce the chance of favorable political change in Tehran.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
Impact Warrant: An attack on Iran would create long-term resentment.

Georgetown University. Nov. 2007. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
7%20Pillar.pdf>.

An attack also could be expected to affect long-term attitudes of almost all
Iranians. An instructive example is how the events in Iran of 1953, in which a U.S.-
instigated coup removed the populist Prime Minister Mossadegh, still rankle many
Iranians more than half a century later. This resentment persists regardless of how any
Iranians feel about Mossadegh himself, or how much they understand the issues that were
in play in 1953. A military attack, being an open and violent act of hostility that
would be even more salient than a clandestinely supported coup, would have even
greater potential for creating this kind of long-term resentment. It would become, for
generations to come, the first thing many Iranians think of when thinking of the United
States. As such, it would help to poison relations between Tehran and Washington
for generations, even if there were substantial change from the current distribution
of power inside Iran.

Argument: U.S. attack would cause anti-American sentiment in the Middle East overall.

Warrant: Most Middle Eastern governments would oppose U.S. military action.

7%20Pillar.pdf>.

Most governments in the Middle East would oppose U.S. military action against Iran, in
both their public rhetoric and their privately expressed sentiments.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

Warrant: Although military action could appease some Gulf state governments, it would overall
have a negative impact on the Arab public.

Aug. 2013.

While a United States-led military action against Iran could temporarily improve official
U.S. relations with the governments of Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf States, the
impact on the broader Arab public is likely to be negative for U.S. interests and leverage
in the region, particularly in Egypt.

Warrant: A U.S. attack could further alienate Muslims.

Aug. 2013.

U.S. military action, especially if unilateral, could further alienate Muslims and
others worldwide, reinforcing the view that the United States resorts too often to
military force. An attack on a Muslim nation could enhance the recruiting ability of
radical Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda. Even though some Sunni Muslims might be
pleased to see attacks on Shiite Iran, the likely impact on U.S. stature in the Muslim
world would be negative.

Warrant: Middle East would view U.S. attack as attack against Muslims.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
7%20Pillar.pdf>.

Intensely unpopular it would be, not only in the Persian Gulf region but throughout the
Middle East. Iraq war increases the likelihood that most people in the region would view
an attack on Iran in similar terms. They would interpret it not primarily in terms of
Arabs versus Persians, or Sunni versus Shia, much less in the U.S.-preferred terms
of moderates versus extremists. They would view it as one more assault by the
United Statesthe leader of the Judeo-Christian Westagainst Muslims.

Warrant: Unilateral American force has led to a growth of anti-Americanism.

Hammond, Andrew. "The International Growth of Anti-Americanism." Japan Today, 13
Mar. 2013. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.japantoday.com/category/opinions/view/the-international-growth-of-
anti-americanism>.

Over the course of the past decade, not one but two cross-cutting meta-narratives have
been at work in international public opinion. The first is the international growth of
anti-Americanism, driven by Iraq and wider perceptions of excessive U.S. power,
unilateralism and over-reliance on military might. This was an especially strong
impulse from 2003 to 2008 during the Bush administration.

Impact Warrant: An attack on Iran would enhance terrorist recruitment.

Aug. 2013.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#"

In addition, we believe that an attack on Iran would enhance the ability of radical
Islamist groups, including Al Qaeda, to recruit in the region. It is hard to quantify the
scale of this effect, but if Iraq and Afghanistan are models, one could anticipate that an
attack on Iran will boost the popularity of groups and leaders who claim that the
U.S. is the enemy of Islam. Even though Al Qaedas Sunni leaders might be pleased by
attacks against the Shiite Iran, they would nonetheless welcome the resulting
international Muslim outrage, which would create fertile ground for expanding their
ranks.

Impact Warrant: An attack on Iran would enhance terrorist recruitment (2).

7%20Pillar.pdf>.

The other follow-on consequence, and potentially the more costly one, would be an
increase in extremist sentiment and support for anti-U.S. terrorism, including
terrorism having no connection whatever to the Iranian regime. The boost that the
Iraq war has given to Islamist terrorism is only partly because the disorder and
insurgency in Iraq have made it a training ground and operating base for international
terrorism. It also is because outside Iraq, the war has become a propaganda point and
recruiting poster for al Qaida and other extremist groups. A U.S. attack on Iran would
have the latter effects, even without an occupation and insurgency.

Impact Warrant: Anti Americanism will affect Middle Eastern government action.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
7%20Pillar.pdf>.

Governments in the Middle East would have to shape their policies against the
backdrop of this popular sentiment and the more specific security concerns
mentioned above. Although it is impossible to project specific decisions and thus
specific consequences for U.S. interests, it is likely that visible cooperation with the
United States would become politically costlier or riskier than before, and that the
net U.S. influence in the region would thus be less than before. Specific, admittedly
immeasurable, forms this might take would be greater reluctance to cooperate on
counterterrorism or to provide military access rights.

Impact Warrant: Anti Americanism will affect Middle Eastern government action (2).

7%20Pillar.pdf>.

The further consequences of increased anti-Americanism would be twofold. First, as in
the Middle East, many governments would find it politically more difficult to
cooperate with Washington, especially in publicly visible ways. In some instances
other motivations would be sufficient to sustain cooperation despite this political cost,
but in others the United States would find it more difficult to get what it wants from
foreign partners.

Impact Warrant: A slight increase in Anti Americanism still has a negative impact.

Georgetown University. Nov. 2007. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
7%20Pillar.pdf>.

One might ask whether the U.S. standing in much of the Muslim world already has
sunk so low that a new military action would not make an appreciable difference.
Even small increments in anti-Americanism, however, can have major effects,
particularly with regard to boosting extremism and terrorism. Consider, for example,
how an attack on Iran might play in Pakistan, Irans currently volatile neighbor to the east
and like it, a large non-Arab Muslim country. Even if the new attack were to add only
one percentage point to existing anti-American sentiment, in a country of 165
million that would represent more than a million and a half people. Suppose that of
those, only a tenth were sufficiently angry to become favorably inclined toward extremist
groups. Suppose further that of those favorably inclined toward extremist groups only a
tenth would actually work on the groups behalf, and that of those willing to work on
their behalf only a tenth would become terrorists themselves. All of these suppositions
may be conservative, but they still would yield about 1,600 new terrorists, with easy
access to a terrorist career via al-Qaida and other elements ensconced in the
frontier areas of northwest Pakistan.

Analysis: An Anti-Americanism argument is used in pretty much every U.S. foreign policy
topic. For this resolution, it is clear that U.S. military force has and will continue to cause
negative U.S. sentiment in the region of the Middle East. Therefore, to give this point tangible
impacts that you can weigh in the round, you can either make it specific to Iran (you can even
use the history of previous U.S. intervention in Iran as reasons why they are uncooperative
today) or talk about the Middle East and Muslim citizens overall and how that affects terrorism
and U.S. policy actions in the region.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

%73 8 9:0: %++-;< ="(>. !-(,* %#+?@%)*&?;-# 0*#+?)*#+

Answer: Anti- American sentiment has many factors and fluctuations.

Warrant: Anti-American sentiment has increased in the last five years due to the Iraq war.

7%20Pillar.pdf>.

Beyond the allies and the major powers, and especially in the broader Muslim world, the
dominant consequence would be an increase in anti-Americanism. Numerous opinion
polls over the past five years have documented a substantial increase in antipathy
toward the United States. The Iraq war, as the dominant U.S. action during this period,
clearly has much to do with this trend in sentiment.

Warrant: Fluctuations in American favorability are common.

Hammond, Andrew. "The International Growth of Anti-Americanism." Japan Today, 13
Mar. 2013. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.japantoday.com/category/opinions/view/the-international-growth-of-
anti-americanism>.

To be sure, significant ups and downs in international favorability toward the United
States are not unprecedented. During the Vietnam War, anti-Americanism increased
markedly. There was also significant overseas concern about U.S. policy during the early
Reagan presidency following increased tensions with the Soviet Union.

Warrant: Anti- American protests broke out in response to a Muhammad mocking video.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "##

Loconte, Ph.D., Joseph. "Anti-Americanism and the Funeral of a Great Myth." The
Huffington Post, 16 Aug. 2013. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-loconte-phd/anti-
americanism_b_3760908.html>.

Last September, violent anti-American protests broke out in over 20 countries
across the Muslim world, from Afghanistan to Indonesia, following the release of an
online film mocking the prophet Muhammad. In Libya, Islamic militants armed with
antiaircraft weapons and rocket-propelled grenades stormed the U.S. diplomatic mission
in Benghazi, killing the U.S. ambassador and three other Americans. It was the first
violent death of an American diplomat since 1979.

Argument: U.S. government cannot control anti-American sentiment.

Warrant: Anti- Americanism surges despite a reduced U.S. presence in the Middle East.


Anti-Americanism has surged, in fact, just as the United States has reduced or
eliminated its "imperialist" footprint in the Middle East. Consider: President Obama
has withdrawn all U.S. combat troops from Iraq; he is pulling U.S. forces out of
Afghanistan next year; and he has taken a hands-off approach to the political revolutions
in Egypt, Syria, and Libya. Despite this strategic retreat, it now appears that anti-
Americanism in Muslim lands is more violent and more intractable than it was a
decade ago.

Warrant: U.S. is regularly denounced in Arab Media.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$


The United States is regularly denounced in Arab media as "the engineer of
destruction" and the enemy of Islam. In Egypt -- that longtime American ally --
President Obama is burned in effigy or depicted with a beard and turban,
announcing his "support for terrorism." Demonstrators routinely throng the streets of
Arab cities chanting "irhal" -- get out -- as they desecrate the American flag.

Warrant: Anti-Americanism still high despite Obamas apologetic addresses and empathy.


All of this is occurring with an American president who delivered an apologetic address
in Cairo to Muslims worldwide, in which he chastised his own nation for treating Arab
states "without regard to their own aspirations." It is occurring under a president who has
empathized, like no other, with the narrative of victimization that sustains much of the
Muslim world.

Analysis: Instead of trying to refute the fact that an attack would cause anti-American sentiment,
you should go into the causes of anti-Americanism in the status quo. The fact is, there are more
factors than anyone can count. For that reason, you can show that no matter what the United
State government does, anti-American sentiment will be prevalent and strong.
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

!78 9 :;<;+-&= >"&?* @-&), 0"A+ B"/*&

Argument: The use of military force harms the U.S.'s ability to use soft power to influence
other countries decisions.

Warrant: As the United States begins to lose influence in the Middle East, Iran will take it.

Muasher, Marwan. "The Day After a Strike on Iran." The National Interest. 10 May
2013. Web. 18 Aug. 2013. <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-day-after-
strike-iran-8456>.

Tehran lost popularity and legitimacy following its crackdown on protesters in the
aftermath of its 2009 election and by supporting the brutal Syrian regime. Damaging
Irans nuclear program wont necessarily weaken Iran further, however, as the
action could flip the script. Tehran could be seen in a more positive light as the
latest victim of an unwarranted attack and actually gain influence in the Middle
East.

Warrant: Drones prove that hard power harms our image and thereby our soft power.

Stokes, Bruce, and Richard Wike. "World to America: We Want Soft, Not Hard Power."
CNN, 9 Aug. 2012. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/09/world-to-america-we-want-
soft-not-hard-power/>.

A drone campaign against extremist leaders and organizations in places such as
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia has been one of the Obama administrations signature
foreign policy initiatives. Yet a median of 69 percent across 20 of the countries
surveyed by the Pew Research Center this spring oppose such strikes. The policy is
particularly unpopular in majority Muslim nations, but also in Europe and other
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
regions as well. Indeed, at least three-in-four hold negative views in a diverse set of
countries: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Jordan (85 percent), Turkey (81
percent), Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent) and Japan (75 percent).

Warrant: States believe that the U.S. is only acting in its own interests, reducing the chances
that we can influence their actions using soft power.

Stokes, Bruce, and Richard Wike. "World to America: We Want Soft, Not Hard Power."
CNN, 9 Aug. 2012. Web. 20 Aug. 2013.
<http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/09/world-to-america-we-want-
soft-not-hard-power/>.

Moreover, just as in the Bush years, theres a widespread perception that
Washington acts unilaterally in world affairs. Among the 20 countries surveyed,
there isnt a single country where at least half the population believes Obama has
taken their nations interests into account when making foreign policy (Brazil is
the closest, with 49 percent of those surveyed saying he had). The numbers are
similarly low for those who believe Obama hasnt sought international approval
before militarily intervening in the worlds trouble spots.

Impact: Soft power is key for the U.S. to exercise its material capabilities.


The United States may have more material resources and capabilities than any other
country on Earth, but its ability to use these resources effectively hinges on the consent
among other countries to use those resources and capabilities.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$
Analysis: The use of military force has, in the past, only hindered the U.S.'s perception in the
global community; moreover, it only helps the state that we use it against as other countries
sympathize with that state. Unfortunately, this erodes on the U.S.'s ability to influence other
states and its ability to put its interests first on the global agenda. On another note, remember
that the people's perception of the U.S. is just as important as their officials' because at the end of
the day the constituents can punish the ruling government if they don't abide by the people's
wishes.

!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#$

%73 8 9:;:+-&< ="&>* ?-&), 0"@+ A"/*&

Answer: Most countries support force against these scary nuclear proliferators.

Warrant: Negative reactions to military action exercised by the U.S. could easily be avoided,
while Washington would gain much support by those intimidated by Iran in the Middle East.

attack-iran>.

Washington could also reduce the political fallout of military action by building global
support for it in advance. Many countries may still criticize the United States for
using force, but some -- the Arab states in particular -- would privately thank
Washington for eliminating the Iranian threat. By building such a consensus in the
lead-up to an attack and taking the outlined steps to mitigate it once it began, the
United States could avoid an international crisis and limit the scope of the conflict.

Answer: Proliferation harms the U.S. at the negotiating table.

Warrant: By evening the playing field, nuclear weapons proliferation harm the U.S. on the
negotiating table, so in either world U.S. influence decreases.

College. Post 2009. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.

Realistically, proliferation of nuclear [weapons]constitutes a threat to international
peace and security (UN Security Council, 2006, pg. 1). Nuclear security threats arise in
four forms: the threat of existing arsenals, the emergence of new nuclear states, the
!"# %&'()*#+, -#. %#,/*&, 0*1+*)2*& 3456

!"#$%&'( *+&,-. "#"
collapse of international non-proliferation regimes and the rise of nuclear terrorism. Due
to their asymmetric destabilizing and equalizing effects, nuclear weapons erode the
unipolarity of the international system by balancing political actors relative
military power and security.

College. Hamilton College, post 2009. Web. 18 Aug. 2013.

As the sole international hegemon, the U.S. seeks to use its power to insure its
security and influence international politics in a way that reflects its own interests
and values (Huntington, 1993, pg. 70). In addition to creating a direct security threat,
further proliferation jeopardizes the United States ability to project its primacy
and promote its interests internationally.

Analysis: Explain to the judges that nuclear proliferation evokes a completely different calculus
from the people. While the negative will give examples of acts of force against terrorism etc.,
nuclear proliferation has the ability to kill millions of people instantly, rendering the use of force
acceptable. Even in the Middle East, where we have the most difficulties establishing popular
support and our soft power, there is much support for U.S. military action against nuclear
proliferation. Even if we lose soft power, remind the judge it would have happened anyway.

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