Ramonito Manaban vs.

Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines FACTS: At around 1:25 oclock in the morning of October 11, 1996, the victim, Joselito Bautista, who was a member of the UP Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi, who complained of difficulty in breathing, to the UP Health Center. The doctors gave him prescriptions and so he went to BPI Kalayaan to withdraw some money from its Automated Teller Machine (ATM). When Bautista could not withdraw money, he started kicking and pounding the machine which caught the attention of herein petitioner. Bautista said that the machine captured his card and that he did not get the money he badly needed. Manaban said that the PIN entered was incorrect that is why the card was captured. Angered by what Manaban said, Bautista then continued kicking and pounding the machine. The former advised the latter to call the customer service which Bautista did but still kicked the machine. Failing to pacify the victim, petitioner fired a warning shot, and according to him fired the second one hitting, and eventually, killing Bautista. Manaban said that he feared that Bautista would pull his gun first and might kill him so he fired his gun and shot Bautista. The trial court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide. This decision was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals with modification respect only to the award of loss of earning capacity. This case is then submitted before this court for review. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable. 2. Whether or not the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and obfuscation are present. RULINGS: 1. Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the three requisites to prove self-defense as a justifying circumstance which may exempt an accused from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendants life in real peril. In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to draw his gun when he turned his back at Manaban is mere speculation. Aggression presupposes that the person attacked must face a real threat to his life and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary. Absent such actual or imminent peril to ones life or limb, there is nothing to repel and there is no justification for taking the life or inflicting injuries on another. 2. It is undisputed that Manaban called the police to report the shooting incident. When the police arrived, Manaban surrendered his service firearm and voluntarily went with the police to the police station for investigation. Thus, Manaban is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On obfuscation, we find that the facts of the case do not entitle Manaban to such mitigating circumstance. The threat was only in the mind of Manaban and is mere speculation which is not sufficient to produce obfuscation which is mitigating.41 Besides, the threat or danger was not grave or serious considering that Manaban had the advantage over Bautista because Manaban was already pointing his firearm at Bautista when the latter turned his back. The defense failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the cause that allegedly produced obfuscation. People vs. Genosa FACTS: Marivic and Ben Genosa, who knew each other since elementary and were 3rd cousins, were married in November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Their marriage, save for the first year where, according to Marivic, she lived happily with Ben, had been tumultuous and unhappy because of the many and frequent quarrels of the couple which usually resulted in the cruel treatment of Marivic by Ben. This went on for about 10 or 11 years, occurring around thrice a week when everytime the latter got drunk. On the evening of November 15,

1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas, his co-worker, after having collected their salary, went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO where they stayed for 3 hours and drank 2 bottles of beer, each. They then went to the Genosa residence but Marivic was not there because, as she explained, she was out with her cousin looking for Ben, knowing that it was a payday and that he was probably out to gamble again. Upon arriving later at the Genosa residence and finding Ben drunk because of his staggering walking, Marivic asked Ecel to sleep in the house because she was scared that Ben might again beat her, but Ecel declined for fear of a repetition of an incident a year ago. Ben was in his usual unruly behavior, nagging and yelling at Marivic, even cutting the antenna wire with a bolo to keep her from watching TV. There were basically 2 incidents of attack made by Ben: 1) he whirled Marivic, causing her to fall on the bedside, and two hours later when 2) he dragged her out of the room towards the drawer, holding her neck. He tried opening the drawer, failed, so reached for a blade instead in his wallet. At this point, she was aware that he was going to kill her so she smashed his arm, causing the wallet and blade to fall. She also subsequently smashed him with a metal pipe before running to the childrens room, where she felt overwhelming selfpity an d felt nauseous. Marivic admitted killing her husband, however, by shooting him later on. She had distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot him. The RTC charged Genosa with parricide, giving her the death penalty. ISSUES: 1) WON Marivic acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus (invoking BWS) 2)WON there was treachery in the killing of Ben Genosa 1)No, but with 2 mitigating circumstances 2)None

HELD: RATIO: 1) Crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed that killing him would save her life. Here, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. The reality or even imminent danger he posed ended altogether the moment he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed, notwithstanding the Courts recognition of this special case that requiring the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her to murder by installment and that threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense. In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense- complete or incomplete- the part of the victim. Mitigating circumstance 1: Par. 9 and 10 of Art. 13 of the RPC The cyclical nature of the BWS and repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts. Mitigating circumstance 2: passion and obfuscation. This state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust acts or a legit stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason, with 1) there is an unlawful and sufficient act to produce such condition and 2) no considerable length of time when the accused might recover her normal equanimity, as requisites. 2) There is no showing of the victims position relative to appellant at the time of the shooting, nor that Marivic chose a specific means of attacking her husband which does not pose as a risk to her. Besides, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel. JUDGMENT: Conviction of parricide affirmed, with 2 mitigating circumstances. Penalty reduced. People vs. Razon Facts: PO1 Francisco Chopchopen (Chopchopen) was walking towards Upper Pinget Baguio City, at around midnight of August 1, 1993, when a taxicab driven by Edwin Razon y Lucea (Razon) stopped beside him. Razon told Chopchopen that he was held up by three men at Dreamland Subdivision. Chopchopen then asked Razon to go with him to the place of the incident to check if the persons who held him up were still there. Razon was hesitant at first but eventually went with Chopchopen to said area about 100 meters up the road.

While walking about eight meters off the road, Chopchopen noticed a person lying on the ground and partially hidden by a big stone. Upon closer look, Chopchopen saw that the person's shirt was soaked in blood and that he was hardly breathing. Lying beside the man was a wooden cane. Chopchopen asked Razon to help him bring the person to the hospital. On the way, Chopchopen asked Razon if he was the one who stabbed the victim. Razon answered no. Soon they met a police mobile patrol driven by SPO2 Samuel Bumangil (Bumangil) who followed them to Baguio General Hospital. The victim, who was later identified as Benedict Kent Gonzalo (Gonzalo), was pronounced dead on arrival.3 He was 23 years old and a polio victim. Upon questioning, Razon told Bumangil that he was held up by three men, which included Gonzalo whom he stabbed in self-defense. Razon brought out a fan knife and told Bumangil that it was the knife he used to stab Gonzalo. A later search of the cab however yielded another weapon, a colonial knife with bloodstains which was found under a newspaper near the steering wheel. At the police station, Razon admitted having stabbed Gonzalo but insisted that he did so in self-defense. Issue: WON there is self-defense? Held: NO Petitioner unequivocally admitted that after the three men went out of his taxicab, he ran after them and later went back to his cab to get his colonial knife; then he went down the canal to swing his knife at the victim, wounding and killing him in the process. Such can no longer be deemed as self-defense. It is settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away, unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not selfdefense is committed.52 Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the accused.53 Even assuming that some danger did in fact exist, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment petitioner was able to disarm the victim by wresting the knife from the latter. After the former had successfully seized the weapon, and he as well as his companions went out of the cab, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill the victim.54 The defense employed by petitioner also cannot be said to be reasonable. The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.55 The nature or quality of the weapon; the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor as well as those of the person who invokes selfdefense; and the place and the occasion of the assault also define the reasonableness of the means used in self-defense. PEOPLE vs LUAGUE -Natividad Luague's act in mortally wounding Paulino Disuasido, unaided her husband and co-accused Wenceslao Alcansare, and in the circumstances above set out, constitutes the exempting circumstance defined in article 11, subsection 1, of the Revised Penal Code, because, as stated by a commentator of note, "aside from the right to life on which rest the legitimate defense of our person, we have the right to party acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of man's patrimony." (1 Viada, 172, 173, 5th edition.) "Will the attempt to rape a woman constitute an aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense?" asks the same commentator. "We think so," he answer, "inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, cannot her very existence; this offense, unlike ordinary slander by word or deed susceptible of judicial redress, in an outrage which impresses an indelible blot on the victim, for, as the Roman Law says:quum virginitas, vel castitas, corupta restitui non protest (because virginity or chastity, once defiled, cannot be restored). It is evident that a woman who, imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability provided by this article and subsection since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage." (1 Viada, 301, 5th edition.)

FACTS: On 16 March 1996, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Arnel Tanael was on his way to the house of Romulo Cario. He passed in front of the house of [petitioner] Manuel Oriente and saw the latter and his companions having a drinking spree at the terrace of the petitioner's house. He arrived at Romulo's house where the latter was drinking beer alone. Thereafter, Romulo went out of the house to buy cigarettes. While watching television in the house of Romulo, Arnel Tanael heard two gunshots. Hence, he rushed outside the house to check on what the gunshots were all about. Peeping through potted plants perched on top of a neighbor's fence Tanael saw Romulo Cario, Manuel Oriente, the latter's daughter, Marilou Lopez and her husband, Paul Lopez and one Rogelio Gascon arguing. He heard Paul Lopez telling Romulo Cario, "Ikaw Cario, ang liit-liit mo, ang yabang mo!" Then Tanael saw Marilou coming out from their house with a lead pipe and handed it over to Paul. Paul then hit Romulo with a lead pipe at his right arm. Accused-appellant got the lead pipe from Paul and hit Romulo on his left eyebrow. Romulo reeled and fell down. Upon seeing Romulo fall down, Arnel got confused, hence, he went back inside the house and switched off the light and turned the television off. He went outside again and saw Romulo moaning. At this point, Paul Lopez was already poking a gun at Romulo, then pulled the trigger twice but the gun did not fire. Arnel then shouted, "Putang ina ninyo, bakit niyo ginagawa iyan sa bayaw ko, bakit ninyo ginaganito siya, ano ba ang kasalanan niya sa inyo." Oriente and his company did not say anything. Romulo Cario was brought by Arnel to the East Avenue Medical Center where Romulo, two hours after, passed away. The accused pleaded self-defense, arguing that the victim was the one who shot the gun and that he was only defending himself and his family when he hit the victim. The RTC rendered a Decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of Homicide. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether accused may claim self-defense. HELD: No. The petitioner emphasizes that the victim, allegedly a troublemaker in the vicinity, was drunk, fired his gun twice, and then proceeded towards the petitioner and his companions. The Court is not convinced.

When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing was legally justified. Having owned the killing of the victim, the accused should be able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court the elements of self-defense in order to avail of this extenuating circumstance. He must discharge this burden by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused.

Self-defense requires that there be (1) an unlawful aggression by the person injured or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. All these conditions must concur. There can be no selfdefense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor. To invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack. The testimonies of the defense witnesses, including the accused, that Cario threatened the persons gathered in front of Oriente's house with a gun is quite difficult to believe in view of the admissions of the same defense witnesses, including the accused, that Cario was able to get up from the ground after being hit and ran away with gun in hand. A person who was already threatening to kill with a gun and who was then hit with a piece of wood in a serious manner, can be reasonably expected to make use thereof. Here, the defense makes a

People vs Oriente

rather unusual claim that Cario simply ran away and did not use the gun he was holding while running.

2.WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights. Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of selfdefense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites: Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting up fence. A536 of the CC also provides that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In case, killing was disproportionate to attack. Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited w/ the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to A13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender & passion & obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault wasnt deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered 3 degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor.

US vs. Bumanglag Facts: On the night of January 2, 1909, Rafael Bumanglag noticed that 40 bundles of palay which were kept in his granary were missing. He searched for the missing palay the following morning and found them in an enclosed field which was planted with sugar cane, at a distance of about 100 meters from his granary. For the purpose of ascertaining who had done it, he left the palay there, and that night, accompanied by Gregorio Bundoc, Antonio Ribao, and Saturnino Tumamao, he waited near the said field for the person who might return to get the palay. Guillermo Ribis appeared and attempted to carry the palay away him, but at that instant Bumanglag, Bundoc, and Ribao assaulted the presumed thief with sticks and cutting and stabbing weapons; as a result of the struggle which ensued, Ribis fell down and died instantly. Issue: WON there is defense of property. Held: NO. Defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with said property. (People v. Apolinar) The bolo worn by the deceased was in its sheath and hanging from his waist. It can not be concluded that the deceased even intended to assault his murderers with his bolo either before he was attacked by them or during the fight. Without unlawful aggression and the other requisites which would exempt the accused from criminal responsibility, the appellant and his two companions assaulted Ribis with sticks and cutting and stabbing arms, inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds, and therefore, the said accused is guilty of the crime of homicide as co-principal by direct participation, fully convicted, together with his codefendants who are already serving their sentence. People vs Narvaez Facts: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages. Issues: 1.WON CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person. No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land. Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. Its accepted that victim was the original aggressor.

3.WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party. No. He isnt liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for non -payment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of A39 applicable to fines only & not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages & costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its commission, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to RPC A22. Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 mos. arresto mayor & to indemnify each group of heirs 4K w/o subsidiary imprisonment & w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 yrs so his immediate release is ordered. Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served more than that, he should be released. People vs. Chua Hiong Facts: Cesario Gocheco, nephew of Federico Chua Hiong (accusedappellant), published an article in the Manila Chronicle on February 11, 1952 entitled Doubtful Citizenship questioning the latters citizenship. Aside from that, Gocheco also filed various charges against the appellant with different government agencies. To answer this, on February 21, 1952, Chua Hiong published an article in the Manila Chronicle accusing Cesario Gocheco of persecution mania and sending the appellant a threatening letter under the pseudonym Benito Solipco. Chua Hiong also alleged that Gocheco was trying to damage his reputation to retaliate. In an earlier case, Gocheco and his family lost 2/3 of the inheritance left by his father. Chua Hiong was behind the prevailing parties, helping them with the expenses of the case. Thus, for the article, Chua Hiong was charged with and found guilty of the crime of libel.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant was justified by virtue of defense of reputation when he published article in the Manila Chronicle dated the February 21, 1952 containing libelous material 1. Held: In a physical assault, retaliation becomes unlawful after the attack has ceased, because there would be no harm to repel. But that is not the case when it is aimed at a persons good name. Once the

aspersion is cast, its sting clings and the one defamed may avail himself of all necessary means to shake it off. He may hit back with another libel, which, if adequate, will be justified. (emphasis supplied) Note: However, it is justified as self-defense only when it is clearly intended to explain or deny what was previously said of the one making the libelous statement. (People vs. Pelayo) Appellant acquitted with costs de-officio.

Honorable Court in said case, dated October 28, 1949, which reads as follows: Under the foregoing facts, there can be no doubt that had the accused Julito Sto. Domingo not taken the gasoline tank-truck trailer out in the street, a bigger conflagration would have occurred in Rizal Avenue Extension, and, perhaps, there might have been several deaths and bearing in mind the provisions of Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code the accused Julito Sto. Domingo incurred no criminal liability. 4. That it was consequently the defendant Rural Transit Co., from whose premises the burning gasoline tank-truck trailer was driven out by defendant Julito Sto. Domingo in order to avoid a greater evil or injury, for whose benefit the harm has been prevented under article 101, second subsection of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the above quoted law and facts, the cause of action against the Rural Transit Company can hardly be disputed, it appearing that the damage caused to the plaintiff was brought about mainly because of the desire of driver Julito Sto. Domingo to avoid greater evil or harm, which would have been the case had he not brought the tank-truck trailer to the middle of the street, for then the fire would have caused the explosion of the gasoline deposit of the company which would have resulted in a conflagration of much greater proportion and consequences to the houses nearby or surrounding it. It cannot be denied that this company is one of those for whose benefit a greater harm has been prevented, and as such it comes within the purview of said penal provision. The acquittal of the accused cannot, therefore, be deemed a bar to a civil action against this company because its civil liability is completely divorced from the criminal liability of the accused. The rule regarding reservation of the right to file a separate civil action does not apply to it. Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby modified as follows: it is affirmed with regard to defendants Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico; but it is reserved with regard to defendants Standard Vacuum Oil Company and Rural Transit Company, with costs. People v. Beronilla Facts: The accused was a military major of La Paz , Abra in 1941. He received an order form the regional commander of an infantry of the Philippine Army, operating as a guerrilla unit, to prosecute Arsenio Borjal for treason and to appoint a jury of 12 bolomen. The jury found Borjal guilty of the charge and the recommendation of the jury was approved by the Headquarters of the guerrilla unit. For the execution of Borjal, the accused was prosecuted for murder. The accused acted upon orders of superior officers which turned out to be illegal. Issue: WON Beronilla can be considered to be acting upon a call of duty and thus, covered by justifying circumstances which would warrant acquittal Held: Yes; Criminal intent not established; he was acting pursuant to orders of his superiors in the City (orders given through letters/telegrams). As a military subordinate, he could not question the orders of his superior officers. He obeyed the orders in good faith without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on his part. People vs Barroga Convicted of the crime of falsification of a private document, the defendant appeals from the judgment sentencing him to one year, eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify the Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas in the sum of P10,857.11, with subsidiary imprisonment, the accessaries of law, and the costs. The errors attributed by the appellant to the trial court are:

People vs. Pelayo Facts: On Nov.15, 1956 Pelayo told Atty. Clapano in his office and within hearing distance of three other people that upon his investigation about the existence of gambling in the community, a Chinese operator named Lim Peng told him that then Gov. Alejandro Almendras (now Senator) used to receive from him P500 protection money. The following day, Pelayo delivered a privileged speech in city council session wherein he did not directly mention but insinuated through his interpellations that the governor was receiving tongs . Pelayo admits having the said conversation with Clapano. Issues: (1) WON the conversation was said in confidence and covered by the rule on privileged communication (2) WON the crime charged which is serious slander should only be intriguing against honor (3) WON words were uttered in Self Defense to what the governor had said about him previously Held: (1) NO this contention of confidence is inconsistent with contention of self-defense, there were others who heard the remarks he made to Clapano thus could not have given the communication in confidence. (2) NO - it cannot be Intriguing against honor because the source of the information can be pin-pointed= Lim Peng. When the source can be determined and the information was passed for the purpose of causing dishonor, the act is slander (3) NO even if on a previous occasion the governor made derogatory remarks against Pelayo, the retaliation with scurrilous words cannot be self-defense. It will only exist of the defendant did not go beyond explaining what was previously said of him for the purpose of repairing the effect of the damage caused to him. There is no justification for him to hit back of make the same imputation of accusation because this is not an act of defense but an aggression itself Tan vs Standard Vacuum Oil Co. Anita Tan is the owner of the house of strong materials based in the City of Manila, Philippines. On May 3, 1949, the Standard Vacuum Oil Company ordered the delivery to the Rural Transit Company at its garage at Rizal Avenue Extension, City of Manila, of 1,925 gallons of gasoline using a gasoline tank-truck trailer. The truck was driven by Julito Sto. Domingo, who was helped Igmidio Rico. While the gasoline was being discharged to the underground tank, it caught fire, whereupon Julito Sto. Domingo drove the truck across the Rizal Avenue Extension and upon reaching the middle of the street he abondoned the truck with continued moving to the opposite side of the first street causing the buildings on that side to be burned and detroyed. The house of Anita Tan was among those destroyed and for its repair she spent P12,000. As an aftermath of the fire, Julito Sto. Domingo and Imigidio Rico were charged with arson through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Manila where, after trial, both were acquitted, the court holding that their negligence was not proven and the fire was due to an unfortunate accident. Issue: Under par. 4 of Art. 11 of RPC who is held to be civilly liable? Held: And on this point, the complaint contains the following averments: 3. That after the corresponding trial the said defendants were acquitted and defendant Julio Sto. Domingo was acquitted, on the ground that he so acted causing damage to another in order to avoid a greater evil or injury, under article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as shown by the pertinent portion of the decision of this

1. In considering the evidence of the prosecution more worthy of credit than that of the defense. 2. In finding the defendant-appellant guilty of the crime of falsification of private documents, and in imposing upon him the penalty of one year, eight months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify the Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas in the sum of P10,857.11, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial, notwithstanding the insufficiency of the evidence adduced by the prosecution. The defendant freely admits that he prepared the falsified documents with full knowledge of their falsity; but he alleges that he did so from data furnished by his immediate chief, the now deceased Baldomero Fernandez, and only in obedience to instructions from him.

As regards the data, we find it to be sufficiently proven that they were not supplied by the aforementioned Baldomero Fernandez, but by the head of the pressmen, Hermenegildo de la Cruz, and the defendant later collated them with the books of the daily pressings. With respect to the alleged instructions give by said Baldomero Fernandez, even supposing that he did in fact give them, and that the defendant committed the crime charged by virtue thereof, inasmuch as such instructions were not lawful, they do not legally shield the appellant, nor relieve him from criminal liability. In order to exempt from guilt, obedience must be due, or as Viada lucidly states, it must be a compliance with "a lawful order not opposed to a higher positive duty of a subaltern, and that the person commanding, act within the scope of his authority. As a general rule, an inferior should obey his superior but, as an illustrious commentator has said, "between a general law which enjoins obedience to a superior giving just orders, etc., and a prohibitive law which plaintiff forbids what that superior commands, the choice is not doubtful." (1 Penal Code, Viada, 5th edition, p. 528.) We reiterate the statement that it has not been proved that the defendant committed the acts charged in the information in obedience to the instructions of a third party. But even granting, for the sake of argument, that such was the case, we repeat that such obedience was not legally due, and therefore does not exempt from criminal liability. (U. S. vs Cuison, 20 Phil., 433.) There being no merit in the assignments of error, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.