G.R. No. 154486 December 1, 2010 FEDERICO JARANTILLA, JR., Petitioner, vs.

ANTONIETA JARANTILLA, BUENAVENTURA REMOTIGUE, substituted by CYNTHIA REMOTIGUE, DOROTEO JARANTILLA and TOMAS JARANTILLA, Respondents. This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to modify the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated July 30, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 40887, which set aside the Decision3 dated December 18, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 98 in Civil Case No. Q-50464. The pertinent facts are as follows: The spouses Andres Jarantilla and Felisa Jaleco were survived by eight children: Federico, Delfin, Benjamin, Conchita, Rosita, Pacita, Rafael and Antonieta.4 Petitioner Federico Jarantilla, Jr. is the grandchild of the late Jarantilla spouses by their son Federico Jarantilla, Sr. and his wife Leda Jamili.5 Petitioner also has two other brothers: Doroteo and Tomas Jarantilla. Petitioner was one of the defendants in the complaint before the RTC while Antonieta Jarantilla, his aunt, was the plaintiff therein. His co-respondents before he joined his aunt Antonieta in her complaint, were his late aunt Conchita Jarantillas husband Buenaventura Remotigue, who died during the pendency of the case, his cousin Cynthia Remotigue, the adopted daughter of Conchita Jarantilla and Buenaventura Remotigue, and his brothers Doroteo and Tomas Jarantilla.6 In 1948, the Jarantilla heirs extrajudicially partitioned amongst themselves the real properties of their deceased parents.7 With the exception of the real property adjudicated to Pacita Jarantilla, the heirs also agreed to allot the produce of the said real properties for the years 1947-1949 for the studies of Rafael and Antonieta Jarantilla.8 In the same year, the spouses Rosita Jarantilla and Vivencio Deocampo entered into an agreement with the spouses Buenaventura Remotigue and Conchita Jarantilla to provide mutual assistance to each other by way of financial support to any commercial and agricultural activity on a joint business arrangement. This business relationship proved to be successful as they were able to establish a manufacturing and trading business, acquire real properties, and construct buildings, among other things.9 This partnership ended in 1973 when the parties, in an "Agreement,"10 voluntarily agreed to completely dissolve their "joint business relationship/arrangement."11 On April 29, 1957, the spouses Buenaventura and Conchita Remotigue executed a document wherein they acknowledged that while registered only in Buenaventura Remotigues name, they were not the only owners of the capital of the businesses Manila Athletic Supply (712 Raon Street, Manila), Remotigue Trading (Calle Real, Iloilo City) and Remotigue Trading (Cotabato City). In this same "Acknowledgement of Participating Capital," they stated the participating capital of their co-owners as of the year 1952, with Antonieta Jarantillas stated as eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) and Federico Jarantilla, Jr.s as five thousand pesos ( P5,000.00).12 The present case stems from the amended complaint13 dated April 22, 1987 filed by Antonieta Jarantilla against Buenaventura Remotigue, Cynthia Remotigue, Federico Jarantilla, Jr., Doroteo Jarantilla and Tomas Jarantilla, for the accounting of the assets and income of the co-ownership, for its partition and the delivery of her share corresponding to eight percent (8%), and for damages. Antonieta claimed that in 1946, she had entered into an agreement with Conchita and Buenaventura Remotigue, Rafael Jarantilla, and Rosita and Vivencio Deocampo to engage in business. Antonieta alleged that the initial contribution of property and money came from the heirs inheritance, and her subsequent annual investment of seven thousand five hundred pesos (P7,500.00) as additional capital came from the proceeds of her farm. Antonieta also alleged that from 1946-1969, she had helped in the management of the business they co-owned without receiving any salary. Her salary was supposedly rolled back into the business as additional investments in her behalf. Antonieta further claimed co-ownership of certain properties14 (the subject real properties) in the name of the defendants since the only way the defendants could have purchased these properties were through the partnership as they had no other source of income. The respondents, including petitioner herein, in their Answer,15 denied having formed a partnership with Antonieta in 1946. They claimed that she was in no position to do so as she was still in school at that time. In fact, the proceeds of the lands they partitioned were devoted to her studies. They also averred that while she may have helped in the businesses that her older sister Conchita had formed with Buenaventura Remotigue, she was paid her due salary. They did not deny the existence and validity of the "Acknowledgement of Participating Capital" and in fact used this as evidence to support their claim that Antonietas 8% share was limited to the businesses enumerated therein. With regard to Antonietas claim in their other corporations and businesses, the respondents said these should also be limited to the number of her shares as specified in the respective articles of incorporation. The respondents denied using the partnerships income to purchase the subject real properties and said that the certificates of title should be binding on her.16 During the course of the trial at the RTC, petitioner Federico Jarantilla, Jr., who was one of the original defendants, entered into a compromise agreement17 with Antonieta Jarantilla wherein he supported Antonietas claims and asserted that he too was entitled to six percent (6%) of the supposed partnership in the same manner as Antonieta was. He prayed for a favorable judgment in this wise: Defendant Federico Jarantilla, Jr., hereby joins in plaintiffs prayer for an accounting from the other defendants, and the partition of the properties of the co-ownership and the delivery to the plaintiff and to defendant Federico Jarantilla, Jr. of their rightful share of the assets and properties in the co-ownership.181avvphi1 The RTC, in an Order19 dated March 25, 1992, approved the Joint Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement20and on December 18, 1992, decided in favor of Antonieta, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises above-considered, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff Antonieta Jarantilla and against defendants Cynthia Remotigue, Doroteo Jarantilla and Tomas Jarantilla ordering the latter1. to deliver to the plaintiff her 8% share or its equivalent amount on the real properties covered by TCT Nos. 35655, 338398, 338399 & 335395, all of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City; TCT Nos. (18303)23341, 142882 & 490007(4615), all of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal; and TCT No. T-6309 of the Registry of Deeds of Cotabato based on their present market value;2. to deliver to the plaintiff her 8% share or its equivalent amount on the Remotigue Agro-Industrial Corporation, Manila Athletic Supply, Inc., MAS Rubber Products, Inc. and Buendia Recapping Corporation based on the shares of stocks present book value;3. to account for the assets and income of the co-ownership and deliver to plaintiff her rightful share thereof equivalent to 8%;4. to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages;5. to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees; and6. to pay, jointly and severally, the costs of the suit.21 Both the petitioner and the respondents appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals. The petitioner claimed that the RTC "erred in not rendering a complete judgment and ordering the partition of the co-ownership and giving to [him] six per centum (6%) of the properties."22 While the Court of Appeals agreed to some of the RTCs factual findings, it also established that Antonieta Jarantilla was not part of the partnership formed in 1946, and that her 8% share was limited to the businesses enumerated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. On July 30, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein challenged decision setting aside the RTCs decision, as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court, dated 18 December 1992 is SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered ordering that:(1) after accounting, plaintiff Antonieta Jarantilla be given her share of 8% in the assets and profits of Manila Athletic Supply, Remotigue Trading in Iloilo City and Remotigue Trading in Cotabato City;(2) after accounting, defendant Federico Jarantilla, Jr. be given his share of 6% of the assets and profits of the above-mentioned enterprises; and, holding that(3) plaintiff Antonieta Jarantilla is a stockholder in the following corporations to the extent stated in their Articles of Incorporation:(a) Rural Bank of Barotac Nuevo, Inc.;(b) MAS Rubber Products, Inc.;(c) Manila Athletic Supply, Inc.; and(d) B. Remotigue Agro-Industrial Development Corp.(4) No costs. The respondents, on August 20, 2002, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied this in a Resolution24 dated March 21, 2003. Antonieta Jarantilla filed before this Court her own petition for review on certiorari25 dated September 16, 2002, assailing the Court of Appeals decision on "similar grounds and si milar assignments of errors as this present case"26 but it was dismissed on November 20, 2002 for failure to file the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.27 Petitioner filed before us this petition for review on the sole ground that: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER FEDERICO JARANTILLA, JR. IS ENTITLED TO A SIX PER CENTUM (6%) SHARE OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE REAL PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY THE OTHER DEFENDANTS USING COMMON FUNDS FROM THE BUSINESSES WHERE HE HAD OWNED SUCH SHARE.28 Petitioner asserts that he was in a partnership with the Remotigue spouses, the Deocampo spouses, Rosita Jarantilla, Rafael Jarantilla, Antonieta Jarantilla and Quintin Vismanos, as evidenced by the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital the Remotigue spouses executed in 1957. He contends that from this partnership, several other corporations and businesses were established and several real properties were acquired. In this petition, he is essentially asking for his 6% share in the subject real properties. He is relying on the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital, on his own testimony, and Antonieta Jarantillas testimony to support this contention. The core issue is whether or not the partnership subject of the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital funded the subject real properties. In other words, what is the petitioners right over these real properties? It is a settled rule that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.29 A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of

fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.30 Since the Court of Appeals did not fully adopt the factual findings of the RTC, this Court, in resolving the questions of law that are now in issue, shall look into the facts only in so far as the two courts a quo differed in their appreciation thereof. The RTC found that an unregistered partnership existed since 1946 which was affirmed in the 1957 document, the "Acknowledgement of Participating Capital." The RTC used this as its basis for giving Antonieta Jarantilla an 8% share in the three businesses listed therein and in the other businesses and real properties of the respondents as they had supposedly acquired these through funds from the partnership.31 The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, agreed with the RTC as to Antonietas 8% share in the business enumerated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital, but not as to her share in the other corporations and real properties. The Court of Appeals ruled that Antonietas claim o f 8% is based on the "Acknowledgement of Participating Capital," a duly notarized document which was specific as to the subject of its coverage. Hence, there was no reason to pattern her share in the other corporations from her share in the partnerships b usinesses. The Court of Appeals also said that her claim in the respondents real properties was more "precarious" as these were all covered by certificates of title which served as the best evidence as to all the matters contained therein.32Since petitioners claim was essentially the same as Antonietas, the Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner be given his 6% share in the same businesses listed in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. Factual findings of the trial court, when confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive except in the following cases: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. In this case, we find no error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Both the petitioner and Antonieta Jarantilla characterize their relationship with the respondents as a co-ownership, but in the same breath, assert that a verbal partnership was formed in 1946 and was affirmed in the 1957 Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. There is a co-ownership when an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.34 It is a partnership when two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.35 The Court, in Pascual v. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue,36 quoted the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Angelo Bautista in Evangelista v. The Collector of Internal Revenue37 to further elucidate on the distinctions between a co-ownership and a partnership, to wit: I wish however to make the following observation: Article 1769 of the new Civil Code lays down the rule for determining when a transaction should be deemed a partnership or a co-ownership. Said article paragraphs 2 and 3, provides;(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not itself establish a partnership, whether such co-owners or copossessors do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property;(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived; From the above it appears that the fact that those who agree to form a co- ownership share or do not share any profits made by the use of the property held in common does not convert their venture into a partnership. Or the sharing of the gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership whether or not the persons sharing therein have a joint or common right or interest in the property. This only means that, aside from the circumstance of profit, the presence of other elements constituting partnership is necessary, such as the clear intent to form a partnership, the existence of a juridical personality different from that of the individual partners, and the freedom to transfer or assign any interest in the property by one with the consent of the others. It is evident that an isolated transaction whereby two or more persons contribute funds to buy certain real estate for profit in the absence of other circumstances showing a contrary intention cannot be considered a partnership. Persons who contribute property or funds for a common enterprise and agree to share the gross returns of that enterprise in proportion to their contribution, but who severally retain the title to their respective contribution, are not thereby rendered partners. They have no common stock or capital, and no community of interest as principal proprietors in the business itself which the proceeds derived. A joint purchase of land, by two, does not constitute a co-partnership in respect thereto; nor does an agreement to share the profits and losses on the sale of land create a partnership; the parties are only tenants in common. Where plaintiff, his brother, and another agreed to become owners of a single tract of realty, holding as tenants in common, and to divide the profits of disposing of it, the brother and the other not being entitled to share in plaintiffs commission, no partnership existed as between the three parties, whatever their relation may have been as to third parties. In order to constitute a partnership inter sese there must be: (a) An intent to form the same; (b) generally participating in both profits and losses; (c) and such a community of interest, as far as third persons are concerned as enables each party to make contract, manage the business, and dispose of the whole property. x x x. The common ownership of property does not itself create a partnership between the owners, though they may use it for the purpose of making gains; and they may, without becoming partners, agree among themselves as to the management, and use of such property and the application of the proceeds therefrom.38 (Citations omitted.) Under Article 1767 of the Civil Code, there are two essential elements in a contract of partnership: (a) an agreement to contribute money, property or industry to a common fund; and (b) intent to divide the profits among the contracting parties. The first element is undoubtedly present in the case at bar, for, admittedly, all the parties in this case have agreed to, and did, contribute money and property to a common fund. Hence, the issue narrows down to their intent in acting as they did.39 It is not denied that all the parties in this case have agreed to contribute capital to a common fund to be able to later on share its profits. They have admitted this fact, agreed to its veracity, and even submitted one common documentary evidence to prove such partnership - the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. As this case revolves around the legal effects of the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital, it would be instructive to examine the pertinent portions of this document: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PARTICIPATING CAPITAL KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That we, the spouses Buenaventura Remotigue and Conchita Jarantilla de Remotigue, both of legal age, Filipinos and residents of Loyola Heights, Quezon City, P.I. hereby state: That the Manila Athletic Supply at 712 Raon, Manila, the Remotigue Trading of Calle Real, Iloilo City and the Remotigue Trading, Cotabato Branch, Cotabato, P.I., all dealing in athletic goods and equipments, and general merchandise are recorded in their respective books with Buenaventura Remotigue as the registered owner and are being operated by them as such: That they are not the only owners of the capital of the three establishments and their participation in the capital of the three establishments together with the other co-owners as of the year 1952 are stated as follows: 1. Buenaventura Remotigue P25,000.00 2. Conchita Jarantilla de Remotigue 25,000.00 3. Vicencio Deocampo 15,000.00 4. Rosita J. Deocampo 15,000.00 5. Antonieta Jarantilla 8,000.00 6. Rafael Jarantilla 6,000.00 7. Federico Jarantilla, Jr. 5,000.00 8. Quintin Vismanos 2,000.00 That aside from the persons mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, no other person has any interest in the above-mentioned three establishments. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, they sign this instrument in the City of Manila, P.I., this 29th day of April, 1957. [Sgd.]BUENAVENTURA REMOTIGUE [Sgd.]CONCHITA JARANTILLA DE REMOTIGUE40 The Acknowledgement of Participating Capital is a duly notarized document voluntarily executed by Conchita Jarantilla-Remotigue and Buenaventura Remotigue in 1957. Petitioner does not dispute its contents and is actually

relying on it to prove his participation in the partnership. Article 1797 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1797. The losses and profits shall be distributed in conformity with the agreement. If only the share of each partner in the profits has been agreed upon, the share of each in the losses shall be in the same proportion. In the absence of stipulation, the share of each partner in the profits and losses shall be in proportion to what he may have contributed, but the industrial partner shall not be liable for the losses. As for the profits, the industrial partner shall receive such share as may be just and equitable under the circumstances. If besides his services he has contributed capital, he shall also receive a share in the profits in proportion to his capital. (Emphases supplied.) It is clear from the foregoing that a partner is entitled only to his share as agreed upon, or in the absence of any such stipulations, then to his share in proportion to his contribution to the partnership. The petitioner himself claims his share to be 6%, as stated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. However, petitioner fails to realize that this document specifically enumerated the businesses covered by the partnership: Manila Athletic Supply, Remotigue Trading in Iloilo City and Remotigue Trading in Cotabato City. Since there was a clear agreement that the capital the partners contributed went to the three businesses, then there is no reason to deviate from such agreement and go beyond the stipulations in the document. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in limiting petition ers share to the assets of the businesses enumerated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. In Villareal v. Ramirez,41 the Court held that since a partnership is a separate juridical entity, the shares to be paid out to the partners is necessarily limited only to its total resources, to wit: Since it is the partnership, as a separate and distinct entity, that must refund the shares of the partners, the amount to be refunded is necessarily limited to its total resources. In other words, it can only pay out what it has in its coffers, which consists of all its assets. However, before the partners can be paid their shares, the creditors of the partnership must first be compensated. After all the creditors have been paid, whatever is left of the partnership assets becomes available for the payment of the partners shares.42 There is no evidence that the subject real properties were assets of the partnership referred to in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital. The petitioner further asserts that he is entitled to respondents properties based on the concept of trust . He claims that since the subject real properties were purchased using funds of the partnership, wherein he has a 6% share, then "law and equity mandates that he should be considered as a co-owner of those properties in such proportion."43 In Pigao v. Rabanillo,44 this Court explained the concept of trusts, to wit: Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while implied trusts come into being by operation of law, either through implication of an intention to create a trust as a matter of law or through the imposition of the trust irrespective of, and even contrary to, any such intention. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another.45 On proving the existence of a trust, this Court held that: Respondent has presented only bare assertions that a trust was created. Noting the need to prove the existence of a trust, this Court has held thus: "As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its existence, and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements. While implied trusts may be proved by oral evidence, the evidence must be trustworthy and received by the courts with extreme caution, and should not be made to rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. Trustworthy evidence is required because oral evidence can easily be fabricated." 46 The petitioner has failed to prove that there exists a trust over the subject real properties. Aside from his bare allegations, he has failed to show that the respondents used the partnerships money to purchase the said properties. Even assuming arguendo that some partnership income was used to acquire these properties, the petitioner should have successfully shown that these funds came from his share in the partnership profits. After all, by his own admission, and as stated in the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital, he owned a mere 6% equity in the partnership. In essence, the petitioner is claiming his 6% share in the subject real properties, by relying on his own self-serving testimony and the equally biased testimony of Antonieta Jarantilla. Petitioner has not presented evidence, other than these unsubstantiated testimonies, to prove that the respondents did not have the means to fund their other businesses and real properties without the partnerships income. On the other hand, the respondents have not only, by testimonial evidence, proven their case against the petitioner, but have also presented sufficient documentary evidence to substantiate their claims, allegations and defenses. They presented preponderant proof on how they acquired and funded such properties in addition to tax receipts and tax declarations.47 It has been held that "while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription."48Moreover, it is a rule in this jurisdiction that testimonial evidence cannot prevail over documentary evidence.49This Court had on several occasions, expressed our disapproval on using mere self-serving testimonies to support ones claim. In Ocampo v. Ocampo, 50 a case on partition of a co-ownership, we held that: Petitioners assert that their claim of co-ownership of the property was sufficiently proved by their witnesses -- Luisa Ocampo-Llorin and Melita Ocampo. We disagree. Their testimonies cannot prevail over the array of documents presented by Belen. A claim of ownership cannot be based simply on the testimonies of witnesses; much less on those of interested parties, self-serving as they are.51 It is true that a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Registration in the Torrens system does not create or vest title as registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership; hence, this cannot deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy in law.52 However, petitioner asserts ownership over portions of the subject real properties on the strength of his own admissions and on the testimony of Antonieta Jarantilla.1avvphi1 As held by this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Orfinada, Sr.53: Indeed, a Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the land referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that a Torrens title was regularly issued and valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against anyinformacion possessoria, of other title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens title. Moreover, persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on its face.54 As we have settled that this action never really was for partition of a co-ownership, to permit petitioners claim on these properties is to allow a collateral, indirect attack on respondents admitted titles. In the words of the Court of Appeals, "such evidence cannot overpower the conclusiveness of these certificates of title, more so since plaintiffs [petitioners] claims amount to a collateral attack, which is prohibited under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree."55 SEC. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. This Court has deemed an action or proceeding to be "an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed."56 In Aguilar v. Alfaro,57 this Court further distinguished between a direct and an indirect or collateral attack, as follows: A collateral attack transpires when, in another action to obtain a different relief and as an incident to the present action, an attack is made against the judgment granting the title. This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled under the judgment had been disposed of. x x x. Petitioners only piece of documentary evidence is the Acknowledgement of Participating Capital, which as discussed above, failed to prove that the real properties he is claiming co-ownership of were acquired out of the proceeds of the businesses covered by such document. Therefore, petitioners theory has no factual or legal leg to stand on. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40887, dated July 30, 2002 is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner, vs.GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 26 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the latters prayers for an inspection order, production order and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data. Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioners Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the complained incident. Petitioners prayers for an inspection order, production order and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these reliefs.3 We begin with the petitioners allegations. Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.4 While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.5 During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.7 In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.9 After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat,Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.11 Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down.12 The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.13 Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands.14 At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name.15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the vanbruising her arms, legs and knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her.17The van then sped away. After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to alight.19After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors.20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22 What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture.23 The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold."24 The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner.25 Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep.26 Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she became acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her.27 There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.28 Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC."29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle."30 On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncles house in Quezon City. 31 Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM32 card, a slip of paper containing an email address with password,33 a plastic bag containing biscuits and books,34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes.35 Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family.36 Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to her.37Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card. Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009.38 Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC."39 The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her P15,000.00 cash.40 In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.41 The Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified written return.42 On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs43 on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents. We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents. The public respondents label petitioners alleged abduction and torture as "stage managed."44 In support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special Report45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house.46 From this statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for those already inside M r. Paolos house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted.47 This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any "abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves.48 Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductorsinflictions that could have easily produced remarkable bruisesher Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps.50 For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of petitioners alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that she represents.51 Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit,52 and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or at least

authorized, the commission of such atrocities.53 Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the petitioner.54 In both the police and military arms of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner: Police Action Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the report, the police station launched an initial investigation.56 The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators of an abduction incident involving three (3) personslater identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandocwho were all staying in his house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 oclock in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house.58 Other witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers.59 At 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results.60 On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Report61 that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction.62 Followup investigations were, at the same time, pursued.63 On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task Group CAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc.64 Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators.65 Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of Peoples Rightsorganizations trusted by petitionerin the hopes of obtaining the latters participation in the ongoing investigations.66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting for the availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.67 The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the reports68 that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the abductorsa fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.69 Military Action Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about the alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing him and the other respondents to file their return.70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a Memorandum Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation of military involvement in the abduction.72 Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message73 addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.74 For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner.75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation.76 On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation Report77 detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioners allegat ions as "opinionated" and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture.78 The Decision of the Court of Appeals In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioners version that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth.80 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly taken.81 The Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van.82 The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was released.83 This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large.84 Thus, the appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations involving the abduction.85 The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of "records of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPPNPA.86 The appellate court derived the existence of such records from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further strain on her already volatile security.87 To this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioners alleged ties with the CPP -NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.88 The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner.89 The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was behind her abduction.90 Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner.91 The petition was likewise dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit.92 Accordingly, the petitioners prayers for the return of her personal belongings were denied. 93 Petitioners prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the same fate.94 Hence, this appeal by the petitioner. AMPARO A. Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and torture.95 Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings.96 Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement.97 Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the highranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition.98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings.99 Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.100

The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that:102 The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,104foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liabilit y," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators105 (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied) Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.106 While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo:108 x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied) It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleadednot actually on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis,110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit: x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Responsibility of Public Respondents At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture.111 To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and torture i.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical abusewhich, according to her, is consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces.112 Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysaya conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she was actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while thereat.113 We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay. First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government. In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain. In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits,114 the cartographic sketches115 of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioners abduct ors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command. Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its facenot only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful.116 With nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioners claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation. In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made. Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings. In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and torture.117 We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner. In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.118 But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a persons right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rights which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.119 Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights. B. The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.121 Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioners ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order.122 Contrary to the explicit position123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence. An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision.124 A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking

the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do. Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful. HABEAS DATA As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP -NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture." Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant. For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion125 of its decision: Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Governments Order of Battle under Oplan B antay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal charges were filed based on made up and perjured information. Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference where they revealed that they received an information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises. Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioners denial that she was the person in said video, there were records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one way or another, to petitioners abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made available to the public, Petitioners security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for public consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioners right to privacy which must be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied). The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.126 The writ operates to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.127 This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do. The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioners ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately provenconsidering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph. In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioners "alleged ties with the CPP -NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have. Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes far fetched, and premature. For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data. DISPOSITION OF THE CASE Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights,"128must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids. Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the main source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo case.129 Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard requiring the "respondent who is a public official or employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty."130 Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect. With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar. A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background investigation on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive behind the abduction its necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her captors. Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitionerwho, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts.131 While it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJANs investigation, this Court believes that the formers reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads.132 Indeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court of lawthey are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations. Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJANs reports still failed to explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo who, along with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioners account, was not wearing any mask.1avvphi1 The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included in petitioners offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latters independent investigation on the abduction and torture of the pet itioner.133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date. In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation under the norm of

extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice. To add teeth to the appellate courts directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the CHR.134 We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of the petitioner as evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the commission.135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR. Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows 1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture.2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court. Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for the return of her personal belongings;2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioners prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it under this decision.4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as followsa. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture.b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the Commission on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this determinationc. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendation of the Commission on Human Rightsits own report, which shall include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public respondents who were found not responsible and/or accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those found responsible and/or accountable.Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 188315 August 25, 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs.ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, On appeal is the 29 January 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00726 finding appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape. In 181 Informations, which are similarly worded except for the dates of the commission of the crime and the age of the complainant, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, appellant was accused of raping AAA,2 allegedly committed as follows: That in or about and sometime during the month of _________, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the adopting father of complainant who was then _________ years of age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with [AAA] by means of force and intimidation and against the will of the complainant.3 Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. During the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated on the following facts:1. AAA is below fifteen (15) years of age;2. Appellant is the guardian of AAA; and3. AAA has been under the care and custody of appellant and his wife since AAA was one and a half years old.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The following facts are undisputed: AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB,5 since she was just a few months old.6 BBB is married to appellant, who was working abroad for six (6) years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. for six (6) days a week. Five (5) witnesses testified for the prosecution. They are the victim herself, Marvin Suello (Marvin), PO1 Evangeline Babor (PO1 Babor), P/Sr Insp. Paul Ed Ortiz (P/Sr Insp. Ortiz), and Maximo Duran (Duran). The prosecutions version of the facts follows In February 1999 at around 9:30 p.m., AAA, then 11 years old, was sleeping inside the house when she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. AAA could see appellants face as there was a light coming from the altar. AAA was naturally surprised and she asked appellant why the latter did such a thing. Appellant did not answer but told her not to mention the incident to anybody. AAA then saw appellant went back to his bed and touch his private part. AAA immediately went back to sleep.The following day, at around the same time, and while BBB was at work, appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. AAA tried to resist but appellant threatened that he will kill her and BBB. Two (2) weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw appellant holding a knife. While pointing the knife at AAAs neck, appellant removed his shorts, as well as AAAs pajamas. He slowly parted AAAs legs and inserted his penis into AAAs vagina. Meanwhile, AAA struggled and hit appellants shoulders. Appellant was able to penetrate her twice before he got out of the house. Two (2) days after, appellant again raped her by inserting his organ into AAAs vagina. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at least three (3) times a week at around the same time until 15 October 2002, when she was 14 years old. After the last rape incident, AAA did not go home after school and instead went to the house of her friend, Marvin.7 On 16 October 2002, Marvin watched television with AAA from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Afterwards, AAA refused to go home. She told Marvin that appellant would spank her for going home late. Marvin asked AAA if there were other things that appellant might have done to her, aside from spanking. At that point, AAA finally cried and divulged that she has been raped by appellant. Marvin told AAA to file a complaint.8 AAA stayed at her mothers friends house and came back on 18 October 2002. She, together with Marvin, went to Kagawad Ramon Espena to seek assistance. Marvin went with the Barangay Tanod in apprehending appellant, who at that time, was trying to escape.9 PO1 Babor was the duty investigator at the Womens and Childr en Desk of Makati Police Station on 18 October 2002. She took down the statements of AAA and her friend, Marvin. She then referred AAA to the PNP Crime Laboratory to undergo medico-legal examination.10

P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz confirmed that she conducted the medico-legal examination on AAA. Results of the examination, as indicated in the medico-legal report, show that the "hymen is with presence of deep healed laceration at 1 oclock and shallow healed laceration at 2 oclock positions at the time of examination." Said report concluded that AAA is in a "non-virgin state physically."11 P/Sr. Insp. Ortiz opined that the lacerations could have been caused by any solid object, like the penis inserted at the genitalia.12 Duran and another Bantay Bayan member were at the barangay outpost at 2:10 p.m. on 18 October 2002 when they were summoned by Barangay Kagawad Ramon Espena. Acting on the complaint of AAA, they were directed to proceed to the house of appellant to invite him for questioning. Duran saw appellant about to board a jeep. They stopped the jeep and asked appellant to alight therefrom and invited him to the Bantay Bayan outpost. Appellant voluntarily went with them. Appellant was then brought to the police station.13 Only appellant testified in his defense. While appellant admitted that he was a strict father to AAA in that he would scold and spank her whenever the latter would ran away, he denied raping AAA.14 He alleged that AAA has the propensity to make up stories and was even once caught stealing money from her grandmother. Appellant recalled that on 16 October 2002, AAA asked permission to go out to buy a "project." She never came home.On 27 August 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 to 03-261, finding accused ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-ONE (181) counts of RAPE penalized by RA 8353, Chapter 3, Article 266-A, par. 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B par. 1. Taking into account the minority of [AAA], adopted daughter of the accused, at the time of rape, and the fact the offender is the adoptive father of the minor complainant, accused, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH for each count of rape, and to pay [AAA] the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 150,000.00) for moral damages and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 50,000.00) for exemplary damages for each count of rape.16 The trial court found that force and intimidation attended the commission of the crime of rape through the testimony of the victim, which the trial court deemed "straightforward, consistent and credible." The trial court also established that appellant is the adoptive father of AAA since 1989 and that AAA was then a minor, as proven by the birth certificate, testimonies of witnesses, and admission made by AAA.17 Finally, the trial court dismissed appellants defense of denial as self-serving and which cannot prevail over AAAs positive testimony. 18 Upon denial of appellants motion for reconsideration, the case was initially elevated to the Court of Appeals for its review pursuant to People v. Mateo.19 However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case in 23 August 2005 for failure of appellant to file his appellants brief. 20 When the case was brought before us on automatic review, we set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals and remanded it back for appropriate action and disposition on the ground that review by the Court of Appeals of the trial courts judgment imposing the death penalty is automatic and mandatory. On 29 January 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by appellant, but it did so only on two (2) counts. The fallo of the Decision reads: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision is hereby rendered as follows:1. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260, inclusive, is found not guilty on the ground of reasonable doubt and is hereby acquitted;2. Accused-appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03261 is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim AAA (to be identified through the Information in this case), the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count.22 The appellate court found that the guilt of appellant on the first and last incidents of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03081 and 03-261, respectively, was proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.23 With respect to the other incidents, according to the appellate court, the testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations that she was raped on the average of three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. Therefore, the appellate court concluded that her statement is inadequate and insufficient to prove the other charges of rape.24 On 17 February 2009, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court of Appeals Decision. In a Resolution dated 26 October 2009, this Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective Supplemental Briefs. Appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) both filed their Manifestations stating that they will no longer file any Supplemental Briefs, but instead, they will merely adopt their Appellants and Appellee's Briefs, respectively.25 Appellant harps on the failure of AAA to actively defend herself or resist the alleged assaults. Moreover, considering that the relatives of AAA live only meters away from her and the frequency of the alleged molestation, appellant proffers that it was impossible for them not to notice the abuses. Appellant also questions the appreciation of the circumstances of minority and relationship as basis for the imposition of the death penalty. He contends that an adopting parent is not included within the purview of qualifying relationships under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. Assuming arguendo that an adopting parent may be construed as similar to a parent, appellant argues that the term "adopting parent" must be given a definite and technical meaning in that the process of adoption must first be undertaken and a judicial decree to that matter must have been issued.26 The OSG, on the other hand, avers that the positive and categorical testimony of AAA that appellant sexually abused her, in tandem with the medico-legal report, are more than sufficient to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, appellant failed to impute any ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of rape.27 The OSG insists that AAAs failure to report promptly the previous incidents of rape does not dent her credibility. Appellants exercise of moral ascendancy over AAA and that fact that she was under physical threat during those times, could have instilled fear on AAA from reporting said incidents.28 The OSG moved for modification of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in light of Republic Act No. 9346.29 After an extensive review of the records, we find no cogent reason to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals. Appellant was charged with 181 counts of rape, all of which were committed within the span of three (3) years or from February 1999 until 15 October 2002. We are in full accord with the acquittal of appellant in the 179 counts of rape. Stated otherwise, we agree with appellants conviction for two (2) counts of rape. In rape cases, "the victims credibility becomes the single most important issue. For when a woman says she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed; thus, if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof."30 Both the trial court and the appellate court found AAAs testimony credible. The RTC co nsidered it "straightforward and consistent on material points," while the Court of Appeals described it as "spontaneous, forthright, clear and free-from-serious contradictions." Well-entrenched is the legal precept that when the "culpability or innocence of an accused hinges on the issue of the credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court, when duly supported by sufficient and convincing evidence, must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court and are not to be disturbed on appeal."31 We see no reason in this case to depart from the principle. Moreover, we give due deference to the t rial courts assessment of AAAs credibility, having had the opportunity to witnesses firsthand and note her demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.32 Worthy of reiteration is the doctrine that "when the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. When a girl, especially a minor, says that she has been defiled, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was inflicted on her."33 Out of the 181 counts of rape charged against appellant, the prosecution was only able to prove two counts. Applying the ruling in People v. Garcia,34 the Court of Appeals correctly declared, thus: As to the other counts of rape (Criminal Cases Nos. 03-082 to 03-260) imputed against accused-appellant, We find him not guilty beyond reasonable doubt as the testimony of AAA was merely based on general allegations that she was raped by the accused-appellant on the average of three (3) times a week from February 1999 to 15 October 2002. AAAs bare statement is evidently inadequate and insufficient to prove the other charges of rape as each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime and that each of them must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On that score alone, the indefinite testimonial evidence that the victim was raped three times a week is decidedly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant therefore with the required quantum of evidence.35 As regards to the first incident of rape in 1999, AAA recounted how appellant forced her to have sexual intercourse with him, thus: Q: What happened after two (2) weeks? A: I was sleeping when somebody went on top of my head. Q: Tell us about what time was this when this happened, when you said you noticed somebody climbing up your bed? A: 9:30 in the evening. Q: At that time again, where was your [BBB]? A: At work, sir. Q: What happened after you noticed somebody climbing up your bed?

A: I woke up and I saw him holding a bread knife. xxxx Q: Did you know who was this person who climbed your bed and who was holding a knife? A: Yes, sir. Q: Who was that person? A: "Papa" Q: When you said "Papa," you are referring to the accused? A: Yes, sir. Q: What happened next? A: "Tinusok nya yong kutsilyo sa leeg ko" and he removed his shorts. Q: At that time, what were you then wearing? A: Pajama, sir. Q: What if any did the accused do to what you were wearing then? A: He undressed me. Q: Which one did he remove? A: My pajama. Q: What about your upper garments? A: He did not remove. Q: After you said the accused remove his shorts and removed your pajama, what happened? A: He slowly parted my legs. Q: And then? A: He inserted his penis into my vagina. Q: What were you doing, were you resisting when he was doing that? A: I was resisting but my strength is no match to him. He was strong. Q: What sort of resistance were you putting up that time? A: "Hinampas ko po siya sa braso." Q: What was his response to your act of hitting his arms? A: "Wag daw po akong papalag at bubutasin nya ang leeg ko."36 Under Article 266-A(d) of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman who is below 12 years of age. At that time of the commission of the first incident of rape, AAA was only 11 years old, as evidenced by her birth certificate.37 As regards the final incident of rape in 15 October 2002, AAA narrated: Q: You said this happened always, approximately three (3) times a week, until when? A: The last time was in October 15, 2002. Q: This last incident, describe to us where did it happen again? A: In our house. Q: At about what time? A: 9:30 in the evening. Q: Narrate to us how did this incident happen? A: The same. He went to my bed, holding a bread knife, pointing it to me and he removed my shorts and he also undressed himself. Q: Then? A: And he inserted his sexual organ into my vagina and after the incident, he left the house.38 Since AAA was already 13 years old at the time of the commission of the last incident of rape, the applicable rule is Article 266-A(a) which states that rape is committed by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation. AAAs testimony that she was defiled by appellant was co rroborated by the medical findings of the medico-legal expert. The presence of deep healed and shallow healed laceration only confirms AAAs claim of rape. In both rape incidents, the trial court applied Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code in imposing the penalty of death, which was later modified by the Court of Appeals to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. Article 266-B provides: The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances: "l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; xxxx The Court of Appeals appreciated the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It relied on the established fact that AAA was still a minor when she was raped and on the stipulated fact that appellant is her guardian. One of the instances wherein the crime of rape may be qualified is when the victim is a minor AND the accused is her guardian. At this point, we cannot subscribe to this interpretation and hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of relationship. Indeed, it was stipulated during the pre-trial conference that appellant is the guardian of AAA. However, we cannot simply invoke this admission to consider guardianship as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. "Circumstances that qualify a crime and increase its penalty to death cannot be subject of stipulation. The accused cannot be condemned to suffer the extreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the gravity and irreversibility of capital punishment. To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender."39 Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with his ward. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early case of People v. De la Cruz.40 The issue in said case was whether the aunt of a rape victim could file a criminal complaint on behalf of her niece, when the victims father was still living and residing in the Philippines. The Solicitor-General contended that the aunt was the legal guardian of the victim, thus, was competent to sign the information. The Court rejected this contention and ruled as follow: Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 3, is as follows: (spanish)Without passing at this time on the question whether the tutor (legal guardian) may file a complaint in the temporary absence of the parents or grandparents of the offended party, it suffices to say that we cannot accept the view of the Government that an aunt who has the temporary custody of a minor in the absence of her father occupies the position of a tutor (legal guardian). The word "tutor" (guardian) appearing in article 344, supra, must be given the same meaning as in section 551 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, a guardian legally appointed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure.41 Garcia was more direct in addressing the issue of when the accused will be considered a "guardian" as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape. In said case, appellant therein raped a 12-year-old girl. The victim was left to the care of appellant, who is the live-in partner of the victims aunt. The issue of whether appellant is considered a guardian in the contemplation of the amendment to the law on rape such that, the victim being a minor, he should be punished with the higher penalty of death for the nine (9) crimes of rape was answered in the negative by the Court. The underlying reason behind its ruling was explained in this discourse: In the law on rape, the role of a guardian is provided for in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, specifically as one who, aside from the offended party, her parents or grandparents, is authorized to file the sworn written complaint to commence the prosecution for that crime. In People vs. De la Cruz, it was held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on civil procedure. xxxx It would not be logical to say that the word "guardian" in the third paragraph of Article 344 which is mentioned together with parents and grandparents of the offended party would have a concept different from the "guardian" in the recent amendments of Article 335 where he is also mentioned in the company of parents and ascendants of the victim. In Article 344, the inclusion of the guardian is only to invest him with the power to sign a sworn written complaint to initiate the prosecution of four crimes against chastity, while his inclusion in the enumeration of the offenders in Article 335 is to authorize the imposition of the death penalty on him. With much more reason, therefore, should the restrictive concept announced in De la Cruz, that is, that he be a legal or judicial guardian, be required in the latter article. The Court notes from the transcripts of the proceedings in Congress on this particular point that the formulators were not definitive on the concept of "guardian" as it now appears in the attendant circumstances added to the original provisions of Article 335 of the Code. They took note of the status of a guardian as contemplated in the law on rape but, apparently on pragmatic considerations to be determined by the courts on an ad hoc basis, they agreed to just state "guardian" without the qualification that he should be a legal or judicial guardian.1wphi1 It was assumed, however, that he should at the very least be a de facto guardian. Indeed, they must have been aware of jurisprudence that the guardian envisaged in Article 335 of the Code, even after its amendment by Republic Act No. 4111, would either be a natural guardian, sometimes referred to as a legal or statutory guardian, or a judicial guardian appointed by the court over the person of the ward. They did agree, however, that the additional attendant circumstances introduced by Republic Act No. 7659 should be considered as special qualifying circumstances specifically applicable to the crime of rape and, accordingly, cannot be

offset by mitigating circumstances. The obvious ratiocination is that, just like the effect of the attendant circumstances therefore added by Republic Act No. 4111, although the crime is still denominated as rape such circumstances have changed the nature of simple rape by producing a qualified form thereof punishable by the higher penalty of death. xxxx The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. Such considerations do not obtain in appellant's case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere custodian of a ward or another's property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions should he betray the trust. In results, therefore, that appellant cannot be considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in the category of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of [AAA]. Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a temporary period, we cannot impose the death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category.42 People v. De la Cuesta43 adhered to Garcia when it ruled that the mere fact that the mother asked the accused to look after her child while she was away did not constitute the relationship of guardian-ward as contemplated by law.44 Garcia was further applied by analogy in People v. Delantar45 where it was held that the "guardian" envisioned in Section 31(c) of Republic Act No. 7610 is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. In said case, accused was charged for violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 when he pimped an 11 year old child to at least two clients. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish filiation albeit it considered accused as a de facto guardian. However, this was not sufficient to justify the imposition of the higher penalty pursuant to the ruling in Garcia. In addition, the Court construed the term "guardian" in this manner: Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.87 Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an "ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This relationship may be established either by being the ward s biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAAs biological parent nor is he AAAs adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the "guardian" contemplated by law.46 Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned in the Informations. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the "adopting father" of AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish. For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant could only be convicted for two (2) counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape. We likewise reduce the Court of App eals award of civil indemnity from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 and moral damages from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence.47 The award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be increased to P30,000.00 pursuant to People v. Guillermo.48 While no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of rapes, it was established during trial that appellant used a deadly weapon to perpetrate the crime. Hence, the award of exemplary damages is proper. WHEREFORE, the decision dated 29 January 2009 convicting Isidro Flores y Lagua of the crime of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-081 and 03-261 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that he is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape only and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. He is also ordered, for each count of rape, to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.

G.R. No. 166470 August 7, 2009

CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ and NATIVIDAD CRUZ-HERNANDEZ,\ vs.JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 169217 CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN and TERESA C. HERNANDEZVILLA ABRILLE, vs.JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan. On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced three children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille. Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50 million in 1997). Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She was then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due to her "violent personality," Lulu stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5. In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her estate.3 Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulus properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of administering Lulu's properties. During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix and petitioners undertook various "projects" involving Lulus real properties. In 1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulus properties for an undisclosed amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision.4 In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed Lulu that her 11-hectare Montalban, Rizal property5 was under litigation. Thus, Lulu signed a special power of attorney6 (SPA) believing that she was authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila Electric Company for P18,206,400.7 Thereafter, Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize him to lease her 45-hectare property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford Concrete Aggregates for P58,500 per month so that she could have a car and driver at her disposal. In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the basement of petitioners Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly daily allowance of P400 for her food and medication. Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and smelled of urine. She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water. Since she had not been given a proper toilet, Lulu urinated and defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu's poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for medical examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and diabetes from which she was suffering several complications.8 Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of Lulus estate from petitioners. 9However, the demand was ignored. On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship10 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because she was of weak mind. Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the same. Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since she and her late husband were the registered owners of the said property, it was allegedly part of their conjugal partnership. Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulus competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the properties for her to manage. They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the consequences of executing an SPA. Furthermore, whether or not Cecilio and Ma. Victoria acted within the scope of their respective authorities could not be determined in a guardianship proceeding, such matter being the proper subject of an ordinary civil action. Petitioners also admitted that the property developed into the Marilou Subdivision was among those parcels of land Lulu inherited from the San Juan family. However, because the "sale" between Felix and Lulu had taken place in 1974, questions regarding its legality were already barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, its validity could no longer be impugned, or so they claimed. During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy and experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. She claimed inheriting tracts of land from the San Juan family. However, these properties were dissipated by the Hernandez family as they lived a "luxurious" lifestyle. When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her stepmother and half-siblings rode in cars while she was made to ride a tricycle. Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulus examinations which revealed the alarming state of her health.11 Not only was Lulu severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications,12 she also had an existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulus intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications. In a decision dated September 25, 2001,the RTC concluded that, due to her weak physical and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian over the person and property of Lulu on a P1 million bond. Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the P1 million bond was grossly insufficient to secure LulusP50-million estate against fraudulent loss or dissipation.The motion, however, was denied. On July 2, 2002, petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA).The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75760.On December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the September 25, 2001 decision of the RTC (in the petition for guardianship) in toto.17 It held that respondent presented sufficient evidence to prove that Lulu, because of her illnesses and low educational attainment, needed assistance in taking care of herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her estate. With regard to the respondents appo intment as the legal guardian, the CA found that, since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her legal guardian.1avvphi1 Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the RTC was bound to appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted. Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 166470.18 Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina apartment) and was provided with two housemaids tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was abducted from her Marikina apartment. Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National Police. The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the investigation, Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently contacted the PACER to inform them that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad because her guardian had allegedly been maltreating her.19 On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus20 in the CA alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal. On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her legal guardian, was entitled to her custody. 21 Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied in a resolution dated July 12, 2005.22 Aggrieved, they filed this petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 169217. This was consolidated with G.R. No. 166470. The basic issue in petitions of this nature is whether the person is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her person and property. Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physiciansregarding her mental state were inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in psychiatry. Respondent therefore failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered her an incompetent. She should have been presumed to be of sound mind and/or in full possession of her mental capacity. For this reason, Lulu should be allowed to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family Code,egitimate brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are required to support each other fully.Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the courts a quo. She disclosed that Lulu had been confined in Recovery.com, a psychosocial rehabilitation center and convalescent home care facility in Quezon City, since 2004 due to violent and destructive behavior. She also had delusions of being physically and sexually abused by "Boy Negro" and imaginary pets she called "Michael" and "Madonna."25 The November 21, 2005 medical report26 stated Lulu had unspecified mental retardation with psychosis but claimed significant improvements in her behavior. We find the petition to be without merit. Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.27 Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal. Their opinions were admissible in evidence. Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary.28 The observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence29 establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice.30 Here, the trial judge was

given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she testified before the RTC. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court,31 persons who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact.As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this case.32 We thus adopt the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.1avvph!1Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts finding as to the propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu.33 We therefore affirm her appointment as such. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as well.34 Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the issuance of a writ ofhabeas corpus in her favor was also in order. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.35 Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.36 WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED. Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulus legal guardian, an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds they unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against them for any criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandezs estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal guardian. Treble costs against petitioners.

G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,MONINA P. LIM x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM,The Case This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision1dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The Facts The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the childrens parents. The children2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioners clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.4 The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen. Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5 given under Republic Act No. 85526 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.8 Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.11 The Ruling of the Trial Court On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply. As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities. Hence, the present petition. Issue Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt. The Courts Ruling Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim " dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority. We deny the petition It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial courts decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads: SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt: (a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spo use of the adoptees parent; (b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following: (i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or (ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or (iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or (c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or (iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied) The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12 The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other. The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial. These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner. Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been emancipated

having reached the age of majority. This is untenable. Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.15 It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of age16 emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus: ARTICLE V EFFECTS OF ADOPTION SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s). SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family. SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern. Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.18 Therefore, even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled20 such as support21 and successional rights.We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.23 But, as we have ruled inRepublic v. Vergara:We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial courts decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1.zw+ Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner. Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court. We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG, May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case. The facts are undisputed. On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate childStephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mothers surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname. On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603. WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes. SO ORDERED."On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration5 praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garc ia" (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons: First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained. Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family

Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother."7 We find merit in the petition. Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.9 Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surname10 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus: "Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father. Art. 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs. Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name andsurname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees otherwise, or(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surnameemployed before the legal separation. Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370. Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion. Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendantsshall either: (1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use. The middle name or the mothers surname is only co nsidered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mothers surname shall be added. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus: "(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name . In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus "Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and that of the child because the fathers surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child ma y also use the surname of the mother. Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother. Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article 364, which reads: Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since th e mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David but they all call him Justice David. Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name. Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied) In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters."13Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 16 The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as aState Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.20 One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Art icle 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her midd le name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberallyconstrued to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the

law.27 Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail." This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law."28 Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname "GARCIA" as her middle na me. Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption. G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006 DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGINvs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein. The Antecedents On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition3 for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989.6 The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos. Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990,7 the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent8 to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written consent9 to the adoption of the minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petit ioners custody. Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows: WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after publication and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor childrens name follow the family name of petitioner. Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises.10 On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition.11 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance12 but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its behalf.13 Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.14 The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her and her siblings.15 The petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.16 On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the following recommendation: In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the following reasons:1. Minors surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance and support they need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto attached.2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their willingness to be adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The minors developed close attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as second parent.3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also family to look after. As young adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure their protection and well being. In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are close relatives and that close attachments was already developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.17 Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows: The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her children. The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived after the death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives including the petitioner who attended the wake of their mother were very much concerned about the well-being of the three minors. While preparing for their adoption, they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act as their temporary guardian. The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that her children need parental love, guidance and support which she could not provide as she already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have been supporting her children up to the present and truly care for them, she believes her children will be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and bright future to her children.However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption. On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural parents and that they be declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering that parent-children relationship has long been established between the children and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin." Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the above-mentioned minors. SO ORDERED.19 The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. In its brief21 for the oppositorappellant, the OSG raised the following arguments: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES BIOLOGICAL MOTHER. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW. III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONERS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES. On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22 reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the childrens natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioners children could not also be admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.23 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.25

Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari26 on September 7, 2004, assigning the following errors: 1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE. 2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.27 The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees. The Courts Ruling The petition is denied for lack of merit. It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,28 that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.29 However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court also ruled that the liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Courts position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.31 Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides: Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required: (a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over; (b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child; (c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latters souse, if any; (e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.32 Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition. Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer necessary because when Amelias husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal re latives, including petitioner, who provided for the childrens financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner. Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian. Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties.33 The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.34 Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment.35To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.36 In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioners testimony on that matter follo ws: Q Where is the mother of these three children now? A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir. Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where she communicated with the family?A None, sir. Q How about with her children?A None, sir. Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?A I do not know, sir. Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos? A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man. Q From whom did you learn that?A From others who came from Italy, sir. Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage?A Yes, sir, she got two kids.Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus: Q Where is your mother now?A In Italy, sir. Q When did your mother left for Italy?A After my father died, sir. Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?A Two years old, sir. Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with you?A No, sir. However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the following: IV. Background of the Case: xxxx Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and custody of their maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves as their guardian. The petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad have been supporting the minor children financially, even during the time that they were still living with their natural parents. Their mother also sends financial support but very minimal. V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption: As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works and has fun with them. She also encourages openness on their problems and concerns and provides petty counseling. In serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt. In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy and comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had continued providing support for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the support of her husbands relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they are undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which she used in going to Italy and worked as domestic helper. When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law who returned home for good, however she died on November 2000. While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular support.

Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously providing support for most of the needs & education of minors up to present.41 Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide. Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on the adopter.42 It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent.43 Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered. Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioners children45 was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103,46 which states: Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the following requirements:(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited. The officer making the authentication shall certify under his official seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are genuine. As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate children did not comply with the afore -cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers. Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence. In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to support the children and is only relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of her children and her siblings.Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that "petitioner has limited income." Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in keeping with the means of the family. Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family. According to the Adoption Home Study Report49 forwarded by the Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioners main intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings. Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioners allegation that her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue. While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009

P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and JOHN DOES,vs.DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ, Petitioners1 , employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of Malolos, challenge the March 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in a petition for issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents. The factual antecedents. Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects. The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before the then Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan. By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz, which judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC, became final and executory. The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused to vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province2 and the judges who presided over the case.3 Those cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of judgment lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos. The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of injunction to prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment against them. By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes allegation that subsequent events changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the execution of the final and executory judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 10, 2004 is herebyGRANTED. Order dated August 10, 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the verified petition dated November 05, 2002 are hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners with the same determines the metes and bounds of 400 sq. meters leased premises subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch. Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners on the issued writ of demolition to the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan. SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for the lifting of the permanent injunction, the determination of the boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineers Report submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were indicated. The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition. On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion before Branch 10 of the RTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on January 25, 2008 on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been implemented. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO.5 The Spouses Cruz, along with their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of the property which was for lease. On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to "protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property," entered the property. Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC July 19, 2005 Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats. Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data," docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008, which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC Malolos. Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered the property with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and tents,6 and arrested them when they resisted petitioners entry; and that as early as in the evening of February 20, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police had already camped in front of the property. On the basis of respondents allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the RTC, by Order of March 4, 2008, issued writs of amparo and habeas data.7 The RTC, crediting respondents version in this wise: Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged offenses examined into on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going hearings on the verified Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-M-2006, before this Court for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary Injunction Order dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held on January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents prayed for an April 22, 2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February 20, 2008, police officers, some personnel from the Engineering department, and some civilians proceeded purposely to the Pinoy Compound, converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a pretext of an ordinary police operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at 8:00 a.m. to late in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners, subjecting them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen,8 rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases Nos. 08-77 for Direct assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78 for Light Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were deprived of their substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal violence. Accordingly, the commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners is declared ABSOLUTE. Without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED."9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 1910 of The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC),11 which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).12 In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of the petition, the same ought not to have been issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in substance as the same involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases had already been filed and pending with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos. (Underscoring supplied) The petition is impressed with merit. The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.13 In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Courts commitment towards internationalization of human rights. More than three months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was promulgated. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides: Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides: Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, libertyand security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions. Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo14 teaches: As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof."Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or

indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.15 (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted) To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners entry into the property. Apropos is the Courts ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:16 To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit: xxxx The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.17 (Emphasis and italics in the original, citation omitted) Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the petitioners therein branding as "acts of terrorism" the therein respondents alleged entry into the disputed la nd with armed men in tow. The Court therein held: On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing. 18(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners (respondents)"19 will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.20 Although respondents release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified. That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from their Joint Affidavit, viz: xxxx 11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak ang nasabing kautusan ng RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February 12, 17 at 19 2008) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng "SELF-HELP" at batas ukol sa "PROPERTY RIGHTS", Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming "IN POSSESSION." (Underscoring supplied) Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence. As for respondents assertion of past incidents21 wherein the Province allegedly violated the Permanent Injunction order, these incidents were already raised in the injunction proceedings on account of which respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against petitioners.22 Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22, 2008, petitioners even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot and academic by Branch 14 of the Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008. More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs of amparo andhabeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition was dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping. It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges.231avvphi1 It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute. At all events, respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 11224 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.25 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186027December 8, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-inFact, EVELYN M. OGA This petition for review on certiorari assails the December 9, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN, which affirmed the September 28, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 8 (RTC), in a petition for correction of entries, docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427), filed by respondent Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera) under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Factual and Procedural Antecedents On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth fromMarilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048).2 Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the case may be, is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. "Under said law, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The law now excludes the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied"3 and removes "correction or changing of clerical errors in entries of the civil register from the ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of the rules are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.4 The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048."5 Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC). The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427). Section 2 of Rule 108 reads: Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o)changes of name. [Underscoring supplied] Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order, dated June 10, 2005, which reads: Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, notice is hereby given that the hearing of said petition is set on JULY 26, 2005 at 8:30 oclock in the morning, at the Session Hall of Branch 8, this Court, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Dipolog City, on which date, time and place, anyone appearing to contest the petition shall state in writing his grounds there[for], serving a copy thereof to the petitioner and likewise file copies with this Court on or before the said date of hearing. Let this order be published at the expense of petitioner once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper edited and published in Dipolog City and of general circulation therein, the City of Dapitan and the province of Zamboanga del Norte, and copies hereof be furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General of (sic) 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila, the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog, and posted on the bulletin boards of the City Hall of Dipolog, the Provincial Capitol Building, and of this Court. IT IS SO ORDERED. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for the Republic of the Philippines and deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to assist in the case only on the very day of the hearing. This prompted the court to reset the hearing on September 5, 2005. On said day, there being no opposition, counsel for Mercadera moved for leave of court to present evidence ex parte. Without any objection from the City Prosecutor, the trial court designated the branch clerk of court to receive evidence for Mercadera. On September 15, 2005, the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private transactions. On September 26, 2005, the RTC issued an order6 admitting Exhibits "A" to "I"7 and their submarkings, as relevant to the resolution of the case. The following facts were gathered from documentary evidence and the oral testimony of Oga, as reported by the lower court: Petitioner Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on August 19, 1970 at Dipolog City. She is the daughter of spouses Tirso U. Mercadera and Norma C. Lacquiao. The fact of her birth was reported to the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City on September 8, 1970. It was recorded on page 68, book no. 9, in the Registry of Births of said civil registry. In the certification of birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by the same registry, her given name appears as Marilyn and not Merlyn (Exhibit "C"). On September 29, 1979, petitioner was baptized according to the rites and ceremonies of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines. As reflected in her certificate of baptism issued by said church, she was baptized by the name Merlyn L. Mercadera (Exhibit "D"). In her elementary diploma issued by the Paaralang Sentral ng Estaka, Dipolog City; her high school diploma issued by the Zamboanga del Norte School of Arts and Trades, Dipolog City; and college diploma issued by the Silliman University, Dumaguete City, where she earned the degree of Bachelor of Secondary Education, uniformly show her name as Merlyn L. Mercadera (Exhibits "E", "F", and "G"). Presently, she is working in U.P. Mindanao, Buhangin, Davao City. Her certificate of membership issued by the Government Service Insurance System also bears his [sic] complete name as Merlyn Lacquiao Mercadera (Exhibit "H"). When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live birth from the National Statistics Office, she discovered that her given name as registered is Marilyn and not Merlyn; hence, this petition. In its September 28, 2005 Decision,8 the RTC granted Mercaderas petition and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera. Specifically, the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City is hereby directed to correct the given name of petitioner appearing in her certificate of live birth, from Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera. In a four-page decision, the RTC ruled that the documentary evidence presented by Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition. Considering that she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until she discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced that the correction was justified. The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule 108. In its Brief9 filed with the CA, the OSG argued that the lower court erred (1) in granting the prayer for change of name in a petition for correction of entries; and (2) in admitting the photocopies of documentary evidence and hearsay testimony of Oga. For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercaderas given name might seem innocuous enough to grant but "it is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights."10 What the lower court actually allowed was a change of Mercaderas given na me, which would have been proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor. The lower court, "may not substitute one for the other for purposes of expediency."11 Further, because Mercadera failed to invoke a specific ground recognized by the Rules, the lower courts order in effect allowed the change of ones name in the civil registry without basis. The CA was not persuaded. In its December 9, 2008 Decision, 12 the appellate court affirmed the questioned RTC Order in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN. The CA assessed the controversy in this wise: Appellants insistence that the petition should have been filed under Rule 103 and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is off the mark. This Court does not entertain any doubt that the petition before the trial court was one for the correction on an entry in petitioners Certificate of Live Birth and not one in which she sought to change her name. In Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, the High Court reiterated the distinction between the phrases "to correct" and "to change." Said the High Court: To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected or distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may be. Such entries include not only those clerical in nature but also substantial errors. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein. That appellee sought to correct an entry and not to change her name is patent to the Court from the allegations in her petition, specifically, paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof xxxx Anent the RTCs error in admitting the photocopies of Mercaderas documentary evidence and in vesting probative value to Ogas testimony, the CA cited the well-established rule that "evidence not objected to may be admitted and may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment."13 On March 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present petition. On behalf of Mercad era, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed its Comment14 on July 3, 2009. The OSG declined to file a reply claiming that its petition already contained an

exhaustive discussion on the following assigned errors:15 I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE CHANGE IN RESPONDENTS NAME UNDER RULE 103. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN CONSIDERING SECONDARY EVIDENCE. Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code.16 This rule provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community.17 In petitions for change of name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the "designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known."18 When granted, a persons identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new "label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or dealing with him."19 Judicial permission for a change of name aims to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree. The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires publication of the order issued by the court to afford the State and all other interested parties to oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision binds not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. "It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it."20 Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a cha nge of ones existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. 21 However, "there could be instances where the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already bear the surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously impressed on the public mind."22 Hence, in requests for a change of name, "what is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced x x x mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant x x x."23 Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code.24 Entries in the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons,"25 also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law.26Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are beyond the ambit of the rule. In the abandoned case of Chua Wee v. Republic,27 this Court declared that, x x x if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the new Civil Code." In the latter case of Wong v. Republic,28 however, Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in a separate concurrence, opined that Article 412, which Rule 108 implements, contemplates all kinds of issues and all types of procedures because "the provision does not say that it applies only to non-controversial issues and that the procedure to be used is summary in nature." In Republic v. Judge De la Cruz,29 the dissenting opinion penned by Justice Pacifico De Castro echoed the same view: It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered unconstitutional if it would allow the correction of more than mere harmless clerical error, as it would thereby increase or modify substantive rights which the Constitution expressly forbids because Article 412 of the Civil Code, the substantive law sought to be implemented by Rule 108, allows only the correction of innocuous clerical errors not those affecting the status of persons. As was stressed in the dissent on the aforesaid Wong Case, Article 412 does not limit in its express terms nor by mere implication, the correction authorized by it to that of mere clerical errors. x x x it would be reasonable and justified to rule that Article 412 contemplates of correction of erroneous entry of whatever nature, procedural safeguards having only to be provided for, as was the manifest purpose of Rule 108. x x x proceedings for the correction of erroneous entry should not be considered as establishing one's status in a legal manner conclusively beyond dispute or controversion, x x x the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. Hence, the status as corrected would not have a superior quality for evidentiary purpose. Moreover, the correction should not imply a change of status but a mere rectification of error to make the matter corrected speak for the truth. x x x Finally in Republic v. Valencia,30 the above stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x x."31 "Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution."32 In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108. It appears from these arguments that there is, to some extent, confusion over the scope and application of Rules 103 and Rule 108. Where a "change of name" will necessarily be reflected by the corresponding correction in an entry, as in this case, the functions of both rules are often muddled. While there is no clear-cut rule to categorize petitions under either rule, this Court is of the opinion that a resort to the basic distinctions between the two rules with respect to alterations in a persons registered name can effectively clear the seeming perplexity of the issue. Further, a careful evaluation of circumstances alleged in the petition itself will serve as a constructive guide to determine the propriety of the relief prayed for. The "change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of ones name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.33 In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 10834 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in ones name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108. This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein."35 A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack of support to the OSGs assumption that Mercadera intended to change her name under Rule 103. All that the petition propounded are swift arguments on the alleged procedural flaws of Mercaderas petition before the RTC. In the same vein, no concrete contention was brought up to convince this Court that the dangers sought to be prevented by the adversarial proceedings prescribed in Rule 103 are attendant in this case. Instead, the RTC found the documents presented by Mercadera to have satisfactorily shown that she had been known as MERLYN ever since, discounting the possibility that confusion, or a modification of substantive rights might arise. Truth be told, not a single oppositor appeared to contest the petition despite full compliance with the publication requirement. Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."36 From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the

one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief. Thus, the petition was clear in stating:7. That as such, there is a need to correct her given name as appearing in her Certificate of Live Birth from MARILYN to MERLYN to conform to her true and correct given name that she had been using and had been known within the community x x x.8. That herein petitioner went to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City and requested them to effect such correction in her Certificate of Live Birth, however, the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City will not effect such correction unless an order is obtained by herein petitioner from this Honorable Court because the Local Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048, hence the filing of this petition. [Emphases supplied] Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercaderas case which re cognize the same a harmless error. In Yu v. Republic37 it was held that "to change Sincio to Sencio which merely involves the substitution of the first vowel i in the first name into the vowel e amounts merely to the righting of a clerical error." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,38 it was held that the change of pet itioners name from "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to "Emperatriz Labayo" was a mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding was appropriate. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto, the correction involved the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as "Midael" as given name would read "Michael." In the latter case, this Court, with the agreement of the Solicitor General, ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such that, "changing the name of the child from Midael C. Mazon to Michael C. Mazon cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig)."39 In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn" is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix- up that blemished Mercaderas Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same. The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could remember. It is worthy to note that the OSGs reliance on Republic vs. Hernandez40 is flawed. In that case, this Court said that "a change in a given name is a substantial matter" and that it "cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding that would in effect render it a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding." While this Court stands true to the ruling in Hernandez, the said pronouncement therein was stated in a different tenor and, thus, inapplicable to this case. Hernandez was decided against an entirely different factual milieu. There was a petition for adoption that must not have led to a corresponding change in the adoptees given name because "it would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of a corresponding petition for the latter relief at law." In the present case, the issue is the applicability of either Rule 103 or Rule 108 and the relief sought by Mercadera can in fact be granted under the latter. This Court finds no attempt on the part of Mercadera to render the requirements under Rule 103 illusory as in Hernandez. Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and that compliance with the procedural requirements under Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it still cannot be denied that Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact that no one opposed the petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same and did not make the proceeding less adversarial in nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective. Indeed, it has become unnecessary to further discuss the reasons why the CA correctly affirmed the findings of the lower court especially in admitting and according probative value to the evidence presented by Mercadera. WHEREFORE, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.