TAN VS.

COMELEC, 237 SCRA 353, OCTOBER 4, 1994 Facts: On May 10, 1992, the petitioner, as an incumbent City Prosecutor of Davao City, was designated by the COMELEC as Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers in the said area for the May 11, 1992, synchronized national and local elections conformably with the provisions of Section 20 (a) of Republic Act 6646 and Section 221 (b) of the Omnibus Election Code. Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a Congressional seat to represent the 2nd District of Davao City. Alterado, the private respondent, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation. The cases filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the Office of the Ombudsman was dismissed. What is still pending is an administrative charge, against the Board of Canvassers and herein petitioner for Misconduct, Neglect of Duty, Gross Incompetence, and Acts Inimical to the Service, instituted in the COMELEC. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction to take action on the administrative case when in fact the petitioner as a City prosecutor is under the Administrative jurisdiction. Held: The COMELECs authority under Section 2 (6 -8), Article 9 of the Constitution is virtually all-encompassing when it comes to election matters, also Section 52, Article 7 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be stressed that the administrative case against petitioner is in relation to the performance of his duties as an Election canvasser and not as a City Prosecutor. The COMELECs mandate includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate suspension and control over national and local officials or employees, including members of any national and local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. To say that the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and, perhaps more than that, even a possible denial of the process to the official or employee concerned.

the Katibawasan Falls and the construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those designated as Foreign-Assisted, consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include the construction of Human Development Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and waterworks systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital and laboratory equipment; and the rehabilitation of office and equipment. On the same day, respondent Judge issued the question TRO. In the same order, he directed the petitioners to file their Answer within 10 days from receipt of notice and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for April 24, 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. They contend that the case principally involves an alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465. RULING: The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link the private respondent's principal grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and (w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is particular emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which read: Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense: (a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. xxx xxx xxx (b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. xxx xxx xxx (v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. Any public official or employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for: (1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following: xxx xxx xxx (w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and similar devices. During the period of forty-five days preceding a regular election and thirty days before a special election, any person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph; or (b)

Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr. January 29, 1993 218 SCRA 253 FACTS: On April 10, 1992, private respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil Action No. 465) before the court a quo against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing or prosecuting certain public works projects as it violates the 45-day ban on public works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because although they were initiated few days before March 27, 1992, the date the ban took effect, they were not covered by detailed engineering plans, specifications or a program of work which are preconditions for the commencement of any public works project. The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a) those that are Locally-Funded, consisting of 29 different projects for the maintenance or concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of

issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds. The court ruled that Comelec has jurisdiction to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. The 1987 Constitution implicitly grants the Commission the power to promulgate such rules and regulations as provided in Section 2 of Article IX-C. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the Comission with the power to investigate and, where appr opriate, prosecute cases of violations of election law, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. It is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court under the election laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The Constitution itself grants to it exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal officials. Neither can the Court agree with the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action filed in the RTC below involves the prosecution of election offenses; the said action seeks some reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged election offenses; specifically, what is sought is the prevention of the further commission of these offenses which, by their alleged nature, are continuing. There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no legal standing to initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in the law to prevent any citizen from exposing the commission of an election offense and from filing a complaint in connection therewith. On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of complaints for election offenses may be done motu propio by the Commission on Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered political party or organization under the party-list system or any of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission. However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal." As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not seriously concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He merely sought a stoppage of the public works projects because of their alleged adverse effect on his candidacy. Indeed, while he may have had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked the wrong authority. The court, therefore, has no alternative but to grant this petition on the basis their resolution of the principal issue. Nevertheless, it must be strongly emphasized that in so holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action No. 465.

GADOR vs. COMELEC Facts: The petition alleges that the petitioner is a candidate for the Office of Mayor of the City of Ozamiz as Independent this coming January 30, 1980 local election. He filed his certificate of candidacy with the Election Registrar of Ozamis City on January 7, 1980 because of the news in the Bulletin Today. The said news stated that the respondent COMELEC issued a resolution for the extension of time for filing COC. However, the President denied said resolution. Therefore, respondent COMELEC informed the petitioner that his name might not be included in the list of candidates for mayor because of the said incident. Thus, this petition. ISSUE: WON the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner which was filed on January 7, 1980 is valid. DECISION: WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. RATIO DECIDENDI:

NO. A certificate of candidacy filed beyond reglementary period is void. Section 7, Batasang Pambansa Bilang 52, provides that "The sworn certificate of candidacy shall be filed in triplicate not later than January 4, 1980." It is a fact admitted by the petitioner that the President had not extended the period within which to file the certificate of candidacy. This Court is powerless to grant the remedy prayed for in the petition. Having been filed beyond January 4, 1980, the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner is void.

In the case of De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La Union, and Lucero (48 Phil., 211), the court said: "The certificate of the respondent Juan T. Lucero was defective, lacking the formality of the oath. This irregularity might have justified the elimination of the name of Juan T. Lucero as a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor, if an objection on the part of the petitioner Tomas de Guzman had been made in due time. Yet we are of the opinion that this irregularity does not invalidate the election for the fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technically consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to." The second and eight assignments of error are groundless and must be dismissed.

Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698 Facts: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide: SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position. Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs. Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause Held: Yes. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle. Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the law. The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign. As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could

be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

2175 of the Administrative Code did not violate the right to freedom of religion because it did not give any requirement for a religious test. The view of the dissenting seven failed to obtain a vote of eight members, so it was not controlling. The provision of the BAUTISTA V. COMELEC 298 SCRA 480 (SINGSON)

FACTS: Petitioner Cipriano Efren Bautista and private respondent were duly registered candidates for the position of Mayor of Navotas in the 1998 Elections. Aside from them, a certain Edwin Efren Bautista (Edwin Bautista) also filed a certificate of candidacy for the same position. Petitioner filed a petition praying that Edwin Bautista be declared a nuisance candidate. COMELEC declared Edwin Bautista as nuisance candidate and consequently ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor. MR was filed by Edwin Bautista; subsequently denied. Before final determination of Edwin Bautistas MR, upon request of petitioners counsel, the Regional Election Director of NCR gave instructions to the BEI to tally separately either in some portion of the same election return not intended for votes for mayoralty candidates or in a separate paper the votes Efren Bautista, Efren, E. Bautista and Bautista, consider ed as stray votes. When the canvass of the election returns was commenced, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Navotas refused to canvass as part of the valid votes of petitioner the separate tallies of votes on which were written Efren Bautista, Efren, E. Bautista and Bautista. Petitioner filed with COMELEC a Petition to Declare Illegal the Proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers; dismissed for lack of merit.

PAMIL VS. TELECOM [86 SCRA 413; G.R. 34854; 20 NOV 1978] Facts: Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected as Municipal Mayor in Alburquerque, Bohol. Petitioner, also an aspirant for said office, then filed a suit for quo warranto for Gonzagas disqualification based on the Administrative Code provision: In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The respondent Judge, in sustaiing Fr. Gonzagas right to the office, ruled that the provision had already been impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. Petitioner on the other hand argues that there was no implied repeal. Issues: (1) Whether or Not Fr. Gonzaga is eligible for the position of municipal mayor, according to law. (2) Whether or Not the prohibition regarding elected or appointed ecclesiastics is constitutional. Held: The court was divided. Five voted that the prohibition was not unconstitutional. Seven others voted that the provision was impliedly repealed. However, the minority vote overruled the seven. According to the dissenting seven, there are three reasons for the said provision to be inoperative. First, the 1935 Constitution stated, No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Second, said section 2175 is superseded by the Constitution. Third, section 2175 has been repealed by Sec. 23 of the Election Code (1971): Appointive public office holders and active members of the Armed Forces are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office. Ecclesiastics were no longer included in the enumeration of personsineligible under the said Election Code. On the other hand, the controlling five argued: Section 2175 of the Administrative Code deals with a matter different from that of section 23 of the Election Code. Also, section

HELD: There was grave abuse of discretion in denying the inclusion as part of petitioners valid votes the Bautista stray votes that were separately tallied by the BEI and Board of Canvassers.

# It must be emphasized that the case at bar involves a ground for disqualification which clearly affects the voters will and causes confusion that frustrates the same. # Election Laws give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. Thus, extreme caution should be observed before any ballot is invalidated. # In the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of their validity. # Matters tend to get complicated when technical rules are strictly applied technicalities should not be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, especially so if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, as in this case. # Sec. 69 of the Omnibus Election Code the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy 1) if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, 2) or to cause confusion among voters by the similarity of the names of registered candidates; 3) or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that a candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. # Fatual circumstances and logic dictate that the Bautista and Efren votes which were mistakenly deemed as stray votes refer only to one candidate, herein petitioner. Such votes, which represent the voice of approx. 21,000 electors could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista, allegedly known in Navotas as a tricycle driver and worse a drug addict, not known as Efren as stated in his certificate of candidacy, but Boboy or Boboy Tarugo as his known appellation or nickname, and satisfactorily and finally shown as a candidate with no political line up, no personal funds that could have supported his campaign, and no accomplishments which may be noted band considered by the public, as against a known former public officer who had served the people of Navotas as Brgy. Official, councilor and vice mayor. # To rule otherwise will definitely result in the disenfranchisement of the will of the electorate, which is, as we mentioned, the situation that our election laws are enacted to prevent. SOCRATES V. COMELEC 391 SCRA 457 (NEPOMUCENO)

Petitioner filed a motion to nullify the recall resolution but was dismissed by the Comelec for lack of merit Comelec set date for conducting the recall election; former 3 term mayor Edward Hagedorn files his certificate of candidacy Petitioner Adovo and Gilo files petition before Comelec to disqualify Hagedorn claiming that he is disqualified from running for a 4th term; petition was dismissed

HELD: Hagedorn is qualified to run in the recall election

Art. X Sec. 8 of 1987 Constitution: the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Sec. 43 (b) RA 7160: Term of office no local official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected These constitutional and statutory provisions have 2 parts The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve ore than 3 consecutive terms The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the 3-term limit rule The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms After 3 consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms

FACTS: Petitioner is mayor of Puerto Princesa, who was removed from office thru a recall proceeding initiated by the majority of the incumbent barangay officials of the city

Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service Clearly, the constitution prohibits immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms The constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term A recall election midway in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term Neither does the constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office What the constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term The prohibited election referred to by the framers of the constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term, not any other subsequent election The framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection, and not to any subsequent election, during the 6 year period following the two term limit The framers of the constitution did not intend the period of rest of an elective official who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term

ISSUE: WON Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. HELD: Latasa cannot serve as Mayor of the new city of Digos. Latasa having been elected as mayor in 1998, the conversion of Digos from a municipality to a city in 2000 falls within his term. As Digos acquired a new corporate existence, qualifications for its elective positions also change. As a result, the Office of the Municipal Mayor was abolished to make way for the creation of the Office of the City Mayor. However, under the Charter of the City of Digos, the elective officials of the Municipality of Digos shall have holdover power until a new election and the duly elected officials have assumed their office. Latasa never ceased to discharge his duties as Mayor during the conversion of Digos. Also, although Digos was converted into a city, Digos never redefined its territory, the inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. Sungas cannot claim that he be proclaimed as mayor after the disqualification of Latasa, the SC already ruled that the disqualification of the winning candidate does not entitle the second highest vote earner the position of mayor. Vacancy be filled by succession. RAMON LABO, JR. VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if hes considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office. 2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is disqualified. HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an

Latasa vs. Comelec FACTS: Arsenio Latasa was elected Mayor of Digos, Davao del Sur to 3 three consecutive terms (1992, 1995, 1998). During his third term, a plebiscite was held to convert Digos into a component city (2000). The ratification of the Charter of the City of Digos ended the tenure of Latasa as Mayor. However, he was still mandated as hold-over mayor of the city until the next election. For the election of 2001, Latasa filed his COC for his first term as mayor of the city. He acknowledges that he served as mayor of Digos when it was still a municipality. Sunga, also a candidate for mayor, filed a petition to disqualify Latasa as he already had served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. Comelec issued a resolution in favor of Sunga and disqualified Latasa. Latasa submitted a motion for reconsideration which was not acted upon by the Comelec until the end of the May 14 elections. As a result, Latasa was still able to continue his campaign and eventually won the election. Sunga now also sought to annul Latasas proclamation. Comelec only rendered its decision denying Latasas motion for reconsideration in 2002. Sunga claims that he should be proclaimed mayor as he holds the second most number of votes in 2001

oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress none of this happened. Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen. 2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the mayor by reason of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC GR 133495 (September 3, 1998) G.R. No. 133495; 295 SCRA 157 September 3, 1998 Facts: Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected Vice Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected Mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected Mayor for another term of three years ending July 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for Mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter would already have served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would thereafter be ineligible to serve for another term after that. The COMELEC ruled in favor of Capco saying that In both

the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. Capco won in the elections against Borja. Issue: Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit. Held: The Court ruled in favor of Capco. The term served must therefore be one for which the official concerned was elected. If he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vicemayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such representative serves a term for which he was elected. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full (when he succeeded the mayorship upon demise of Cesar Borja) and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. Hence, the petition was dismissed. RAYMUNDO ADORMEO V. COMELEC G.R. No. 147927; February 4, 2002; J. Quisumbing NATURE: Petition for certiorari with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and/ or temporary restraining order to set aside COMELEC resolution declaring Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. qualified to run for Mayor in Lucena City for the May 14, 2001 election. FACTS: Petitioner Raymundo Adormeo and private respondent, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. were the only candidates for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992, and served the full term. He was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, in the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. (13 months and 18 days) Petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the latter was elected and had served

as city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms. Petitioner contended that Talagas candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. The Comelec first division on April 20, 2001 found Talaga, Jr. disqualified. The Comelec en banc reversed and ruled that:

Likewise, in the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), we said, This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. Accordingly, COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. Patently untenable is petitioners contention that COMELEC in allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates Article X, Section 8 of 1987 Constitution. To bolster his case, respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision that if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed. As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas comment is pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives.Unlike local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of Congress. Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said: The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. DISPOSITION: Petition DISMISSED. COMELEC en banc AFFIRMED.

1.) respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2.) that he was installed only as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3.) that his victory in the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3-term disqualification rule, and 4.) that he did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City. ISSUE: WON Talaga is disqualified to run for mayor HELD: No RATIO: The issue before us was already addressed in Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157, 169 (1998), where we held,o recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made clearer by considering the following case or situation: Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election? Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively. To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.

ALDOVINO VS COMELEC AND ASILO FACTS: Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code) The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the1998-2001, 20012004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandi ganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought todeny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered. ISSUE: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and . Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160HELD: NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve. The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office, preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections - presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected

for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.(EXCEPTION) "Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists .

G.R. No. 196804

October 9, 2012

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents. x-----------------------x G.R. No. 197015 PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARBARA RUBY TALAGA and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should assume the office following the substitutes disqualification. The consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul and set aside the En Banc Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 in SPC No. 10-024 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the January 11, 2011 Resolution of the Second Division; 2. GRANTING the petition in intervention of Roderick A. Alcala; 3. ANNULLING the election and proclamation of respondent Barbara C. Talaga as mayor of Lucena City and CANCELLING the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation issued therefor; 4. Ordering respondent Barbara Ruby Talaga to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor; 5. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Lucena City, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor is ORDERED to succeed as Mayor as provided under Section 44 of the Local Government Code; 6. DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Resolution to the Office of the President of the Philippines, the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Department of Finance and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Lucena City. Let the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Regional Election Director of Region IV of COMELEC implement this resolution. SO ORDERED. Antecedents
1

On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections.2 Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-CMD,3 declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to. Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena, which was docketed as SPA 09-029 (DC).4 He alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections. The pertinent portions of Castillos petition follow: 1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of Barangay Mayao Crossing, Lucena City but may be served with summons and other processes of this Commission at the address of his counsel at 624 Aurora Blvd., Lucena City 4301; 2. Respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is likewise of legal age, married, and a resident of Barangay Ibabang Iyam, Lucena City and with postal address at the Office of the City Mayor, City Hall, Lucena City, where he may be served with summons and other processes of this Commission; 3. Petitioner, the incumbent city vice-mayor of Lucena having been elected during the 2007 local elections, is running for city mayor of Lucena under the Liberal party this coming 10 May 2010 local elections and has filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor of Lucena; 4. Respondent was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004, and 2007 local elections based on the records of the Commission on Elections of Lucena City and had fully served the aforesaid three (3) terms without any voluntary and involuntary interruption; 5. Except the preventive suspension imposed upon him from 13 October 2005 to 14 November 2005 and from 4 September 2009 to 30 October 2009 pursuant to Sandiganbayan 4th Division Resolution in Criminal Case No. 27738 dated 3 October 2005, the public service as city mayor of the respondent is continuous and uninterrupted under the existing laws and jurisprudence; 6. There is no law nor jurisprudence to justify the filing of the certificate of candidacy of the respondent, hence, such act is outrightly unconstitutional, illegal, and highly immoral;

7. Respondent, knowing well that he was elected for and had fully served three (3) consecutive terms as a city mayor of Lucena, he still filed his Certificate of Candidacy for City Mayor of Lucena for this coming 10 May 2010 national and local elections; 8. Under the Constitution and existing Election Laws, New Local Government Code of the Philippines, and jurisprudence the respondent is no longer entitled and is already disqualified to be a city mayor for the fourth consecutive term; 9. The filing of the respondent for the position of city mayor is highly improper, unlawful and is potentially injurious and prejudicial to taxpayers of the City of Lucena; and 10. It is most respectfully prayed by the petitioner that the respondent be declared disqualified and no longer entitled to run in public office as city mayor of Lucena City based on the existing law and jurisprudence.5 The petition prayed for the following reliefs, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate under the existing Election Laws and by the provisions of the New Local Government Code. 6 (Emphasis supplied.) Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence7 to the effect that an involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule. In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 8 holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus, on December 30, 2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, taking into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino. Relevant portions of his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve are quoted herein, viz: 4. When respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena City, the rule that where the separation from office is caused by reasons beyond the control of the officer i.e. involuntary the service of term is deemed interrupted has not yet been overturned by the new ruling of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, the prevailing rule then of the Honorable Commission in [sic] respect of the three (3)-term limitation was its decision in the case of Aldovino, et al. vs. Asilo where it stated: "Thus, even if respondent was elected during the 2004 elections, which was supposedly his third and final term as city councilor, the same cannot be treated as a complete service or full term in office since the same was interrupted when he was suspended by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division. And the respondent actually

heeded the suspension order since he did not receive his salary during the period October 16-31 and November 1-15 by reason of his actual suspension from office. And this was further bolstered by the fact that the DILG issued a Memorandum directing him, among others, to reassume his position." (Emphasis supplied.) 5. Clearly, there was no misrepresentation on the part of respondent as would constitute a ground for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondents certificate of candidacy at the time he filed the same. Petitioners ground for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondents certificate of candidacy thus has no basis, in fact and in law, as there is no ground to warrant such relief under the Omnibus Election Code and/or its implementing laws. 6. Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the Supreme Court in respect of the issue on the three (3)-term limitation, respondent acknowledges that he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City having served three (3) (albeit interrupted) terms as Mayor of Lucena City prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the 2010 elections. 7. In view of the foregoing premises and new jurisprudence on the matter, respondent respectfully submits the present case for decision declaring him as DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City.9 Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his CoC. Acting on Ramons Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution on April 19, 2010,10 disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to run for Mayor of Lucena City for the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. SO ORDERED. Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.11 Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for Reconsideration.12 At 4:30 p.m. on the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had nominated Ramon.13 On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramons Ex parte Manifestation of Withdrawal, declared the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution dated April 19, 2010 final and executory. 14

On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillos 39,615 votes.15 Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the suspension of Barbara Rubys proclamation. 16 It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the recommendation of its Law Department,17gave due course to Barbara Rubys CoC and CONA through Resolution No. 8917, thereby including her in the certified list of 18 candidates. Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of Lucena City.19 On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC,20 docketed as SPC 10-024. He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray. In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation,21 Barbara Ruby maintained the validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramons COC, despite a declaration of his disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006 22 applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in her favor. On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to intervene, 23positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Rubys substitution had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the elections. On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castillos petition and Alcalas petition-in-intervention,24 holding: In the present case, Castillo was notified of Resolution 8917 on May 13, 2010 as it was the basis for the proclamation of Ruby on that date. He, however, failed to file any action within the prescribed period either in the Commission or the Supreme Court assailing the said resolution. Thus, the said resolution has become final and executory. It cannot anymore be altered or reversed. xxxx x x x. A close perusal of the petition filed by Castillo in SPA 10-029 (Dc) shows that it was actually for the disqualification of Ramon for having served three consecutive terms, which is a ground for his disqualification under the Constitution in relation to Section 4(b)3 of Resolution 8696. There was no mention therein that Ramon has committed material representation that would be a ground for the cancellation or denial of due course to the CoC of Ramon under

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The First Division, in fact, treated the petition as one for disqualification as gleaned from the body of the resolution and its dispositive portion quoted above. This treatment of the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification only is affirmed by the fact that its members signed Resolution No. 8917 where it was clearly stated that the First Division only disqualified Ramon. Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid down in Miranda v. Abaya is not applicable. Ramon was rightly substituted by Ruby. As such, the votes for Ramon cannot be considered as stray votes but should be counted in favor of Ruby since the substituted and the substitute carry the same surname Talaga, as provided in Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006. xxxx Moreover, there is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code or any election laws for that matter which requires that the substitution and the Certificate of Candidacy of the substitute should be approved and given due course first by the Commission or the Law Department before it can be considered as effective. All that Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code as implemented by Section 13 of Resolution No. 8678 requires is that it should be filed with the proper office. The respondent is correct when she argued that in fact even the BEI can receive a CoC of a substitute candidate in case the cause for the substitution happened between the day before the election and mid-day of election day. Thus, even if the approval of the substitution was made after the election, the substitution became effective on the date of the filing of the CoC with the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance. There being no irregularity in the substitution by Ruby of Ramon as candidate for mayor of Lucena City, the counting of the votes of Ramon in favor of Ruby is proper. The proclamation, thus, of Ruby as mayor elect of Lucena City is in order. Hence, we find no cogent reason to annul the proclamation of respondent Barbara Ruby C. Talaga as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Lucena after the elections conducted on May 10, 2010.25 Acting on Castillo and Alcalas respective motions for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed Resolution dated May 20, 2011 reversing the COMELEC Second Divisions ruling.26 Pointing out that: (a) Resolution No. 8917 did not attain finality for being issued without a hearing as a mere incident of the COMELECs ministerial duty to receive the COCs of substitute candidates; (b) Resolution No. 8917 was based on the wrong facts; and (c) Ramons disqualification was resolved with finality only on May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc concluded that Barbara Ruby could not have properly substituted Ramon but had simply become an additional candidate who had filed her COC out of time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala should succeed to the position pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code (LGC).27 Issues

The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband. Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among the contending parties should assume the contested elective position. Ruling The petitions lack merit. 1. Existence of a valid CoC sine qua non for a valid substitution is a condition

statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated. Accordingly, a persons declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render the person making the declaration a valid or official candidate. There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court differentiated the two remedies in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, 30 thuswise: x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.31 Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact of a candidates permanent residency in another country when that fact affects the residency requirement of a candidate) are separate and distinct from the grounds for the cancellation of or denying due course to a COC (i.e., nuisance candidates under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code; and material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code), the Court has recognized in Miranda v. Abaya32 that the following circumstances may result from the granting of the petitions, to wit: (1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid CoC; (2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not have filed a valid CoC; and (3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied due course or cancelled. In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies, or withdraws his CoC before the elections, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides the option of substitution, to wit: Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died,

The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit: Section 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code specifies the contents of a COC, viz: Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. x x x The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit for filing them are, namely: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days prior to the regular election, the candidates from among whom they are to make the choice; and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. If the law does not confine to the duly-registered candidates the choice by the voters, there may be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes may be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election. 28 Moreover, according to Sinaca v. Mula,29 the CoC is: x x x in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidates political creed or lack of political creed. It is a

withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission. Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted. Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy,33 there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.34 Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code.35 2. Declaration of Ramons rendered his CoC invalid; hence, a valid candidate to be properly substituted disqualification he was not

the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. Castillos petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) Ramon made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a material matter that would affect the substantive right of Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (c) Ramon made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible.37 The petition expressly challenged Ramons eligibility for public office based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and the Local Government Code against any person serving three consecutive terms, and specifically prayed that "the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent Ramon be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate." 38 The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false.39 A petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC that is short of the requirements will not be granted. In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,40 the Court stressed that there must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead, thus: The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or confused with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under the two sections are different, for they are based on different grounds, and can result in different eventualities.41 A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a person who has not filed a CoC.42 Miranda v. Abaya43 has clarified that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate.1wphi1

In the light of the foregoing rules on the CoC, the Court concurs with the conclusion of the COMELEC En Banc that the Castillo petition in SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v. Commission on Elections:36 Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of

To be sure, the cause of Ramons ineligibility (i.e., the three -term limit) is enforced both by the Constitution and statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for all elective local officials, to wit: Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. (Emphasis supplied.) The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office." The Court underscored this objective in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,44 stating: x x x The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it. To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made his situation even worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the nuisance candidate may remain eligible despite cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of due course to the CoC pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.45 Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC.46 That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELECs declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.

We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As Miranda v. Abaya aptly put it: Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non. All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.47 (Emphasis supplied) 3. Granting without any qualification of petition in SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELECs intention to declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC That the COMELEC made no express finding that Ramon committed any deliberate misrepresentation in his CoC was of little consequence in the determination of whether his CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. In Miranda v. Abaya,48 the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given due course and/or cancelled." The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced in apparent contradiction that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Mirandas CoC. The Court explained: The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and cancelled. The Court rules that it was. Private respondents petition in SPA No. 98 -019 specifically prayed for the following: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled. Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.) In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the Comelec ruled favorably in the following manner: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections. SO ORDERED. (p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.) From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. x x x.49 xxxx x x x. There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda (Rollo, pp. 26-31). There is likewise no question that the said petition was GRANTED without any qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the Comelec granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course and cancelled. x x x.50 The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of cancelling or denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to any qualification. Miranda v. Abaya applies herein. Although Castillos petition in SPA No. 09-029 (DC) specifically sought both the disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to or cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC categorically stated in the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 that it was granting the petition. Despite the COMELEC making no finding of material misrepresentation on the part of Ramon, its granting of Castillos petition without express qualifications manifested that the COMELEC had cancelled Ramons CoC based on his apparent ineligibility. The Resolution dated April 19, 2010 became final and executory because Castillo did not move for its reconsideration, and because Ramon later withdrew his motion for reconsideration filed in relation to it. 4.

Elected Vice Mayor must and assume the position of due to a permanent vacancy in the office

succeed Mayor

On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits that the doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections51 should not apply to him because Ramons disqualification became final prior to the elections. 52 Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on Elections,53 where the Court said: x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment declaring the candidates disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition the disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case. Thus, in Labo, Labos disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayats candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections. The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states: Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added) Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6. The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The

Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayats favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palilengs proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none. 54 Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that he was entitled to assume the position of Mayor of Lucena City for having obtained the highest number of votes among the remaining qualified candidates. It would seem, then, that the date of the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Ramon disqualified is decisive. According to Section 10, Rule 19 of the COMELECs Resolution No. 8804, 55 a decision or resolution of a Division becomes final and executory after the lapse of five days following its promulgation unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. Under Section 8, Rule 20 of Resolution No. 8804, the decision of the COMELEC En Banc becomes final and executory five days after its promulgation and receipt of notice by the parties. The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified through its Resolution dated April 19, 2010, the copy of which Ramon received on the same date.56 Ramon filed a motion for reconsideration on April 21, 201057 in accordance with Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696,58 but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010,59ostensibly to allow his substitution by Barbara Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not file any motion for reconsideration. Such circumstances indicated that there was no more pending matter that could have effectively suspended the finality of the ruling in due course. Hence, the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 could be said to have attained finality upon the lapse of five days from its promulgation and receipt of it by the parties. This happened probably on April 24, 2010. Despite such finality, the COMELEC En Banc continued to act on the withdrawal by Ramon of his motion for reconsideration through the May 5, 2010 Resolution declaring the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division final and executory. Yet, we cannot agree with Castillos assertion that with Ramons disqualification becoming final prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the ruling in Cayat was applicable in his favor. Barbara Rubys filing of her CoC in substitution of Ramon significantly differentiated this case from the factual circumstances obtaining in Cayat. Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified on April 17, 2004, and his disqualification became final before the May 10, 2004 elections. Considering that no substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., his rival, remained the only candidate for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. In contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded by the electorate of Lucena City as a bona fide candidate. To the electorate, she became a contender for the same position vied for by Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillos claim of being the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, and of being consequently entitled to assume the office of Mayor.

Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer.1wphi1 Labo, Jr. should be applied. There, the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office could not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was "not the choice of the sovereign will." 60 Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated candidate could not be deemed elected to the office.61 There was to be no question that the second placer lost in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the vacated position.62 No law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their representative.63 The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidates disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.64Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected.65 But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact of Barbara Rubys ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the decisions. On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Ramons ineligibility. Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate.66 A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:67 Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases; AFFIRMS the Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 by the COMELEC En Banc; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195229

October 9, 2012 TEA, Petitioner, vs. and ESTELA D.

position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in May 10, 2010 elections. SO ORDERED.8 Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Raymond C. Viray of Branch 75, Olongapo City on 5 July 2010.9 On the same date, Aratea wrote the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanidas disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion No. 117, S. 2010 10 stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanidas disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was deemed permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELECs resolution of Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration. In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response dated 24 August 2010, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the [COMELEC]." 11 On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution12 disqualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bancs resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; andsecond, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prisin correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisin mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People,13before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. Pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read: Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Lonzanida, for having served as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three (3) consecutive terms and for having been convicted by a final judgment of a crime punishable by more than one (1) year of imprisonment, is clearly disqualified to run for the same position in the May 2010 Elections. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.14

EFREN RACEL ARA COMMISSiON ON ELECTIONS ANTlPOLO, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari1 seeking to review and nullify the Resolution2 dated 2 February 2011 and the Order3 dated 12 January 2011 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo v. Romeo D. Lonzanida, docketed as SPA No. 09-158 (DC). The petition asserts that the COMELEC issued the Resolution and Order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Facts Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. 4 On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution5 and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code6 both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution7 on 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy. Pertinent portions of the 18 February 2010 Resolution read: Respondent Lonzanida never denied having held the office of mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than nine consecutive years. Instead he raised arguments to forestall or dismiss the petition on the grounds other than the main issue itself. We find such arguments as wanting. Respondent Lonzanida, for holding the office of mayor for more than three consecutive terms, went against the three-term limit rule; therefore, he could not be allowed to run anew in the 2010 elections. It is time to infuse new blood in the political arena of San Antonio. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent Romeo D. Lonzanida for the position of mayor in the municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is hereby CANCELLED. His name is hereby ordered STRICKEN OFF the list of Official Candidates for the

On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention.15She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 elections. In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who received the second highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since Lonzanidas disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanidas subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by Section 4416 of the Local Government Code to succeed as Mayor. The COMELECs Rulings The COMELEC En Banc issued an Order dated 12 January 2011, stating: Acting on the "Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention" filed by Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) and pursuant to the power of this Commission to suspend its Rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice, this Commission hereby RESOLVES to: 1. GRANT the aforesaid Motion; 2. ADMIT the Petition-in-Intervention filed by Antipolo; 3. REQUIRE the Respondent, ROMEO DUMLAO LONZANIDA, as well as EFREN RACEL ARATEA, proclaimed Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, to file their respective Comments on the Petition-in- Intervention within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt thereof; 4. SET the above-mentioned Petition-in-Intervention for hearing on January 26, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. COMELEC Session Hall, 8th Floor, Palacio del Gobernador, Intramuros, Manila. WHEREFORE, furnish copies hereof the parties for their information and compliance. SO ORDERED.
17

The teachings in the cases of Codilla vs. De Venecia and Nazareno and Domino vs. COMELEC, et al., while they remain sound jurisprudence find no application in the case at bar. What sets this case apart from the cited jurisprudence is that the notoriety of Lonzanidas disqualification and ineligibility to hold public office is established both in fact and in law on election day itself. Hence, Lonzanidas name, as already ordered by the Commission on February 18, 2010 should have been stricken off from the list of official candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission hereby: 1. Declares NULL and VOID the proclamation of respondent ROMEO D. LONZANIDA; 2. GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela D. Antipolo; 3. Orders the immediate CONSTITUTION of a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to PROCLAIM Intervenor Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales; 4. Orders Vice-Mayor Efren Racel Aratea to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor, and to cause a peaceful turn-over of the said office to Antipolo upon her proclamation; and 5. Orders the Office of the Executive Director as well as the Regional Election Director of Region III to cause the implementation of this Resolution and disseminate it to the Department of Interior and Local Government. SO ORDERED.19 Aratea filed the present petition on 9 February 2011. The Issues The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of Lonzanidas removal. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. The dissenting opinions reverse the COMELECs 2 February 2011 Resolution and 12 January 2011 Order. They hold that Aratea, the duly elected Vice-Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, should be declared Mayor pursuant to the Local Government Codes rule on succession. The dissenting opinions make three grave errors: first, they ignore prevailing jurisprudence that a false representation in the certificate of candidacy as to eligibility in the number of terms elected and served is a material fact that is a ground for a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; second, they ignore that a false representation as to eligibility to run for public office due to the fact that the candidate suffers from perpetual special disqualification is a material fact that is a ground for a petition to

In its Resolution dated 2 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc no longer considered Lonzanidas qualification as an issue: "It is beyond cavil that Lonzanida is not eligible to hold and discharge the functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. The sole issue to be resolved at this juncture is how to fill the vacancy resulting from Lonzanidas disqualification." 18 The Resolution further stated: We cannot sustain the submission of Oppositor Aratea that Intervenor Antipolo could never be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Antipolo [sic] for being a second placer in the elections.

cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78; and third, they resort to a strained statutory construction to conclude that the violation of the three-term limit rule cannot be a ground for cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, even when it is clear and plain that violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility affecting the qualification of a candidate to elective office. The dissenting opinions tread on dangerous ground when they assert that a candidates eligibility to the office he seeks election must be strictly construed to refer only to the details, i.e., age, citizenship, or residency, among others, which the law requires him to state in his COC, and which he must swear under oath to possess. The dissenting opinions choose to view a false certification of a candidates eligibility on the three-term limit rule not as a ground for false material representation under Section 78 but as a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the same Code. This is clearly contrary to well-established jurisprudence. The Courts Ruling We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor. Qualifications and Disqualifications Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points to the Local Government Code for the qualifications of elective local officials. Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39 and Section 40 of the Local Government Code provide in pertinent part: Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province x x x; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. xxxx (c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day. xxxx Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad; (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis supplied) Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Sec. 12. Disqualification. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude , shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied) The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code are specifically enumerated: Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6 , shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis supplied) A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country." 20 All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that would justify

including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,21 this Court ruled: [T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. x x x Clearly, the violation by Lonzanida of the three-term limit rule, or his conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, does not constitute a ground for a petition under Section 68. False Material Representation Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy : Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied) Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the certificate of candidacy: Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections was thus required to provide 12 items of information in the certificate of candidacy:22 name; nickname or stage name; gender; age; place of birth; political party that nominated the candidate; civil status; residence/address; profession or occupation; post office address for

election purposes; locality of which the candidate is a registered voter; and period of residence in the Philippines before 10 May 2010. The candidate also certifies four statements: a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen; a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; a statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and a statement of the candidates allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.23 The certificate of candidacy should also be under oath, and filed within the period prescribed by law. The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office . This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. x x x Prisin mayor and temporary disqualification . The duration of the penalties of prisin mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty . xxxx Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects: 1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election. 2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office . 3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned. In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence. 4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held. Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. The penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following effects: 1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.

2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification. Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage . The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office.Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification. Art. 42. Prisin mayor Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prision mayor shall carry with it that oftemporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied) The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,24 the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office. The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisin mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification, which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run. In Lacuna v. Abes (Lacuna),25 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification: On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellees conviction of a crime penalized with prision mayor which carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment. The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 October 1961.

But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually , as distinguished from temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised Penal Code, provides: Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage . The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of disqualification. The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" which means according to whether the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually. The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time the judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 . 26 Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of

candidacy. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections,27 the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility. One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes afalse material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this Court explained inFermin: Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.28 (Emphasis supplied) Latasa, Rivera and Ong: The Three-Term Limit Rule as a Ground for Ineligibility Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is eligible for the public office he seeks election. Thus, Section 74 states that " the certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing x x x is eligible for said office. The three-term limit rule, enacted to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and to enhance the electorates freedom of choice,29 is found both in the Constitution30 and the law.31 After being elected and serving for three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for the same office in the next regular election32 because he is ineligible. One who has an ineligibility to run for elective public office is not "eligible for [the] office." As used in Section 74, the word "eligible" 33 means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for the public office. In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,34 petitioner Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995, and 1998. The Municipality of Digos was converted into the City of Digos during Latasas third term. Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. Romeo Sunga, Latasas opponent, filed before the COMELEC a "petition to deny due course, cancel certificate of candidacy and/or disqualification" under Section 78 on the ground that Latasa falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City. Latasa argued that he did not make any

false representation. In his certificate of candidacy, Latasa inserted a footnote after the phrase "I am eligible" and indicated " *Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the first time as city mayor." The COMELEC First Division cancelled Latasas certificate of candidacy for violation of the three term limit rule but not for false material representation. This Court affirmed the COMELEC En Bancs denial of Latasas motion for reconsideration. We cancelled Marino Morales certificate of candidacy in Rivera III v. Commission on Elections (Rivera).35 We held that Morales exceeded the maximum three-term limit, having been elected and served as Mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms (1995 to 1998, 1998 to 2001, 2001 to 2004, and 2004 to 2007). We declared him ineligible as a candidate for the same position for the 2007 to 2010 term. Although we did not explicitly rule that Morales violation of the three-term limit rule constituted false material representation, we nonetheless granted the petition to cancel Morales certificate of candidacy under Section 78. We also affirmed the cancellation of Francis Ongs certificate of candidacy in Ong v. Alegre,36 where the "petition to disqualify, deny due course and cancel" Ongs certificate of candidacy under Section 78 was predicated on the violation of the three-term limit rule. Loong, Fermin and Munder: When Possession of a Disqualifying is Not a Ground for a Petition for Disqualification Condition

It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the grounds for eligibility and ineligibility vis-vis qualifications and disqualifications. For example, a candidate may represent that he is a resident of a particular Philippine locality37 when he is actually a permanent resident of another country.38 In cases of such overlap, the petitioner should not be constrained in his choice of remedy when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly makes available multiple remedies.39 Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy before the election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the election. Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification using grounds enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinction between a petition under Section 68 and a petition under Section 78 was discussed in Loong v. Commission on Elections40 with respect to the applicable prescriptive period. Respondent Nur Hussein Ututalum filed a petition under Section 78 to disqualify petitioner Benjamin Loong for the office of Regional Vice-Governor of the Autonomous Government of Muslim Mindanao for false representation as to his age. The petition was filed 16 days after the election, and clearly beyond the prescribed 25 day period from the last day of filing certificates of candidacy. This Court ruled that Ututalums petition was one based on false representation under Section 78, and not for disqualification under Section 68. Hence, the 25-day prescriptive period provided in

Section 78 should be strictly applied. We recognized the possible gap in the law: It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification of the candidate committing the misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which, according to it, is unnecessary and should be remedied. At the same time, it can not be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative branch of the government to fix a definite time within which petitions of protests related to eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed, as seen in Sections 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission may have seen the need to remedy this so-called procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribe what the law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether the time to file these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide and remedy.41 In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,42 the issue of a candidates possession of the required one-year residency requirement was raised in a petition for disqualification under Section 68 instead of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Despite the question of the one-year residency being a proper ground under Section 78, Dilangalen, the petitioner before the COMELEC in Fermin, relied on Section 5(C)(1) and 5(C)(3)(a)(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 43 and filed the petition under Section 68. In Fermin, we ruled that "a COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary legislative enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds."44 A petition for disqualification can only be premised on a ground specified in Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. Thus, a petition questioning a candidates possession of the required one -year residency requirement, as distinguished from permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country, should be filed under Section 78, and a petition under Section 68 is the wrong remedy. In Munder v. Commission on Elections,45 petitioner Alfais Munder filed a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur on 26 November 2009. Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip filed a petition for Munders disqualification on 13 April 2010. Sarip claimed that Munder misrepresented that he was a registered voter of Bubong,

Lanao del Sur, and that he was eligible to register as a voter in 2003 even though he was not yet 18 years of age at the time of the voters registration. Moreover, Munders certificate of candidacy was not accomplished in full as he failed to indicate his precinct and did not affix his thumb-mark. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed Sarips petition and declared that his grounds are not grounds for disqualification under Section 68 but for denial or cancellation of Munders certificate of candidacy under Section 78. Sarips petition was filed out of time as he had only 25 days after the filing of Munders certificate of candidacy, or until 21 December 2009, within which to file his petition. The COMELEC En Banc, however, disqualified Munder. In reversing the COMELEC Second Division, the COMELEC En Banc did not rule on the propriety of Sarips remedy but focused on the question of whether Munder was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. This Court reinstated the COMELEC Second Divisions resolution. This Court ruled that the ground raised in the petition, lack of registration as voter in the locality where he was running as a candidate, is inappropriate for a petition for disqualification. We further declared that with our ruling in Fermin, we had already rejected the claim that lack of substantive qualifications of a candidate is a ground for a petition for disqualification under Section 68. The only substantive qualification the absence of which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 is the candidates permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country. The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification under Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars him from running for public office despite the possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the [Local Government Code]." In so holding the dissenting opinions write in the law what is not found in the law. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification under said Section. The grounds for filing a petition for disqualification under Section 68 are specifically enumerated in said Section. However, contrary to the specific enumeration in Section 68 and contrary to prevailing jurisprudence, the dissenting opinions add to the enumerated grounds the violation of the three-term limit rule and falsification under the Revised Penal Code, which are obviously not found in the enumeration in Section 68. The dissenting opinions equate Lonzanidas possession of a disqualifying condition (violation of the three-term limit rule) with the grounds for disqualification under Section 68. Section 68 is explicit as to the proper grounds for disqualification: the commission of specific prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code and possession of a permanent residency or immigrant status in a foreign country. Any other false representation regarding a material fact should be filed under Section 78, specifically under the candidates certification of his eligibility. In rejecting a violation of the three-term limit as a condition for eligibility, the dissenting opinions resort to judicial legislation, ignoring the verba legis doctrine and well-established jurisprudence on this very issue. In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under oath his eligibility, and thus qualification, to the office he seeks

election. Even though the certificate of candidacy does not specifically ask the candidate for the number of terms elected and served in an elective position, such fact is material in determining a candidates eligibility, and thus qualification for the office. Election to and service of the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the succeeding elections. Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because he knew full well that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three consecutive terms yet he still certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding term. Thus, Lonzanidas representation that he was eligible for the office that he sought election constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or eligibility for the office. Legal Duty of to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification COMELEC

fiat on the three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day, respondent Lonzanidas disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. 48 (Boldfacing and underscoring in the original; italicization supplied) Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor.1wphi1Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who therefore received the highest number of votes. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 2 February 2011 and the Order dated 12 January 2011 of the COMELEC En Bane in SPA No. 09-158 (DC) are AFFIRMED. The COMELEC En Bane isDIRECTED to constitute a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner Efren Racel Aratea is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. SO ORDERED.

Even without a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law. Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to " enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."46 The disqualification of a convict to run for elective public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of theenforcement and administration of "all the laws" relating to the conduct of elections. Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.47 We quote from the COMELECs 2 February 2011 Resolution with approval: As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second Division had already ordered the cancellation of Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy, and had stricken off his name in the list of official candidates for the mayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the Commission En Banc in its resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously affirmed the resolution disqualifying Lonzanida. Our findings were likewise sustained by the Supreme Court no less. The disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground. On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En Banc resolution that Lonzanidas disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional